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THEORIZING SOCIAL CONSCIOUSNESS: LÜ CHENG (1896–1989) AND THE RISE OF A NEW BUDDHIST IDEALISM IN MODERN CHINA

Zu, Xiaomin

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THEORIZING SOCIAL CONSCIOUSNESS: LÜ CHENG (1896–1989) AND THE RISE OF A NEW BUDDHIST IDEALISM IN MODERN CHINA

Xiaomin Zu

A DISSERTATION PRESENTED TO THE FACULTY
OF PRINCETON UNIVERSITY
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ABSTRACT

Why did many early twentieth-century Chinese intellectuals celebrate a form of ancient Buddhist idealism—Yogācāra (the school of consciousness-only)— at a time when science, realism, and social Darwinism were gaining sway? Extant scholarship characterizes this revival as a Buddhist science because of its systematic nature and rigorous logic. However, this approach does not explain how Buddhist idealism could be reconciled with scientific realism.

To understand this apparent paradox, this dissertation traces the intellectual journey of the renowned advocate of Yogācāra, one of the first Buddhologists of modern China, Lü Cheng (1896-1989). In the 1920s, the young Lü Cheng called for an aesthetic revolution. He then turned to consciousness-only philosophy as the primary resource for renewing society. This dissertation argues that what propelled Lü to turn toward Yogācāra was his quest for a universal moral agency suitable for the scientific world.

This study reveals that Buddhist idealism appealed to many modern Chinese intellectuals because of its powerful social critique. In the early twentieth century, "social reality" had become an independent category of intellectual inquiry, freed from the reign of politics and religion. The dominant sociological view defined social reality as objectively existing and subject to scientific study. This sociological view worked in tandem with social Darwinism to depict individuals as passively controlled by natural laws and bereft of moral agency. In order to inject human agency into the realm of the collective, Lü renewed Yogācāra critiques of realism and materialism and redefined social reality as an intersubjective oneness subject to karmic laws. Consciousness-only doctrines proved effective in counterbalancing scientific realism, remedying the ills of capitalist materialism, and redefining social evolution as collective spiritual progress.

This study argues that Lü repurposed Buddhist spiritual exercises to build an egalitarian, democratic society. I term this movement of welding soteriological goals with social concerns a "socio-soteriology" in order to emphasize that, for Lü, Buddhist emancipation was supposed to take place through a transformation of society. Beyond the Chinese sphere, Lü's theorization of Buddhist

social consciousness was part of a transnational trend—now discussed under the category of "engaged Buddhism"—of integrating Buddhism and social activism.

For mom, my eternal light and inspiration

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There is a clear moment when this dissertation was conceived. On April 23, 2015, after Prof. William S. Waldron's talk on Yogācāra, Buzzy asked him a question, which I paraphrase. "The Yogācāra concepts of ālayavijñāna and common karma seem to be so easily applicable to social aspects or social theories. Do you happen to know any such applications?" Buzzy's question started a tsunami in my brain. Waves of faces and names associated with modern Yogācāra movements swelled up in my consciousness: Zhang Taiyan, Ouyang Jingwu, Liang Shuming, monk Taixu, Lü Cheng, Han Qingjing, Wang Enyang, and so many more.

At that moment, I first realized that there is a common thread that tied these seemingly disconnected intellectuals together: They all employed Yogācāra concepts for some kind of social reform. The logical next step was to investigate when, why, and how Yogācāra soteriology was retooled for social reform. Soon after I embarked on this adventure, I realized that I must also explore two related but much broader questions: How was Buddhist spiritual equality reinvented as social equality? By whom? On whose behalf? For whose benefit? How did historical actors reconceive Buddhist soteriology as strategy for dismantling structures of inequality and as the spiritual ground for new regimes of equality? Most importantly, how and why did so many new Buddhist movements that aspired to build a just society instead end up reproducing unjust hierarchies and inventing clever

justifications for systemic inequality? Buzzy's question set me on my journey from the problem of Yogācāra in modern China to broader inquiries into the global history of socially engaged Buddhism.

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NOTES ON SPELLING AND TRANSLITERATION

I transliterate names of organizations and personal names in Chinese with Pinyin romanization. I transliterate proper nouns in Japanese with modified Hepburn where long vowels are indicated with a macron. Because I mostly work with classical Tibetan not colloquial Tibetan, therefore pronunciation is not the primary concern. For Tibetan proper names and terminology, I transliterate using Wylie system. With regard to Chinese Buddhist terminology, I use my own English translation with Pinyin and Chinese characters given in parenthesis, e.g., one true-reality realm (*yizhen fajie* 一真法界). Note that the default language in parenthesis is Chinese. For Chinese terms that match specific Sanskrit terms, I use English translation with Chinese and Sanskrit equivalents given in parenthesis, e.g., revolutionizing consciousness (Skt: *āśrayaparivṛtti*; Ch: *zhuanyi* 轉依). In the parentheses, I only mark the language with Skt, Ch, or Tib (for Sanskrit, Chinese, and Tibetan, respectively) when there are multilingual equivalents. I only provide Tibetan equivalents when the Tibetan term represents a significant doctrinal divergence. In addition, Lü Cheng used five terms extensively and in multiple ways: Abhidharma, Yogācāra, Prajñā, Nirvāṇa, and Vinaya. To mark his idiosyncratic way of using these terms as independent academic disciplines in his training program, I reserve the capitalized terms to refer to his disciplines exclusively. I use the lower-case terms, i.e., abhidharma, prajñā, nirvāṇa, and vinaya, to refer to either a concept or a body of text conventionally labelled as such. When these terms appear in the title of a specific text, they are italicized as usual. The only exception is Yogācāra, which remains capitalized throughout the dissertation. I hope the distinctions between the historical Yogācāra school, a body of texts, and Lü's idiosyncratic use of it as an academic discipline are clarified by context.

CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION: THE SOCIAL TURN OF BUDDHIST SOTERIOLOGY

An Enigmatic Canon and A Quixotic Hero

This study analyzes an enigmatic edition of seventy-four selected Buddhist scriptures in three collections, *Essentials of the Buddhist Canon* (1928–1937; Ch: 藏要 Zangyao; henceforth: *Essentials*), produced by a quixotic figure, Lü Cheng 呂澂 (1896–1989). As the first scholarly edition of the Chinese canon produced in China, *Essentials* signifies a turning point in the history of modern Chinese Buddhism: For the first time, lay scholars encroached on the monastic jurisdiction, jettisoned state aegis, and took control of the interpretative authority. As such, *Essentials* marks the birth of Buddhist studies as an academic discipline in the Chinese intellectual landscape. The chief editor of *Essentials*, Lü Cheng, is often lauded as the first Buddhologist of modern China. Despite the central place of *Essentials* in the modern transformation of Buddhism, the story of its making and the impact of Lü's editorial practices remain unexplored.

As the first study of *Essentials* and the first book-length study of Lü Cheng in English, this dissertation uncovers both the Buddhist underpinning of the Chinese revolution and the revolutionary intent that fueled the modern transformation of Buddhism.[1] This study argues that Lü's scholarship was one of several movements sharing a spiritual horizon in the modern era: Lü and many like-minded Chinese intellectuals enthusiastically excavated Buddhist resources for China's salvation. Throughout his life, Lü sought to revolutionize society, and he produced *Essentials* to dismantle the logic of social Darwinism and capitalist-materialist thinking.

By tracing Lü's ironic failure as a revolutionary and his accidental success as a Buddhologist, this dissertation analyzes three interrelated issues, until now poorly understood, in the Chinese experience of becoming modern: the forces that set in motion the renewal of a form of Buddhist

[1] Throughout the dissertation, I use "the Chinese revolution" with the lowercase revolution to refer to the series of reforms and revolutions begun in the 1911 overthrow of dynastic rule in China and continuing after. I use "Xinhai Revolution" for the events of 1911 that led to the downfall of the dynastic rule in China, narrowly defined.

idealism—Yogācāra (the school of consciousness-only), the social function of this new idealism, and the significant role of Buddhist societal vision in the long Chinese revolution from 1911 to 1976.[2]

Essentials is enigmatic because while it adopts a Chinese outlook, its content betrays its status as a multilingual translation. The page layout of *Essentials* mimics the first printed Chinese canon, the Song-dynasty Kaibao Canon (971–983; Ch: 開寶藏; henceforth: *Kaibao*)[3] (see Fig. 1). Its organization also follows *Kaibao* conventions. Instead of adopting the early twentieth-century academic standard of using chronological order, *Essentials* starts with the prajñāpāramitā (wisdom) scriptures. These emerged a few centuries after the earliest Buddhist texts in the traditional canon, but they were widely accepted by Chinese practitioners as the most important words of the Buddha, and hence this body of texts was placed first in the traditional canon.

Despite its Chinese outlook and organization, the content of *Essentials* also displays what we might call its translatedness. *Essentials* was the first scholarly edition of the Chinese Buddhist canon—as opposed to traditional canons compiled by monastic leaders. It was produced after more than a decade of rigorous multilingual comparative study of primary materials in Sanskrit, Pāli, classical Tibetan, classical Chinese, as well as secondary literature in German, French, Japanese, and English. The pages of *Essentials* are peppered with multilingual footnotes (see Fig. 1).[4] Two out of three collections of *Essentials* are introduced by extensive editorial prefaces, which thoroughly document both multilingual premodern translations and modern scholarly translation-editions

[2] For an analysis of China's short century and long revolution from 1911 to 1976, see Wang Hui, *China's Twentieth Century: Revolution, Retreat and the Road to Equality* (London: Verso, 2016).

[3] *Kaibao Canon* as a complete set has long been lost. Today, partial remnants of the *Kaibao* canon are housed in various libraries in China. For an accessible introduction of the history of the Chinese canon in English, see Jiang Wu, "The Chinese Buddhist Canon Through the Ages: Essential Catalogues and Critical Issues in the Study of a Textual Tradition," in *Spreading Buddha's Word in East Asia: The Formation and Transformation of the Chinese Canon* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2016), 15–45. To be accurate, Kaibao Canon's format is scroll, not palm-leaf style. However, most of the Song printed canons follow palm-leaf format, which also became the dominant format of all later Chinese canons in Yuan, Ming, and Qing. Since late Qing (after 1900), most canons were printed in booklet format (Ch: 方冊本). *Essentials* is printed in booklet format but the page design mimics the palm-leaf style.

[4] More accurately, they should be called "interlinear notes." *Taishō Canon* uses footnotes, i.e. notes positioned at the bottom of the page. *Essentials* looks like interlinear notes but functions as headnotes or footnotes because these are appended to the left or right (i.e., beginning or end) of the page.

published by French, Russian, and German Buddhologists and Indologists (see Fig. 2). In this light, then, the enigma is: Why did the editor—arguably the first academic Buddhologist of modern China—cloak his polyglot scholarly production under a traditional Chinese robe?

As if this modern canon were not puzzling enough, its editor, Lü Cheng, is equally intriguing. To begin with, Lü first made his name in 1919 as a radical youth calling for an aesthetic revolution. From 1919 to 1923, Lü not only worked to build an aesthetic society at the epicenter of China's Western Art movement—Shanghai Art Academy—but also penned some of the earliest Chinese academic monographs on European aesthetics. During this time, he advocated idealistic views of social revolution, argued against social Darwinism, and resisted the commodification of art.

Nevertheless, at the height of his career as the provost of Shanghai Art Academy, it seems that Lü suddenly dropped everything and turned to Yogācāra studies. In this new venture, as I demonstrate below, Lü believed that rigorous scholarship could fundamentally revamp society and inspire everyone to embark on the path of collective spiritual progress. He worked hard for his goals. He taught himself difficult languages such as Sanskrit and classical Tibetan. He conducted detailed textual analysis everyday over a forty-year period, despite the political turmoil unfolding around him, and even during the Japanese air raids, he pushed on with his studies. In the end, his social revolution failed. However, the weapons he created to realize his revolution of consciousness, chief among them *Essentials*, established his fame as one of the first Buddhologists of modern China and a renowned Yogācāra philosopher.

This understanding of an enigmatic new canon and its idealistic editor, Lü Cheng, raise two central questions of this study. The first is: What attracted Chinese intellectuals like Lü to study Yogācāra? The second is: What issues were they trying to resolve? My analysis of Lü's life and work reveal some keys to answer these questions. One of my arguments is that Lü is important to scholarly understanding of modern China's cultural transformation because his life and work discloses the Buddhist underpinnings of the long Chinese revolution. Further, I argue that Lü's thought warrants new scholarly engagement because he articulated an approach to morality and social justice that was both unique during his own time and fruitful as a resource for contemporary debates.

This study pursues a combinatory approach to Buddhist studies, interweaving Buddhological philology, Buddhist doctrine and philosophy, historical analysis, and a global perspective. Until recently, scholars of Buddhist studies have often followed one of the two approaches: the conceptual and the historical. Buddhologists and philologists, by and large, engage in a conceptual project. They examine the nuances, hermeneutical implications, and variations of selected doctrines and concepts. On the other hand, historians of Buddhism typically analyze the historical contours and material realities of Buddhist practice. Combining both approaches, of course, has always been a common goal, though difficult to achieve. Fortuitously, for the case of modern Chinese Buddhism, the vagaries of history preserve the primary sources needed to pursue both methods, the conceptual analysis of abstract doctrines and historical contextualization. By tracing Lü's puzzling career from a devoted revolutionary to an accidental Buddhologist from 1918 to 1966 and by analyzing the conditions of production as well as the social function of *Essentials*, this dissertation folds the conceptual and historical approaches into one. In particular, this synthetic approach opens up a new set of questions: For whom and for what purpose was Yogācāra used? Who employed Yogācāra methods? For solving what kind of local and global issues? Equally important, how were the received traditions reevaluated and deployed?

This approach also helps us appreciate what is new and what is old in the modern Chinese transformation of Buddhism. A sociological perspective sheds light on the rupture in Buddhist practice, while a focus on soteriology demonstrates continuities in the Buddhist quest for liberation. Later chapters argue that, in the modern era, the traditional idea of Buddhism as a form of psychological medicine was reconfigured as a cure for social ills. At the same time, I trace how the meaning of nirvāṇa shifted from extinguishing suffering to initiating social change. The new perspective I propose, as well as the new movements themselves, I term "socio-soteriology."

In addition to constituting a definitive feature of Lü's Yogācāra movement, socio-soteriology is, in this dissertation, an analytic framework that makes two interventions. The first is historiographical: My aim is to move outside the reigning discourse of political modernity in order to deepen our understanding of the modern transformation of religious traditions. The second

intervention is methodological. I use the concept of socio-soteriology to enable the comparative analysis of inter-religious dynamics that treats all modern religious movements on equal footing. I would argue that the commonly used labels of "modern," "new," and "religious" in the study of religious modernisms are built on a negation of "non-modern" possibilities and presume an unchanging antagonism between religion and non-religion. While these categories may be useful in outlining broad trends, they often obscure as much as they illumine.

Recently, scholars of religious studies have made great strides in complicating these binary categories. Most notably, Goossaert and Palmer propose a new perspective for reexamining the modern transformation of China: the lens of Chinese social ecology.[5] Instead of taking religion as a given category, Goossaert and Palmer suggest that scholars examine emerging conceptions as well as the vicissitudes of the "religious field" in the complex social ecology since the late nineteenth century that is vaguely labelled as "modernity."[6] While the angle of social ecology foregrounds the importance of social reality in molding religious transformations, nevertheless Goossaert and Palmer and many like-minded scholars treat the formation and transformation of this religious field as a "political project."[7] On the one hand, it is undeniable that social reality has remained a handmaiden

[5] Vincent Goossaert and David Palmer, *The Religious Question in Modern China* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2011), 8.

[6] Goossaert and Palmer, The Religious Question in Modern China, 8–10.

[7] Goossaert and Palmer, 11. Many scholars of Chinese religious follow the same approach, presuming social reality as a derivative of political reality. See, for example, Jan Kiely and J. Brooks Jessup, eds, *Recovering Buddhism in Modern China* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2016). Similarly, in understanding the religious transformation of modern India, Peter van der Veer incisively established the import of religion in the formation of Indian nationalism, see Peter van der Veer, *Religious Nationalism: Hindus and Muslims in India* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994). Van der Veer's recent monograph that compares the different fates of religion in Indian and Chinese nationalisms follows the same assumption of subsuming the social as a subcategory of the political. The result of this analysis is a reification of the nationalist discourses of "spiritual India" and "rational China." See Peter van der Veer, *The Modern Spirit of Asia: the Spiritual and the Secular in China and India* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014). Saba Mahmood studies the political production of religion in a similar vein. See Saba Mahmood, *Religious Difference in a Secular Age: A Minority Report* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2015). Instead of confronting the dynamics between politics and religion, Talal Asad approached the entanglement of the secular and political modernity sideways, from the perspective of the formations of the epistemic category of the secular. See Talal Asad, *Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, Modernity* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003). This dissertation is inspired by Asad's sideways look at political modernity and its production of the religious field. However, instead of producing another anthropology of secularism, which examines the prehistory of secularism, the current dissertation suggests we look into the

of the state. On the other hand, it is also undeniable that many historical actors took this new independent category of social reality seriously and reversed the hierarchy by asking: How shall the state or other political institutions serve to build a just society? As this dissertation reveals, instead of trying to confront or conform to the political demands of the day, many thinkers sidestepped the political question and imagined an ideal society in which political institutions must serve the ideals of the common good.[8] Unfortunately, mainly due to the unreflective use of the social and the unexamined presumption of social reality as derivative of the political project, extant scholarship tends to reproduce the story of the triumph of the secular and overlooks significant alternative societal visions.

To avoid this singular focus on the political, the socio-soteriological binocular offers scholars a means to understand the formation of the Chinese religious field from a new angle. The social lens of the binocular examines how historical actors wrestled with the new category of social reality and how they drew moral sources from their received traditions to resolve the problem of human agency in an allegedly morally neutral reality. The soteriological lens traces the religious transformation outside the discourse of political modernity and through the eyes of the religious practitioners. It asks and answers the question of how historical actors updated their soteriological toolboxes,

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understudied category of social reality and examine how historical actors tried to subsume the category of the political in the service of an ideal society.

[8] In fact, in premodern forms of Buddhism, there are numerous cases where religious practices in Buddhism transformed the social organizations of their host society in multiple ways. For a seminal work on Buddhism and society in India and South Asia, see Trevor Ling, *The Buddha: The Social-Revolutionary Potential of Buddhism* (Onalaska, WA: Pariyatti, 2013 [1973]). For Buddhism and society in Southeast Asian countries such as Thailand, see, Stanley J. Tambiah, *World Conqueror and World Renouncer: A Study of Buddhism and Polity In Thailand Against a Historical Background* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976. For a seminal work on Buddhist economic impact in medieval China, see Jacques Gernet, *Buddhism in Chinese Society: An Economic History From the Fifth to the Tenth Centuries* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995). This is an English translation of Gernet's monograph in French, *Les Aspects économiques du bouddhisme dans la sociétè chinoise du Ve au Xe siècle* (Saigon: École Française d'Extrême-Orient, 1956). For how the Buddhist texts, rituals, story-telling, and festivals changed the medieval Chinese social landscape, see, for example, Stephen F. Teiser, *The Ghost Festival in Medieval China* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988).

While the religious and the social have always been intertwined in premodern Chinese societies, when Lü's launched his Yogācāra studies, this moment marked the first time that Buddhist thinkers started to theorize the ontological status of the social independently from politics, economics, or cosmology.

revised the goals of liberation, redefined moral agency, and imagined a more livable world. Although this study focuses on a Buddhist modernist movement, I also hope that the analytic category of the socio-soteriological enables cross-disciplinary conversation and the comparative study of religion and modernity.

My argument is three-fold, spanning the historical, social, and philosophical spheres. The historical argument unveils not only the understudied Buddhist contribution to the Chinese revolution but also the revolutionary origins of this new Yogācāra. The new Yogācāra owed its birth to a concerted effort by Buddhist intellectuals to indigenize science and democracy through Yogācāra concepts on the one hand and to replace the dominant idea of the survival of the fittest[9] with a Buddhist vision of collective spiritual liberation on the other. As I demonstrate, in the 1920s, when the quest to rescue China from the Western powers permeated the Chinese intellectual landscape, Yogācāra became popular among revolutionaries after Lü and others promoted it as a moral guide to lead China out of the Darwinist jungle. The rise of Yogācāra spiritual exercises also marked the birth of Buddhist social consciousness.

I pursue social and philosophical arguments in order to highlight the newness of this modern Yogācāra, which used ancient analytic tools to realize structural justice. As I demonstrate, when "social reality" became an independent category of analysis in early twentieth-century China, freed from its pre-modern subservience to cosmology, religion, economy, and politics, the ancient Yogācāra doctrines became newly relevant. Intellectuals like Lü largely accepted the imported concept of "social reality" as an independent category. At the same time, they rejected its Western ontological bases, including the objective realism of Durkheimian sociology or interior mystical psyche represented by Bergsonian creative evolution. Instead, they used the conceptual framework of Yogācāra to formulate an alternative theory of social evolution based on Buddhist-naturalist doctrines such as shared karma and common consciousness. This theory of social reality enabled Lü to reframe science as a system of causal laws among diverse streams of consciousness participating

[9] The slogan of social Darwinism, *ruorou qiangshi* 弱肉強食, the weak are eaten by the strong, or literally "the weak are meat, the strong eat."

in intersubjective oneness. This new Yogācāra socio-soteriology was appealing to Chinese intellectuals because it integrated Western science into a Buddhist moral system and curtailed what many viewed as the two main problems of Western modernity: excessive materialism and rampant individualism.[10] In this way, the impact of Lü's new Yogācāra socio-soteriology went far beyond the Buddhist sphere. Rather, it molded the Chinese reception of the imported category of social reality and offered an alternative social theory outside the confines of Durkheim and Bergson.

My philosophical argument unpacks Lü's reworking of Yogācāra doctrine that aimed to establish a robust Yogācāra theory of social evolution. The central philosophical challenge in reconciling Yogācāra with science and evolution is how to bridge the gulf between scientific objectivity and Yogācāra subjectivity. As I demonstrate, since the very beginning of his quest for a just and caring society, Lü strived to theorize intersubjectivity. For Lü, the intersubjective is ontologically primary. From this intersubjectivity arise an objective aspect such as rivers and mountains and a subjective aspect such as the sense of a self. In his early forays into Western aesthetics, Lü sought unsuccessfully to establish a theory of intersubjectivity grounded in Western philosophy. This failure prompted Lü's turn to Buddhist thought. Over a period of eighteen hundred years, Yogācāra masters had developed a wealth of arguments against dualistic concepts such as outer-inner, matter-mind, and objective-subjective. This Yogācāra toolbox proved ready-to-hand for

[10] Both materialism and individualism were Western imports. In the early twentieth century, many Chinese thinkers used materialism, social Darwinist competition, and capitalist commercialization interchangeably and characterized the West as a material civilization (*wuzhi wenming* 物質文明) and the East as a spiritual civilization (*jingshen wenming* 精神文明). Materialism was not a philosophical concept but a social critique of the mentality that judged the success and progress of a society based on military power and material wealth, as seen in Adam Smith's *The Wealth of Nations*, translated by Yan Fu into Chinese and published in 1902. The Chinese understanding of materialism, individualism, and social Darwinism must be contextualized within the history of imperialism. From the mid-nineteenth century onwards, the successive encroachments of British, French, and Japanese imperialism were searing experiences and instructive lessons in "survival of the fittest." Therefore, many Chinese saw the imported concepts of materialism, individualism, and social Darwinism as the Western glorification of military power and material wealth. For an in-depth analysis on the leading proponent of the theory of material civilization and spiritual civilization, Liang Shuming, and his cultural impact, see, Thierry Meynard, *The Religious Philosophy of Liang Shuming: The Hidden Buddhist* (Leiden: Brill, 2011). Similarly, individualism in China was also a social critique instead of a philosophical school. For an overview of the rise and fall of individualism, see, Yang Nianqun, "The Rise and Fall of 'Individualism' Before and After the May Fourth Movement," *Chinese Studies in History* 52, no. 3–4 (2019): 209-222.

Lü's mission to build a defensible theory of an intersubjective social unity. In this light, Lü's lifelong endeavor reveals a broader trend of employing Buddhist moral sources to solve newly emerging social issues.

The term socio-soteriology encapsulates this three-fold inquiry in one phrase. In the following, I explain, step by step, the analytic work and historiographical interventions that are made possible by this tool. In the conclusion of this dissertation, I highlight the larger implications of this analytic binocular for understanding the prehistory of socially engaged Buddhism and the promise of comparative analysis of religious modernisms emerged from indigenous networs, translocal exchanges, and shared concerns.

The Historical Argument: Social Darwinism and the Rise of Modern Yogācāra

One key contribution of this dissertation is a new understanding of the recent history of Buddhist thought. I argue that the rise of modern Yogācāra as advocated by Lü and his teacher Ouyang Jingwu 歐陽竟無 (1871–1943) was a legitimate offspring of the May Fourth New Culture Movement 五四新文化運動 (1915–1921). The May Fourth Movement was a socio-cultural reform that sprang from a shared belief that the resources of the Chinese past were inadequate to address China's problems. In the May Fourth era, many intellectuals, who earlier had supported the 1911 overthrow of dynastic rule, became disillusioned with the hope of using power and wealth to rescue China. Instead, a decade later, they called for the creation of a new Chinese culture based on democracy and science. Inspired by this wave of new socio-cultural experiments, intellectuals like Ouyang and Lü reinterpreted democratic values and scientific laws in Buddhist terms, substituting the moral commitments of the bodhisattva (a Buddhist heroic exemplar who vows to save all sentient beings) for democracy and karmic causal laws for scientific explanation. In their effort to Buddhicize science and democracy, Lü and Ouyang indigenized Western universal discourses and simultaneously reinvented a new form of Chineseness grounded in the centuries-old Chinese Buddhist translation enterprise.[11]

[11] For an overview of diverse effort to make Buddhism compatible with science in the early twentieth century China, see, Erik Hammerstrom, *The Science of Chinese Buddhism: Early Twentieth-Century Engagements*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2015). Building upon the broad contours outlined in

This finding reveals a shared horizon of concern among Chinese intellectuals: At a time when scientific realism, capitalist materialism, and social Darwinism dominated the intellectual terrain, many progressive intellectuals turned to Buddhist traditions for resources to dismantle unjust global and social orders and to build an egalitarian society. For many intellectuals, a just society avoids the pitfalls of Darwinian competition and enables stronger social bonds as the foundation of a new republicanism. Recognizing this shared horizon sheds light on two related forms of amnesia concerning the modern transformation of Chinese Buddhism and the nature of the May Fourth Movement.

First, this shared mindset illustrates the overlooked role of social Darwinism in popularizing modern Yogācāra. Extant scholarship on Ouyang and his China Inner Learning Institute (Zhina neixue yuan 支那內學院, 1922–1952) correctly identifies their Yogācāra studies as an offshoot of the Buddhist revival movement spearheaded by Ouyang's teacher Yang Wenhui 楊文會 (1837–1911).[12] However, the received wisdom confines these generations of Buddhist experimentation to an exclusively Buddhist sphere, set apart from the institutional and cultural experiments of Republican China. Furthermore, the standard narrative also fails to differentiate Yang's pre-Darwinist vision of revitalizing Buddhism from the full-frontal encounter with Darwinian ideas among the next generation of leaders such as Ouyang and the monk Taixu 太虛 (1890–1947). My dissertation reexamines the rise of the new Yogācāra in its own historical context. I first demonstrate how Lü Cheng, from 1918 to 1922, initially aspired to theorize an aesthetic society in order to subvert social evolutionism inspired by Darwin. I next show how, from 1922 onwards, he joined forces with other young disciples of Ouyang to promote Yogācāra theory as an alternative to the moral universe of

Hammerstrom's monograph, the current case study makes a different historical argument, analyzed in Chapters Four and Six.

[12] The seminal work is Holmes Welch's monograph; see Holms Welch, *The Buddhist Revival in China* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1968). The literature in Chinese is too extensive to list here. For a concise review of the state of the subfield of modern Chinese Buddhism, see Erik Hammerstrom and Gregory Adam Scott, "Revisiting the revival: Holmes Welch and the study of Buddhism in twentieth-century China," *Studies in Chinese Religions* 3 no. 3 (2017): 197–203. DOI: 10.1080/23729988.2017.1380938. The articles in this special issue of *Studies in Chinese Religions* extend Welch's seminal work in different directions.

Darwinian competition; in this phase, these young Yogācārins redefined social evolution as collective spiritual emancipation. My treatment of this social reorientation of Buddhism discloses to us a concrete path of making "Buddhism as a world religion in a scientific world," which has otherwise been obscured by the bias toward the secular in modern scholarship.[13]

Building upon the recent scholarly effort to uncover the Buddhist underpinnings of modern China,[14] this dissertation takes the study of modern Yogācāra out of the confines of philology and philosophy. My historical analysis shows how Buddhist theories and practices of liberation were merged with May Fourth societal goals.[15] I build on Eyal Aviv's essay restoring the soteriological intention central to Ouyang's Yogācāra studies.[16] My analysis in Part I further maps out the historical context of Ouyang's soteriological quest and illustrates the central problems that Ouyang sought to remedy through Yogācāra scholarship: excessive materialism and rampant individualism. I am also indebted to Lei Ying's reading Ouyang alongside the leading figure of modern Chinese literature, Lu Xun (1881–1936). She is the first to identify Ouyang as a May Fourth thinker, illustrating Ouyang's and Lu Xun's shared sense of crisis and common mission of "rescuing our country and preserving our race [or seeds]" (*jiuguo baozhong* 救國保種).[17] My analysis in Chapters Two and Three pushes Aviv's

[13] Holmes Welch, The Buddhist Revival in China, 10.

[14] Kiely and Jessup, *Recovering Buddhism in Modern China*. The introduction by Kiely and Jessup also aptly maps out the broad contours of Buddhist transformations as well as national policies and trends that impacted socio-religious transformation in modern China.

[15] I am inspired by Jessica Main and Rongdao Lai's call to analyze how Buddhism and activism became integrated in the modern era. Their goal is to make "socially engaged Buddhism" (SEB) an analytic category by investigating the moral reasonings of integrating social activism with soteriology. I have a slightly different goal, i.e., mapping out the prehistory of SEB around the globe. I will explain the significance of Main and Lai's work and the relevance of this study to the global history of SEB in the conclusion of this dissertation, after I have discussed how Lü repurposed Yogācāra soteriology for social reform. See Jessica Main and Rongdao Lai, "Reformulating 'Socially Engaged Buddhism' as an Analytical Category," *The Eastern Buddhist* 44 no. 2 (2014): 1–34.

[16] Eyal Aviv, "Ouyang Jingwu: From Yogācāra Scholasticism to Soteriology," in *Transforming Consciousness: Yogācāra Thought in Modern China*, ed. John Makeham (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), 286–317.

[17] Ying Lei, "Lu Xun, the Critical Buddhist: A Monstrous Ekayāna," *The Journal of Chinese Literature and Culture* 3, No. 2 (November 2016): 400–28. DOI 10.1215/23290048-3713863. For an outline of the history and impact of the "rescuing our nation and preserving our race" movements, see, for example, Chen Zhefu 陈哲夫, *Xiandai Zhongguo zhengzhi sixiang liupai* 现代中国政治思想流派 (Beijing: Dangdai Zhongguo chubanshe, 1999), 2: 183–86. See also Fang Keli 方克立 and Li Jinquan 李錦全, eds., *Xiandai xinrujia xue'an* 現代新儒家學案 (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, 1995), 2: 575–80.

and Ying's arguments one step further by pinpointing when, why, and how Ouyang's new Yogācāra became a major force in the May Fourth mission.

Moreover, my study also highlights the unrecognized role of Buddhist societism in the May Fourth New Culture Movement, foregrounding the spiritual quest obscured by the secular myopia. I define societism negatively: It is neither Durkheimian sociology (which is one form of not-societism) that underpins liberal democracy nor historical materialism (another kind of not-societism) that underpins the Marxist vision of socialism and communism. The term societism was first coined by Vogt, seeking to bring to the relief the wide range of Jewish figures who were rethinking social justice in terms of a collective life in nineteenth-century France, thus nurturing Durkheimian sociology.[18] I use this concept to showcase an overlooked aspect of the social: How diverse religious traditions have provided fertile ground for alternative philosophical theorizations of relationality and social evolution. This new aspect of the social, I term "religious societism." As I demonstrate in Part I of the dissertation, these religious societist visions, whether Yogācāra social theory or Confucian vitalism, sustained a wide range of experiments to revive elements of Chinese culture deemed suitable for modern democracy.

By contrast, extant scholarship often characterizes modern Buddhist transformation as either a resistance against modern depravities or a desire to fit in the modern world. By adopting a pre-determined definition of modernity, however, these approaches fail to interrogate how Buddhist

[18] Paul W. Vogt, "The Politics of Academic Sociological Theory in France, 1890–1914" (PhD Diss., Indiana University, 1976), 23–24. Vogt defines societism "to denote a growing belief on the part of social thinkers in late nineteenth-century France that human actions can only be understood when they are seen in relation to the societies in which they take place …" at a time that "commenced a rapidly increasing awareness of the collective sources of human motivation and a marked tendency to view traditional social and economic problems in terms of group rather than individual life… Society was seen as conceptually distinct from the individual in it. More important was a concomitant extension of the concept of society as society was somehow more than the sum of the individuals composing it." Indeed, in studies of social ontology, Durkheim is often seen as a representative of the holism camp that considers social reality as fundamental, independent, or autonomous because Durkheim "argues that 'social facts' are autonomous of individuals and have the power to constrain and affect their actions."
For an analysis of Durkheimian social ontology and its rival theories of social ontology, see Brian Epstein, "Social Ontology," *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Summer 2018 Edition), ed. Edward N. Zalta, URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2018/entries/social-ontology/>.

societist visions redefined the meaning of modernity and thereby shaped the manifold meanings of becoming modern. In particular, extant scholarship on the China Inner Learning Institute tends to position the Institute as narrowly focused on reviving the Yogācāra school of thought and as the lay counterpart of the reform of monastic life led by monk Taixu's Wuchang Buddhist Seminary (Wuchang foxue yuan 武昌佛學院; 1922–1926; 1929–1949; 1994–2007).[19] This branch of scholarship leaves unexamined the emic divide between lay and monk. Hence, it is not equipped to analyze the drastic metamorphosis of both lay and monastic identities that was taking place. One important exception is Lai's recent dissertation, "Praying for the Republic," which analyzes the formation of a new monastic identity—student-monk—that emerged out of the desire to make Buddhist soteriological goals relevant in modern society.[20] The corresponding transformation of lay identity that I undertake in this dissertation is still understudied.[21] By foregrounding the Buddhist societist vision, the current study discloses one form of the drastic remaking of the premodern bodhisattva ideal as the linchpin of a new lay identity, i.e., a group of engaged Buddhist scholars who tirelessly excavate Buddhist archives for collective spiritual liberation.

Beyond casting the modern transformation of Buddhism in a new light, I also aim to highlight the Buddhist underpinnings of the modern Chinese revolution. In James Reeve Pusey's seminal study of Darwinism in China, he establishes how generations of Chinese revolutionaries, from the late-Qing reformer Liang Qichao 梁啟超 (1873–1929) to the founding father of the Republic, Sun Yat-sen 孫逸仙 (1866–1925), appropriated Darwinist discourse to advance their own political agendas,

[19] The literature in Chinese is too extensive to summarize. Here, I only list the most relevant monographs: Liu Chengyou 刘成有, *Jinxiandai jushi foxue yanjiu* 近现代居士佛学研究 (Chengdu: Bashu shushe, 2002); Luo Cheng 羅琤, *Jinling kejingchu yanjiu* 金陵刻經處研究 (Shanghai: Shanghai shehui kexueyuan chubanshe, 2010); Cheng Gongrang 程恭讓, *Ouyang Jingwu foxue sixiang yanjiu* 歐陽竟無佛學思想研究 (Taibei: Xinwenfeng Press, 2000).

[20] Rongdao Lai, "Praying for the Republic: Buddhist Education, Student-monks, and Citizenship in Modern China (1911–1949)" (PhD Diss., McGill University, 2013).

[21] There are many studies of lay Buddhism in both Chinese and English. However, extant scholarship tends to take the label *jushi* (居士) as unproblematic and thereby fails to investigate the contested boundaries of lay-monastic in modern China.

eventually leading to the end of the Qing empire and the rise of the Chinese Republic in 1911.[22] Seen in hindsight from the perspective of state-building, social Darwinism seems to have been productively implanted in the Chinese intellectual terrain since 1895. This impression of a harmonious coexistence between Darwinism and modern China apparently spilled over to the realm of Buddhism. Consequently, the encounter of Chinese Buddhism and social Darwinism remains understudied.[23] However, if we broaden our purview to include diverse views of the collective future, then we can identify various societist experiments before, during, and after the May Fourth era that have been silenced by subsequent Nationalist and the Communist paradigms. In his important 2016 monograph *China's Twentieth Century*, the intellectual historian Wang Hui characterizes China's twentieth century as both a short century from 1911 to 1976 and simultaneously a long socialist revolution.[24] Unfortunately, by considering it a socialist journey, Wang's study partially reproduces the winners' narrative and solidifies the teleology of the inevitable rise of socialist China. By attending to the societist experiments marginalized by this conventional discourse, I hope that scholars will appreciate better the many Buddhist visions of community that nurtured China's long revolution.

Once scholars look outside the confines of socialism, it quickly becomes clear that the Yogācāra societism of Ouyang and Lü's was merely one case among many efforts to Buddhicize imported modernity. The project launched by the China Inner Learning Institute reveals to us a significant and widely acclaimed movement in May Fourth China that revised the Yogācāra spiritual path to build a just, caring, and inclusive society.[25] In concert with the tide of recent scholarly efforts

[22] James Reeve Pusey, *China and Charles Darwin* (Cambridge: Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard University, 1983).

[23] Erik Hammerstrom's monograph devotes one chapter on this topic. Hammerstrom's chapter is only extant study focusing on Buddhism and Social Darwinism, although there are many other articles or book chapters mention this topic in passing. Hammerstrom, *The Science of Chinese Buddhism*, 128–49.

[24] Wang Hui, *China's Twentieth Century*.

[25] The panelists in the 2018 American Academy of Religion annual meeting "Seeing through the Secular Paradigm: Buddhism and the Chinese Revolution" examined the impact of Buddhism on the Chinese revolution from the late nineteenth-century Buddhist revival movements to the post-1949 Tibetan scholarly effort to Buddhicize the Chinese revolutionary discourses. Equally important, Justin Ritzinger's 2017 monograph on Taixu's Maitreya cult marks a ground-breaking study of modern Chinese Buddhism by rescuing Taixu from the reductive secularist narrative of Humanistic Buddhism. Ritzinger not only discloses the impact of radical political thoughts on the modern transformation of Buddhism but also

to excavate marginalized voices of Buddhist revolutionaries, the new analytic lens of socio-soteriology investigates key questions concerning the intertwined emergence of religion, science, and society in the modern era: When, how, why, and who employed what kind of Buddhist soteriological tools to resolve what kinds of perceived or real social and political concerns?

The Social Argument: The Rise of Social Reality and the Birth of Buddhist Socio-Soteriology

While the historical trajectory outlined in Part I uncovers imagined communities in recent Buddhist history that have been understudied, the social and philosophical analysis therein sheds light on the novelty of Lü's Yogācāra theory of social evolution. In so doing, this study makes several interventions. First, it enables me to evaluate Lü's achievements across the disciplines of philosophy, epistemology, and Buddhology.[26] Second, the socio-soteriological lens enables me to identify a larger discursive field in which thinkers employed Buddhist soteriology not as a dead tradition but as a

recovers silenced Buddhist contestations on the meaning of revolution. Justin Ritzinger, *Anarchy in the Pure Land: Reinventing the Cult of Maitreya in Modern China* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2018). Scott Pacey's 2014 essay is the first to take Taixu seriously as a May Fourth thinker. Scott Pacey, "Taixu, Yogācāra, and the Buddhist Approach to Modernity," in *Transforming Consciousness*, 149–70.

[26] There are only two extant book-length studies of Lü's work. The first is Ding Xuqing's 丁徐清 2012 dissertation (obtained from Nanjing University), which is not yet available to the public. The second is Yuan Hongyu's book on Lü Cheng's Yogācāra philosophy; see Yuan Hongyu 袁宏禹, *Lü Cheng weishixue sixiang yanjiu* 吕澂唯识学思想研究 [A Study of Lü Cheng's Yogācāra Thought] (Beijing: Renmin Press, 2015). Both project presentist concerns of Buddhist philosophy onto Lü's scholarship and do not engage with Lü's broader social project. Two English essays on Lü Cheng similarly cast Lü merely as a Buddhologist and Yogācārin; see, Chen-kuo Lin, "The Uncompromising Quest for Genuine Buddhism"; and Dan Lusthaus, "Lü Cheng, Epistemology, and Genuine Buddhism." Studies on Ouyang adopt similar perspectives. For example, in Lin's evaluation of Ouyang and Lü's scholarship, Lin characterizes their 1930s' debate on a key Chinese Buddhist text, *Awakening the Mahāyāna Faith* (*Dasheng qixin lun* 大乘起信論), as a narrow doctrinal debate on original enlightenment or original quiescence, without addressing their social concerns; see Chen-kuo Lin, "Metaphysics, Suffering, and Liberation: The Debate between Two Buddhisms," in *Pruning the Bodhi Tree: The Storm over Critical Buddhism*, eds. Jamie Hubbard and Paul L. Swanson (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 1997), 298–313. Similarly, Cheng Gongrang's monographs on Ouyang place Ouyang's thought squarely within the box of Buddhist philosophy and Confucian ethics, as it is commonly understood; see Cheng Gongrang, *Ouyang Jingwu sixiang yanjiu*. Only recently have scholars started to treat Ouyang seriously not merely as a Buddhist philosopher but as a modern thinker in his own right. Among the first to do so was Zhang Zhiqiang; see Zhang Zhiqiang 張志強, *Zhu Lu, Kong Fo, xiandai sixiang* 朱陸・孔佛・現代思想 [Zhu Xi and Lu Jiuyuan—Confucius and the Buddha—Modern Thought] (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexueyuan chubanshe, 2012); and Jessica Zu, "Ouyang Jingwu's *Must-Read Classics for Laity*: Body Politics and Gendered Soteriology," *Journal of Chinese Religions* 47:1 (May 2019): 61–86.

living moral source to wrestle with modern societal issues. This approach adds to recent scholarly efforts to complicate binary categories such as this-worldly vs. other-worldly, god-centered vs. human-centered, traditionalism vs. modernism. More specifically, my approach places the indigenous theorizations of the social question at the center of scholarly analysis and thereby both avoids the pitfalls of Western methods vs. Eastern materials and sharpens Goossaert and Palmer's category of social ecology. Simultaneously, by making the social the primary lens of comparison, this method enables scholars to understand the emergence of religion and politics sideways and thereby promises to unravel the cheap stereotypes of "spiritual India" and "rational China."[27] In addition, answering Dipesh Chakrabarty's call to provincialize Europe, the current research uncovers how Chinese intellectuals redefined the Buddhist path to provide a powerful critique of social injustice and a source for a new global morality.[28] I argue that by critiquing modern practices that originated in Europe as inferior, needful of Buddhist wisdom, they inverted the stereotypes of advanced and primitive.

