The “Rule of Law” Reform in Contemporary China: An Empirical Examination of Xi’s “Tigers and Flies” Anti-Corruption Campaign and Court Sentencing Outcomes

Abstract

This paper aims to answer two questions: Is Xi’s “Tigers and Flies” anti-corruption campaign a genuine effort to battle corruption or is it more of a political purge? Has legal reform in contemporary China enabled or constrained Xi’s efforts? In answering this question, I bridged a scholarly dialogue between anti-corruption and legal reform in China. I present the anti-corruption drive and legal reform as a two-fold tale: At the elite level, the centralization of judicial power and CCDI power helps Xi strike against “tigers” and serves his political motive of purging factional rivals and diminishing the influence of the elders, thus consolidating his own power; At the “flies” level, however, the examination of court-sentencing results complicates this singular narrative by revealing certain degree of neutrality in the court sentencing results for Party and non-Party members. Taken together, this paper rejects the simple “Turn against Law” argument and sees promises for further rule of law development in China.