Conditionality and Sovereignty: Explaining Divergent Populist Outcomes in Greece, Ireland, and Italy

Abstract

This paper examines how EU/IMF bailout conditionality shaped public perceptions of national sovereignty and contributed to divergent populist outcomes during the Eurozone crisis. Focusing on Greece, Ireland, and Italy, it asks why bailout countries did not experience strong right-wing populist surges despite significant declines in institutional trust, while non-bailout Italy did. To address this question, the paper combines qualitative analysis of bailout agreements with quantitative evidence from Eurobarometer surveys (2007–2019) and national election results. The findings show that bailout conditionality influenced not only economic policy but also how citizens assigned political responsibility. In Greece, strict and highly visible conditionality concentrated blame toward external actors, contributing to the emergence of left-wing populism. In Ireland, where conditionality was less severe, political backlash was substantially more limited. In contrast, Italy’s experience of diffuse external pressure in the absence of a formal bailout led to broader anti-establishment sentiment, which ultimately became consolidated into right-wing populism. The paper argues that the structure and visibility of external intervention are critical in shaping political outcomes, with important implications for the design of future crisis responses in the European Union.