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The Undefinable Soul: Aristotle’s De Anima II.1-3

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2015-06-26

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Aristotle’s account of the soul is somewhere in the conceptual space between substance dualism and materialism, and much modern commentary has been taken up with where precisely it falls on this spectrum. In the first chapter, I explain what the soul is according to Aristotle and the plausibility of his view. In the second chapter, I set out my interpretation of the status of Aristotle’s account of what the soul is and show that Aristotle does not conceive of this account as a definition. Finally, in the third chapter I present and dispute Aquinas’ interpretation, since he considers Aristotle’s account to be a definition.

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Princeton University Senior Theses

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