This thesis argues that Kentucky underwent an ideological secession during the Civil War. Rather than identifying a single moment or cause of this departure from the Union, it takes a broader lens and synthesizes previously isolated historical arguments. While Kentucky never officially joined the Confederacy, it resisted federal emancipation efforts, opposed Lincoln’s reelection, and rejected the Thirteenth Amendment, ultimately emerging from the war ideologically estranged from the Union too which it had remained loyal. Building on the work of historians E. Merton Coulter, Gary Matthews, and Jacob Lee, this study examines how Kentucky’s political and cultural identity gradually shifted. Through analysis of local newspapers, diaries, manuscripts, letters, and legislation, this thesis traces the gradual unraveling of Kentucky’s Unionism and argues that its transformation was not a moment, but a process.

The U.S. Naval-era on Guam, characterized as a period in the island's history where the U.S. Navy appointed all-powerful naval governors to rule Guam with little oversight or checks to their power, stretches from 1898 to 1950. The history of the Naval-era on Guam is often presented through a simplified 'binary' history, split between an American presence and the consequences it had on the indigenous CHamoru people. In this senior thesis, I try to take a more multi-faceted approach to the Naval-era on Guam, uncovering splits between Washington, DC and the Naval Governor, alongside the ways power was also negotiated through nuanced lines as class, race, and labor. This thesis then shows that Guam, during the U.S. Naval-era, developed a very complex power structure where surface-level designations were often divorced from the ways identity played out in practice.

In the years preceding the Second World War, many individuals in democratic societies clung to a belief that Nazi Germany’s economic system was weak and would eventually fall apart on its own. From British policymakers to respected contemporary newspaper publications, a popular-held view was that Germany’s militarized economy, supported by policies like self-sufficiency, low wages, and massive rearmament, was unsustainable. This belief helped shape appeasement foreign policies, particularly in Britain, where many voices argued that time itself would defeat the Nazi Party. Rather than confronting this aggressive regime directly, democratic nations often rationalized complacency as the best decision, believing that Germany’s internal economic collapse was both inevitable and imminent. This belief in the collapse of the Nazi economy was not just a random theory held by a few people, it was embedded in British popular opinion, which was reinforced by newspapers’ coverage and diplomatic hesitation. However, this confidence in economic collapse, however politically convenient, was not based on rigorous economic analysis. Two British economists writing in the late 1930s, Thomas Balogh and Claude Guillebaud, challenged this narrative by closely examining the structure, functioning, and short-term stability of the Nazi economy. Drawing on official statistics, financial records, and careful observation based on evidence, both men concluded that the Nazi economic system would not collapse in the near future. Despite the system being authoritarian, oppressive, and morally unacceptable, these economists proved the system to be more durable than most had anticipated. This study examines the works of Balogh and Guillebaud, demonstrating how each addressed and dismantled the assumption that the Nazi economy was facing economic collapse. Rather than viewing Germany’s excessive rearmament efforts as a short-term way to hide economic problems, both economists emphasized the Nazi’s strict control to create jobs, limit spending, prevent inflation, and manage investments. Their writings did not condone the regime but offered a warning. The Nazi economy was not an illusion, it was held together by effective economic planning. While many democratic individuals expected a “gamblers last throw,” these economists warned that such assumptions were false and dangerous. Thomas Balogh and Claude Guillebaud offered a rare but important counterpoint to the dominant beliefs of their time. Their work reveals that the Nazi regime had achieved a degree of short-term economic stability through aggressive state intervention because of their authoritarian nature. By bringing their overlooked analyses into conversation, it demonstrates that the collapse of the Nazi economy was never inevitable, and that the faith in Germany’s failure contributed to costly miscalculations in the years before World War II. Ultimately, this study brings to light the risks of allowing ideological bias to overshadow fact-based analysis when evaluating the strength of authoritarian systems that democracy opposes.