PERSONALISM AND PROTECTIONISM: AN ANALYSIS OF TRADE POLICY IN DICTATORSHIPS

Abstract

How does personalism affect trade openness in authoritarian regimes? While much of the literature in international political economy focuses on democracies, there has been relatively little research on trade policy in dictatorships. This thesis exploits panel data on authoritarian regimes between 1946 and 2010, finding that personalism is negatively associated with openness to trade. I further analyze this relationship through the case of China, arguing that varying degrees of personalization by CCP leaders can help explain the shift from extreme protectionism during the Mao Era to trade liberalization after the Reform and Opening Up, as well as the recent resurgence of ideological trade policies under Xi Jinping. Overall, the study improves upon typology-based approaches to authoritarian political economy by demonstrating that gradations of power concentration within regimes are a meaningful driver of trade policy.