From the holdings of the Department of Special Collections , Princeton University Library, Princeton, NJ

These documents are either in the public domain, or can only be used for educational and research purposes (Fair use) as per U.S. Copyright law (text below). By accessing this file, all users agree that their use falls in the public domain or within fair use as defined by the copyrightlaw. We do not charge any permission or usage fees for the publication of images of material inour collections, including those provided by Princeton University Library, via our website, catalog, or directly from staff.For more information regarding copyright, credit, and citation please review the information onthe Copyright, Credit and Citation Guidelines page of our website.
https://library.princeton.edu/special-collections/policies/copyright-credit-and-citation-guidelines. If you have any questions, including how to order higher-quality images from the collection, contact Special Collections Public Services via our Ask Us! Form. https://library.princeton.edu/special-collections/ask-us

Doctoral Dissertations, 2011-2026 Philosophy

2022

Pride, Shame, and Patriotism: Conceptual and Normative Questions About Self- and Other-Directed Emotions

Di Rosa, Elena

Princeton, NJ : Princeton University

http://arks.princeton.edu/ark:/88435/dsp01j6731692j

U.S. Copyright law: The copyright law of the United States (Title 17, §108, United States Code) governs the making of photocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. Under certain conditions specified in the law, libraries and archives are authorized to furnish a photocopy or other reproduction. One of these specified conditions is that the photocopy or reproduction is not to be used for any purpose other than private study, scholarship, or research. If a user makes a request for, or later uses, a photocopy or reproduction for purposes in excess of fair use that user may be liable for copyright infringement. This institution reserves the right to refuse to accept a copying order if, in its judgment, fulfillment of the order would involve a violation of copyright law. https://www.copyright.gov/title17/title17.pdf

PRIDE, SHAME, AND PATRIOTISM:
Conceptual and Normative Questions About Self- and Other-Directed Emotions

Elena Di Rosa

A DISSERTATION
PRESENTED TO THE FACULTY
OF PRINCETON UNIVERSITY
IN CANDIDACY FOR THE DEGREE OF
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

RECOMMENDED FOR ACCEPTANCE BY
THE DEPARTMENT OF
PHILOSOPHY

Adviser: Elizabeth Harman

January 2022

© Copyright by Elena Di Rosa, 2021. All rights reserved.

Abstract

This dissertation explores pride, shame, and patriotism. In Chapter One, I discuss various ways in which pride—both the emotion and its expression—can be inappropriate or 'improper.' I argue that in order for an instance of pride to be proper, at least four conditions must be met. Through a series of cases, I highlight instances of pride that violate one or more of these necessary conditions. In doing so, I hope to draw attention to two potentially counterintuitive phenomena: that one can make a mistake in being proud of a prideworthy object, and that this mistake—among other mistakes one can make with respect to pride—can render instances of pride morally improper.

In Chapter Two, I discuss shame. Philosophical accounts of shame focus on self-directed shame. The experience of feeling ashamed of *others* and what *they* have done, on the other hand, has been relatively under-examined. It is this 'other-directed' or 'interpersonal' shame that is the focus of the second chapter. I argue that exploring this species of shame is worthy of greater philosophical attention both because of its prevalence in our social and emotional lives, and because it reveals (1) that many existing accounts of shame are ill-equipped to handle an entire class of shame episodes and (2) that there is a significant asymmetry between other-directed pride and other-directed shame, which is notable insofar as pride and shame are commonly thought to be contraries.

Chapter Three concerns the ethics of patriotism. I argue that patriotism is love of country, and that patriotic love is consistent with feeling—and in fact disposes one to feel—pride in one's country in certain instances and shame in one's country in others. I maintain that patriotism as such is neither inherently morally objectionable nor inherently morally good, and that in order to determine the appropriateness—moral or otherwise—of an instance of patriotism, we must evaluate the reasons that underlie it. After developing a preliminary account of proper patriotism, I explore the ways in which oppression and social positioning might bear on the appropriateness of an individual's patriotism.

For Beempa, my favorite interlocutor, and in loving memory of Connie.

Acknowledgements

This project is the culmination of nine (!) years of graduate and undergraduate study at Princeton University. I am so grateful to the Philosophy Department for helping me grow as a philosopher and into an 'adult' during that time.

This dissertation would not have been possible without the encouragement, support, and guidance of my advisors: Elizabeth Harman, Grace Helton, and Philip Pettit. Thank you for your thoughtful feedback, rich questions, and moral support throughout this process. I value so highly all that you have taught me through your mentorship—both philosophical and otherwise—over the years.

Thanks also to Hendrik Lorenz, my undergraduate thesis advisor, for inspiring me to pursue philosophy after college, Tori McGeer for teaching my favorite undergraduate philosophy course (which inspired my thinking about shame), and Johann Frick for providing feedback on earlier drafts of this dissertation. Thanks to the Princeton philosophy grad students for your friendship over the past five years. Thanks also to my high school English teacher (and now friend), Joe Riener, who taught what I now realize was my first philosophy course.

Thanks to my grandfather, Beempa (a.k.a. Hans Oberdiek), for starting the most obscure family business and for being an invaluable part of my advising committee. I will always cherish the time we have spent philosophizing, traveling, and laughing together during my time in graduate school. Thanks also to my uncle John for answering substantive philosophical questions over text at all hours of the day and night, and for being a role model to me in and outside of philosophy. Thanks, Virginia, for being my partner in crime as we carry on the Oberdiek philosophy tradition, and for being a sister to me in all realms. Thanks to Connie for being a trailblazing woman in academia, who might also be surprised to know that I actually finished my dissertation by the time I said I would (well, roughly). Her legacy at Swarthmore College and in our family is treasured. Thank you, Heidi, Larry, Nan, John, and Patty, for hosting me so many times while I was at Princeton – our dinners together are one of the things that I will miss most in this next chapter.

Thank you, Mom, Dad, Isabel, Ben, Matt, and my second mom, Heidi, for being my best friends and fiercest cheerleaders from day one. Thanks to my dad for teaching me how to write, my mom for making sure I actually *did* write, and my siblings for tolerating discussions about these topics during many quarantine dinner table discussions. Thanks also to my mom for her unparalleled enthusiasm about and interest in my ideas, and for all of the helpful conversations during our walks with June. I love you all so much, and you are the most important part of my life.

Everyone I mentioned here can justifiably feel 'contributory pride' (and hopefully not shame…) in this dissertation, as I truly could not have completed it without you. Thank you.

Table of Contents

Title Page……...

Copyright Page……...

Abstract Page……..iii

Dedication……...iv

Acknowledgements……..v

Table of Contents…….....vi

Introduction…….vii-viii

Chapter One……1-34

Chapter Two…….35-64

Chapter Three……...65-98

Conclusion……..99-100

Bibliography……101-104

Introduction

In this dissertation, I discuss pride, shame, and patriotism. I first became interested in these topics while thinking about the range of responses to oppression on the part of oppressed and privileged people in the United States. I considered the way in which collective pride—as a form of resistance—is sometimes fostered amongst members of oppressed groups, but also the way in which oppression can induce shame in people with marginalized identities. I considered the collective pride that has formed amongst some members of privileged groups who (inappropriately) take themselves to be oppressed, and the shame that other members of privileged groups feel about their status as beneficiaries of an unjust system.

After thinking about "The Proud Boys" and other white-nationalist groups, I became particularly interested in exploring the ways in which pride can be morally objectionable. This inspired the idea that I develop in the first chapter, namely that pride has propriety conditions. Given that pride and shame are often treated as contraries in the philosophical literature, I began to wonder about the extent to which they are in fact symmetrical. I noticed that if we examine interpersonal or "other-directed" instances of both emotions (i.e., being proud of others and being ashamed of others), it is clear that there is at least one significant asymmetry between pride and shame. Moreover, traditional accounts of shame are ill-equipped to explain cases of other-directed shame. These are the two main ideas of the second chapter. The third chapter on patriotism might be approached as a culmination and application of the ideas I discuss in the first two chapters insofar as countries are common objects of both pride and shame. In thinking about the ethics of patriotism, I returned to the issue that initially inspired this project, namely the emotional responses of oppressed and privileged people to oppression in the United States.

In sum, the main contributions of the dissertation are as follows. First, I develop an account of proper pride and, in doing so, illustrate the variety of ways in which pride can be morally objectionable. Second, I show that if we examine *other-directed* instances of both pride and shame, which have thus far been neglected in philosophical discussions of the two emotions, we can see (1) that traditional accounts of shame do not adequately account for or explain other-directed instances and (2) that pride and shame are asymmetrical insofar as there is a sort of pride that is exclusively other-directed, but no such thing as *purely* other-directed shame. The final topic of the dissertation is patriotism. In the third chapter, I argue that patriotism is love of country, and that patriotism understood in this way is consistent with feeling both pride and shame in one's country. I claim that there is a distinction between genuine and proper patriotism, and that recognizing this distinction helps reconcile various intuitions that we have about the ethics of patriotism. In general, my hope is that this dissertation illuminates (1) some conceptual and normative problems associated with pride, shame, and patriotism, respectively, (2) the theoretical and practical issues at stake in each of these three discussions, and (3) some interesting facets of the relationship(s) between pride, shame, and patriotism.

Chapter One

The Propriety of Pride

Introduction

Much attention has been paid by philosophers to the harmful effects of negative reactive attitudes and emotions, such as anger and resentment. This makes sense, as these attitudes, unlike their positive counterparts, normally subject their objects to unpleasant treatment. The element of disapproval characteristic of many negative reactive attitudes might be morally worrisome in its own right, but is especially so when the attitude in question is unjustified or unwarranted. After all, condemning someone without proper justification is morally wrong.

The discussion of negative reactive attitudes and their unethical manifestations, while important and fruitful, has left the positive reactive attitudes and emotions relatively underexamined. In particular, the focus on the obvious wrongs of unjustified negative attitudes has obscured some of the genuine, if subtle, wrongs associated with *positive* attitudes and emotions. Thus, it is my project in this chapter to draw attention to various puzzles that reveal some of the normative constraints on one positive emotion, pride.

In exploring the ethics of pride[1], I will show how we can ask analogous questions to those that feature in discussions of the ethics of blame. For example, just as we ask whether (1) a given object is an apt target of blame (i.e., blameworthy), (2) a given subject has standing to blame an object, and (3) a given degree of blame is warranted, we can likewise ask whether (1) an object is an apt target of pride (i.e., prideworthy), (2) a given subject has standing to be proud, and (3) a given degree of pride is warranted. I maintain that these questions ought to be taken

[1] My analysis is restricted to the emotion of pride, as opposed to the character trait of pride. I will elaborate on this distinction in the next section.

seriously with respect to pride[2]—as they already are with respect to blame—in order to illuminate an important set of associated ethical issues, both similar to and different from those posed by undue blame[3].

In what follows, I will begin by offering some preliminary comments about the particular conception of pride with which I will be working. I will then outline various ways in which pride is valuable. Given that pride is a positive emotion that is valuable in such ways, one might think (1) that inapt pride is always morally innocuous and/or (2) that it is always appropriate, even good, to be proud of prideworthy objects. Through a series of cases, however, I will show that neither is the case. I will argue that being proud of an object that is not worthy of pride is a mistake that can be morally objectionable, and that even if an object is in fact worthy of pride, pride can nevertheless be a mistake in at least two ways. First, one can make a mistake in the degree of pride that is warranted. Second, one can lack the relevant relation to the prideworthy object—what I will call 'standing to be proud'—such that her pride is rendered improper. Pride without standing—like pride in an unworthy object and pride of a mistaken degree—is an error that can be morally objectionable. Thus, I hope to draw attention to two potentially counterintuitive phenomena: that one can make a mistake in being proud of a prideworthy object

[2] While I will be concerned exclusively with the ethical implications of improper pride in this chapter, I am confident that a similar analysis could be conducted on other positive attitudes and emotions. Thus, in exploring pride, I hope to also make the case for viewing the 'standing requirement' as having much broader applicability than just to blame (and, as I argue here, pride). For example, gratitude and forgiveness seem to have something like a standing constraint; it does not seem that just anyone can be grateful for a given thing or, likewise, forgive someone. Some special relation seems to be required in order for such emotions to be warranted. My analysis of pride might also lend itself to an investigation of whether one might need standing to be ashamed, when shame is pride's contrary.

[3] At various points throughout the chapter, I will discuss pride and blame in tandem. In doing so, however, I do not mean to exaggerate the similarities between pride and blame. I do not see the two as especially tightly connected other than that they both have standing requirements. The reason I discuss blame here to the extent that I do is because it is the context in which standing is normally discussed and, thus, provides a useful framework and lens through which to examine the relationship between standing and pride.

and that this mistake—amongst other mistakes one can make with respect to pride—can make pride *morally* improper.

1. What is Pride?

In broad strokes, the four most heavily theorized questions and hotly contested issues in the relatively small philosophical body of work about pride have been the following: (1) What is pride?; (2) Is it a virtue[4] or a vice[5]?; (3) What is its contrary? Humility or shame?[6]; and more recently (4) What, if anything, is the relationship between pride as a character trait and pride as an emotion (i.e., being a proud person vs. feeling proud of/taking pride in something)?[7]

The conception of pride that I will examine in this chapter is related to but distinct from the traditional conception of vicious pride rooted in Christian theology[8]. In the Christian tradition, pride is viewed as a character trait, specifically a character *vice*; the 'proud' person is arrogant, conceited, or vain.[9] This kind of vicious pride concerns one's relationship with God; the proud person unjustifiably elevates himself, which gets in the way of viewing God as superior and, as such, prevents proper worship.[10] This view of pride as a 'cardinal sin' seems to have informed much of the subsequent philosophical work on pride as a vice, for even contemporary accounts of vicious pride[11]—while not concerned with God—highlight the way in

[4] For a seminal defense of pride as a virtue, see Hume's discussion in *A Treatise of Human Nature* Book II Part I. In *Nicomachean Ethics* IV.3, Aristotle discusses the virtue of *megalopsychia*, which is sometimes translated as pride. I think that Aristotle's view should be bracketed for my purposes because he is talking about 'great-souledness,' which is different from typical conceptions of pride as a character trait and pride as an emotion.
[5] See Aquinas' treatment of pride as a vice in *Summa Theologiae* 2a2ae q. 162, which, it should be noted, is distinct from his discussion of 'magnanimity' in 2a2ae q. 129.
[6] See Isenberg (1949) for an argument that Hume is mistaken that pride and humility are incompatible. Isenberg claims that, in fact, pride and humility often coexist insofar as they are both indications that one "knows one's place" — appreciating both one's merits and one's limitations. He thinks that shame, not humility, is pride's contrary.
[7] See Fischer (2012).
[8] For a recent survey of the role of pride in Christian theology throughout time, see Carter & Gordon (2017).
[9] See Taylor (2006) for an interesting discussion of the difference between arrogance, conceit, and vanity.
[10] See Statman (1992).
[11] See Taylor (2006) Chapter 5.

which the proud person views himself as superior to others.

In the existing literature, analyses of pride have used agential pride[12] as the paradigm case, as opposed to other-directed pride. In other words, the focus has been on pride in oneself—whether in terms of being a proud person or being proud of oneself for a particular thing—as opposed to one's pride in others. It is argued that pride is in the first instance an emotion of *self*-assessment[13] having to do with one's identity and appraisal of oneself. Other-directed pride, on this view, is just a derivative form of self-pride; we are only proud of others insofar as we perceive ourselves to be partially responsible for their success or insofar as we take their success to reflect well on us in some other way.[14] I will ultimately argue against this view.

Unlike the historical treatment of pride as a virtue or vice, I will be concerned with pride as an *emotion*, as opposed to a character trait. I will argue that there are instances in which the emotion of pride is morally improper, but this is not the same as portraying pride as a character vice.[15] My primary task in this chapter is to draw attention to instances of improper pride and the ways in which improper pride can be morally objectionable both inherently and in virtue of its negative consequences.[16]

[12] By 'agential' pride, I mean self-directed pride or pride in oneself (as opposed to pride in others), not just pride for what one has *done*.
[13] See Taylor (1985) and (2006).
[14] See Walsh (1970) and Fischer (2017).
[15] That being said, it might well be the case that the viciously proud person is disposed also to *feel* pride improperly in the ways that I will go on to identify. After all, the arrogant person seems likely to regard himself too highly and to, therefore, be condescending in his feelings or expressions of pride. Thus, pride as a character trait and pride as an emotion might be related in interesting ways. Kristjansson (2001) offers a discussion of the relationship between what he terms 'pridefulness' and pride where "A prideful person believes that he should experience pride often, but shame seldom and ideally never. A prideful person also believes that he is entitled to due recognition of his achievements and is deeply concerned about his opportunities for pride and the merited external recognition" (170).
[16] Some of my examples will involve instances in which pride and/or its expression is wrong in itself and other examples will involve instances in which pride and/or its expression is wrong in virtue of its consequences. I will elaborate on this distinction and on the nature of the objection to improper pride at the end of the chapter in the "Objections" section.

While the aim of this chapter is not to present necessary and sufficient conditions of pride, it will nevertheless be important to have a clear idea of what pride is and how it is different from other nearby emotions and attitudes, such as admiration. I take pride to be a positive emotion in response to someone or something (1) for whom or for which one has especially high regard and (2) with whom or with which one closely identifies. One can have this close personal connection to someone or something in various ways and for various reasons, some of which I will now outline.

It is obvious that we are closely connected to ourselves and with our own positive attributes, achievements, and associations. After all, they are ours. If it is the case that we identify with most aspects of ourselves simply because they are our own, it might be the case that we are proud of many of the aspects of ourselves that we regard particularly highly. Clearly, however, this is not the case in the context of other-directed pride. Just because we regard someone else highly does not mean that we are thereby proud of them. What explains this?

In order for one to feel pride—as opposed to admiration, for example—in response to someone or something—as opposed to oneself—one must identify with that person or thing in a particular way. Some reasons for this identification in the case of other-directed pride include that one is partially responsible for the allegedly prideworthy object, that one has an intimate personal relationship to the allegedly prideworthy object, or that that the allegedly prideworthy object is closely tied to one's sense of self. If one does not take oneself to have the requisite connection to the object of high regard, genuine pride does not get off the ground so to speak. Admiration, on the other hand, might. After all, admiration requires high regard, but without the personal connection. While admiration can be felt from a distance, pride seems necessarily personal and participatory.

It is important on my view that pride does not *require* that one takes oneself to be partially responsible for or to have had any role in bringing about the allegedly prideworthy object. I reject the view that pride is always a form of taking credit, though I grant that it can take this form. I also reject the related view that one is only proud of those things that one takes to reflect well on oneself; though, again, one *can* be proud for this reason. Closely identifying with a friend, for example, does not entail that I take all, or even any, of her successes to reflect well on me. All it means is that I might take special pleasure in her success because of how much I care about and am invested in her well-being, regardless of whether her success indicates anything positive about me.

Thus, the pride that I will examine is the sort that we feel in response to someone or something that we deem valuable or remarkable and to which we, in the proper case, bear a sufficiently close relation. In particular, I will focus on the way that actual feelings and expressions of pride can go awry. While I will argue that certain kinds of self-directed pride (i.e., being proud of oneself) are bad from an ethical point of view, I am also interested in the ethics of other-directed pride (i.e., being proud of others), both in its expressed and unexpressed forms. I will argue that (1) unexpressed pride can be bad in itself and (2) it can be morally objectionable to express pride regardless of whether the emotion itself—if left unexpressed—is proper.[17]

Now that I have distinguished between pride as a character trait and pride as an emotion, it is also worth distinguishing between two variations of the emotion, namely *feeling* proud and *taking pride in* something. The former seems to be an emotional response as we ordinarily conceive of it, while the latter seems to more closely resemble a judgment. Parents might 'swell

[17] The emotion of pride (i.e., the feeling) and its expression need not co-travel for the purposes of my analysis. It can be improper for one to express pride even if one is not actually proud and it can be improper for one to feel proud even without expressing it.

with pride' in certain instances in response to their children's particular achievements, but they might also be proud of or take pride in their children more generally and stably over time without a clear affective component such as swelling or bursting with pride.[18] Is it possible that we might take pride in something without a corresponding feeling? A complex view of emotions—one that does not reduce emotions to mere feelings—should be able to accommodate this "taking pride in" variation of pride as a genuine emotion. For the purposes of my analysis, though, it is not necessary to settle whether these two variations of pride both count as emotions, as both forms can run afoul of lack of fittingness and standing, which is my primary concern in this chapter.

2. The Value of Pride

In order to home in on the kinds of wrongs associated with improper pride, it is useful first to briefly sketch some of the valuable aspects of felicitous pride. After all, pride is good from an ethical standpoint in at least four ways. First, having sufficient pride in oneself is essential for self-esteem and one's sense of self-worth. It is good if I take pride, for example, in my own character traits and values provided that they are in fact worthy of pride. This kind of reflexive pride helps us to develop our sense of self, to have confidence, and to treat ourselves with respect.