My social argument illustrates the importance of blocking the colonial gaze and instead foregrounding the vibrant debates that were central to the meaning-making at the margins of colonial empires. In particular, my study highlights the centrality of social ontology in the rise of modern Yogācāra. In particular, I demonstrate that after "social reality" became a new analytic category in early twentieth-century China,[29] Lü repurposed ancient Yogācāra critiques of the two extremes of realism and idealism in order to theorize this new category of social totality. To a certain

[27] Recently, many scholars have proposed diverse ways of examine Chinese and Indian modernities beyond the regimes times, see for example, van der Veer, *The Modern Spirit of Asia*. For a general analysis of the field of China-India comparison, see Tansen Sen, "China–India Studies: Emergence, Development, and State of the Field," forthcoming in *Journal of Asian Studies*.

[28] Dipesh Chakrabarty, *Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), 3–11.

[29] For an historical analysis of the emergence of this category of the social, see Yang Nianqun 杨念群, *Wusi de ling yimian: "shehui" guannian de xingcheng yu xinxing zuzhi de dansheng* 五四的另一面："社会"观念的形成与新型组织的诞生 [Another Face of May Fourth: The Formation of the Concept of "Society" and the Birth of New Organizations], (Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 2019.) For the rise of sociology as an academic discipline in 1920s' and 1930s' China, see Tong Lam, *A Passion for Facts: Social Surveys and the Construction of the Chinese Nation State, 1900–1949* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2011).

extent, the rise of social totality grew out of Chinese intellectuals' collective reflection on the problematic legacy of Darwin in the 1920s. On the one hand, they still believed in progress, science, and democracy. On the other hand, disillusioned with power and control that had been touted as China's salvation, they started to search for new moral sources as a replacement for competition or survival in the Darwinian scheme. Thus began a historical shift in China from focusing on wealth and power in the 1911 Xinhai Revolution to valorizing culture and civilization in the May Fourth era as China's contribution to a more livable world.

Caught up in the tide of rethinking Darwinism and the social question, Lü proposed a phenomenological naturalist social theory. This Yogācāra social theory grants the collective a new ontological status as the intersubjective. This intersubjective oneness presumes an ontologically primary status. This primary intersubjectivity gives rise to the "mistaken" views of the individual, the group, and the natural. As my investigations reveal, phenomenological naturalism was Lü's solution to the problem of the modern: How to theorize human agency in a scientific world without celebrating the atomized individual? Lü described the dynamics of the totality of the perceptual world in terms of Buddhist causal theory, commonly known as karmic laws. This Buddhist theory enabled Lü to avoid the two extremes of defining social reality in terms of ontological realism and idealism.

Social reality was originally, of course, an imported analytic category. In Western Europe, from 1750 to 1920, through the political turmoil stirred up by the French Revolution, the development of capitalism, and the rise of modern individualism, the problem of social reality gradually emerged as an independent category of scholarly analysis. In European contexts, one of the central tensions was the antimony of the collective and the individual.[30] In Europe, this was a long debate spanning several centuries. By the time one of that debate's major concepts, social reality, was transplanted in Chinese soil and cultivated domestically for a few decades (from the late nineteenth

[30] For a brief history of the rise of the social and an in-depth analysis of different social theories, see Ken Morrison, *Marx, Durkheim, Weber: Formations of Modern Social Thought* (London; Thousand Oaks; New Delhi: SAGE Publications, 1995).

century to the early 1920s), the Chinese debate about social reality took on a different form: the ontological status of societal unity.

The Chinese fixation on social oneness is overdetermined by premodern Chinese forms of society and politics. As Goossaert and Palmer point out, in pre-modern Chinese culture, diverse Chinese religions are nonetheless cohered around an irresistible magnetic force—the religio-political state. When this state crumpled in the Xinhai Revolution, Chinese intellectuals started their century-long search for a new "spiritual center of gravity."[31] Central to this search was the question of the collective: How to establish a new sociality that promises a spiritual and moral civilization? I argue that this Chinese obsession with social ontology loomed large in many debates about religion, science, superstition, and modernity.

For our purpose, as I demonstrate in Chapters Two and Three, there were two main camps in the Chinese debate on the ontological status of social reality. The first was scientific realism, represented by both social science and social Darwinism. The second is its opposite—mythical idealism, which is represented by Bergsonian creative evolution and the Chinese indigenous vitalism.[32]

Early in his career as a revolutionary, Lü identified the central philosophical problems of both formulations of social reality and proposed his own theory of an intersubjective social oneness. For Lü, the problem with scientific realism is that it does not leave room for moral agency. Lü viewed social Darwinism as the moral system of science, which naturalized selfish competition for material

[31] Goossaert and Palmer, *The Religions Question in Modern China*, 3. For an in-depth analysis of the religio-political state in premodern Chinese society, see John Lagerwey, *China: A Religious State* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2010).

[32] For the spread of social Darwinism in modern China, see Pusey's seminal work: James Reeve Pusey, *China and Charles Darwin.* For the impact of anarchism in modern China, see Peter Gue Zarrow, *Anarchism and Chinese Political Culture* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990) and John A. Rapp, *Daoism and Anarchism: Critiques of State Autonomy in Ancient and Modern China* (New York: Continuum, 2012), 107–22. For Bergsonism and Chinese Vitalism, see, Joseph Ciaudo, "Introduction à la métaphysique bergsonienne en Chine: Échos philosophiques et moralization de l'intuition," *Noesis* no. 21 (Spring 2013): 293–328; An Yanming, "Liang Shuming and Henri Bergson on Intuition: Cultural Context and the Evolution of Terms," *Philosophy East and West* 47, no. 3, (1997): 337–62, and Ku-ming (Kevin) Chang, " 'Ceaseless Generation': Republican China's Rediscovery and Expansion of Domestic Vitalism," *Asia Major* 30.2 (2017): 101–31.

gain and control. Unlike Western cultures whose Christian roots instilled the concepts of individuality and free will as the site of moral agency, many modern Chinese thinkers viewed the imported concept of free will as part of the problematic Western individualism. Lü was no exception. To inject human agency into the social collective and to avoid the Western individualist pitfall, Lü redefine the nature of the scientific enterprise. To him, science consisted of rigorous methods exercised in order to reach intersubjective agreement. At the same time, Lü also criticized Bergsonism for its philosophical solipsism. In his effort to build an aesthetic society, Lü creatively misread many European aesthetes such as Jean-Marie Guyau, Theodor Lipps, and Walter Pater and reassembled these deconstructed elements into a grand theory of the intersubjective. For Lü, intersubjectivity was the substrate of social solidarity and could be maintained through the expansion of aesthetic empathy and sensibility.

I argue that, in 1922, when Lü abruptly terminated his career as an aesthetic revolutionary, what precipitated this rupture was Lü's quest for a more robust theorization of the intersubjective. To build a theory of an intersubjective oneness imbued with moral agency, Lü looked back to Yogācāra causal enframing (*weishi yuanqi* 唯識緣起). To further his project of societal renewal, Lü found in Yogācāra doctrines the perfect refutation of both idealist and realist misunderstandings of social ontology. In the hands of modern Yogācārins such as Lü Cheng and Ouyang Jingwu, Yogācāra causal theory and spiritual exercises were reinvented as the theory and practice, respectively, for the remaking of society. The collective spiritual awakening Lü prophesied was based on the power of turning consciousness toward revolution, a modern reformulation of the Yogācāra concept of transformation of the basis (Skt: *āśrayaparivṛtti*; Ch: *zhuanyi* 轉依), or, in Lü's use, revolution of distorted modes of cognition.

In my view, Lü's social evolutionary theory is a sophisticated subversion of capitalist logic. The capitalist myth of infinite economic progress is best represented by a Möbius strip: Starting from the inner surface where profits are generated out of self-interest, one builds a more prosperous enterprise where every employee gains better pay, which, in turn, generates better social well-being, which, consequently, leads to more profit for the selfish individual (see Fig. 3). Here, egoistic desires

are sanctified and celebrated as social well-being.[33] Lü's Yogācāra social evolutionary theory, on the other hand, represents a reversal of the capitalist Möbius strip: Starting from the outer surface of benefiting other living beings' spiritual progress, one accumulates more merit that leads to the reduction of egoistic desires, which, then, leads to more supernatural powers of the person, which, in turn, allows the person to help more sentient beings (see Fig. 4). In this verso of the capitalist recto, altruistic commitments are turned or warped into true self-interest—the ultimate liberation of oneself and others.[34]

The Philosophical Argument: Where Does Moral Agency Lie? Neither Inside nor Outside

The imported category of "social reality" also stirred a recurring philosophical question: What is it to be a human agent? This issue was particularly pressing in early twentieth-century China. Under the onslaught of Western science, scientism, and social Darwinism, the traditional Confucian moral framework crumbled. In this system, human agency is firmly embedded in the social norms governing the Five Constants (*wuchang* 五常)—humanness, justice, proper rite, knowledge, integrity. More problematically, while Confucian morality deems human nature inherently good (*xingshan* 性善), the imported system of science and morality—social Darwinism, widely understood as "survival of the fittest"—made competition seem part of nature and glorified force, control, and domination. This obsession with material progress posed a new philosophical question: How does one theorize moral agency in a way that resolves the two main problems of Western modernity—excessive materialism and rampant individualism?[35]

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[33] The idea itself is a characterization of Bernard Mandeville's 1714 satire *The Fable of The Bees: or, Private Vices, Publick Benefits*, which influenced Adam Smith's political economy that was introduced to China together with social Darwinism through Yen Fu's translation.

[34] Johan Elverskog's recent monograph summarizes this kind of teaching on self-interest and compassion as a Buddhist "prosperity theology" that facilitated the emergence of proto-capitalism and noticeable degree of environmental destructions. Johan Elverskog, *The Buddha's Footprint: An Environmental History of Asia* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2020). The goal of Elverskog's monograph is to correct socially engaged Buddhists' romanticization of premodern Buddhism. My goal is different. In highlighting the social turn of the Buddhist soteriology, I seek to highlight the continual impact of Buddhist doctrines in the social debates about capitalism, free market, individualism, freedom and liberty.

[35] Throughout this dissertation, I use rampant individualism or Western/modern individualism to distinguish the modern trends of individualist thinking from traditional Chinese conceptions of self and

The problem of moral agency in modern China is not unique. Lü's anti-realist and anti-idealist theorization of human agency, however, offered a unique solution to moral dilemmas raised by modernity. This moral quandary burst into view during the debate over mind and matter in the 1920s.[36] Central to this debate was this issue of where human agency lies. While proponents of historical materialism and scientific realism championed a presumably Western idea of free will, the opposing view, advanced by representatives of an Chinese indigenous vitalism (often dubbed New Confucianism, Xinrujia 新儒家), was similarly animated by ideas imported from Bergsonian notions of creative evolution—a philosophy of the occult self.[37] Strangely, Lü remained silent during this contentious episode. However, we should not take this silence as a lack of interest. As I show in Chapters Three and Four, during this time, Lü already identified the philosophical flaws in both camps of the debate, construing them as the two extremes long criticized by ancient Yogācāra masters. Instead of getting embroiled in this debate, Lü embarked on a less-traveled path: He proposed a middle-way solution and offered a radical theorization of an intersubjective consciousness as the foundation for universal moral agency.

My analysis of Lü's theorization of a communal moral agency also discloses that Lü's was a compelling vision of modern identity, especially important because it stood outside the Eurocentric

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agency either as a conformist agent embedded in social relations or as an individuated agent endowed with innate cosmic powers. For an in-depth analysis of individualism in early China, see Erica Brindley, *Individualism In Early China: Human Agency and the Self In Thought and Politics* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2010).

[36] Erik Hammerstrom briefly points out how Buddhist intellectuals saw Yogācāra as a middle way to refute the two extremes of materialism and idealism, in the context of physical universe; see Hammerstrom, *The Science of Chinese Buddhism*, 77; idem, "The Expression 'The Myriad Dharmas are Only Consciousness' in Early 20th Century Chinese Buddhism," *Chung-Hwa Buddhist Journal* 23 (2010):71–92. The issue has also been discussed in the context of modern Japanese Buddhism; see, for example, Gerard Clinton Godart, "'Philosophy' or 'Religion'? The Confrontation with Foreign Categories in Late Nineteenth-Century Japan," *Journal of the History of Ideas* 69, no. 1 (January 2008): 71–91. For the most part, these studies confine themselves to the realm of ontology of nature, failing to elucidate how the new category of social reality was dealt with using Buddhist soteriological tools.

[37] For an overview of the rise of occultism in the West, see, for example, Alex Owen, *The Place of Enchantment: British Occultism and the Culture of the Modern* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2004). For a broader historical review of the magic, see Nevill Drury, *Stealing Fire From Heaven: The Rise of Modern Western Magic* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011). For the rise of Chinese indigenous vitalism see, Ciaudo, "Introduction à la métaphysique bergsonienne en Chine."

discourses about the modern self. In his seminal work on selfhood and the formation of the modern identity in Europe and North America, Charles Taylor illustrates the often-unarticulated yet inescapable moral frameworks within which the modern identity emerges.[38] As Taylor explains, in the modern West, the central debates were pursued within two main streams of thought: 1) a reductive naturalism that deems all human activity, and hence all human values, to be reducible to natural laws, and 2) an ad hominem reaction to reductive naturalism that strives to justify and then articulate the irreducible qualitative distinctions. These qualitative distinctions, in Taylor's view, constitute a human orientation towards the world and are thereby intrinsic to human life. Rejecting both traditions of thought, Taylor instead celebrates a projectionist naturalism. This projectionist naturalism argues for the irreducibility of human values into natural laws, rejects the existence of universal criteria for resolving the subjective beliefs of different cultural communities, and holds that qualitative distinctions of goods cannot be measured against a value-neutral universe.

In other words, Taylor champions an account of human life that seeks to identify a "constitutive good" as the substrate of ethics upon which qualitative distinctions in moral values can be made. Taylor defines it as "the love of which empowers us to do and be good."[39] In his analysis, the constitutive goods of the modern, chiefly "universal justice and beneficence," "claims of equality … demands to freedom and self-rule," and "the avoidance of death and suffering," stem from three primary moral sources: a theist grounding of these constitutive goods, a naturalism that later led to the rise of scientism, and Romantic expressivism together with its afterlives.[40] This case study of the Western modern—posing as the universal modern—elides other possible moral sources and other equally viable formulations of moral agency. In premodern and modern China, theism and deism are simply not a dominant moral source. My dissertation reveals that, in their stead, Yogācāra philosophy provided well-honed tools for reinterpreting the moral systems of science and democracy in

[38] Charles Taylor, *Sources of the Self: The Making of Modern Identity* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1989), 3–24.
[39] Taylor, *Sources of the Self*, 93.
[40] Taylor, *Sources of the Self*, 495.

Buddhist terms. Thereby, I argue, Lü showed a way to inscribe Buddhist language on the edifice of Chinese modernity.

Once scholars take seriously the contributions of Asian philosophers in defining modernity, other possible manifestations of the modern dilemma burst become visible. In the European situation, the modern dilemma often manifests itself as the antinomy of the social and the individual. Instead of an antinomy of the social and the individual, Yogācārins in modern China formulated the modern dilemma as a dualistic reification of the realist and the idealist ontology of social oneness. In response, they theorized a society of interdependence and relationality.

The Chinese Yogācārins also proposed a robust philosophical solution to this modern dilemma. They proposed a form of moral agency embedded in collective consciousness as it was understood in Buddhist idealism. By looking at other possible formations of the modern identity proposed by non-Western scholars like Lü Cheng, we gain a rare opportunity to understand the processes of how a local formulation of moral issues was transplanted into new soil, developed new features, and offered innovative solutions.

My dissertation discloses how, in his effort to build a modern China, Lü made ancient Buddhist ideas speak to a modern world and thereby syncretized Western ideals with Chinese moral sources. Without fully appreciating the successful crossbreeding of ideas—and the falsity of Western claims about universality—the scholarly world will continue to be blinded by the constructed East-West hierarchy. In this enframing, the East represents local conditions and the West offers universal or comparative ideas and globalizing forces. Not only is this hierarchical duality falsified by Lü Cheng's intellectual achievements; it also is invalidated by similar attempts throughout modern Asia that employed other forms of Buddhist soteriology to solve social, political, and moral problems.

As Justin Ritzinger's 2017 monograph argues, the quest for a moral "hypergood" underpinned monk Taixu's transition from an anarchist radical to a monastic reformer.[41] As Erik Hammerstrom outlined in his 2015 monograph, the quest for a new moral system also motivated many Buddhist

[41] Justin Ritzinger, *Anarchy in the Pure Land*, 8–13.

intellectuals' critique of European modernity.[42] Nor were Chinese Buddhists alone in their quest for alternative theorizations of social justice. As Stephen Large, Vladimir Tikhonov, and Lee Kwang-rin point out, the domestication of social Darwinism and capitalism represented a significant strain of thought in the modern transformation of Buddhism in Japan and Korea.[43] While the historical actors in these studies shared Lü's concerns about social justice and strived to provide their own Buddhist solutions to modern depravities, they generally lacked Lü's rigorous philosophical examination of the issue of moral agency.

Employing Buddhist soteriology to resolve social problems was a common trend among Buddhist intellectuals across East Asia. They believed that, deep down, human nature was constituted by intersubjectivity, and that emancipation of that shared humanity could take place through the Buddhist path. Within this broad group, however, Lü Cheng stands out for his ability to translate this shared conviction and to develop it into a robust Yogācāra theory of social evolution. As I argue in Chapters Six and Seven, Lü extended the meaning of nirvāṇa from its earliest sense of extinguishing psychological suffering, developed the Mahāyāna expansion of the idea to include interpersonal and collective emancipation, and sketched how it necessarily entailed the tangible restructuring of modern society.

A Global Perspective: The Socio-Soteriological Transformation of Religion

My dissertation also aims to place modern Chinese Buddhism as well as the long Chinese revolution in the perspective of what is now called global intellectual history. For this endeavor, the concept of

[42] Hammerstrom, *The Science of Chinese Buddhism*, 128–49.

[43] Stephen Large, "Buddhism, Socialism and Protest in Pre-War Japan: The Career of Seno'o Girō," *Modern Asian Studies* 21, no. 1 (1987): 153–77. For a broader overview of Japanese Buddhist engagement with radical political movements, see Gerald Iguchi, "Nichirenism as Modernism: Imperialism, Fascism, and Buddhism in Modern Japan" (PhD diss., University of California, San Diego, 2006); and Kwang-rin Lee, "Korea's Response to Social Darwinism," in *Korean History: Discovery of its Characteristics and Developments*, ed. Korean National Commission for UNESCO (Seoul: Lollym, 2004), 439–73. For the Buddhist critique of capitalism and social Darwinism in modern Korea, see Vladimir Tikhonov and Owen Miller, trs., *Selected Writings of Han Yongun: From Social Darwinism to Socialism with a Buddhist Face* (Folkestone: Global Oriental LTD, 2018). For different contextualization of Buddhist social engagement from the angle of nationalism and violence, see, Vladimir Tikhonov and Torkel Brekke, eds, *Buddhism and Violence: Militarism and Buddhism in Modern Asia* (New York: Routledge, 2012).

socio-soteriological helps to foreground the toehold of many modern transformations of different religions: their shared concern of reweaving the spiritual needs and the quest for structural justice into a new fabric of the social.

Too often, I think, historians of Buddhism have taken the concept of society as self-explanatory and not explored their own presuppositions about it. Consequently, they have missed the opportunity to understand how Buddhist philosophers over the centuries entertained a wide range of social imaginaries. Once we dispense with the presumption that society is the sum of individuals and move the discussion beyond the bounds of social contract theory, we are able to understand better the great variety and creativity of Buddhist social philosophies. In the case of Lü Cheng, as I demonstrate below, this shake-up allows us to better appreciate how he reexamined the boundary of the self, critiqued the kind of social bonds that give rise to atomized individuals, rejected the logic of social Darwinism grounded in individualism and calculations of self-interest, and enacted an alternative social solidarity based on relationality and intersubjectivity. This enables us, further, to pursue a new line of inquiry: What were the societal visions proposed by the modern Chinese Buddhists and their interlocutors? For these actors, what counted as social engagement? Why did they believe activism was necessary, and how did they find fulfillment in engagement?

Taking soteriology seriously also offers conceptual advantages. In particular, it opens up new ways of examining Buddhist theory and practice: For Buddhist thinkers and actors, what was the goal of social engagement? How were the social means justified by soteriological ends? What doctrinal innovations were needed to legitimize these practices? How were path and goal related?

A global perspective is called for not merely because Lü Cheng, as one of China's first modern Buddhologists, was a polyglot and lived in the transnational world of early twentieth-century China's cosmopolitan centers. A global perspective is also needed in order to adequately gauge the significance of Lü and his peers, as well as to combat Orientalist stereotypes. By joining forces with

scholars seeking to challenge the simplistic dichotomy of the East-West divide, I hope to better understand the contributions of modern Asian scholars in the creation of Buddhist studies.[44]

Recent studies have succeeded in making modern Yogācāra a respectable subject for scholarly inquiry. Most of them, however, focus on Buddhist philosophy proper and limit their view to China.[45] As a result, we are prevented from seeing, much less understanding, the intense desire of several generations of Chinese Buddhists (including Ouyang and Lü) to Buddhicize the world, to globalize Buddhism, and to craft Buddhism into a remedy for the ills of capitalism. An exception is Viren Murthy's 2011 monograph, which initiates a fruitful conversation between Yogācāra and the critique of capitalism.[46] Building upon Murthy's work, this dissertation pushes the academic conversation on modern religious transformation one step further by drawing scholarly attention to the understudied global dimension of the modern transformation.

Approaching our subject from the perspective of global history offers several advantages. First, it helps us develop more supple understandings of subjects that are typically viewed under binary categories, including premodern/modern, local/universal, theocentric/humanistic, this-worldly/other-worldly. Global history also has the potential to add nuances to what is left out of such

[44] Twenty-five years ago, Charles Hallisey first challenged this East-West divide and called for more scholars to criticize the assumptions that Orientalist presentations of Buddhism are primarily a by-product of European modernity; see Charles Hallisey, "Roads Taken and Not Taken in the Study of Theravāda Buddhism," in *Curators of the Buddha: The Study of Buddhism Under Colonialism*, ed. Donald Lopez (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1995), 50. Since then, scholars of South Asian, Southeast Asian, and East Asian Buddhism have taken up Hallisey's challenge; see Richard M. Jaffe, *Seeking Śākyamuni: South Asia in the Formation of Modern Japanese Buddhism* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2019); Jack Meng-tat Chia, *Monks in Motion: Buddhism and Modernity across the South China Sea* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020); and Justin Ritzinger, "Original Buddhism and its Discontents: The Chinese Buddhist Exchange Monks and the Search for the Pure Dharma in Ceylon," *Journal of Chinese Religions* 44, no. 2 (2016): 149–73.

[45] John Makeham, ed., Transforming Consciousness; Ulrich Timme Kragh, ed., The Foundation for Yoga Practitioners: The Buddhist Yogācārabhūmi Treatise and its Adaptation in India, East Asia, and Tibet (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2013). See also Matthew T. Kapstein, "The Foundation for Yoga Practitioners: The Buddhist Yogācārabhūmi Treatise and Its Adaptation in India, East Asia, and Tibet, edited by Ulrich Timme Kragh," Indo-Iranian Journal 60, no. 3 (2017): 292–301.

[46] Viren Murthy, *The Political Philosophy of Zhang Taiyan: The Resistance of Consciousness* (Leiden, Boston: Brill, 2011).

reifications (typically, nominalized verbs) as secularization, modernization, privatization, and even the emic term Buddhicization.

Breaking down questionable binaries, however, requires more than making comparisons and identifying connections. As pointed out by Sebastian Conrad, to think globally also means to pursue causality up to a global scale.[47] Hence, another agenda this dissertation advances is to highlight those aspects of early twentieth-century Chinese Buddhist social movements that lay the groundwork and anticipated what later came to be called socially engaged Buddhism. Once we look into the aspirations of the historical actors themselves, we could readily identify diverse experiments around the world since the late nineteenth century that informed later versions of Buddhist social action, including Japanese Buddhist nationalism,[48] Buddhist anarchism,[49] Buddhist socialism,[50] Buddhist revolutionary movements in South Asia,[51] Dharmic socialism in Southeast Asia,[52] Chinese Buddhist nationalism,[53] Chinese Buddhist Marxism,[54] the Bengal Buddhist revival,[55] the Dalit Buddhist

[47] Sebastian Conrad, *What is Global History* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2016), 72.

[48] See for example, Osamu Ōnishi, *Senji kyōgaku to Jōdo Shinshū: Fashizumu-ka no bukkyō shisō* 戦時教学と浄土真宗: ファシズム下の仏教思想 [Education during Wartime: The Jōdo Shin Sect under Fascism] (Tokyo: Shakai Hyōronsha, 1995); and Robert H. Sharf, "The Zen of Japanese Nationalism," *History of Religions* 33, no. 1 (1993): 1–43.

[49] See for example, Justin Ritzinger, "The Awakening of Faith in Anarchism: A Forgotten Chapter in the Chinese Buddhist Encounter with Modernity," *Politics, Religion & Ideology* 15, no. 2 (2014): 224–43 and Fabio Rambelli, *Zen Anarchism: The Egalitarian Dharma of Uchiyama Gudō* (Berkeley: Institute of Buddhist Studies and BDK America, 2013).

[50] See for example, Tikhonov and Miller, *Selected Writings of Han Yongun*.

[51] See, for example, Braj Ranjan Mani, "Dr. Ambedkar's Predecessors on the Path Towards Narayana," in *Buddhism and the Contemporary World: An Ambedkarian Perspective*, eds. Bhalchandra Mungekar and Aakash Singh Rathore (New Delhi: Bookwell, 2007), 57–85.

[52] See, for example, Santikaro Bhikku, "Buddhadasa Bhikku: Life and Society through the Natural Eyes of Voidness," in *Engaged Buddhism: Buddhist Liberation Movements in Asia*, edited by Christopher S. Queen and Sallie B. King (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 147–93.

[53] See, for example, Gregory Adam Scott, "The Buddhist Nationalism of Dai Jitao," Journal of Chinese Religions 39, no. 1 (2011): 55–81; and Xue Yu, Buddhism, War, and Nationalism: Chinese Monks In the Struggle Against Japanese Aggressions, 1931–1945 (New York: Routledge, 2005).

[54] See, for example, Xue Yu 學愚, *Zhongguo fojiao de shehuizhuyi gaizao* 中國佛教的社會主義改造 [The Socialist Transformation of Chinese Buddhism] (Hong Kong: The Chinese University of Hong Kong Press, 2014).

[55] See, for example, Hemendu Bikash Chowdhury, *Hundred Years of the Bauddha Dharmankur Sabha, the Bengal Buddhist Association, 1892–1992* (Calcutta: The Sabha, 1992). For a general analysis of the Buddhist revival in modern India, see Trevor Ling, *Buddhist Revival In India: Aspects of the Sociology of Buddhism* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1980); D. L. Ramteke, *Revival of Buddhism in Modern India* (New Delhi:

movement, and many other understudied social turns of Buddhist soteriology. All of these societist experiments, though drawing from Buddhist moral sources, are, arguably, hybrids of diverse intellectual, political, and religious trends. Serious study of these religious movements (typically relegated to less serious categories like "modern" or "new") could benefit from different questions: How do they address the ontological status of the social and the individual? What values do they advance and critique? What is their approach to morality, and which moral frameworks do they advocate? What resources within Buddhism or elsewhere do they draw on to imagine and sustain their social ideals? How do they interact with local, national, regional, and international trends.

The early twentieth century witnessed a unique phenomenon. Many historical actors started to self-consciously imagine a society independent of governments and political regimes. This dissertation hopes to draw scholarly attention to this self-awareness. This is not to underestimate the reality that, in the long Chinese revolution from 1911 to 1976, the social as a category of analysis has been the handmaiden of the state, despite generations of scholars who argued for the opposite. However, by tracing the shifting meanings of the social, one can understand the continuing clout of local and global politics in shaping the social turn of modern Buddhism from the eyes of marginalized actors. Looking at the political through the angle of the societal imaginary provides deeper insight into how marginalized intellectuals tried to forge an independent sociality despite the political intrusion forced upon them.

Overview: The Rise and Fall of Lü's Yogācāra

The dissertation consists of three parts. After the current introductory chapter, Part I is divided into three chapters. Chapter Two traces Lü's aesthetic revolution. It examines how Lü employed Western aesthetics to build an aesthetic sociality grounded in intersubjective empathy. Chapter Three uncovers the rise of the China Inner Learning Institute and its global ambition, namely, its effort to save the world from grim outlook of social Darwinism. Chapter Four interprets Lü's reframing of

Deep & Deep, 1983); and Gitanjali Surendran, "The Indian Discovery of Buddhism: Buddhist Revival in India, c. 1890–1956" (PhD diss., Harvard University, 2013).

scientific rigor as comparative hermeneutics, examining how he attempted to subvert the Aryan myth conjured up by European Buddhologists.

Part II is devoted to the study of the most important scholarly production of the Inner Learning Institute—*Essentials*—and of its significance in Lü's Yogācāra societism. In Chapter Five, I examine the conditions of the production of *Essentials*. To map out the background of Lü's societal vision, I also analyze Ouyang's vision of *Essentials* as a resource for his soteriological project of Buddhicizing the world. Then, in Chapter Six, I demonstrate how Lü professionalized Buddhist learning through his mastery of Buddhological footnote practice and how he consequently transformed Buddhist canons into archives for the mining of soteriological knowledge. I also explain how Lü employed comparative hermeneutics to accentuate the inchoate elements of phenomenological naturalism in one of Xuanzang's treatises on Yogācāra. Through this, I argue, Lü, effectively redefined the soteriological term *āśrayaparivṛtti* as revolutionizing consciousness, and reframed essential Yogācāra doctrines in service of building a strong intersubjectivity.

Part III is devoted to the philosophical and doctrinal analysis of Lü's Yogācāra social evolutionary theory and practice. In Chapter Seven, I first outline the scope of Lü's societal evolutionary project, demonstrating how he redesigned the doctrines of "three natures" and "transformation of basis" into a mission of spiritual emancipation. Then I summarize how Lü pursued critical thinking in Buddhist terms: as a practice of organized skepticism guided by comparative hermeneutics and grounded in empathy. Lü's theorization of critical thinking is also a modern rendition of the traditional Buddhist pairing of wisdom and compassion. Lastly, I demonstrate how Lü reformulated Yogācāra bodhisattva precepts as communal rules for deliberative democracy and how he reinvented the six perfections as guidelines for social activism.

In the end, Lü's social revolution failed. His training program, which started in October 1943, was cut short because of the outbreak of the Chinese civil war immediately after the Japanese surrender in 1945. However, in my view, his noble experiment nonetheless offered a powerful critique of capitalism. His project penetrates deep into the heart of capitalist logic but also promises to rebuild a different society at a pragmatic level.

Thus, Lü's failed experiment provides much insight into rethinking capitalism and post-secularity: Can the ethos of compassion serve as a substrate for appreciating cultural differences and universal humanity? Can we overcome global capitalism by inspiring everyone to develop their best possible spiritual potential—becoming a bodhisattva? These important questions are central to many contemporary socially engaged Buddhists. An even more challenging question is: Can we take these questions out of the confines of religion (as defined with malice by modern secularism) and instead bring these overlooked moral sources into the horizon of the general public, who still searches for the place of human agency in a globalized, consumerist, and scientific world?




Figure 1 Page Layout of *Essentials*. Note the references in the footnotes referring to Sanskrit and Tibetan texts.




Figure 2 Multilingual Editorial Notes in *Essentials*



Figure 3 The Capitalist Logic of Infinite Economic Growth



Figure 4 The Yogācāra Logic of Limitless Spiritual Progress

PART I. SOCIAL DARWINISM AND THE RISE OF BUDDHIST IDEALISM

In Part I, I trace the rise of the new Yogācāra. Part I is divided into three chapters. Chapter Two traces Lü's aesthetic revolution. It reveals not only the origin of Lü's social consciousness but also the cause of Lü's turn toward Yogācāra studies. Chapter Three uncovers the critical force that led to the rise of the China Inner Learning Institute: Chinese intellectuals' search for an alternative social vision outside the rules of social Darwinism and scientific realism. Chapter Four decodes Lü's reframing of scientific rigor as comparative hermeneutics and examines his application of this new interpretative method to continue his revolution of consciousness.

CHAPTER 2. AESTHETIC REVOLUTION AND A MORAL SOCIETY

On December 15, 1918, a mostly unknown art teacher wrote a spirited letter to the flagship journal of the May Fourth New Culture Movement *New Youth* (*Xin qingnian* 新青年), calling for an "aesthetic revolution" (*meishu geming* 美術革命).[1] The editor promptly published this letter on January 15, 1919 and broadcasted his unreserved support. Soon afterward, the renowned artist Liu Haisu 劉海粟 (1896–1994), the founder of the Shanghai Art Academy that was deemed the epicenter of new art education at the time, invited this author to join his Academy and to toil for aesthetic revolution together in the cosmopolitan Shanghai. Once there, this art teacher not only introduced a wide range of Western aesthetic thinkers to the Chinese readers but also published several earliest academic monographs on aesthetics in modern China that laid the foundation for the academic discipline of aesthetic studies.[2]

The author of this letter was none other than Lü Cheng 吕澂 (1896–1989).[3] He was soon be recognized as the most erudite Buddhologist of modern China. Once placed on the pedestal of Buddhology since the 1930s, however, Lü became a victim of his own reputation: The public

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[1] Lü Cheng, "Meishu geming" 美術革命, *New Youth* 新青年 vol. 6, no. 1 (January 15, 1919): 84–86. The letter itself was composed in December 15, 1918. The title was added by the editor. Lü Cheng himself used *geming*, *gexin*, *gaige*, interchangeably in the letter, which was typical of its time. The editor at the time was Chen Duxiu (1879–1942), one of the founding fathers of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).

[2] For example, in his lecture series, "Wanjin de meixuehsuo he meide yuanli" 晚近的美學說和美的原理, published in *Education Magazine* 14, no. 2 and no. 3 in February and March 1922, he introduced a wide range of Western aesthetic movements to the Chinese students. The works cited by Lü included but are not limited to George Santayana's 1896 *The Sense of Beauty*, Bernard Bosangque's 1915 *Three lectures on Aesthetics*, Kaarle Laurila's *Zur Theorie der ästhetischen Gefühle*, Lipps's 1903 *Aesthetik*, Inagaki Suematsu's 稲垣末松 1921 *Bigaku hanron* 美學汎論, Richard Hamann's 1911 *Ästhetik*, Benedetto Croce's 1902 *Estetica*, Oskar Bie's 1895 *Zwischen den Künsten*, Hermann Cohen's 1912 *Ästhetik des reinen Gefühls*, Conrad Fiedler's 1887 *Der Ursprung Der Künstlerischen Thätigkeit*, Max Dessoir's edited journal in 1906 *Zeitschrift für Ästhetik und allgemeine kunstwissenschaft*, Karl Groos's 1892 *Einleitung in die Aesthetik*, Friedrich Hegel's 1826 *Philosophie der Kunst oder Ästhetik*, Kant's *Kritik der Urteilskraft*, Edward von Hartmann's 1887 *Philosophie des Schönen*, Konrad Lang's 1907 *Das Wesen der Kunst*, Henry Marshall's 1895 *Aesthetic Principles*, Ethel Puffer Howes's 1905 *The Psychology of Beauty*, Johanness Immanuel Volkelt's 1895 *Ästhetische Zeitfragen*, Wilhelm Wundt's *Völkerpsychologie* Vol. 3 *Die Kunst*, Guyau's 1897 *L'Art au point de vue sociologique*, Yrjö Hirn's 1900 *The Origins of Art*, Ernst Grosse's 1894 *Die Anfänge der Kunst*, Paul Gaultier's 1907 *Le Sens de l'art*, Jonas Cohn's 1901 *Allgemeine Ästhetik*, Eleonore Kühn's 1908 *Das Problem der ästhetischen Autonomie*.

[3] Lü Cheng's birth name was Lü Zhongwei. He received a modern education. In September 1918, he changed his name to Lü Cheng.

understanding of his works became squarely restricted in a self-contained Buddhist sphere and outside the secular imagination of cultural renewal.[4] As a result, his revolutionary vision fell into oblivion.

This study reconsiders Lü Cheng's actions at this crucial historical juncture. A reevaluation is necessary not only to understand Lü better but also to revise our perception of the May Fourth Movement. More generally, it rediscovers diverse strands of societist thinking during the long Chinese revolution from 1911 to 1976 that the renowned historian Wang Hui characterized as a long socialist experiment.[5] By societism, I refer to the different theorizations of a social oneness that lie outside the narrow definitions of sociology and socialism.[6] As I explain, Lü has been erased from the Chinese collective memory because of ensuing battles over the meaning of revolution among the Nationalists, the Communists, and the cultural secularists.[7] As this study reveals, Lü Cheng's clarion call for an aesthetic revolution signaled the beginning of a lifelong endeavor to address concerns shared by several generations of Chinese reformers: renewing China, transforming the world, and rectifying the modern crisis caused by rampant individualism and Darwinist social competition.

Unfortunately, mainly due to the current division of academic labor, historians of modern China and scholars of Chinese Buddhism alike have overlooked Lü's early revolutionary activities. More problematically, once the meaning of social revolution was monopolized by the Nationalist and the Communist discourses, the category of "Buddhist revolutionaries" or "revolutionary Buddhists" becomes oxymoronic. Therefore, in studies of early Lü, scholars view his adventure into aesthetics as a youthful

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[4] The laudatory titles attributed to him since the 1930s include a guru of Buddhist learning (Foxue dashi 佛學大師), a maestro of Buddhist learning (Foxue taidou 佛學泰斗), and an expert of Buddhist learning (Foxue jia 佛學家). These titles mirrored masters of National learning (Guoxue dashi 國學大師), who were often remembered as the conservative remnants against the progressive May Fourth intellectuals.

[5] For the periodization of this long Chinese Revolution, see Wang Hui, *China's Twentieth Century*, 8.

[6] For a more in-depth analysis of societism in France, see Paul Vogt, "The Politics of Academic Sociological Theory in France, 1890–1914," 23–45.

[7] For the shifting meanings of revolution in modern China, see Wang Gungwu, "To Reform a Revolution: Under the Righteous Mandate," in *China in Transformation*, ed. Tu Weiming (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1994), 71–94.

aberration from, rather than an initial push leading toward, his later Buddhological toil.[8] As I demonstrate in this study, this characterization stems from an unexamined projection of the presentist view that draws a clear boundary between the secular and the religious. Once we remove this presentist overlay, it becomes clear that the global circulation of social Darwinism not only sparked Lü's initial foray into aesthetic awakening but also fueled his turn toward Yogācāra (consciousness-only) doctrines. The central link between Lü's aesthetics and Buddhology is a quest to find more robust solidarity both for disrupting the commodity fetish that objectifies social relations in terms of material things and for building a "social totality" as the substrate of ethics for a just global community of diverse cultures and peoples.

This search for enduring solidarity underpins the long Chinese societist experiment from 1911 to 1976. The Chinese intellectual cosmos was initially fractured by both the military defeats since the 1840s and the political chaos that led to the 1911 revolution.[9] The tattered moral fabric was further ripped apart by a tempest of translation that also began in the late nineteenth century. In a mere three decades, Chinese intellectuals avidly translated and consumed torrents of Western literary and artistic works, religio-philosophical schools, and political and social theories from the ancient Greeks to famous European contemporaries.[10] For the generation of Chinese intellectuals coming of age during this era, uprooted from their Confucian past, floating in the ocean of Western ideas, the sense of disorientation and lack of moral

[8] For Lü Cheng's reliable autobiography see: Lü Cheng [1959], "Wo de jingli yu Neixuyuan fazhan licheng" [My Autobiography and the Development of the Inner Learning Institute], ed., GAO Shanshan 高山杉, *Shijie zhexue*, 2007(03): 77–79, 86. Many other biographers of Lü also mention in passing this phase of Lü's life and quickly move into Lü's career as a Buddhist scholar, see for example, Lan Jifu, "Lü Cheng jushi de shengping yu xueshu chengjiu" 呂澂居士的生平與學術成就 [Layman Lü Cheng's Life and Scholarly Achievements], in *Ershi shiji de Zhongri fojiao* 二十世紀的中日佛教 (Taipei: Xinwenfeng Press, 1991), 199–212. See also, Yuan Hongyu, *Lü Cheng weishixue sixiang yanjiu*, 17–20.

