Preserving Location Privacy in Directional mmWave Communications

Abstract

This paper explores strategies for preserving users' location privacy in directional mmWave 5G networks. While mmWave spectrum offers plentiful bandwidth for multi-Gbps data rates, their inherent directional transmission opens up new avenues for unlawful device localization. This paper focuses on the privacy vulnerabilities within the beam selection process in mmWave wireless networks.

First, we conduct simulations to analyze the vulnerability of such beam search protocols to an adversary compromising a user's location. We found that given line-of-sight connections, an adversary can successfully localize a user almost 70% of the time. To combat this, we suggest two simple solutions. The first involves randomizing the Beam ID at the access point, which works independently of the environment with zero overhead; successful localization drops to less than 3% of the time. The second relies on using a non-line-of-sight path that sacrifices power at the receiver for improved location privacy, entirely preventing localization. The results provide insights for mmWave standardization and are a step toward privacy-preserving communication in future networks.