The Price of Pharmaceutical Influence

Abstract

My thesis examines the extent to which pharmaceutical company lobbying shapes the regulation of opioids in the United States and the effect this influence has on the opioid crisis. I argue that pharmaceutical company lobbying has systematically influenced which opioid bills were passed and which died. To substantiate this argument, I analyze pharmaceutical industry campaign contributions to members of Congress across the 2014, 2016, 2018, and 2024 election cycles, pharmaceutical company lobbying activity on ten pieces of drug legislation, and original interview evidence from nine individuals with direct experience navigating opioid-related policy. I find that pharmaceutical contributions were concentrated among members of the committees with direct jurisdiction over drug legislation, and that the legislative outcomes of the bills examined are consistent with a pattern of financial influence. The results of this analysis are supported by the nine interviews, which also played a role in attesting to the severity of the opioid crisis as a leading cause of death in the United States.