The Impact of State Level Marriage Penalty Policies on Entry Rates into the Foster Care System

Abstract

In this paper, I begin with the motivation for the study, which is to test whether marriage penalty policies increase entry rates into the foster care system by increasing the number of single mother households, which are disproportionate contributors to the foster care system. Next, I analyze existing literature from economists surrounding single mother households as well as the foster care system, while also introducing the marriage penalty policy variables. After that, I provide descriptions of the important datasets and key variables I used to prepare the data, and I include a table of summary statistics with descriptions of their meaning from the finalized dataset I put together. Then, I introduce my four types of testing: Simple OLS models, Political and Geographic region fixed effects models, Mechanism Testing, and Region Interaction fixed effects models, as well as including and explaining the different equations that go with each type of testing. Following that, I provide the results of each model, while also explaining the meaning of results, which shows how each policy is affecting entry rates into the foster care system. Lastly, I take the results and provide the policy implications that in certain states certain marriage penalty policies seem to have a significant effect increasing entry rates into the foster care system, and therefore, those states should seriously consider eliminating those policies. I also include possible reasoning for the mixed results I found as well as the limitations of my study, opportunities for further research, and the desired further effect of my policy suggestions.