[9] Charlotte Furth pointed out how the traditional moral universe centered around the virtues of the emperor was substituted by a deterministic moral universe governed by Newtonian physics, biology, and Herbert Spencer's social Darwinism. See, Charlotte Furth, "Intellectual Change: From the Reform Movement to the May Fourth Movement, 1895–1920," in *An Intellectual History of Modern China,* ed. Merle Goldman and Leo Ou-fan Lee (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 15–16.

[10] Shouhua Qi, *Western Literature in China and the Translation of a Nation* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 29–86.

compass was overwhelming. As I explain, Lü's blueprint for moral invigoration can help us uncover important aspects of this keen awareness of a shattered world. Lü prescribed comparative studies as a means to navigate this bewildering age and to weave together a new social fabric. The appeal of comparative rigor provides us a fresh angle for rediscovering diverse strands of societist thinking outside the teleology of the triumph of socialism.

This study starts with an analysis of Lü Cheng's debut on the May Fourth intellectual stage, i.e., his call for an aesthetic revolution that catapulted him out of obscurity and into the center stage of cultural renewal. Lü's anti-realist agenda gestures toward a rebuttal of the logic of capitalism that both objectifies nature as resources and portrays human beings as mechanized subjects bereft of life force. Then I hone in on a debate about aesthetic education, which started as early as 1917 but only went public from 1922 to 1923. In this pubic conversation, Lü launched an anti-realist rebuttal of Cai Yuanpei's 蔡元培 (1868−1940) secularist proposal, which demanded not only for institutionalized religion to be replaced by aesthetic education but also for religious beliefs to be verified by science and explained in observable terms.[11] In this debate, Lü contested the prevailing yet unexamined faith in the saving power of realism.

Then to understand his transition into Yogācāra studies, in section three, I analyze another debate on Yogācāra and Bergsonism from 1921 to 1922. Lü Cheng launched his anti-idealist critique against Bergsonian creative evolution and the famous late-Qing revolutionary Zhang Taiyan's 章太炎 (1868−1936) idealist reading of Yogācāra.[12] Ostensibly Lü Cheng joined the conversation to repudiate Zhang's

[11] For a general analysis of Cai's secularist thinking about religion, see Douglas Gildow, "Reforming Buddhism to Save China: Cai Yuanpei (1868–1940), Religion, and 'Protecting the Nation through Buddhist Teachings' (1900)," *Asia Major* 31:2 (2018): 107–48. See also, William J. Duiker, *Ts'ai Yüan-P'ei: Educator of Modern China* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1977).

[12] Zhang Taiyan, also known as Zhang Bingling 章炳麟, is known for his promotion of Yogācāra thought as a political theory to resist social Darwinism and the logic of global capitalism. See Viren Murthy, *The Political Philosophy of Zhang Taiyan*. For an analysis of Zhang Taiyan's critique of evolutionary history, see Viren Murthy, "Transfiguring Modern Temporality: Zhang Taiyan's Yogācāra Critique of Evolutionary History," *Modern China* 38, no. 5 (2012): 483–522.

manufacturing of false doctrinal equivalences of *ālayavijñāna* (storehouse consciousness) and Bergsonian *élan vital* (vital impetus). However, it would be regretful to reduce the debate to a hair-splitting discussion of an arcane doctrine.

As I demonstrate, in both debates, what was at stake for Lü Cheng was soteriology: how to disrupt Darwinist beliefs about evolution and how to rein in materialism that obstructs the realization of truth. This insight has broader implications on what the modern Yogācāra revival had meant for one of its leading advocates. From 1921 to 1923, Yogācāra functioned more than a doctrinal system. Instead, it worked in tandem with aesthetics, and it offered Lü Cheng a powerful toolbox to dispel two related "wrong" paths to renew the world: The first is the widespread yet unexamined faith in naturalism and science that reproduced the logic of capitalism despite revolutions against it. The second is the equally problematic indigenous vitalism that credulously bought into Bergsonian philosophy of the occult self.[13] Lü's critique of Bergsonism also marked the beginning of a social turn of the Yogācāra soteriology that laid the doctrinal foundation for the rise of socially engaged Buddhism in the late 1960s around the world.

To build a society uncorrupted by Darwinist competition, Lü Cheng championed a moral ecology: cultivating a habit of moral reasoning instead of unreflexively following *a priori* ethical principles; relying on an interpretative community to construct moral goods collectively and to adapt to new circumstances instead of prescribing what virtue is; transforming others through learning, reason, aesthetic resonances, and voluntary association instead of through laws, coercion, and violence. This chapter concludes with an outline of Lü's revolutionary vision, one that heralded a social turn of Buddhist soteriology.

A Forgotten May Fourth Revolutionary, 1918–1923

Why would Lü Cheng, the Buddhologist-to-be, dabble with an aesthetic revolution in his mid-twenties? Was it merely a phase of youthful rebellion? Or a ripple of its time? What have we missed

[13] Joseph Ciaudo, "Introduction à la métaphysique bergsonienne en Chine," 293–328.

by allowing his later Buddhological achievements to overshadow his youthful aspirations? What happens if we take him seriously as a self-avowed advocate for aesthetic revolution? What happens if we ask what his social imaginary can reveal to us about the forgotten scenes looming behind the mythical May Fourth?[14] What happens if we ask how his interpretation of cultural renewal could inform our understanding of the modern transformation of Buddhism?

This section explores these questions first by asking what kind of renovation Lü intended to initiate and how he planned to implement it. My research shows that, instead of offering his own diagnosis and prescribing a straightforward cure, Lü sketched a blueprint of how to identify causes and how to search for remedies. In this blueprint, scholarship and comparative studies stood out as the moral compass to navigate the stormy sea of traditional and imported moral thinking and to guarantee the establishment and healthy evolution of a new moral landscape.

Lü Cheng Calls for an Aesthetic Awakening

Lü made his debut on the May Fourth stage with his 1919 call for an aesthetic awakening. When reading through this letter, it becomes evident that Lü's project is a revolt against vulgarity. The revolution he had in mind entails a moral awakening. This awakening enables ordinary folk (*hengren* 恒人) to appreciate a universal beauty, to know how to differentiate right and wrong, and to commit themselves to proper cultivation. The outcome of this moral awakening, in Lü's imagination, would be an ideal society held together by an aesthetic appreciation of life.

From the beginning, Lü Cheng's revolution was fueled by deliberative scholarship and proceeded with measured steps. While this may contradict the common-sense definition of revolution as a violent political revolt, it is undeniable that such optimism for profound transformation was in sync with the May Fourth crucible of cultural renewal. Indeed, one central strain of thought during this time was a reappraisal of the 1911 overthrow of the Qing dynasty and

[14] I am borrowing Charles Taylors' use of this term to denote the ways in which people "imagine their social existence, how they fit together with others." "They" and "people" include three levels, i) how common folk imagine their social surroundings, ii) a minority who theorize this imaginary, and iii) the shared imaginaries that make possible common social practices. See, Charles Taylor, *A Secular Age* (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2007), 171–72.

the ensuing violence and trauma: ceaseless battles among warlords, incompetent governance, callous treatment toward the poor. All these human-made atrocities were exacerbated by regional floods, droughts, famines, plagues, and other natural disasters. Violence seemed to beget more violence. Under this climate, many intellectuals looked elsewhere for alternative non-violent cultural means to invigorate the Chinese mind.

Lu Xun's 1921 novel *The Real Story of Ah Q* gives a snapshot of the widespread doubts about the efficacy of a political revolution. It simultaneously poses an urgent question on how to transform the Chinese mindset. This novel narrates a poignant story of a poor peasant's comic fantasy: Although he was finally executed as a revolutionary, he imagined revolution as a means to settle the score, to get rich, and to sleep with women.[15] Through Ah Q's epiphany at the moment of his own execution, in Ah Q's eventual realization of the crowds' penetrating eyes more terrible than wolves', Lu Xun exposes the utter inadequacy of a political overthrow in transforming the "cannibalistic" tradition of China.[16] Disillusioned with quick-fixes, May Fourth intellectuals longed for a more fundamental remake of the Chinese mind-heart.[17] Riding this tide of cultural renewal, Lü called for moral awakening and promoted a culture of deliberation.

Real revolutionaries were in it for the long haul, toiling for gradual spiritual invigoration over temporary political band-aids. Aesthetics, for Lü Cheng and many May Fourth youth alike, was one of many promising avenues to cultivate a new mentality and to nurture a new form of upwardly expanding communal life, where upwardness was defined in opposition to traditional moral order while maintaining a sense of self-perfection.[18] Lü believed that an aesthetic revolution must awaken one's innate aesthetic sensibility and remake the mind-heart.

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[15] Julia Lovell, trs., The Real Story of Ah-Q and Other Tales of China: The Complete Fiction of Lu Xun (London: Penguin Books, 2009).

[16] Gloria Davies, *Lu Xun's Revolution* (Cambridge; London: Harvard University Press, 2013), 306–7.

[17] This yearning for a fundamental cultural change is best captured in Ying Lei's dissertation chapter "A Revolution of the mind." See Ying Lei, "Shadows of Karma: Buddhism, Literature, and the Modern Chinese Revolution" (Ph.D. Diss., Harvard University Press, 2018), 29–58.

[18] For this shared sense of upwardness, see Wang Fansen 王汎森, "Cong xinmin dao xinren—jindai sixiang Zhong de ziwo yu zhengzhi" 從新民到新人—近代思想中的自我 與政治 [From New Citizenry to New Human—Self and Politics in Modern Thought], in *Zhongguo Jindai sixiang yu xueshu de xipu* 中國近代思

Against this backdrop of a widespread disillusion about political reform yet a simultaneously hope for cultural renewal, the import of Lü's revolution also became evident: In one of many competing yet mutually reinforcing subcultures of the May Fourth, Lü pioneered a revolution of the heart. The tenet of this aesthetic revolution was to eradicate social corruptions with art, aesthetic attitude, systematic education, and life-long learning. In an era enchanted by the promise of cultural renewal, Lü Cheng's call became emblematic. When he wrote the letter to *New Youth*, he was still an unknown art teacher in a high school in Xuzhou 徐州, a town three-hundred-mile south of Beijing and three-hundred-mile north of Shanghai.[19] However, he nonetheless possessed the audacity to propose a total revamp of the society through art and comparative study.

Moreover, his writing is elegant. His arguments are supported with well-chosen examples and skillfully crafted interlinear notes. His proposal is thoughtful. As I demonstrate in later chapters, all these features adumbrate Lü Cheng's crucial strategies in establishing a new epistemological community for initiating a revolution of consciousness.

Lü opened this letter by foregrounding a glaring blank that he himself created: The literary revolution championed by *New Youth* should be accompanied by a corresponding one in fine arts and aesthetics (*meishu* 美術).[20] Fine arts, the art form devoted to the universal Beauty, was the missing pillar among the three pillars of art. The other two were poetry and theatre that had packed the pages in *New Youth*. Lü created this conceptual blank by using an interlinear note. On this standard traditional exegetical move, one appends further information in smaller characters and fits double columns in the space of one column of the main text. In this note, he first defined art as all objects that were endowed with an aesthetic appreciation and fine arts as one that has a spatial presence

想與學術的系譜 [A Genealogy of Modern Chinese Thought and Scholarship] (Shijiazhuang Shi: Hebei jiaoyu Press, 2001), 192–94.

[19] Lü, "My Autobiography," 77–78. Lü never formally studied aesthetics and art.

[20] I use fine arts and aesthetics interchangeably in translating *meishu* 美術. This is because 1) fine arts have played a key role in the emergence of academic studies of aesthetics and 2) Lü Cheng was well-versed in the historical relation between fine arts and aesthetics and he used both interchangeably in this letter. For an analysis of the relationship with fine arts and aesthetics in the West, see, Paul O. Kristeller, "The Modern System of the Arts: A Study in the History of Aesthetics," *Journal of the History of Ideas* 12 (1951): 496–527.

such as painting, sculpture, and architecture.[21] This definition of art singled out literature as a temporal art in contrast with fine arts as a spatial form. Not only did Lü justify his key arguments using traditional hermeneutic moves, but also he revealed to us a life-long habit of hiding his central observations in interlinear notes.

Once this conceptual blank was produced, Lü substantiated it with a well-known modernist art moment: Futurism that gained its namesake from the Italian poet Filippo Tommaso Marinetti's *Manifesto del Futurismo* in 1909. Futurism was a long-lived avant-garde movement that rejected anything old and celebrated youth, speed, machinery, and industry.[22] At the same time, the Futurist artists reinvented every imaginable medium, such as poetry, performance, film, industrial design, painting, sculpture, and architecture. Note that Futurist painters also tend to adopt a critical attitude toward nude painting—denouncing the monotonous techniques tailored for vulgar taste.[23] This fusion of media in Futurism accentuated the absence of spatial art in *New Youth*.

To further urge the editor to initiate an aesthetic awakening, Lü Cheng, in concluding this letter, prophesied a bright future of *New Youth* as the Chinese counterpart of *Poesia*. This poetry magazine first published *Manifesto del Futurismo*. Lü Cheng's analogy not only works well with *New Youth*'s self-presentation but also portrays a more impactful future for it. Unsurprisingly, among many readers' letters, Chen Duxiu, who already became a national figure for his 1917 essay "On

[21] This classification of art into temporal and spatial forms was a common theme in European philosophical writings about aesthetics. Max Schasler (1819–1903), one of the most influential art critics in Germany since the 1860s, classified art in a similar vain. This classification also appeared frequently in Theodor Lipps's works, who tends to explain temporal and spatial art as unities created by consciousness. E.g. architecture was a total-form that united spatial elements and consonances were a unity created by connecting a series of temporal intervals, see, Theodor Lipps, "Explanation of the Theory of 'Tone-rhythms'," in *Psychological Studies*, trans. Herbert Charles Sanborn, 2nd rev, (Baltimore: Williams and Wilkins, 1926), 179, 186.

[22] Sascha Bru, Luca Somigli, and Bart Van Den Bossche, "Futurism from Below: By Way of Introduction," in *Futurism: A Microhistory*, eds. Sascha Bru, Luca Somigli, and Bart Van Den Bossche, (Cambridge: Legenda, 2017), 1–12.

[23] For the impact of Futurism on May Fourth writers, see Luo Gang 罗钢, "'Wusi shiqi ji ershi niandai xifang xiandaizhuyi wenyi lilun zai Zhongguo" 五四时期及二十年代西方现代主义文艺理论在中国 [Western Modernist Literary Theories in China During the May Fourth Era and the 1920s], *Zhongguo shehui kexue* 1988 (02): 23–25.

Literary Revolution," noted this one from an obscure art teacher in some high school in an inland town, promptly published it, and appended it with his full support.[24]

Lü intentionally fused aesthetics with ethics. He prescribed a long and challenging path, one that is only achievable through the scholarly endeavor. Many features in this blueprint persisted in his later effort to initiate a Yogācāra renewal of collective consciousness. Instead of laying out a utopian vision, Lü recommended a methodology to search for Beauty and genuine aesthetic learning. Revolution, for Lü, is a path of inquiry for Truth and for the best means to reach Truth. Lü laid out four steps. First, one must clarify the scope and substance of fine arts and understand the *raison d'être* of this art form, which Lü defined as what makes artworks beautiful and equated this essence with aesthetics. In the next three steps, Lü called for comparatives studies of various art movements in China and Europe as well as in the past and the present. The purpose of undertaking comparative studies was to ensure that one could identify the mainstream and thereby realize principles of right and wrong and thus can inherit, develop, and carry it forward. He trusted that comparison was the only viable means to search for a transcendent moral Truth: "the truly authentic [evaluations] of right and wrong" (*zhenzheng zhi shifei* 真正之是非). This moral concern would take center stage in his life-long endeavor to transform the world.

In Lü's vision, revolution is not an overthrow of the past. Instead, its essence is taking responsibility for the shared past and taking on the responsibility for engendering a new world of what should be.[25] Taking responsibility for what is given necessitates an in-depth observation of

[24] Based on Chen's appended letter, it was clear that Lü wrote this unsolicited advice to the editors of *New Youth*. For Chen, Futurism and revolution had a positive correlation at this historical juncture. He was sympathetic toward the Russian revolution and would certainly know about the role of Russian Futurism in the 1917 revolution. Although, in the late 1920s, Chen became a Trotskyist, in 1919 Leon Trotsky has yet to write his famous booklet *Literature and Revolution* (1924) that denounced Futurism as the forerunner of Italian Fascism and fundamentally at odds with Russian revolution. Leo Trotsky, *Literature and Revolution* Chapter 4, Trotsky Internet Archive, https://www.marxists.org/archive/trotsky/1924/lit_revo/ch04.htm (last updated 2007).

[25] Lü's understanding of revolution represented a strong current at the time. For example, the renowned scholar and poet Wang Guowei's conception of literary renewal was to inherit the past and to usher in the future. Similar to Wang, whose impact to the May Fourth Movement became written out of the history, Lü's aesthetic revolution also became forgotten. For Wang Guowei's view and his impact on the May

current situations. Lü singled out two modern vices that required healing. One was the profiteering of art as embodied in the commercialization of paintings of maidens. The other was the proliferation of homespun art institutions and shallow magazines flaunting themselves as champions for aesthetic education. Both phenomena represented mainstream critiques of art scenes in modern China. However, Lü's path forward stood out because of his restraint from offering panacea.

To take on responsibilities for engendering what should be, the first step is to diagnose the root cause. Once again, Lü saved his most strident critiques and his identification of the root cause in the interlinear notes. In these fine prints, Lü pinpointed the main culprit as "superficial learning and arbitrary judgment" (*qianxue wuduan* 淺學武斷). Lü wanted his readers to see that, in order to cure such a root problem, one must follow the path of awakening that he himself laid out.

This letter not only catapulted Lü onto the May Fourth stage but also won him unexpected admirations. The renowned avant-garde artist Liu Haisu, having read Lü's letter, invited Lü to join his Shanghai Art Academy, the epicenter of the new art movement in modern China. Once there, Lü not only obtained an influential platform but was also initiated into a vibrant network of like-minded reformers. He started a series of lectures in the cosmopolitan Shanghai, a city that was simultaneously the hub of new international religious establishments and new Buddhist movements in Republican China.[26] Lü later edited and published these lecture notes, which became the earliest academic monographs on aesthetics in modern China. In the meanwhile, the community in Shanghai Art Academy also transformed Lü Cheng's intellectual outlook. In addition to teaching, Lü also furthered his reform as the chief editor of *Fine Arts* (*Meishu* 美術; October 1918–May 1922), the main publishing venue for Liu Haisu's academy. During his editorial work in this journal, Lü gradually adopted the journal's agenda, "Studying fine art for advancing an aesthetic life."

The journal's emphasis on life reflected a global rise of life philosophy in the 1910s that impacted the Chinese intellectual landscape in two ways. One the one hand, through the translation

Fourth movement, see, Chen Yi'ai 陳以愛, "Wang Guowei yu Hu Shi wenxue geming lun" 王國維與胡適文學革命論, *Academica Sinica Bulletin of the Institute of Modern History* 101 (September 2018): 63–115.

[26] For an overview of the new Buddhist movements in Shanghai, see Ge Zhuang, "A Survey of Modern Buddhist Culture in Shanghai," *Chinese Studies in History* 46, no. 3 (2013): 79–94.

of Japanese aesthetician Ōnishi Hajime (1864–1900) and the Kyoto school philosopher Tanabe Hajime (1885–1962), the German New Idealist philosopher Rudolf Eucken's (1846–1926) thought together with Henri Bergson's (1859–1941) creative evolution became the central push toward the birth of "life-centralism" in Japan, which in turn molded the Chinese view of life philosophy. On the other hand, American liberal Protestant thinkers, influenced by the father of Liberal Theology Fredrich Schleiermacher (1768–1834), quickly embraced Eucken's and Bergson's life-centrism and popularized the dual vision of life as both a biological site and a spiritual resource in Asia through their missionary activities.[27] This import of Western life philosophies simultaneously made Chinese indigenous vitalism newly relevant to a modern era.[28] All these trending views on what constituted a good life conditioned Lü's turn toward an aesthetic life (*meide rensheng* 美的人生).

Mirroring Durkheim: Imagining a "Social Oneness" Grounded in Empathy

For Lü Cheng, Beauty and Truth grounded the transcendent oneness of an aesthetic society (*meide shehui* 美的社會). Empathy was the key mechanism to cohere all members together. As first articulated in March 1922, Lü believed that aesthetic empathy is what enables a mutual-appreciative collective mind.[29] For Lü, empathy grows out of both appreciations of things as-is and recognitions of desires for life inherent in all sentient beings. He believed that only deep contemplation could nurture this empathy. He trusted that only by genuinely appreciating all conscious existences, including both humans and animals, can one fully develop one's own spiritual potential. He

[27] Gal Gvili, "In Search of the National Soul: Writing Life in Chinese Literature 1918–1937" (Ph.D. Diss., Columbia University, 2015), 32–38.

[28] Ku-ming Chang, "Ceaseless Generation."

[29] As early as 1920, Lü Cheng framed Lippsian empathy in terms of contemplation, Cheng Shu 澄叔 [Lü Cheng], "Liboshi meixue dayao" 栗泊士美學大要 [An Outline of Lippsian Aesthetics], *Dongfang zazhi* 東方雜誌 vol. 17, no. 5 (1920): 69–75. By March 1922, he already developed this empathy as the means to build inter-subjective resonances, which laid the ground for his reformulation of communal life as aesthetic resonances, see for example, Lü Cheng, "Meishu fazhan de tujing" 美術發展的途徑 [The Path of Aesthetic Development], *Meishu* 美術 [*Fine Arts*] 3, no. 2 (May 1922): 30–31. This essay was last edited in December 9th, 1921.

prophesied that only by outwardly expressing this upwardness (defined as opposite to selfish tendencies) can one transform this actual society ensnared in evolutionary bookkeeping.[30]

Borrowing from the French philosopher Jean-Marie Guyau (1854–1888), Lü argued that only aesthetic education could cultivate this kind of intersubjective empathy.[31] In this vision, the heuristic goal is not to enable more creativity but to engender a turn away from one's petty ego and to instill a love for all living forms. Only then can fully dynamic and expanding living experiences become possible, which Lü termed "an aesthetic life."[32]

Scholars of religious studies would recognize an uncanny resonance between aesthetic sociality and Durkheimian collective effervescence. Both theories call to mind a simultaneous coming-together that enables a community to think transcendentally as one. In contrast with the role of ritual in Durkheimian sociality, artistic creation functioned to cohere people together in Lü's societist imaginary. Behind this surface semblance, there is a common thread. Both thinkers owe their theorization of the society in totality to the talented yet short-lived French philosopher Jean-Marie Guyau. It is well-known that Durkheim first conceived his social oneness when critiquing Guyau's *L'irréligion de l'avenir: étude sociologique* [The Non-religion of the Future: A Sociological Study].[33]

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[30] Lü used *tongqing* 同情 to translate empathy as the ultimate point of unification of the inward contemplation and outward expression, see Lü Cheng, "Wanjin de meixueshuo he meide yuanli (5–7)," *Education Magazine* 14, no. 3 (20 March 1922): 6–7.

[31] Lü Cheng, "Wanjin de meixueshuo he meide yuanli (5–7)," 1. In fact, Lü Cheng was citing Jean-Marie Guyau's (1854–1888) position, who argued that the purpose of art is not about pleasure, but to create sympathy among members of a society. For a more in-depth discussion of Guyau's philosophy of life and his take on art and sympathy, see for example Keith Ansell-Pearson, "Beyond Obligation? Jean-Marie Guyau on Life and Ethics," *Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement* (2015): 207, 217. The first part of Lü's essay was published in February 1922 of the same periodical. The essay itself was dated to January 1922.

[32] Lü Cheng, "Yishu yu meiyu" 藝術與美育 [Art and Aesthetic Education], *Education Magazine* 14, no. 10 (10 October 1922): 1–2. See also, Lü Cheng, "Meishu fazhan de tujing," 20, 27–28, 32–35.

[33] Michael C. Behrent, "Le débat Guyau-Durkheim sur la théorie sociologique de la religion: une nouvelle querelle des universaux? " [The Debate of Guyau and Durkheim on the Sociological Theory of Religion: A New Dispute of Universals?], *Archives de sciences sociales des religions* 53 no.142 (2008): 9–26. See also, Frank James William Harding, *Jean-Marie Guyau, 1854–1888, Aesthetician and Sociologist: A Study of His Aesthetic Theory and Critical Practice* (Genève: Droz, 1973), 112–13.

This convergence of interests was not incidental. Both rode a tide for rethinking communal living in the wake of violent political reforms. In the 1880s, after the failure of the 1848 revolution, the ensuing monarchist rule of Napoleon III, and the re-establishment of Republicanism in the 1870s, many French thinkers sought to establish stronger solidarity than what has been promised by social contract and individual rights, Guyau and Durkheim included.[34]

Guyau, as a sympathizer of the French Revolution and a promoter of Republican values, reimagined the collective in terms of religious *anomie* (lawlessness). This anomie entails a voluntary association based on an individual's instinct to satisfy the innate yearning to maintain and enlarge life.[35] Guyau considered collectivity an abstraction that is fully embedded in individual free choices. He also dismissed any ontological independence of social oneness. Therefore, Guyau theorized religion as a nominalist abstraction of the community as the sum of all members.[36] Thus, the future of religion, for Guyau, like the future of a community, would emerge only out of voluntary associations of individuals, i.e., the anti-thesis of religion, as in *l'irréligion de l'avenir*.

In contrast with Guyau's nominalist position, Durkheim theorized a realist social-being-in-totality, one that was "both an aggregation of individuals and *sui generis* society." Religion was a formation of this dual collective existence.[37] Despite their different ontologies, both Guyau and Durkheim struggled to build stronger bonds for republicanism and consequently reconceived religion as the sum of all social relations.

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[34] Michael C. Behrent, "The Mystical Body of Society: Religion and Association in Nineteenth-Century French Political Thought," *Journal of the History of Ideas* 69, no. 2 (2008): 219–20. For an in-depth analysis of Durkheim's role in inventing a new conception of solidarity and its relation with his sociological project, see Jacques Donzelot, *L'invention du social: essai sur le déclin des passions politiques* (Paris: Fayard, 1984), 74–86.

[35] Michael C. Behrent, "The Mystical Body of Society," 234–38. See also, Guyau, *A Sketch of Morality Independent of Obligation or Sanction*, trans. Gertrude Kapteyn (London: Watts & Co., 1898), 75; Guyau, *Esquisse d'une morale sans obligation ni sanction* (Paris: Felix Alcan, 1921 [1885]), 87.

[36] Michael C. Behrent, "The Mystical Body of Society," 237.

[37] Michael C. Behrent, "The Mystical Body of Society," 239–40 and Seumas Miller, "Social Institutions," *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Winter 2014 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2014/entries/social-institutions/, Section 4 "Agency and Structure." Access December 2018. See also, Émile Durkheim, *Les formes élémentaires de la vie religieuse* [The Elementary Forms of Religious Life] (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1960 [1912]), 604.

Similarly, May Fourth intellectuals, after experiencing the crisis of Chinese Republicanism and after realizing the limitations of political overthrows, were struggling to reimagine a different but broader and stronger fraternity to justify democracy and civil society. The leading intellectuals hoped to redefine "culture" and used the new culture to "call forth a new political subject."[38] This desire for a social oneness contributed to the popularity of Deweyan pragmatism, which sought to "make the school the unsteepled church of democracy."[39] Lü's aesthetic revolution was one of many initiatives during this swelling tide of reimagining a collective future.

However, unlike Durkheim, Lü sought to construct a social oneness purely based on aesthetics and ethics, without resorting to any forms of realism. Unlike Durkheim, who read Guyau's social theory, Lü encountered Guyau through aesthetics. Guyau's social thinking permeated in all his writings. For example, his sociological view on aesthetics is well documented in Japan. In 1914, Guyau's 1887 work *L'art au point de vue sociologique* was translated into Japanese.[40] This was the book Lü encountered.[41] In this book, Guyau first asserted common bases between aesthetics and ethics and argued that the purpose of art is to create sympathy among members of society.[42] In contrast to Guyau's Japanese translators who introduced Guyau together with German thinkers mostly in terms of aesthetic appearance (*aesthetischer Schein*),[43] Lü took to heart Guyau's thoughts on ethics and society.

One also finds a similar predilection for the social in Lü's reception of Theodor Lipps. In Europe and North America, Lipps is well-known for theorizing empathy as a primary epistemic

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[38] Wang Hui, *China's Twentieth Century*, 108–9.

[39] Robert B. Westbrook, *John Dewey and American Democracy* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991), 251.

[40] Ōnishi Yoshinori 大西克礼 and Ogata Tsunemasa 小方庸正, trans., *Shakaigaku jō yori mitaru geijutsu: Gyuiyō* 社会学上より見たる芸術: ギュイヨー [Art Seen from a Sociological Point of View (L'Art au point de vue sociologique) by Guyau] (Tokyo: Iwanami Bunko, 1914).

[41] See Lü Cheng, *Meixue qianshuo* 美學淺說 [An Elementary Introduction of Aesthetics] (Shanghai: The Commercial Press, 1931), Appendix, footnote 6. In this footnote, in addition to Ōnishi Yoshinori's translation, Lü Cheng also listed the French original and another Guyau's work in French, *Les problèmes de l'esthétique contemporaine* [The problems of Contemporary Aesthetics] (Paris: F. Alcan, 1904).

[42] Harding, *Jean-Marie Guyau*, 126–27.

[43] Watanabe Kazuyasu, "Ōnishi Hajime: Criticism and Aesthetics," in *A History of Modern Japanese Aesthetics*, edited by Michael F. Marra, (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2001), 104.

means to perceive other humans as independent consciousnesses. Lipps is well-known mainly because he influenced Freudian theorization of the unconscious and contributed to the rise of Husserlian phenomenology.[44] Similarly, Lipps' Japanese commenter Abe Jirō 阿部次郎 (1883–1959) focused more on the function of Lippsian empathy in eliciting emotional responses from artwork and nature.[45] Lü Cheng's reading of Lipps departed from their Japanese interpreters. Lü employed Lippsian empathy chiefly as a means to establish intersubjective accords for its efficacy to recognize other conscious creatures.[46]

What undergirds Lü Cheng's propensity to read Lipps and Guyau as social thinkers was his desire to build a social totality without resorting to social Darwinism or Bergsonian creative evolution. As is well-known, Bergson rejected the Darwinist evolutionary theory in explaining both social and biological changes. In *L'évolution créatrice*, Bergson put forth his theory of an evolution motivated by *élan vital*, a "vital impetus" that is an innate human creative impulse. Bergson believed that the spiritual quality of this force ensured free will and human creativity and refuted the portrayal of human beings as entities passively ensnared in the Darwinist evolutionary teleology. Although Lü shared with Bergson the critique of Darwinism, he found Bergsonian interpretation of life in terms of vital impetus (*élan vital*) overly idealistic and thereby lacking transformative impact on intersubjective connections. Instead, Lü strived to find a universal aesthetic principle that bridges

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[44] For Lippisan theorization of *Einfühlung*, see Karsten Stueber, "Empathy," *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Spring 2018 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2018/entries/empathy/>. Accessed December 2018.
Note that Theodor Lipps not only inspired Freudian theorization of the unconscious but also played a key role in the rise of Husserlian phenomenology (largely because a group of his students in Munich rebelled against Lippsian phychologism and championed Husserl's *Logische Untersuchungen* as their philosophical bible). Both schools of Western thoughts have been employed as interpretative lenses to understand various strands of Yogācāra philosophy.

[45] For Abe's reception of Lipps, see, for example, Hijikata Teiichi, "On the *Aesthetics* of Abe Jirō," in *A History of Modern Japanese Aesthetics*, 197–203 and for Abe's use of Lippisan empathy as a method of self-cultivation, see Ōishi Masashi, "Abe Jirō to kanjō inyū bigaku" 阿部次郎と感情移入美学, *Tetsugaku* 113 no.3 (2005): 93–130.

[46] Lü Cheng is not alone in identifying the resonances between Lippsian empathy and Guyau's socio-emotional function of aesthetics. Harding also noted this link, see Harding, *Jean-Marie Guyau*, 114 and for an in-depth analysis of Guyau's social thinking of aesthetic emotions see Harding, *Jean-Marie Guyau*, 57–76.

the subjective (Lippsian psychological approach and Bergsonian *élan vital*) and the objective (Guyau's sociological approach) divide in the study of Beauty.[47] While Guyau inspired Lü to theorize a social totality, Lipps supplied Lü one concrete means to achieve his goal—building an aesthetic society through intersubjective empathy.

Lü Cheng achieved this unification through the concept of life (*sheng* 生; i.e., an aesthetic life), which is simultaneously psychological and intersubjective. Lü argued that the chief process of a proper life was an expression after contemplation. Here, contemplation entails inner spiritual life and expression expands this inner conscience to cement intersubjective bonds through empathic resonances. Therefore, in Lü Cheng's reframing of aesthetics, this contemplative and expressive life itself became universal and should become the central theme in the future explorations of Beauty.[48] When all sentient beings became attuned to this aesthetic life, Lü prophesied, then an aesthetic society became possible.

An Anti-Realist Agenda: Art Critics and the Task of the Translator

This contemplative and expressive life was the central thread in Lü's theorization of a social totality. However, to understand the processes of cultivating this aesthetic life and how these processes functioned to sustain a transcendent oneness, one must understand Lü's unique theorization of translation. Translation played a crucial role in Lü's refutation of the realist agenda of social revolution. Rather than a movement from a target language to a host language, Lü theorized translation as concerted and persistent acts of consciousness that render universal beauty and social oneness perceptible to all.

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[47] Lü Cheng, "Wanjin de meixuehsuo he meide yuanli (1–4)," *Education Magazine* 14, no. 2 (February 1922): 2. Lü Cheng used Lippsian empathy to achieve sociality because, unlike Guyau, Lü Cheng did not consider aesthetics as an outcome of social interactions. Rather, for Lü Cheng aesthetics principles are universal, beyond the social circumstances. Therefore, while praising Guyau's greatest contribution as his discovery and articulation between Beauty and human life, Lü Cheng nonetheless faulted Guyau for minimizing the transcendence and universality of aesthetics. See, Lü, *Xiandai meixue sichao* 現代美學思潮 (Shanghai: The Commercial Press, April 1931 [July 1923]), 85–86.

[48] Lü Cheng, "Wanjin de meixuehsuo he meide yuanli (5–7)," 11.

In the 1920s, the grand artifice of realism enchanted a generation of May Fourth reformers with its promises to wield positive communal influence, presumably for the power of artistic realism to rid of petty ego and to engender an altruistic turn toward more considerable common concerns. Nevertheless, because literature and art inevitably involve self-expression, this discourse created a paradox. On the one hand, artwork cannot escape from the reign of self-expression because of their createdness. On the other hand, for realism to deliver its promises, authors must self-consciously initiate the moral conviction to purge any traces of self-involvement in creating their artwork. [49] What lies at the heart of this paradox is the quest for an impossible "objective" description of a "real world" out there.

To resolve this dilemma, Lü simply removed the impossible task of being objective and flatly rejected artistic realism. Instead, he claimed that all artistic creations and art critiques are mere subjective translations of nature and that any artwork is mere self-expression, through and through. Defying the prevailing wind of realism, in November 1922, Lü argued that the task of an artist is not transcribing nature but translating (*yiyi* 迻譯) external objects in one's own languages.[50] This train of thought first appeared seven months after he joined Liu Haisu's Art Academy. In March 1921, Lü published an essay "On Artwork and the Mettle of the Artist." In this essay, he carefully analyzed two

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[49] Martson Anderson termed this moral dilemma as "moral impediments of realism," see Marston Anderson, *The Limits of Realism: Chinese Fiction in the Revolutionary Period*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), 44–45, 76–118.

[50] Lü Cheng, "Meishu chengxing zhi jingguo" 美術成形之經過, *Shishi xinbao (Supplement—The Lamp of Learning)* 時事新報 (副刊—學燈) (November 24, 1922): 55. Here Lü cited a classical Chinese translation of Hermann von Helmholtz's (1821–1894), a physicist who claims that "yishujia feineng juanlu zi ziran, te fanyi zhi er" 藝術家非能謄錄自自然, 特翻譯之耳 [artists are not merely transcribing nature, they are especially translating them]. Helmholtz is known for his argument that aesthetic induction is a means of knowing unique to human sciences, which is non-reducible but complimentary to the dominant way of knowing in natural sciences—logical induction. See H. Helmholtz, "On the Relation of Optics to Painting," *The Humboldt library of popular science literature* vol. 1 (1 July 1881): 9 [789]. Lü appropriated Helmholtz's cultural capital to put forth his own theory of translation. Helmholtz was advocating a particular artist way of portraying the surroundings of objects in paintings, "The artist cannot transcribe nature; he must translate her; yet this translation may give us an impression in the highest degree distinct and forcible, not merely of the objects themselves, but even of the greatly altered intensities of light under which we view them." Lü considered this saying right to the point and commented that "yishujia zhiyu ziran gu geyong qi dute zhi yuyanwenzi er xiang yiyi ye" 藝術家之於自然固各用其獨特之語言文字而相迻譯也 [with regard to nature, artists employ their unique languages and writings to transpose and translate it]. But he overlooked the realism behind Helmholtz's observation.

drastically different busts of Goethe sculpted by Christian Daniel Rauch and by Friedrich Tieck, one depicting a tranquil and solemn Goethe, the other portraying a smart scholar.[51] Using this contrast as an example, Lü argued that, because of distinctive perceptual dispositions between Rauch and Tieck, two busts of the same Goethe adopted distinct mien. Lü believed that artwork is always more about the artistic expression of personality than an imitation of things outside consciousness.

In Lü's construction of the social oneness, the intersubjective resonances were made possible through artistic translations across medium and between subjective experiences. Not only art itself but also art critique ought to be the task of the translator. Lü proposed this concept in a series of epistolary writings from October 14 to October 24, 1921 and published them in May 1922 volume 3 issue 2 of *Fine Arts*. In these letters, he argued that the task of art critique was two-pronged. First, "true critique is an aesthetic creation." Therefore, criticism is not about evaluating an artwork. Rather "art critics translate existing artistic creation into literary creation." Hence, criticism is a translation from visual or musical expressions into verbal ones. Second, the social function of art criticism is not to impact the artists themselves but to deepen commoners' appreciation of artworks. Lü argued that art-critique-cum-translation was meaningful precisely because its in-betweenness that promises a communal cohesion, whose function is fusing the minds of artists and the masses.[52]

Sensibility holds the key to intersubjective cohesion. Lü Cheng developed this theory from his March 1921 argument that the basis for art criticism is "sensibility," an innate human potential that can be cultivated to appreciate the universal Beauty.[53] As for this sensibility, borrowing from the famous predecessor of the Aesthetic Movement Walter Horatio Pater (1839–1894), Lü defined it as "the power of being deeply moved by the presence of beautiful objects."[54]

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[51] Lü Cheng, "Meishupin yu meishujia de renge" 美術品與美術家的人格 [On Artwork and the Mettle of the Artist], *Meishu* 美術[*Fine Arts*] 2 no.4 (March 1921): 11–14.

[52] Lü Cheng, "Guanyu 'yishu piping he chuangzuo' wenti taolun de jifengxin: (er) Lü Qiuyi da Tang Zhe'an de xin"關於'藝術批評和創作'問題討論底幾封信: (二) 呂秋逸答唐哲安的信[Several Letters Discussing the Issues of Art Critique and Creation: 2. Lü Qiuyi's Reply to Tang Zhe'an], *Fine Arts* 3, no. 2 (May 1922): 155–56. This letter was written on October 16th, 1921.

[53] Lü Cheng, "Meishu piping de genju" 美術批評的根據 [Grounds for Art Critique], *Fine Arts* 2 no.4 (March 1921): 1–3.

[54] Lü Cheng, "Meishu piping de genju," 2. He translate this sentence as "yuzhe meide duixiang shifen gandong de nengli" 遇著美的對象十分感動的能力, quoted from Walter Pater, *The Renaissance: Studies in*

Lü valued Pater for his successful theorization of art as purely mental experiences. As a leading advocate of Aestheticism that championed "art for art's sake,"[55] Pater convincingly carved out an art realm purely grounded in subjective occurrences, independent from the objective world.[56] Admittedly, Pater theorized artistic sensibility for championing individuality and for explaining the existence of genius. Nonetheless, this purely experiential explanation of Beauty proved a ready-to-hand tool for Lü to reframe aesthetic appreciation as intersubjective accord.

Lü took Walter Pater's aesthetic sensibility into the realm of the social. For Lü Cheng, when commoners develop this (social) sensibility, they become connoisseurs (*jianshang zhe* 鑑賞者). When a connoisseur appreciates Beauty, their aesthetic sensibility then recreates the temperament of the artist is in the consciousness of this connoisseur. This recreation then expands the observer's psychological world. The social function of an artwork and of artists is precisely this expansion of personality through aesthetic experiences of artworks.[57] Therefore for Lü Cheng, a community emerges through holistic intersubjective appreciations.

Furthermore, Lü Cheng believed that the relation between artists and the masses is a dynamic one, where leadership is provisional. In Lü's imagination of this joint venture, artists are like head geese in the annual migration, always ahead yet never separate from the flock.[58] Lü argued that, while all people possess this inborn ability, only artists have fully developed their potentials, and only art critics have cultivated their capacity to translate between different media.[59] Therefore, art critics are

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Art and Poetry, preface, http://www.gutenberg.org/files/2398/2398-h/2398-h.htm. Accessed December 2018. This might not be the edition Lü read. However, the exact quote in this edition matches Lü Cheng's. The context of this quote is as follows, "What is important, then, is not that the critic should possess a correct abstract definition of beauty for the intellect, but a certain kind of temperament, the power of being deeply moved by the presence of beautiful objects."

[55] Lionel Lambourne, *The Aesthetic Movement* (London: Phaidon, 1996).