There is also pride in which one is proud not of oneself, but of one's association with someone or something. This sort of pride is a way of having and relating to genuine cares and commitments, a way in which one identifies with central aspects of one's life. I feel proud, for example, of being a Washington, D.C native, of being a member of the Princeton community,

[18] Hacker (2017) distinguishes between three forms of pride: pride as an 'episodic' emotion, pride as a motivation, and pride as a character trait. He thinks that pride as an emotion has two forms: a 'momentary' emotion and a 'persistent' emotion. On his view, the former can be captured by a 'flash of pride,' while the latter occurs when we 'take pride in' something. See pp. 133-135 for a useful overview and accompanying diagram of the various forms of pride.

and of being the sister of two NCAA soccer national champions. I take pride in these associations because I care and feel sufficiently connected to the things in question such that their merits (and flaws) are, or at least feel as though they are, to some extent my own. This type of pride is distinct from pride *in* oneself because it is not as if I am proud *of myself* for growing up in D.C. or proud of myself for my brothers' national championship victory, though I am proud to have these *associations*. Insofar as we have meaningful identities, connections, and relationships, we also normally feel pride when these things are valuable, remarkable, unique, or foundational—another positive face of pride.

Other-directed pride—being proud of someone else—is a typical and often important aspect of close interpersonal relationships. In felicitous cases, being proud of someone or taking pride in their achievements indicates one's emotional investment in the success, projects, and/or values of another. Parents often feel proud of their children, for example, or advisors feel proud of their advisees. In order for a relationship to warrant pride, however, it need not be hierarchical. Take the case of my brothers. I am proud of them for winning a national championship, a goal toward which they have been working hard for their entire lives. It is not just that I am proud to be their sister (i.e., pride by association), but also that I am proud *of them* (i.e., other-directed pride). Without this disposition to feel pride when it is appropriate, close relationships might be more distant and without the sense of shared activity that we normally think is characteristic of them.

It is important for the purposes of my upcoming analysis to emphasize the distinction between (1) a subject's pride by association (e.g., when I am proud *to be* my brothers' sister) and (2) a subject's being proud of an object itself (e.g., when I am proud *of* my brothers). These two senses of pride can come apart. For example, I am proud that I was born and raised in

Washington, D.C. (of my association with the city), but I am not normally particularly proud of the city as such. I might be proud of the city itself if it, for example, adopts a commendable policy, but this need not be the case in order for me to feel proud of my association with it. All I want to establish at this point is that being proud of an association with something is distinct from being proud of the thing itself. This distinction will be crucial later in the chapter as I sketch different kinds of wrongs associated with improper pride.[19]

Finally, let us consider one more positive face of pride. Insofar as expressions of pride offer us a way of clarifying our values to ourselves and to others, pride is an important part of character formation and of ethical life more broadly. We take pride in things that we deem valuable and expressions of pride are one way of solidifying to ourselves and conveying to others what we value. Proclaiming our pride is, in effect, taking a stand for what and whom we care about. Alternatively, sometimes what we take pride in actually makes more vivid to us what we value when it was previously obscure to us. For example, we might notice ourselves swelling with pride and, as a result of recognizing this response, are better-positioned to examine what value sparked our pride. In this way, pride can aid in developing one's sense of one's own values.

In sum, because pride plays these central positive roles in our personal, social, and moral lives[20], it is easy to overlook the associated wrongs that I will identify in this chapter. Reviewing

[19] For example, on my view, it might be morally objectionable in certain instances to tell someone that you are proud *of* them, while it might not be morally objectionable for you to tell them that you are proud to be *associated with* them. This will become clearer later in the chapter.

[20] See Carter and Gordon (2017) for a defense of a functionalist approach to pride and an informative explanation of various socially adaptive functions that pride serves. For example, they argue (1) that pride motivates individuals to keep doing good things (so that they are regarded highly by others) and (2) that in-group pride enhances the commitment, drive, and unity of group members. Thus, on their view, pride helps with the pursuit of goals at both the individual and group levels. These seem to be additional positive faces of pride.

the positive faces of pride is a useful lens through which to begin to explore the comparatively negative faces of pride to which I will now turn.

3. Improper Pride: Some Examples

With this background in place, I will now present a series of cases in which pride is inappropriate. In these cases, the pride in question is improper in one of the following three ways: (1) the object is not worthy of pride; (2) the object is not worthy of that degree of pride; or (3) the subject lacks standing to be proud.[21] When any of these conditions is violated, pride is improper, and in some cases, it is morally improper as a result of violating one of these conditions.[22] Thus, when I say pride is improper, it can be, but need not be, improper from a moral standpoint. Before turning to moral cases, I will introduce the three ways in which pride can be improper in contexts that are morally neutral. In such cases, feelings or expressions of pride are odd and inappropriate, but not unethical. Once I establish the various mistakes one can make with respect to pride, I will show, further, how and when these mistakes can be morally objectionable.

I will use the umbrella term 'proper pride' to refer to pride in which the object is in fact prideworthy, the subject has the appropriate relationship to the prideworthy object to warrant pride, the pride is felt to an appropriate degree given the prideworthiness of the object, and the pride is morally permissible. I will use the term 'improper pride' to describe pride that violates

[21] There are also cases in which the *emotion* of pride is proper in that it meets these three conditions, but its *expression* is morally problematic and therefore improper. Thus, the expression of pride can be morally improper in the following two ways: (1) because the emotion itself violates one of these three conditions or (2) because its expression is morally objectionable even if the emotion itself is proper.

[22] Hacker (2017) defines *prope*r pride as pride that is "felt with regard to the right object, for the right reason, and to the right degree." He defines *false* pride—or what I will call 'improper pride'—as "taking pride in the wrong kind of thing, or overvaluing what one is proud of, or overestimating the extent to which one has it, or having an excessive degree of pride" (144). I mostly agree with this conception of proper pride, but I will add that proper pride also has a standing condition that requires the right relation to obtain between the subject and the object. After all, as I will show, simply because an object is prideworthy does not guarantee that just anyone can take pride in it. I argue that one must have standing to be proud.

any of these conditions. I will sometimes refer to pride as specifically morally improper, which means that the pride has run afoul of the moral permissibility condition even if it has met other necessary conditions.[23]

3.1 One Kind of Mistake: Standing

Imagine that I am traveling and express pride in a random coffee shop's excellent coffee. I have no real connection to the coffee shop. It is not owned by me or by anyone close to me and I do not work there. The coffee is in fact prideworthy, but pride on my part is clearly a mistake. How, though, could my pride be mistaken if the coffee is prideworthy? After all, I have gotten things right in one sense. I have correctly deemed the coffee as a proper object of pride.

My pride is a mistake not because the coffee is not prideworthy for certain people in certain circumstances (it is), but because pride is not the kind of response that it is fitting for *someone like me* to have—someone without a connection to the shop. I lack *standing* to be proud in this scenario. I might reasonably be appreciative of and impressed by the good coffee, but being proud of the coffee is an error on my part.[24] Only those sufficiently closely connected to the shop can reasonably take pride in its coffee (i.e., have standing to be proud). While the

[23] See D'Arms and Jacobson (2000) for a useful discussion of two senses of the propriety of emotions. They argue that one way for an emotion to be appropriate is that "it accurately presents its object as having certain evaluative features." Another, distinct, way for an emotion to be appropriate is for it to be morally permissible. These two forms of appropriateness can come apart on their view and on mine.

[24] There is a legitimate question of whether I could really feel genuine pride in this scenario given that I lack any connection to the coffee shop. I can respond to this worry in the following four ways. First, it is possible that I mistakenly take myself to have a connection to the coffee shop so I genuinely, albeit mistakenly, feel pride. Second, it is possible that the reason that I do not muster genuine pride is precisely because I lack standing to be proud, which highlights the importance of my standing condition. Third, even if I do not *feel* genuine pride in the coffee shop in this case, surely I can still *express* pride. If this is the case, the objection to my expression of pride is still a standing objection. A final route I can take in response to this worry is to say that I intentionally chose pride of a clear outsider to highlight how crucial connection is to pride. We can, however, imagine someone having a bit more of a connection, though still a tenuous one—a neighborhood customer, for example—in order to illustrate the same point. The owner or a barista at the coffee shop might reasonably claim that this customer lacks standing to be proud of the shop. Even though the customer has *some* connection to the shop, the connection might not be strong enough or of the right sort for pride to be appropriate.

standing error that I commit in the coffee shop case is morally innocuous, I will go on to show that this is not always the case.

At this point, I want to distinguish between two related but distinct forms of standing, only one of which has been the subject of serious philosophical scrutiny. The kind of moral standing one needs for it to be appropriate to blame someone is well-known, though its contours need some clarification. When we deny that someone has moral standing to blame, it is normally because their relationship to the wrong in question would make blame hypocritical on their part. For example, if a blamer is guilty of the same wrong, complicit in it, or otherwise relevantly morally corrupt, this blamer seems to lack the requisite *moral authority*–or standing—to blame someone else for that thing even though it is genuinely blameworthy.[25] This sort of standing-less blamer does not have the right relationship to the moral wrong in question to justifiably blame. Clearly this kind of standing is not the one that is lacking in the coffee shop example above because morality just does not factor into that scenario.

There is another type of standing, though, one which is not strictly moral, but that features in discussions of standing to blame and, as I will argue, arises in the context of pride as well. One's relationship not just to morality, but also to the object of blame, is relevant in determining whether one has standing to blame. One common standing objection to blame is the following: "who are YOU to blame me for X?" This is often referred to as standing's "business" condition in that one has standing to blame only in cases in which the matter or person under scrutiny is in the realm of one's business. To blame and thereby violate the business condition is to overstep, meddle in the affairs of others, and fail to respect the privacy of others.[26] Now let us

[25] For a thorough summary and critique of recent work on standing to blame, see Bell in Coates and Tognazzini (2013). See also the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry "Blame" Section 2.3 for an overview of the various reasons one can lack standing to blame.
[26] See Bell (2013) and Smith (2007) for a useful discussion of the business condition.

return to the coffee shop example to sketch the way in which something like standing's business condition applies to pride as well as to blame.

What might it mean for someone to have or lack standing to be proud of a coffee shop? If one lacks standing, it cannot be because one is a hypocrite or complicit, but rather because one does not have the requisite relationship to the coffee shop to feel proud of it. In this way, it is similar to blaming when it is not one's business; when something is not one's business, it is because one lacks a sufficiently close relationship to the thing in question to warrant involvement by blaming. Similarly, if I feel proud of a random coffee shop's coffee, an owner or a barista there might inquire why *I* feel proud, challenging me to justify my emotion or attitude given my apparent lack of connection to the shop and its coffee. In some sense, it is not my business to be proud of the coffee shop because I am clearly an outsider; *who am I* to be proud of it? Later in the chapter, I will show that just as one can have legitimate reasons not to want others to blame when it is not their business, one can also have legitimate reasons not to want others to be proud without standing.

Regarding the coffee shop case, it is worth highlighting that *someone*, such as the owner or a barista, might justifiably be proud of the coffee shop's coffee, even if *I* lack standing to be proud of it. After all, excellent coffee is something of value that is difficult to come by, so if you are sufficiently connected to it, you might have good reason to feel proud. I emphasize this to underscore that the question of whether one has standing to be proud is distinct from the question of whether the object in question is in fact prideworthy. In fact, the question of standing really only arises when the object is prideworthy because if the object is not prideworthy, that alone is sufficient to render pride inappropriate.

While the factors that undermine standing are likely different for blame than for pride[27], I have shown that both require a certain relation to obtain between the subject and object of blame and pride, respectively. Just as must consider the relationship between the blamer and the blameworthy object to determine whether the blamer has standing to blame, we must consider the relationship between the proud person and the prideworthy object to determine whether that person has standing to be proud. My contention is that instances of standing-less pride are fairly common in our ordinary interpersonal relationships and, as such, are worthy of closer philosophical scrutiny.

3.2 Another Kind of Mistake: Prideworthiness

There are some things of which it seems that no one could reasonably be proud. It is not that everyone lacks standing in such cases, but rather that the thing in question is just not worthy of pride. Imagine that a coffee shop owner is proud of his shop's mediocre coffee. He is not proud of the effort or process involved to make the coffee, which might be worthy of pride; he is proud of the quality of the coffee itself. We think that he is making a mistake. Mediocre coffee is not worthy of pride by anyone, at least with respect to its quality. Mediocre coffee is, by definition, unremarkable. Interestingly, the coffee shop owner would have standing to take pride in his coffee if it were in fact prideworthy. Lacking standing is not his problem; his problem is that the coffee is not prideworthy. Thus, we can see that pride can be improper (1) because one lacks standing and (2) because the object of pride is not prideworthy.

[27] Frick (2016) discusses a case in which Person C urges his colleagues to vote for him for 'co-worker of the month for being so modest and self-effacing.' Frick notes, "C's claiming the reward for himself by uttering the above argument would stand in performative contradiction with the supposed traits for which he demands to be honored, namely, his modesty and self-effacingness. Were C, in particular, to put forward the argument to press his claim, this would make the argument unsound" (225). Frick's discussion reveals an interesting phenomenon regarding being proud of one's own modesty, which is worth further exploration on my part.

We encounter this same phenomenon in the case of blame. When a given person is not blameworthy, we do not say that everyone lacks standing to blame that person. While it is true that no one can reasonably blame a blameless person, the issue of standing never arises because the mistake is in deeming a blameless person blameworthy in the first place. A legal analogy is also useful to illustrate this distinction. A person might have the requisite standing to sue, but it turns out that he does not have a good case, so he loses. Another person, by contrast, might not even have the requisite standing to sue.[28]

3.3 A Third Kind of Mistake: Degree

A third kind of mistake one can make with respect to pride is the degree to which one is proud of something. What is interesting about this kind of case is that it reveals that pride can be improper even when one is proud of a prideworthy object *and* has the requisite standing to be proud of it. If we think that certain things can be more or less prideworthy than others or that someone can go 'overboard' with their pride, it seems clear that different objects merit different degrees of pride. Thus, one can err in this respect, in addition to the two ways just discussed. What might this kind of error look like?

Imagine that the coffee shop that you frequent has an extremely enthusiastic barista. Each day when you visit, this barista is bursting with pride over the shop's excellent coffee. He cannot stop talking about how delicious it is nor how high the quality. He is giddy with excitement and seems almost obsessed with the coffee. You find this odd – why?

On the one hand, you think he is justified in being proud. You agree with him that the coffee is excellent. After all, you go there every day. Therefore, you conclude that he is not making a mistake about whether or not the coffee is prideworthy. You also think that he is

[28] See Sabini and Silver (1982) for more on the legal analogy.

justified in being proud insofar as he is the one who brews the excellent coffee. Thus, he has a sufficiently close connection to the prideworthy object such that he has standing to be proud of it. What, then, is his mistake?

The barista's mistake with respect to his pride is one of degree. His pride is improper because the coffee is not worthy of that degree of pride. He has gone overboard in his response to the coffee; his pride is excessive. We can imagine that you, the devoted customer, might have one of the following reactions to his excessive pride: (1) "okay the coffee is good, but it's not *that* good" or (2) "okay the coffee is good, but it's just coffee!" Either way, you can acknowledge that the coffee is prideworthy and that the barista has standing to take pride in it, while still maintaining that he has made a mistake that makes his pride improper, namely that he is excessively proud.

4. Conditions of Proper Pride

If the above three coffee shop cases constitute instances of improper pride, what, then, is required for pride to be proper? In light of the discussion of the value of proper pride at the outset and the errors underlying improper pride that I just outlined, we can see that proper pride has at least three necessary conditions: (1) that the object in question is worthy of pride; (2) that the subject has standing to feel proud; and (3) that the subject feels an appropriate degree of pride in the object. The first condition is what we might think of as a descriptive fittingness condition; is X a fitting object of pride? Is X the kind of thing that is worthy of pride? The second condition is what I will call a standing condition; is it appropriate for this particular subject to feel proud of X? Does the subject have the right relation to the object to be justified in feeling proud of it? I maintain that this amounts to the following question: does A have standing to be proud of X? The third condition concerns what degree of pride the prideworthy object

merits. In the subsequent discussion, I will show how pride can go morally astray with respect to each of these three conditions.

4.1 Wrongful Agential Pride

So far, I have discussed cases in which it is unreasonable and strange for someone to take pride in something, whether because one lacks standing, because the thing in question is not prideworthy, or because one overreacts[29] with one's pride. However, the mistakes that I have described thus far have been morally innocuous. I will now present cases in which the pride in question is morally objectionable.

The first type of morally improper pride that I will discuss is wrongful pride in oneself. There are instances in which people (1) take too much pride in aspects of themselves that are in fact prideworthy, just not to that degree and (2) take pride in aspects of themselves that are not worthy of pride at all. I will offer examples of each of these in turn.

Consider pride in one's own appearance. One case in which pride in oneself can be an ethical failing is when someone is disproportionately proud of their appearance, as this indicates that they are vain. Even if no one else is negatively impacted by their vanity, we can still say that this person's excessive pride in their appearance is objectionable in itself. After all, it reveals both that their values are misguided—they lack an appropriate perspective on the importance of appearance—and that they lack humility. They value their looks to such an extent that it constitutes a character flaw. It is not just unreasonable for someone to care so much about their appearance; it is also an ethical shortcoming.

[29] There might also be cases, though probably less common, in which one's degree of pride constitutes an *underreaction*. For example, we can imagine that a parent ought to be extremely proud of his child for something of which he is actually only somewhat proud. It does seem that in ordinary life, people would think that the parent is making a mistake, potentially a morally objectionable one. We can imagine the child being offended, hurt, or angry that the parent is not sufficiently proud.

As I mentioned, it is possible to appropriately take some degree of pride in one's own appearance. As long as such pride is not excessive, it seems that appearance is a candidate for proper pride. Unlike appearance, however, some things just are not eligible for proper pride at all, such that any degree of pride in that thing would be a mistake. Earlier in the chapter, I described the coffee shop cases in which pride is ill-fitting, but harmless. When the reason for one's pride in oneself is itself unethical or at least a major source of injustice, though, it is actually wrongful, not merely ill-fitting, to be proud of oneself for that thing.

For example, consider a man who is proud of himself for being cis-male, heterosexual, and/or white. What is his mistake? On the one hand, we might think that the man's mistake is that such attributes are not candidates for pride insofar as they are unearned and out of one's control. This explanation fails, however, because we think that it is appropriate to take some amount of pride in one's innate talents, for example, which are similarly unearned. In fact, I will go on to claim that it might be appropriate for certain groups to feel pride in virtue of their gender, sexuality, or race, as I do not think that gender, sexuality, and race are altogether unworthy of pride irrespective of the particular subgroup or social context.

In my view, the correct explanation for why it is wrong for this man to be proud of his maleness, heterosexuality, and/or whiteness is that these particular characteristics have oppressive functions vis-a-vis their oppressed counterparts (femaleness, homosexuality, and blackness, for example). By being proud of these oppressive identifiers, a man is effectively revealing—and, if expressed, signaling—his acceptance, if not endorsement, of gender, sexual, and racial inequality. After all, if one takes pride only in things that one deems good and valuable, one is, in this case, mistakenly deeming maleness, heterosexuality, and whiteness to be good and valuable. Given the role that these privileged identities have in benefiting from and

perpetuating injustice, it is inappropriate to regard them as good or valuable in the way that taking pride in them does.[30] Thus, we can see that being proud of an object that is not prideworthy—even without expressing that pride—can be morally objectionable in itself insofar as such pride reveals one's objectionable values or attitudes toward others. Furthermore, when such pride is expressed, there can be serious downstream consequences. In this case, expressions of pride in one's privileged identity risk further entrenching the oppressive system and thereby harming members of marginalized groups.

By contrast, it seems morally permissible (even constructive) to be proud of one's identity as gay, black, or a woman, for example, as people are otherwise *oppressed* in virtue of these identities. Being proud of such identities is one way for marginalized people to take a stand against the oppressive system that tells them that it is shameful or inferior to be the way that they are. Pride, in such cases, serves to block, protest, and counteract the shame that they are expected to feel. In being proud that I am a woman, for example, I am elevating womanhood from its otherwise reduced status in society, which is importantly different from elevating manhood further beyond its already privileged status in society. Being proud of socially oppressive identities risks reinforcing the idea that the relatively underprivileged identities are in fact lesser. When underprivileged people are proud of their identities, on the other hand, it is not that they are maintaining that they are superior, but rather proclaiming that they are not inferior as society views and treatment of them suggests.[31]

---

[30] It is worth noting that I do not think that these characteristics are *shameful* either.

