From Prey to Predator: Examining the Russo-Ukrainian War as a Case Study for How Weaker Militaries Defeat Stronger Adversaries

Abstract

Although many scholars have previously studied asymmetric warfare from the counterinsurgent perspective, few have examined how weak militaries may defeat stronger adversaries. This thesis combines existing schools of thought with the unprecedented deployment of FPV drones in the Russo-Ukrainian War to propose a new theory of tactical exigency. Defined as the ability to dictate an opposing military’s tactics to fight winnable battles, this theory explains how Ukraine’s deployment of FPV drones has forced the Russian military to adopt guerrilla warfare tactics, thereby forfeiting their manpower and matériel advantages. To determine FPV drones’ effect on the battlefield, this thesis analyzes data collected by ACLED and Ukraine’s Army of Drones before reinforcing the results with a case study examining how Ukraine’s FPV drones have forced Russian commanders to switch from brigade-level “meat grinder” maneuvers to assaults with small fireteams of three to five soldiers. Ultimately, this thesis finds that although FPV drones killed fewer enemy combatants than traditional airstrikes, their dual functionality as intelligence collection and direct strike platforms empowered the Ukrainians to inflict catastrophic losses on masses of advancing Russian soldiers, forcing the Russians to seek cover. By deploying these revolutionary and cost-effective weapons systems that minimized risk to their soldiers, Ukraine created winnable smaller-scale engagements. Over time, these small successes may aggregate into significant victories against superior militaries. Critically, Ukraine’s deployment of FPV drones yields valuable lessons for countries with militarily superior neighbors, particularly those with entangled histories.