[56] Walter Pater, The Renaissance: Studies in Art and Poetry, preface.

[57] Lü Cheng, "Meishu piping de genju," 3.

[58] Lü Cheng, "Meishupin yu meishujia de renge," 14. March 1921.

[59] Lü Cheng, " Guanyu 'yishu piping he chuangzuo' wenti taolun de jifengxin: Lü Qiuyi da Tang Zhe'an de xin," 155. This is a rephrasing of Walter Pater's comments on art "genius" as "always above its time," see Pater, *The Renaissance*, preface. Lü Cheng, "Guanyu 'yishu piping he chuangzuo' wenti taolun de jifengxin: Lü Qiuyi zai da Tang Zhe'an de xin" 呂秋逸再答唐哲安的信 [Lü Qiuyi's Second Reply to Tang Zhe'an's Letter], *Fine Arts* 3, no. 2 (May 1922): 162.

crucial nexus in this intersubjective fusion. They both deepen the viewers' sensibility synchronically and inspire future artists diachronically. Future head geese are the awakened few from the flock, who would then inspire more art critics and more future leaders. Thanks to the critics' mastery of cross-media and intersubjective translation, the social being is able to evolve together.

Lü understood aesthetic appreciation in terms of translating momentary existences across affective, visual, melodic, and linguistic spheres. This refashioning of translation as transmuted affects enables Lü to theorize a communal living in entirety grounded exclusively in minded experiences, in terms of a phenomenological naturalism, without resorting to external physicality. In this manner, Lü was able to theorize a collective evolution driven by aesthetic and ethical expansions of consciousness.

Lü's anti-realist agenda is fundamentally a subversion of the logic of global capitalism. As is well-known, the interpretation of revolution in both European and Chinese linguistic contexts has a long-contested history. To make a convoluted story short, after the social and political upheaval in 1789, Parisian intellectuals gradually constructed the term "la Révolution française" by synthesizing many themes associated with "revolution" in its pre-1789 use. This conceptual synthesis created a new category of "revolution as a transcendental present in which eternity and contingency were conjoined, as an absolute value to be realized by immediate historical action, as a dynamic conflict between good and evil, projected indefinitely into the future." [60] However, when the Chinese intellectuals in the twentieth century encountered this universal category, it already merged with the logic of global capitalism. In this paradigm, revolution naturally emerged from the Enlightenment, as the unfolding of the progress of the human mind, and, more importantly, as part of the discourse of civilization that ranks nations and peoples along an evolutionary timeline.[61] Unsurprisingly, under this Eurocentric gaze, China was put into the waiting room of civilization of progress.[62] Under this condition of reception, many Chinese intellectuals employed the logic of social Darwinism to justify

[60] Keith Michael Baker, Inventing the French Revolution: Essays on French Political Culture In the Eighteenth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 223.
[61] Viren Murthy, *The Political Philosophy of Zhang Taiyan*, 54–55.
[62] Chakrabarty, *Provincializing Europe*, 3–11.

their call to revolution.[63] However, their loyalty to science and realism has predetermined that their revolution could not launch a forceful critique of global capitalism that objectifies social relations in terms of physical things outside consciousness.[64] As a result, the long Chinese revolution that eventually gave rise to the Communist regime is nothing more than another "example of the circular history of capital that reconstitutes its logic despite revolutions against it."[65] In contrast, Lü's societism jettisons the shackles of realism and instead reconstitutes a social oneness in terms of intersubjectivity. By a radical reframing of the social as intersubjective empathy, it shatters the trammels of commodity fetish and points to a way out of the claws and teeth of Darwinist competition.

Three identifiable factors fueled Lü's social (r)evolution. The first, as discussed earlier, is his experiences in Shanghai Art Academy. The second, which deepened his commitment to building an aesthetic community through moral awakening, is the debate on aesthetic education with Cai Yuanpei. This debate was primarily carried out in public through a series of essays and letters published in *Education Magazine* (*Jiaoyu zazhi* 教育雜誌) from January to October 1922. During this debate, Lü further elaborated on his project of disrupting the Darwinist bookkeeping with aesthetic cultivation. In this project, Lü imagined a holistic transformation of the moral landscape by germinating many new interpretative communities through invigorating aesthetic attitudes among commoners. I will discuss the third factor, the quest for a universal moral agency, in section three.

An Alternative (R)evolution: Replacing the Commodity Fetish with an Aesthetic Society

Lü Cheng further fleshed out his conception of an aesthetic sociality by arguing against Cai Yuanpei's secularist agenda. In this section, I demonstrate that despite their shared moral concerns, Cai and Lü disagreed on what constituted a "society" and the public role of "religion." They constructed different sets of dualities to support their own agendas. For Cai, it was aesthetics vs. religion. Employing an evolutionary framework, Cai prophesied that, with the advancement of civilization, the parochial

[63] For the sway of social Darwinism and its link to the rise of Marxism, see Yü Ying-shih, "The Radicalization of China in the Twentieth Century China," in *China in Transformation*, 134.

[64] Karl Marx, *Capital* (London: Penguin Classics, 1990), 165. "It is nothing but the definite social relation between men themselves which assumes here, for them, the fantastic form of a relation between things."

[65] Viren Murthy, *The Political Philosophy of Zhang Taiyan*, 238.

religion would naturally die out and eventually be superseded by universal aesthetic education. In contrast, for Lü, the critical issue was a binary moral choice: either an aesthetic life that was built upon empathy or this actual life that had evolved through Darwinist competition. The outcome of this public conversation is clear. Cai, the secularist, ushered in a new era of education.[66] Lü's proposal quickly sank into oblivion. By highlighting a forgotten aesthetic sociality, this section seeks to rediscover other ways of imagining "society" and "religion," one that put forth a powerful critique of the commodity fetish and enchanted social relations with moral agency and aesthetic empathy.

Against Cai Yuanpei: Nature and Consciousness, Which Transforms Which?

Lü argued against Cai's conception of aesthetic education because he read Cai's proposal as overly pragmatic and rejected the implication that nature itself and beautiful human-made environments would be enough to nurture a healthy sense of moral being in all citizens. It would be a mistake to label Cai as a pragmatist. Nevertheless, as the president of Peking University during John Dewey's visit (1919–1921), Cai had plenty of opportunities to exchange views with and be influenced by Dewey.[67] Given the popularity of Dewey at the time, it is necessary to consider Cai and Dewey's meetings as a backdrop to Cai and Lü's debate. This pragmatist mentality of the era highlighted Cai's faith in nature as a generative force to initiate social transformation.[68]

Like many intellectuals of the May Fourth era, Cai entrusted moral awakening to the power of realism and social Darwinism.[69] This faith in realism and social Darwinism is reflected in his

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[66] For the impact of Cai's secularist project on aesthetic education, see Walter Davis, "Art, Aesthetics, and Religion in Modern China," in *Modern Chinese Religion II 1850–2015*, eds. Vincent Goossaert, Jan Kiely, and John Lagerwey (Boston: Brill, 2015), 197–261 and Duiker, *T'sai Yüan-p'ei: Educator of Modern China*.

[67] In fact, in 1920, Cai already began to push forward Deweyan educational concepts, for details and main proponents of this trend, see Barry C. Keenan, *The Dewey Experiment in China: Educational Reform and Political Power in the Early Republic* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1977), 55–79.

[68] Note that in the 1920s, Dewey has not yet invented the term "natural piety," but one can already detect the significance of nature in his pragmatic philosophy that "viewed knowledge as arising from an active adaptation of the human organism to its environment." See *Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, "John Dewey," https://www.iep.utm.edu/dewey/. For Dewey's own conception of this term, see John Dewey, *A Common Faith* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1934), 25.

[69] For scientism as the cultural norm and as an exegetical key for Darwinism in the 1920's China, see Grace Yen Shen, "Scientism in the Twentieth Century," in *Modern Chinese Religion II 1850–2015*, 117–25.

pragmatic strategies for implementing aesthetic education: building up beautiful public institutions of prenatal care, daycare, schools, museums, parks, and beautiful cities as a means of purifying the Chinese mind. Presumably, these pleasant surroundings would inculcate democratic values and selfless dispositions into the subconsciousness of the masses, calling to mind the Deweyan project of making the school the unsteepled church of democracy.[70]

However, unlike Dewey, who rejected static models of knowledge and instead viewed moral inquiry as a heuristic process of human's active adaptation to its environments, Cai Yuanpei promoted a different kind of natural piety. Cai argued that the appreciation of a universal, beautiful, and grandiose nature would self-evidently expand one's horizon and rid one of any petty, selfish desires, which would then resolve such potential conflicts of interests between the individual and the group.[71] Cai first publicly advocated his proposal in August 1917 and asserted that religion should be superseded by aesthetic education because he deemed religion parochial and aesthetics universal.[72] While hotly debated, this suggestion gathered more and more support in the ensuing years. Nevertheless, in the 1920s, pragmatism fad started to wane. It was being criticized by both the leftists and the conservative intellectuals. Many such critiques were based on misreadings. One anonymous critic felt that Deweyan pragmatism ignored the aesthetic and religious dimensions of human experience and, therefore, would not help renew the Chinese spirit.[73]

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[70] Cai Yuanpei, "Meiyu shishi de fangfa," *Education Magazine* 14, no. 6 (20 June 1922): 1–7. The similarity of Cai's and Deweyan project lies in their shared pragmatic focus on building up institutions such as schools and libraries. For an in-depth analysis of "natural piety" and its relation to pragmatism, see Eddy P. Wilson, "Emerson and Dewey on Natural Piety," *The Journal of Religion* 75, no. 3 (1995): 329–46.

[71] Cai Yuanpei, *Cai Yuanpei Quanji* (Hangzhou: Zhejiang jiaoyu chubanshe, 1996), vol 3, 90–92, vol 6, 602–3, 605–6. In fact, Cai knew about and borrowed from Dewey's pragmatism in education as early as April 1912, see Cai Yuanpei, "Duiyu jiaoyu fangzhen zhi yijian" 對於教育方針之意見, *Dongfang zazhi* 8, no. 10 (1912): 7–11.

[72] Cai first lectured on this topic on April 8th, 1917, then published the notes in two periodicals, see, Cai Yuanpei, "Yi meiyu dai zongjiao shuo: zai Beijing Shenzhou xuehui yanjiang," *Xueyi* 1, no. 2 (July 1917): 267–72; Cai Zimin [Yuanpei], "Yi meiyu dai zongjiao shuo," *New Youth* 3, no. 6 (August 1917):10–14. For an English translation of Cai's essay, see Ts'ai Yüan-p'ei, "Aesthetics as a Substitute for Religion," in *Chinese Essays on Religion and Faith*, trans. Douglas Lancashire (San Francisco: Chinese Materials Center, 1981), 242–51.

[73] Jessica Ching-Sze Wang, *John Dewey in China: To Teach and to Learn* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2007), 41–63 and 54–55.

Pragmatists' faith in the edifying power of nature, in Lü Cheng's eyes, could hardly lead to a viable path out of China's crisis. Lü worried that natural piety, as embodied in one's emotional experiences, merely constituted perceptions contaminated by petty ego, which was itself an unconscious habit reified through Darwinist competition.[74] Lü argued that uncritical trust in nature represented another ignorant entanglement mired in this world, which led to "the actual society" and the corresponding "actual human life." In this collectivity sustained by habitual possessive desires, people would live lives full of petty contradictions and boredom. To further emphasize the imperative to break with this actual life, Lü argued that:

> There is also creativity in this actual life, which emerged together with possessive, selfish desire… Whereas in an aesthetic attitude toward life, every happening is for all living beings, and yet this actual life only acknowledges ego, which is only an uncontrolled expansion of egoist life… When educators of aesthetics attempt to employ a fundamentally different aesthetic creativity to aid the creativity sprung from disguises of possessive desires in ordinary life, here evidently lies a layer of an extreme contradiction.
>
> 現狀的生活裡也有創造, 伴著佔有的私慾而起,… 藝術生活態度裡在在都為著一切的生命, 而現狀的生活呢, 祇明白有自我, 祇是自我生命須得無限的擴張… 美育家要用本質不同的藝術創造來助長一般生活佔有欲變相的創造, 這中間明明橫著重極大的矛盾. [75]

For Lü, this actual life is but a shadow, signifying nothing more than boredom and futile selfish pursuit. In contrast to Cai, who saw art as naturally emerging from and eventually replacing religion, Lü imagined art as a revolution, i.e., a fundamental break with this actual life and a decisive turn toward an aesthetic life. Lü saw an irreconcilable contradiction between the materialistic life against an aesthetic spirituality. For Lü, art must revamp this actual life. Lü's aesthetic revolution echoes the post-1789 French interpretation of revolution as an eternal conflict between good and evil. However, under the condition of global capitalism, Lü's iteration of the French Revolution adopted a new meaning: The aesthetic spirituality functioned to disrupt the capitalist reduction of human and natural relations into the commodities and reinject moral agency into social relations.

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[74] Lü Cheng, "Shicen wuxiong zuoyou" 石岑吾兄左右, *Education Magazine* 14, no. 1 (January 1922):1. The letter itself was dated to November 20th, 1921. This was a letter published under the section "Tongxun" 通訊. This was later collected into a book, Li Shicen and Lü Cheng, *Meiyu zhi yuanli* 美育之原理 (Shanghai: The Commercial Press, 1925).

[75] Lü Cheng, "Yishu yu meiyu," 7.

Lü chose to respond publicly to Cai's project because he deemed Cai's project ineffective for revolutionizing consciousness. In an October 1922 essay, Lü explicitly denounced natural piety, pointing out the impossibility of "building up various pleasant environments and waiting quietly for the natural transformative effects [of these environments]."[76]

This critique directly caricatured Cai's project to waiting-for-environment-to-transform-mind-ism. For Lü, natural piety reifies the commodity fetish and reinforces the materialistic slumber. He worried that pleasant environments could potentially dull one's moral deliberation and thus abet arrogance.[77] Hiding his most strident critique in a footnote, Lü asserted that beautiful public spaces could merely embellish, adjust, and ameliorate everyday life. Nonetheless, they lacked any potential to change one's possessive habitual desires.[78]

Instead, Lü argued that aesthetic education must begin from a moral awakening. One shall not rely on nature or beautiful objects for this moral conviction. To begin living an aesthetic life, one must embark upon a self-conscious path of purifying the mind. It is in this sense that Lü considered himself a revolutionary: disrupting Darwinist (naturalistic) bookkeeping of petty, selfish interests, and instead cultivating an aesthetic life through purification of the mind.

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[76] Lü was drafted into this debate by Li Shicen. In Li Shicen's December 22, 1921 reply to Lü Cheng, Li explicitly cited Cai's 1917 essay in *New Youth* to serve as a counter argument, pointing out the diverging interpretations of "religion" and "aesthetic education" between Lü and Cai and requesting a public rejoinder. For Lü's response, see Lü Cheng, "Yishu he meiyu," 7.

[77] This is not a hypothetical concern. Lü in his article listed quite a few examples of selfish and decadent artists who commodified artwork for profit. Unlike Cai who admired ancient Greek temples and Roman theatres for their lasting aesthetic presence, Lü was more in tune with his contemporaneous aesthetic trends that were a mixed bag of egoistic and altruistic potentials in his eyes. One apt example for how aesthetics could mask profit-driven mentality was the establishment of Italian concession in Tianjin. As pointed by Marinelli, in the early twentieth century, the Italians in China, who were basked in the glory of the Renaissances, nonetheless ruthlessly drove out local residence and heartlessly dismantled their shanties so that the Italians could build up beautiful exemplary architectures in Tianjin's Italian concession and to spiritualize the "aesthetic desert" that is China. See Maurizio Marinelli, "Projecting *Italianità* on the Chinese Space: The Construction of the 'Aristocratic' Concession in Tianjin (1901–1947)," in *Italy's Encounters with Modern China: Imperial Dreams, Strategic Ambitions*, eds. Maurizio Marinelli and Giovanni Andornino (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 7–10.

[78] Lü Cheng, "Yishu yu meiyu," 5–6.

Revolutionizing the Consciousness with an Aesthetic Attitude

Lü did not doubt that nature was merely an outcome of conscious activities. Revolution, in this new paradigm, requires a turn toward aesthetic life. In imagining an aesthetic life, Lü Cheng termed it "collective living with an aesthetic attitude"—an attitude that is grounded in selfless empathy and limitless expansion. Lü first laid out his vision for aesthetic education on November 20, 1921, in response to the editor of the well-known progressive periodical *The People's Bell* (*Minduo* 民鐸) Li Shicen's inquiry. In this letter, Lü rejected the viability of replacing spiritual cultivation with art education and argued that truly effective aesthetic education is "the education that aims at an aesthetic human life."[79]

Employing the same strategy of separating the temporal from the spatial, Lü argued that religion emerged from a spiritual yearning for eternal life and that aesthetics grew out of a desire to expand life to include all forms of minded creatures.[80] They complement each other but cannot be reduced to one or the other, just like the temporal and spatial forms of art that must be revolutionized in tandem. Lü argued that a beautiful life could only be enacted through an aesthetic attitude. For Lü, aesthetic attitude consists of both a conscious striving for a selfless spiritual invigoration and a commitment to engendering intersubjective accord. He then prophesied that this selfless spirituality and intersubjectivity would cohere all conscious existences into an aesthetic society.

This 1921 public letter further spelled out his inchoate idea of an aesthetic revolution in 1919. Revolution must be carried out through education. The central issue in his theory of revolution is a new conception of "society" (*shehui* 社會). In premodern China, *shehui* denoted devotional associations or worship communities. By the early twentieth century, however, this term became the central site of contestation for many political theories.[81] By the 1920s, the dominant reading of social

[79] Lü Cheng, "Shicen wuxiong zuoyou," 1.

[80] Lü Cheng, "Shicen wuxiong zuoyou," 3.

[81] For a summary of the concept of *shehui* at the village level since Song China, see Joseph Mcdermott, "The Village Quartet," in *Modern Chinese Religion I: Song-Liao-Jin-Yuan (960–1368 AD)*, eds. John Lagerwey and Pierre Marsone (Leiden: Brill, 2014), 169–228. Although this study focuses on southern China, the overall ritual structure of local communities such as lineages and village territories could be traced back to ancient Chinese records *Rites of Zhou*. For a manageable summary of this long history, see John Lagerwey, *China: A Religious State*, 7–17, 19–55. As explained by Lagerwey and others, lineage as the defining

Darwinism had transformed the meaning of society. Due to the increasing disillusion with political revolution, among the May Fourth revolutionaries, society emerged as an independent category outside the political and economic discourses.[82]

Many May Fourth thinkers rejected the capitalist logic that portrays the basis of a group (*qun* 群) as calculated in terms of its collective survival advantage in evolutionary terms. Instead, they followed social contract theories proposed by Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, and Jean-Jacques Rousseau or looked into anarchism and socialism for inspiration.

Joining this wave of rethinking revolution, Lü theorized a social oneness grounded in an aesthetic life. To mark the radical departure of Lü's social oneness from the logic of capitalism, sociology, or socialism, I term it a societism. Lü prophesied that an aesthetic life is an enlightened one that was awakened by a keen awareness of the unsatisfactoriness of this actual life. It would be a oneness grounded in empathy (*tongqing* 同情).[83] Lü argued that empathy grew out of a profound understanding of beings as-such as well as a categorical acknowledgment of all sentient beings' will to live. In his January 20, 1922 letter, Lü contended as follows.

> Therefore, when encountering people, things, and the natural world with an aesthetic attitude, [one] thoroughly understands their essence without exception. Because of one's acknowledgment and affirmation of their desire for life, empathy arises. And then, social phenomena emerge.
> 故從美的態度以遇人物自然，莫不一一洞徹本質，而自其生之要求，以為肯定，得起同情，而成社會現象.[84]

institution of a local community and the Chinese "essence" that had been most vehemently attacked by May Fourth intellectuals only grew to its prominence in Ming after Emperor Shizu allowed commoners to worship their own ancestors, see Lagerwey, *China: A Religious State*, 49–52. For the complex trajectory of *shehui* as society and its convoluted intertwining with revolutionary thinking and socialism, see for example, Cui Yingling 崔应令, "Zhongguo jindai 'shehui' guannian de shengcheng" 中国近代"社会" 观念的生成, *Shehui* 社会 2015(02): 29–57. For the politics of translation as a background story of the Chinese adoption of the Japanese translation of "society" as "社会," see Lydia He Liu, *Translingual Practice: Literature, National Culture, and Translated Modernity—China, 1900–1937* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995), 91–93, 336.

[82] For a historical analysis of the emergence of social revolution as an independent category in the post May Fourth era, see Yang Nianqu, *Wusi de ling yimian*.

[83] Lü Cheng, "Shicen wuxiong zuoyou," 2–3.

[84] Lü Cheng, "Shicen wuxiong zuoyou," 2. Lü Cheng reiterated and expanded a similar set of ideas about the inherent sociality of an aesthetic life in another essay, see Lü Cheng, "Meishu fazhan de tujing," 15–35.

In one sentence, Lü redefined social phenomena as intersubjective accord sprung from empathic resonances. Although Lü never explicitly conversed with the Marxist critique of capital, his redefinition of social oneness nonetheless subverted the commodity fetish by enchanting social relations with Beauty.

Lü defined an aesthetic attitude as a trained attitude to appreciate other minded creatures. Lü's was inspired by Lippsian *Einfühlung*. Lü argued that it could only be cultivated through "an expression after contemplation" (*guanzhao biaochu* 觀照表出).[85] In his moral imaginary, a contemplative attitude guarantees seeing things as they really are, which anchors all forms of knowledge and thus broadens the territories of art and beauty. Expression enables artists to materialize their spiritual life and through the physical and spatial presence of their artworks to inspire connoisseurs to expand their own intellect.[86] Because expression after contemplation fundamentally contradicts the conception of lived realities, one must self-consciously initiate this metamorphosis.[87]

To implement this anti-realist project, by October 1922, Lü Cheng laid out a plan for institution-building. In this plan, Lü turned his attention to nurture talents as leaders of the movement. The first step was to spread true knowledge of aesthetics among all. In the second step, Lü moved beyond epistemology and explicitly advocated for "initiating social reform movements." Here, Lü pointed out that because the aesthetic life was fundamentally at odds with this actual world, one could not patiently wait for nature to work its magic. Instead, one must rely on the foreseers to

[85] Despite its apparent resonance with Buddhism, the most direct predecessor of Lü's use of the term *guanzhao* 觀照 is borrowed from Abe Jirō, for Abe's use of this term, see Ōishi Masashi "Abe Jirō to kanjō inyū bigaku," 93–130. See also, Abe Jirō, *Bigaku* 美學 (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1917), 299–350. Abe was also influenced by Japanese Buddhist concepts such as Buddha-nature, but these seems to have quite different origins than Lü Cheng's Yogācāra learning. For Lü Cheng's use of this term, see Lü Cheng, "Meishu fazhan de tujing," 21–35 and Lü Cheng, *Meixue gailun* 美學概論 (Shanghai: The Commercial Press, 1923), 5–8, 35. This was not the first time Lü Cheng used similar terms to describe aesthetic experience, the earliest published article that discusses contemplation and expression appeared in 1920, Cheng Shu 澄叔 [Lü Cheng], "Liboshi meixue dayao," 69–75.

[86] Lü Cheng, "Shicen wuxiong zuoyou", 2 and Lü Cheng, "Meishu fazhan de tujing," 25.

[87] Lü Cheng, "Yishu yu meiyu," 5.

initiate the turn toward an aesthetic, social life. He further prophesied that, once these visionaries established a niche, one could gradually expand the aesthetic landscape.[88]

Rather than the thrill of rage or competitive righteousness, Lü Cheng's revolutionary mission resembles a gradual transformation of the landscape. The fundamental break happens only at the level of mental conviction to start an aesthetic life, not a torch-earth fire that desires to burn down this actual life. Outwardly, the social change would come about gradually. He imagined that a few new seedlings would establish an initial small foothold. Then, through intersubjective expansion, this seed community would fundamentally transform its surroundings, acting as the bastion for further expansion.

Despite his self-identification as a revolutionary and the fact he first made his fame by calling for an aesthetic revolution, Lü's project of renewing the world has nothing in common with the familiar narrative of sparks that started to a prairie fire promising to burn down anything old. In Lü's social imaginary, even the conviction to break with this actual life must be achieved through a careful search for the truth of aesthetics and a sustained commitment to cultivate joys of learning and to nurture a taste for considered arguments. This surprising view leaves us to wonder, to what extent, can we take seriously his self-identification as a revolutionary?

I argue this oddness is a valuable opportunity to defamiliarize us from the entrenched cultural memory of the long Chinese revolution. Instead of retelling the inevitable triumph of socialism, Lü's revolutionary vision indicates to us a much broader search for more robust solidarity and for a more just global order, outside the well-known cases of anarchism, social contract theory, liberal democracy, communism, and socialism. Lü's seemingly odd conception of revolution represented a broader undercurrent that rebelled against realist formulations of social evolution. As I demonstrate in later chapters, his rebel against realism was one of the determining factors for the rise of modern Yogācāra.

[88] Lü Cheng, "Yishu yu meiyu," 4.

It is essential to understand that Lü's anti-realism was simultaneously a scientific one, albeit a unique understanding of science as a study of etiology and a reframing of the scientific method as rigorous comparison. Lü's debate with Zhang Taiyan on the interpretation of Yogācāra and Bergsonism revealed to us this unique interpretation. This debate was primarily carried out through a series of essays and letters published in different periodicals edited by Li Shicen 李石岑 (1892–1934) from late 1920 to early 1921. During this debate, Lü further elaborated his anti-realist view of worldly phenomena as causal mental links and consequently redefined scientific rigor as comparative rigor. Both reformulations served to further his aesthetic revolution, i.e., a total remake of social relations by establishing interpretative communities committed to awakening aesthetic attitudes among commoners.

Where does Moral Agency Lie: Differentiating Yogācāra from Bergsonism

Moral agency, for Lü, lies in the intersubjective, not in some mythical interiority. By articulating his criticism of both Zhang Taiyan and Bergson, Lü Cheng sharpened his theorization of a universal moral agency through comparative rigor. Lü trusted that, to guarantee the right direction toward total emancipation, one must rely on meticulous comparative studies. Only then can one harness the power of the universal moral agency as the driving force of a collective march toward an aesthetic society. If scholars continue to ignore the soteriological function of Lü's philosophical investigation, then it would be to impose present disciplinary categorizations back in the early twentieth century when the boundaries between Buddhology and soteriology were still under contestation.

The increasing traction of the global Bergsonian vogue in May Fourth China whipped into shape Lü's articulation for a universal agency and a powerful critique of philosophical solipsism. As pointed out by Alex Owen, Bergsonian intuition shared striking parallels with the fin-de-siècle faze of occult philosophy. Indeed, occultism of this era valorizes transcendent self-realization, advances the experience of the self as inherently spiritual and potentially divine, and conceives of reality as

forever exceeding the reach of the rationalizing mind.[89] Bergsonian philosophy of life played a crucial role in stimulating a new wave of Chinese vitalism, as seen in the rise of New Confucianism and the Chinese infatuation of the Yogācāra-inflected phrase "the myriad dharmas are only Consciousness."[90] This Sinification of Bergsonism is mainly because the Chinese intellectuals moralized Bergsonian creative evolution in order to challenge the dominant discourse of social Darwinism and science.[91]

However, both Bergsonian philosophy of the occult self and Chinese vitalist revalorization of self-consciousness suffer from the fatal flaw of philosophical solipsism. Reeling backward from the blow of scientific realism, social Darwinism, and commodity fetish, those who were spiritually invested in the occult self stumbled into the opposite extreme that posited a mythical interiority as the only gateway to the great secrets of the universe.[92] Lü's quest for a universal moral agency stood out as a thoughtful critique of both scientism and solipsism.

Bergsonian Creative Evolution Injected with a Confucian Sentimentality

Henri-Louis Bergson (1859–1941) was first introduced to Chinese readers in 1910, together with the German philosopher Rudolf Christoph Eucken (1846–1926) as part of a new "philosophy of life" packaged by American liberal theologians. They sought to continue William James's project of establishing a science of religion.[93] Bergson's most influential work in China was the 1907 *L'évolution créatrice* [The Creative Evolution], translated into Chinese in 1920.[94] Furthermore, John Dewey, the American pragmatist and William James' admirer, who was seen as the impersonation of Mr. Science

[89] Owen, *The Place of Enchantment*, 114–47. For a brief analysis of how Bergson occult philosophy impacted William's James's theorization of religious experience and pragmatism, see Owen, 138–39.

[90] For the popularization of this phrase, see Hammerstrom, "The Expression 'The Myriad Dharmas are Only Consciousness' in Early 20th Century Chinese Buddhisms." I understood this Yogācāra vogue as part and parcel of the Chinese vitalism described in Ku-ming Chang's article, see Ku-ming Chang, "Ceaseless Generation."

[91] Joseph Ciaudo, "Introduction à la métaphysique bergsonienne en Chine," 293–328; Ciaudo, "Bergson's 'intuition' in China and its Confucian Fate (1915–1923): Some Remarks on *Zhijue* in Modern Chinese Philosophy," *Problemos* (2016): 35–50; For the impact of Bergsonism on traditional vitalism, see, Chang Ku-ming, "Ceaseless Generation."

[92] Owen, *The Place of Enchantment*, 256.

[93] For the details and the role of American missionaries in packaging these two philosophers together, see Gvili, "In Search of the National Soul," 39–48.

[94] Zhang Dongsun 張東蓀, *Chuanghua lun* 創化論 (Shanghai: The Commercial Press, 1920).

and Mr. Democracy in the May Fourth China, lectured on William James's enthusiastic reading of Bergson. Dewey's lectures promoted the Bergsonian "stream of consciousness" and "intuition" and further fueled the Bergsonian Boom.[95]

Bergson became popular in the 1920s also because many intellectuals started looking for alternatives. These intellectuals felt that social Darwinism posits passive subjects who are subordinate to the mechanization of life. Simultaneously, many Buddhist intellectuals also treated social Darwinism as a prescriptive moral system of science rather than a description of natural processes.[96] This shared moral concern overdetermined the Chinese reception of Bergson. In *L'évolution créatrice*, Bergson rejected Darwin's natural selection as the driving mechanism of biological and social evolutions. Instead, Bergson put forth his theory of an evolution motivated by *élan vital*, a "vital impetus" that is an innate human creative impulse. Although in fin-de-siècle Europe, Bergsonian *élan vital* bore a distinct relationship to ancient animal occultism, it satisfied European bourgeoise sentimentality exactly because Bergson's concoction of supra-consciousness effectively displaced the analytical power of the intellect as a valid means to access "life as a whole."[97] Once transplanted into the Chinese soil, Bergsonian critique of science and rationality was soon domesticated with Confucian sentimentality. Bergsonian intuition was first translated as intuition (*zhijue* 直覺) in 1918. This intuition soon became equated with Confucian self-cultivation and transformed into an authentic means to access innate knowledge.[98] Many Chinese intellectuals found

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[95] John Dewey, "Three Contemporary Philosophers: William James, Henri Bergson, and Bertrand Russell," in *The Middle Works of John Dewey, 1899–1924. Volume 12: 1920, Essays, Reconstruction in Philosophy*, ed. Jo Ann Boydston and Larry Hickman, (Charlottesville, Va.: InteLex Corporation, 1996), 203–51. Online edition. This lecture series was delivered in Peking University in March 1920. In the third lecture, when Dewey introduced Bergson, he focused on Bergsonian intuition and credited him for introducing a fresh way of explaining how one could create one's own future beyond narratives of science and rationality, "Bergson's emphasis on intuition adds an element of freshness to this creation of one's own future, especially when he insists that it is not a matter of rationalizing or calculating, but comes as a result of our innate impulse to forward striving," in John Dewey, "Three Contemporary Philosophers," 251.

[96] Hammerstrom, *The Science of Chinese Buddhism*, 128–29.

[97] Owen, *The Place of Enchantment*, 135–38.

[98] For the detailed translation history mediated by Japanese and German translations of Bergson and the process of moralization of this concept in modern China, see Ciaudo, "How Bergson's 'intuition' became moral in China," 25–26. Moreover, the consequence of this moralization led to Jiang Jieshi's (Chiang Kai-shek) appropriation of Bergsonism for the Fascist/Nationalist social control, which induced vehement

Bergsonism appealing, partially thanks to this moralization process but most crucially for its passionate promotion of a life force and its powerful critique of scientific materialism. Together with John Dewey's promotion, Bergsonian evolution soon enthralled many Chinese intellectuals, and there were plans to invite Bergson in December 1921.[99]

Lü Cheng Dragged into the Debate

Lü was dragged into the debate on Yogācāra and the moralized Bergsonism in 1921.[100] None of Lü Cheng's early engagement with Western aesthetics and philosophy demonstrates any influence from Bergson.[101] On the contrary, despite Lü Cheng's reservation about Kantian metaphysics, he admired the Kantian critical method, which Bergson tried to replace with intuition.[102] Nor had Lü paid much attention to Bergson after this debate. Li Shicen drafted Lü Cheng into this debate by requesting Lü to comment on Zhang Taiyan's reading of both.

Zhang Taiyan's agenda was part and parcel of the prevalent scientism at the time.[103] He attempted to use "science" to "prove" the truth of Yogācāra. For Zhang, the resemblance of storehouse

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critique from Marxist thinkers and led to the demise of Bergsonism soon after WWII, see Wu Xianwu 吴先伍, *Xiandaixing de zhuiqiu yu piping—Bogesen yu zhongguo jindai zhexue* 现代性的追求于批评—柏格森与中国近代哲学 (Hefei: Anhui renmin chubanshe, 2005), 231–33.

[99] Li Shicen 李石岑, "Xiandai zhexue zaping—Duwei yu Luosu, Luosu yu Bogesen, Bogesen yu Wokeng" 現代哲學雜評—杜威與羅素, 羅素與柏格森, 柏格森與倭鏗, *Minduo* 民鐸 3, no. 1 (December 1921): 2.

[100] Lü Cheng, "Bogesen zhexue yu weishi" 柏格森哲學與唯識 [Bergsonian Philosophy and Yogācāra], *Minduo* 3, no. 1 (December 1921): 1–6. Other cultural luminaries who contribed to this special include Li Shicen, Zhang Dongsun, Cai Yuanpei, Liang Shuming, Li Jinxi 黎锦熙, Feng Youlan, and Zhang Taiyan. Lü also partiticpated in a debate through letters, see Yao Binbin 姚彬彬, "1921–1922 nian Zhang Taiyan, Lü Cheng, Li Jinxi lunxue shujian kaoshi" 1921–1922 年章太炎, 吕澂, 黎锦熙论学书简考释, *Foxue yanjiu* 佛学研究 23 (2014): 326–39.

[101] In fact, none of Lü Cheng's post 1923 publications and republications of his early works showed any sign of serious engagement with Bergsonian aesthetics. This is in stark contrast with other leading aestheticians' (such as Zong Baihua 宗白華 and Zhu Guangqian 朱光潛) warm reception of Bergsonism, see Wu Xianwu, *Xiandaixing de zhuiqiu*, 211–30.

[102] In Lü Cheng's early monographs, he identified German philosophy since Kant's time as the hotbed of aesthetics and introduced Kantian aesthetic concepts in conjunction with many other popular aesthetic theories at the time. Lü Cheng commented that "Kantian unique critical method" is what made him a "genius among scholars/academics." See Lü Cheng, "Kangde zhi meixue sixiang" 康德之美學思想, *Minduo* 6, no. 4 (20 May 1925): 4–5.

[103] This scientism among Buddhist intellectuals, as observed incisively by Erik Hammerstrom, refers to a prevailing belief that some of the scientific discoveries are already known to Buddhism, see, Hammerstrom, *The Science of Chinese Buddhism*, 127–28.

consciousness with Bergsonian *vital impetus* and *intuition* provided "scientific" evidence to validate Yogācāra epistemology. Although by contemporary standard, Bergsonism could hardly count as science, in the late 1910s and early 1920s, the clout of philosophical methods still occasionally outweighed experiments and the logic of falsifiability.[104] A fitting anecdote would help us understand the different perceptions of science at the time. In 1920, in a cultural event, the physicist Albert Einstein ran into Bergson. During this short encounter, Bergson harshly critiqued Einstein's 1916 publication on General Relativity, accusing Einstein of mixing metaphysics with empirical science. Because of Bergson's public critique of Einstein's theory of time, in 1921, when the Nobel Prize committee deliberated on Einstein's award, they decided to award Einstein for his relatively less controversial—albeit much less impactful—work on the photoelectric effect.[105] In China, although Bergson's fascination with séance and other paranormal phenomena remained mostly unknown, it had accentuated Zhang Taiyuan's accurate capturing of this enchantment in Bergsonian "science."[106] Neither was Zhang alone in reading Bergsonism as science. Cai Yuanpei, the educator of modern China, partially translated a German translation *Einführung in die Metaphysik* of Bergson's 1903 essay "Introduction à la métaphysique," and asserted that "metaphysics is a science expressible without symbols."[107]

[104] For various contestations on the boundary and priority between science and philosophy in modern China, see Shino Yoshinobu 志野好伸, "Testugaku no kyōkai kakutei: Kindai Chūgoku ni okeru Berukuson juyō no ichi rei" 哲学の境界画定—近代中国におけるベルクソン受容の一例, *Chūgoku testugaku kenkyū* 24 (January 2009): 146–62.

[105] For a detailed recounting of this event and in-depth analysis, see Jimena Canales, *The Physicist and the Philosopher: Einstein, Bergson, and the Debate That Changed Our Understanding of Time*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2015). For a different interpretation of this debate, see Gilles Deleuze, *Bergsonism*, trs. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam (New York: Zone Books, 1990), 115–18.

[106] For Bergson's interests in séance and paranormal phenomena such as telepathy and clairvoyance and how it influenced his *Creative Evolution* (1911) and his later work *The Two Sources of Morality and Religion* (1932), see for example, G. William Barnard, *Living Consciousness: The Metaphysical Vision of Henri Bergson* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2011): 249–56.

[107] According to Ciaudo's comparative study, this sentence appears to be an addition in the German translation, not in the French original, see Joseph Ciaudo, "Introduction à la métaphysique bergsonienne en Chine," 306, footnote 34. However, Cai's Chinese translation this German addition undoubtedly fuelled the tide of scientism by granting metaphysics (*xuanxue* 玄學) a status of science in China.

Lü Cheng initially critiqued Zhang Taiyan through private communication mediated by Li Shicen. Li soon published these letters in January 1921 in *The Lamp for Learning* (*Xuedeng* 學燈). Once dragged into the public arena, Lü Cheng was compelled to participate further. Soon, Li organized a special issue on Bergson in December 1921 in *The People's Bell* and continued to publish Lü Cheng's and Zhang Taiyan's epistolary debates till January 1922.

Lü Reframed the Debate: You Cannot Find Truth with the Wrong Method

Despite the *prima facie* focus on Yogācāra *ālayavijñāna* and Bergsonian vital impetus, the deeper motivation for Lü Cheng to join this debate lies elsewhere. A close analysis of the letter reveals that Lü's first goal was to establish a rigorous comparative method as the foundation for awakening commoners' aesthetic sensibility. His second goal was to put forth a different etiology of collective progress, one that is grounded in Yogācāra causal enframing (*weishi yuanqi* 唯識緣起) and one that posits a universal moral agency as the sole mover of social evolution.

There were mainly two camps in this debate. Lü Cheng and Liang Shuming 梁漱溟 (1893–1988) saw an unbridgeable difference between Bergsonism and Yogācāra.[108] Zhang Taiyan and Li Jinxi 黎錦熙 (1890–1978) argued for the equivalence of Bergsonian vital impetus with that of storehouse consciousness. However, both Zhang and Li only read Yogācāra and Bergson in translation, and both approached Yogācāra through the lens of Chinese Buddhist hermeneutics.[109]

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[108] Liang Shumin's position is a bit more complicated. While he considered Yogācāra and Bergsonism incompatible, he saw the moral potential of Bergsonian *zhijue* in building his version of New Confucianism, for details of Liang's engagement with Bergsonism, see Ciaudo, "Bergson's 'intuition' in China," 42–43; An Yanming, "Liang Shuming and Henri Bergson on Intuition," 337–62 and Wu Xianwu, *Xiandaixing de zhuiqiu yu piping*, 63–73.

[109] Zhang Taiyan is known for having studied many Yogācāra treatises mostly translated by Xuanzang from the sixth month of 1903 till the seventh month of 1907. A full evaluation of his Yogācāra scholarship is beyond the concerns of the current dissertation. It suffices to point out that Liang Shuming, another recognized Buddhist scholar, in his 1942 autobiography mentioned Zhang as an amateur or outsider 外行 of Buddhism. Liang Shuming 梁漱溟, "Wo de zixu xiaoshi" 我的自學小史, in *Liang Shuming Quanji* 梁漱溟全集 vol. 2 (Jinan: Shandong renmin chubanshe, 1989), 695.

As for Li Jinxi, his dabbling with Yogācāra was even more superficial. Li was a self-trained philologist and an avid advocate for using romanization to replace Chinese writing system. The essay for the December 1921 issue of *People's Bell* was Li's notes of Taixu's lecture on *Vimalakīrti Sūtra* in 1919 combined with his reading of the Chinese translation of Bergson's *Creative Evolution*. See Li Jinxi, "Weimojie jing jiwen ba" 維摩詰經紀聞跋, *Minduo* 3, no. 1 (1921): 1–6.

Zhang ignited this controversy. In 1916, he planned a systematic comparative study of Bergsonism and Yogācāra.[110] Zhang's first public proposition that equated Bergsonian intuition with the storehouse consciousness appeared as part of this more extensive comparative study. This public proposition appeared in a January 5, 1921 letter from Zhang to Li Shicen, which Li titled "Experience and Analysis" (*shiyan yu lixiang* 實驗與理想).[111] In this abridged letter, Zhang equated empiricism (*shiyan* 實驗) with Yogācāra epistemological category *xianliang* 現量 (Skt: pratyakṣa) and likened analysis (*lixiang* 理想) with *biliang* 比量 (Skt: anumāna, commonly translated as inference).[112] In Yogācāra epistemology, *pratyakṣa* and *anumāna* are two mutually exclusive modes of knowing, and both have a long-contested history of interpretation.[113] In the eyes of the aspiring Buddhologist Lü Cheng, Zhang's crude comparisons committed the fatal sin of creating specious analogies.