[31] One might object here as follows. All pride in race, gender, and sexuality is inapt, regardless of whether one is relatively privileged or underprivileged. When marginalized groups claim that they are proud of their identities, they are only proud insofar as they are insisting that they are not ashamed. This is not real pride. In response, I would argue that (1) pride in race, gender, and sexuality (which might otherwise seem like strange candidates for pride) can be made apt or inapt by the social context and (2) pride fostered as a response to being shamed can still be genuine and proper. After all, in the case I described, there is a positive emotional response in which one regards oneself highly in light of an aspect of oneself that one deems valuable (i.e., it meets my definition of pride). Why should the fact that such pride is in response to societal messages to the contrary affect whether it constitutes proper pride? If

A related but more nuanced way in which agential pride can be unethical is evidenced in cases in which one is too proud of oneself for something that is a product of unearned privilege and structural inequality. If, for example, I am disproportionately proud of getting into Princeton, one might think that I have failed to recognize the role that my whiteness and my socioeconomic status, for example, played in this outcome. It does seem that getting into Princeton constitutes a genuinely prideworthy achievement, but for me to be *overly* proud of myself for it is morally objectionable. In being too proud of ourselves in instances in which drastic social inequality is a salient factor, we are failing to acknowledge our privilege, and, as such, failing to exercise humility, self-awareness, and social consciousness.[32]

This is why, by contrast, we often tell members of marginalized groups that they should be *especially* proud of their achievements in the face of social injustice. The odds were stacked against them and they overcame obstacles that many others did not face. For example, insofar as I am proud of being a woman in philosophy, it is because the discipline is historically male-dominated and sexist. It can be expected that women have to overcome particular challenges to enter the profession, let alone be successful in it. Thus, it is a unique sort of achievement to be a woman philosopher—as opposed to cis white man—and, as such, might be particularly prideworthy.

---

anything, the fact that there are these discriminatory societal messages should help us see why pride is appropriate in such instances. Thanks to Grace Helton for urging me to explain further why race, gender, and sexuality are improper objects of even unexpressed pride in the privileged case. Thanks also to Philip Pettit for pushing me to address the objection about the connection between pride and shame with respect to marginalized groups.

[32] In the Princeton case, one might also think that excessive pride is morally inappropriate due to the role that luck plays in admission. In being overly proud, I am failing to acknowledge my good fortune, and am therefore failing to exercise sufficient humility. This is distinct from the issue of race and socioeconomic status and is worth further exploration. Thanks to Philip Pettit for highlighting this distinction.

My aim in this section was to illustrate the ways in which improper pride in oneself can be morally objectionable. In the next section, I will argue that being proud not of oneself, but of one's association with something, can be similarly objectionable.

4.2 Wrongful Pride by Association

There are at least three forms of wrongful improper pride by association, which are roughly analogous to the errors one can make with respect to pride in oneself. First, one can make a mistake in the degree of pride in one's association with something, such as when a person is excessively proud of one's country[33]. Second, one can mistakenly take pride in one's association with something that is not worthy of pride, such as one's home state's Confederate history. Finally, one can improperly take pride in something genuinely prideworthy insofar as one lacks the requisite association to that prideworthy thing. In such cases, I will argue, one lacks standing to be proud. I will now discuss each of these cases in turn with an eye toward showing that mistakes of pride by association are morally relevant in that they can be wrongful, thus revealing another face of improper pride.

On the Fourth of July, many Americans celebrate their connection to the United States. It is a day in which people clearly demonstrate pride by association. What might be wrong with this overt display of national pride? Let us assume that some amount of pride in one's country is permissible, so the problem is not that a country is an altogether improper object of pride. The mistake occurs when there is an excess of national pride, which can be both unreasonable and unethical.

[33] Note here that I want to distinguish between pride in one's country and love of one's country, where the latter is what constitutes patriotism. Thus, in this case, what is excessive is one's *pride* in one's country, and not necessarily one's patriotism (i.e., love of country). Patriotism is the topic of the final chapter of the dissertation.

There are two primary reasons that excessive national pride can be morally objectionable. First, while some basic amount of pride in one's country might signal that one values one's country and what it represents, excessive pride often indicates that one takes one's country to be superior to others.[34] This sense of superiority and exclusivity is particularly problematic when, as in the case of the United States, the country in question is guilty of oppressing less powerful countries. Excessive pride can be both wrong in its own right and in virtue of its downstream consequences. Excessive pride in one's country can be disrespectful insofar as it inappropriately elevates one's own country above others, regardless if it has any actual consequences. It might well have consequences, though, insofar as excessive national pride by association perpetuates, and likely partially causes, imperialism and xenophobia.

Another reason to worry about excessive pride in one's country is that in being too proud of one's association with a country, one is—or at least signals that one is—underestimating or underappreciating the injustices and atrocities committed by the country in question.[35] After all, it seems that if one were to sufficiently recognize and understand the gravity of such injustices, one would not be nearly so proud of one's association. When Americans are aggressively proud of the United States, for example, it is hard to believe that they are appropriately concerned with systemic racism and sexism, for example, that pervades the country today and throughout history.

While it is a legitimate question whether any degree of national pride is morally justifiable in an unjust country, my aim has been to establish that, at the very least, an excess of

[34] One worry raised by Elizabeth Harman is that small, oppressed countries might appropriately have an in light of their oppressed status. My response is that due to their plight, such countries' pride is not necessarily in *excess*, and, thus, not necessarily unethical simply in virtue of being greater than that of other countries.

[35] One might object here that a country cannot be prideworthy at all if it is guilty in such ways. I am granting for the sake of illustrating this point that it is still possible for a country to be prideworthy on balance. One question worth further discussion is whether one can at the same time be proud of X in virtue of certain things and ashamed of X in virtue of other things. I will turn to this issue in the third chapter.

national pride is morally objectionable. By contrast, there are some associations in which no amount of pride is appropriate. For example, consider people who are proud of their state or family's Confederate history. When people are proud of this association, their mistake is not one of degree. It is not as though there is some minimal amount of pride that one can justifiably feel in one's connection to the Confederacy. The error in such cases is in thinking that Confederate history is worthy of pride at all; in fact, if anything, such a history might instead be worthy of shame. When one is proud of one's association with morally bad things, such as the Confederacy, the pride itself is unethical, because of the way it can wrong others when expressed, such as, for example, descendants of enslaved persons. After all, this kind of improper pride celebrates something as good and valuable that is in fact wrong and harmful.[36]

A final sort of improper pride by association involves a lack of standing. If I feel proud of a tenuous or nonexistent association, I am making a mistake. I lack a sufficiently robust connection to the thing in question in order to feel proper pride by association. Why is this kind of improper pride objectionable? Consider a fair-weather fan—a sports fan who only roots for a team when the team is winning—who poses as a die-hard fan. These kinds of flighty fans make die-hard fans angry. It is not just that the die-hard find fair-weather fandom odd or foreign. Hardcore fans think that fair-weather fandom reveals a kind of character flaw: such fans are inconsistent in their loyalties and disingenuous in their purported devotion[37]. They only show support during the good times and bail during the bad. In being inconsistent in this way, fair-

[36] I want to block the following potential objection: if we have all of the information, we can see that many things have both shameful *and* prideful aspects. I have chosen the Confederacy case precisely because the Confederacy seems obviously not prideworthy. However, I will add that we can assume for the purposes of this example that the proud person is proud of all of and only the shameful aspects. It is worth noting that even for something that, *unlike* the Confederacy, in fact has some prideworthy aspects, expressing pride in such aspects might still be wrongful because it might appear that one is endorsing the thing as a whole, which might in turn harm symbolically.

[37] One morally problematic aspect of posing as a die-hard fan is the element of deception that is involved. This is not, however, the only morally problematic aspect in my view.

weather fans might reasonably be accused of disrespecting (or at least underappreciating) the steadfast commitment—which sometimes involves enduring great disappointment—that some people have to their teams. Hardcore fans would likely argue that fair-weather fans lack standing to feel pride by association when the team in question wins the championship, for example. While the team's accomplishment is in fact prideworthy, fair-weather fans lack the connection necessary to feel proper pride. *Who are they* to be proud?

Of course the ethical stakes are not so high in the case of sports fandom and we can argue about whether professional sports teams' and/or die-hard fandom itself are in fact proper objects of pride, but now consider a less innocuous cases of improper pride by association. Imagine a prideworthy social justice movement in the United States. Activists have worked tirelessly to achieve the various successes of the movement while many other Americans get to reap its benefits without having participated in the process. While it seems clear that activists ought to be proud of their association with the movement, we can imagine that these activists might reasonably object to some others taking pride in the movement. For example, of course Americans might justifiably be proud of the movement without having participated insofar as they are proud of what their fellow Americans have done, there is another type of objectionable pride in which one "poses" as having contributed to the outcome. Genuine activists might take issue with non-participants who are unduly proud of their association with a movement because such people seem to be taking credit for, or trying to gain recognition and status by associating themselves with, the activists' efforts. We might think that such non-participants—qua non-participant—lack the standing to be proud of the otherwise prideworthy social movement.

So far, my focus has been on improper pride related to oneself, first pride in oneself and aspects of oneself, and, then, pride in one's association with something. Now I will turn to cases

of improper pride directed at others, specifically cases in which taking pride in or being proud of others is morally objectionable.

4.3 Wrongful Interpersonal Pride

One might think that being proud of others can be inappropriate in various circumstances, but it is less obvious how or why such inappropriate pride could be morally objectionable. The following cases illuminate the range of ethical implications of instances of improper interpersonal pride (i.e., being proud of someone else). The first case involves being proud of someone for something that is not worthy of pride because the thing in question is just what should have been expected of that person. The second case concerns taking pride in someone with whom the prideful person lacks the requisite relationship (i.e., lacks standing). Finally, in the third and fourth case, in being proud, the prideful person fails to exercise humility and recognize one's *place* vis-a-vis the object of their pride.

Consider the first case. Growing up, my younger sister struggled to ask for directions because she was embarrassed to approach strangers. I know that she has since gotten over that fear, but my memory of it is still vivid. Now my sister and I are adult siblings and are peers in most respects. When we recently got lost while walking, my sister went up to a stranger to ask for directions. When she returned, I told her how proud I was of her for asking for directions. She rolled her eyes in response. Why did my pride bother her?

First, implicit in my pride was the view that it is still notable or remarkable—years later—that she asked for directions when, in fact, it is not. We can imagine that she would object to my pride in her by asking me why I would expect anything less of her. Thus, there are two morally relevant problems with my improper pride in this case. For one, I elevate myself and demean her by telling her that I am proud of her for doing this simple and un-prideworthy task;

my pride is patronizing. Second, in being proud of her for this, I reveal an element of surprise in my reaction to what she has done. This is offensive to her given that it should have been expected that, as the mature adult that she is, she would be able to ask for directions. Thus, we see one way in which improper pride can go awry: it can be condescending.[38]

It should be noted that, sometimes, one consistently meets or even exceeds a very high standard, such that what one does is expected and yet still worthy of pride. For example, some people are so often courageous that we come to expect it of them. If I am associated with this courageous person in the right ways, it seems that I can take pride in them despite that I expected them to act courageously. My focus is on cases in which the standard is *low* and it ought to be expected that one will meet it. Thus, I can distinguish between two cases: one is the case I described, in which the bar is low. The other case involves a high bar, but you expect the person to clear that bar because she usually does – but it takes great, sustained effort.

Another instance in which improper pride can be morally objectionable is when the subject in question lacks the requisite relationship to the prideworthy person, yielding the following response from the object of the pride: "who are YOU to be proud of me?" Imagine the following two cases. First consider an absent faculty member with whom a Ph.D. candidate, regrettably, has had no relationship. This faculty member expresses his pride in her for getting a job and she objects. Why? She objects because this faculty member has always culpably failed to participate in departmental culture, has somehow skirted the obligation to teach seminars, and has never mentored any graduate students. He has only ever focused on his own research. In the previous case, my sister's asking for directions was simply not prideworthy. In this case,

[38] See Fritz and Miller (2018) for an argument about the relationship between standing to blame and the equality of persons. They hold that in blaming without standing, the blamer treats himself as special and, in doing so, rejects "impartiality of morality" and its assumption of the equality of persons.

however, surely *someone* can reasonably take pride in the graduate student for getting a job—a prideworthy accomplishment—but this absent faculty members lacks standing. Why?

We might think that in expressing pride in the student for securing a job, the faculty member is or at least appears to be partially—and inappropriately—taking credit for the accomplishment despite his lack of contribution.[39] This would be a problem even if he had not shirked whatever particular advising obligations he had to the student, but is particularly problematic given that he did not in any way contribute to creating a supportive graduate program. Of course, there might be some things that it would be appropriate for that faculty member to express to the student, short of pride. For example, it might be appropriate to congratulate the student. And maybe the faculty member can appropriately take pride in *her department and university* as a result of that student's success. All I want to establish is that expressing a certain type of pride—namely pride that seems to be taking credit in some way—would be inappropriate.[40]

Now consider a related case involving lack of standing. I, a graduate student, attend a prestigious lecture delivered by a renowned faculty member from my department. After the lecture, I approach the faculty member to tell her how proud I am of her for her lecture. I am not saying that I am proud to be *associated* with her insofar as she represents our department (which might be appropriate); I am instead saying that I am proud *of* her for her lecture. While she might be puzzled by this reaction for a variety of reasons, she might also reasonably be put off. After

[39] Johann Frick raised the interesting possibility that the faculty member can avoid expressing morally improper pride if he first acknowledges that he played no role in the student's success and/or that she succeeded in spite of his lack of support. Such acknowledgments might cancel some of his pride's morally problematic implicature(s). In my view, his pride would still be improper (though maybe not *morally* improper) given his lack of connection to—and therefore lack of standing to be proud of—the student.

[40] One might also think that even if the faculty member is not taking credit via his pride, he still does not deserve to share in the joy and celebration of the student's success in the intimate way that pride does. The idea of pride as a privilege is worth further pursuit.

all, it seems that in being proud of her, I either (1) did not expect her to give a good lecture, as in the sister/direction case or (2) do not know my place relative to her, thus evincing a lack of humility or, worse, a lack of respect.

A final case involves elements of each of the three cases I have outlined. Recall my adult sister. At this point in our lives, our two-year age difference is not normally salient, nor should it be. We are peers now and, as such, we ought to view and treat each other as equals. When my sister starts her first job, I immediately revert back to "older sister" mode and convey to her how proud I am that she has officially joined the workforce (of which I have only been a part for two years). Once again, she is annoyed at me and accuses me of being patronizing. She tells me to stop sounding like our mom and reminds me that I am only two years her senior. It seems reasonable that she objects to my pride in this way despite my good intentions. After all, in that instance, I was not relating to her as an equal.

The cases described in this section are meant to draw attention to the ways in which we can *directly wrong others* through our feelings and expressions of improper pride. This distinguishes them from the reflexive cases of improper pride in oneself and improper pride by association, which wrong others in a more indirect way. Now I will turn to two potential objections in order to further explicate my views about the impropriety of pride.

5. Objections and Responses

One might agree with me that expressions of pride can be objectionable (morally or otherwise), but reject my claim that the emotion itself—without any accompanying expression—can be similarly objectionable. We can imagine that this opponent would argue as follows. Expressions of emotions often seem to be under our direct control and can therefore be normatively assessed on epistemic and/or moral grounds. Emotions themselves, on the other

hand, are not themselves proper objects of such assessment because they are not voluntary in the same way. Therefore, while unexpressed emotions can be improper in the sense of ill-fitting or inapt, they cannot be *objectionable*. In response, I will appeal to two distinctions. The first is the distinction between voluntariness and reasons-responsiveness. The second is between whether something is morally objectionable and whether an agent is blameworthy for that thing.

Before exploring cases of *morally* improper pride, I examined cases in which one's pride is improper because unreasonable. This charge of unreasonableness exhibits one way in which improper pride can be objectionable. In feeling pride improperly, one has failed to respond properly to the relevant reasons. If we think that pride is reasons-responsive, it seems that we can object to improper pride on epistemic grounds even if we are not convinced that the emotion is fully voluntary. After all, one has failed to respond properly to one's reasons, something to which others can reasonably object. Moreover, we might think that when one fails to respond properly to one's reasons, one has exhibited a character defect. Character defects are familiar candidates for normative appraisal.

At this point, one might concede that an emotion itself can be objectionable in the sense of unreasonable, but still wonder how a mere emotion can be *morally* objectionable. In proposing that one can exhibit a defect of rational character in feeling undue pride, I have offered one way in which undue pride is subject to some kind of ethical assessment. In order to further illustrate how pride can be *morally* objectionable, consider the distinction between something being morally objectionable and someone being blameworthy for that thing. I take it that much of the worry about the voluntariness of emotions is motivated by the idea that people should not be

blamed for things that are outside of their control. Thus, the argument goes, if emotions are not under our direct control, we should not be blamed for them.[41]

In response, I will argue that *even if* control is a prerequisite for blameworthiness, surely something need not be voluntary in order for it to be morally objectionable. Consider the case of unwarranted, unexpressed anger. It seems clear that it is morally objectionable, even if not blameworthy, to be angry at someone for no reason. In being unjustifiably angry, one has responded to the object of one's anger unfairly or, worse, has subjected that object to unwarranted hostility or distance simply by being angry. Regardless of whether a given target of undue anger has in fact been harmed by the anger, it does seem that this target can object to this anger on moral grounds without any underlying view about the voluntariness of that anger.

Given that we ordinarily think that the targets of unjustified anger can reasonably object to it on moral grounds, it is my contention that we can say something similar about unjustified pride. After all, undue pride exhibits at least one of the following ethical failures. First, one's improper pride can reveal mistaken values in that one fails to correctly discern what is prideworthy and, therefore, takes pride in the wrong things. Second, one's improper pride can (1) constitute a failure to treat others with respect, as in the case of condescending pride, or (2) reveal arrogance, as in the case of not knowing one's place vis-a-vis one's superiors. Here we see that improper pride can be morally objectionable without saying anything about whether the agents involved are blameworthy.

Thus, one route I can take in response to the discussed objection—while remaining neutral on the question of the voluntariness of emotions—is to maintain that even if non-voluntariness precludes *blaming* people for improper pride, it does not preclude all forms of

[41] See Helton (2020: pp.9-11) for a helpful discussion of this objection about voluntariness and blameworthiness in the context of belief, as well as a compelling response to it. See also Adams (1985).

moral assessment. We can therefore justifiably deem improper unexpressed pride morally objectionable even if the improperly proud person is not thereby *blameworthy* for it. In responding in this way, however, I am not endorsing the position that merely having an improper emotion cannot be blameworthy (in fact, I think that it can). In highlighting the distinction between something being morally objectionable and someone being blameworthy for that thing, my aim is rather to show that there is room for the opponent to accept more of my argument than just my claims about emotional *expressions*. After all, I have shown that one can agree that the emotion of pride can be morally objectionable, while still holding that subjects can only be blameworthy if that pride is voluntarily expressed.

The previous objection did not take issue with my argument about expressions of pride, only with my claims about unexpressed pride. Now I will turn to address the following potential objection about *expressions* of pride. One might argue that expressions of pride and expressions of negative emotions, such as anger, are importantly different in the following sense. Improper expressions of anger can obviously *harm*, whereas it is not clear that the forms of improper expressed pride that I have sketched similarly harm. We can imagine that this opponent might claim that unlike undue anger, undue pride is harmless and anyone who suggests otherwise is just being uptight. Thus, the argument might go, improper expressions of pride are not morally objectionable.

It seems that a strong version of this opponent's objection, namely that expressions of pride can *never* harm, is clearly incorrect. Consider the cases of expressed 'white pride' and expressed excessive pride in one's country that I sketched. These expressions of pride can clearly harm the relatively marginalized groups insofar as the pride endorses (or at least appears to endorse), and thereby perpetuates, the relevant oppressive structures.

At this point, however, my opponent might argue that even if *that* sort of expressed pride can be harmful, the form of other-directed condescending pride that I describe is harmless. In response, I will begin by making the case that condescending pride can in fact harm. Then, I will go on to distinguish between harming and wronging in order to show that even if one is not harmed by an improper expression of pride, one can still be wronged by it.

Consider the following case. Colleague A and Colleague B are peers at work. Colleague A is surprised every time her Colleague B speaks eloquently in a meeting despite the fact that Colleague B *always* speaks well in such meetings. Thus, it should come as no surprise to Colleague A. Colleague B once again speaks well in a meeting and, once again, Colleague A is surprised. In fact, this time, Colleague A is *proud of* Colleague B for her performance; after all, she exceeded her (albeit mistakenly low) expectations. After the meeting, Colleague A approaches Colleague B and expresses how proud she is of Colleague B's performance.

We can imagine two versions of the aftermath of this case. The first version serves as a counterexample to the opponent's claim that condescending pride does not harm. The second version highlights the distinction between harming and wronging and, in doing so, serves as a counterexample to the opponent's assumption that harmless expressions of pride cannot be morally objectionable.

In the first version of the case, Colleague B's self-esteem plummets upon Colleague A's expression of improper pride. Colleague B immediately begins to question her own speaking skills. After all, why is Colleague A so surprised and proud of her for this performance? Was it not expected that she would meet a high standard? Colleague B concludes that Colleague A must see herself as superior because she is giving the kind of feedback that, in this particular case, it might be appropriate for a manager to offer, but is just condescending in the case of a peer. Next

time Colleague B gets ready to speak at a meeting, she is filled with self-doubt. Clearly, Colleague A's condescending pride has harmed Colleague B and Colleague B can object on *moral* grounds.

