Knowing Better, Doing Worse: Moral Masquerading in Akrasia and Hypocrisy

Abstract

This thesis examines the moral psychology and normative significance of two common but distinct forms of evaluative failure: akrasia and hypocrisy. Specifically, it examines deceptive-blaming hypocrisy: hypocrisy categorized by an agent who knowingly misrepresents her genuine moral beliefs in public by professing to hold beliefs she does not sincerely endorse, while simultaneously blaming others for violating those exact beliefs, all in pursuit of some form of personal, social, or reputational gain. Akrasia and hypocrisy are widely accepted as two distinctive vices, given the multifarious differences in the conditions for each. Despite their distinctive characters, cases of akrasia often elicit the same reactive attitudes of contempt, frustration, and repugnance that cases of hypocrisy typically elicit. Why? The central claim defended is as follows: although moral akrasia and deceptive-blaming hypocrisy are conceptually distinct, these moral failings exhibit striking structural similarities with one another. In Chapter 1, I lay out existing accounts of akrasia and hypocrisy, broadly conceived, and explain what is morally problematic about each of these two vices. I then discuss the distinction between the two. Chapter 2 follows with a five-part account of the structural parallels between akrasia and hypocrisy which includes: normative dissonance, the erosion of the normative credibility of moral claims, damage to moral integrity, weakening of moral reputation, and susceptibility to rationalization. It should be noted that while the thesis draws upon select empirical findings—particularly in this chapter regarding rationalization, norm erosion, and audience perception—it does not purport to offer a comprehensive empirical account of these phenomena. Rather, its primary aim is interpretive and normative. In doing so, I take some empirical claims for granted. I end with chapter 3 that explains why we take agents of this kind to be especially repugnant, namely that they undermine important values deeply tied to our moral lives and personal characters: integrity, seriousness, coherence, and commitment. I end with a discussion of what our valuing of these four ideals says about how we might want to rethink our theory of moral value and assessment, and accordingly, the ethical theories we follow.