Empathic Concern, Moral Epistemology, and Moral Progress

Abstract

In this dissertation, I argue that a specific form of empathy—empathic concern—has a crucial role to play in moral inquiry. I argue that experiences of empathic concern serve as a basic source of evidence regarding the strength of our reasons to help and not harm others, and that recognizing this can help us make progress on debates about the strength of our obligations to reduce animal suffering and extreme poverty. In chapter 1, I draw on work in cognitive science to argue that we would not be doxastically justified in holding certain moral beliefs unless empathic concern provided evidence of our reasons to help and not harm others. Since we are in fact doxastically justified in holding these beliefs, it follows that empathic concern must provide evidence of this sort. In chapter 2, I provide an account of how the evidence provided by empathic concern can improve moral judgment despite its various limits. I argue that just as visual perception can be a useful source of evidence despite its inherent limits, empathic concern can provide a useful source of evidence despite its inherent limits. I go on to provide an account of how we should go about collecting this evidence. I argue that to collect the evidence provided by empathic concern in the proper way, we would have to put ourselves in the favorable conditions identified at the end of chapter 1 whenever we harm someone or fail to help them. In chapter 3, I argue that we have decisive reason to believe that if we collected the evidence provided by empathic concern in the proper way, we would judge that we’re morally required to consume far fewer animal products than most of us do. I argue in chapter 4 that we have decisive reason to believe that if we collected the evidence provided by empathic concern in the proper way, we would judge that we’re morally required to give much more money to charity than most of us do. I argue further that we should defer to the judgments we would make under these conditions.