Lü Cheng stated his motive in his January 25, 1921 letter: to avoid mixing seemingly similar ideas that could precipitate further confusion, especially when the truth is still beyond reach.[114] At first glance, Lü was concerned with accurate interpretations of Yogācāra doctrines. However, careful readers could readily recognize Lü Cheng's consistent attentiveness to analytical methods in both his call for an aesthetic awakening and his quest for genuine messages of the Buddha. The central issue Lü raised was that one "shall not use seemingly alike concepts to precipitate further confusion."

In an age overwhelmed by the tide of imported Western thoughts, Lü Cheng relied on rigorous methods as the vessel to keep one afloat during the tempest of proliferating false analogies.

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[110] Ciaudo, "How Bergson's 'intuition' became moral in China," 17. In fact, as early as 1906, Zhang Taiyan already started to create simplistic equivalence between Buddhist logic, Aristotelian logic, and the ancient Chinese legalist thinker Mozi's 墨子 (c. 470–c. 391 BC) thought.

[111] Yao Binbin, "1921–1922," 327–28.

[112] Zhang Taiyan interprets *lixiang* 理想 as *minxiang zhenli* 冥想真理, literally, meditating on truth (true principles). Yao Binbin, "1921–1922," 328. This is Zhang's own interpretation of *lixiang*. The common meaning of *lixiang* is ideal or aspiration. However, in the 1920s, this term was used to in many different senses, such as plan, hypothesis, imagination, inference, reasoning.

[113] For this complex history, see for example, Stephen Phillips, "Epistemology in Classical Indian Philosophy," *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Spring 2017 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2017/entries/epistemology-india/ and Tom Tillemans, "Dharmakīrti," *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Spring 2017 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2017/entries/dharmakiirti/

[114] Yao Binbin, "1921–22," 331.

Two features of Lü Cheng's comparative method warrant our attention. Both have functioned as an antidote to superficial learning and arbitrary judgment. The first is a skillful use of footnote, endnote, or interlinear note, which we encountered in his earlier essays. The second is his care in providing textual evidence in its original language, which first appeared in this debate and would continue to shape his approach to comparative studies.

One must read the endnotes to appreciate Lü Cheng's insistence on accessing writings in their original languages. In the special issue on Bergson in *The People's Bell*, other than Bergson's Chinese translator such as Zhang Dongsun 張東蓀 and Bergson's biographer such as Yan Jicheng 嚴既澄, Lü Cheng was the only one who cared enough to read the French original.[115] His introduction of Bergsonism was brief but right to the point.[116] Likewise, in articulating Yogācāra doctrines, Lü Cheng was careful to list all textual sources to substantiate his claims, in contrast to Zhang Taiyan. The latter rarely mentioned the primary texts to support his claims about either Yogācāra or Bergsonism. In fact, one of Lü Cheng's main critique of Zhang is that most of Zhang's interpretations contradicted canonical Yogācāra sūtras and treatises by Xuanzang 玄奘 (602–664) and Xuanzang's disciple Kuiji

[115] All other essayists or translators in this issue relied on German, English, Japanese, and Chinese translations of Bergson. This include Cai Yuanpei, who, despite his proficiency in French, only chose to translate selected passages from a German translation, see *Cai Yuanpei quanji*, vol.9, 489–99, originally published in Li Shicen's *Minduo* 3 no.1. As for the problems of translating from other translations, especially when translating a philosophical treatise, other than the problem of injecting a text with views not in the original, further problem could include changing the style of the original text, a good example as pointed out by Ciaudo, is how Kantian conception of freedom adopted a Buddhist flavor through its translation from German to English to Japanese and then to Chinese, see, Ciaudo, "Introduction à la métaphysique bergsonienne en Chine," 300, footnote 23. See also Joël Thoraval, "L'appropriation du concept de "liberté" à la fin des Qing-en partant de l'interprétation de Kant par Liang Qichao," in *La Chine et la démocratie*, eds. Pierre-Étienne Will and Mireille Delmas Marty, (Paris: Fayard, 2007), 215–29.

[116] See also Ciaudo's comment on Lü Cheng's accuracy in understanding the relations between different Bergson's works, Ciaudo, "How Bergson's 'intuition' became moral in China," 18, footnote 86.

窺基 (632–682).[117] Lü argued that Zhang's theorization of specious analogies, due to its lack of scholarly due diligence, should not be valued by scholars.[118]

Theorizing a Universal Moral Agency with Yogācāra Causal Enframing

This debate also reveals to us the seeds of a Yogācāra cultural renewal. Lü Cheng was keenly aware of the pitfall in joining this debate: Randomly comparing two systems of thought out of context could hardly bear scholarly fruits. Nevertheless, to dispel the prevalent practices of creating false equivalences, Lü Cheng chose to engage. Out of numerous possible reasons that one can enlist to dispel random associations, Lü Cheng focused on three. As I show below, these three points provide valuable information on why Yogācāra became newly relevant for Lü and like-minded Buddhist revolutionaries.

First, Lü reframed the perceivable world in terms of Yogācāra causal enframing (*weishi yuanqi* 唯識緣起).[119] Lü spilled much ink in illustrating three irreconcilable contradictions between Bergsonism and Yogācāra dependent origination. Anti-realism lies at the center of Lü's epistemological revolution. Lü Cheng concluded that the very reason that Yogācāra masters set up the concept of storehouse consciousness was to dispel the mistaken belief about a really existing outside world (*shijing* 實境) and to establish everything as *vijñapti* (appearance, false cognition).[120] Experts of Yogācāra philosophy will immediately recognize the soteriological ramifications here.

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[117] See Lü Cheng's January 25, 1921 letter published in the *Lamp for Learning*, in Yao Binbin, "1921–22," 330–331. In this letter, Lü Cheng not only substantiated his own interpretation with canonical texts but also pointed out where Zhang's misreading of Yogācāra could have come from, namely, the controversial text *Awakening Mahāyāna Faith* (*Dacheng qixin lun* 大乘起信論) attributed to Aśvaghoṣa (Maming 馬鳴), adumbrating the controversy of *Awakening Faith* between the China Inner Learning Institute and Taixu's disciples in late 1922, a debate that lasted well into the 1930s. At this time, Lü Cheng only used Chinese translations and treatises composed by Chinese authors. This is because he was still learning Sanskrit and classical Tibetan on his own. It was not until 1925 did Lü Cheng become proficient in both classical languages.

[118] Yao Binbin, "1921–22," 330.

[119] *Weishi yuanqi* 唯識緣起 is also called *laiye yuanqi* 賴耶緣起. This name is not how Xuanzang and Kuiji characterized their own teachings. Rather, it stems from a later Huanyang school characterization of Dharmalakṣaṇa school's main teachings. See DDB, entry "賴耶緣起" for details and further references. Lü and Ouyang both used these labels to characterize their own doctrinal traditions.

[120] Lü Cheng, "Bogesen zhexue yu weishi," *Minduo* 3, no. 1 (December 1921): 4.

Establishing *vijñaptimātratā* (appearance-only) entails the simultaneous destruction of two mistaken views that deemed either external objects (attachment to dharmas) or internal sensory organs (attachment to the self) as really existing. Yogācārins hold that only this anti-dualist stance can lead one toward liberation.[121] As such, it becomes evident that Lü Cheng did not reject Bergsonism *per se*. On the contrary, Lü deemed Bergsonism worthy of further study but instead denied the analytic efficacy of the Bergsonian causal story and rejected the validity of Zhang's method that used Bergsonian "science" to prove the truth of Yogācāra.[122]

Indeed, Lü further stressed that the Yogācāra concept of seeds and their causal efficacy were the most precise descriptions of the perceptual world.[123] For Lü, the path of liberation relied on the learner's conscious discernment (which relies on the functions of the sixth consciousness) of false analogies and ascertainment of correct interpretation (*zhengjie* 正解).[124] In contrast, Zhang prescribed a soteriological path that followed Chan tradition, whose fundamental teaching was that liberation is a matter of taming and stopping the functions of the sixth consciousness (*fuduan yishi* 伏斷意識). This teaching is in direct contradiction of the Yogācāra theory of how all eight consciousnesses relate and work together, where the sixth consciousness is always present,[125] and where liberation is a matter of purifying the eighth consciousness. When Zhang suggested that Bergson must have seen *ālayavijñāna* by taming the sixth consciousness, Lü Cheng considered his statement pure speculation.[126] Lü denied the soteriological potential in Bergsonism because he

[121] Although Lü Cheng was still not able to read Sanskrit and Tibetan texts at this point, as I will explain later, his interpretation of Yogācāra doctrines could garner some contemporary support. Jonathan Gold's argument of early Yogācāra as a form of anti-dualism (denying both realism and idealism), see Jonathan Gold, "No Outside, No Inside: Duality, Reality and Vasubandhu's Illusory Elephant," *Asian Philosophy* 16, no. 1 (2016): 3, 25–26.

[122] Lü made this clear in an earlier letter, Jan 19, 1921. Yao, "1921–22," 328.

[123] Yao, "1921–22," 328.

[124] Yao, "1921–22," 328, 330.

[125] Verse 16 of *Thirty Verses* says "manovijñānasaṃbhūtiḥ sarvadāsaṃjñikād ṛte/ samāpattidvayān middhān mūrchanād apy acittakāt." In Xuanzang's translation, the first Sanskrit stanza is rendered "*yichi changxianqi* 意識常現起," literally means, the sixth consciousness is always manifest. Overall, this verse points out that, other than a few exceptions of deep concentration and rare cases when people lose consciousness (similar to drug induced general anesthesia), the sixth consciousness always functions.

[126] Yao, "1921–22," 328.

deemed it one of the just-so stories of evolution. In Lü's eye, such a *prima facie* etiological explanation could only further solidify one's egotistic graspings.

Second, Lü refuted the Bergsonian ontology of nature and agency. While Bergson infused moral agency into both plants and animals, Lü considered plants and nature in general as mere manifestations of consciousness. Bergson tried to bridge the mind and matter dualism by asserting that all matters are images or streams of vibrations.[127] Under this rubric, what distinguishes animals and plants were mobility: Plants could survive without moving (photosynthesis), but animals must chase streams of vibrations as food. Despite the apparent similarities between streams of vibrations and Yogācāra streams of consciousness, they tell entirely different causal stories. Bergson reduced every evolutionary trajectory of plants and animals into one common origin and put plants and animals on equal footing. Lü judged that Bergson had wrongly identified plants as agentive.[128] In the Yogācāra system, nature (*qi shijian* 器世間) is deemed dependently arising from the world of sentient beings (*youqing shijian* 有情世間). Therefore, for Lü Cheng, plants are mere appearances in the five consciousnesses engendered by shared agentive seeds in storehouse consciousness.[129] This rebuttal discloses to us that Lü Cheng faulted Bergson for having prescribed transformative power in insentient beings by mistake and therefore undermined the sole source of moral agency—the seeds in the storehouse consciousness.

Thirdly, Lü took issue with Bergsonian memory. While Bergson identified memory as the reservoir of the true lifeforce, Lü considered the sense of an enduring memory as an illusion. Scholars of Buddhist philosophy could recognize memory as a central concern of Yogācārins. Because Abhidharma Buddhists consider consciousness as momentarily arising and disappearing and assume annihilation as self-evident, explaining the apparent continuity of memory becomes a thorny issue. Indian idealists retorted by illustrating that a continuous memory proves the existence of a real self.

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[127] It is questionable whether this assertion of the sameness of mind and matter is philosophically defensible. Nevertheless, this Bergsonian position exerted huge influence in the emergence of New Confucianism in modern China. See, Chang Ku-ming, "Ceaseless Generation."

[128] Lü Cheng, "Bogesen zhexue yu weishi," 3.

[129] Lü Cheng, "Bogesen zhexue yu weishi," 3. See also Yao Binbin, "1921–22," 328.

To defend the doctrine of non-self, Yogācārins invented the storehouse consciousness as a stream full of momentary karmic impressions, called "seeds," to explain the appearance of an enduring memory without an eternal self. In contrast, Bergson took for granted that memory was the very reservoir of durations in life that extended life from past to future, [130] which was nothing more than another just-so story of psychology in Lü's discernment. Furthermore, for Lü Cheng, this duration is too crude to have any analytic efficacy or saving power. Lü likened it to the Chan conception of one thought (*yixin* 一心), which contains many arisings and disappearances of karmic seeds. Lü believed that to hold onto this composite illusion was to miss the opportunity of actual realization.

In his concluding remarks, Lü Cheng further stressed that Bergson in *Matière et mémoire* adopted a dualistic ontology. As mentioned earlier, Lü considered this position antithetical to the Yogācāra thesis that asserts both self and the environment as appearance-only. More detrimentally, Bergson considered time (or duration) to be the fundamentally generative force. In Lü Cheng's eyes, Bergson committed the unforgivable sin of mistaking illusion as really existing. [131] To further underscore the soteriological significance of scholarly pursuit, Lü Cheng, in a later letter dated January 15, 1922, asked Li Shicen to print a preface by Ouyang.[132] In this preface, Ouyang proclaimed that one must study the Buddhist canon to comprehend the Way (*Dao* 道). Ouyang believed that Confucian classics were too obscure, and therefore only the Buddhist canon, which extensively commented on Dao, could lead one unimpededly to the ultimate Truth. In contrast with Bergson's Chinese promoters who moralized intuition, Lü Cheng rejected Bergsonism because it could not lead to liberation. Either way, Bergsonism was not received on its own merits but rather served as a springboard for Chinese intellectuals to launch their own renewal projects.

This debate revealed a crucial link in Lü's transition from aesthetics to Yogācāra. It was the first time that Lü linked the evolution of life with Yogācāra causal enframing. The arguments flushed

[130] For detailed discussions of Bergson's idiosyncratic use of duration, qualitative multiplicity, and memory, see Leonard Lawlor and Valentine Moulard Leonard, "Henri Bergson," especially Section 4.
[131] Lü Cheng, "Bogesen zhexue yu weishi," 6.
[132] Lü Cheng, "Shicen woxiong zuoyou," appendix, 12. The same letter is also included in Yao Binbin, "1921–22," 334–35.

out during this debate also paved the way for Lü's later reframing of social (r)evolution with Yogācāra soteriology. It was also the first time that Lü experimented with comparative hermeneutics to clarify his point and to convince others. It failed to garner broader support but established Lü's authority as a Yogācāra scholar.[133] This debate also fully discloses to us that, like his teacher Ouyang Jingwu, Lü was confident that Buddhist scholarship was a great vehicle to achieve collective emancipation. As such, this public conversation marked a natural extension to his aesthetic revolution, in which comparative studies served as a moral compass for initiating an aesthetic life.

Toward a Moral Ecology

Lü's social theory is a moral ecology. Its intersubjective social oneness powerfully refutes the capitalist logic as embodied in the commodity fetish. It imagines a social-being in its entirety as the entity that achieves morality, which Lü termed as "an aesthetic society" that entails a temporal expression of universal Beauty, moving away from selfish desires and expanding toward complete freedom.[134] An aesthetic society is evolved collectively according to an appreciation of all forms of life and all living processes. This aesthetic life is fundamentally a spiritual one that interweaves two streams. The first stream is a proper religious aspiration driven by yearnings for eternity. Hence, with the correct realization (*zhengjue* 正覺), it promises to lead to selflessness. The second stream is driven by an innate desire to expand one's life, leading to an ever-expanding recognition of all living creatures, like a river running into the ocean.[135]

For Lü Cheng, an aesthetic life must be grounded in religio-psychological life and is inherently social in that it is always alternating between inwardly seeing things as they really are and outwardly expressing one's affective experiences, without enclosing into itself. In this ever-expanding life, religion provides the temporal dimension, and aesthetics provides the social dimension. Lü believed that key to distinguish genuine and non-genuine art was whether one can achieve universal Truth

[133] For example, Liang Shuming was won over by Lü Cheng, for Liang's changing positions on Bergson, see An Yanming, "Liang Shuming and Henri Bergson on Intuition," 337–362 and Wu Xianwu, *Xiandaixing de zhuiqiu yu piping*, 63–73.

[134] Lü, "Meishu fazhan de tujing," 16, 27, 34.

[135] Lü, "Meishu fazhan de tujing," 18–19. See also, Lü, "Shicen wuxiong zuoyou," 3.

and that rigorous comparative studies alone held the key to reach this Truth.[136] In this sense, an aesthetic life is simultaneously an ethical one. Aesthetic inquiry is simultaneously moral reasoning.

All ethical criteria are subject to moral inquiry, open for further revisions when circumstances alter. Therefore, an aesthetic life must be a pensive one. For Lü Cheng, aesthetic desires compel one to pose the following questions continually:

> Is this actual life a proper one? Is this actual society a justifiable one? … Is this method [scientific method and mechanic human life] the ultimately proper path? … If so, why would people experience boredom … If so, why are people reluctant to let go of … faith? If so, why some people surreptitiously try to use fine arts to substitute for faith? …[137]

Lü worried that artistic realism would function just like faith required by organized religions. For Lü, the blind faith in realism would foreclose moral reflections and thereby shut out considered arguments about ethical choices in life. Lü warned that once people treated nature as if it is inviolable, then nature itself became obstacles of spiritual awakening.

Furthermore, for Lü, moral inquiry must be conducted with rigorous methods. This methodology, which I summarize as "comparative hermeneutics," is the focus of analysis in Chapter four. During the early 1920s, Lü has yet to flesh out his methodology of comparison. In this phase, he just realized the rectifying potential of rigorous methods and the import of examining writings in their original languages: Knowledge was salvation, method was the savior. Equally important, this method of moral deliberation must be integral to one's daily life, as a habit pattern that is initiated by a conscious conviction to lead a proper life. This habit of moral deliberation, Lü termed it "an aesthetic attitude," a habitus to be cultivated through expression after contemplation. Only then can artists see through the illusions imposed upon beings and express beings as they really are, and therefore can achieve an intersubjective expression of universality—the key for expanding one's life.[138]

Lü also imagined a community of like-minded beings to cultivate habits of moral deliberation. This aesthetic community, as has been discussed earlier, include artists, art critics, and connoisseurs

[136] Lü, "Meishu fazhan de tujing," 16, 18–19, 28–29, 30, 34.
[137] Lü, "Meishu fazhan de tujing," 28–31.
[138] Lü, "Meishu fazhan de tujing," 25–26.

(commoners with awakened aesthetic sensibilities). Artistic diversity is vital in this ideal community. Lü took it to be a self-evident truth that each artist develops unique languages and skills. He believed that because of empathetic resonances and the universal Beauty, commoners could understand diverse artistic languages that express a wide range of temperaments.[139] Once every human being has cultivated their aesthetic attitude, the world becomes "a blossoming field in a mountainside," where each flower emits its unique and miraculous splendor. Simultaneously, they are all nurtured by the same soil and breathe the same air.[140] The purpose of building an interpretative community is not to create multiple copies of the same ideal type but to accentuate individual differences with a collective commitment to peaceful co-existence.

One finds many parallels in Lü's ecology of selflessness with pragmatic ethics. These parallels, I contend, reveal to us a shared horizon of concern. Like Dewey's followers, Lü was searching for a heuristic and collaborative procedure to inculcate a habit of ethical reasoning, instead of producing yet another set of moral laws or reinventing another locus of sacredness. It is in this sense that I characterize Lü's aesthetic awakening as a moral ecology, which later morphed into an ecology of compassion that drew inspirations from phenomenological naturalist elements in the ancient Yogācāra teachings.

Lü's new social imaginary not only rejects moral orders that establish authority through laws, divine rules, and rituals but also departs from dominant May Fourth discourses such as realism, individualism, and social contract theories.[141] At the same time, Lü Cheng's new vision also departs from Buddhist moral cosmology that evolves cyclically under karmic retributions. While karma is still central in Lü Cheng's universe, its dynamics no longer functions in terms of reward and punishment. Instead, the function of karma adopted an uplifting and soteriological tenor when Lü reinterpreted it with metaphors of cultivating pure seeds and burning off defiled seeds. This

[139] Lü, "Meishupin yu meishujia de renge," 11–14, especially 13.
[140] Lü, "Meishu fazhan de tujing," 29.
[141] All forms of social contract theory presume the social as a sum total of individual members, organized by negotiated agreements. For a brief introduction of social contract theory, see, for example, Celeste Friend, "Social Contract Theory," *Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy* https://www.iep.utm.edu/soc-cont/, accessed December 12, 2017.

interpretation is not only firmly rooted in Yogācāra thought but also reoriented toward an actionable agenda.

An Anti-realist Revolutionary Road to Buddhology

This chapter has explored a forgotten anti-realist revolution and its joint endeavor to employ the intersubjective function of aesthetics for theorizing a social totality. As has been demonstrated, what propelled Lü toward collective rejuvenation was a form of evolutionary thinking and a yearning for a just and caring society. To build a different society that is free from excessive materialism and rampant individualism, Lü placed aesthetic attitude on center stage. What sustains the care and cohesion in this new social collective, in Lü's rubric, is aesthetic empathy and Buddhist-inflected selflessness.

Instead of locating sociality in objective truth, Lü reconceived social phenomena as intersubjective accord. This intersubjective oneness is Lü's rejoinder of the lively discussions about mind (*jingshen* 精神) and matter (*wuzhi* 物質).[142] The mirage of an unambiguous spiritual and material divide has masked a central aspect of this debate, i.e., whether society in its totality should be understood in realist or idealist terms. In the ears of modern Yogācārins, this new wave of dualistic view about "social reality" must have sounded like echoes of the two extremes of realism and nihilism, only now centered on the ontological status of the "social." Lü Cheng's rejection of these two extremes revealed his stance as a non-theistic non-realist. Although Lü has yet to flesh out his full rebuttal in Yogācāra terms, he directly addressed the issues mentioned above in his critiques of Cai Yuanpei, Zhang Taiyan, and Bergson. More than mere academic curiosity, these inquiries reflected contentious issues: Possibility of collective redemption was at stake.

[142] A representative voice is from the avid advocate for modernization Hu Shih (1891–1962)'s 1959 article. In this essay, Hu Shih traces scientific spirit and method in Chinese traditions, see, Hu Shi, "The Scientific Spirit and Method in Chinese Philosophy," in *The Chinese Mind*, Charles A. Moore ed, (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 1967), 125–31. For a Buddhist response, see, Erik J. Hammerstrom, *The Science of Chinese Buddhism*, 128–49. For the inseparability of materialism and idealism in the emergence of the modern and the secular in Western European societies, see, Charles Taylor, *A Secular Age*, 212–18, 270–95.

More than denaturalizing received wisdom about the meaning of May Fourth, this study also touched upon a further issue of how to understand the modern transformation of Chinese Buddhism. The collective amnesia about Lü Cheng's revolutionary thinking already led to a misconstrue of one crucial characteristic of the Buddhist modernist movement at this historical juncture, i.e., a widely shared vision to reorient Buddhist soteriology for collective salvation. Chinese religions have always been integral to communal life. To confine them into a private sphere is to refuse to recognize the ever-present demand for transcendence in building a decent society, for which faith-based communities have always provided vital inspirations and compelling justifications. Lü's aesthetic revolution is fundamentally a reframing of collectivity in intersubjective and soteriological terms.

In this sense, "the religious question" is simultaneously the social question in modern China.[143] The prevalence of the label "religious" only signals to us how the monopoly of state secularism has obscured many contested ideas about what constitutes a "society" and how society shall function that drew inspirations from what came to be classified as "religious" traditions.[144] Advocates of secularism have projected the later mythical construction of a clear secular and religious divide to this earlier creative ferment, retroactively relegating many dissenting voices into a separate non-secularistic realm and thus rendering them mute. As pointed out by Talal Asad, "the secular" in both its social form and state policy permeates every aspect of modern life. Instead of grasping it directly, "it is best pursued through its shadows."[145]

The current study has traced one such shadow of the secular myth looming at the threshold of our consciousness: a new moral ecology, masked as an aesthetic awakening, spearheaded by Lü Cheng, and buried under the dust of history. Taking cues from Guyau's social oneness, Pater's aesthetic sensitivity, and Lippsian empathy, Lü Cheng theorized an agentless moral agency. Lü's

[143] Goossaert and Palmer, The Religious Question in Modern China.

[144] Here, and throughout this dissertation, I distinguish secularization as a social process from secularism as a state project. Secularization puts the state power at the background while foregrounding the religious and social changes. Secularism focuses on the state ideology and its secular policies. See, Tam T. Ngo and Justine B. Quijada, *Atheist Secularism and its Discontents: A Comparative Study of Religion and Communism in Eurasia* (Hampshire; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 16–17. The focus of the current dissertation intersects more with secularization.

[145] Asad, Formations of the Secular, 16.

universal agency remedies both the excessive materialism as implied by the Darwinist portrayal of social evolution and the rampant individualism, as seen in many aesthetics movements in modern China.

As later chapters of this dissertation will reveal, Lü Cheng turned to Yogācāra philosophy to harness its soteriological efficacy to fulfill his vision of building an aesthetic society. Young Lü Cheng's foray into aesthetics allowed him to diagnose the root cause of modern disease: superficial learning and arbitrary judgment. Lü turned to Yogācāra soteriology and blazed a trail for Buddhist collaborative emancipation. Simultaneously, Lü also constructed a new sociality grounded in relationality and interdependence. In Lü's cosmopolitan world, compassion is central: It not only serves as a substrate of ethics but also defines an ethos of just thematization of religious difference, the other, and multiculturalism.

This thought-provoking social imaginary compels scholars to think beyond the binary of the religious and the secular. It further challenges scholars to investigate the agency and driving force behind the modern transformations of Chinese Buddhism: What has it meant to be a Buddhist and to be a Chinese in a modern era for the historical actors themselves? In line with Pierre Hadot's effort to rediscover "spiritual exercises" for oneself that dwelled at the center in ancient Greek philosophical inquiries,[146] Lü's revived Yogācāra as a spiritual invigoration for the masses. Thus, this modern Yogācāra also has much to contribute to the academic conversations on what is philosophy and what is Buddhist philosophy.

[146] Pierre Hadot, "Exercices Spirituels," *Annuaires De l'École Pratique Des Hautes Études* 88, no. 84 (1974): 25-70.

CHAPTER 3. BUDDHIST LEARNING, SOCIAL DARWINISM, AND GLOBAL DHARMA

To comprehend the increasing appeal of Buddhist teachings among the May Fourth youth,[1] one must situate this era in a broader international context, heeding to the lively conversations about how to build a just world order and how to resolve the modern crisis. This imagined global community is what partially underpins the "shared horizon of meaning" among Buddhist intellectuals.[2] This quest for an alternative future of the globe beyond social Darwinist discourses is also evident in Anarchism's indelible mark in the Chinese political culture since the late-Qing era. The Anarchist streak is particularly prominent in Ouyang's social clique, such as Zhang Ji (1882–1947) and Zhang Taiyan (1868–1936) as well as monk Taixu (1890–1947) who studied together with Ouyang under Yang Wenhui (1837–1911).[3] Furthermore, a similar globalizing impulse also formed

[1] It is hard to provide a comprehensive evaluation without resorting to digital tools. However, what can be said is that Buddhism was considered by many May Fourth thinkers as in integral part of new cultures during this time, together with vitalism, evolutionism, and other social theories. A good example is a popular dictionary on new cultures by Tang Jinggoa. See Tang Jinggao 唐敬杲, *Xinwenhua cishu* 新文化辭書 [An Encyclopedic Dictionary of New Knowledge] (Shanghai: The Commercial Press, 1939 [1923]). Tang spent sixty-three pages explaining Buddhism in contrast to twenty pages on Kroptokin; thirteen pages on Henri Bergson and idealism, respectively; thirteen pages on Hans Driesch (1867–1941)—a renowned biologist turned philosopher who promoted "autonomy of life" theories; seven pages on guild socialism; four and a half pages on Darwinism, individualism, Nikolai Lenin, and materialism, respectively; two pages on humanism, empiricism, John Dewey, doctrine of social contract, Rudolf Christoph Eucken, and materialist conception of history (Karl Marx), respectively; one and a half pages on communism, evolutionism, and Karl Marx, respectively. The popularity of this dictionary can be attested by its frequent reprints. It was first printed in October 1923, then reprinted in March 1924. We do not know how many more times it was reprinted before between March 1924 till September 1932. But know that it was reprinted five times between September 1932 and June 1939. Tang's goal was to provide fellow countrymen most useful knowledge (*zui youyong de zhishi* 最有用的知識), which implies that Tang viewed Buddhism "most useful knowledge." See Tang Jinggao, *Xinwenhua cishu*, 3–4. While the dictionary itself is partial in capturing the actual impact of Buddhism on the street level in the urban centers, the increasing popularity of religion-themed novels, plays, Peking Operas, and films (the most popular themes include the goddess Guanyin, the great Maudgalyayana rescuing his mother from hell, the crazy monk Jigong) since the mid-1920s displays another understudied aspect of the entanglement of Buddhism and Chinese modernity.

[2] Ying Lei, "Shadows of Karma," 18.

[3] For Anarchism's impact on Zhang Ji and Zhang Taiyan, see Peter Zarrow, *Anarchism and Chinese Political Culture*, 238–58, 45–52. For Anarchism's impact on monk Taixu, Justin Ritzinger, "The Awakening of Faith in Anarchism," 228. For the greater impact of anarchism in making society an independent category from the national politics, see Yang Nianqun, *Wusi de ling yimian*, 71–135.

the backdrop for a wide range of Chinese Buddhist engagements with sciences since the 1920s.[4] As revealed by Lü's critical analysis of Guyau, Bergson, Lipps, Pater, and his foray into Buddhism, there is a central thread guiding his navigation in the vast sea of imported and indigenous ideas: What makes a livable society and what constitutes a life worth living?

Lü was by no means unique in identifying Buddhism as the antidote of the modern crisis afflicting the globe. Rather, Lü's turn toward Yogācāra reflected a much larger trend of employing Buddhism as solutions to social problems. For example, the renowned late Qing reformer Liang Qichao (1873–1929) saw Buddhist philosophy inherited by the Chinese people as a powerful correction to the modern materialistic civilization. In his 1921 treatise on Qing scholarly trends, after identifying Buddhism as the undercurrent in late-Qing reform, Liang concluded his observation with five prophecies. The second prophecy proclaimed the inevitable revival of Buddhist philosophy in China as an effective cure for global spiritual hunger.[5] Nor was Liang alone in seeing Buddhist philosophy as a social critique of Western civilization. Japanese clerics initiated this intellectual trend in the late nineteenth century. As pointed out by Moro Shigeki, to wrestle with the post-Meiji era (1868–1911) anti-Buddhist policy, some Japanese clergy, such as Kira Kōyō 雲英晃耀 (1831–1910), Gonda Raifu 權田雷斧 (1846–1934), and Nanjō Bun'yū 南條文雄 (1849–1927), employed Buddhist logic (Skt: *hetuvidyā*; Jp: *inmyō* 因明), a branch of Yogācāra philosophy, to ensure democratic rules of discussions, to critique Christianity and Western society, and to debate governmental responsibility in solving social problems such as poverty.[6] Though shorted-lived in Japan, this movement nonetheless left an indelible mark on the rise of Buddhism late Qing China. The most relevant figure

[4] For a comprehensive review and analysis of Buddhist engagement with science, see Erik Hammerstrom, *The Science of Chinese Buddhism*. This work is organized thematically, highlighting how the meaning of Buddhism changed with their different engagements with various kinds of sciences such as physics, biology, psychology, evolutionism.

[5] Liang Qichao, "Qingdai xueshu gailun," online edition, Zhongguo zhexueshu dianzihua jihua 中国哲学书电子化计划, https://ctext.org/wiki.pl?if=gb&chapter=249202&remap=gb, accessed Feb 2019.

[6] Moro Shigeki, "Counterargument to the West: Buddhist Logicians' Criticisms of Christianity and Republicanism in Meiji Japan," *International Journal of Buddhist Thought & Culture* 27, no. 2 (2017): 181–204.

for the rise of Yogācāra is Zhang Taiyan. He revived Yogācāra as a philosophical critique of global capitalism and the social Darwinist ranking of civilizations.[7]

In the same manner, Lü's turn toward Yogācāra was animated by his hope to disrupt Darwinist competition and to search for a universal moral agency as an antidote to the raging materialism and corruption. When Lü Cheng asked Li Shicen to print an obscure preface by Ouyang in early 1922, he already signaled this transition from Western aesthetics to Buddhism. Ostensibly, the preface was written in 1912 for a Qing literatus turned a Pure Land Buddhist. In actuality, Ouyang used the preface as a vehicle to advance his own agenda of world renewal. Lü envisioned a new sociality in which Buddhist learning would play a central role in leading all under heaven toward liberation. For Lü and Ouyang alike, studying Buddhism is the only way

> to give full realization to the human nature of others, to give full realization to the nature of other creatures, to assist in the transformative and nourishing processes of heaven and earth, … Only with perfect truthfulness could one act in perfectly humane ways and [because of the transforming effect of such humane treatment of things in the world with which one interacts] things will be as they should.
> 盡人性, 盡物性, 贊天地之化育, … 以至誠而時措之宜.[8]

To give full realization of human nature and the nature of other creatures entails recognition of inter-relationality and an affirmation of the value of all lives and all living processes. Although Ouyang still employed the Confucian concept of heaven and earth, what he alludes to is a new framework of thinking about a livable world in terms of inter-relationality. This quest for a society-cum-relationality is why Ouyang grounded his social vision on the perfect truthfulness, which is an outcome of realizing Dao—the nature of things and the workings of heaven and earth. Despite

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[7] For Zhang Taiyuan's connection with Japanese Yogācārins, see John Jorgensen, "Indra's Network: Zhang Taiyan's Sino-Japanese Personal Networks and the Rise of Yogācāra in Modern China," in *Transforming Consciousness*, 64–99. For an in-depth analysis of Zhang's employment of Yogācāra to critique colonial modernity, see Viren Murthy, *The Political Philosophy of Zhang Taiyan*.

[8] Yao Binbin, "1921–22," 334–35. This preface was published in February 1922 *Minduo* 3 no. 2. The preface itself was written in 1912 at the request of Zhou Bangdao 周邦道 a famous educator in Republican China and in Taiwan after 1949, see, "Jinyin Wuliangshou jing qixinlun xu er" 景印無量壽經起信論序二 [The Second Preface for Respectfully Printing *Treatise on Awakening Faith in The Sūtra of the Buddha of Infinite Life*], http://www.book853.com/wap.aspx?nid=1451&p=2&cid=124, accessed June 2016.
The quoted passage was Ouyang's rephrase of the *Doctrine of the Mean*. In my translation, I consulted Daniel Gardner's translation, see Daniel Gardner, *The Four Books* (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 2007), 123–26.

Confucian terminologies, Ouyang valued the Buddhist canon as the direct path to the Dao of heaven and earth because Confucian classics were too obscure and too open to interpretation.[9] In and of itself, the message in Ouyang's 1912 essay resonates with the late Qing reformers such as Kang Youwei, Zhang Taiyan, and Liang Qichao. These Qing literati considered Buddhism a philosophy best suited for resisting Western ontology and for supporting their own reformist/revolutionary agendas aimed to administer the global community of peoples and cultures.[10]

In contrast to the late Qing reformers who valued Buddhism for its philosophy, Ouyang valued Yogācāra for its soteriology. In Ouyang's new Yogācāra, epistemology and philosophy serve the goal of transforming consciousness. Consequently, Ouyang's take on Confucian tradition also fundamentally diverged from other late Qing thinkers. Ouyang attempted to reformulate a universal moral agency rooted in storehouse consciousness (Skt: *ālayavijñāna*), whereas Confucian rites and rituals serve as skill-in-means to govern the Chinese people. This 1912 essay marked one of the earliest attempts to employ Buddhism as a comprehensive moral framework to build an ideal society.[11]

Furthermore, thanks to Lü's promotion, Ouyang's old message became newly relevant and found new audiences. When Lü published Ouyang's message alongside essays about Bergsonism and other evolutionary theories in the 1922 issue of an important May Fourth journal promoting cultural renewal, *The People's Bell*, Ouyang's message gained traction. Ouyang reinvented Buddhist soteriology for freeing China from colonial intrusion. This Buddhicized path also set the stage for

[9] Yao Binbin, "1921–22," 335.

[10] For a concise analysis of late Qing reformers' use of Buddhism, see Gong Jun 龚隽, "Jindai Foxue cong jingshi dao xueshu de mingyun zouxiang" 近代佛学从经世到学术的命运走向, *Shijie zhexue* (1997 no. 5): 40–41.

[11] One may argue that Zhang Taiyan identified Yogācāra soteriology as the ultimate justification of a global order. However, Zhang and Ouyang differ in that Zhang merely uses Yogācāra framework to resist the rankings of civilizations and to put all nations and all peoples on equal footing. For Zhang, Confucianism rather than Buddhism is still the proper cultural practice for the Chinese ethnicity. For Ouyang, Buddhism and Confucianism teach the same soteriology but Buddhist scholarship is superior than Confucian learning thanks to its sophisticated philosophy, lucid logic, and rich documentations.

later renditions of Buddhicized social evolutionism.[12] It is crucial to understand that Ouyang's Yogācāra critique of social Darwinism was published in a non-Buddhist periodical where intellectuals of all ideological dispositions discussed and debated Western sciences, evolutionism, and Buddhist teachings. This shared horizon of meaning facilitated the social turn of Buddhist soteriology.

Precisely because of Ouyang's groundbreaking role in ushering in this social turn, in this chapter, I analyze Ouyang's design of the Yogācāra government. Ouyang's vision will serve as the backdrop for a deeper appreciation of Lü's ecology of compassion. The crucial difference between Ouyang's social vision and Lü's is the role of the state in the march toward emancipation. For Ouyang, the government was a necessary stage on this Buddhicized social evolution. For Lü, as I demonstrate in later chapters, the state became an undesirable remainder of this actual world ruled by Darwinist competition. Instead of a government, the key institution in actualizing Lü's revolution of consciousness was a new epistemological community governed by compassion and democracy. Throughout his life, Lü remained true to his initial interest in an aesthetic society that emerges out of the voluntary association of individuals, echoing Guyau's prophecy *l'irréligion de l'avenir*.

There are three sections in this chapter. I first map out the emergence of the Inner Learning Institute as a new center for Buddhist learning, demonstrating its inextricable interconnection with the lively international conversation about how to fashion a just society and a livable world. In this section, I examine how Ouyang's young disciples worked together to promote inner learning among the May Fourth generation. I also explain how their effort was motivated not only by the desire to strengthen China but also by the hope of making China a legitimate member in the post-WWI new world order.

In the second section, I turn my attention toward Ouyang's global vision and the international impact of his institute. I survey the most relevant articles about the institute in newspapers and

[12] For the continual Buddhist critique and engagement with various evolutionary theories, see Hammerstrom, *The Science of Chinese Buddhism*, chapter 5 "Science, Ethics and Society," 128–49. The earliest of the primary materials analyzed in Hammerstrom's book chapter dated from 1923 but most were in 1930s. My review of relevant primary materials confirmed that Ouyang's application of Buddhism as a critique of social Darwinism marked the earliest case together with Taixu's experimentations. Ouyang's and Taixu's writings set forth a new wave of redefining social evolution as spiritual progress.

periodicals from both Chinese and Japanese publishing houses and relevant memoir as well as acknowledgments of this institute in monographs by both Buddhologists and Christian missionaries. In so doing, this section illustrates 1) Ouyang's self-projection as an authoritative voice and his purposeful strategies of self-promotion around the globe and 2) the institute's increasing national and global reputation as the new authority in adjudicating authentic Buddhist texts. By foregrounding the social and political subtexts that had conditioned the making of inner learning, I demonstrate how Ouyang wrapped knowledge, power, and soteriology together and narrated an engaging Buddhist story of transforming the modern.

In the last section, I hone in on Ouyang's redefinition of Confucian governance on Yogācāra terms. I illustrate how he reinvented Buddhist spirituality to justify a Yogācāra government that incorporated democratic values such as freedom and equality into a spiritocracy, a hierarchical society that is organized according to individual spiritual advancement, and that adapts the bodhisattva path into a state's conduct of conducts. In this spiritocracy, Ouyang weaved political and scholarly ambition into one: He promoted the Inner Learning Institute as a leader both to uncover genuine soteriological message and to lead all under the heaven out of the modern crisis.

An accurate understanding of the early history of the Institute from 1918 to 1926 is not only crucial for understanding Lü's transition from aesthetics to Yogācāra but also essential to correct a prevalent misreading of this lay-led modern Yogācāra movement. Extant scholarship uncritically accepts the narrative of early promotors of Yogācāra, such as Liang Qichao and Zhang Taiyan. These Buddhist intellectuals valued Yogācāra thought for two reasons. First, this indigenous philosophy bridged the modern divide of subjective interiority and objectified self. Second, it proved useful in forging a civil religion in the service of a modern state.[13] While this portrayal is not entirely wrong, it

[13] The explicit identification of Buddhist philosophy as the Chinese counterpart of Wester philosophy seemed to begin with Liang Qichao's 1921 essay, "Qingdai xueshu gailun," https://ctext.org/wiki.pl?if=gb&chapter=249202&remap=gb.
Zhang Taiyan also employed Yogācāra to imagine a different global order outside the logic of capitalism. Although his theorization of nation-state is often contradictory, in general, Zhang considered nation a necessary stage and a natural outcome of history, see Viren Murthy, *The Political Philosophy of Zhang Taiyan*, 34.

severs Yogācāra philosophy from its soteriology and emphasizes elements that conformed to the secularist discourse. As a consequence, contemporary scholars still typecast the rise of Yogācāra as a philosophical critique of Western modernity and thereby remain blind of Yogācāra's soteriological charm that attracted some May Fourth youth under its sway.

