Power Play - Rethinking Taiwan's Energy Framework to Deter a Chinese Invasion

Abstract

Deterring a Chinese attack on Taiwan is a paramount concern for both the Taiwanese and U.S. governments. Current deterrence models fixate on Taiwan’s military preparedness, but have failed to adequately address Taiwan’s existentially precarious energy framework. In this thesis, I will review energy data, expert scholarly analysis, and government documents, to investigate how Taiwan’s existing energy framework impacts their defensive deterrence posture. I argue that Taiwan’s high dependence on energy imports, scarce and unprotected energy storage, and current energy policies, that include a termination of nuclear energy, all subvert Taiwan’s security and exacerbate the risk of Chinese military aggression. To improve Taiwan’s energy security and deterrence posture, I suggest three policies 1) diversifying Taiwan’s existing energy imports and strengthening import channels, 2) overhauling Taiwan’s domestic energy storage capabilities in both scale and fortification, and 3) increasing Taiwan’s energy self-sufficiency through a return to nuclear energy and domestic price controls.