Free Will and Abilities

Abstract

My central aim in chapters 1 and 2 is to evaluate the Consequence Argument for incompatibilism about free will and determinism. In chapter 1, I present a modified version of the "modal argument" for incompatibilism and I develop a novel account of the argument's central, quasi-technical idiom being able to render a proposition false. I begin chapter 2 by considering two alleged counterexamples to rule BETA, the Consequence Argument's central rule of inference. I argue that these counterexamples fail, if the incompatibilist operates with a particular luck dependent notion of ability. Chapter 2 concludes with a discussion of David Lewis' influential reply to the Consequence Argument. I argue, in particular, that Michael Huemer's provocative objection to Lewis can be successfully deflected. In chapter 3, I take a closer look at what the compatibilism debate is really about and I examine the luck dependent notion of ability in more detail. I begin by focusing on Kadri Vivhelin's conception of the free will problem and I argue that it fails to isolate a unique problem. I conclude by sketching an alternative conception of the free will problem, one that sees the compatibilism dispute as a distinctively normative problem, a problem concerning the conditions under which an agent deserves to be harmed.

In chapter 4, with the normative conception of the free will problem in view, I examine the dispositional theory of ability, a theory that has recently been used to defend compatibilism. After explaining the motivation for the dispositional account, I argue that Michael Fara's version of the theory fails to identify a form of ability that is necessary for moral responsibility. I then consider Michael Smith's alternative version of the dispositional theory. While Smith's view is promising, I argue that it faces serious challenges.