Yariv, LeeatZhang, Aster2024-07-082026-09-292024-07-082026-09-292024-04-142024-07-08http://arks.princeton.edu/ark:/88435/dsp017p88ck90thttps://theses-dissertations.princeton.edu/handle/88435/dsp017p88ck90tThis thesis presents a new model for markets with certification intermediaries, who reveal the true value of an item to uninformed buyers in the market. By characterizing an oligopoly of certifiers and defining item value over multiple dimensions, we show that an oligopoly of certifiers choose an equilibrium which is more seller-optimal and less certifier-optimal than the monopolistic market and which reveals more information to the market. We also characterize outcomes under certifier collusion. Next, we show and quantify the changes in certifier pricing power as buyers' preferences for multiple dimensions become asymmetric. Finally, we show that the entry of a third certifier with stronger information revelation mechanisms significantly captures the profits of the limited-capability certifiers and suggest that in such a market a subgame-perfect equilibrium may not exist or exists only under very limited conditions.application/pdfenPrinceton University Senior Theses