Now consider another version of the case. Colleague B is puzzled by Colleague A's expression of pride in her performance. She finds it odd, maybe even rude, but her self-confidence remains intact. She regards Colleague A's insinuations as insulting, but she remains unaffected by them. Thus, we can confidently say that Colleague B is not harmed by Colleague A's expression of pride. In this case, is my opponent right in thinking that the improper pride is harmless and therefore not morally objectionable? I think not.

In the case in which Colleague B is unharmed by Colleague A's condescending expression of pride, Colleague B is still *wronged* by Colleague A. After all, Colleague A has still failed to treat Colleague B as an equal and failed to accord her the respect that she deserves.[42] While Colleague B's self-esteem might be robust enough to withstand Colleague A's condescension such that she is unharmed by it, she can nevertheless object to it on moral grounds. Thus, we can see that harming and wronging can come apart. If an improper expression of pride wrongs someone, it is morally objectionable even if no one is harmed as a result. This distinction can be employed to overcome the opponent's objection that what follows if improper pride is harmless is that it is morally innocuous.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I have discussed various ways in which pride—both the emotion itself and its expression—can be inappropriate. I argued that in order for pride—whether the emotion itself or its expression—to be proper, (1) the object of the pride must be prideworthy; (2) the

[42] Of course there will be different ways of cashing out what the wrong consists in (e.g., a rights violation) depending on one's view of morality.

pride must be of an appropriate degree; (3) the subject must have standing to be proud; and (4) the feeling and/or expression of pride must be morally permissible. Through a series of cases, I outlined different ways in which instances of pride can violate one or more of these conditions.

This chapter had two primary aims. The first was to make the case that pride has a standing condition. The second was to reveal that pride can be morally objectionable. Thus, I hope to have drawn attention to two potentially counterintuitive phenomena: that one can make a mistake in being proud of a prideworthy object and that this mistake—amongst other mistakes one can make with respect to pride—can make pride morally improper.

Chapter Two

Interpersonal Shame

Introduction

Feeling ashamed of others is a common part of our social and emotional lives, and yet the experience of this sort of shame is notably absent from many philosophical discussions of the emotion. Prominent accounts of shame are concerned primarily—and often exclusively—with self-directed instances of shame (i.e., feeling ashamed of oneself). What these accounts have in common is the view that shame is an emotion of negative self-assessment, and they describe the content of this assessment in various ways, as a loss of self-respect[43], self-esteem[44], or a sense of failure with respect to some standard(s) or ideal(s)[45]. In what follows, I will show that in focusing exclusively on self-directed shame, extant views of shame fail to incorporate a primary instance of the emotion, as they do not fit cases of being ashamed of *others*. My aim is both to bring to the fore this under-theorized type of shame—what I will call 'interpersonal' or 'other-directed' shame—and discuss its conceptual implications. In particular, I will argue that examining other-directed shame reveals that shame does not constitutively involve negative self-assessment, and, in fact, need not involve any self-assessment at all.

This chapter has two parts. The first part will take the following form. I will begin by discussing why it is surprising that other-directed shame has been overlooked. Then, I will introduce shame in the vein in which it is traditionally discussed, and, in doing so, will briefly

[43] See Rawls (1971: pp. 388-391) for an argument that shame is "a feeling that someone has when he experiences an injury to his self-respect or suffers a low to his self-esteem" (388).
[44] Rawls does not distinguish between self-esteem and self-respect in his discussion of shame. See Taylor (1985: pp. 77-80) for a useful discussion of Rawls' view and an argument for the distinction between self-esteem and self-respect as it pertains to shame. See also Deonna, Rodogno, and Teroni (2012: pp.84-88) for a helpful survey of views about the relationship between shame, self-esteem, and self-worth.
[45] See Mason (2010) and Maibom (2010). See Calhoun (2004) for a compelling argument against the view that people only feel shame when they have transgressed ideals that they themselves endorse.

sketch Gabriele Taylor's account of shame both because of its influence and because it is representative of the standard philosophical treatment of shame. My aim is to use Taylor's account as a lens through which to reveal that accounts of self-directed shame do not always fit other-directed instances. I will show how, in crucial respects, other-directed shame does not resemble self-directed shame, so in focusing exclusively on self-directed shame, existing views of shame are found wanting. Accounts of shame must take seriously the common experience of being ashamed of others if they are to do justice to the full range and variety of shame experiences.

After I highlight the importance and relevance of other-directed shame, I will, in the second part of the chapter, compare it to other-directed pride, which I discussed in the last chapter. Here I will outline what I take to be the main types of other-directed pride and shame with an eye toward illuminating a significant asymmetry between pride and shame. This asymmetry, I argue, is only evident through an examination of other-directed instances of both emotions, revealing yet another reason to take other-directed pride and shame seriously.

1. Other-Directed Shame: The Mystery of its Absence

The fact that the philosophical treatment of shame has largely[46] ignored its other-directed instances is surprising for at least four reasons. First, feeling ashamed of others is a normal and widespread experience in response to the shameful actions or attributes of those with whom we identify. As with other-directed pride, other-directed shame is an ordinary feature of interpersonal relationships and of group membership; we experience, for example, shame about

[46] Thomason (2018) only discusses shame about others on pp. 107-108 in her book on shame. Deonna, Rodogno, and Teroni (2012) discuss "shame for others" on pp. 112-113 where this mainly refers to "second-hand" shame. Peter Hacker is one of the rare philosophers to offer a sustained discussion of other-directed shame. However, he does not attempt to offer an account of shame, but rather a 'connective analysis' of observations about the relationship between shame, embarrassment, and guilt. See Hacker (2017).

family members in the interpersonal case and about compatriots in the group case. Given shame's role in our relationships, whether individual- or group-level, it is surprising that accounts of shame have not incorporated one of its seemingly paradigmatic instances.

A second reason that the lack of analysis of other-directed shame is surprising is because many debates about shame concern whether shame is necessarily tied to an audience, in particular whether a concern for how one appears in front of others is constitutive of shame. I will argue that in instances of other-directed shame, we are primarily—sometimes exclusively—concerned with how the people around us will view us in light of our connection to another person, and this often amounts to a concern for protecting our own reputation. Insofar as instances of other-directed shame seem to lend support to the view that an audience plays a central role in the experience of shame, it is surprising that they are hardly mentioned in arguments in favor of this position. Moreover, one would think that those who defend the claim that shame is an emotion of 'self-protection'[47] would find other-directed shame ripe with examples of shame involving a concern for protecting our own image.

A related, but distinct, reason that other-directed shame's absence from discussions of shame is puzzling is that there is an emphasis on the 'social nature' of shame and the role that it plays in our social lives and moral communities[48]. The fact that the experience of being ashamed of others is missing from discussions of the social nature of shame is ironic, as a prime example of its social nature is left out. Shame's role in our social lives is instead limited to debates about (1) whether an audience—real or imagined—is necessary for shame[49] and (2) whether the experience of shame is associated with pro- or anti-social tendencies on the part of the individual

[47] See Taylor (1985).
[48] See Calhoun (2004), Williams (1993), Maibom (2010), and Thomason (2018).
[49] See Deonna, Rodogno, and Teroni (2012: Chapter 1).

who feels it[50]. I maintain that being ashamed of others is part and parcel of the social nature of shame.

The final reason that the lack of attention to other-directed shame is perplexing is that the existence of other-directed shame is one feature that distinguishes shame from guilt. We only feel (appropriately) guilty about things for which we take ourselves to be responsible or at fault, and not about things for which we perceive only others to be responsible or at fault. People feel *ashamed*, on the other hand, both of themselves and of others. For example, insofar as we think that guilt is tied to responsibility, it would be a mistake for me to feel *guilty* about my friend's wrongful act if I had no role in it, but it might be fitting for me to feel ashamed about what she has done.

In at least one respect, the fact that other-directed shame is mentioned at most in passing in accounts of shame make sense. After all, I will argue, other-directed shame does not fit neatly into accounts of self-directed shame. In particular, when we are ashamed of others, we do not always exhibit some of the allegedly characteristic features of shame, such as judging ourselves negatively. My aim in calling attention to cases of other-directed shame is not to show that accounts of self-directed shame are fatally flawed as accounts of self-directed shame. Rather, my aim is to suggest that if we are to provide a *full* account of shame, we must contend with its other-directed instances. Much has been made of providing a 'unified' account of shame, where that refers to making sense of both 'moral' and 'natural' shame[51]. I hope to show that the project of providing a unified account of shame should also be concerned with accommodating the

[50] See Manion (2002) and Nussbaum (2004). See also Snoek, McGeer, Bradenburg, and Kennett (2021) for an interesting discussion of the constructive and destructive aspects of both shame and guilt with respect to addiction recovery.

[51] We might think of this distinction as, roughly, moral versus bodily shame. See Thomason (2018: Chapter 3) for a detailed discussion of this distinction.

experience of being ashamed of oneself and that of being ashamed of others. I will now turn to a discussion of what shame is according to traditional accounts.

2. What is Shame?: The Standard Account

Imagine that you have waited for 30 minutes in the check-out line at a local grocery store. The grocery store has fallen on hard times as a result of the Covid-19 pandemic, and is understaffed and struggling to stay afloat. You get so impatient with the long line that you leave it and, without paying, discreetly walk out of the store with your items. Once you get inside of your car in the store parking lot, you are overwhelmed with shame over what you have done. What are you experiencing here and why? This is what accounts of shame aim to explain.

Shame is one of the most universally unwelcome emotions. Standard accounts of shame maintain that shame is a painful feeling in response to a perceived failure to live up to one's own and/or society's standards. This is sometimes a moral failure, but it need not be; all shame seems to connect to (and indeed reflect) one's own or society's values, but familiar objects of shame involve non-moral values as well as moral. For example, one can be ashamed of some aspect of one's appearance without thinking that there is any moral value at stake. Not all failures are met with shame, though; shame is considered to be a particularly severe assessment of oneself as, for example, unworthy[52], degraded, disgraced, or spoiled[53], either in one's own eyes or in the eyes of others. The experience of shame is often associated with a desire to hide or shrink, and there is considerable disagreement about whether shame assumes an audience in front of which one has exposed[54] oneself in an unflattering way. It is a further source of disagreement whether shame necessarily involves a 'global' assessment of oneself and one's character, or whether it can be

[52] Deonna, Rodogno, and Teroni (2012: p. 104).
[53] See Nussbaum (2004).
[54] Velleman (2001) argues that shame is a response to our inability to control how we appear to others.

limited to a 'local' assessment of a shameful attribute or action[55]. Either way, standard accounts of shame are united in holding that shame essentially involves a negative self-assessment, whether that is the 'global' assessment that one has poor character or the 'local' assessment that a given attribute or action reflects poorly on oneself (stopping short of concluding that one has poor character altogether).

2.1 Taylor's Account of Shame

Gabriele Taylor's view of shame[56] is representative of standard accounts of shame. As such, my response to her account applies more broadly to accounts of shame that take negative self-assessment to be constitutive of the emotion. Taylor's account of shame is nicely captured in the following two passages:

> There is firstly the self-directed adverse judgment of the person feeling shame: she feels herself degraded, not the sort of person she believed, assumed, or hoped she was or anyway should be. This judgment is constitutive of the emotion, it is the person's identificatory belief (64).

> This is not to say that whenever injury to self-respect then also the experience of shame. For it is conceivable that such injury or loss may not be noticed by the agent. It is the converse which is always true: whenever a person experiences shame then he experiences an injury to his self-respect (80).

According to Taylor, a negative self-assessment—in particular, a loss of self-respect—is constitutive of shame. In order to grasp her view, let us return to the shoplifting case. She would describe the shame the shoplifter experiences as follows: when the shoplifter gets in the car, he realizes that he has just done something that is a clear violation of his values, prompting him to think less of himself and of his character. In feeling shame, he necessarily experiences a loss of self-respect, according to Taylor.

[55] See Deonna, Rodogno, and Teroni (2012) and Thomason (2018).
[56] Taylor (1985).

While Taylor's view might be persuasive with respect to self-directed shame, I will now show that it cannot extend to other-directed cases. Imagine this time that you are grocery shopping with a friend. You waited the 30 minutes in line, paid for your items, and met your friend at the exit of the store. Once you get to the parking lot, your friend says that he was not in the mood to wait in the long line so he stole his items. You feel a pang of shame – you might even tell him that you are ashamed of him for what he has done. On Taylor's account, when you feel ashamed of what your friend has done, you are judging *yourself* negatively and you experience a loss of self-respect. I think that this is clearly not the case.

When you experience shame about your friend, it might be true that you necessarily judge *him* negatively and even lose respect for *him*. However, it is not at all intuitive that you judge *yourself* negatively or lose respect for *yourself* in such cases. In fact, in being ashamed of your friend, you might think relatively highly of yourself, allowing you to maintain or even bolster your self-respect. After all, you might hold that you would never do such a thing, and, in thinking this, you actually affirm your good character. Often when we feel ashamed of others, we are distancing ourselves from their behavior and expressing that, despite our association, we do not condone what they have done.

Of course it might be the case that when faced with the shameful behavior of someone with whom you associate, you come to question your own character. Maybe you wonder if the fact that you associate with them suggests that you are a worse person than you thought, or maybe you worry that you played a role in—or could have prevented—their shameful act. I do not wish to deny that being ashamed of others might be accompanied by a negative self-assessment or a loss of self-respect, but I think it is clear that this is not typically the case. Thus,

in my view, the constitutive claims that Taylor makes about shame are unsound because in being ashamed of someone else, I can maintain a positive view of myself.

It is surprising that Taylor does not incorporate other-directed shame into her account because she discusses at some length instances in which we feel embarrassed about the behavior of others (72). Taylor might claim that instances of what I am calling other-directed shame are really just instances of embarrassment. It seems clear, though, that when I learn that my friend has just stolen items from our struggling grocery store, I am not embarrassed by him. Embarrassment does not capture the sense in which I am judging his *character* for what he has done. Thus, Taylor cannot set aside the cases I am interested in by labeling them as embarrassment. Embarrassment does not capture the severity of the judgment involved in, for example, my judgment of my friend, nor does it explain cases in which there is no audience (such as when we are alone in the grocery store parking lot). Moreover, even if, for example, the store owner had witnessed my friend stealing and confronted us about it, it seems natural that I would feel ashamed of what my friend has done, and not just embarrassed by it. Embarrassment seems better suited to describe what I might feel if, while shopping together, my friend accidentally knocked down all of the watermelons from the produce stand.

2.2 Other-Directed Shame: Self-Directed Shame in Disguise?

A natural thought that arises at this point is whether being ashamed of others just is an instance of being ashamed of oneself, such that self-directed and other-directed shame are really one and the same. According to this view, when I am, for example, ashamed of a friend for doing something shameful, I am just ashamed of *myself* for being friends with her. If this is true, then it seems that Taylor's claim that shame constitutively involves negative self-judgment is plausible even with respect to other-directed cases. Thus, one might respond to what I have said so far by

conceding that Taylor's account can be criticized for failing to address other-directed cases, but, at the same time, maintain that her account can accommodate such cases.

In sum, Taylor—and other proponents of traditional accounts of shame as negative self-assessment—might hold that being ashamed of a friend necessarily involves a negative evaluation of oneself; I negatively evaluate myself for, for instance, being 'the sort of person' that is friends with someone like *that*. I, by contrast, will argue that other-directed shame, such as being ashamed of this friend, need not involve a negative *self*-assessment, and, instead, might only involve the belief or fear that one's own image has been—or will be—tarnished in the eyes of others.

The desire to shrink or disappear that is typical of self-directed shame, amounts in the other-directed case to a desire to hide from others one's association with the 'disgraced' person. Other-directed shame of this sort responds to a perceived threat to one's reputation, whether that be one's moral reputation or one's general social standing. This makes sense of the fact that being ashamed of others often involves a desire to distance oneself or disassociate from the other person in order to preserve one's own public image. Being ashamed of others, at least on many occasions, does not involve negative self-assessment on the part of the subject, but rather a fear that the 'stain'[57] of shame will bleed onto them via association. If we return to the friend case, we see that, on my account, being ashamed of a friend might not involve the judgment that *I* am somehow deficient for being friends with her, but rather a desire to hide the fact of my friendship with her out of fear that I will be *seen* as a person of bad—or questionable—character, in the eyes of others, by association.

[57] I borrow the term 'stain' from Hacker (2017) on shame.

What accounts of self-directed shame get wrong, on my view, is that shame constitutively involves negative self-assessment. It seems true that being ashamed of oneself constitutively involves negative self-assessment, but when we are ashamed of others, we can, on my view, maintain a positive view of ourselves. Of course we might not have a positive view of ourselves in the first place, so my general claim is that being ashamed of others need not involve any sort of critical view of the self. In fact, sometimes when we are ashamed of someone else, we experience higher regard for ourselves by comparison, or our high self-regard becomes salient in the process of judging the other person as defective.[58] I will now offer two cases to support my claim that shame need not involve negative self-assessment.

First, consider a case of being ashamed of some of one's compatriot while in a foreign country. Imagine that I am an American tourist in Spain and I am on some sort of cultural tour with a group of people, only one of whom is also American. Throughout the tour, the other American makes offensive remarks about the aspects of Spanish culture that we are learning about. The non-Americans on the tour are some combination of appalled, insulted, and disgusted by his commentary. I share these sentiments, but, in addition, I am *ashamed* of him. I am ashamed to be associated with him. I strongly oppose the objectionable views he has shared, and, as a fellow American in the group, I wish to dissociate from him – I wish to hide the fact of our shared nationality from the other members of the group. After all, I do not want them to wonder whether I, too, hold these views since I am also American.

[58] Later in the chapter, I will argue that not only does shame not constitutively involve a negative assessment of oneself, but also being ashamed of another person does not even require that one holds a negative view of that person. Some episodes of other-directed shame might only involve a concern that one will be perceived negatively in light of one's connection to this person that *others* view as shameful, even if one does not oneself share this judgment. This might be the case with a parent being ashamed of a transgender child, for example.

When I am ashamed of my compatriot in this case, I fear that he is giving Americans 'a bad name' and, in particular, that his shameful remarks will damage *my* standing in the group. What is clear, though, is that I am not assessing *myself* negatively in this instance. In fact, it seems that when I am ashamed of my compatriot, it is especially salient to me that I am *not* that type of person; my character is *not* defective in that way. I appreciate and am respectful of other cultures, and I hope that the group recognizes that I am not deserving of the same negative assessment as my compatriot.

Now consider a different case. Imagine that my aunt is an active Facebook user who makes frequent public posts claiming, for example, that the coronavirus is a hoax or that the 2020 presidential election was fraudulent. I cringe every time I encounter her posts, and feel a pang of shame about what she has said. After all, she is in *my* family and the fact that she has these beliefs will be exposed to our mutual friends. In a heated debate at the Thanksgiving table, I tell her that I am ashamed of her. I am distraught that someone in my family holds her views and, further, that I might be associated with such views. As in the last case, though, I am not judging myself negatively in light of her views. I do not think that there is something deficient about *me*. Rather, the source and focus of my shame is her questionable character and the fact that I am associated with her.

It is beyond the scope of this chapter to offer a full analysis of other-directed shame. My aim here was to bring other-directed shame 'onto the map' and to show that instances of other-directed shame do not obviously involve negative self-assessment, therefore presenting a serious problem for standard accounts of shame.

3. Other-Directed Pride vs. Other-Directed Shame

Now that I have introduced other-directed shame and highlighted its potential implications, I will compare it to other-directed pride. In the last chapter, I demonstrated various ways in which pride can be morally objectionable, and, in the process, explored different ways in which one can be inappropriately proud of another person. So far in this chapter, I have examined the experience of being ashamed of another person, and argued that it has important conceptual upshots for traditional theories of shame. In what remains, I will systematize the discussion other-directed pride *and* other-directed shame in order to compare the two. I will argue that there are three types of other-directed pride, and that there are shame analogs to only two of these types of pride, thus yielding an asymmetry between the two emotions.

After establishing the asymmetry, I will offer a possible explanation for it. Then, I will make the conceptual claim that pride and shame, as it turns out, are *not* contraries[59] 'all the way down' because there is no phenomenon that constitutes non-contributory, non-associative shame. In addition, I will make the normative claim that the fact that doing something shameful implicates one's close associates is one reason not to do the shameful thing. By contrast, the mere fact that one's close associates would be proud does not provide an additional consideration in favor of doing the prideworthy thing.

As I began to explore in the first chapter, when we are proud of others, it does not always involve taking credit for their achievements or a desire to highlight our connection to them or their achievement. When we identify with family and friends, for example, but do not take certain prideworthy achievements of theirs to reflect well on us, the pride is not self-focused. Rather, because we identify in some way with those close to us, we can share in their successes

[59] See Isenberg (1949) for an argument that pride and shame (as opposed to pride and humility) are contraries.

without claiming any responsibility. In being proud of those with whom we are closely connected, we celebrate them and their prideworthy attributes or accomplishments in an intimate way, whereas we would just admire or be in awe of the same success if the person were instead an acquaintance. This type of pride, what I will later refer to as non-contributory, non-associative pride, is not self-centered (in a neutral, non-pejorative sense of the term) because even though it involves identification—without which there would be no pride—it does not involve taking responsibility or credit for the prideworthy object, nor the judgment that one appears in a positive light due to it. This sort of pride is truly other-directed insofar as we are proud of A for X, as opposed to being proud of *ourselves* for our role in A's achievement of X.

