False Guardians: The Predatory Turn of Civilian Defense Forces in Latin America

Abstract

A relatively understudied phenomenon in civil war literature is the emergence of civilian defense forces (CDFs) as a third actor in armed conflicts. A related and even more understudied phenomenon is the propensity of these forces to become predatory. Thus far, the extant literature has provided an initial theoretical framework for understanding this transformation of CDFs as well as anecdotal evidence in support of the framework. This thesis contributes to the literature by proposing innovations to the existing theoretical framework and providing a comparative case study analysis of the transformation of CDFs in Latin America. This thesis proposes that two variables are central determinants of whether a CDF will become predatory: command type and operation type. Community-commanded CDFs are less prone to predation than externally commanded CDFs because they are better able to sanction their members, their goals are aligned with the interest of the community in self-preservation, and they attract recruits who are invested in protecting their neighbors. Externally commanded CDFs are often willing to ignore the excesses of CDF members so long as their primary objective is achieved, and they typically attract opportunistic recruits interested in material gain. Where they execute defensive operations, CDFs are less likely to engage in predatory activities because they are located closer to accountability structures, they have social and kinship ties with members of their community, and they are embedded in local intelligence networks that allow for selective targeting of insurgents. Offensive operations distance CDFs from accountability structures, degrade intelligence quality, and eliminate social and kinship ties, all of which increase the likelihood of predation. This thesis tests the proposed theory in three Latin American cases—Peru, Mexico, and Guatemala—that exhibit both within and between-case variation on the dependent variable of community predation, with the findings tracking theoretical predictions. Based on the findings, governments should refrain from forming or legalizing CDFs because they often engage in some degree of predation, even when they begin as innocuous forces. Rather, states should focus on improving local security and projecting their monopoly over violence across their entire territory. However, given the difficulty of building state capacity, states that create or legalize CDFs can minimize predation by limiting them to defensive operations and delegating authority over these forces to local government actors.