You Get What You Pay For: A Pilot Proposal for Recidivism Reduction Through Performance-Linked Compensation in US Corrections

Abstract

Given the current state of corrections in the United States, there exists a need for new methods of reform that aim at ameliorating the conditions which lead to such high levels of incarceration. In this thesis, I build on the literature regarding pay-for-performance models in different settings in an attempt to propose a viable incentive-based compensation system within prisons with the goal of reducing recidivism rates in United States prisons. This system would allocate a certain amount of funds at a selected pilot site to financially support bonuses given to correctional officers based on a corresponding reduction in recidivism rates. In doing so, correctional officers are given a monetary incentive to improve prison operations through efforts towards rehabilitative facilities as opposed to punitive ones. The parameters of this pilot are guided by findings from two similar pilot studies in the United Kingdom, which also aimed at reducing reoffending in two prisons through financial incentives. Under this model, projected costs would be offset by savings related to reductions in recidivism, such as the direct costs of housing an inmate or other indirect costs that are rooted in the experience of incarceration. This thesis attempts to support the implementation of such a pilot through a cost-benefit analysis spanning different jurisdictions and different cost structures. This cost-benefit analysis assesses the projected individual bonus sizes for correctional officers, projected aggregate bonus pool, projected total aggregate cost savings, and the projected return on investment of Federal, Massachusetts, and Mississippi correctional agencies respectively. There are also considerations made for direct costs and indirect costs of incarceration for each jurisdiction, leading to six models being conducted. Of these six models, all but one had a positive return on investment, indicating financial viability for most scenarios under which this pilot would be implemented. The model which did not have a positive return on investment (Mississippi without social costs) provides insight into what may make this pilot proposal financially viable and what may prevent such a status. There seems to be some indication that this discrepancy is related to the average salaries of correctional officers in the state as well as the total annual cost of incarceration for inmates under that jurisdiction. Further sections discuss the anticipated criticisms of such a pilot proposal, such as excessive cost, feedback loops, or US prison-specific conditions. These criticisms are addressed in the discussion chapter which preface the conclusion. Concluding remarks go over the policy implications of such a proposal and the wider impacts on recidivism in the United States.