In what follows, I argue that other-directed shame does not admit of anything analogous to this species of pride, marking a significant asymmetry between pride and shame. Being ashamed of others for who they are or what they have done is, I will argue, necessarily self-focused. Shame is always analogous to the sort of pride in others in which one takes the prideworthy achievement to reflect well on oneself, whether for a contributory or non-contributory reason. I maintain that when we are ashamed of someone with whom we identify in a certain way, we are always concerned with the possibility of people (whether a real or hypothetical audience) viewing us negatively in light of our relationship to the person who has done the shameful thing. While we can be proud of others in a way that is primarily, if not exclusively, about *them*, we cannot coherently say "I am ashamed of you, but I do not care what anyone thinks about me due to your shameful behavior." By contrast, it seems that with respect to pride, it is intelligible to say "I am proud of you, but I do not care what anyone thinks about me in light of your prideworthy achievement."

3.1 Other-Directed Pride

There are at least three main types of interpersonal or other-directed pride: contributory pride, associative pride, and non-contributory, non-associative pride.[60] I will sketch each of this in turn, ultimately with an eye toward arguing that there is no non-contributory, non-associative shame and that all other-directed shame is associative. I should preface the discussion with the claim that, in the context of interpersonal relationships, we feel (proper) pride and shame only about those with whom we identify, so while these will often be one's close associates, they need not be. For example, I might identify with a stranger due to our common nationality, religion, or political party, and, as such, might appropriately feel proud or ashamed of what they do. For now, it suffices to note that my discussion here will be limited to instances of other-directed pride and shame in which the proud or ashamed person, Person A, identifies with the object of pride or shame, namely Person B or what Person B has done, and Person A assumes that the association between Person A and Person B is salient to some audience.

Now let us return to the three types of pride. Contributory pride is the sort of pride we feel in response to the achievement of someone with whom we identify when (1) we regard the person's achievement as prideworthy and (2) we judge that we played an important role in the achievement. Contributory pride arises due to one's *recognition* that one played an important role. To illustrate this type of pride, consider the pride that parents might feel about their own child's academic success. Let us imagine that these parents played an active and supportive role in their child's education, such that the parents could reasonably claim something like partial

[60] I should note that there are instances in which one's contributory and associative pride might overlap, such that one's pride constitutes both contributory *and* associative pride. I do not present this as its own category (i.e., contributory, associative pride) because it is just a combination of two primary types of pride, namely contributory and associative. Non-contributory, non-associative pride, by contrast, is not captured under either of these two primary types of pride, so needs its own category.

responsibility for the child's success. At the child's college graduation, the parents might feel contributory pride about the child's achievement. Compare this to the pride that a close family friend might feel about the child's graduation. Of course a close family friend might have played a role in the child's life that would warrant contributory pride, but let us assume that this is not the case. The family friend might appropriately be proud of the child's achievement, but she would not be proud in the contributory sense.

It is worth noting that contributory pride need not be self-aggrandizing or self-absorbed when felt for good reason and to an appropriate degree. One might wonder whether contributory pride is just being proud of oneself in response to something that someone else has done, as opposed to being proud of the other person. I do not think this accurately describes certain cases. After all, taking oneself to have contributed to another person's success does not necessarily—and ought not—involve overestimating one's own contribution or thinking that the achievement primarily reflects well on oneself, as opposed to on the other person. Rather, contributory pride can be a *participatory* sort of pride in which one celebrates the prideworthy achievement from the unique perspective of someone who has played a particularly important role in the prideworthy achievement. It is just because of the parents' level of involvement that they might feel contributory pride; it is not necessarily the case that they are focused on their contribution when they feel contributory pride.

Of course contributory pride can go awry, such as when one inappropriately takes complete or disproportionate credit for the prideworthy achievement of someone else. In Chapter One, I presented the case of the absent advisor who unjustifiably feels contributory pride about his advisee's success. Given his failures as an advisor and associated lack of contribution to her achievements, I argue, he does not have standing to be proud in a contributory way, so his pride

is improper. By contrast, the pride that a hands-on, supportive advisor feels about her students seems like a paradigmatic instance of appropriate contributory pride.

Now consider associative pride. In one sense, all pride is associative because, as I have said, one must identify with the other person in order for pride to be intelligible. Without identification, one might esteem, admire, or be in awe of another person, but one would not be proud of them. If one were proud without the requisite connection, it would be inappropriate, if not unintelligible. So, pride requires some degree of association, particularly the sort that involves identification, but still not all pride is what I call associative pride.

Associative pride is the sort of pride that we feel about our association with another person who has done something prideworthy, where the object of pride makes essential reference to the association. Associative pride assumes an audience, whether real or imagined, insofar as one is glad about and wants to highlight one's association with another person in light of that person's prideworthy achievement. One takes one's association with another person to reflect well on oneself, but not for the same reason as in the case of contributory pride. It is not that one takes partial credit for the achievement, but rather that one is proud to be connected to the other person in the eyes of others.

Consider the case of the college graduation. Recall that the parents feel contributory pride about their child's graduation due to their integral role in the child's success. Now imagine the pride that the graduate's siblings might feel. Although the siblings could, in theory, appropriately feel contributory pride, let us assume that this does not in fact accurately characterize their pride. Instead, imagine that their sister is valedictorian and, as such, is publicly recognized at the graduation for her academic excellence. When she gives her valedictorian speech, her siblings beam with pride; that is *their* sister up on stage. I maintain that the sort of pride they might feel

in this instance is associative pride. They are proud to be her siblings; they are proud to be associated with her. Her prideworthy achievement reflects well on them because other people will likely view them in a positive light given their connection to her, but, crucially, not because they are assumed to have contributed to her academic success.

At this point, one might have a similar worry about associative pride to the one I raised about contributory pride. One might be concerned that having associative pride in response to the achievements of another person is necessarily self-absorbed. After all, one might argue, the focus should be on the other person and that person's achievement, and not about the fact that one is associated with that person. I only raise this worry because my response to it will clarify my understanding of associative pride.

In my view, the concern that associative pride is necessarily vain stems from too literal and simplistic an understanding of associative pride. When the siblings are proud to be associated with their sister, it is not that they are making the achievement all about them or how they are perceived by, for example, the other graduation attendees. They are not flaunting their connection, but, by having associative pride, they are celebrating the fact that one of their own, someone with whom they identify, is being commended in a public way. We might think of associative pride as a celebration of the personal victory of a team member in which the other teammates are happy to share in the spotlight, not because they are selfish or opportunistic, but because of their excitement that *one of them* has succeeded. Of course associative pride, like other types of pride, can be objectionable, but it need not be.

Now let us turn to what I take to be the final species of other-directed pride, namely non-associative, non-contributory pride, or what I will call 'purely other-directed pride.' This is the sort of pride for which I will argue that there is no shame-analog. When one feels purely other-

directed pride, one leaves oneself out of it, as the name suggests. When people feel this sort of pride, they do not take themselves to have contributed to the other person's achievement, nor is the fact that other people will associate them with this person a reason for their pride. Purely other-directed pride occurs *due to* one's identification with another person, but the object of the pride in this case is exclusively the other person and that person's achievement. Purely other-directed pride has nothing to do with the character or reputation of the person who feels it even though it is grounded in one's identification with the other person.

Consider, for example, the close friends of the college graduate that I discussed earlier. The friends might be proud of the graduate in a non-contributory, non-associative way in which they proud of her for her sake. They identify with her, but not with what she has done, and, therefore, are unconcerned with their own involvement in her achievement and potential benefits they might reap from that achievement[61]. They take joy in and celebrate her achievement in a particularly intimate way, namely by being proud, because they identify with her. However, their pride does not involve a judgment that they are partially responsible for her accomplishment, nor the judgment that others will regard them highly because their friend graduated. Thus, the object of their pride is exclusively the friend and what she has done; they are not proud of *themselves* for their friend's graduation, nor are they necessarily proud to be associated with her because she graduated.

Consider also the pride one might feel as part of a collective or group agent, such as a university body.[62] Professor A and B are both Princeton University professors, but in different departments. Professor A, a chemist, is reading *The New Yorker* and discovers that her colleague, Professor B, in the English department has won a prestigious literary prize. Professor A swells

[61] We might think of this as not being concerned with what Brennan and Pettit (2005) term 'borrowed glory'.
[62] Thanks to Philip Pettit for encouraging me to think about pride and group agency.

with pride upon reading about the success of her colleague. They are part of the same community and, as such, take pride in each other's successes in a way that they would not without this connection. Despite identifying with Professor B in virtue of their shared membership in the Princeton community, Professor A does not take any *credit* for Professor B's success—she might not even know her personally—nor does she think that Professor B's award might reflect well on her in the eyes of others. After all, Professor A is a chemist, so it is implausible that anyone would think highly of her for her colleague's *literary* prize. Thus, it is not accurate to describe her pride as about being associated with Professor B. It is true that Professor A identifies with Professor B insofar as they have in common the characteristic of being members of the Princeton faculty; this is what accounts for the fact that she is proud, rather than merely impressed, as she might be by a faculty member from another university. I maintain that Professor A is proud of Professor B in a non-contributory, non-associative way.

3.2 Other-Directed Shame

Now that I have outlined the three types of other-directed pride, I will show that there are only two types of other-directed shame: contributory associative and non-contributory associative. Other-directed contributory shame is the shame that we feel when we take ourselves to have played a role in a shameful thing that someone else has done and, therefore, judge that it reflects poorly on us in addition to on them. While contributory pride involves celebrating one's perceived role in another person's prideworthy success, contributory shame involves self-criticism about and a desire to conceal one's perceived role in another person's shameful behavior. Despite the fact that these instances of pride and shame are a response to the actions of another person, they are felt from a particularly 'close' vantage point because one takes some responsibility for the outcome (good or bad).

Sometimes the judgements about our own role that ground contributory shame are accurate and, other times, mistaken. Consider the following case. Imagine the shame that one might feel if one's child is expelled from graduate school for plagiarism. In response, the student's parents might question their parenting and the values they have instilled—or failed to instill—in their child. Let us imagine that, in one version of the case, while understandable, it is in fact unreasonable for the parents to blame themselves or take partial responsibility for their child's behavior because they raised him responsibly. They did not in fact contribute to the shameful act. Moreover, their child is an adult now and the parents do not have control over what he does. Their contributory shame in this case is unwarranted because they have misjudged their own culpability. By contrast, we can imagine another version of the case in which when helping their child with homework when he was younger, the parents suggested that he simply copy and paste from Wikipedia. In this case, the causal connection between the child's upbringing and decision to plagiarize is clear, seemingly rendering contributory shame appropriate on the part of the parents. In both cases, in feeling contributory shame, the parents take their child's behavior to reflect poorly on their parenting and feel that it has tarnished their self-image and the image that others might have of them.

Just as I noted in the discussion of the three types of pride, there is one sense in which all other-directed shame is associative. After all, we feel ashamed of another person or what another person has done precisely because we identify—and associate ourselves—with that person. Without the identification component, one might be appalled or disgusted by another person's shameful actions, but one would not be ashamed of them. Association, it seems, is a prerequisite for shame, just as it is for pride.

There is another way in which all shame is associative that is not true for pride, though. This is where the asymmetry between pride and shame becomes salient; I will show that there is no category of non-contributory, non-associative shame. While not all shame is contributory because often we have not played a role in the bad choices and behavior of those close to us, I will argue that all shame, including contributory shame, is associative. Associative pride is a distinct type of pride because only in certain instances of pride is there a consideration of one's own social standing and image in light of the other person's prideworthy achievement. In such cases, one is proud to be associated with the person where the object of pride is the association itself. A concern for one's association to the person who has done the shameful thing or to the shameful thing itself is just *what it is* to be ashamed. The object of other-directed shame is always, at least partially, one's association to the other person or to what they have done.

What accounts for the fact that all shame is associative while not all pride is associative? In my view, unlike pride, shame constitutively involves a concern for how one is perceived by a real or hypothetical audience. Thus, when one is ashamed of what someone else has done, one is overwhelmed by a desire to disassociate or hide one's association to that person or that person's shameful actions. By contrast, pride does not constitutively involve a desire to be associated with the person who has done the prideworthy thing. We can set aside considerations of our own self-conception, character, and public image/reputation when we are proud of others, as in the case of the college graduate's friends, but not when we are ashamed of others. We cannot 'leave ourselves out of shame,' as we do when we feel non-contributory, non-associative pride, because what it is to be ashamed is to care about how something reflects on oneself and one's own character.

4. Explaining the Asymmetry

In this section, I offer an explanation of this asymmetry. In doing so, I will describe some of our psychological responses and social norms surrounding pride and shame, which appear consistent over time and across cultures. I claim that in the eyes of an audience, the 'stain' of shameful acts bleeds onto one's associates in a way that the 'glory'[63] of prideworthy acts does not extend to one's associates. Furthermore, I suggest that there are good reasons for this discrepancy. I should clarify, though, that my aim in this section is not to prove an empirical claim about our psychological responses to shameful and prideworthy acts. If my assumptions about the underlying psychology of this asymmetry turn out to be false, that does not threaten my argument for the asymmetry and its implications.

I have noted that just as a psychological fact, we seem to associate people's shameful actions with their close associates in a way that we do not normally associate people's prideworthy actions with their close associates. When someone does something shameful, particularly in a public setting, this person's close associates are often judged and criticized for having a close relationship to the person[64]. People take the fact of the close relationship to reflect poorly on the associates even if they played no role in the shameful act itself, and to reflect even more poorly on associates who aided in or enabled it.

Consider, for example, the way in which people's perceptions of Bernie Madoff's friends and family might have changed after his Ponzi scheme became public news, or how various

[63] I borrow the term 'glory' from Brennan and Pettit (2005).

[64] In a discussion of group membership, association, and esteem, Brennan and Pettit (2005) claim: "Members' esteem will suffer if they are associated with the disesteemed!" (228). It is interesting to note that Brennan and Pettit are focused on esteem (and disesteem) *of others*, as opposed to *self*-esteem (and disesteem), which mirrors my focus being proud or ashamed of others, as opposed to being proud or ashamed of oneself. Their focus on esteem as a commodity also supports my view that the 'stain' of shame is a real and consequential social phenomenon.

actors were viewed when their close relationship with Harvey Weinstein was highlighted. There is a real sense in which when one does something shameful, particularly something as abhorrent as Madoff or Weinstein's actions, shame is 'brought upon' others in addition to the individual. After all, it is natural to wonder whether the fact that the person's close associates *are* close associates suggests that they are poor judges of character or, worse, that they consciously accepted the person's bad character. In addition, one might wonder whether the fact of these people's status as close associates raises the likelihood that they, too, have some of the same character flaws. For these reasons, I maintain that the shadow of shame, which includes the judgments of third parties, encompasses one's close associates, even if to a far lesser extent and for different reasons than the person who did the shameful thing.

What about when someone does something prideworthy? I contend that, by contrast, we do *not* think that the mere fact that people are closely associated with someone who has done something prideworthy necessarily reflects positively on that person's associates. Third parties do not immediately regard the associates as, for example, good judges of character or assume that they share the same good characteristics as the person who did the prideworthy thing. When someone does something shameful, we might think of the person's close associates as being *demoted* in the eyes of others. Likewise, there are cases in which when someone does something prideworthy, the person's close associates are *elevated* in the eyes of others. However, when an achievement is considered to reflect well on the close associates, I maintain, it is because of their contribution to the prideworthy thing, and not simply because they are associated with the person who did it.

Recall the American gymnast, Sunisa Lee, who won the gold medal in the 2020 Olympics. Just as one might bring shame upon one's close associates—as in the Madoff and

Weinstein cases—it seems that Lee's gold medal did in fact bring 'glory' to her father. He subsequently received significant positive attention and praise for his daughter's victory[65]. What is interesting, though, is that, amidst this positive attention, the focus was on his role in his daughter's gymnastics career and the sacrifices he made in his own life to provide her with opportunities.

In my view, he is elevated along with his daughter's achievement because of his role in making it possible, not merely because he is associated with her. It is common for parents to play a contributory role in their children's prideworthy achievements, so, it makes sense that people often take the achievement to reflect well on the parents as well. What I want to highlight is that this is because of the contribution, and not because of the mere association. For the family members and friends who did not play a contributory role, it does not seem that people normally think that the achievement reflects well on them. They might share in the spotlight, but not because people's views of who *they* are have been altered, as is often the case with shameful conduct.

In the case of shame, we demote people merely due to their relationship with the person who has done the shameful thing, and not necessarily because they are taken to have contributed to it. Why might this be the case? It seems to me that there is an assumption that people should distance themselves from—and certainly not identify with or think well of—the 'sort of person' who does shameful things. While this principle is too extreme, the adoption of some version of it might account for the fact that the reputations of one's associates are threatened when one does something shameful. By contrast, we do not normally think that people *should* have a relationship with someone simply because that person does something prideworthy.

[65] See O'Kane (2021).

Consider, for example, a philosophy graduate student's prideworthy achievement of receiving a tenure-track job offer. It would be odd for people to assess this student's friends and think "good on them for choosing that person as a friend." It is not likely that people would think that the student's achievement reflects on the friends at all, aside from the fact that their support might have contributed to the positive outcome. People would not think that this student's achievement is a reason to pursue a friendship with the student, at least not in the way that someone doing something shameful is regarded as a reason not to pursue a friendship with that person.

Consider a graduate student whose tenure-track offer is revoked for making sexist comments to colleagues. It seems likely that people would think that the student's behavior reflects poorly on the student's friends because they have chosen to be friends with someone like this. Even if it does not in fact reflect poorly on the student's friends—if the student was a completely closeted sexist up until that point, for example—it still seems reasonable for third parties to be skeptical of the friends' judgment and characters, at least under the assumption that we should not be friends with sexist people. Thus, we see a disanalogy in the way that one's close associates are implicated in one's shameful versus prideworthy acts.

So far, I have argued that it is just a fact of our psychology that when someone does something prideworthy, we do not automatically see this as reflecting well on the close associates of that person. It might be prideworthy that my sister perseveres with a good attitude in the face of chronic illness, for example, but this does not obviously reflect well on my family or her friends. In some cases, prideworthy things exclusively elevate—in the eyes of others—the person who did the prideworthy thing. By contrast, it seems that, across cultures, the shameful behavior of one person casts a 'stain' on that person's close associates, too. It is common to

speak of "bringing shame upon a family," for example, and while that has historically been applied to many non-shameful things, such as pre-marital sex, there is still a very real sense in which the shameful behavior of one person affects the way that people around them are perceived and, in some cases, treated.

Now, let us return to my initial question: why is there non-contributory, non-associative pride but no species of shame that is non-contributory and non-associative. The first step in explaining this asymmetry was to explore the ways in which, in ordinary life, we have different psychological responses and norms with respect to people associated with someone who has done something shameful, as compared to people associated with someone who has done something prideworthy. I offered some potential reasons for these differences. Now I will show that the pride and shame we feel about those close to us (i.e., when we are proud or ashamed of them) are responsive to the norms I have discussed, which ultimately, in my view, explains the asymmetry.

When someone close to us does something shameful, we (reasonably) assume that we will be viewed—and possibly treated—differently in light of that person's behavior. This assumption leads us to feel ashamed of that person. Shame constitutively involves wanting to hide an aspect of ourselves, and, in this case, what we want to hide is our association to this person because we fear that, when our association is salient, our image will be tarnished by what that person has done. Specifically, we fear that we will be viewed unfavorably in the eyes of others in light of our associate's shameful conduct. When we are ashamed of others, but have not contributed to the shameful thing, I maintain that we still feel implicated because we in fact *are* implicated anyway. To be clear, it is not that people always assume that close associates are culpable with respect to the shameful thing itself, but rather that people wonder what it says

about the associates that they are, for example, close friends with someone who could 'do something like this.' In sum, our shame about our association is at least in part due to our reasonable belief that we will be viewed unfavorably by others in light of this association, and also our recognition that we have a tendency to judge people in this way ourselves when we are the third party. Non-contributory, non-associative pride, by contrast, is responsive to the fact that other people do not necessarily think more highly of us when someone close to us does something prideworthy, and our recognition that our own perceptions of people do not change simply because someone close to them does something prideworthy.

5. Upshots

Now that I have identified this asymmetry and offered a possible explanation for it, I will argue that the asymmetry has at least three important implications. First, if I am right that we can be proud of others in a non-contributory, non-associative way, and that we cannot be ashamed of people in a non-contributory, non-associative way, then pride and shame are not opposites in all respects. Second, this species of non-contributory, non-associative pride, as well as the fact that pride and shame have an asymmetry, was revealed by broadening the lens beyond first-personal cases. This suggests that interpersonal pride and shame ought to be taken seriously in future explorations of pride and shame, lest we miss some important facets of both emotions and overlook a philosophically rich dimension of our emotional lives.

