Buying Influence? How State Politics Shape Oil and Gas Lobbying and Policy

Abstract

How do state-level political structures, party affiliations, and committee memberships shape oil and gas lobbying and policy outcomes? While federal lobbying has been widely studied, state-level dynamics remain underexplored despite its critical role in energy regulation. This paper hypothesizes that oil and gas lobbying strategies vary across state legislatures, dependent on party affiliation, committee memberships, and legislative tenure. Moreover, this thesis suggests that higher campaign contributions correlate with industry-friendly votes with energy committee members receiving higher contributions. Using a comparative case study of Texas, Pennsylvania, California, and Michigan, this study analyzes campaign contributions, legislative votes, and policy outcomes. Findings show that party affiliation is the strongest predictor of voting behavior, with Republicans consistently favoring industry policies. Contributions correlate with support, but outliers highlight limits to lobbying influence. Additionally, energy committee members receive substantially more funding indicating strategic lobbying efforts, while the impact of tenure varies depending on state political ideology.