Kant's Critique of Cosmology

Abstract

The antinomies in the Critique of Pure Reason are what apparently first turned Kant towards transcendental idealism. They are four sets of seemingly contradictory thesis and antithesis which, when one assumes realism, can both be proven equally plausibly. The realist is said to fall into these contradictions unavoidably, yet the transcendental idealist can resolve the contradiction. The antinomies are thus also an indirect proof for transcendental idealism. I argue in this thesis that Kant’s indirect proof in the Antinomies chapter is successful. In doing so, I analyze the second antinomy—concerning composition and mereology—and argue that both the thesis and antithesis proofs are sound. I then present and argue against two readings of the antinomies which explain their unavoidability in (i) Kant’s doctrine of transcendental illusion and (ii) the interests of practical reason. I conclude by giving my own solution to the problem which argues that there are two notions of unavoidability and that the ‘Supreme Principle of Pure Reason’ is merely a description of the necessary conditions of realism. The indirect proof thus succeeds.