Resisting Without Censorship: Taiwan’s Democratic Response to PRC Disinformation

Abstract

This thesis examines how democracies can respond to sustained foreign disinformation campaigns without undermining core democratic values. Using Taiwan as a key case study, it analyzes how the island has confronted information influence operations linked to the People's Republic of China, particularly during the 2024 election cycle. These campaigns aim to manipulate public opinion, erode trust in institutions, and shape political outcomes in favor of reunification. The central research question asks how Taiwan has designed and implemented its counter-disinformation strategy, and what this reveals about democratic resilience under constant information threat. The study employs a qualitative case study approach, drawing on expert interviews, government documents, NGO reports, and platform data, while engaging key academic themes including cognitive warfare, media literacy, platform governance, and the tension between regulation and freedom of expression. To this end, the primary argument is that the most effective democratic response to disinformation is not the removal of false content, but the reduction of its influence. Taiwan’s “whole-of-society” model distributes responsibility for detecting, verifying, and responding to disinformation across government, civil society, journalists, and private platforms. It prioritizes speed, transparency, and public participation over censorship, enabling rapid identification and exposure of false narratives while protecting freedom of expression. A key feature is the use of rapid response mechanisms, such as an informal four-hour window for government clarification. However, the findings also highlight limitations, as effectiveness is difficult to measure, exposure remains widespread, and structural constraints including platform algorithms, limited civil society resources, and the rise of generative artificial intelligence continue to challenge countermeasures. Based on these findings, the conclusion is that Taiwan offers a compelling alternative to both authoritarian information control and fragmented Western approaches. Its experience suggests that democratic resilience depends less on controlling information and more on strengthening society’s capacity to critically engage with it. While not fully transferable, Taiwan’s model provides key policy lessons, including the importance of rapid response systems, process-based regulation, and sustained investment in civil society and public trust. Ultimately, resilience in the digital age is defined not by the absence or control of disinformation, but by a society’s ability to withstand and adapt to it.