The goal in this chapter is to restore the soteriological appeal of Yogācāra into the history of the rise of Yogācāra. Doing so will pave the way for my analysis of Lü's revolutionary project in later chapters. As I will demonstrate, for Lü, the appeal of Yogācāra lied primarily in its phenomenological naturalist description of the perceptual world, which offered him a ready-to-hand toolkit to subvert commodity fetishism and the domination of things. Re-enchanting the social oneness with a Yogācāra moral agency, Lü merged soteriology with social (r)evolution and simultaneously made an ancient tradition of idealism relevant to the world objectified by the global capital.

Despite their diverging political views, Ouyang's Yogācāra government laid the groundwork for Lü's reinvention of Yogācāra soteriology into a social revolution. My rereading of Ouyang's socio-soteriological agenda makes two historiographical interventions. First, it places the spiritual and the mythical back into the center of Chinese intellectual life. Second, it contributes to a much broader scholarly effort to rethink the place of the "irrational" in global modernity and to denaturalize the Weberian myth of disenchantment.[14]

May Fourth, Social Darwinism, and the Birth of a New Yogācāra

In this section, I analyze Ouyang's expanding intellectual network during the May Fourth. I argue that the ascendency of inner learning and their signature interpretation of Yogācāra are as much a

[14] For the central role of enchantment among the British intellectual avant-garde, see Owen, *The Place of Enchantment*. For a similar analysis of the centrality of esotericism in the American modern intellectual life, see John Lardas Modern, *Secularism in Antebellum America: With Reference to Ghosts, Protestant Subcultures, Machines, and their Metaphors; Featuring Discussions of Mass Media, Moby-Dick, Spirituality, Phrenology, Anthropology, Sing Sing State Penitentiary, and Sex with the New Motive Power* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2011). For an in-depth analysis of the rise of this myth of disenchantment, its relation to folklorist such as James Frasier, as well as the Frankfort School's and the Vienna Circle's entanglement with magical thinking and the paranormal, see Jason Ā. Josephson-Storm, *The Myth of Disenchantment: Magic, Modernity, and the Birth of the Human Sciences* (Chicago; London: University of Chicago Press, 2017).

legitimate offspring of the May Fourth intellectual ferment as a fruition of Buddhist seeds sowed by Yang Wenhui. The May Fourth intellectual tide not only proved a fertile ground for sprouting this new profession of Buddhist learning but also gave it its distinctive newness: an interpretative authority grounded in both rigorous methodology and ascetic achievement, outside the control of both the state and the monastic establishment.

Along with realism and scientism, May Fourth set in motion a new tide of methodological reflections and epistemological innovations. Although scientism was undoubtedly the mainstream, its eliding of the human agency also stirred up oppositions. Many thinkers strived to bridge realism and idealism and harked back to both Confucian and Buddhist thoughts for inspiration to acquire new tools for living in a scientific world.[15] As has been demonstrated in the debate about Bergsonism in the previous chapter, many reformers were simultaneously active in both the so-called mainstream "science" and its alleged opposites. A central thread that united these diverse streams of thought was the shared goal of making China a respectable member of a just global community.[16] It was in this highly fluid intellectual terrain that Ouyang's combination of evidential research method with his interest in Indian origins gained its reputation as a new approach to Buddhist studies.[17]

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[15] For new forms of poetry advocated by "Old School" poets, see Jon Kowalls, *The Subtle Revolution: Poets of the "Old School" during Late Qing and Early Republican China* (Berkeley: Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, 2006). Note that Ouyang was friend with many Old School poets such as Chen Sanli (1853–1937) who was known as an advocate and leader of the 1898 Hundred Days' Reform. For the 1920s revival of Chinese Vitalism, see Chang Ku-ming, "Ceaseless Generation." New Confucianism was also a significant counter current. The literature is too vast to summarize here. For a brief analysis of New Confucianism and the May Fourth, see Shan Shilian, "May Fourth, the New Confucianism, and the Modernization of Humanity," *Chinese Studies in Philosophy* 24, no. 3 (Spring 1993): 25–40.

[16] Indeed, in the mid-1920s, even avid supporters of science such as Yang Xingfo aimed to use science to build a civil society in China under the rubric of a scientific internationalism. See Wang Zuoyue, "Saving China through Science: The Science Society of China, Scientific Nationalism, and Civil Society in Republican China," *Orsiris* 17 (2002): 299, 318.

[17] For an in-depth analysis of Ouyang's innovative use of evidential research in studying Buddhist texts and its indebtedness to the late-Qing evidential research movement, see Eyal Aviv, "Differentiating the Pearl from the Fisheye: Ouyang Jingwu and the Revival of Scholastic Buddhism" (PhD Diss., Harvard University, 2009), 27, 67, and 97–118. For the most comprehensive treatment of the Qing evidential research in English, see Benjamin Elman, *From Philosophy to Philology: Intellectual and Social Aspects of Change in Late Imperial China* (Los Angeles: UCLA Asian Pacific Monograph Series, 2001).

Equally important, Ouyang's erudition in Yogācāra and his doctrinal innovation only became known to the May Fourth generation because his young disciples such as Lü Cheng and Wang Enyang 王恩洋 (1896–1964) vigorously promoted him in the student circles. They praised Ouyang's writings in May Fourth periodicals. They also introduced Ouyang's Yogācāra to their fellow students. They further wrote articles in student newspapers to promote Ouyang's inner learning.

The timeline of Ouyang's rise to fame as a May Fourth thinker is as follows. As early as 1912, Ouyang already put forth his vision of using Buddhist soteriology to transform this world, which Lü republished in 1922's *The People's Bell* alongside essays about evolutionary theories. In 1914, when Ouyang established his research department to implement his plan to use Buddhist canon to reach the Dao, it was merely a subdivision of the Jinling Sūtra Press and a continuation of Yang Wenhui's 1910 Buddhist Research Society (Foxue yanjiu hui 佛學研究會). Although Ouyang was well-known to the late-Qing reformers such as Zhang Taiyan, Tan Sitong, Liang Qichao, and Zhang Ji, his innovative interpretation of Yogācāra and new research methodology remained obscure outside Yang Wenhui's social circle.

In 1918, Ouyang started to plan for the China Inner Learning Institute. He drafted a letter "Introducing the China Inner Learning Institute" and circulated it among his friends, e.g., Zhang Taiyan, Zong Yang, Chen Sanli, Shen Zengzhi, Cai Yuanpei, and other late-Qing literati. However, as made clear from the content of this letter, Ouyang aimed for a much broader audience and hoped to recruit young students.

In February 1920, invited by Wang Jiuling 王九齡 (1879–1951), a politician in Yunnan 雲南 Province, Ouyang went to Yunnan for public fundraising. This trip marked Ouyang's first opportunity to preach his new vision of a global Dharma to a student group. However, what enabled this trip was still Ouyang's old intellectual circle. The sponsor Wang Jiuling was a former student of Gui Bohua 桂伯華 (1869–1915). They had studied together under Yang Wenhui. Ouyang's aim was two-fold: fundraising and recruiting students to join his new institute. In December 1919, the tenth issue of a lesser-known periodical, *Noble Will* (*Shangzhi* 尚志), circulated in Kunming 昆明, Yunnan, Ouyang published his letter, introducing the Inner Learning Institute to the May Fourth generation. *Noble*

Will was a typical May Fourth periodical. It not only introduced and commented on *New Youth* and similar writings on democracy, science, and John Dewey's lectures but also introduced the 1917 Russian Revolution, commented on WWI, introduced Woodrow Wilson's famous September 1919 speech on self-determination together with republications of essays by leading Marxist advocates such as Li Dazhao. Lü Cheng accompanied Ouyang on this trip in February 1920. However, Ouyang could neither raise enough money nor garner students' interest. Later that year, Lü left Ouyang and joined Liu Haisu's Shanghai Art Academy in September 1920.[18]

Ouyang's fate changed drastically in March 1922, mostly thanks to Lü Cheng's effort. Recall that Lü first published his critique of Bergsonism in December 1921 in the special issue on Bergson in *The People's Bell*. In the next issue of *The People's Bell*, in February 1922, Li Shicen published Lü's critique of Zhang Taiyan's reading of Bergson together with Ouyang's 1912 preface. Then in March 1922, *The People's Bell* republished a lecture note by Ouyang titled "Bauddha Dharma is neither Religion nor Philosophy."[19] This was a lecture Ouyang had delivered in the Association of Philosophical Studies (Zhexue yanjiu hui 哲學研究會) in the Nanjing Advanced Normal School (Nanjing gaodeng shifan xuexiao 南京高等師範學校) earlier that year. The lecture notes were recorded then amended by another Ouyang's disciple, Wang Enyang. Wang first published the essay, entitled "Mr. Ouyang Explains Buddhism" in the school's student publication, *Journal of Literature and Philosophy* (*Wenzhe xuebao* 文哲學報).[20] Unsurprisingly, this student journal was also a product of the May Fourth. It aimed to rectify some of the overstatements of the Westernization discourse by establishing a nonsectarian research institute.[21] In the same journal, Wang Enyang also republished Ouyang's 1918 introductory essay to the China Inner Learning Institute. Despite Wang Enyang's promotion, the impact of publications in this student periodical was minimal. Ouyang's message

[18] For the recount of this fundraising trip, see Lü, "My Autobiography," 78.

[19] Ouyang, "Fofa fei zongjiao fei zhexue" 佛法非宗教非哲學, *Minduo* 3 no.3 (March 1st, 1922): 1–16. See also the online edition http://www.guoxue123.com/new/0002/bfehyx/002.htm. Accessed July 2018–June 2019.

[20] Ouyang Jingwu, "Ouyang Jingwu xiansheng shuo fofa" 歐陽竟無先生說佛法, recorded by Wang Enyang 王恩洋, *Wenzhe xuebao* 文哲學報 1 (March 1922): 1–24.

[21] *Wenzhe xuebao* 文哲學報, "Fakan yaozhi" 发刊要旨 [Essential Goals for Issuing this Periodical], *Wenzhe xuebao* 1 (March 1922): preface.

gained traction only after the editor of *The People's Bell*, Li Shicen, requested Wang Enyang for the right to republish the lecture note.[22]

Ouyang's lecture note is essential for understanding Ouyang's proposal of a global Bauddha Dharma (*shijie fofa* 世界佛法). In this lecture, Ouyang put forth his critique of Western philosophy and religion and proclaimed that "Bauddha Dharma (Fofa 佛法) is neither religion nor philosophy but what this world (*shijie* 世界) needs now." Thanks to the broader readership of *The People's Bell*, Ouyang became better known to the May Fourth generation.

The other pieces published in the same issue of *The People's Bell* is also essential to understand the new relevance of Ouyang's old message. From December 1921 to December 1922, *The People's Bell* published five issues, including one special issue of Bergsonism and then two special issues of evolutionism. Ouyang's lecture notes were published after the Bergson issue and before the first issue of evolutionism. All in all, Ouyang's essay was published alongside other essays on Bergson's creative evolution or other evolutionary theories, including introductions of technical issues such as genetic mutation and the Baldwin effect (the effect of learned behavior on biological evolution).

When properly contextualized, Ouyang's inner learning provided a compelling alternative to Western evolutionary theories, Bergsonian vitalism, and Chinese indigenous vitalism. In Ouyang's critique of religion and philosophy, one finds many echoes of Lü's critiques of Bergson. For example, Ouyang interpreted the natural world as the seen part (*xiangfen* 相分) of the storehouse consciousness and stated that the real causes of the vast transformations in the seen part are causal fruition of seeds stored in the storehouse consciousness. Further, in the latter half of the essay that is edited by Wang Enyang and approved by Ouyang, one also finds a critique of Bergsonian intuition as anti-scientific, arbitrary (*wuduan* 武斷), and subjective (*duduan* 獨斷). Ouyang stated that this arbitrary and subjective intuition would eventually lead to philosophical solipsism. Ouyang defined solipsism as a theory that denies everything external but confirms everything internal to oneself (*yu*

[22] In fact, Liang Shuming was also quite actively promoting Ouyang's teachings around the same. But it is difficult to pinpoint the timeline and content of Liang and Li's interactions.

waiwu ze yiqie jie fei, yu ziwo ze yiqie jie shi 于外物则一切皆非, 于自我则一切皆是). It is also important to note that the version of Buddhism advocated by Ouyang was the Chinese transmission Yogācāra and its causal enframing of consciousness-only.[23] Ouyang promoted Yogācāra causal enframing, which explains all worldly phenomena in terms of the functioning of agentive karmic seeds in the storehouse consciousness, as the only antidote to remedy the two dangerous extremes: 1) realism as embodied in science and social Darwinism and 2) philosophical solipsism as embodied in Bergsonian creative evolution and Confucian vitalism. When contextualized within the global flow of evolutionary theories, it becomes clear that Ouyang targeted the May Fourth youth who both welcomed new research methods and yet remained suspicious of Westernization. Ouyang's 1912 message proved attractive to many May Fourth youth who sought to rectify the social vices through deep learning and rigorous scholarship.[24]

Indeed, the appeal of Ouyang's socio-soteriological vision among the May Fourth youth since March 1922 played a vital role in the eventual establishment of the Institute in July 1922. While a causal relationship is difficult to establish, there was a noticeable increase in fundraising and meetings about the Institute since March 1922. Furthermore, the opening of the Institute subsequently provided Ouyang an influential platform to deliver his renowned lecture series in September 1922. In these lectures, Ouyang distinguished the synonymous terms of Dharmalakṣaṇa and Vijñānamātra in premodern China into two separate doctrinal systems, where Dharmalakṣaṇa denoted a systematized doctrinal whole from Vijñaptimātra that consisted of profound teachings of the truth of consciousness-only.

Although many scholars have correctly identified this series as a watershed moment in the modern Yogācāra movement, they failed to identify the link between the rise of Ouyang's new Yogācāra and the May Fourth quest for an alternative to social Darwinism. As the above timeline indicates, Ouyang's new Yogācāra only reached out to the May Fourth Youth after sustained

[23] Ouyang, "Fofa fei zongjiao fei zhexue," 1.

[24] In addition to lectures among university students and fund-raising trips among rich merchants and political progressives, Ouyang also taught in summer camps. However, his thick Jiangxi accent might have prevented him from gaining sway among students.

promotion by a few of Ouyang's dedicated young disciples. Indeed, Wang Enyang himself also considered Ouyang's institute a legitimate heir of the May Fourth spirit. According to Wang, the reputation of the institute became established thanks to the new intellectual tide of the May Fourth.[25] More importantly, situating Ouyang Jingwu and the renowned May Fourth writer Lu Xun in the same constellation of thought, one could readily identify a shared horizon of concern where Ouyang's message found a receptive audience.[26] In short, Yogācāra became newly relevant in the May Fourth era because Ouyang's new vision offered a powerful Chinese rejoinder to the global sway of scientism and evolutionism.

Toward A Global Dharma

This global outlook was inherent in the Buddhist genes of inner learning, reaching back to Yang Wenhui. In his Jetavana Hermitage, the first modern educational institute for both clergy and laity, Yang Wenhui planned to use English as the common language for combining Sanskrit and Chinese Buddhist teachings in the curriculum and thereby connecting the Indian past with the Chinese present.[27] Further, Yan aimed to invigorate (*zhenxing* 振興) instead of reviving Buddhism. The critical difference between "invigorate" and "revive" is the global outlook: For Yang, to invigorate Buddhism meant to make Buddhism a first-rate religion in the globe.[28]

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[25] The key figure in attracting attention from these social elite seemed to be Huang Shuyin, a student turned Sanskrit teacher and translator in Peking University at the time. According to Wang Enyang's memorial in 1925 (published in 1926 *Neixue* 內學[Inner Learning] 3, 175–76), only after Huang's avid promotion of Ouyang's teaching did both Liang Qichao and Liang Shumin notice the significance of Ouyang's new Yogācāra. Huang Shuyin also inspired Wang Enyang and many other intellectuals to join the institute and Liang Shumin played a key role in the famous New Confucian scholar Xiong Shili to join the cause.

[26] Ying Lei, "Shadows of Karma," 146–67. Ying Lei is not along in taking seriously Buddhist figures as key players in the intellectual life of modern China. Pacey Scott also examined the significance of monk Taixu as an "republican-era thinker." Pacey Scott, "Taixu, Yogācāra, and the Buddhist Approach to Modernity," in *Transforming Consciousness*, 169–70.

[27] Yang Wenhui, "Zhihuan Jingshe kaixue ji" 祇洹精舍開學記, in *Yang Renshan quanji* 楊仁山全集(Hefei: Huangshan Shushe, 2000), 338.

[28] Yang Wenhui, "Zhina fojiao zhenxing ce er" 支那佛教振興策二, in *Yang Renshan quanji*, 333. For Yang's global vision, see also Li Silong 李四龙, "A'erge'er kao: Yang Wenhui de hongfa linian yu guoji shiye" 阿尔格尔考:杨文会的弘法理念与国际视野 [A Study of Henry Olcott: Yang Wenhui's Ideas of Dharma Propagation and His International Perspective], *Shijie zongjiao yanjiu* 2010 (03): 36–45, 194. It is important to note that Yang consistently used "invigorate" instead of "revive" to characterize his project. Invigorate is the same verb he used to describe the rise of Western nation-states and their ensuing

Furthermore, one must recognize that this global vision was firmly grounded in Yang's soteriological agenda. Yang Wenhui started the Jinling Sūtra Press in the wake of the Taiping Rebellion (1850–1864).[29] Taiping Rebellion was a Christianity-inspired uprising that destroyed many Buddhist temples and almost wiped out the Buddhist presence in South China. To mourn the war dead and reestablish Buddhist communal life, the first Buddhist texts Yang printed and circulated were ritual manuals such as the *Water-Land Repentance Ritual* (*Shuilu yigui* 水陸儀軌) for appeasing the dead and releasing the hungry ghost from suffering.[30] Ritual texts occupy a vital place in Jinling Sūtra Press' catalog despite later additions of more philosophical and doctrinal oriented sūtras and treatises. One of the central features of the *Water-Land Repentance Ritual* is that it aims to release all sentient beings from suffering without discrimination. This non-discriminative attitude toward visible or invisible beings later adopted a global turn in Yang's education project. In his writings, Yang commented on the global appeal of Henry Olcott's (1832–1907) Theosophy. Note that, by 1907, Olcott's famous pamphlet *The Buddhist Catechism* that has gone through the 40th edition and has been translated into multiple languages. Excited by Olcott's success, Yang commented that Buddhism was probably the only religion that could spread around the world without causing any controversy.

Equally important, inherent in Yang's global vision is a conviction that only Buddhism could lead the world out of the war and calamity brought forth by Western modernity. Yang's vision resonated strongly with the view of Japanese Buddhist resident students in South Asia like Kawaguchi Ekai 河口慧海 (1866–1945) and Kimura Nichiki 木村日紀 (1882–1965). These two thinkers frequently exchanged their ideas with advocates of the Indian Independence movement.

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domination of the world. Using the same verb to describe the future rise of Buddhism with the rise of nation-states further highlights Yang's global vision.

[29] Wu, Yankang, "Yang Renshan and the Jinling Buddhist Press,"*The East Asian Library Journal* 12, no. 2 (2006): 49–98.

[30] Marnyi Gyatso, "Hidden Stories on the Sūtra-blocks of the Jinling Buddhist Press," manuscript in preparation, private conversation with the author. The *Water-Land Ritual Manual* was edited by the Ming monk Ouyi Zhixu, now included in CBETA, X74.1497. Marnyi's study reveals that, from 1866 till the 1880s, Yang and his collaborator in Yangzhou Sūtra Press printed and circulated thirty-four ritual manuals, many of which were not included in later especially post-1949 catalogues of the Jinling Sūtra Press.

They were predisposed with an anti-colonial attitude in their effort to build stronger transnational solidarity grounded in Asian spirituality against the West.[31] Similarly, Timothy Richard, Yang's collaborator who translated the influential Chinese Mahāyāna treatise *Treatise on the Awakening of Faith in the Mahāyāna* (*Dacheng qixin lun* 大乘起信論, T1666; henceforth, the *Awakening Faith*) into English, promoted a united religion in which Chinese Buddhism would have a legitimate seat as a "higher Buddhism" alongside the so-called original Buddhism practiced in Southeast Asia.[32] All these strands of globalism informed Yang's project. Framing the future of the globe in terms of Buddhist cosmology, he described endless cycles of calamity and peace caused by the rise and fall of the human population.[33] The only path to escape this endless cycle, Yang prophesied, would be a global Buddhism.

Both Taixu and Ouyang carried on this dream of curing worldly sufferings with a global Dharma. Ouyang experimented with his new species of learning as early as 1914 when he established a research department in the Jinling Sūtra Press. Nevertheless, both Ouyang's and Taixu's dreams of Buddhicizing the globe only became recognized outside the immediate Buddhist circles and gained traction in the wake of the May Fourth Movement.[34] As I demonstrate below, Ouyang's cosmopolitan thinking not only aimed to challenge the linguistic hierarchies constructed by Buddhologists but also became an effective means of producing cultural capital both within Chinese Buddhist communities and in the cultural restoration movement spearheaded by Rabindranath Tagore (1861–1941). By proffering a Chinese version of global Buddhist history, Ouyang convinced many of his Chinese compatriots that the Institute was a legitimate heir of genuine Indian Buddhism. In this way, Ouyang not only actualized Yang Wenhui's dream of integrating the Indian past with the Chinese present but also ensured that Chinese civilization would occupy a legitimate seat in a global Buddhist future.

[31] Richard Jaffe, Seeking Śākyamuni: South Asia in the formation of modern Japanese Buddhism (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2019), 17.

[32] Lai Pan-Chiu, "Timothy Richard's Buddhist-Christian Studies," *Buddhist-Christian Studies* 29 (2009): 23–38.

[33] Yang Wenhui, "Guan weilai" 觀未來, in in *Yang Renshan Quanji*, 330–31.

[34] Taixu's cosmopolitan thinking was still guided by Buddhist cosmology, for detailed analysis of its rise during the May Fourth era and the shifting meanings of Taixu's cosmopolitanism, see Justin Ritzinger, *Anarchy in the Pure Land*, 120–33.

Ouyang posited that, because of the successful Chinese translation enterprise that preserved the precious teachings of the Buddha and because Chinese people always valued the universal humanity embodied in the Bauddha Dharma, Chinese culture was a worthy member of the global community of civilizations. Rather than a return to Indic root, Ouyang looked back at India to move forward into a new era of Buddhist cosmopolitanism.

Regrettably, studies of May Fourth internationalism tend to focus on cosmopolitan thoughts thriving in the new literature movements and international diplomacy. The appeal of religious internationalism and multiculturalism is often overlooked.[35] Unsurprisingly, rarely any scholar has paid attention to the salient cosmopolitanism in Ouyang's Buddhist scholarship. By contextualizing a serious engagement with the consciousness-only theory alongside revolutionary understandings of rationality and civil society, I demonstrate below how a so-far overlooked enchanted global vision thrived in the intellectual life of modern China.

The Missionary Intent

Yang Wenhui only dreamed of spreading Buddhism around the globe. Despite his efforts, all his institutional-building initiatives were abortive. Riding on the tide of May Fourth, where Yang failed, Ouyang succeeded. Ouyang not only implemented Yang's global-soteriological vision but also simultaneously established his own brand of Buddhist learning, i.e., inner learning, as the concrete embodiment of Yang's global Buddhism.

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[35] For international thinking in diplomacy and politics, see, for example Guoqi, Xu "Nationalism, Internationalis, and National Identity, China from 1895 to 1919," *in Chinese Nationalism in Perspective: Historical and Recent Cases*, ed. C.X. George Wei and Xiaoyuan Liu, (Westport; London: Greenwood Press, 2001), 101–20. For John Dewey's role in introducing and explaining international politics after WWI, see Barry C. Keenan, *The Dewey Experiment in China*, 132–35. For internationalism and cosmopolitanism in May Fourth literature, see for example, Merle Goldman, ed., *Modern Chinese Literature in the May Fourth Era* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1977); Shu-mei Shih, *The Lure of the Modern: Writing Modernism in Semicolonial China, 1917–1937* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001), 96–109. For cosmopolitan thinking and its role in the rise of communism, see for example, Xiaoming Chen, *From the May Fourth Movement to Communist Revolution: Guo Moruo and the Chinese Path to Communism* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2007); Feigon Lee, *Chen Duxiu, Founder of the Chinese Communist Party* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983).

Ouyang's Inner Learning Institute materialized Yang's soteriological aspiration. In his 1918 fundraising letter, Ouyang identified the root suffering of the modern world as the absence of learning, which led to four difficulties: the lack of an entrance (Dharma gate), the lack of trustworthy texts, the difficulty of interpretation, and the difficulty of learning foreign languages. Furthermore, Ouyang proclaimed that, to alleviate these sufferings, the institute must engage in a two-pronged endeavor: the enterprise (*shi* 事) and the learning (*xue* 學). In one short letter, Ouyang merged soteriology with learning and offered his brand of inner learning as the only antidote to the modern crisis.

To actualize this global-soteriological mission, in 1922 when the institute opened its gate, Ouyang added a third office—the Office of Collation, Edition, and Circulation (Bianjiao liutong chu 編校流通處). More importantly, this new office now functioned as a central link between the Office of Learning (Xue wu chu 學務處) and the Office of Enterprise (Shi wu chu 事務處), see Chart 1 below. Businesses classified under this new office included collation (*jiaokan* 校勘) and edition (*bianzhuan* 編纂), which actually entails comparing and editing texts using Qing evidential and Buddhological methods. Under this newly added third office, Ouyang also established an independent branch of circulation (*liutong* 流通). This circulation branch is a missionary enterprise. Ouyang hoped to proselytize through scholarly edited texts and alleviate the second difficulty stemming from the suffering of the absence of learning.

With this new Office of Collation, Edition, and Circulation as the linchpin between learning and enterprise, Ouyang also reclassified the businesses conducted by the Office of Learning and the Office of Enterprise. This institutional reshuffle further merged scholarly learning and soteriology into one mission. Under the Office of Learning, other than the sub-office for general affairs, the first branch was the research department. This research department was followed by a public lecture department, a library, the department of sūtra printing, and the department of publishing. What went

missing here was the originally-planned middle school and college.[36] With an exception for the research department, all other branches used to belong to enterprise in the 1918 blueprint. In 1922, by reshuffling all institutional branches related to knowledge production and dissemination under the Office of Learning, Ouyang gave his Buddhist scholarship an institutional home. Under the Office of Enterprise, there were no longer practice and training centers that separated scholarship from practice and meditation. Instead, the sub-office of general affairs under the Office of Enterprise was concerned with the construction of dorms and lecture halls. Other branches of the Office of Enterprise were concerned with the financial and reputational survival of the institute: fundraising, accounting, official record-keeping, and the department of communication. In short, the Office of Learning is the intellectual home of inner learning, while the Office of Enterprise ensures the material existence of this Institute. Moreover, the Office of Collation, Edition, and Circulation links both offices together to carry on the Institute's mission of transforming the globe.

The vigor of this new office should not be underestimated. By 1924, when the first issue of *Inner Learning* was published, the Department of Collation boasted of collating more than fifty kinds (more than four hundred fascicles) of ancient texts. The Department of Edition finished editing fifty fascicles of commentary on Xuanzang's *Cheng weishi lun* 成唯識論 (*Treatise for Establishing* Consciousness-only; henceforth: *Establishing Consciousness-only*). In Ouyang's blueprint, both accomplishments directly addressed the difficulty due to the lack of access to authentic texts. The Department of Circulation reported the establishment of both a branch inside the Institute and a new circulation center in Shanghai. Together with the Office of Learning, which now had absorbed research, public lecture, library (whose main task was securing the Pāli canon and Tibetan canon for research purposes), and publishing, Ouyang's institute unquestionably put scholarship at the heart of its mission.

[36] This may not be an intentional omission. Most likely it was due to financial difficulties in running a middle school and college at the same time. Nevertheless, the fact that Ouyang preserved the research department reveals to us that the core of his project was in scholarship.

At first sight, this intentional foregrounding of scholarship may fit perfectly into the secularization discourse. However, if secularization is understood as a promotion of knowledge at the expense of religious truth, then Ouyang's inner learning does not fit. On the contrary, for Ouyang, scholarship was the chief means to promote the Buddhist truth. In his 1918, Ouyang redefined inner learning as an antidote to the worldly sufferings. Furthermore, in his 1912 preface, which was republished in *The People's Bell* in 1922, Ouyang asserted that the Buddhist canon was the only reliable way to reach Dao. As such, it becomes evident that this Office of Collation, Edition, and Circulation is an institution for advancing his soteriological mission.

To spread this global Dharma, Ouyang also initiated frequent contacts with the Buddhological and Sinological centers around the world. Without international recognition, Ouyang, as a layman outside the monastic establishment and political power center, would not be able to build up the interpretative authority and to produce authoritative editions of Buddhist texts. Therefore, in addition to the circulation department under the new third office, Ouyang also added a department of communication under the Office of Enterprise. The purpose of this branch was to "conducting liaisons with international (outside China) Buddhist learning centers."[37] In addition, one of its first tasks was to prepare for the Japanese *Hossō shū* [Dharmalakṣaṇa school] monk Saeki Jōin's (1867–1952) visit. Note that, Saeki Jōin's disciple Hashimoto Gyōin (1897–1978) who presumably visited the institute together with his master in 1924, discussed Tibetan texts with Lü Cheng and credited Lü for his help.[38] Other activities of this department included sending out the first issue of *Inner Learning* to French, Japanese, and other Buddhological centers, which triggered many exchanges of scholarly monographs among the institute and other academic institutions.[39]

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[37] Anonymous, *Inner Learning* 1 (1924): 4.

[38] Gao Shanshan 高山杉, "Waiguo zhexuejia he zongjiaojia bixia de zhina neixueyuan" 外国哲学家和宗教学家笔下的支那内学院, *Shijie zhexue* 2006 (3): 71. Hashimoto Gyōin was often called the last "anomalous monk" in the twentieth century 20 for being celibate and keeping a vegetarian diet, going against the tide of *Nikujiki Saidai* 肉食妻帯 [Eat meat and marry] among post Meiji Japanese clergies. For the politics behind the spread of this practice in modern Japan, see Richard Jaffe, *Neither Monk nor Layman: Clerical Marriage in Modern Japanese Buddhism* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001).

[39] Anonymous, "Liaisons with International Buddhist learning centers" 對於國外佛學界之交際, *Inner Learning* 2 (1925): 7.

The term I have been translating as "Buddhist learning" (*foxue* 佛學) is also important to keep in mind. The double meaning of *foxue* enabled Ouyang to straddle two worlds: the academic and the soteriological. A more proper interpretation of *foxue* should be Buddhology because this was the European and Japanese mainstream of Buddhist studies at the time, and Ouyang indeed considered his project integral to this global scholarly community. However, for a Chinese reader not familiar with European academic practices, this term served to Sinicize Buddhology and turned it into Ouyang's inner learning. This Sinicized meaning, as presented in Ouyang's own preface to the first issue of *Inner Learning*, stood in stark contrast with secular experience and knowledge (*shisu xianzheng* 世俗現證). For Ouyang, secular experience and knowledge included logical analysis, understanding the causal connections of things in flux, and empirical observation of nature. Sinicized Buddhology, which Ouyang termed inner learning, embodied the ultimate realization (*shengyi xianzheng* 勝義現證). For Ouyang, this ultimate realization relied on direct experience and promised to release all beings from suffering.[40] This double meaning is crucial for establishing the independence of the Institute: Buddhist learning as Buddhology enables it to claim independence from the monastics; and Buddhist learning as inner learning enables it to claim independence from the state.

This double meaning of *foxue* also underpins Ouyang's claim of being neither secular nor religious. In an August 15, 1925 letter to Zhang Xingyan (1881~1973), Ouyang criticized science as mere wisdom without compassion and religion as mere compassion without wisdom and lauded Buddhism as having both.[41] The root of this critique already appeared in his July 1923 speech, which Ouyang delivered at the first research conference in the institute. In this speech, he urged his students to engage in proper research, namely, "research after the conclusion." He later elaborated that research should serve to justify universal Buddhist principles—impermanence, no-self, nirvāṇa, and

[40] Ouyang Jingwu, "Preface" 敘言, *Inner Learning* 1 (December 1924): opening page. Note that this was a reiteration of Yang Wenhui's point. See Yang Wenhui, "Fofa dazhi" 佛法大旨, in *Yang Wenhui quanji*, 325–26.

[41] Ouyang, "Yu Zhang Xingyan shu" 與章行嚴書, *Neixue zazhu—xia*, OJNWX 12: 1.

compassion.[42] In other words, Ouyang's new research methodologies are mere instruments for his soteriological agenda.

Subsuming Buddhology into a soteriology might seem to be a hard-sell in international Buddhological circles. However, it is well-known that Japanese Buddhology grew out of sectarianism and that the earliest generation of Japanese Buddhologists, though studying under famous European scholars such as Max Müller and Sylvain Lévi, were ordained clergies selected and supported by their respective sects.[43] Moreover, many of the Western religious studies scholars such as Clarence Hamilton and James Pratt were devout Christians themselves. As pointed out by James Turner and other historians, the birth of religious studies as a discipline was partially propelled by the need to enhance the persuasive power of Christianity or to perfect Christianity by accentuating universal elements of religion common to all people.[44] Therefore, marketing scholarship for its potential to transform society would not be too out of the line to those inclined to see religion playing a more prominent role in public life. At the very least, it might allow individual scholars to value the findings of Ouyang's institute. As carefully documented by Gao, this impression partially captured what had happened. Many scholars such as Ui Hakuju, Hamilton, and Pratt, together with Christian missionaries such as Karl Ludvig Reichelt, viewed Ouyang's institute as purely intellectual and not religious. They labeled it as "intellectual," "better-educated," and "the foremost school of Chinese

[42] Ouyang Jingwu, "Zhina Neixueyuan yanjiuhui kaihui ci" 支那內學院研究會開會辭 [The Opening Speech for the Research Workshop of the China Inner Learning Institute], *Inner Learning* 1 (December 1924): 1–2. The talk was delivered in July 1923.

[43] Indeed, the editors and project managers of the Taishō canon such as Nanjō Bunyū and Takakusu Junjirō were all deeply religious men. The university established by Takakusu, Musashino University (Musashino daigaku 武蔵野大学) in Japan today is still steeped in a religious message about bringing forth world peace, https://www.musashino-u.ac.jp/.

[44] James Turner, Religion Enters the Academy: The Origins of the Scholarly Study of Religion in America (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2011), 56. See also D. G. Hart, The University Gets Religion: Religious Studies in American Higher Education (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999) and Murray G. Murphey, "On the Scientific Study of Religion in the United States, 1870–1980," in Religion and Twentieth-Century American Intellectual Life, ed. Michael J. Lacey (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 136–71. For the birth of religious studies in European countries, see for example, David Chidester, *Empire of Religion: Imperialism and Comparative Religion* (Chicago; London: The University of Chicago Press, 2014) and Tomoko Masuzawa, *The Invention of World Religions, or, How European Universalism Was Preserved in the Language of Pluralism* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2005).

textual scholarship in this field." The connotations of these labels are that the institute is either too elitist to be suitable to the Chinese populace or impossible to thrive in China due to its lack of "religious zeal and warmth."[45] This impression of Ouyang's scholarship as intellectual and academic is carried over into the foundation of Chinese Buddhist studies. Homes Welch, in his classic 1968 monograph, characterized Ouyang as a representative of the new trends: anti-superstition, anti-ritual, anti-idol, and shifting "from sutras to treatises, from devotions to research, from the religious to the secular."[46] However, a closer analysis of these materials reveals more about the unreflexively secular attitude of these foreign observers. Their preconceived conceptions of "religion" and "scholarship" prevented them from comprehending Ouyang's integration of textual study with religiosity, as embodied in the double meaning of *foxue.*[47]

In short, the double meaning of *foxue* allowed Ouyang to present his institute as one of China's new Buddhological centers to Japanese and European academia and won the Institute qualified

[45] Gao Shanshan's article provides a quite comprehensive list of contemporaneous English and Japanese comments on the Institute. See Gao, "Waiguo zhexuejia," 63–72. But I disagree with Gao's reading of these materials.

[46] Welch, The Buddhist Revival in China, 120.

[47] For example, immediately following Reichelt's comment on the scholarly quality of Ouyang's institute, he commented on its obvious lack of "religious zeal and warmth" and lack of "regular worship." See Karl Ludvig Reichelt and Kathrina Van Wagenen Bugge, *Truth and Tradition In Chinese Buddhism: A Study of Chinese Mahayana Buddhism*, (Shanghai, China: The Commercial Press, 1927), 301. Both statements read quite strange, given Ouyang's pronounced soteriological zeal. As for the lack of "regular worship" reported by Reichelt, I suspect it is due to his limited visit time and a different (and I dare to say more "secularized") definition of religiosity. As mentioned in the last page of the "Admission Guide" 招生簡章 appended to the Institute's letter published in the January 10th 1921's *Sound of the Tide*, "every Sunday all students and teachers are expected to gather together in the Dharma Hall for a communal ritual, whose format will be stipulated in detail elsewhere." For reference, see, "Zhina Neixueyuan laihan zhaodeng" 支那內學院來函照登 [Reprint of the Letter from the China Inner Learning Institute], *Haichaoyin* 2, no. 1 (January 10, 1921): 12. Similarly, James Bissett Pratt lauded the scholarly tenor of Ouyang's institute, but commented that compared with Ouyang's "purely intellectual" pursuit, monk Taixu is "both scholar, thinker, and mystic." See, James Bissett Pratt, *The Pilgrimage of Buddhism and a Buddhist Pilgrimage* (New York: Macmillan, 1928), 387–88. The only exception might be Clarence Hamilton, who in his preface valued the institute as "the foremost school of Chinese textual scholarship in this field" without any further qualifications, see Vasubandhu, Xuanzang, and Clarence Herbert Hamilton, *Wei Shih Er Shih Lun … Or, The Treatise in Twenty Stanzas on Representation-Only*, (New Haven, Conn.: American Oriental Society, 1938), 5. Nonetheless, Reichelt, Pratt, and Hamilton all measured the Institute with their own perceptions of religion and scholarship and thereby only paid attention to the Institute's scholarly activities and ignored the religious aspects.

respect among international scholars.[48] Furthermore, it also enabled Ouyang to straddle two worlds. On the one hand, Ouyang could stake his claim of being authentically Buddhist. On the other hand, he could import Western Buddhological methods and dismiss Chinese Buddhist hermeneutics. Nevertheless, the secular categories implicitly or explicitly used by the international observers of the Institute also effectively limited *foxue* as Buddhology and thus typecast Ouyang's Institute as a purely intellectual enterprise. This contemporaneous Western impression has occluded the soteriological motivation in Ouyang's project since its birth. My analysis in this subsection is the first step to correct this skewed understanding of modern Yogācāra.

Non-Reception in Europe and Japan

However, being labeled "purely intellectual" did not mean being taken seriously as scholars. As I demonstrate in this subsection, despite Ouyang's effort to join the international academic circles, by and large, most contemporaneous scholars of Buddhism viewed Ouyang's Institute as an initial attempt to become academic, but not there yet. Furthermore, my research discovers that only Lü's research was treated as serious Buddhological studies. Generally speaking, the Institute as a whole was not recognized as a reputable center of Buddhist studies.

This "not-there-yet" status was most prominently seen in Japanese Buddhist studies. Among the hundreds of Japanese Buddhist journals published during the 1920s and 1930s, only Takakusu Junjirō's 高楠順次郎 (1866–1945) journal—the primary advertising venue for his Taishō canon *Modern Buddhism* (Jp: *Gendai Bukkyō* 現代佛教)—regularly listed publications of *Inner Learning* and

[48]Other than the scattered mentioning of this institute in published monographs, its self-conscious international orientation could also be evidenced by the exchange of scholarly monographs and academic journals triggered by the institute's initial self-promotion (primarily by sending out the first issue of *Inner Learning* to French, Japanese, and other Buddhological centers). Today, against all odds (e.g. the burning of books during the Cultural Revolution and the well-known episode of how the Red Guards "lost" Lü Cheng's personal library and his years of research notes), in a dusty bookcase in Jinling Sūtra Press, one can still find monographs from Sasaki Gesshō 佐々木月樵, Giuseppe Tucci, and many other authors not mentioned in the second issue of *Inner Learning* as well as dictionaries, academic journals, foreign language Buddhist texts (though the Pāli and Tibetan canons are clearly acquired through the institute's own funding), though in a sorrow dilapidated state with almost indiscernible hand-written commentaries interspersed in between printed words evidencing the ghostly existence of some careful reader(s) poring over these texts in a not too distant past.

other individually printed pamphlets from the Institute under the category of "Overview of the Academia" (Jp: Gakukai zōmi 學界綜覽), a seemingly secular academic category.[49] However, a closer examination of what was included under this category reveals that this journal's definition of academia was broad. Nonacademic and religious talks, such as monk Taixu's lectures in Japan and his talks in the 1925 East Asia Buddhist Conference (Jp: Tōā Bukkyō Daikai 東亞佛教大會), were also categorized here. In another issue, where Takakusu published an overview of Chinese Buddhist publishing titled "Chinese Buddhist periodicals" (Jp: *Shina Bukkyō zashi* 支那佛教雜誌), *Inner Learning* was listed together with Taixu's *The Sound of the Tide* (*Haichoayin* 海潮音), *The Sound of the Buddha* (*Foyin* 佛音), *The Newspaper for Buddhicization* (*Fohua bao* 佛化報), *Buddhicization Weekly* (*Fohua zhoukan* 佛化周刊) and the like. Evidently, Takakusu categorized *Inner Learning* as religious rather than scholarly.[50]

To add insult to injury, among the handful writings that noted *Inner Learning*, few considered the institute a full-fledged academic enterprise. Out of the more encouraging assessments of the Institute, *Ryūkoku University Review*'s (Jp: *Ryūkoku Daigaku Ronsō* 龍谷大學論叢) reports best captured the "not-there-yet" characterization of the institute. In Tamachi Tōkō's 玉置韜晃 (1888–1953) broad-stroke summary of Buddhist associations in China, he contrasted Ouyang's institute in Nanjing with Han Qingjing's 韓清淨 (1884–1949) Association of Three Times (Sanshi xuehui 三時學會) in Peking,[51] another renowned lay-led group specializing Yogācāra studies. On the one hand, Tamachi praised Ouyang's program as the more progressive southern group. Tamachi also praised the Institute's openness toward scholarly attitude (Jp: *gakuteki no tachiba* 學的立場). On the other hand, he prophesied that it would soon outgrow the current mode of mixing Buddhology with

[49] In fact, Japanese classification of Buddhist studies is much more complex and thereby beyond the scope of this dissertation. For example, the section of "Gakugai zōmi" 學界綜覽 in *Gendai Bukkyō* 現代佛教 consistently classify Buddhism 佛教 as an independent category from both philosophy 哲學 and religion 宗教. But, in general, Japanese classification system lumps academic studies of Buddhism and Buddhist apologetics together.

