The Politics of Proliferation: Navigating China’s Uranium Supply and Demand for Civilian and Military Programs Under Global Oversight and Safeguards

Abstract

China is increasing its uranium dependencies for the development of its civilian and military industries. Currently, China requires 13,131 tons of natural uranium per year to power its 57 civilian nuclear reactors producing 55.7 GWe of electricity — equal to 5% of China’s total electricity needs. China has another 30 reactors under construction that will be completed by 2030 and are estimated to produce an additional 32GWe. This paper estimates China’s total civilian uranium needs for 2030 at 20,721 tons of natural uranium per year. In parallel, China will require unrestricted uranium for the development of its nuclear weapons program. This includes the production of warheads requiring HEU, plutonium and tritium, and naval reactor technology for the expansion of its nuclear submarine and aircraft carrier fleets. This paper estimates that China will require between 2,779 and 3,885 tons of unrestricted natural uranium per year until 2035 to support these developments — a figure 1.7 to 2.5 times higher than China’s declared domestic uranium production. As the IAEA and bilateral agreements between importing and exporting countries hold states accountable to a set of peaceful practices regarding uranium material, unrestricted uranium is more difficult to acquire. Unrestricted natural uranium can be sourced through domestic production and through uranium contracts with weak bilateral agreements. This paper analyses the terms of China’s Voluntary Offer Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA as well as its bilateral agreements with Russia and Canada to understand the legal boundaries preventing China from developing its military industry. Finally, this paper looks into unrestricted uranium opportunities in Africa through case studies of Niger and the Democratic Republic of Congo for China to source unrestricted uranium for the development of its military expansions.