Polarized We Stand: How Institutional Choices Shape the Impact of Polarization on Legislative Effectiveness

Abstract

Polarization is rising rapidly, in Congress and in statehouses across the United States. Most Americans––scholars, pundits, and regular citizens alike––seem to fear that increased polarization among lawmakers inherently harms the legislative process. However, an emerging literature asserts that increased polarization has differing effects on legislative performance depending on different conditions. It emphasizes the role of political factors that are beyond the legislature’s control (i.e. divided government and majority seat share) in conditioning polarization’s effects. This thesis investigates how controllable institutional factors moderate polarization’s impact on legislative effectiveness, which I operationalize using state budgetary delay. I take a mixed methods approach, beginning with a quantitative analysis in which I estimate how institutional factors conditioned polarization’s effect on budgetary delay in 49 states from 1993 to 2010. I develop these findings further with a qualitative case study of New Jersey’s budgetary process from 2002-2008. I find that institutional choices about legislative professionalism, government shutdown provisions, election year frequency, and state fiscal management can interact with polarization to mitigate its pernicious effects. These findings imply that legislatures can take concrete policy steps to minimize the damage wrought by polarization on our legislative process. Legislators can “problem solve” in spite of high polarization. We just need to ensure that the right institutions are in place to incentivize them to do so.