Philosophy, 1924-2026

Motivated by its critical relevance, this thesis concerns itself with the issue of attention. Through phenomenological study, it seeks to understand what it is to consciously attend to something, or rather what it is like to do so. I begin by justifying an account of attention as the structuring of conscious experiences through peripheral relations around a focal center (Sebastian Watzl’s Structuralism). Yet, revisiting Husserl’s early manuscripts, I argue that this account renders attention static and neglects its phenomenologically intuitive dynamism: a turning-toward motion that results from an interplay of pulling forces we experience. In response, I propose Field-Theoretic Structuralism. The framework adds a primitive of structural relation — depth — that spatializes the attentional structure as a three-dimensional manifold permeated by a gravitational-like force field. Phenomenal objects acquire a weight and exert pulls on the attentional space that impact how contents are structured, while the subject’s volition to sustain focus acts as a resisting force that maintains intended structural relations. To conclude, I detail how attention is to be thought of as a continuous configuration of conscious experiences in a relativistic space of competing force fields and I explore the limitations and scalability of the latter to account for more complex factors influencing attentional dynamics. The thesis forwards a unified, phenomenologically grounded model of attention and a conceptual tool for examining how attention is shaped and contested in our present day.

This thesis examines the relationship between surveillance capitalism and political freedom. Drawing on Shoshana Zuboff's analysis of behavioral data extraction and predictive markets, the paper argues that contemporary digital economies are structured around reducing uncertainty in human behavior. While these systems are often framed as technological innovations that are for society’s benefit, this paper argues that deeper political concerns are at stake. Using Hannah Arendt's account of action and freedom as the primary normative framework, the thesis holds that meaningful political freedom depends on the human capacity to initiate action in a common world that is not wholly pre-shaped by predictive systems. Political action, as Arendt describes it, must be capable of genuine novelty. It must be capable of introducing something new into a shared public space. Under surveillance capitalism, however, the conditions necessary for this kind of action are gradually eroded. The system does not eliminate political freedom outright. Rather, it progressively reshapes the environment in which freedom is exercised, narrowing the space where unscripted political initiatives can take shape. The argument is developed through a defense of three premises connecting the reduction of unscripted action, the undermining of meaningful political action, and the logic of surveillance-capitalist rationality. The paper also situates this argument within broader debates in political philosophy, engages with liberal and republican conceptions of freedom, and responds to objections concerning the novelty of surveillance capitalism and the compatibility of predictive technologies with political agency.

This thesis examines what risk attitude decision-makers ought to adopt when making decisions on behalf of others and applies this normative framework to policymakers regulating emerging technologies. Specifically, I survey cases of therapeutic applications of artificial intelligence (AI) because this technology possesses great potential for both real benefits and harms. I argue that when patients’ risk attitudes are known, a deferential approach is the only normatively appropriate response. When patients’ risk attitudes are unknown, the appropriate approach depends on the number of people affected and the frequency of choice. For low-frequency decisions, I argue that a permissive approach may be taken by the decision-maker when acting on the behalf of few people, but avoiding risk is required when acting on the behalf of many. For high-frequency decisions, decision-makers must maximize expected utility. Drawing on decision theory and the philosophical literature on risk, I develop a context-sensitive framework that offers practical guidance for policymakers navigating these decisions. While regulating emerging technology is undeniably difficult, this thesis argues that policymakers need not consider these decisions as categorically different from the perspective of risk attitudes.

Breakthroughs in genetic editing technology have prompted scientists, philosophers, and parents alike to consider the ethics of genetically modifying our children. It is theoretically possible to edit the genetic material of a human embryo during the process of in vitro fertilization, enabling parents to correct genetic diseases or enhance desirable traits. Discussions about the ethics of embryonic genetic engineering (EGE) often focus on its high costs and risks, the known and unknown consequences of interfering with the human germline, and the sacredness (or lack thereof) of human nature. In this paper, I propose a different type of ethical objection to EGE—one that appeals to individual autonomy. Genetically modifying embryos would be fundamentally altering the bodies, lives, and functioning of (future) people without their consent. Unless absolutely necessary, imposing such an intrusive intervention on our (future) children would be a violation of their autonomy.

The antinomies in the Critique of Pure Reason are what apparently first turned Kant towards transcendental idealism. They are four sets of seemingly contradictory thesis and antithesis which, when one assumes realism, can both be proven equally plausibly. The realist is said to fall into these contradictions unavoidably, yet the transcendental idealist can resolve the contradiction. The antinomies are thus also an indirect proof for transcendental idealism. I argue in this thesis that Kant’s indirect proof in the Antinomies chapter is successful. In doing so, I analyze the second antinomy—concerning composition and mereology—and argue that both the thesis and antithesis proofs are sound. I then present and argue against two readings of the antinomies which explain their unavoidability in (i) Kant’s doctrine of transcendental illusion and (ii) the interests of practical reason. I conclude by giving my own solution to the problem which argues that there are two notions of unavoidability and that the ‘Supreme Principle of Pure Reason’ is merely a description of the necessary conditions of realism. The indirect proof thus succeeds.

This thesis probes what it means to have a genuine friendship in an age where people are increasingly using AI chatbots for social purposes. I first establish core characteristics of friendship based on existing leading accounts of friendship, and I compare friendship to other relationships, namely companionship and acquaintanceship. I then introduce the term frAIndship, or a social relationship with an AI chatbot. After reviewing existing accounts of frAIndship, I argue that what distinguishes friendship from frAIndship is sentience, something largely overlooked in the existing literature. Sentience in both parties is necessary for friendship. With sentience as a foundational building block, I build a chain of necessary requirements for friendship. Finally, I briefly examine the impact of frAIndship in society today.

This thesis argues that the Attention Schema Theory (AST), first proposed by Michael Graziano, is the most promising framework for approaching the possibility of conscious AI. The argument proceeds in three stages. The first stage examines the philosophical challenges posed by David Chalmers’ hard problem of consciousness and John Searle’s biological naturalism; both constrain but do not rule out the possibility of conscious AI. The next stage situates the AST within the landscape of informational theories of consciousness to which it belongs. This landscape includes the Global Workspace Theory (GWT) and the Integrated Information Theory (IIT). I argue that the AST’s specificity about the attention schema as an internal model of attention gives it an advantage over these other theories that it shares features with. This prepares the argument for the third stage, which applies the requirements of the AST for consciousness to BabyX, a neurobotic agent developed by Alistair Knott, Mark Sagar, and Martin Takac. The thesis concludes that the AST provides specific and testable criteria for attributing consciousness to AI systems, and that the proximity of AI systems to satisfying these requirements makes ethical considerations about these systems an urgent priority.