On the Problem of Moral Supervenience for Moral Non-Naturalism

Rosen, GideonBranch, Clair2014-07-172026-09-302014-07-172026-09-302014-03-312014-07-17http://arks.princeton.edu/ark:/88435/dsp013b5918750https://theses-dissertations.princeton.edu/handle/88435/dsp013b5918750Moral supervenience states that no two entities can share all their natural properties without possessing the same moral properties. I argue that non-reductive naturalists cannot explain the truth of moral supervenience. Given the importance of moral supervenience for any functioning ethical system, this is a reason to reject non-reductive naturalism.73en-USOn the Problem of Moral Supervenience for Moral Non-NaturalismPrinceton University Senior Theses