The third upshot of the asymmetry is a normative one. As I have argued, when one does something shameful, it does in fact 'bring shame' or risk bringing shame upon one's close associates. Thus, a person who might do something shameful has a primary reason not to do the thing, namely whatever makes it wrong, and a secondary reason not to do the thing, namely that it will implicate one's close associates. The consequences for one's close associates might take a

variety of forms, one being that they suffer—or risk suffering—the stain of shame insofar as other people judge them for their association and they feel the sting of this judgment. So, when someone is contemplating doing something shameful, the fact that one's close associates are put at high risk of being associated with that shameful act—and of responding to that risk by *feeling ashamed*—are two additional considerations against doing the shameful thing. One consideration is that people will view one's close associates differently (i.e., *their* reputation will be tarnished, too), and another is that the associates' whose reputations are in fact—or at risk of being—tarnished will have the unpleasant, and often painful, experience of feeling ashamed.

By contrast, because a prideworthy achievement is not necessarily taken to reflect positively on one's close associates—as a psychological and sociological fact—there is not an analogous other-regarding consideration that counts in favor of doing the prideworthy thing. Of course it could be the case that one's prideworthy achievement will in fact bring 'glory' to one's family, for example, and that might well constitute an additional reason to do the thing, especially under a consequentialist framework. However, given that the prideworthy achievement of an individuals do not necessarily make people think well of that person's associates, it is simply not the case that associates always reap social benefits from an individual's prideworthy achievement. This shows that the mere fact that something is prideworthy does not count in favor of doing it in the same way that the mere fact that something is shameful counts against doing it. It is a separate question whether the fact that one's close associates might enjoy the positive experience feeling proud—even in a non-contributory, non-associative way—counts in favor of doing the thing.

In the second part of the chapter, I have argued that though pride and shame are often categorized together as 'self-conscious' emotions, pride need not be self-conscious in the way

that is constitutive of shame. While both pride and shame involve identification with the object of pride or shame, only shame necessarily concerns our view of ourselves and how others perceive us. I argue that when we are proud of other people, our experience need not involve a concern for ourselves, but when we are ashamed of other people, we cannot maintain this sort of distance – we cannot leave ourselves 'out of the equation' when we feel ashamed of others. This difference yields an asymmetry, which is exposed only through an examination of the contours of other-directed instances of both emotions. After all, when one is proud or ashamed of oneself, the pride and shame are obviously self-centered, so the asymmetry goes undetected.

In sum, I tackled the following five tasks in Part II of the chapter: (1) outlined what I take to be the three ways in which we are proud of other people and the two ways in which we are ashamed of other people; (2) argued that there is a species of pride, what I call 'non-contributory, non-associative pride,' that does not concern oneself; (3) demonstrated that there is no analogous sort of shame (i.e., that shame is always self-focused), thus revealing an asymmetry between the two emotions; (4) offered a possible explanation for this asymmetry; and (5) discussed some conceptual and normative upshots of this asymmetry.

Conclusion

I began with a discussion of shame, in which I drew attention to the category of other-directed shame. I claimed that while this category has been relatively neglected by extant accounts of shame, it ought to be taken seriously due to its prevalence in our lives and its conceptual import. In particular, I argued that when we consider other-directed shame, it becomes clear that standard accounts of shame err in holding that negative self-assessment is constitutive of shame. I maintain that when we are ashamed of others, we normally assess the other person negatively, but, crucially, not ourselves.

After making my case for the conceptual implications of other-directed shame, I compared it to other-directed pride, which I discussed in the last chapter. I contrasted what I take to be the main types of other-directed pride with the main types of other-directed shame, with an eye toward showing that pride and shame are asymmetrical in at least one significant way. When we are proud of someone else, our pride can be entirely un-self-centered, whereas when we are ashamed of someone else, our shame always concerns we might be viewed in light of our connection to the other person. This reveals an interesting, and potentially counter-intuitive, relationship between the two parts of this chapter: just as other-directed pride need not involve positive self-assessment, other-directed shame need not involve negative self-assessment. However, unlike other-directed pride, which can be entirely about the other person, other-directed shame always concerns oneself in some way. While, as I argued in Part I, this concern for oneself need not amount to negative self-assessment, it is self-focused insofar as it involves a concern for how one might be assessed by *others*.

Chapter Three

Puzzles About Patriotism

Introduction

American patriotism is multi-faceted and its faces can be difficult to reconcile. On the one hand, there is the purported patriotism that has been—and continues to be—the hallmark of the Trump era. Trump's "Make America Great Again" slogan, American flag and Confederate flag paraphernalia, and pro-USA and xenophobic chants seem emblematic of one prominent strain of American patriotism. At the same time, there is the purported patriotism that is espoused by, for example, the anti-racist activists of the Black Lives Matter movement, those who are fighting to protect voting rights in states like Georgia, or those who are helping refugees enter into and navigate American life. And, finally, there is the purported patriotism that is evident in fans of, for example, the Olympics or the FIFA World Cup who cheer for the athletes that represent the United States on the world stage.

In considering these three faces of American patriotism, two questions naturally arise: which of these faces constitutes the *real*, *genuine*, or *true* patriotism, and is patriotism morally permissible? In response to these questions, one might find oneself with the following set of views: (1) some paradigmatic instances of patriotism are morally objectionable, and (2) alleged instances of patriotism are not true patriotism if they are morally objectionable. At first blush, these claims seem individually plausible, but jointly inconsistent. After all, how can central cases of patriotism not constitute true patriotism? The view I will present in this chapter aims to show that these two claims are actually consistent if 'true' patriotism is understood as 'proper' patriotism as opposed to just 'genuine' patriotism. After all, it seems consistent to hold that (1) some paradigmatic instances of (genuine) patriotism are morally objectionable, and (2) alleged instances of patriotism are not (proper) patriotism if they are morally objectionable.

The chapter will proceed as follows. I will argue that patriotism is love of country, and that patriotic love is consistent with feeling—and indeed disposes one to feel—pride in one's country in certain instances and shame in one's country in others. I maintain that patriotism as an apt object of appraisal—moral and otherwise (e.g., unreasonable but not immoral)—and that in order to determine the appropriateness of an instance of patriotism, we must also evaluate the reasons for one's love. I will argue that patriotism has at least one propriety condition and show how distinguishing between the conditions of genuine patriotism and proper patriotism offers a useful framework for diagnosing different ways in which alleged instances of patriotism can be deficient. Armed with the categories of genuine, proper, and improper patriotism, we can consistently hold that some central instances of patriotism are morally objectionable, and that while such cases constitute *genuine* patriotism, they are nevertheless *improper*. After developing my account of proper patriotism, I explore whether one's social position (i.e., membership in oppressed and/or privileged social group(s)) might bear on whether one's patriotism is proper. I raise this question not to resolve it here, but because it seems that any account of patriotism ought to take it seriously.

So far, philosophers have dealt with morally objectionable instances of purported patriotism in two main ways. The first camp claims that the morally objectionable cases are simply not patriotism[66]. The second camp holds that these morally objectionable cases reveal that patriotism as such is morally objectionable[67]. I will make the case for a third camp by proposing my preferred account: that patriotism is neither inherently morally good nor inherently morally objectionable.

[66] See Smith (2021) for a defense/reclamation of patriotism in response to what he deems extreme and misguided views of patriotism of both the political "left" and "right."
[67] See Gomberg (1990) for an argument that patriotism is like racism. See Keller (2005) for an argument that patriotism disposes one to bad faith.

I will first outline the account of patriotism that I favor and the conditions that accompany it. Because people define patriotism in different ways, I will offer some brief remarks about the merits of my account of patriotism as love of country, and how this account easily, and importantly, permits of propriety conditions. In particular, I highlight reasons in favor of separating the existence conditions of patriotism from its propriety conditions. Defining patriotism as love of country and distinguishing genuine patriotism from proper patriotism via my conditions gives us the flexibility to include many different types of beliefs, actions, and expressions under the realm of genuine patriotism, while still being restrictive enough to exclude cases that are intuitively mistaken or otherwise misguided from the realm of *proper* patriotism.

I conceive of patriotism as love of one's country or particular aspects of it, where this love can manifest in various ways and in response to a wide array of things[68]. I might love my country for many reasons, some good reasons and some not. I can also demonstrate my love for my country in many ways, some appropriate and some not. Patriotism might look like exhibiting fierce loyalty to my country's Constitution, serving in the military, community organizing, celebrating the election of a particular political candidate, or rooting for my country's team at the Olympics. Some exhibit their love of country by singing national anthems and flying national flags. Others demonstrate it through social activism, both by bringing to light the injustices in their country and fighting to rectify them.

Colloquially, when people say that they are *feeling* patriotic, they usually mean that their love of country is particularly strong or salient to them at that moment. Often, when one feels patriotic, one feels positive about or proud of one's country, but this need not be the case. One can feel patriotic while protesting the government, for example, as long as one's protesting still

[68] See Smith (2021) and Callan (2010) for defenses of the view that patriotism is love of country.

involves, or is even grounded in, love of country. Moreover, when one's values and ideals are deeply misguided, this can lead one to feel patriotic for the wrong reasons. I maintain that in such instances, one's patriotism is genuine but improper. Just as one's genuine anger can be inappropriate, so, too, can one's genuine patriotism.

There is widespread agreement that patriotism centrally involves love of country, but there is widespread disagreement about what attitudes, beliefs, actions, and expressions this love encompasses and permits. Thus, even if we can agree that patriotism is, at its core, love of country, there is still a further question about what constitute proper grounds for love of country, as well as what type of expressions of this love are appropriate and under what conditions. These are crucial questions about the ethics of patriotism, ones that I address as I develop patriotism's propriety conditions. Understanding patriotism as love of one's own country has a strength in that it is able to accommodate both the positive and negative faces of patriotism that we encounter in everyday life.

My hope is that when I apply my propriety condition to real-life cases, it will become clearer that an account of what patriotism is (in general) should not directly answer normative questions. Either one loves one's country or does not, and we often concede that even people with whom we staunchly disagree do in fact love their country. The more interesting question in the vicinity, in my view, as well as the question that I take to be at the center of public debate, is whether the *grounds* of one's love of country are appropriate.

In sum, the main project of this chapter is to offer a framework for normative assessment of instances of love of country. By identifying some common ways in which one's love of country can be deformed, I highlight some of the ways in which genuine patriotism can go awry. By introducing the category of 'improper patriotism' to describe such cases, I try to do justice to

both the affective and cognitive elements of patriotism. In other words, I can acknowledge the empirical fact that the emotion or attitude one has is love, while still normatively evaluating the *reasons* for that love. Distinguishing between patriotism in its proper and improper forms allows us to acknowledge that genuine love can be present, while at the same time recognizing that there can be real problems with and dangers of this love.

1. Conditions of (Genuine) Patriotism

Patriotism (i.e., love of country) has at least three necessary conditions. First, there must be love. Second, this love must be directed at the right kind of object, namely a country. Third, one must take oneself to have a special relationship of identification with the country in question. At this point, one might ask what counts as love and what counts as a country. A thorough discussion of what constitutes love and what constitutes a country is beyond the scope of this chapter, but a rough picture of my views on this should become clear through a series of cases—some in which the 'love' condition is failed, some in which the 'object' condition is failed, and some in which the 'standing' condition is failed.

I will begin by briefly sketching cases that are not instances of patriotism because the love, object, and/or standing condition(s) is failed. I will then turn to cases in which these three conditions are met—so the cases in question are indeed instances of genuine patriotism—but other *propriety* conditions—concerning the reasons for and degree of one's patriotism—are failed in such a way that renders the patriotism deformed or improper.

1.1 The Love Condition

I will now highlight some pairs of cases in which one instance constitutes patriotism and the other does not because only one instance involves love of country. Consider two activists, both fighting against police brutality toward Black people in the United States. They go to the

same protests, sign the same petitions, and organize in the same communities. One of these activists—Activist A—is motivated by her love of her country, while the other—Activist B—is motivated purely by independent moral commitments. Activist A is patriotic, while Activist B is not, yet both are aiming to improve the country.

Activist A wants to rectify injustice in the country because she loves the country and cares deeply about the basic moral principles upon which she takes it to be founded. Activist B wants to improve the situation of Black people in the country, which would, in turn, improve the country. However, what Activist B cares about is rectifying injustice wherever she finds it. It is no matter to her that this injustice is happening in *her* country. After all, she does not love the United States, and being American is not an important part of how she self-identifies. That being said, she still cares about what goes on in the world around her and sees it as her responsibility—as a human being, as opposed to as an American—to combat injustice wherever she can. It just so happens that she finds herself in the United States, so, due to her proximity to it, this is where she focuses her social justice efforts.

My view is that only Activist A ought to be regarded as patriotic because only Activist A loves her country. I take the question of whether or not one loves one's country (i.e., is patriotic) to be an empirical question, not a normative one. After all, one either loves one's country—as in the case of Activist A—or does not—as in the case of Activist B. The fact that Activist A counts as patriotic is not, on its own, praise for Activist A. Likewise, holding that Activist B is not patriotic is not, on its own, a criticism of Activist B. The normative question concerning whether patriotic love is appropriate is one that I will explore in the next section. So far, all I have claimed is that in order for an instance to count as patriotism, it must have the affective

component of love[69]. Thus, as demonstrated through the activist example, in two cases that are otherwise identical, only one might constitute patriotism if only one involves love of country.

Before moving to the "object" condition of patriotism, I will address some potential objections to what I have said thus far. One might think that while Activist B does not *feel* patriotic herself, her *actions* are nevertheless patriotic. Relatedly, one might think that even if Activist A is generally patriotic, surely she does not *feel* patriotic when she focuses on her country's flaws. I will respond to each of these suggestions in turn, using a prominent real-life case to illustrate various points.

Consider the famous case of Colin Kaepernick, an American football player who knelt during the national anthem in protest of a series of police killings of Black men[70]. Kaepernick was both widely lauded and widely criticized for his decision to kneel. Some people thought he was right to use his celebrity status to draw attention to this injustice, and that doing so during the national anthem was fitting because honoring and displaying pride in the United States when injustice is rampant is inappropriate. Others thought it was disrespectful to protest during the national anthem because the anthem and the flag are symbols of the American freedom for which military troops sacrifice their lives. Still others misunderstood Kaepernick's protest as protesting the American flag itself.

The Kaepernick case—both his protest and the public's response to it—raises a number of interesting questions about patriotism. I will focus on the following two questions: (1) What do we mean when we call someone or something patriotic or unpatriotic? (2) How are the

[69] One might have the following thought here: when a person is called a "true patriot" because of her actions, this does not refer to her affective attitudes at all. Here I think we need to distinguish between someone who is a patriot and someone who is patriotic. I do not think that one must love the country in order to count as a *patriot*, but one must love the country in order to count as *patriotic*.
[70] See *The Atlantic* article "Did Kaepernick Really Insult the Troops? (2016).

affective and cognitive components of patriotism distinct, such that one might not feel patriotic in a given moment while still being patriotic overall? I think that much of the reason these questions have been controversial and confusing is that it is not always clear what aspect of patriotism the adjective 'patriotic' is tracking in any given instance.

Some people criticized Kaepernick's act as unpatriotic because they saw his kneeling as a betrayal of national loyalty. Others commended Kaepernick's act as patriotic because they viewed his kneeling as a challenge to Americans to reinstate its country's fundamental values, thereby signaling that he takes the flag to represent an ideal for the country—one that present society was clearly falling short of meeting. Finally, others thought that in exercising his freedom of speech and expression, Kaepernick was being patriotic, as these are some of the freedoms that are afforded to Americans by the Constitution.

In my view, what Kaepernick's proponents and opponents disagree about is what love of country consists in and what actions demonstrate that love. Some people understand patriotism as national pride or loyalty, and they regard public criticism of the country as the opposite of that. While pride and loyalty might be important components of patriotism, they are not necessary components, in my view. If we adopt my preferred account of patriotism as love of country, it is easy to see how that love disposes people to pride and loyalty when things are going well in the country, but also to shame and disappointment when things are going poorly. It is consistent with being generally patriotic to adopt any of these attitudes, including the negative ones, in response to particular aspects of or events in one's country.

Consider the analogy with parental love. If I love my parent, it might be expected that I feel some degree of pride in and loyalty to the parent in certain situations. However, it is obviously not the case that if I criticize something that my parent does that I no longer love that

parent. The point here is just to emphasize that one can be patriotic while also being outraged or dejected about certain aspects of the country. It is true, though, that one might not *feel* patriotic when one is outraged and dejected. Here we can draw a helpful analogy to pride. If I am a proud parent, that means I am generally proud of my child. However, I can be ashamed of my child in a particular instance while still being a proud parent overall. Moreover, I can swell with pride in a moment, to which we might say that I am feeling particularly proud. It is not as though I am more of a proud parent in this moment, but rather that my pride is particularly salient to me or that I am *feeling* it—affectively—in a way that I do not in my more stable state of being a proud parent.

I think that being patriotic works similarly. Kaepernick might be a patriotic person generally who was not feeling loving toward his country at a particular time or for a particular reason. In other words, he might be patriotic in a stable—less affectively charged—way, and this love can feel stronger or weaker—from an affective standpoint—at different times. Consider the common saying: "I love him, but I don't like him." We might think of patriotism as permitting of this attitude. So far, I have been focused on how the term 'patriotic' is used to describe people, but what about actions? How do we settle whether Kaepernick's act of kneeling was patriotic?

To answer this question, I think we should start by making what I take to be a crucial distinction between love and pride. Of course, if we think that an act is patriotic if and only if it demonstrates national pride, then Kaepernick's act is not patriotic. As I have said, I think that this way of understanding patriotism is mistaken. Love is manifested in a variety of ways, and expressing pride is just one way of showing one's love. Furthermore, pride is not always warranted. While kneeling for the national anthem is certainly not an expression of national pride, it can easily be understood as an expression of care for the country. In fact, in some ways,

Kaepernick was suggesting that we are failing the country, rather than the country failing us, a sentiment that emphasizes his high regard of the country.

Now that I have offered some thoughts about what patriotic love is and what it can look like, I will turn from discussing the 'love' condition of patriotism to the 'object' (i.e., country) and 'standing' conditions. I have presented cases in which one loves one's country and cases in which one doesn't, where there is no dispute that the object in question is a country. Now I will discuss cases that are not patriotism because the love in question is directed at an object that is not a country, as well as cases that are not patriotism because the love in question is directed at a country to which one lacks the requisite relationship for patriotism.

1.2 The Object Condition

Consider the following case. An American raves about the beauty of Northern Michigan. She loves the lakes and the strong attachment she has to her identity as a Michigander is in large part owed to her love of this one region. She sees Northern Michigan not only as the main attraction of Michigan, but also as a main attraction of the United States as a whole. Her love for Northern Michigan is undeniable and she is a proud Michigander thanks to this love. Clearly, whatever love is present here is not a love of *country*.

Even if a love of Northern Michigan does amount to a love of the state of Michigan more broadly, loving one state within the United States is not sufficient for loving the country as a whole. Imagine if one were to say: "I love Northern Michigan, so I love the United States." This should strike us as a mistake, or at least as odd. How about "I love Michigan, so I love the United States"? Something still seems wrong about this, though maybe less so. What these cases reveal is that some parts (e.g., geographical or cultural) of a country are too unrepresentative of

the country as a whole in order for a love of that aspect to constitute love of country. If the object of love is not a country, it is not an instance of patriotism.

While there are not sharp distinctions in terms of what counts as a "representative" aspect of a country, there are some aspects of the United States, for example, that while specific, might be symbolic or representative enough of the country, its values, or its defining features in such a way that love of that aspect can be understood as love of the country more broadly. People who love the freedoms that the Constitution affords Americans might appropriately be considered patriotic even though it is not the case that the United States can be reduced to its Constitution.

There is another common way in which the object condition of patriotism is failed, which is if one's love is directed exclusively at one's tribe or at a particular sub-group of people in one's country. Communities are central to our identities, and, in that sense, love of any community that is important to us resembles patriotism. However, in order for an instance to count as patriotism, the object of love must be the country at large. Imagine a country that is divided into many different tribes. Because of the way the country is organized, people rely on their tribe for everything. As a result, most people in the country do not have a strong sense of attachment to or identification with the country as a whole. Because the love here is of one's tribe, and not of one's country, it is not patriotism.

Another case that fails the object condition of patriotism is the alleged patriotism of some politicians. Some politicians ought not count as patriotic because what they love is not their country, but rather power, their party, or people of their own socioeconomic status. They only care about advancing themselves and those who agree with them, as opposed to the country as a whole.

1.3 The Standing Condition

Finally, let us turn to the 'standing' condition of patriotism. Patriotism's standing condition asks: does this person have the right relationship to the country in question such that her love of this country constitutes patriotism? It seems that one can only be patriotic about a country with whom one has a special relationship, namely that the country is part of one's identity. This might be the country in which one currently resides, one's country of origin, or some other country to which one has especially close ties, such as one's parents' home country. I might love many other countries for a host of reasons, but patriotism involves a particular kind of love I have for a country (or countries) that as see as *my own*.

