Revisiting Build Back Better: Theoretical and Normative Lessons from High Stakes Negotiations

Abstract

This thesis explores the dynamics of congressional negotiations through three analytical frameworks: electoral incentives, pivotal politics theory, and negotiation literature. Each chapter focuses one of these frameworks to explain how members of Congress behave and how legislative outcomes are shaped, using Build Back Better negotiations as a case study. The first chapter examines how electoral incentives influence the priorities and strategies of lawmakers, emphasizing the role of primary and geographic constituencies in shaping individual behavior. The second chapter assesses the pivotal politics theory, which argues that legislative power is concentrated among key players whose ideological positions relative to the status quo and happen to exist at key ideological inflection points as determined by institutional rules. While the theory has limitations, it remains a useful tool for understanding power distribution within Congress. The third chapter draws from negotiation literature to analyze the Build Back Better negotiations, providing a framework for understanding congressional bargaining that incorporates both interpersonal dynamics and structural constraints. This chapter also generates practical recommendations for how members of Congress can improve their negotiation strategies in future legislative efforts. The methodology of this thesis is qualitative and draws from multiple sources to build a comprehensive picture of congressional negotiations. Primary materials include public statements by members of Congress, relevant news coverage, and personal interviews with congressional staffers and other political professionals. These interviews offer behind-the-scenes insights into the negotiation process that are not captured in public records. By analyzing these sources using the different theoretical approaches, this thesis reconstructs key moments in Build Back Better negotiations and evaluates how well various theoretical frameworks explain what happened. This methodological approach allows for both theoretical evaluation and normative recommendations for policymakers. Ultimately, this thesis offers not only a clearer understanding of how negotiations in Congress actually occur through analysis of a case study, but it also makes recommendations for how members can succeed in them and suggests future work that examines the role of parties in shaping Congressional negotiations, extends the theory of pivotal politics to thoroughly incorporate a multidimensional policy space, and evaluates how changes to institutional design and internal rules would impact the legislative process.