The Rights of (Future) People: An Autonomy-Based Objection to Embryonic Genetic Engineering

Abstract

Breakthroughs in genetic editing technology have prompted scientists, philosophers, and parents alike to consider the ethics of genetically modifying our children. It is theoretically possible to edit the genetic material of a human embryo during the process of in vitro fertilization, enabling parents to correct genetic diseases or enhance desirable traits. Discussions about the ethics of embryonic genetic engineering (EGE) often focus on its high costs and risks, the known and unknown consequences of interfering with the human germline, and the sacredness (or lack thereof) of human nature. In this paper, I propose a different type of ethical objection to EGE—one that appeals to individual autonomy. Genetically modifying embryos would be fundamentally altering the bodies, lives, and functioning of (future) people without their consent. Unless absolutely necessary, imposing such an intrusive intervention on our (future) children would be a violation of their autonomy.