A Fervor to Arms: The Impact of External Pressures on Defense Industrial Integration in the European Union

Abstract

Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine has shocked the European security landscape, particularly the European defense industry. This thesis evaluates how this change in the international geopolitical order has shaped national preferences for defense industrial integration within the European Union (EU). Drawing on existing integration and defense industry literature, it considers three possible outcomes of this external shock on preferences for defense industrial integration: increased delegation of competence from the Member States to the European Union, increased preference for intergovernmental coordination but not change of competence, or the continuance of the status quo. To examine the effects of the invasion on Member State preferences, this thesis focuses on the supply (production and exports) and demand (procurement and imports) sides of the European defense industry. Ultimately, it demonstrates that Member States prefer increased intergovernmental coordination on defense industrial issues. In an additional application of the external shock framework, the thesis also finds that the second Trump administration, and resultant turmoil in the trans-Atlantic relations, has further generated a preference for increased intergovernmental coordination but with greater impetus and urgency than previously observed.