Why Are They Speaking with a Single Voice? Reconsidering Foreign Policy Coordination in the European Union

Abstract

This thesis asks two questions that are often overlooked in the current literature on European Union foreign policy coordination: how does coordination benefit the member states, and is the current level of coordination suboptimal? Using a rationalist framework, I propose seven theories describing how coordination adds value to member state foreign policies, which can be divided into bargaining, reputational, and policy explanations. I assert that how the member states institutionalize common policies is inextricably linked to what motivated coordination in the first place, proposing a distinct hypothesis for relative institutional involvement for each set of coordination explanations. Through case studies of the EC/EU response to the Yugoslav Wars between 1991 and 1995, the 2003 Iraq War, Operation Atalanta, the 2011 military intervention in Libya, and the ongoing crisis in Ukraine, I find that the member states use EU coordination effectively to add value to their foreign policies. Furthermore, the observed patterns of institutionalization generally conform to my expectations, though the EU has demonstrated a difficulty in coordinating for reputational reasons. I suggest that the member states can more effectively employ the supranational foreign policy institutions to take on more of a policy planning role rather than trying to always foster policy consensus.