Oppenheimer, MichaelNix, PaulPublic and International Affairs Department2024-10-032026-09-302024-10-032026-09-302024-01-012024http://arks.princeton.edu/ark:/88435/dsp011v53k137bhttps://theses-dissertations.princeton.edu/handle/88435/dsp011v53k137bNumerous governance barriers interfere with achieving effective outcomes in climate change adaptation and mitigation. These barriers include the politicization of climate change and insufficient decision-making coordination between public and private stakeholders. U.S. quasi-governmental organizations (QGOs) were traditionally created to address several of these barriers in non-climate change domains. This thesis investigates QGOs’ structure, role, and potential for climate change governance. Firstly, we examine how the design characteristics of subnational U.S. QGOs may be useful for overcoming the politicization and insufficient stakeholder coordination barriers in climate adaptation. We analyze six cases, selected to illustrate the major characteristics of climate-focused and non climate-focused U.S. subnational QGOs. Among those QGOs’ designs, we conclude that some are particularly well suited to overcoming either the politicization or insufficient stakeholder coordination barriers; while some reduce both, albeit to a lesser extent. Secondly, we investigate whether federal U.S. QGOs function in the climate or environmental domains, or whether they can be oriented towards those domains (ce-QGOs). To understand their potential role, we examine their corporate structure, and how emerged historically and fit in to the U.S. governance landscape. We conclude ce-QGOs represent a sizeable proportion (~20%) of federal QGOs; emerged at different periods in time, and more continuously, than government agencies for climate change or environmental governance; were mostly created for environmental purposes, and later added on climate change policies to their work. We suggest ce-QGOs with high public and private stakeholder variation on their boards have unique potential to overcome the insufficient stakeholder coordination barrier, while those with low variation offer little advantage over government agencies. Thirdly, we investigate a case study of a QGO green bank, the Connecticut Green Bank (CGB). We aim to understand how the CGB’s quasi-governmental status may have played a role in its ability to adapt to a budget shock instigated by Connecticut state. To study this adaptation, we use organizational ambidexterity theory. We conclude the CGB adapted financially to the shock, as a result of mission and financial drift away from Connecticut state control. The CGB’s adaptation hinged on its quasi-governmental status, which allowed it to create a spin-off nonprofit.application/pdfenambidexterityclimate change barriersgovernancegreen bankpublic organizationsquasi-governmental organizationsClimate changePublic administrationPolitical scienceAcademic dissertations (Ph.D.)