The necessity of the standing condition is evident if we consider a case in which the 'love' and 'object' conditions that I have proposed are met, and yet the case is clearly not an instance of patriotism. The standing condition helps distinguish patriotism from, for example, the love I might have of Switzerland for its great skiing. The sort of love that one must have for a country in order to be patriotic is only intelligible with a country that might reasonably be claimed as one's own.

The standing condition not only allows us to exclude cases like the Switzerland one, but also to explain why cases of appropriation do not count as patriotism. Imagine that I am a U.S. citizen who happened to be born in Ghana because my American parents were living there at the time for work. I was only there for my first year of life and have no ties to Ghana other than my parents having worked there. I spent the rest of my life in the United States. One might worry that while it might be justified for me to have special affection for or interest in Ghana, it would be inappropriate—even morally objectionable—for me to act as though the country were my own.

With that preliminary discussion of patriotism's three conditions in place, I have offered a framework for evaluating whether a given instance constitutes genuine patriotism. If we have established that an instance is in fact patriotism, then we can ask the further question of whether that patriotism is appropriate. I will now introduce the idea that patriotism has propriety conditions, as well as outline what I take those conditions to be.

2. Proper Patriotism

I think that people ardently disagree about what constitutes patriotism and care so deeply about what love of country should look like in large part because people disagree and care so deeply about fundamental values and ideals. This, in turn, influences what they think is worth loving about the country. Whatever our core values and ideals are partially determines which instances of patriotism we find morally permissible and which we do not. We are forced to ask the following questions. What things are worthy of loving about a country? What reasons for loving a country are legitimate reasons? These are questions concerning the appropriateness of patriotism.

In my view, in order for genuine patriotism to be proper, it must meet at least one condition in addition to the three conditions of patriotism that I just outlined. Proper patriotism is a love of one's own country that is felt and/or expressed for the right reasons[71]. I will offer a brief introduction to this condition before turning to an examination of real-life cases with an eye toward illustrating the various ways in which patriotism can—and often does—go awry.

Evaluating the propriety of patriotism shifts the focus away from whether love of country is present in a given instance to whether the love of country in that instance is appropriate, in particular whether the reasons that form the basis for one's love are good reasons. I take it that,

[71] Proper patriotism, in my view, is morally permissible, and *not* obligatory.

often, when an instance of alleged patriotism strikes us as morally problematic, it is really the reasons for one's love of country, as opposed to the love itself, that we find objectionable.

2.1 The Reasons Condition

Sometimes, one genuinely loves one's country, but for bad reasons, rendering one's patriotism genuine but improper. Sometimes, this sort of improper patriotism is morally objectionable. For example, if I love my country because men in my country have more power than women, my patriotism is improper. It is not only an illegitimate reason to love a country, but also a morally objectionable one. Loving one's country for illegitimate reasons, whether morally objectionable or not, can reflect poorly on one's character. After all, it can indicate (1) that one is unreasonable, insofar as one is failing to respond appropriately to aspects of one's country (i.e., by loving some aspect that is not worth loving), or (2) that one's values are problematic, insofar as one loves something about the country that is not only not worth loving, but also morally objectionable.

The aim of this chapter is not to offer a list of what is worth loving about a country. After all, different countries are worth loving for different reasons, and different people love even the same country for different reasons. Someone might love the United States, for example, for some aspect that I do not much care about, and yet I can still recognize their reason for love as falling within the scope of legitimate reasons that one might love the country. Thus, I take it that there is some flexibility about what reasons count as acceptable ones in this realm, and I intentionally leave it to each of us to consider, on a case-by-case basis, whether any particular reason counts as a good one.

There are at least three ways in which the reasons for one's love can be evaluated. First, there is the question of what aspects of countries are worth loving. Then, there is the question of

whether a given love-worthy feature is in fact a feature of the country in question. Finally, we can ask whether loving Country Y based on its love-worthy feature X is appropriate. Thus, there are three ways in which one's patriotism can be improper in this realm. The thing that one loves might not be worth loving; the country might not possess the actual love-worthy feature in question; and third, the feature—while love-worthy and possessed by the country—does not offer sufficient grounds for loving that country.

Recall the analogy to parental love. Imagine that I claim to love my father for his wisdom. First, we can ask whether wisdom is something that is worth loving about a person. If the answer is yes, then we must still ask the further question of whether wisdom is something that is reasonable to love about a particular person. In order to evaluate whether my love of my father is appropriate, I must evaluate whether wisdom is a good reason to love someone generally, as well as whether my father in fact possesses this quality. If my father is unwise, then even if wisdom is a good basis for love, loving *him* on that basis would be inappropriate.

Now consider a case like the one I described initially, in which one loves one's own country because it is patriarchal. First, I can ask whether the United States is in fact patriarchal. If the answer to that is yes, the question of whether my love is appropriate is still not settled. I must ask the additional question of whether having that characteristic is a good thing, whether it the fact that the country has that characteristic is a good reason to love the country. If the answer to that question is no, as in this case, then the patriotism is improper despite the fact that the country actually possesses the characteristic in question. Returning to the analogy with parental love, imagine that I love my mother because of her wealth. Even if it is true that my mother is wealthy, my love is improper because that is not a good reason to love someone.

Thus, I contend that much public disagreement about patriotism boils down to disagreement about these three questions: (1) whether a given feature is worth loving; (2) whether Country Y possesses that feature; and (3) whether that feature offers sufficient grounds for loving that particular country. I maintain that during the Trump era, disagreements about patriotism between, for example, Trump's supporters and opponents concern all three of these questions.

Often, disagreement is about whether a given feature is worth loving. The things that present-day liberals and conservatives love about the United States, for example, are often quite different. Sometimes, members of one side can recognize that while they do not love some feature of the country that the other side loves, that feature is something that someone could reasonably love. Other times, members of one side object to the other side's love of a certain feature. For example, consider two possible responses that liberals might have to conservatives' love of the Second Amendment. Some liberals might concede that this Constitutional right falls within a range of legitimate things that one might love about the country, despite not loving the feature themselves. Other liberals might hold that in light of all of the mass shootings that have occurred due to a lack of gun reform, the Second Amendment does not constitute legitimate grounds for loving the country.

Now consider another type of disagreement. I might agree with someone that loving the country for its protection of women's reproductive rights is appropriate. However, I might also think that their love of *our* country on this basis is inappropriate because our country is failing to protect women's reproductive rights. Alternatively, I might think that while protecting reproductive freedom is a good thing, the way in which this country protects it—for example, the inconsistency in protection across states—renders loving the United States for its protection of women's reproductive rights improper and morally problematic.

3. Patriotism: A Virtue or a Vice?

Much of the philosophical debate[72] about patriotism has concerned whether patriotism is a virtue[73] or a vice[74]. If we adopt the account of patriotism as love of country, then, it seems to me, patriotism is neither a virtue or a vice. I have argued that particular instances of patriotism can be assessed from a moral standpoint, but it does not follow that patriotism, in general, is virtuous or vicious.

In introducing the category of "improper patriotism," I have highlighted various ways in which one's love of country can be deficient. Having the category of improper patriotism does justice to the commonsense intuition that patriotism can be morally objectionable without thereby having to declare that patriotism is always morally objectionable or having to exclude all such instances from the realm of patriotism altogether. Instead, I argue, there are two distinct objections that we can advance against instances of alleged patriotism, one being "that's not patriotism," and another being "that is patriotism, but it is improper."

Given that I understand patriotism as love of country and as something that arises naturally if people identify with the country in which they find themselves, I do not think that the mere presence or lack of love necessarily reflects positively or negatively on a person's character. It is not an accomplishment or a failure to love or not love one's country. Of course, proper patriotism can motivate virtuous behavior, and improper patriotism can motivate vicious behavior. For example, appropriate love of country might be the basis of one's courage to serve

---

[72] See the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy's entry "Patriotism" for an overview of various debates about patriotism.

[73] See MacIntyre (1984) for a seminal defense of patriotism as a virtue. See Kleinig, Keller, and Primoratz (2015: Chapter 1) for Kleineg's defense of patriotic loyalty. See Macedo (2011) for a "conditional" defense of patriotism as a "dangerous virtue" and an argument for the possibility of just patriotism.

[74] See Gomberg (1990) and Kateb (2000). See Kleinig, Keller, and Primoratz (2015: Chapter 2) for Keller's case against patriotism and how patriotic loyalty is not similar to loyalty to friends and family. See Nussbaum (1996) for criticisms of patriotism on the grounds that it is arbitrary and a cosmopolitan argument that people ought to put humanity and global citizenship above national ties.

in the military. Likewise, inappropriate love of country might be the basis of one's greed. I will now show how my position—namely that patriotism is neither a virtue nor a vice—is preferable to two rival positions—namely that patriotism is always a virtue or always vice. I will use case of post-9/11 American patriotism to highlight the merits of my account.

Consider the ethos in the United States immediately following the September 11th attacks. People often reference the sense of national unity that they felt in the wake of that tragedy, a unity that was likely a combination of collective grief, fear, sympathy, and pride. Many felt that their identity as an American was more salient than ever and that their love of their country and compatriots was particularly strong and public. American flags were flying; people wanted to help strangers in need; and many were committed to protecting and rebuilding the country. There was also an active rejection and condemnation of Al Qaeda's portrayal of the United States, leading many Americans to highlight and celebrate the values and principles that they took to be unique to their country. Post-9/11 American culture seems to be a paradigmatic example of patriotism and one that is often cited as a touchstone of a period, unlike the present, when people felt a shared love of country.

Many who felt justified in their patriotism during this time, though, were also concerned about the Islamophobic and xenophobic attitudes that it seemed to be fostering. The sense of unity people felt due to their love of the United States and their desire to protect it from a "common enemy" had positive aspects, but this same ethos also caused people to direct their fear and hostility toward an innocent 'other'. Hate crimes against Muslim and South Asian people increased dramatically domestically, and, on an international scale, this combination of fear, national loyalty, prejudice, and a desire for revenge ultimately led the U.S. to invade Afghanistan

to start an unjustified, years-long war. What are we to say about the fact that many people were wronged in the name of—and under the guise of—American patriotism?

If we adopt the view that patriotism is a virtue, then we can deal with all negative faces of post-9/11 American patriotism in a straightforward way. Whenever the moral line was crossed—when fearmongering, racial profiling, and nationalism reared their heads—then this simply was no longer patriotism. I, too, feel the pull of denying people's appeals to patriotism and claims of being patriotic any time I deem their associated views or actions morally objectionable.

If we were instead to adopt the view that patriotism is a vice, then we could also explain the negative faces of post-9/11 American patriotism quite easily. After all, we could point to these manifestations as clear evidence that patriotism is problematic. What seems inadequate about this approach, though, is that it runs counter to common-sense views about national unity in the wake of tragedy. To suggest that such unity and its positive elements are always something other than patriotism seems to take us too far astray from the term's ordinary usage. After all, even people who do not think that patriotism is necessarily a virtue can appreciate the ways in which love of one's country—which is what I think patriotism is—might be valuable or, at the very least, unproblematic, particularly in times of national crisis.

Instead, cases like the negative faces of the post-9/11 American ethos are best categorized as *improper patriotism*. If we understand patriotism as neither always a virtue nor always a vice, then some morally problematic cases, as I have argued, can constitute genuine, albeit improper, patriotism.

4. Proper Patriotism: The Problem of Injustice

In the first part of this chapter, I hope to have shown that proper patriotism is a theoretical possibility. However, we are still left with the further question of whether patriotism is proper in

any actual countries. After all, most, if not all, actual countries are riddled with injustice. There are two questions one might ask about the possibility of proper patriotism in unjust countries. The first is whether, in light of their negative characteristics, unjust countries can be worthy of the positive regard that is characteristic of patriotism. Another question is whether, even if an unjust country can be worthy of patriotism, any actual people can be properly patriotic about that country. There are reasons, albeit different ones, to think that it is morally objectionable for members of *both* oppressed and privileged groups to be patriotic, raising the possibility that no one can be properly patriotic about unjust countries. It is this issue, and, more broadly, the way in which one's social situatedness affects the propriety of one's patriotism, that is the focus of the remainder of the chapter.

4.1 Is an Unjust Country Worthy of Love?

Before turning to the issue of whether anyone can be properly patriotic about unjust countries, it is worth considering the question of whether an unjust country can be a fitting object for love in the first place. I take it for granted that patriotism is at least sometimes proper, where love is an appropriate attitude, not the *uniquely* appropriate attitude[75]. Some claim that patriotism is always unreasonable and/or morally objectionable. Earlier in the chapter, I rejected such views and maintained that, in at least some cases, it is proper—from a moral and rational standpoint—, though not required, to love one's country. In the subsequent discussion, I explore whether patriotism can be proper on the part of privileged people and/or oppressed people in an unjust country.

Assuming that countries can be appropriate objects of love, we must ask whether the particular country in question is worthy of love. Does it have sufficiently good qualities? Are

[75] See Kleinig, Keller, and Priomoratz (2015: Chapter 3) for Primoratz' argument that "ethical patriotism" can be morally obligatory.

these qualities central to the country's identity? Are there enough good qualities to escape the conclusion that the country is thoroughly bad and, therefore, entirely unworthy of love? In my view, there are two compelling arguments to support the idea that even an unjust country can be worthy of love. First, one might think that love can be, to some extent, groundless. One might appropriately love one's family members, for example, not for any substantive reason or positive characteristic on the part of the family member, but simply because they are one's family. There is the common saying, "I love her, but I don't like her," and I take it that this is the sentiment that many people feel not just about their unpleasant family members, but also about their own countries. I might love my country simply because it is *mine*. If it is extremely unjust, I might not—and probably ought not— hold it in high regard, but that is compatible with my still loving it.

Another way in which an unjust country might be a worthy object of love is in virtue of its positive characteristics. Even unjust countries can have positive attributes. So long as one loves one's country for *these* attributes, as opposed to the problematic ones, then one's patriotism might be proper. For example, I might love my country because of its cultural diversity while still maintaining that, on the whole, the country is deeply flawed. Alternatively, I might hold that, despite its substantial flaws, my country is still good on balance. Exploring what features of a country make it worthy of love or how to weigh positive and negative features against each other is beyond the scope of this chapter. For my purposes, it will suffice that there are good reasons for thinking that even an unjust country can be an apt candidate for love and, therefore, for proper patriotism. Maybe some countries are just so bad, and, therefore, entirely unworthy of love. I will set this possibility aside to focus on unjust countries that could reasonably merit love.

In what follows, I will assume that the unjust countries in question are worthy of love in order to isolate the unique problems posed by the social situatedness of the subject.

4.2 Revisiting The Reasons Condition of Proper Patriotism

There are at least three types of considerations involved in evaluating an instance of patriotism: facts about the country in question, facts about the patriotism in question, and facts about the patriotic person in question. The first category, that I just discussed, assesses facts about the country itself. Once we have established that the country in question is an appropriate object of love, we then turn to the second category of questions, which concerns facts not about the country, but about the patriotism at issue. Here we ask whether the reasons underlying one's patriotism are good reasons. Good reasons, in this case, are those that could reasonably make a country worth loving *and* that accurately reflect qualities that the country actually has.

Consider two sorts of cases, both of which fail to meet the Reasons Condition of proper patriotism, but in different ways. First, patriotism can be improper if the reasons underlying one's patriotism do not make the country worth loving. For example, the whiteness of the population is not a good reason to love a country. While I might accurately ascribe a feature of the country to the country—if the population is in fact white, for example— the patriotism in question is still improper because this feature is not one that could make a country worthy of love. Now consider another case. Freedom of expression, for example, might be good grounds for patriotism insofar as it, unlike the whiteness of the population, is in fact a positive attribute. However, if the country in question clearly lacks freedom of expression, then that is not a good reason to be patriotic about *that* country in particular. One's patriotism is improper if it fails to accurately reflect the country's characteristics. By contrast, if one is patriotic because one's

country does in fact protect and encourage freedom of expression, then that is a case in which the country is worthy of love *and* the person loves the country for the right reasons.

4.3 Social Situatedness: Another Possible Condition of Proper Patriotism

The main claim of this section is to introduce a possible second dimension of evaluation of patriotism's propriety, namely the social situatedness of the subject. By social situatedness of the subject, I mean whether the patriotic person in question is relatively oppressed or privileged within the country in question. Of course people have complex identities and might be oppressed along certain dimensions and privileged along others. I will return to that issue later. For now, I will show that regardless of whether one adopts my preferred view of patriotism as love of one's own country or a prominent alternative account in which patriotism is pride in one's own country, a potential problem arises. The general issue that both accounts face is this: it seems that when an unjust country is worthy of patriotism, it might still be the case that no one can be properly patriotic about it because any person's social position renders the patriotism morally objectionable. Thus, even if the Reasons Condition of proper patriotism is met, it might be that it is nonetheless morally problematic for any actual person—privileged or oppressed—to be patriotic.

In what follows, I explore the way in which one's social position might affect the propriety of one's patriotism in an unjust country. I raise this issue because I think it is one that appears often—if implicitly—in public debates about the ethics of patriotism, and one that is worthy of philosophical examination. My exploration of the relationship between social positioning and the propriety of patriotism will take the following form. I will begin by outlining the various reasons that patriotism on the part of oppressed and privileged persons, respectively, might be morally objectionable. I will show that whether one adopts the Love View of patriotism

(i.e., that patriotism is love of one's country) or the Pride View of patriotism (i.e., that patriotism is pride in one's country), one is faced with the possibility that social position renders all actual patriotism improper in unjust countries.

4.3.1 Problems for the Love View

First, let us explore the issues that arise for my preferred account of patriotism, the Love View. For members of oppressed groups, a worry is that loving their country constitutes loving their abuser because the systems, institutions, and culture that shape a country are responsible for their oppression[76]. Thus, the argument might go, an oppressed person's patriotism necessarily involves loving the agent of one's oppression. Loving the country that oppresses you might be morally objectionable for two reasons. The first is that it seems incompatible with exercising appropriate self-respect, for if one were to recognize and appreciate one's rights and the treatment that one deserves in light of those rights, then one would not love a country that so obviously and egregiously fails to meet that standard.

The second reason that loving one's country seems morally objectionable for an oppressed person is that *even if* loving the country is compatible with maintaining self-respect, loving one's abuser necessarily involves—and signals— some level of acceptance of one's oppressed position. This, in turn, perpetuates the unjust status quo. This is related to but distinct from the self-respect worry. While it might well be the case that signaling acceptance of one's oppressed position by being patriotic is inherently self-disrespecting, an additional concern is that continuing to love one's country in the face of one's oppression actually serves to uphold the oppressive regime. I will examine return to these concerns after I introduce the rest of the puzzle. First I will raise issues with privileged people's patriotism for the Love View, then issues with

[76] See Cherry (2019) for an argument that Black Americans' anger at racial injustice is an expression of—self-love and "agape love."

privileged people's patriotism for the Pride View, and, finally, issues with oppressed people's patriotism for the Pride View.

Unlike oppressed people, privileged people's love of their country does not involve loving *their* oppressor because they are not oppressed. One might think that it does, however, involve loving the oppressor of their counterparts. Thus, while loving the country is consistent with privileged people being self-respecting, their patriotism might still be inherently disrespectful to others. Normally, privileged people know, or at least ought to know, that not everyone in their country enjoys the same freedom and opportunity that they do. Given that oppressed groups are actively abused in an unjust country, it seems morally objectionable for privileged people to love the country merely because they do not suffer this abuse. The concern with patriotism on the part of the oppressed is that it is akin to loving one's abuser, so the concern with patriotism on the part of privileged people is that it is akin to loving *someone else's* abuser.

When privileged people are patriotic about their unjust country, it could be morally objectionable in at least three ways. First, in loving a country that oppresses people, a privileged person seems to evince insufficient regard for the well-being of the victims of oppression. If they are patriotic, one might think, privileged people evidently are not sufficiently grasping—or, worse, are not moved by—the severity of the injustice that their oppressed counterparts face. This is made more objectionable by the fact that it is often not just that privileged people are unfairly advantaged and oppressed people are unfairly disadvantaged, but rather that the advantages that privileged people enjoy are *due to* or *at the expense of* the relative disadvantage of the oppressed. Therefore, if privileged people love the country for such benefits, it seems that they are not taking seriously the objectionable manner in which those benefits were acquired and

distributed. The benefits are inextricably linked with the plight of the oppressed, so they are inevitably tainted. Thus, when privileged people are patriotic about their unjust countries, it seems that they are disrespecting their compatriots, or at the very least revealing a character defect of some kind, such as selfishness or a lack of compassion.

