Return of an Axis? Analyzing Great Power Competition through China and Russia’s Coalition-Building Strategies in the 21st Century

Abstract

Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea have exhibited an increased willingness and capacity to support a common cause, one that is in opposition to the Western-led international order. These four countries, referred to as the CRINK, have enabled Russia’s war effort in Ukraine and accelerated strategic cooperation among themselves. As a result, observers have begun referring to the CRINK as an axis. This paper asks two questions: (1) Are China and Russia building a coalition against the West with Iran and North Korea, and if so, how? (2) Does the cooperation among CRINK members constitute a coalition? Relying on traditional criteria of great power projection through the DIME (diplomatic, information, military, and economic) framework, this thesis identifies measurable and comparable variables to examine China and Russia’s coalition-building strategies. Using expert interviews, open-source quantitative data, and qualitative content analysis, this paper argues Beijing and Moscow deploy distinct coalition-building strategies in the 21st century. As the second largest economy in the world, Beijing uses a strategy of economic statecraft and strategic diplomacy to position itself as an alternative to the US through nonkinetic forms of power projection. Following its invasion of Ukraine, Russia has become more assertive in eroding the international order by pursuing a strategy dependent on presenting itself as a security guarantor in its region and a threat to countries abroad. An examination of the relationships between CRINK members reveal that although a set of mutually reinforcing bilateral relations anchored by China and Russia have emerged, this group is not a coalition of four countries making decisive, coordinated actions. An examination of the 2026 war in Iran helps identify the limits of CRINK cooperation. These findings are used to analyze three key areas of US policy relating to CRINK countries: economic sanctions enforcement, commercial diplomacy, and international strategic messaging. Actionable policy recommendations for addressing the threat posed by the CRINK are presented, and ultimately argue that the US must work with its global network of partners to address the relationships between CRINK countries rather than creating policies to address four independent actors.