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On the Problem of Moral Supervenience for Moral Non-Naturalism

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dc.contributor.advisorRosen, Gideon
dc.contributor.authorBranch, Clair
dc.date.accessioned2014-07-17T14:48:47Z
dc.date.accessioned2026-09-30T00:07:32Z
dc.date.available2014-07-17T14:48:47Z
dc.date.available2026-09-30T00:07:32Z
dc.date.created2014-03-31
dc.date.issued2014-07-17
dc.description.abstractMoral supervenience states that no two entities can share all their natural properties without possessing the same moral properties. I argue that non-reductive naturalists cannot explain the truth of moral supervenience. Given the importance of moral supervenience for any functioning ethical system, this is a reason to reject non-reductive naturalism.en_US
dc.format.extent73en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://arks.princeton.edu/ark:/88435/dsp013b5918750
dc.identifier.urihttps://theses-dissertations.princeton.edu/handle/88435/dsp013b5918750
dc.language.isoen_USen_US
dc.titleOn the Problem of Moral Supervenience for Moral Non-Naturalismen_US
dc.typePrinceton University Senior Theses
dspace.entity.typePublication
pu.date.classyear2014en_US
pu.departmentPhilosophyen_US

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