I raised the possibility that patriotism on the part of the oppressed could have the effect of preserving the unjust status quo. The same worry arises with respect to patriotism on the part of privileged people. It seems that when privileged people love the country in spite of its inequities, they run the risk of reinforcing the oppressive system. It is worth noting that their patriotism can perpetuate oppression regardless of whether it is outwardly expressed. However, expressed patriotism might uphold the oppressive system to a greater degree if love of country is widely considered to signal an endorsement of the status quo. Thus, we can see that privileged people's patriotism can be both inherently bad if it is disrespectful or revealing of a character flaw, or it can be bad in virtue of its negative consequences if it actively contributes to or passively helps maintain the country's oppressive features.

So far, I have shown that on the Love View, even if proper patriotism is a theoretical possibility in an unjust country, it might be the case that proper patriotism is impossible in any actual countries. After all, if, for the reasons I just outlined, it is morally objectionable for both oppressed and privileged people to love their country, then it seems that there is no one left to be the subject of proper patriotism.

4.3.2 Problems for The Pride View

I will now show that social situatedness of subjects is also a problem for the Pride View, where patriotism is pride in one's country, as opposed to love. In doing so, I will draw on the account of proper pride that I offered in the first chapter to argue that privileged people lack

standing to be proud about certain prideworthy aspects of their country, such as certain social justice movements. Oppressed people, on the other hand, might have the right relationship to these anti-oppressive movements to warrant pride, but lack the right relationship to other genuinely prideworthy aspects of the country. I will briefly present the account of proper pride that I developed in Chapter One before considering its implications for the Pride View of patriotism.

I take pride to be a positive emotion in response to someone or something (1) for whom or for which one has especially high regard and (2) with whom or with which one closely identifies. One can have this close personal connection to someone or something in various ways and for various reasons. In order for one to feel pride—as opposed to admiration, for example—in response to someone or something—as opposed to oneself—one must identify with that person or thing in a particular way. Some reasons for this identification in the case of other-directed pride include that one is partially responsible for the allegedly prideworthy object, that one has an intimate personal relationship to the allegedly prideworthy object, or that that the allegedly prideworthy object is closely tied to one's sense of self. If one does not take oneself to have the requisite connection to the object of high regard, genuine pride does not get off the ground, so to speak. Admiration, on the other hand, might. After all, admiration requires high regard, but without the personal connection. While admiration can be felt from a distance, pride seems necessarily personal and participatory.

Pride does not require that one takes oneself to be partially responsible for or to have had any role in bringing about the allegedly prideworthy object, though. I reject the view that pride is always a form of taking credit, though I grant that it can take this form. I also reject the related view that one is only proud of those things that one takes to reflect well on oneself; though,

again, one might be proud for this reason. Closely identifying with a friend, for example, does not entail that I take all, or even any, of her successes to reflect well on me. All it means is that I might take special pleasure in her success because of how much I care about and am invested in her well-being, regardless of whether her success indicates anything positive about me.

Thus, I take it that pride is the emotion that we feel in response to someone or something that we deem valuable or remarkable and to which we, in the proper case, bear a sufficiently close relation. If I feel proud of a tenuous or nonexistent association, I am making a mistake, and this mistake can be morally objectionable. Pride that is morally objectionable because it lacks the right association to the object is the sort that, for example, White Americans might exhibit when they are patriotic about the Civil Rights Movement or Black Lives Matter. One might think that White Americans can admire and be grateful for these movements, and even deem them *prideworthy*, but they lack the requisite connection to be properly proud of them. If this is the case, then when privileged people are proud of the country for its anti-oppressive movements, their patriotism is improper.

Imagine that victims of oppression have worked tirelessly in their activism to achieve success in a given social justice movement. Meanwhile, many other Americans get to reap its benefits without having participated in the process. While it seems clear that activists ought to be proud of their association with the movement, we can imagine that these activists might reasonably object to some others taking pride in the movement. For example, of course Americans might justifiably be proud of the movement without having participated insofar as they are proud of what their fellow Americans have done, there is another type of objectionable pride in which one "poses" as having contributed to the outcome. Genuine activists might take issue with non-participants who are unduly proud of their association with a movement because

such people seem to be taking credit for, or trying to gain recognition and status by associating themselves with, the activists' efforts. We might think that such non-participants—qua non-participant—lack the standing to be proud of the otherwise prideworthy social movement.

At this point, one might concede that, due to their social position, privileged people lack standing to be patriotic about anti-oppressive movements. I will return later to the issue of social justice advocates who are themselves privileged, as these people do not necessarily lack the standing to be proud. Setting that aside for now, there is still a question of whether there are non-social justice-related, pride-worthy aspects of unjust countries to which privileged people do in fact have the right connection. For example, some of the rights and freedoms that the U.S. Constitution guarantees might be good grounds for their pride in the country. Privileged people, unlike many oppressed people, actually get to enjoy these freedoms, so one might think that it is appropriate for them to be proud on that basis.

A different worry arises here. Even if privileged people bear the right connection to, for example, the right to vote in democratic elections, such that patriotism on that basis seems proper, the fact that voter suppression is such a problem for oppressed people might make it inappropriate for privileged people to be proud on that basis. One possibility is that the right to vote in the United States, for example, is not actually a prideworthy aspect of the country because, in practice, this right is violated for so many citizens and many elected officials are actively trying to prevent certain minority groups from voting.

Now let us turn to the patriotic pride of oppressed people. On the one hand, it seems that oppressed people do in fact have the right association to certain prideworthy social justice movements to render their pride about such movements, and their corresponding patriotism, proper. However, patriotism on those grounds seems strange. After all, social justice movements

are a response to shameful aspects of the country, so even if the movements themselves are worthy of pride, it is not clear that the country is worthy of pride because of these movements. There was only a need for a Civil Rights Movement, for example, because so many people were denied basic rights to start.

For oppressed people to be patriotic about positive aspects of the country that only privileged people have access to also seems misguided. For example, for Black Americans in the South to be patriotic about the right to vote might reveal a failure on their part to appreciate the way in which the government and institutions fail them by systematically denying them this right. To take pride in aspects of the country that do not reflect one's experience of the country calls into question the propriety of one's patriotism.

So far, I have raised problems for both privileged and oppressed people in being patriotic, and claimed that these problems arise for both the Love View and the Pride View of patriotism. Now I will argue that the Love View has the tools to overcome this problem at least with respect to the patriotism of oppressed person.

4.4 The Love View: A Possible Response

In order to show how the Love View might explain the appropriateness of patriotism on the part of oppressed people, I should briefly revisit what I have in mind when I refer to a country. The main reason that this question matters for my purposes is that, in the face of conditions of injustice, loving one's country might seem more or less morally objectionable depending on one's view of what comprises a country. For example, if a country is just the government, then, on this view, patriotism is love of the government. If that is the case, then in countries with oppressive governments, patriotism might always be morally objectionable.

I have a more encompassing view of what makes up a country. While I do not claim to know what a country essentially is, plausibly the peoples, history, traditions, Constitution (or other founding documents), culture, and landscapes are all constituent parts of it. These are also the parts that normally play a causal role in one's love. In my view, a country is just the sum of these parts; there is no sense of country over and above the combination of these facets. This is important because I will argue that loving one's abuser is not an apt analogy in part because we *do* conceive of a person as more than just the sum of, for example, his or her individual traits. While parts of the country, such as the government or the people, constitute entities in their own right, the same cannot be said of personality traits, for example. I will claim that while we can, to some extent, isolate the oppressed person's relationship with various constituent parts of the country, we cannot break down the abused person's relationship with various parts of the abuser in the same way.

Although the analogy between loving one's abuser and loving one's country is initially attractive, I will now show that it is ultimately inapt. Although both relationships involve an oppressed party and an oppressor, there are important differences between the two. One difference, that I just introduced, is that a country is made up of many different components, and an oppressed person might have distinct relationship to each of these components. For example, a person might have one relationship to the history and a different relationship to the culture, and both the history and culture are crucial parts of the country. Of course abusive people, too, can be multi-faceted, but the relationship that the abused person has with the abuser cannot be broken down into the abused person's relationship with each of the abuser's individual personality traits. While the abused person is more *affected* by certain traits than others, a person has a relationship with the abusive *person*, not with aspects of the person.

This distinction is important because while an oppressed person might have a relationship with some good, non-oppressive aspect of the country (potentially rendering their love of country unobjectionable), an abused person just has a relationship with the abusive person, and not with the person's particular traits. Therefore, loving the person is necessarily loving the abuser. Oppressed people might love the country without loving their abuser because the abusive parts can plausibly be separated from the country as a whole.

While it is true that oppressed people are oppressed *within* a country and *due to* parts of the country, it is not clear that oppressed people are always oppressed by the country as such or as a whole. After all, I have argued that a country is comprised of many different components, some of which do not play a role in, and even aid in resisting or ending, oppressive components of the country. For example, surely anti-racist organizations, activists, and movements are an important part of the United States, evincing and furthering the quest to live up to the country's values and ideals. Given that one can reasonably love a country in virtue of its good parts, we can imagine that an oppressed person might love the country in virtue of its anti-oppressive or, at least, non-oppressive, components. The fact that the object of one's love is a country does not entail that one loves every aspect of that country. So, if oppressed people love components of their country, as long as those components do not aid in their oppression (or in the oppression of others), then their patriotism seems compatible with self-respect. Of course the component that they love must be a sufficiently significant or representative feature of the country in order for it to plausibly count as loving the *country*.

Another important disanalogy between loving your country, as an oppressed person, and loving your abuser is that you are part of your country, but you are not part of your abuser. It is common for oppressed people to cite their ancestors as the reason for their patriotism. The recent

1619 Project[77] discusses American history starting with the arrival of the first enslaved people to Virginia in order to highlight the impact of slavery on the foundation of the United States and center black people's contributions to American history and democracy. The leader of this initiative, Nikole Hannah-Jones, recounts that her father, a black man from Iowa, always flew an American flag at her childhood home despite the racism that permeated their life. She says that she came to be convinced by her father "that no one has a greater claim to this flag and this country and patriotism than we do, because we have fought for it the hardest." She believes, "as much as the white founders whom we recognize — that we are the founding fathers of this country," again referring to black Americans.[78]

What sentiments like Hannah-Jones' express is that oppressed people are a crucial part of their country and that they are often responsible for its best aspects. If we adopt her perspective that black people founded American democracy, for example, then for black people to love their country in fact seems self-respecting. They are honoring their own, and their ancestors', pivotal role in creating and sustaining whatever good parts the country has. In sum, while there are undoubtedly abusive parts of the United States, which the *1619 Project* discusses at length, it need not be the case that oppressed people love those parts when they love their country. Because members of oppressed groups are an indispensable part of the country, loving the country is consistent with, and, in some ways, evinces, a love and respect for themselves. By contrast, abused people are not part of their abusers, so loving one's abuser is just that—loving one's abuser—and cannot plausibly be regarded as a way of loving or respecting oneself.

Conclusion

[77] See *The New York Times Magazine* "The 1619 Project" (2019).
[78] See *The New York Times* article "No People Has a Greater Claim to the Flag Than Us" (2019).

In this chapter, I offered three necessary conditions—Love, Object, and Standing—for (genuine) patriotism, as well as an additional Reasons Condition for (proper) patriotism. Armed with the distinction between proper and improper patriotism, I argue, one can do justice to the real perils of patriotism without condemning patriotism wholesale. By including some morally objectionable instances of patriotism as genuine patriotism, and still retaining grounds to criticize that patriotism as improper, my account can comfortably classify a number of otherwise difficult cases. Even though instances of morally objectionable patriotism are a source of much controversy amongst both philosophers and the general public, such cases have not been adequately explained or accommodated by existing accounts of patriotism. I maintain, further, that existing accounts of patriotism have not adequately contended with some issues posed by oppression, specifically whether oppressed and/or privileged persons can be properly patriotic. This question arises for both the Love View and the Pride View of patriotism, though for different reasons. I offer one way that the Love View might respond to the concern that loving one's country, on the part of the oppressed, amounts to loving one's abuser.

Conclusion

In Chapter One, I discussed various ways in which pride—both the emotion itself and its expression—can be inappropriate. I argued that in order for pride—whether the emotion itself or its expression—to be proper, (1) the object of the pride must be prideworthy; (2) the pride must be of an appropriate degree; (3) the subject must have standing to be proud; and (4) the feeling and/or expression of pride must be morally permissible. Through a series of cases, I outlined different ways in which instances of pride can violate one or more of these conditions. I hope to have drawn attention to two potentially counterintuitive phenomena: that one can make a mistake in being proud of a prideworthy object and that this mistake—amongst other mistakes one can make with respect to pride—can make pride morally improper.

In Chapter Two, I drew attention to the category of other-directed shame. I claimed that while this category has been relatively neglected by extant accounts of shame, it ought to be taken seriously due to its prevalence in our lives and its conceptual import. In particular, I argued that when we consider other-directed shame, it becomes clear that standard accounts of shame err in holding that negative self-assessment is constitutive of shame. I maintain that when we are ashamed of others, we normally assess the other person negatively, but, crucially, not ourselves.

After making my case for the conceptual implications of other-directed shame, I compared it to other-directed pride. I contrasted what I take to be the main types of other-directed pride with the main types of other-directed shame, with an eye toward showing that pride and shame are asymmetrical in the following way: when we are proud of someone else, our pride can be entirely un-self-centered, whereas when we are ashamed of someone else, our shame always concerns we might be viewed in light of our connection to the other person. This reveals the following interesting, and potentially counterintuitive, relationship between the two

parts of this chapter: just as other-directed pride need not involve positive self-assessment, other-directed shame need not involve negative self-assessment. However, unlike other-directed pride, which can be entirely about the other person, other-directed shame always concerns oneself in some way. While, as I argued in Part I, this concern for oneself need not amount to negative self-assessment, it is self-focused insofar as it involves a concern for how one might be assessed by *others*.

I close the dissertation with a discussion of patriotism. Countries are common objects of both pride and shame, so patriotism is a natural topic to which the ideas I developed in the first two chapters might be applied. In Chapter Three, I argued that patriotism is love of country, and that patriotic love is consistent with feeling—and in fact disposes one to feel—pride in one's country in certain instances and shame in one's country in others. I maintained that patriotism as such is neither inherently morally objectionable nor inherently morally good, and that in order to determine the appropriateness—moral or otherwise—of an instance of patriotism, we must evaluate the reasons that underlie it. After distinguishing between genuine and proper patriotism and developing a preliminary account of proper patriotism, I explored the ways in which oppression and social positioning might bear on the appropriateness of an individual's patriotism.

There is no doubt much left to explore with respect to each of these topics, and I hope to do so in future work. In this dissertation, my broad goals were to (1) raise some conceptual and normative problems associated with pride, shame, and patriotism, respectively, (2) highlight the theoretical and practical issues at stake in each of these three discussions, and (3) identify some interesting facets of the relationship(s) between pride, shame, and patriotism.

Bibliography

Adams, R.M. (1985). Involuntary Sins. Philosophical Review 94 (1): 3-31.

Aristotle, Irwin, T.H.. *Nicomachean Ethics* (ed. 2), Cambridge and Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1999.

Aquinas. *Summa Theologiae* 2a2ae q. 162.

Brennan, Geoffrey & Pettit, Philip (2005). *The Economy of Esteem: An Essay on Civil and Political Society: An Essay on Civil and Political Society*. Oxford University Press.

Calhoun, Cheshire (2004). An apology for moral shame. *Journal of Political Philosophy* 12 (2):127–146.

Callan, Eamonn (2010). The Better Angels of Our Nature: Patriotism and Dirty Hands. *Journal of Political Philosophy* 18 (3):249-270.

Carter, Emma C. Gordon J. Adam (ed.) (2017). *The Moral Psychology of Pride*. Rowman & Littlefield International.

Cherry, Myisha (2019). Love, Anger, and Racial Injustice. In Adrienne Martin (ed.), *The Routledge Handbook of Love in Philosophy*. New York: Routledge.

Coates, D. Justin & Tognazzini, Neal A. (2013). *Blame: Its Nature and Norms*. Oxford University Press.

Coates, D. Justin & Tognazzini, Neal A. (2014). Blame. *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*.

D'Arms, Justin & Jacobson, Daniel (2000). The Moralistic Fallacy: On the 'Appropriateness' of Emotions. *Philosophical and Phenomenological Research* 61 (1): 65-90.

Deonna, Julien ; Rodogno, Raffaele & Teroni, Fabrice (2012). *In Defense of Shame: The Faces of an Emotion*. Oxford University Press.

Fischer, Jeremy (2012). Being Proud and Feeling Proud: Character, Emotion, and the Moral Psychology of Personal Ideals. *Journal of Value Inquiry* 46 (2): 209-222.

Fischer, Jeremy (2017). Pride and Moral Responsibility. *Ratio* 30 (2): 181-196.

Fischer, Jeremy (2017). Self-Assessment and Social Practices. *Journal of Social Philosophy* 48 (2): 144-164.

Frick, Johann (2016). What We Owe to Hypocrites: Contractualism and the Speaker-Relativity of Justification. *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 44 (4): 223-265.

Fritz, Kyle G. & Miller, Daniel (2018). Hypocrisy and the Standing to Blame. *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly* 99 (1): 118-139.

Gomberg, Paul (1990). Patriotism is like racism. *Ethics* 101 (1):144-150.

Hacker, P.M.S.. (2017). *The Passions: A Study of Human Nature*. John Wiley and Sons, Inc.

Hannah-Jones, N (2019). The 1619 Project. *The New York Times.* Retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/08/14/magazine/1619-america-slavery.html

Helton, Grace (2020). If You Can't Change What You Believe, You Don't Believe It. *Noûs*.

Hume, D., Norton, D. F., & Norton, M. J. (2000). *A Treatise of Human Nature*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Isenberg, Arnold (1949). Natural Pride and Natural Shame. *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 10 (1): 1-24.

Kateb, George (2000). Is Patriotism a Mistake? *Social Research: An International Quarterly* 67:901-924.

Keller, Simon (2005). Patriotism as bad faith. *Ethics* 115 (3):563-592.

Kleinig, J., Keller, S., & Primoratz, I. (2015). *The Ethics of Patriotism: A Debate*. John Wiley and Sons, Inc.

Kristjansson, Kristjan (2001). *Justifying Emotions: Pride and Jealousy*. Routledge.

Louis, P.-A. (2019). "No People Has A Greater Claim to The Flag Than Us". *The New York Times.* Retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/06/us/nikole-hannah-jones-interview.html.

Macedo, Stephen (2011). Just patriotism? *Philosophy and Social Criticism* 37 (4):413-423.

Maclntyre, Alasdair (1984). Is patriotism a virtue? In Derek Matravers & Jonathan E. Pike (eds.), *Debates in Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Anthology*. Routledge, in Association with the Open University.

Maibom, Heidi L. (2010). The Descent of Shame. *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 80 (3):566 - 594.

Manion, Jennifer C. (2002). The Moral Relevance of Shame. *American Philosophical Quarterly* 39 (1):73 - 90.

Mason, Michelle (2010). On Shamelessness. *Philosophical Papers* 39 (3):401-425.

Nussbaum, Martha C. (1996). *For Love of Country?*. Edited by Joshua Cohen. Beacon Press.

Nussbaum, Martha C. (2004). *Hiding From Humanity: Disgust, Shame, and the Law*. Princeton University Press.

O'Kane, Caitlin (2021). Suni Lee's dad was paralyzed two years ago. Now, he's a model for the tenacity his daughter shares. *CBS News*. Retrieved from https://www.cbsnews.com/news/suni-lee-olympic-gymnastics-gold-medal-father-paralyzed/

O'Connell, Robert (2016). Did Kaepernick Really Insult the Troops?. *The Atlantic.* Retrieved from https://www.theatlantic.com/entertainment/archive/2016/08/colin-kaepernick-nfl-patriotism/498014/

Primoratz, Igor, "Patriotism", *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Winter 2020 Edition).

Rawls, John (1971, 1999). *A Theory of Justice.* Revised Edition. Harvard University Press.

Sabini, J. and Silver. (1982). *Moralities of Everyday Life*. Oxford University Press.

Smith, Angela M. (2007). On Being Responsible and Holding Responsible. *Journal of Ethics* 11 (4): 465-484.

Smith, Steven B. (2021). *Reclaiming Patriotism in an Age of Extremes*. Yale University Press.

Snoek, A., McGeer, V., Brandenburg, D., & Kennett, J. (2021). Managing shame and guilt in addiction: A pathway to recovery. *Addictive Behaviors, 120,* Article 106954.

Statman, Daniel (1992). Modesty, Pride and Realistic Self-Assessment. *Philosophical Quarterly* 42 (169): 420-438.

Taylor, Gabriele (1985). *Pride, Shame, and Guilt: Emotions of Self-Assessment*. Oxford University Press.

Taylor, Gabriele (2006). *Deadly Vices*. Oxford University Press.

Thomason, Krista K. (2018). *Naked: The Dark Side of Shame and Moral Life*. Oxford University Press.

Velleman, J. David (2001). The Genesis of Shame. *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 30 (1):27-52.

Walsh, W. H. (1970). Pride, Shame and Responsibility. *Philosophical Quarterly* 20 (78):1-13.

Williams, Bernard Arthur Owen (1993). *Shame and Necessity*. University of California Press.