[50] Anonymous, "Gakugai zōmi" 學界綜覽, *Gendai Bukkyō* 現代佛教 3 (September 1926): 80.

[51] Three Times 三時 is a special term in Dharmalakṣaṇa doctrinal system, classifying Buddhist teachings into the teaching of existence 有教 (Śrāvaka), the teaching of emptiness 空教 (Madhyamaka), and the teaching of the middle-way 中道教—Yogācāra. For details, see DDB entry "三時教判."

Buddhist commentarial tradition and develop independent research.[52] Despite its impressionistic presentation, Tamachi made it clear that Ouyang's Institute would soon produce scholars capable of independent research, but not there yet.[53]

A more strident critique of the Inner Learning Institute can be found in *Religious Studies* (Jp: *Shūkyō kenkyū* 宗教研究),[54] the official publication of Japanese Association of Religious Studies (Jp: Nihon shūkyō gakkai 日本宗教学会).[55] In a 1926 article, Satō Taijun 佐藤泰舜 first praised Ouyang's Dharmalakṣaṇa University (Faxiang daxue 法相大學) as a peak in the Chinese Buddhist revival movement. And then, he lamented that the goal of Ouyang's institute was neither a revived Buddhist center nor a Buddhist research institute. Instead, he said, "[it is suffused with] enthusiasm of Chinese Buddhists who plan to propagate a religion that champions and animates the Buddhist faith."[56] For this reason, Satō lamented that, despite being the first Buddhist research center in China, Ouyang's overt religious sentiment hindered the liberty of inquiry and failed to establish authentic academic studies of Buddhism. He continued by listing all the "defects" of this journal: Its research topics were still limited to doctrinal studies; its guiding principle was too sectarian—using Dharmalakṣaṇa school to integrate all Buddhist thoughts; all studies of Chan, Huayan, and Pure Land Buddhism were mired in the Yogācāra doctrinal classification system. Satō then likened the institute to Japanese Buddhist studies in the Meiji period (1868–1912).[57] What can be gleaned from Satō's critique of the soteriological zeal in Ouyang's project is that Satō measured Ouyang's institute against the historicist

[52] Tamachi Tōkō 玉置韜晃, "Shina Bukkyō gakkai bekken" 支那佛教學會瞥見 [An Impressionist Look at Chinese Buddhist Studies (?) Associations], *Ryūkoku Daigaku ronsō* 龍谷大学論叢 274 (1927): 391–402.

[53] Jinling Sūtra Press still preserved some issues of *Ryūkoku Daigaku ronsō* 龍谷大学論叢 from the early 1920s to 1930s. Most likely, researchers of Ouyang's institute knew about this particular article that questioned the scholarliness of their research.

[54] Satō Taijun 佐藤泰舜, "Gendai Shina no bukkyō kenkyū ippan — Nankin nai gakuin hakkō no `naigaku' ni tsuite" 現代支那の仏教研究一斑—南京内学院発行の「内学」に就て [One Bright Spot of Modern Chinese Buddhist Research: with Regard to *Inner Learning* published by Nanjing Inner Learning Institute], *Shukyō kenkyū* 宗教研究 3, no. 6 (December 1926): 149–56.

[55] Actually, the founding of this association was in 1930 but the journal itself started in 1916. It went through several transformations due to changing Japanese policies regarding religious studies and private schools founded by religious organizations. For a brief history of this association and its journal, see http://jpars.org/journal/bulletin/.

[56] Satō Taijun, "Nanjing Inner Learning Institute," 150.

[57] Satō Taijun, 151–52.

ruler. He further predicted that Ouyang's institute was an inchoate first step on the way to mimic Japan's more mature (i.e., secular) form of Buddhist studies. In short, the "not-there-yet" status exposes the Orientalist discourse that put China in the waiting room of modern progress.[58]

Satō's secularized discourse occluded important shared features between Ouyang's project and the Japanese scholarly enterprise. As convincingly argued by Greg Wilkinson, the emergence of Buddhist studies in Japan was a delicate balancing task to integrate both devotional and academic interests.[59] Similar to Ouyang, the editors of Taishō canon Takakusu and Watanabe Kaikyoku (1872–1933), who were both Ouyang's contemporaries, saw their scholarly project as one of demonstrating the ultimate truth of Buddhism, "regardless of theory or methodology." The renowned Buddhologist at Tokyo Imperial University, Ui Hakujiu (1882–1963), also saw Taishō Canon as the proof of Buddhicized Japanese exceptionalism that was crucially hinged upon the exceptional status of Japanese Buddhism.[60] Takakusu's Buddhist oneness harked back to the so-called highest peak of Buddhist development in medieval China when all three major schools—Kegon (Huayen 華嚴), Tendai (Tiantai 天臺), and Zen (Chan 禪)—matured. Takakusu deemed Japanese Buddhism exceptional because it preserved all three teachings, while in China, such teachings died out.[61] In other words, despite their different political goals, both Ouyang and Hakujiu employed Buddhism to prove the exceptional status of their respective national cultures.

Satō's blindness toward the religious intent behind Japanese Buddhist studies was nonetheless telling. It exposed the politics and ideologies looming behind the supposedly academic pursuit of objective Buddhist knowledge. Precisely because of its self-presentation as apolitical or neutral, the claim of being objective became a curtain to obscure all kinds of political and religious agendas.

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[58] Chakrabarty, *Provincializing Europe*, 3–11.
[59] Greg Wilkinson, "Taishō Canon: Devotion, Scholarship, and Nationalism in the Creation of the Modern Buddhist Canon in Japan," in *Spreading Buddha's Word in East Asia*, 284–310.
[60] Wilkinson, "Taishō Canon," 288–89.
[61] Wilkinson, "Taishō Canon," 302–3.

Whatever his failings in hindsight, Satō took seriously this issue of *Inner Learning*. He read the articles carefully and praised three of the research articles for adopting rigorous scholarly methods and utilizing the most recent research findings. All three articles were penned by Lü Cheng.[62] The first article on comparative hermeneutics is the one that Lü Cheng himself discarded in his 1991 anthology of Buddhist essays. I will analyze it in more detail in the next chapter. The second one on *Saṃyuktāgama* is arguably Lü's most important research finding. This article was the first study to discover an overlooked intertextual connection between the later philosophical treatise *Yogācārabhūmi* and the earlier Buddhist canonical collection *Āgama*, a discovery that Mukai Akira 向井亮 rediscovered sixty years later.[63] The third article discussed the links between *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkārakārikā* (*Dacheng zhuangyan jing lun* 大乘莊嚴經論) and *Mahāyānasaṃgraha* (*She dacheng lun* 攝大乘論), a discovery that Ui would later accuse Sasaki Gesshō of borrowing from without crediting Lü.[64] Other bright spots in *Inner Learning* that Satō singled out were two translations by Liu Dingquan and Lü Cheng, translating key Yogācāra texts from classical Tibetan to Chinese.

After Satō, except for Ui Hakuju's continual interests in the institute, which introduced Giuseppe Tucci (1894–1984) to Lü's research, rarely any other scholars of Buddhism paid attention to the Institute's scholarship. Except for the continual listing of new issues of *Inner Learning* in

[62] Satō Taijun, 153–54. The titles of the articles are "Comparative Methods for Reading Mahāyāna Sutras" (Dachengjing bijiao dufa 大乘經之比較讀法), "Report on Collating Saṃyuktāgama" (Za Ahan jing kanding ji 雜阿含經刊定記), and "On *Mahāyāna-sūtrālamkāra-kārikā* and the Old School of Yogācāra" (Lun Zhuangyan jinglun yu Weishi guxue 論莊嚴經論與唯識古學).

[63] Mukai Akira 向井亮, "Yugashichiron no setsukotobun to Zatsuagongyō" 『瑜伽師地論』の摂事分と『雑阿含経』[The *Vastusaṁgrahaṇī* of the *Yogācārabhūmi* and the *Saṁyuktāgama*], *Hokkaidō Daigaku bungakubu kiyō* 北海道大學文學部紀要 33, no. 2 (1985): 1–41.

[64] Ui Hakuju 宇井伯壽, *Shōdaijōron kenkyū* 攝大乘論研究 [A Study of *Mahāyānasamgraha*], (Tōkyō: Iwanami Shoten,1935), 89. See also, Gao, "Waiguo zhexuejia," 69. Ui's accusation of Sasaki's plagiarism might be overstated. The article was published posthumously, edited by Sasaki's student Yamaguchi Susumu 山口益 in 1927. A later edition credited Lü Cheng. See, Sasaki Gesshō Sasaki, *Kan'yaku shihon taishō Shōdaijōron: tsuketari Seizō yaku Shōdaijōron* 漢譯四本對照攝大乘論: 附西藏譯攝大乘論 (Kyōto-shi: Rinsen Shoten, 1977), 24–25. Note that, this new edition misidentified Lü Cheng's name as 吕徵 instead of 吕澂.

Takakusu's *Modern Buddhism*, rarely any Buddhist journals paid much attention to the Institute's publications.

In short, the double meaning of *foxue* is a double-edged sword. For Western observers, Ouyang's *foxue* was excessively intellectual. For Japanese observers, Ouyang's *foxue* was overly religious. Nevertheless, among Chinese readers, Ouyang's *foxue* gained double respect. Despite the Institute's modest impact in the international arena, the very fact that some non-Chinese scholars took an interest in its scholarship helped to promote the national reputation of Ouyang's reform. In the eyes of Chinese intellectuals, *foxue* continued to represent both a modern form of Buddhist learning and a socio-soteriology that promised collective emancipation.

Ouyang: Yogācāra Scholasticism for Building a Spiritocracy

At its core, Ouyang Yogācāra scholarship is a soteriological-political project. He reorganized Buddhist spiritual exercises into disciplinary technologies for the state to guide the conduct of its citizens. Here also lies the critical difference between Ouyang's agenda and the late-Qing literati's promotion of "Buddhism for administering the world." While late-Qing reformers sought to "purify" Buddhism into a civil religion for building a secular state, Ouyang reverted this subservient role of Buddhism to politics and instead enchanted politics and governance with a new Buddhist spiritual technology.

I term Ouyang's soteriological-political vision a "spiritocracy." This term best characterizes three features of Ouyang's socio-political agenda. First, Ouyang redefined liberal democratic values such as freedom and equality on Buddhist terms such as nirvāṇa. Second, he redefined the linear progress of social (r)evolution as a bodhisattva path that promised to lead all beings toward ultimate emancipation. Third, Ouyang grafted Yogācāra spiritual exercises onto Confucian governance. I argue that this Buddhicized governance captured the imagination of many May Fourth intellectuals because it offered a middle-way alternative to both Western democracy and Chinese national essence.

The following distich captured Ouyang's fusion of Confucian governance and Buddhist soteriology:[65]

> The ancients aspired to manifest the bright virtue to all under heaven, [to fulfill this goal]
> I shall enable all to enter nirvāṇa which entails extinguishing worldly afflictions and releasing all from sufferings.[66]
> 古之欲明明德於天下者, 我皆令入涅槃而滅度之

The above is a verse that Ouyang grafted together from two famous aphorisms. The first comes from the *Great Learning*, a Confucian classic. The second comes from the *Diamond Sūtra*, arguably the most-widely-read scripture among Chinese intellectuals. *Great Learning* links Confucian education to governance: cultivating personal virtue, ordering one's family, governing the country, and bringing peace to all under the heaven. By merging the Confucian social vision with nirvāṇa—the Buddhist soteriological goal—Ouyang designed a Buddhicized path of China's salvation. This path entailed transforming consciousness, establishing a bodhisattva community (Dharma family), educating the citizenry, and leading all toward nirvāṇa.

The core of this Buddhicized world renewal is *xin* 心. This term is commonly translated as "mind-heart" following the Confucian commentarial tradition. In Ouyang's paradigm, the term *xinxue* 心學 adopted both the Yogācāra theory of the consciousness and a Confucian interpretation of morality and virtue. The Yogācāra undertone in Ouyang's framing of *xin* is revealed in Ouyang's treatise on meditation, where he redefines the practice of dhyāna (*dingxue* 定學) as *xinxue*. Ouyang claimed to have followed in the footsteps of Xuanzang in replacing dhyāna with *xin*.[67] However, one should not mistake this *xin* as an individual mentality. In Ouyang's paradigm, not only do individuals have *xin,* but a country also has *xin*.[68] In explicating the *xin* of a country, Ouyang primarily adopted a Confucian stance, redefining the *xin* of a country as its ethics and virtues.[69] Although Ouyang

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[65] A brief summary of this argument is published in 2019. See Jessica Zu, "Ouyang Jingwu's *Must-Read Buddhist Classics for Laity*," 65–68. In this subsection, I provide in-depth analysis of Ouyang's doctrinal innovation in merging Yogācāra and Confucianism into a theory of governance—spiritocracy.

[66] Ouyang Jinwu, "Zeng Zhang Puquan" 贈張浦泉, *Jingwu xiaopin* 競無小品, OJNWX 16: 1.

[67] Ouyang Jinwu, "Xinxue da yi" 心學大意, *Inner Learning* 1 (1924): 107.

[68] There are many incidences in which Ouyang appeals to the *xin* of a country. See, for example, Ouyang Jingwu, "Xinshi xu" 心史序, *Jingwu shiwen* 競無詩文, OJNWX 15: 4.

[69] For a general analysis of the Confucian political theory in Ouyang's thought, see Cheng Gongrang, *Ouyang Jingwu foxue sixiang yanjiu*, 593–606.

vacillated between Yogācāra and Confucian interpretations of the consciousness throughout his career, he consistently stressed that one must recognize the centrality of transforming *xin* in his inner learning project.[70]

While the above verse is undated, the idea itself appeared as early as 1926 in Ouyang's *Instructions of the Institute—On Teachers*.[71] In this instruction, Ouyang offered a succinct exegesis of both verses. In explicating the Dao of teaching (*shidao* 師道), Ouyang reframed the Confucian self-cultivation seen in the first verse as an embodiment of Buddhist compassion and wisdom. To imbricate Buddhist soteriology into the texture of Confucian ethics, Ouyang subsequently quoted a phrase from the *Diamond Sūtra*, a well-known text whose chief goal is to lead four births (womb, eggs, moisture, and spontaneous birth) toward nirvāṇa. To further fold Buddhist soteriology and Confucian ethics into one fabric, Ouyang quoted many Confucian classics and reinterpreted nirvāṇa as that which illuminates the greatest bright virtue. He then asserted that this bright virtue, a common theme in Confucian ethics, was nothing more than the insight of the Buddha.[72] To emphasize the centrality of soteriological cultivation for effective governance, he further proclaimed that "once the Dao of teaching is established, there will be more good friends. Once there are more good friends, the country will be [well] governed." For Ouyang, soteriology is politics, and politics should be soteriology.

Building a Yogācāra Government

Scholarship played a central role in Ouyang's politico-soteriological project. He deemed inner learning an indispensable state apparatus in a Yogācāra government. To understand how Ouyang wrapped social, political, and soteriological transformations into one, we must carefully examine his

[70] For a clear periodization of Ouyang's Buddhist thought, see Eyal Aviv, "Ouyang Jingwu: From Yogācāra Scholasticism to Soteriology," in *Transforming Consciousness*, 285–316.

[71] Ouyang, "Zhina neixueyuan yuanxun shi—shishi—shidao si" 支那內學院院訓釋·釋師·師道四, *Neixueyuan yuanxun*, OJNWX 1: 7–9. This essay was first published in the third issue of *Inner Learning* in 1926.

[72] Ouyang, "Zhina neixueyuan yuanxun shi—shishi—shidao si." Note that the exact phrase from the *Diamond Sūtra* refers to "nirvāṇa without remainder." In his couplet, Ouyang used "nirvāṇa" in an attempt to fit the meter. I suggest that this modification has some doctrinal significance, but not important as far as Ouyang's political theory is concerned. For Ouyang's shifting emphases from nirvāṇa without abiding to nirvāṇa without remainder, see Cheng Gongrang, *Ouyang Jingwu foxue sixiang yanjiu*, 479–526.

1918 essay "Introducing the China Inner Learning Institute." In this essay, Ouyang defined "inner learning" as the Buddhist soteriological path for social renewal. In his mission statement, he declared,

> Eradicating all sufferings, achieving perfect bliss (i.e., nirvāṇa), this is the namesake of Buddhist training, this is the namesake of Buddhist learning, this is the namesake of the China Inner Learning Institute.
> 拔一切苦。得究竟樂。曰佛教、曰佛學、曰支那內學院。[73]

In the above quote, there are three key terms to understand the newness of Ouyang Yogācāra: Buddhist training (*fojiao* 佛教), Buddhist learning (*foxue* 佛學), and the China Inner Learning Institute (Zhina Neixue Yuan 支那內學院). The telos of all three terms pointed to nirvāṇa, i.e., "eradicating all sufferings." In the rest of the essay, Ouyang redefined Buddhist training as all paths of transformation. Two key terms central to Ouyang's Yogācāra government are *āśraya-parivṛtti*s (transformation of basis; or revolution of the consciousness)—the theory of transforming consciousness, and one true-reality realm—the end goal of transforming consciousness.[74] Buddhist learning was redefined as a thorough knowledge and profound insight about all paths of liberation.[75] Naturally, his Inner Learning Institute is the center of this new Buddhist learning.

To moor Buddhist learning onto societal renewal, Ouyang first equated social issues with Buddhist interpretation of worldly sufferings and then identified the root cause of socio-soteriological suffering as a two-fold problem: 1) the experiential level of the absence of training (*wujiao* 無教), whose antidote is a Buddhist training and 2) the epistemic level of the absence of learning (*wuxue* 無學), whose antidote is Buddhist learning.[76] It is difficult to convey the elegance of

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[73] Ouyang Jingwu, "Zhina Neixueyuan xu" 支那內學院敘 [Introducing the China Inner Learning Institute], *Shangzhi* 尚志[Nobel Will] 10 (December 1919), 6–20.

[74] For a brief explanation of these Yogācāra terms, see DDB entries "轉依" [transformation of basis], "一真法界" [one true-reality realm]. Ouyang's use of these terms stems from Xuanzang's *Cheng weishi lun* 成唯識論 T1585.48a3–48b5 that uses this term to explain the true nature of consciousness-only (*weishi shixing* 唯識實性). For a systematic analysis of the transformation of basis in Yogācāra Buddhism, see Ronald Davidson, "Buddhist systems of transformation: Āśraya-parivṛtti/-parāvṛtti among the Yogācāra" (PhD Diss., University of California, Berkeley, 1985). For an in-depth analysis of this term in Yogācārabhūmi, see Hidenori Sakuma, *Die Āśrayaparivṛtti-Theorie in der Yogācārabhūmi* (Stuttgart: F. Steiner, 1990).

[75] Ouyang, "Zhina Neixueyuan xu," 7–10. Ouyang's words read, "shutu tonggui zhi weixue" 殊途同歸之謂學. After defining Buddhist learning as such, he went on to reframe all Chan schools, Yogācāra schools, sects in early Indian Buddhism as a form of learning (*xue* 學)—i.e. the knowledge about the path that leads to nirvāṇa.

[76] Ouyang, "Zhina Neixueyuan xu," 10–14.

Ouyang's writing primarily due to his extensive use of wordplays. For the purpose here, it is enough to note that Ouyang folded traditional tripartite root cause of worldly sufferings, i.e., ignorance, anger, and greed, into a two-fold root cause of social sufferings, i.e., the lack of training caused by lack of learning. Under this new rubric, the logical next step to alleviate all social sufferings is to train competent Dharma teachers. Their task is four-fold: illustrating how to enter the Dharma gate, gathering authentic texts, improving literacy, teaching foreign languages.[77] In sum, from the very beginning, Ouyang conceived the Inner Learning Institute as an apparatus to resolve social problems through Buddhist learning.

Ouyang's vision is bold and transgressive. To claim learning as the root of soteriology is a complete rejection of traditional Chan and Pure Land practices. As is well-known, Chan Buddhism, with its anti-intellectual rhetoric of separate transmission outside language, has been a mainstay in Chinese Buddhism for at least one-thousand years. Neither is intellectual pursuit considered conducive to liberation in Pure Land traditions. This is not to say that intellectual-oriented Buddhist communities did not exist in early modern China. As has been demonstrated by Jiang Wu, since the late Ming and early Qing, thanks to literati's interests in Chan, a new trend of textual spirituality had emerged. This textual spirituality valued textual production, e.g., reading, commenting, and copying, as part and parcel of spiritual training. However, textual spirituality never spread further than literati communities. Once literati lost interest in Chan, this new spiritual community soon fell apart.[78] What remained is a generative paradox of learning (*xue* 學) and training (*xiu* 修) that continues to ignite and fuel debates among Buddhist followers.[79] Despite the contested status, the dominant view is still

[77] Ouyang, "Zhina Neixueyuan xu," 14–16.

[78] Wu Jiang, Enlightenment in Dispute: The Reinvention of Chan Buddhism in Seventeenth-Century China (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 48–82, 247–49.

[79] For an incisive analysis of a new model of balancing learning and practicing in Wuchang Buddhist Seminary, see Rongdao Lai, "Praying for the Republic," 118–81. For the continuing negotiating of learning and practicing in contemporary Chinese seminaries, see Douglas Gildow, "Buddhist Monastic Education: Seminaries, Academia, and the State in Contemporary China" (PhD Diss., Princeton University, 2016), 89–107. This reevaluation of learning and practicing was not unique to China. For another model of resolving this universal tension in Theravāda traditions, see for example, Anne Blackburn, *Buddhist Learning and Textual Practice in Eighteenth-century Lankan Monastic Culture* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001). For a similar movement that redefined the relation between learning and

that learning should be conducive to training, and the central concern is how much and what kind of learning is deemed proper. Ouyang, in contrast, prioritized learning as the root of soteriology. This rhetoric fundamentally subverted the dominant Chinese Buddhist discourse.

To fully appreciate the extent of Ouyang's radical approach, it is crucial to recognize that Ouyang's ambition was simultaneously social, political, and institutional. The China Inner Learning Institute was, by design, a state apparatus for actualizing his vision of a Yogācāra government that promised to develop the spiritual potentials of its citizens fully.

> How to eradicate all these various [sufferings]? The urgency of the circumstances compelled [us] to strive for establishing the China Inner Learning Institute. In contrast with the whole human world (Jambudvīpa), this [enterprise] is called China. In contrast to the external (non-Buddhist) learning, this is called Inner Learning. To extinguish the suffering of the absence of training, one shall establish [various] enterprises. To extinguish the suffering of the absence of learning, one shall build schools. To combine both [projects] into one, this is called Institute.
> 如是如是何以拔之。迫不及已圖支那內學院之建立。對閻浮提乃稱支那。對外學乃稱內學。拔無教之苦者法當興事。拔無學之苦者法當興學。賅攝於一稱之曰院。[80]

Here I translate *shi* 事 as "enterprise" because Ouyang deemed that *shi* included sūtra printing press, circulation centers, lecture halls, sūtra reading groups, libraries, practice and training centers, translation halls, and missionary groups. All of the above are some forms of enterprise (*shiye* 事業). I translate *xue* 學 as school in this context because it has a double meaning of both learning and the new institutional form of learning. Since the late-Qing, there had been a trend of confiscating temple properties to build schools (*miaochan xingxue* 廟產興學). Thus, when Ouyang used the term *xingxue* 興學, there is a strong connotation of building the actual architectural construction of a school and all that was necessary for its daily functioning: teachers, students, classrooms, funding, living quarters, and other mundane affairs. As he explained immediately after this statement, this *xue* included the foundation (*genben fasheng* 根本發生)—a middle school, the expanded scale (*guimo* 規模)—a college, and the ultimate (*qiongzhiqiji* 窮至其極)—a research department. When Ouyang

practicing in Southeast Asia, see Erik Braun, *The Birth of Insight: Meditation, Modern Buddhism, and the Burmese Monk Ledi Sayadaw* (Chicago; London: The University of Chicago Press, 2013).

[80] Ouyang, "Zhina Neixueyuan xu," 16–17.

named this project *yuan* 院 (institute), he meant to house both the social function of teaching and spreading Dharma and its scholastic duty of guarding and reviving genuine Buddhism under one roof.

Despite his seeming secularist agenda, Ouyang ultimately located his confidence in the miraculous power of Dharma. As attested by his own words in the 1918 essay, Ouyang was convinced about the bright future of his institute because he received assurance from Bodhisattva Kṣitigarbha. "Kṣitigarbha compassionately answered me with divinatory words, saying that if [you] seek Buddhist enterprise, then [you] shall prevail." [81] After appealing to past and future supporters whom he addressed as spiritual and wholesome friends, Ouyang concluded his essay with a further emphasis on learning: "There are words left by Ānanda, this is where one shall repay [the Buddha's] benevolence." The phrase "Ānanda's words" refers to the Buddhist canon. This concluding sentence effectively reframed inner learning as the sole route to reach the genuine messages of the Buddha. Equally importantly, Ouyang grounded his authority in both asceticism and scholarship. He stressed that, for more than twenty years, he not only pored over Buddhist texts but also practiced vegetarianism and celibacy.[82] If sacredness for Ouyang was marked by asceticism and confirmed through divination, one could hardly characterize his social project as secular.

To understand the political subtext, one must understand the double meaning of *yuan* 院, which alludes to both political institutions and Buddhist legends. On the one hand, five out of the six Nationalist governmental organs were named *yuan* (e.g., the Examination Yuan, the Legislative Yuan), highlighting Ouyang's self-presentation of his institute as a legitimate branch of the state.[83] On the

[81] Ouyang, "Zhina Neixueyuan xu," 19. Of course, one could question whether Ouyang "actually" believed in such a superstitious practice. However, such a question reflects both a secular myopia that presumes rationality could only happen in naturalist pursuit and an Abrahamic interpretation of religion that is preoccupied with the question of faith.

[82] Ouyang, "Yu Zhang Xingyan shu," *Neixue zazhu—xia*, OJNWX 12: 1.

[83] See Zhang Yufa 張玉法, *Zhonghua Minguo shigao* 中華民國史稿 (Taipei: Lianjing chuban shiye gongsi, 1998), 6–7. Note also that the Nationalists inherited Sun Yat-sen's temporary government's names for their political organs, such as Canyi yuan 參議院 [Senate], Zhongyi yuan 眾議院 [House of Representatives], and Guowu Yuan 國務院 [Department of State]. For details, see, Wang Jianlang 王建郎 and Huang Kewu 黃克武, eds., *Lang'an xinbian Zhongguo jindaishi* 兩岸新編中國近代史 (Beijing: Social Sciences Academy, 2016), 28–48. According to Lü Cheng's memoir, Ouyang was right in the throes of the 1911 revolution in Nanjing. Although Ouyang never participated in it, he was a key figure in establishing the first National Buddhist Association (Fojiao hui 佛教會) right after the temporary Nanjing government

other hand, he prophesied that his community was the only one that would be able to carry on the Buddhist enterprise in the interim between the Buddha's death and the future buddha Maitreya's descent to earth, alluding to Maitreya's inner court, "nei yuan." Equally important, the name *yuan* enabled Ouyang to present inner learning as the only path to reaching the mythical dharma body (Skt: dharmakāya; Ch: *fashen* 法身). He did this chiefly by linking his *yuan* with the thirteen chambers (*shi san da yuan* 十三大院) of the esoteric womb world maṇḍala in whose center sits the Mahāvairocana—the embodiment of the dharmakāya.[84]

In this way, in contrast with late-Qing reformers who instrumentalized Buddhism for building a modern state, Ouyang redefined politics as one stage on the Buddhist path of liberation. In his letter to Hu Hanmin 胡漢民 (1879–1936), one of three top contenders for the Nationalist leadership after Sun Yat-sen passed away, Ouyang advised Hu to implement a Buddhicized state. In Ouyang's mind, a legitimate state should aim to develop people's spiritual potential and should actualize nirvāṇa for all because nirvāṇa embodied the true realization of equality and freedom. In articulating the meaning of equality and freedom, Ouyang asserted that "enabling one's full development is equality. Recovering one's originally pure mind-heart is freedom."[85] In Ouyang's paradigm, good governance entailed both respect for one's innately pure mind-heart and a concrete enterprise to enable all citizens to develop their Buddha nature fully. Politics, in his paradigm, became a substitute for soteriology.

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was established. See Lü Cheng, "Qinjiaoshi Ouyang xiansheng shi lue" 親教師歐陽先生事略, in *Zhongguo fojiao sixiang ziliao xuanbian* 中國佛教思想資料選編, ed. Shi Jun (Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju, 1983), 354.

Note also that *yuan* has long been used to name the literary branches of the imperial state, as in the cases of Hanlin Yuan 翰林院 or Xueshi Yuan 学士院. These refer to the selected literati who wrote official dynastic histories, edited Confucian classics, and drafted edicts, among other tasks. However, given its new relevance in Republican-era politics, Ouyang's use of *yuan* was more connected to the contemporary situation than to the past.

[84] Ouyang, "Zhina Neixueyuan xu," 20. For details on the relationship among the womb world maṇḍala, dharmakāya, and Mahāvairocana, see the DDB entry "胎藏界曼荼羅." For general knowledge about esoteric terminologies used among Buddhist intellectuals, see Erik Schicketanz, *Daraku to fukkō no kindai chūkoku bukkyō: Nihon bukkyō to no kaikō to so no rekishizō no kōchiku* 堕落と復興の近代中国仏教・日本仏教との邂逅とその歴史像の構築 (Kyoto: Hozōkan, 2016), 265–74.

[85] Ouyang, "Zeng Hu Zhantang" 贈胡展堂, *Jinwu xiaopin* 竟無小品, OJNWX 16: 2.

Nevertheless, one must understand Ouyang's politico-soteriological scholasticism as a form of Yogācāra governmentality. It is neither a derivative of its Indian origin nor a mimicry of imported nationalism. I am borrowing Foucauldian governmentality, which refers to the analytic methods of revealing hidden ways that people are inculcated to govern themselves in the everyday.[86] Foucault coined this term to distinguish different forms of power relations that are outside the binary of institutionalized domination and spontaneous powerplay between individuals. This third kind of power relation refers to conduct, which is a means to shape and guide the daily behavior of the citizens. It is systemized, regulated, and reflected disciplinary technologies that follow a specific yet invisible form of reasoning. This reasoning is the *-ality* ending of *governmentality* that could mean either "rationality" or "mentality." This rationality or mentality defines the telos of action and the adequate means to achieve that end. Simultaneously, it also conveys a sense of "conducting oneself" or self-governance that encompasses all realms of human experience including but not limited to the care of self, directing the soul, guidance for the family and children, management of the household.

When Ouyang merged Yogācāra soteriology with Confucian governance in his distich, he lay open the rationale behind his quest for a Yogācāra government. In this paradigm, Yogācāra causal enframing provided both the justification for soteriological efficacy and the systemized toolbox of disciplinary technologies. The telos is none other than nirvāṇa but now geared toward the liberation of the social totality. In an anthology edited for laity, Ouyang reorganized ancient Buddhist sūtras into a toolbox of spiritual technologies that ranged from care of self, guidance for male and female citizens, management of the household, means to serve the government and to develop the spiritual potential of the citizenry fully.[87]

Ouyang tied the rationality of government to a Buddhicized civil society. In this Buddhist civil society, the spiritual progress of individual citizens was regarded as the crucial yardstick for the

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[86] These ideas first appeared in *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison* (New York: Vintage, 1979) and *The History of Sexuality* (New York: Vintage, 1985). It was further developed in his lecture series, *The Government of Self and Others: Lectures at the Collège de France 1982–1983* (New York: St Martin's Press, 2010). For a concise analysis of Foucauldian governmentality, see Thomas Lemke, *Foucault, Governmentality, and Critique* (Boulder: Paradigm Publishers, 2011), 9–24.

[87] Jessica Zu, "Ouyang Jingwu's *Must-Read Buddhist Classics for Laity*," 61–86.

government's efficacy and *raison d'être*. To guide all citizens toward nirvāṇa, Ouyang designed a system of classifying the citizenry based on their gender and spiritual qualities. Those with top spiritual qualities included dedicated male citizens and highly advanced female citizens who already transformed themselves into male bodies. For these elite citizens, their career paths were to serve the government or to be ordained as monks and to serve as Dharma teachers. For the middle-class males, their task was to order the family and manage private businesses. For the middling females, their duty was to reproduce and educate children, serving as virtuous mothers and good wives to ensure the existence of the Han Chinese race/seed. For those who could not live up to their Dharmic duty, it was implied that they would transmigrate into lower realms of existence due to karmic retribution. In this new outlook of Yogācāra governmentality, ancient laws of karmic retribution were refashioned as natural laws, ranking individuals into groups and into a neat spiritocracy that allowed for their identification, classification, ordering, and control by the findings of Yogācāra scholars. Simultaneously, democratic values of freedom and equality were given a new content of spiritocracy.

Furthermore, Ouyang worked hard to naturalize this spiritocracy with Yogācāra soteriology. In Ouyang's outline of the *bodhisattvabhūmi* chapter in *Yogācārabhūmi* (*Yuqie shidi lun pusadi* 瑜伽師地論菩薩地), he equated one true-reality realm with *ālayavijñāna* (*alaiye shi* 阿賴耶識) for the first time. For Ouyang, this doctrinal equation of one true-reality realm and *ālayavijñāna* alone provided necessary and sufficient justification of his claim that learning for others is bodhisattva learning.[88] For Ouyang, because dharma realm always had a connotation of all sentient beings, by equating *ālayavijñāna* with one true-reality realm, Ouyang substantially extended this Yogācāra term of storehouse consciousness as the grounding for all forms of social existences.

This new definition of one true-reality realm also enabled Ouyang to apply the Yogācāra term "equal nature of original quiescence" (*benji pingdengxing* 本寂平等性) to build a free and equal society.[89] Armed by the Buddhist equality, i.e., equality of nature and phenomena, Ouyang depicted a

[88] Ouyang, "Yujia shidi lun pusadi" 瑜伽師地論菩薩地, *Zangyao jing xu* 藏要經敘, OJNWX 6: 17–18.

[89] For Xuanzang's explication of *benji pingdengxing* 本寂平等性, see T 1579.30.559a28; for equality of phenomena (*fa pindengxing* 法平等性) see T 1579.30.559a22. Ouyang's reading of these terms was not new but, he applied them to different soteriological and social contexts.

utopia where all living processes are respected, and every sentient being could equally develop their innate nature. In Ouyang's paradigm, aspiring bodhisattvas, through learning, could facilitate this collective march toward this utopia. While the ultimate goal of social transformation is to help everyone reaching nirvāṇa, the dharma body (also termed as original quiescence) guaranteed such a possibility for everyone.[90] The new twist of equating storehouse consciousness with one true-reality realm transferred doctrinal analysis into the field of social analysis.

To "prove" the efficacy of inner learning in transforming society, Ouyang also reinterpreted a well-known sūtra, the *Vimalakīrti-nirdeśa Sūtra* (*Weimojie suoshuo jing* 維摩詰所說經). In explicating this text, Ouyang laid out ten essential teachings of this sūtra. The first one is supernormal cognition (*shentong* 神通), which Ouyang considered "natural" once one realized that everything is illusory transformation.[91] The second essential teaching is that skill-in-means is the ultimate. He argued that, even though bodhi as skill-in-means is only illusory, yet without bodhi's efficacy in transforming consciousness (*zhuanyi* 轉依), the ultimate nirvāṇa will never be manifested.[92] The third essence is equality. While nirvāṇa was what engendered equality, Ouyang pointed out that, in *Vimalakīrti Sūtra*, equality was explained in terms of non-duality or non-differentiation. In Ouyang's new Yogācāra, the first three essences wrapped all liberal democratic values into Buddhist spiritual technologies.

As for the leaders of this social project, in the tenth essential teaching, Ouyang insisted that *upāsaka* can preach Dharma. While it is not uncommon to equate the Sinic term *jushi* 居士 with the Indic term *upāsaka* (*youposai* 優婆塞), both of which are commonly translated as laymen, Ouyang's *jushi* is harking back to a specific Indic tradition of Buddhist professionals. While contemporarily *jushi* often refers to Buddhist lay practitioners, Ouyang interpreted it more in line with the term *upāsaka* in 6th to 8th century India. It refers to a group of devoted practitioners who keep ten precepts and are skilled in various practices and who live alongside monastics. Wedemeyer called them

[90] Ouyang, "Yujia shidi lun pusadi" 瑜伽師地論菩薩地, *Zangyao jing xu*, OJNWX 6: 18–19.
[91] Ouyang, "Weimojie suoshuo jing" 維摩詰所說經, *Zangyao jing xu*, OJNWX 6: 3–4.
[92] Ouyang, "Weimojie suoshuo jing" 維摩詰所說經, *Zangyao jing xu*, OJNWX 6: 4.

"Buddhist professionals."[93] In Ouyang's new interpretation, male lay Buddhist professionals, i.e., elite citizens, should become public intellectuals whose mission was to actualize social transformation and lead all toward emancipation.

Ouyang's attempt to establish a Yogācāra government eventually failed because he was forced to lay open what should be concealed—naturalizing a manufactured spiritual hierarchy on Yogācāra terms. Nevertheless, this Buddhicized political vision reminds us that, in China's long societist experiment from 1911 to 1976, the very nature of society and state was vehemently contested. In these contestations, many proposals drew inspirations from reputedly "religious" traditions for theorizing the social and for justifying the state.

Ouyang's Yogācāra government represents one such proposal to upcycle long-forgotten spiritual guidance into the state's conduct of conducts, whose *raison d'être* was to manage the pace and possible paths of its citizens' spiritual progress. Although it is difficult to imagine what a Buddhist government would look like in reality, one possibility seems to be Bhutan's 2010 pioneering launch of a governmental 5-year plan based on the Gross National Happiness Index that ranks the nation's progress on happiness scales. As we will see in later chapters, Ouyang's insistence on the necessity of a government in actualizing one true-reality realm diverged drastically from Lü's non-political means to transform society through revolutionizing consciousness. This divergence, I argue, reflects a critical difference between two generations of Chinese revolutionaries: the 1911 revolutionaries and the May Fourth radicals. The 1911 revolutionaries deemed government and politics essential for social transformation. In contrast, the May Fourth radicals abandoned political Band-Aids and yearned for more profound long-term cultural transformations. It is all the more remarkable that ancient Yogācāra attracted a significant number of both generations of intellectuals despite their different political bends. Therefore, tracing the rise of Yogācāra in modern China provides a lateral view of the larger forces at play behind the scene of competing political ideologies.

[93] Christian K. Wedemeyer, Making Sense of Tantric Buddhism: History, Semiology, and Transgression In the Indian Traditions (New York: Columbia University Press, 2013), 181–87.

Yogācāra Studies as Social Critique

Despite Lü's early foray into aesthetics and Ouyang's Confucian background, Lü and Ouyang shared a similar philosophical project, they both rejected realist and idealist social theories, e.g., scientific materialism, social Darwinism, and Chinese vitalism. Moreover, they both sought a middle-path. From 1918 till 1922, when Lü was trying to interweave diverse elements in Western aesthetics to theorize a social oneness in terms of a phenomenological naturalism, Ouyang was trying to combine Yogācāra with Confucian teaching. By highlight their shared philosophical approach to finding solutions to social problems, in this section, I provide further evidence to the general appeal of a new Yogācāra among Chinese intellectuals.

The appeal of Ouyang's Yogācāra extended far beyond the Buddhist circle because it reverted the historicist gaze from the West and elevated Buddhist hermeneutics to refute then cure the ills of Western modernity. With his new Yogācāra, Ouyang presented an alternative vision of social progress grounded in Buddhist conception of mind-heart. Ouyang's hermeneutic strategy put the global community of peoples and cultures under the analytic gaze of the Yogācāra logic, hetuvidyā. This global vision predetermines the nature of Ouyang's analysis: to expose the ills of the *xin* (mind, consciousness) of the modern world and to find a cure. This global vision is crucial to understand Ouyang's charm. In extant scholarship, Ouyang's critical stance is often evaluated solely within a preconceived Buddhist tradition. For example, Lin Chen-kuo linked Ouyang's criticism of Chinese tradition to a later wave of "critical Buddhism" in the 1980s Japan, illustrating their shared critique of the doctrine of original enlightenment thought prevalent in East Asian Buddhism.[94] However, Eyal Aviv cautions us against such an association based on the complex evolution of Ouyang's Buddhist thought and thereby significantly advances our understanding of different roles of the Yogācāra system in Ouyang's career.[95] Only recently have scholars began to investigate Ouyang's cultural

[94] Lin Chen-kuo, "Metaphysics, Suffering, and Liberation: The Debate between Two Buddhisms," in *Pruning the Bodhi Tree*, 298–313.

