Two Sides of the Same COIN: An Analysis and Assessment of American Counterinsurgency in Iraq

Abstract

This paper critically analyzes and assesses American counterinsurgency in the Iraq War. This is done for the purpose of analyzing the American military’s ability to adapt to new ways of war. For the COIN case study, the paper analyzes theory, adoption, and application, all through the lens of the military top-down structure. Key lessons from the bottom up are analyzed for their impact on subsequent adaptations. The scope of this thesis is contained to the military in COIN for the years 2003-2008. This thesis is largely a literature review, but it offers key lessons learned to synthesize this conflict for future adaptation. I promote two key themes: the military’s top-down structure is necessary but nuanced, and that irregular warfare expands the military’s scope. To facilitate this increase in scope, the military must adapt its structure to incorporate bottom-up lessons learned. This will allow for a better fighting force. The purpose of this thesis is to offer an in-depth analysis of the Iraq War for the next generation of leaders in the armed forces who are expected to know, understand, synthesize, and lead counterinsurgency operations, among other warfare, in the Nation’s service as part of the Army’s mission.