Strategic Tradeoffs in the Public Designation of Terrorists: A Reexamination of U.S. Counterterrorism Policy

Abstract

In the 20 years following the attacks of September 11th, United States counterterrorism policy has expanded and evolved to adapt to current needs domestically and abroad, adopting a two-pronged approach to combat terrorism physically and diplomatically through kinetic and non-kinetic (i.e., military and non-combative) means, respectively. Controversy surrounding, and expert consensus on the ineffectiveness of the War on Terror, has shifted U.S. strategies towards the non-kinetic measures. One of the primary non-kinetic resources used by the U.S. is terrorist lists, which aim to undermine terrorist networks by blacklisting terrorist organizations and their actors. Despite the centrality of these lists to U.S. counterterrorism policy, and a large existing body of scholarly research on counterterrorism policy in general, very little empirical research has been conducted on the use of terrorist lists specifically. While the necessity of terrorist lists is widely asserted and accepted in the scholarly and foreign policy community, existing research has failed to weigh the benefits of these lists with their serious potential negative consequences. In order to fill these gaps, this thesis provides a descriptive quantitative analysis of the unintended consequences of terrorist lists. More specifically, I comprehensively examine five of the consequences of terrorist lists that are sorely under researched. These include: the notoriety terrorists gain, the politicization of the lists, the effects of numerous lists, state sponsors of terrorism and the authorities the lists grant. I conclude that the U.S. counterterrorism sector re-examine its terrorist lists and institute a few minor but crucial alterations.