REFORMS, RICE, AND RESISTANCE: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF AGRICULTURAL POLICY REFORM UNDER SHINZO ABE

Abstract

Government intervention in agricultural markets remains one of the most contested issues in global trade, drawing scrutiny for its role in exacerbating inequality and distorting competition. Japan stands at the center of this debate. Consequently, this thesis examines the political economy of agricultural policy reform in Japan under Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s second administration (2012 – 2020), focusing on the persistent protectionism in the rice sector. Despite a sector burdened with inefficiencies and international pressure to reform, Japan’s agricultural policies, particularly those pertaining to rice, have remained resistant to liberalization. This study seeks to answer the central question: Why has Japan’s agricultural sector remained resistant to liberalization despite efforts to reform? More specifically, the dominance of rice farming - reinforced by decades of commodity-specific subsidies and protections - demands a closer examination of rice’s role in sustaining the farming sector’s enduring protectionist stance. Through a combination of policy tracing, quantitative and qualitative analysis, this research evaluates Abe’s reforms in four areas: farmland consolidation, cooperative restructuring, trade liberalization, and the abolition of the Gentan rice system. The findings reveal that while Abe’s administration achieved progress in certain areas, such as increasing farmland consolidation and reducing the influence of agricultural cooperatives, rice policy remained largely unchanged. Four key factors contribute to this: the dominance of the Liberal Democratic Party and its reliance on rural patronage; the lobbying power of the national Japanese Agricultural Cooperative (JA); ideation commitments to food security and agricultural exceptionalism; and deep cultural ties to rice as a symbol of Japanese identity. Ultimately, Japan’s cultural connection to rice and rice cultivation practices were the greatest inhibitor of Abe’s agricultural reforms. This thesis concludes with two recommendations for advancing agricultural liberalization while addressing key inefficiencies in Japan’s farming sector.