Both Germany and the United States maintained consistently high vaccination rates in the decades before COVID-19, yet they achieved this through fundamentally different means. Germany relied on voluntary compliance rooted in institutional trust, while the United States relied on school-entry requirements and legal mandates. These underlying differences were not visible under normal conditions, when both systems produced adequate outcomes. The COVID-19 pandemic exposed them. This thesis argues that the institutional separation of scientific advisory bodies from executive authority is the condition under which voluntary compliance becomes durable, and that embedding health institutions within the executive branch makes partisan collapse not just possible but predictable. Germany’s deliberate separation of scientific advisory bodies—primarily the Robert Koch Institute (RKI) and the Standing Committee on Vaccination (STIKO)—from the executive branch preserved non-partisan institutional credibility under pandemic pressure. Citizens followed guidance not because they were compelled to, but because the institutions issuing it were perceived as scientifically authoritative rather than politically motivated. In the United States, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s (CDC) placement within the executive branch made it structurally impossible for public health guidance to be received as politically neutral once vaccination became associated with a particular administration. The result was a partisan collapse in voluntary compliance that legal mandates could not reverse and likely made worse. The choice between these models is not made during a crisis. It is made years earlier, through decisions about how scientific advisory bodies are structured and insulated from political authority. The cost of getting that choice wrong is paid when voluntary compliance matters most and trust is hardest to rebuild.

This thesis undertakes a sustained philosophical examination of Martin Heidegger’s concept of temporality [Zeitlichkeit] first developed in Being and Time (1927) and traces its development and transformation into Heidegger’s later philosophy of language and poetry. The argument proceeds in the following three veins. The first movement reconstructs Heidegger's existential analytic in Being and Time, showing how temporality constitutes the ontological meaning of care through three ecstases — future, having-been, and present. The second movement follows the Kehre from present ecstasis to presencing, where Heidegger replaces the existential-temporal structure of Dasein with Es gibt and diagnoses Gestell (technological enframing) as the epochal threat to authentic disclosure of Being and language. The third movement reads Heidegger's lecture courses on Hölderlin's Andenken and Der Ister as the site where temporality is enacted in poetic now. The thesis concludes by asking what new understanding of existence, time, and language becomes possible once they are understood not as external frameworks but as the medium through which Being comes to matter originally.