Gauging the Effects of Network Attacks on Ethereum Proof-of-Stake

Abstract

This project aims to develop an understanding of network attacks on Ethereum Proof-of-Stake and the tools that are available study them. Our goal is to explore facets of Ethereum’s behavior under adversarial conditions that cannot be probed in a non-emulated environment. After a brief review of Ethereum’s protocol, we walk through a sequence of malicious behaviors that threaten Ethereum’s safety and liveness. We discuss a set of emulators that aid our study of Ethereum, as emulation provides a safe testing grounds for attacks. After selecting an emulator and upgrading its capabilities through a series of functional improvements, we launch a set of experiments that measure Ethereum’s resilience in the face of network-level disruptions. First, we consider the impact of network delay on liveness by measuring fork rate. We show that adding delay between ASes causes fork rate of up to 6.9% with a uniform distribution of validators on the network and up to 16.7% with a concentrated distribution of validators. Then, we illuminate the danger of concentrating validators within nodes on the network by instigating packet loss for clusters of validators. We examine validator revenue, validator balance, and blockchain finality as evidence of the seriousness of this attack. Our results suggest that targeting clusters of validators allows us to cause an inactivity leak such that validators lose up to 93.8% of their original stake. As a result, we advocate for a more uniform distribution of validators across the network. Finally, we provide an outline for future work that should address the limitations of the research in this report and push to explore ways we can make Ethereum more safe and secure.