I argue that Christian thinkers should adopt Divine Humeanism as the favored conception of physical laws for unifying their theological, physical, and metaphysical beliefs. In addition to biblical coherence and intelligibility, Divine Humeanism offers a precise definition of miracles that captures all relevant intuitions and explains the metaphysical relationship between natural and supernatural events. Christians should abandon the belief that nature is governed by laws that maintain nature unless God intervenes. Instead, they should believe that God is always volitionally controlling each individual spacetime point, always attentively involved in the happenings of His creation and never disengaged. Miracles are not abrupt interventions but rather deviations from how God typically interacts with nature. With God intentionally directing each spacetime point of reality in predictable patterns, Christians can believe that the past will resemble the future. This makes it possible to have propositional and doxastic justification for using induction and forming inductive inferences.

What does friendship demand from us? Some philosophers argue that it demands epistemic partiality; others argue that it demands epistemic objectivity. I say, “Why not both?” In this thesis, I propose a new model of friendship to argue that neither epistemic partiality nor epistemic objectivity is a constitutive demand of friendship. Instead, I suggest that friendship constitutively demands that you care for your friend, and whether you ought to be partial or objective depends on which option allows you to best fulfil this “Care Demand.” Since the way you care for your friend varies across contexts, whether you ought to be partial or objective will also vary. Philosophers have raised the concern that, in demanding epistemic partiality, friendship requires irrationality. My argument raises the stakes: if epistemic partiality stems from care, then any relationship that demands care would potentially require irrationality.

This thesis examines the moral psychology and normative significance of two common but distinct forms of evaluative failure: akrasia and hypocrisy. Specifically, it examines deceptive-blaming hypocrisy: hypocrisy categorized by an agent who knowingly misrepresents her genuine moral beliefs in public by professing to hold beliefs she does not sincerely endorse, while simultaneously blaming others for violating those exact beliefs, all in pursuit of some form of personal, social, or reputational gain. Akrasia and hypocrisy are widely accepted as two distinctive vices, given the multifarious differences in the conditions for each. Despite their distinctive characters, cases of akrasia often elicit the same reactive attitudes of contempt, frustration, and repugnance that cases of hypocrisy typically elicit. Why? The central claim defended is as follows: although moral akrasia and deceptive-blaming hypocrisy are conceptually distinct, these moral failings exhibit striking structural similarities with one another. In Chapter 1, I lay out existing accounts of akrasia and hypocrisy, broadly conceived, and explain what is morally problematic about each of these two vices. I then discuss the distinction between the two. Chapter 2 follows with a five-part account of the structural parallels between akrasia and hypocrisy which includes: normative dissonance, the erosion of the normative credibility of moral claims, damage to moral integrity, weakening of moral reputation, and susceptibility to rationalization. It should be noted that while the thesis draws upon select empirical findings—particularly in this chapter regarding rationalization, norm erosion, and audience perception—it does not purport to offer a comprehensive empirical account of these phenomena. Rather, its primary aim is interpretive and normative. In doing so, I take some empirical claims for granted. I end with chapter 3 that explains why we take agents of this kind to be especially repugnant, namely that they undermine important values deeply tied to our moral lives and personal characters: integrity, seriousness, coherence, and commitment. I end with a discussion of what our valuing of these four ideals says about how we might want to rethink our theory of moral value and assessment, and accordingly, the ethical theories we follow.

In this paper, I discuss the duties of end-of-life care through the case study of idiopathic pulmonary fibrosis, a rare lung disease. I employ Allen Wood's intermediate premise framework and Kant's Formula of Humanity to identify the duty to palliative care and terminate treatment upon patient request, while concluding, surprisingly, that healthcare providers do not have a positive duty to provide efficacy-driven treatment in end-of-life settings. I also discuss the importance of consent in end-of-life care and proxy consent to safeguard patient humanity and autonomy.