Autonomous robotic inspection of nuclear facilities with minimal memory for maximum security

Abstract

The future of nuclear weapons agreements will depend on the development of verification systems that are less invasive and more secure than current methods. Autonomous robotic inspectors provide a potential improvement to human-based onsite inspections if they are designed to address the security challenges of nuclear verification. This work presents on the development and testing of the “Secure Inspection Protocol,” a novel inspection process that uses the neutron counting “Inspector Bot” to inspect nuclear facilities with minimal memory for maximum security. Through a series of OpenMC simulations, the neutron count rates in a model plutonium storage facility were characterized. The Secure Inspection Protocol was then designed to inspect this model facility by using neutron count measurements to iteratively determine the next measurement location a set number of times, after which the final measurement location is reported; this final output is compared to previous inspection results to verify facility compliance. This process requires only two variables to be stored in memory during the inspection, and the final output conveys no sensitive information about the facility. The protocol was demonstrated to recognize abnormalities of 20% in one of 18 plutonium containers with less than 1% error in only 30 minutes, far surpassing the time required using a single-measurement approach. Thus, the Secure Inspection Protocol enhances the possibilities for nuclear disarmament through its security, safety, and efficiency benefits.