Beyond the Elimination of Monetary Bail: How Institutional Design Determines Successful Pretrial Reform

Abstract

Cash bail has long been defended as a necessary mechanism within the pretrial system for ensuring court appearance and protecting public safety. In practice, it does neither. The traditional monetary bail system uses wealth as a proxy for risk, treating a defendant’s ability to pay as evidence of reduced danger and likelihood to appear. The problem is this assumption does not hold. Individuals who pose little risk may be detained because they cannot afford even modest bail amounts, while dangerous defendants may secure release simply because they have the financial means to do so. Despite a growing body of evidence documenting these failures, reform efforts remain politically contested, often dismissed as threats to public safety. This thesis argues that such dismissals misframe the debate. The issue is not whether bail reform works, but under what conditions it succeeds or fails. This thesis examines two states that have comprehensively eliminated monetary bail: New Jersey and Illinois. Drawing on interviews with judges, prosecutors, public defenders, pretrial administrators, and reform advocates, the analysis identifies three categories of structural conditions necessary for effective reform: legislative framework, detention net design, and political and institutional context. Together, these cases demonstrate that when reform fails, the fault lies not in the concept itself, but in the components designed to support it. This thesis identifies those components and develops a framework that jurisdictions can use to structure effective reform.