THE POLITICS OF PRIVATIZED DEFENSE: CONGRESSIONAL PARTISANSHIP AND THE COMPOSITION OF MODERN U.S. WEAPONS PROCUREMENT, 2008-2025

Abstract

This thesis analyzes congressional partisanship and whether it corresponds with variations in the composition of United States defense procurement, particularly the share of Department of Defense contract obligations devoted to privatized weapons systems between 2008 through 2025. The structure of procurement and the correlating outcomes coinciding with political and institutional efforts are examined. A time-series dataset and an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) linear regression analysis are utilized, where the results provide mixed and limited outcomes supporting the hypotheses. It is found that a unified Republican Congress does not demonstrate consistent and significant results regarding increasing privatized weapons procurement, whereas a unified Democratic Congress is more consistently significant, identifying with influencing a reduction in weapons contracts. Key congressional defense committee leaders also appear to securely influence procurement outcomes, specifically when Republican. These results suggest that congressional partisanship may correspond with the composition of privatized weapons procurement to an extent, however there are broader political, institutional, and economic factors that largely influence procurement decisions.