Friendship, Epistemic Norms, and Belief

Abstract

Certain philosophers like Sarah Stroud and Simon Keller have argued that friendship may require epistemic partiality or irresponsibility in the way we form beliefs about friends. In this paper, I argue that our seemingly differential belief-forming practices towards our friends can actually be explained in ways that remain in line with epistemic norms in contrast to what both Stroud and Keller argue. In particular, I argue that evidentialist principles help explain away many of the differences in how we form beliefs about friends compared to how we form beliefs about strangers. Further, I argue that there is a key distinction between behavior and belief when considering our friends that Stroud and Keller seem to neglect: we may still behave towards our friends in supportive, compassionate ways without thereby being forced to compromise our epistemic ideals. I end by addressing practical concerns for applying the evidentialist perspective in everyday life.