Lorenz, HendrikHarman, ElizabethGarrett, Juliet2015-06-262026-09-302015-06-262026-09-302015-04-062015-06-26http://arks.princeton.edu/ark:/88435/dsp01n009w462khttps://theses-dissertations.princeton.edu/handle/88435/dsp01n009w462kIn this paper, I argue that the relevant space for equality in distributive justice is moral, not physical. Physical inequalities should be governed by a principle of modified sufficientarianism—where everybody has enough but nobody has so much that they violate moral equality between persons. I use the capabilities approach to define enough and too much. Finally, I argue for multiple thresholds of capabilities to ensure both sufficiency and moral equality between persons.53 pagesen-USPrinceton University Senior Theses