EPISTEMIC PARTIALITY AND THE DEMANDS OF FRIENDSHIP

Abstract

What does friendship demand from us? Some philosophers argue that it demands epistemic partiality; others argue that it demands epistemic objectivity. I say, “Why not both?” In this thesis, I propose a new model of friendship to argue that neither epistemic partiality nor epistemic objectivity is a constitutive demand of friendship. Instead, I suggest that friendship constitutively demands that you care for your friend, and whether you ought to be partial or objective depends on which option allows you to best fulfil this “Care Demand.” Since the way you care for your friend varies across contexts, whether you ought to be partial or objective will also vary. Philosophers have raised the concern that, in demanding epistemic partiality, friendship requires irrationality. My argument raises the stakes: if epistemic partiality stems from care, then any relationship that demands care would potentially require irrationality.