[95] I follow Eyal Aviv's periodization of Ouyang Jingwu's Buddhist thought from pre-Buddhist, to Yogācāra phase, to Yogācāra-Madhyamaka syncretic phase, to his later thought that accepted a weak version of Tathāgatagarbha. See Aviv, "Ouyang Jingwu: From Yogācāra Scholasticism to Soteriology," in *Transforming Consciousness*, 285–316.

impact beyond the Buddhist sphere. In particular, reading the modern Chinese writer Lu Xun (1881–1936) alongside Ouyang, Ying Lei reveals to us the overlooked impact of Buddhist thought in forging the new literature in modern China. Unfortunately, despite lively scholarly discussions about Ouyang's thought, his global vision remains a missing backdrop lurking at the threshold of recognition.

Without understanding this global force, one remains blind to the power of Yogācāra as a social critique of materialist and solipsist tendencies. As I have demonstrated earlier in this chapter, it is precisely this social and moral force in Yogācāra that lured Lü Cheng and many like-minded May Fourth youth to join Ouyang's Institute. To present his version of invigorated Buddhism as the solution of the crisis brought out by the global colonial modernity, Ouyang's reframed Yogācāra soteriology as governing technologies. Ouyang argued that Chinese culture had a legitimate seat in the global community of peoples because Chinese people had preserved genuine Buddhist teachings and merged it with Confucian governance. Ouyang was confident that his Buddho-Confucian Dharma was poised to lead all peoples and cultures toward a harmonious future.

More than a forceful refutation of social Darwinism and Bergsonism in the May Fourth China, this Yogācāra governmentality also reveals to us Ouyang's grand ambition to remake the world. When he contextualized the China Inner Learning Institute in contrast with the whole human world (Jambudvīpa), Ouyang made explicit the missionary intent behind his scholarship. For Ouyang, one can only reach the Dao of heaven and earth with the help of the Chinese canon; only then can one manifest the true nature of things and creatures in Jambudvīpa. The goal of the Institute was not limited to a parochial attempt for self-preservation but a compassionate project of liberating the global community of peoples with Buddhist Dharma.

Ouyang's most celebrated new methodology attests to his global ambition. This methodology was first made public in his September 1922 lecture series "On Discerning and Selecting Vijñānamātra" (*Weishi jueze tan* 唯識抉擇談), an extensive reinterpretation of Xuanzang's *Cheng weishi lun* (T1585) on consciousness-only doctrines. Thanks to the shock waves it sent through the Chinese Buddhist communities, this lecture series has been well-researched, and its doctrinal

innovation has been widely recognized.[96] To make a convoluted story short, by redefining Dharmalakṣaṇa (*faxiang* 法相) systematized Buddhist teachings as a whole and Vijñaptimātra (*weishi* 唯識) as narrowly focused on consciousness-only teaching, and by distinguishing Dharmalakṣaṇa from Vijñaptimātra, Ouyang discarded Chinese commentarial methods and redefined Yogācāra with his new methodology.[97] Many scholars have rightly recognized his innovation in introducing late-Qing evidential scholarship into the analysis of Buddhist texts and credited Ouyang's Inner Learning Institute as the pioneer of academic studies of Buddhism in China.

However, I contend that the elaboration of Ouyang's methodology and doctrinal innovation were only half of the truth. To paint a fuller picture, I analyze the motivations behind Ouyang's new scientific methods and disclose what kind of social problems this innovator sought to resolve. In Sheldon Pollock's 1993 critical reflections upon the disciplinary history of philology, he incisively points out that the seemingly "disinterested scholarship in the human science" took place "within the realm of interests," its "objectivity is bounded by subjectivity," and that "the only form of it that can appear value-free is the one that conforms fully to the dominant ideology, which alone remains, in the absence of critique, invisible as ideology."[98] In a few pages, Pollock demonstrates the imperative of exposing the ideological underpinnings of philological knowledge. Following Pollock's disciplinary reflection, I demonstrate that Ouyang's inner learning, as a new form of Buddhist knowledge, instead of adopting the Western objective pretense, made explicit political stance—scholarship for China's salvation. As such, the combined soteriological quest with scholarly investment in inner learning offers a mirror to reflect upon alternative models of knowledge production outside colonial "objective" Buddhist knowledge.

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[96] Eyal Aviv, "Differentiating the Pearl from the Fisheye." See also, Eyal Aviv, "Ouyang Jingwu: From Yogācāra Scholasticism to Soteriology." For references in Chinese, see, Cheng Gongrang, *Ouyang Jingwu foxue sixiang yuanjiu* and Zhang Zhiqiang 張志強, *Zhu Lu, Kong Fo, xiandai sixiang*.

[97] Ouyang, *Weishi jueze tan*, OJNWX 10.

[98] Sheldon Pollock, "Deep Orientalism? Notes on Sanskrit and Power Beyond the Raj," in *Orientalism and the Postcolonial Predicament: Perspectives on South Asia*, eds. Carol A. Breckenridge and Peter van der Veer (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1993), 96

At the first glance, Ouyang's championing of new methodology and dismissal of Chinese indigenous commentarial traditions was no different from the German Indologists' unwarranted stance of presuming an "objective" philological-historical method over and above Indigenous hermeneutic traditions. However, this formal resemblance does not indicate an uncritical internalization of the Western objective method. As a Yogācārin, Ouyang repeatedly voiced his critique of both Western realism and Chinese idealism, likening them to Vaiśeṣika (*shenglun* 勝論; seen as realism by Ouyang) and Sāṃkhya (*shulun* 數論; seen as idealism by Ouyang), respectively.[99] Neither was Ouyang alone in enframing Western science within Asian philosophy. Inoue Enryo 井上円了 (1858–1919) in Japan, Liang Shuming (1893–1988) in China, and many others had already proposed various new paradigms to subsume science into indigenous thought.[100] However, one must realize that these diverse proposals were not merely about a powerplay but were put forward to resolve different kinds of perceived social and cultural problems comprehensible to local peoples.

Specifically, the motive behind Ouyang's anti-traditionalism was to justify the respectability of Chinese culture in the modern globe. When he equated Western science with Vaiśeṣika, he simultaneously upcycled Yogācāra critique of Vaiśeṣika into a critique of scientific materialism and social Darwinism. When he equated Chinese traditions with Sāṃkhya, he simultaneously upcycled Yogācāra critique of Sāṃkhya into a critique of Chinese vitalism and Bergsonian creative evolution. Once we understand Ouyang's Yogācāra as a social critique, it becomes clear that Ouyang was promoting a new Chineseness grounded in inter-relationality. For Ouyang, Chineseness is never about anything essential and unchanging. In contrast, Ouyang deemed Chinese culture respectable because Chinese scholars had translated and preserved genuine Buddhist teachings. In other words,

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[99] See for example, Ouyang, "Cheng weishi lun," *Zangyao lun xu* 藏要論敘,OJNWX 7: 44. In the early 1920s, Ouyang only alluded to this matching of contemporary dualism to Indian dualism. The details doctrinal analysis happened in his later thinking on Xuanzang's Yogācāra, which is the focus of Chapter Five.

[100] This hermeneutic strategy, Jason Josephson named "hierarchical inclusion," was not new but became handy under the new situation. See Jason Ānanda Josephson, *The Invention of Religion in Japan* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2012), 24–28. For Inoue's hierarchical inclusion of science into Buddhism, see Jason Josephson, "When Buddhism Became a 'Religion': Religion and Superstition in the Writings of Inoue Enryō," *Japanese Journal of Religious Studies* 33, no. 1 (2006): 143–168. For Liang Shuming's redefinition of science as a matter of spirit and a method, see Thierry Meynard, *The Religious Philosophy of Liang Shuming: The Hidden Buddhist* (Brill, 2011), 25.

Chineseness is worthy of respect not because of who Chinese people are but because of what Chinese people have done and will continue to do.

To justify his new interpretation of Chineseness, Ouyang first redefined genuine Buddhism as manifestations of universal compassion. In this way, the message of the Buddha was abstracted into a doctrinal whole—Dao, which could be accessed through different means, but the Chinese translations proved essential to reach this oneness. Therefore, in his September 1922 public lecture series, Ouyang championed for integrating new research methodologies with systematic teachings from Dharmalakṣaṇa to disclose the totality of genuine Buddhism. Rather than a return to Indian origin, Ouyang's methodological innovation was meant to justify the legitimacy of the Chinese transmission, and ultimately to showcase the advantaged position of Chinese Culture in awakening the world with great compassion. As I reveal in Chapter Five, Ouyang's inchoate theorization of this new Chineseness, Xuanzang's Yogācāra, and global Dharma only became fully manifested in his making of *Essentials.*


Lü Cheng: Aesthetic Society, Dharma, and Buddhology

By now, I have demonstrated that the May Fourth Movement proved fertile ground to germinate the Buddhist seeds sowed by Yang Wenhui. Furthermore, the international outlook of Ouyang's institute was crucial for curating its national prestige. Despite its almost non-perceptible international impact, the institute nonetheless successfully produced a semblance of being a recognized member of the international intellectual community within the Chinese intellectual circles.

Ouyang's success indicates to us a counter-current that sought for means of empowering human agency. The allure of Yogācāra idealism was not merely its systematicity that resembled science. More importantly, the allure of this new Yogācāra lies in its rejection of the capitalist reduction of human agency into physicality, its systematic empowerment of moral forces, and its well-designed path of collective emancipation.

Equally important, despite Lü's rejection of a political solution, Lü and Ouyang shared a philosophical agenda: The rejection of materialism and social Darwinism drew them together.

Ouyang spearheaded this social turn of Yogācāra soteriology, and Lü played a crucial role in remaking Ouyang's inner learning into Yogācāra government. More importantly, both internationally and nationally, the institute's reputation for being scientific, modern, and new hinged crucially to Lü Cheng's scholarly reputation. Therefore, in the next chapter, I focus the analytical lens on Lü Cheng's research methodology and unlock his secret to produce scholarly respectability despite his soteriological fervor.



Graph 1 Organization of the Inner Learning Institute

CHAPTER 4. COMPARATIVE HERMENEUTICS AND AN IDEAL BUDDHIST SOCIETY

Lü Cheng: Renewing the World with Buddhist Scholarship

August 1923 marked the beginning of a new phase in Lü's revolution. Although for Lü, the motivation of doing scholarship has always been how to build a better society, August 1923 marked a watershed moment when Lü weld social concerns onto Yogācāra soteriology. As I have demonstrated in Chapters Two and Three, from 1918 to 1922, Ouyang and Lü each toiled for their own visions of a new society, despite their shared philosophical critique of scientific realism and social Darwinism. Soon after the China Inner Learning Institute opened its gate, in August 1923, Lü moved to Nanjing and took up two teaching jobs: as a lecturer of aesthetics at Nanjing Academy of Fine Arts and as a lecturer of Buddhism at the Inner Learning Institute.[1] A year later, Lü voluntarily gave up his career in aesthetics and devoted full time to Buddhist studies. As such, August 1923 marked the beginning of Lü's career as a Buddhist revolutionary.

In this chapter, I turn the spotlight on Lü Cheng's Buddhist scholarship from 1923 to 1926. I reveal the secret of his international reputation of being both scientific and Buddhist. I also bring into relief another aspect of the newness in the modern Yogācāra movement, namely, the retooling of Buddhist communal rules for resolving structural social issues. I demonstrate that Lü turned to Yogācāra studies because Ouyang's institute proved a more supportive environment for implementing Lü's revolution: renewing the world with comparative studies. In Lü's vision, it is up to humans to break ground for new patterns of inter-relationality, to break out of this actual life corrupted by Darwinist petty competition, and to start living a harmonious, ethical, communal life. In this new phase of Lü's revolution, Buddhist scholasticism became the chief means to safeguard ethical standards, and Buddhist communal rules became the model for engendering a new democratic society. Only in this phase did Lü's social revolution merged with Ouyang's project of revitalizing Buddhism.

[1] Lü, "My Autobiography," 78.

The structure of this chapter is two-fold. Section One examines Lü's new methodology and Section Two analyzes the seed of an overlooked Vinaya revival—Lü's comparative studies of monastic precepts. As we will see in Part III, both proved central to Lü's own Yogācāra socio-soteriological (r)evolution.

Firstly, Lü redefined science as rigorous comparison and simultaneously redefined moral inquiry as a scientific study of Buddhist texts. Lü erased the boundary between natural sciences and human sciences by rejecting scientific dualism of matter and mind. Recall that, in his aesthetic revolution, Lü considered all worldly pursuits mere translations of both the external world and the internal psyche. Later, he understood nature as nothing more than fruitions of karmic seeds stored in consciousness. This phenomenological naturalism enabled Lü to transform scientific studies of worldly phenomena into rigorous comparisons of translated texts. To put it differently, when Beauty is equated with Truth, then aesthetic inquiry, ethical investigation, and scientific studies are all merged into one. Buddhological methods, for Lü Cheng, naturally became the best toolkit for revealing real causal links underpinning all living processes. By analyzing Lü's 1924 essay on comparative methods, I bring to the fore the soteriological imperative looming behind Lü's promotion of science. I argue that Lü's turn toward Yogācāra was motivated by his determination to avoid philosophical solipsism and his confidence in a universal human moral agency (embodied by agentive karmic seeds) to be actualized through scientific inquiries.

Accurately capturing the moral imperative behind Lü's scholarly vigor also uncovers the continual relevance of Buddhist ethics and their function as a social critique of Western modernity in the twentieth century China. In the previous chapter, I have demonstrated that Yogācāra became appealing to reform-minded intellectuals because it replaced social Darwinist competition with a socio-spiritual evolutionary theory grounded in reason and logic.[2] Lü redefined science as

[2] The literature on the appeal of reason and logic of Buddhism is too numerous to summarize. For a succinct evaluation of reason and logic in early Indian Buddhism see Richard F. Gombrich, *What the Buddha Thought*, (London: Equinox Pub., 2009), Chapter 11 "The Buddha's Pragmatism and Intellectual Style," 161–79. For the soteriological import of logic and reason in Mahāyāna path, see for example, Śāntideva, *The Bodhicaryāvatāra*, tr. Kate Crosby and Andrew Skilton (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), xx–xxvi.

comparative hermeneutics (*bijiao dufa* 比較讀法), riding a swelling tide of May Fourth societism. This societism hoped to harness the transformative power of intellectual rigor for China's salvation. During the political turmoil in the wake of May Fourth, many intellectuals viewed science as a promising institution and a progressive force to save Republicanism and to build a civil society.[3] Lü brought this May Fourth social consciousness into his Buddhist studies.

Moreover, this chapter further illustrates the second step in Lü's social turn of Buddhist soteriology: the emergence of inchoate systematic thinking. I show that Lü Cheng's new methodology expanded both the individualistic soteriology in Theravāda Buddhism and the heroic bodhisattva path in Mahāyāna Buddhism.[4] Indeed, comparative hermeneutics gestured toward a desire for a communism of Buddhist knowledge and a yearning for communal cultivation. At the same time, it also established a standard procedure that is open to all willing participants. Lü quest for a communism of Buddhist soteriological knowledge reflects his initial realization that, to dismantle the existing unjust system, he must build an alternative ethical system and work together as a team.

Here also lies the fundamental break between Ouyang's and Lü Cheng's social imaginaries. Ouyang strived for a spiritocracy, a hierarchy ranking its citizens on their spiritual developments. In contrast, Lü worked for a communism of soteriological knowledge grounded in voluntary association. This break reveals a much broader ideological battle forced upon Buddhist communities at this watershed moment: Shall one rely on meditative experience or textual analysis to reach the ineffable insight of the Buddha? Both Lü and Ouyang understood that the Buddha's realization transcends words and conceptions. And yet, they diverged on the paths to reach the ineffable. As I have shown in the previous chapter, Ouyang centered interpretative authority in both scholarship and the

[3] For an analysis of how science was used as a means for social transformation, see Wang Zuoyue, "Saving China Through Science."

[4] For the Indian discourse on gift of the body and its role in creating heroic bodhisattvas, see Reiko Ohnuma, *Head, Eyes, Flesh, and Blood: Giving Away the Body in Indian Buddhist Literature* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007). Lü Cheng's reading of Theravāda Buddhism was heavily influenced by his contemporary Buddhological discourse, which lauded Theravāda Buddhism for its Protestant ethos. However, as I demonstrate in Chapter Six., this uncritical reading of Theravāda Buddhism only reveals to us Lü's preoccupation with harnessing Mahāyāna doctrines for resolving social crises. This oversight proves once more individual limitations and prompts us to heed attention to Lü's call for an impersonal rigorous method and the necessity of a democratic interpretative community.

miraculous power of asceticism. In contrast, Lü Cheng looked to rigorous methods alone as engines for producing interpretative authority.

In Lü's paradigm, asceticism was refashioned as the purity of the mind and would only emerge from scholarly diligence and sustained analytic rigor. For Lü, because the historical Buddha spread his teachings using worldly conventions, all that we have left of him are words and translations.[5] Therefore, for Lü, analytic rigor became the only sharp weapon that could penetrate through the thickets of solipsist snare and linguistic illusion.[6] This analytic rigor laid the ground for Lü's institutional building of a communism of Buddhist knowledge.

In the second section, I illustrate the so-far overlooked aspect of Lü's institutional building intent and the inchoate realization of the need to fight the existing system with an alternative system. For Lü, the import of the Buddhist past entailed far more than a retort of Western science and Western ethics. Instead, the ancient Buddhist communal rules (Skt: vinaya; Ch: *jielü* 戒律) offer ready-to-hand tools to domesticate liberal democratic values such as freedom and equality. For modern advocates of Yogācāra like Lü, the early Buddhist community—Saṅgha—functioned as the prototype of a democratic society. As seen through Lü Cheng's publications from 1923 to 1928, Lü undertook systematic comparative studies of nikāya and āgama (the earliest recorded sūtras in Pāli and Chinese, respectively), abhidharma (a scholastic reworking of Nikāya and Āgama), and vinaya, successively. Only after his extensive comparison of multilingual vinaya texts did Lü move onto multilingual studies of essential Yogācāra treatises. Indeed, in Lü's thorough examination of Buddhist textual history, vinaya studies played a decisive role. Lü's vinaya studies not only echoed Ouyang's

[5] There are deeper philosophical reasons of why Lü Cheng cannot locate authority in meditative experiences. It has to do with the Yogācāra doctrines of transformation of the basis (Ch: *zhuanyi* 轉依; Skt: āśrayaparivṛtti) and storehouse consciousness (Ch: *alaiye shi* 阿賴耶識; Skt: ālayavijñāna), which I will explore further in Chapters Six and Seven.

[6] For a classic discussion on the problem of the hermeneutic circle see, Hans Georg Gadamer, *Truth and Method.* 2d English ed. (London: Sheed and Ward, 1979). For more recent discussions, see, for example, Jeffrey Stout, "The Relativity of Interpretation," *The Monist* 69:1 (1986), 103–18. For the hermeneutic in Western academic studies of Buddhism, see, for example, Andrew P. Tuck, "The Philosophy of Scholarship," in *Comparative Philosophy and the Philosophy of Scholarship: On the Western Interpretation of Nagarjuna* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), 2–30.

political ambition but also dovetailed Lü's early revolutionary blueprint for establishing a model community as the seed to bring forth a complete transformation of the broader environment.

1924: Comparative Hermeneutics, Science, and Moral Inquiry

By design, comparative hermeneutics is a soteriological compass. Its principal function is to guide an interpretative community in their collective search for the true intent of the Buddha. Because the authorial intention was the ultimate goal, scientific method and philosophical discrimination carry more salvific weight.[7] Thus, comparative hermeneutics cannot be reduced to a response to the eighteenth-century philology, Qing evidential scholarship, or Buddhist hermeneutics. Rather, Lü weaved all of these threads together into a new suit that is the science of inner learning.

Lü's reinvention of science brings two methodological interventions. First, Lü theorized scientific realism in terms of phenomenological naturalism. This move skillfully weaved social reality and karmic interdependence into one connected existence. Consequently, he reframed the scientific search for "objective" knowledge in terms of moral inquiry into real causes and effects. Second, this new science-cum-karmic hermeneutics reverts the Euro-centered historicist gaze. The historicism in traditional Buddhology narrates of a story of degeneration: from the original Buddhism as seen in the Pāli texts, to the emergence of Sanskrit texts, to the corrupted translations into Tibetan and the even more corrupted Chinese translations. Instead, through the lens of comparative hermeneutics, Lü offered a new way of doing Buddhology where Chinese translations were taken seriously on equal footing with Sanskrit, Pāli, and classical Tibetan texts. At the margins of the colonial circuit of Buddhist knowledge, Lü offered a powerful critique of the inherent power hierarchy in secularism and historicism.

Once Lü equated social oneness with karmic inter-relationality, he simultaneously transformed the pursuit of the scientific truth into a quest for salvific knowledge. The merging point is that both enterprises share the same goal of ridding the world of egoistic impositions. To minimize

[7] For Lü's quest for original intent instead of a urtext, see also Dan Lusthaus, "Lü Cheng, Epistemology, and Genuine Buddhism," in *Transforming Consciousness*, 337, 342.

subjective impositions, Lü designed comparative hermeneutics. This method is a systematic procedure that sets up a robust interpretative matrix. This interpretative matrix consists of seven independent methods of doing cross examination. Each method has its systemic strengths and limitations. When done step by step, the systemic limitation inherent in one method promises to remedy systemic limitations from other methods. Lü's premise is that an unconscious imposition would have an incredibly low possibility to pass the test of all seven independent modes of comparison. At its very least, with this intricate web of comparison, this procedure maximizes the potential to expose both intentional manipulation and hidden prejudice,[8] primarily through cumulatively examination of a large number of relevant passages. Moreover, when practiced together as a group, each interpretation is thereby exposed to organized scrutiny. In this way, a reading could then be transformed into well-tested communal and salvific knowledge.

Equally important, this analytic method puts European objectivity under the philosophical gaze from both Qing evidential analysis and Buddhist philosophical investigation.[9] As a result, Lü' comparative gaze dethroned European philologists from their pedestal of comparing without being compared. Firstly, Lü's new formulation of science redefined objectivity as the intersubjective agreements engendered by common karmic seeds. I defer my discussion of Yogācāra terminologies such as intersubjective agreements and common karmic seeds to Chapter Six. In the current chapter, it suffices to know that, one of the fundamental features of Yogācāra soteriology is that Yogācāra reframes the commonsensical duality of the subjective and the objective in terms of dependent-origination (Skt: *pratītyasamutpāda*). Dependent-origination is an etiological explanation of moral agency and worldly benefits without positing external objects. This Yogācāra causal enframing not only refashions social oneness into karmic interdependence but also supplies Lü a more defensible

[8] When ambiguities remained even after all seven steps of cross-examination, Lü Cheng's typically deferred to Ouyang's interpretation while waiting for further evidence to confirm or disprove the hypothesis in question. Although he never expressed any disagreement with Ouyang, he openly challenged Wang Enyang's defense of Ouyang's reading. I will discuss this episode later in this chapter.

[9] For the import of logic and philosophy in Lü's methodology, see also Chen-kuo Lin, "The Uncompromising Quest for Genuine Buddhism," in *Transforming Consciousness*, 344. For a good summary of the variety of the Buddhist hermeneutics see, Donald Lopez, ed. *Buddhist Hermeneutics* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 1988).

philosophical foundation of intersubjectivity. Once the ontology of scientific inquiry is relocated into the realm of intersubjectivity, then the quest for accuracy becomes the search for maximizing intersubjective agreement.

To maximize intersubjective agreement, Lü proposed to combine all existing hermeneutic methods into one analytic system. In Lü's seven-step interpretative matrix, each of the seven cross examinations can find its predecessor in Buddhist scholastic methods, Qing Chinese evidential scholarship, or European philology.[10] Nevertheless, when reassembled into a new procedure, European philology loses its primacy and is reduced to one of the many.

At the same time, remaking scientific objectivity as intersubjective rigor also resolved the thorny issue of translatedness. Lü reframed translatedness as situatedness—a local instantiation of the doctrinal oneness. In Lü's paradigm, each translation is a localized instance of the ineffable realization of the Buddha. On the one hand, once all words became mere translations, all Buddhist texts were put on equal footing without presuming an urtext because the only "original" is a doctrinal whole that is beyond words.[11] On the other hand, this new interpretative technology also maximized the strength of the Chinese canon. Chinese translations were crucial in revealing the doctrinal whole precisely because of the more than two thousand years of translation enterprise that preserved copious Buddhist texts. This Chinese corpus includes multiple translations of different transmissions of the same Indian text, abundant variant translations of terminologies and proper names, extensive commentaries, catalogs, as well as edited anthologies.[12] With Lü's new technology in hand, the unruly

[10] Lü Cheng, "Dachengjing bijiao du fa" 大乘經比較讀法 [Comparative Hermeneutics in Reading Mahayana Sūtras], *Inner Learning* 1 (December 1924): 13.

[11] For Lü's defense of all words as mere translations, see Lü, *Fodian fanlun* 佛典汎論 [A Summary of Buddhist Scriptures] (Shanghai: The Commercial Press, October 1925), folio 5–9. In these pages, Lü analyzed the possible language spoken by the Buddha, the languages that his disciples used to recite sūtras and vinayas, as well as the languages might be used in the first and second Saṅgītī (assembly) when the Buddha's teachings became standardized.

[12] For Lü's praise of the quality of Chinese translations, see Lü, *Fodian fanlun*, folio 17. Note that this is a qualified praise, he only claimed so after pointing out the myriad complications in Chinese translational practices, Lü, *Fodian fanlun*, folio 12–17. These complications prompted Lü to engage with philology, Buddhology, and Western textual criticism so to excavate soteriological knowledge. Lü also made similar comments in his 1926 booklet, see Lü, *Fojiao yanjiu fa* 佛教研究法 [Methodologies in Studying Buddhism] (Shanghai: The Commercial Press, 1926), folio 4. These evaluations of Chinese translation enterprise are

Chinese canon is transformed into a goldmine teeming with snippets of salvific knowledge to be unearthed by attentive scholars.

I choose the mining metaphor to foreground the methodological vigor implicit in Lü Cheng's project. At first glance, it severely undercuts the interpretative authority of traditional Chinese hermeneutics. It thereby calls to mind the cruelty exercised by German Indologists to dismiss Vedic and Indian Buddhist interpretative authenticity. However, I would like to caution against such a cursory conclusion. In contrast to mining for exploitive purposes, the vigor in Lü's methods expresses a soteriological imperative. Lü mined the Buddhist canon with a discerning eye: He aimed to consider more fully the pragmatics of concepts in daily life. Following Sally Haslanger's distinctions of different research approaches, it is clear that Lü's method is fundamentally an analytic approach and asks pragmatic questions: "What is the point of having these concepts? What cognitive or practical tasks do they or should they enable us to accomplish? Are they effective tools to accomplish our legitimate purposes; if not, what concepts would serve these purposes better?"[13] After all, Lü combined Chinese hermeneutics on equal footing with Buddhological methods. This combinatory approach is in stark contrast with the German Indologists' dismissal of indigenous interpretation. Lü's attitude toward scholarship is also different: In contrast with feigned objectivity and disinterestedness, Lü was explicit and self-reflexive of his goal—excavating soteriological information for a communism of Buddhist knowledge. For Lü, the point of Yogācāra doctrines was to theorize a defensible sociality-

taken directly from Fukaura Seibun's work, which he first published in various journal articles in the early 1920s and later collected into a monograph. See Fukaura Seibun 深浦正文, *Bukkyo kenkyūho* 佛教研究法 (Tokyo: Seishin Shobo, 1963), 36–37. Note that Lü accentuated the Japanese evaluation of Chinese translation enterprise to suit his own agenda. In general, he significantly and systematically modified the Japanese evaluation of the history of Buddhism to suit the Inner Learning Institute's agenda. For a detailed analysis, see Ibuki Atsushi 伊吹敦, "Shina Naigaku In ni okeru Nihon bukkyō gaku juyō no ichi sokumen: Ryochyō henyaku "Indo bukkyō shiryaku" ni miru gensho no kaihen o chūshin ni" 支那內學院における日本佛教學受容の一側面: 呂澂編譯『印度佛教史略』に見る原書の改變を中心に [One Aspect of the China Inner Learning Institute's Reception of Japanese Buddhology: Seen from the Revision of the Original Works in *The Brief History of Indian Buddhism* edited and translated by Lü Cheng], *Tōyō shisō bunka* 東洋思想文化 5 (2018): 25–55.

[13] Sally Haslanger, "Gender and Race: (What) Are They?(What) Do We Want Them To Be?" *Noûs* 34, no. 1 (2000): 33.

cum-intersubjectivity so to establish an aesthetic society where everyone could fully develop their potential.

Lü first delivered his lecture "Comparative Hermeneutics in Reading Mahāyāna Sūtras" (Dacheng jing bijiao dufa 大乘經比較讀法) in the first research conference of the Institute in July 1923 and printed the revised notes in December 1924 in the first issue of the Institute's publication—*Inner Learning*.[14] Even though it was praised by Satō as one of the only three worthy Buddhological studies in *Inner Learning*,[15] this article was omitted by Lü in his 1991 self-selected five-volume anthology.[16] This decision becomes especially strange when considering that most of his other essays published in *Inner Learning* are incorporated into the 1991 anthology. This glaring omission forms a stark contrast with the centrality of this essay in understanding Lü's transition from aesthetics to Yogācāra.

Below, I demonstrate two forces that compelled Lü to develop this new methodology, which I term "comparative hermeneutics" (*bijiao dufa* 比較讀法). The first is the soteriological imperative to avoid interpretative solipsism. The other is the global consciousness of building a communism of soteriological knowledge. The first force stems from Lü's quest to theorize a social oneness in terms of phenomenological naturalism, undercutting the dominance of scientism and realism. The other force comes from Ouyang's aspiration to initiate a global Dharma for collective salvation. Pushed by these two forces, Lü devised comparative hermeneutics to elevate the global status of the Chinese canon. Indeed, under the gaze of Lü's new analytic tool, the Chinese canon metamorphosized from a messy assemblage of mistranslations to a storehouse of soteriological tools for collective emancipation.

[14] Lü Cheng, "Comparative Hermeneutics," 13–42.
[15] Satō Taijun, "Nanjing Inner Learning Institute," 149–56.
[16] According to the editor Li An 李安, Lü Cheng himself arranged the table of contents and decided on what shall be included and what shall not. See Lü Cheng, *Lü Cheng foxue lunzhu xuanji* 吕澂佛学论著选集 [Selected Works of Lü Cheng's Works on Buddhist Studies] (Jinan: Qilu shushe, 1991), preface. This anthology is central to this dissertation. From now on, when quoting it in the footnote, I will abbreviate it as Xuanji 1991.

The logic behind Lü Cheng's method also reveals to us the central factor in bringing forth this modern Yogācāra: the soteriological imperative to rid the world of ego and the search for a robust ontological foundation for intersubjectivity. As such, the new method is neither a mimicry of the positivist agenda in the science of philology nor a solipsist withdrawal into the occult self. Lü valued scientific rigor for its promise to minimize the subjective unconscious. He also appreciated the "ready-to-hand" aspect of technology that could activate a reproducible and transferrable way of establishing intersubjective resonance.[17] Religiosity, i.e., Lü Cheng's confidence in the salvific power of Yogācāra, instead of hindering critical thinking, became the seedbed to germinate a new Buddhist learning accepted by the international Buddhological circle as one of its own.

From Social Oneness to Doctrinal Oneness

To theorize an intersubjective social oneness, Lü first worked to establish the truth of a doctrinal oneness. The 1924 essay marked this fundamental conceptual transition in Lü's thought: from a quest for universal aesthetic principles to a new conception of a doctrinal whole to be excavated from the Buddhist canon. Lü named the Buddha's ineffable insight "the perfectly realized inner learning" (*yuanzheng zhi Neixue* 圓證之內學). He further asserted that, to reach this inexpressible oneness, one must thoroughly penetrate and cohere all extant words of the Buddha.[18] Not surprisingly, under this rubric, to penetrate and cohere all extant words of the Buddha, one must rely on thorough comparative analyses. After an extensive textual analysis in this 1924 essay, Lü identified original quiescence (*xingji* 性寂) as the doctrinal oneness that grounds the truth of his Yogācāra social theory. Existing studies of the modern debate of original quiescence and original enlightenment exclusively treat it as a doctrinal debate between Yogācāra Buddhists and New Confucians.[19] My analysis in this

[17] I am borrowing the Heideggerian interpretation of technology. For details of "ready-to-hand" aspect of technology, see for example, Don Ihde, *Heidegger's Technologies: Postphenomenological Perspectives* (New York: Fordham University, 2010), 43–55.

[18] Lü Cheng, "Comparative Hermeneutics," 13.

[19] Many scholars have written on this debate. For a complete English translation of these letters, see Chen-kuo Lin, "The Uncompromising Quest for Genuine Buddhism: Lü Cheng's Critique of Original Enlightenment," 360–74.

subsection discloses that Lü's participation in this debate had less to do with defending Yogācāra against Confucianism but instead was motivated by his socio-soteriological quest.

The linchpin to foreground the soteriological intent in his method is a redefinition of historicity as interdependence. Instead of conjecturing history as objective facts on a linear timeline, in this 1924 essay, Lü formulated historical reality as interconnected sequences (*cidi* 次第). Recall that, in 1922, Lü criticized Bergson for mistaking the "illusion" of time as really existing while also simultaneously called for thorough studies of art history. The puzzle is, how do you find out historical facts without relying on a stable sense of time? In 1924, Lü finally clarified his stance: Time is part and parcel of intersubjective agreements about sequential connections.

Concerning the particular issues in studying Mahāyāna sūtras, Lü further elaborated that the first step to uncover historicity should be a holistic and accurate mapping of historical and philosophical variations of extant Buddhist translations. To distinguish legends, myths, or fiction from actual causal links, Lü Cheng laid out three layers of interlinked sequences. These interlinked sequences form the basis for different cross examinations: the logical sequences of dispensing Dharma, the sequences of skillful means appropriate to students' capacities, and the transmission sequences resulted from historical and geographical variations.[20] To disentangle all these layers of changes and to unveil the hidden threads weaving Mahayana sūtras together, Lü Cheng argued that one must thoroughly explicate these complex interconnections without losing the panoramic view. Like historians who cautions against mistaking correlations as causal relations, Lü Cheng viewed these sequential links as clues leading to a soteriological solution: penetrating the mirage of variations and correlations with logic and reason in order to reach the doctrinal oneness. [21] Naturally, comparative hermeneutics becomes the tool tailored for this task.

The use of *cidi* carries soteriological significance. It directly reframes history as a never-ending process in which the message of the Buddha continues to unfold and to be renewed in order to revert the continuing unfolding of worldly sufferings. To see through these three interconnected

[20] Lü Cheng, "Comparative Hermeneutics," 13–14.
[21] Lü Cheng, "Comparative Hermeneutics," 14.

layers of sequences, Lü Cheng stressed two broad perspectives. One is the cultural-soteriological perspective, which attends to details such as when and where and to whom a text was preached. The other is the philosophical-soteriological perspective, measuring the authenticity of the words according to the three Dharma seals (*san fayin* 三法印), namely, un-satisfactoriness, impermanence, and not-self.

Nevertheless, ultimately, for Lü, the soteriological perspective reigns supreme: To authenticate the historicity of Mahāyāna teachings, one must use the three dharma seals to measure the soteriological efficacy.[22] In one stroke, Lü subsumed historical and philosophical studies into the soteriological quest of inner learning.[23] The newness of his method lies in its systematic comparison of all similar passages and terms among all scriptures to pinpoint a text's actual position in the three-layered sequences of Buddhist transmission.

To subsume Buddhology into soteriology, Lü directly challenged the closeness of a sūtra and instead argued for the imperative to put all Buddhist texts under the lens of comparison.[24] In early modern China, Buddhist hermeneutics often presume the inherent closedness and completeness of each sūtra on its own.[25] This assumption of a sūtra as a perfect instantiation of Dharmakāya calls to mind the correlative thinking that sees the body as a cosmos on a small scale. Its underlying logic is a concept of self-similarity, i.e., the whole is seen as structurally similar to its part. This correlative thinking is essential in East Asian literary cultures, where there has always been a ritual dimension

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[22] Lü Cheng, "Comparative Hermeneutics," 14–17.

[23] Lü was not unique. In 1954, when Monk Yinshun published his monograph *Yifofa yanjiu fofa* 以佛法研究佛法 [Employing Buddhist Dharma to Study Buddhist Dharma], he put forth a similar scholastic agenda, echoing Lü's call in 1923. To fully articulate the intellectual connections between Yinshun and Lü Cheng warrants a separate monograph. Monk Yinshun's works are all accessible online, http://www.mahabodhi.org/files/yinshun/index.html. The link for this 1954 monograph is here: http://www.mahabodhi.org/files/yinshun/22/yinshun22-00.html.

[24] Lü Cheng, "Comparative Hermeneutics," 14.

[25] As for "use one sūtra to interpret one sūtra" (*yi yijing du yijing* 以一經讀一經), Lü Cheng is most likely referring to a popular practice among Ming Qing literati who championed a form of textual spirituality and advocated "using the *Śūraṅgama Sūtra* to interpret the *Śūraṅgama Sūtra*," for details see Jiang Wu, *Enlightenment in Dispute*, chapter 2 "The Literati and Chan Buddhism," 47–83.

in reading, writing, and commenting on a classic, Buddhist or otherwise.[26] By assuming every sūtra as a perfect instantiation of a wholeness, the very act of copying, reading, and commenting enacts this instantiated small-scale wholeness. Under this rubric, the acts of ritualized reading and writing produce ethical and cosmological merits. In contrast, facts and knowledge were, at best, the secondary concerns in sustaining this kind of ritual community.

In contrast, Lü's epistemological shift necessitated a new conception of community, a textual community premised upon equal participation of moral inquiry. Lü Cheng considered that each text was a localized and thereby partial and corruptible instantiation of the doctrinal whole. Moreover, he believed that this oneness was only reachable through culling all remnant traces and clues embedded in localized texts. In this rubric, each text, instead of being treated as discrete, reified objects, must be read as particular instantiations of a much more extensive repertoire. In this repertoire, the individual text is but one of many realizations of a shared body of ideas and expressions gesturing toward the ineffable insight of the Buddha. Consequently, if each text embodies a partial truth tailored for a particular group and space-time, then, to reveal the universal soteriological principle, one must rely upon comparative hermeneutics practiced by a new interpretative community. This interpretative community calls to mind Lü's view of art critics whose in-between status linked together the artwork with the commoners. In this new textual community, facts and knowledge became the chief means to arrive at the whole picture. Simultaneously, collaboration and mutual critique under an agreed-upon analytic procedure became the central thread to sustain this new community.

With this insight in mind, history also takes on an extra layer of soteriological significance in Lü's social imaginary. Instead of a means to reveal objective facts, for Lü, the historical analysis is a means to achieve a new epistemic panorama. Lü argued that, in transmission sequences, one could

[26] In Chinese Buddhist traditions, there's a wide-spread practice which Wu Jiang terms "cult of canon" in relation to Chinese veneration of sacred texts, see Wu Jiang, "From the 'Cult of the Book' to the 'Cult of the Canon': A Neglected Tradition in Chinese Buddhism," in *Spreading Buddha's Word in East Asia*, 46–78. For the rituals of writing in Japanese traditions, see Bryan Lowe, *Ritualized Writing: Buddhist Practice and Scriptural Cultures in Ancient Japan* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2017), 2–3. Yang Shen, "Rethinking 'Traditions': Reading the Classics as Ritual," *Journal of Chinese Humanities* 1 (2015): 376–77.

identify similar contours of development in the logical sequences. According to this logic, studying the history of different Buddhist transmissions would help reveal the logical connections between different doctrines. To identify the logical connections, one must cross check variant translations seen from the historical perspective while attending to the internal discourses about historicity in Mahāyāna treatises.[27] In other words, history matters because of its referential value to reveal the logical sequences of Buddha's dispensation, which in turn assists one's discovery of the true intention of the Buddha.

Lü's theorization of historical consciousness, rather than taking a transcendent position of making comparisons without being compared, acknowledges its own situatedness in history and thereby impersonates a different kind of historical community—one that seeks to identify the permissible means of adapting the doctrinal whole for a specific locale through careful examination of historical precedents and one that seeks to instantiate and tailor the ineffable realization of the Buddha for their contemporaries. In other words, comparative hermeneutics becomes a technology for Lü to bring forth a communism of universal soteriological knowledge.

To maximize and sustain intersubjective agreements, Lü Cheng assembled seven known modes of cross examination into a new procedure.[28] I translate *bijiao* 比較 as "cross examination" for two reasons. The first is to highlight the analytic rigor implied in Lü Cheng's use. As a technical term, "comparison" cannot accurately convey Lü Cheng's idiosyncratic use that encompasses the meaning of identifying connections, patterns, and causalities. In Lü's employment of it, the dominant meaning of comparison is analysis with a skeptic attitude.[29] The second is to best capture the broad range of comparative strategies subsumed under this umbrella term. Depending on the passages under interrogation, *bijiao* could mean cross-index, point-by-point comparison, cross-examination, and cross-verification. All these techniques resemble well-known techniques of textual criticism but are

[27] Lü Cheng, "Comparative Hermeneutics," 15.
[28] Lü Cheng, "Comparative Hermeneutics," 19.
[29] I am aware of the dominant legal use of "cross examination" in English. However, I think this connotation works to highlight the skeptic stance behind any analysis and the sense of impersonal rigor intended by Lü Cheng's employment of this word.

most likely skills Lü adapted from Qing evidential studies. Despite the diverse comparative strategies conveyed by this word, they all share the underlying meaning of referring to something across certain preconceived boundaries, with a skeptical stance, hence "cross examination."

Each of the seven modes of cross examination represents an independent mode of analysis tailed to the textual qualities and history of the objects under consideration.[30] The first step is to acquire a synoptic comprehension, and the next six steps peel open the thicket of interpretations, layer by layer.

1) The cross examination of catalogs (*duikan mulu* 對勘目錄). The aim is to gain a panoramic view of the canon and its transmission history.

2) The cross examination of variant prints of the same sūtra (*tongjing yike zhi bijiao* 同經異刻之比較). This step is a point-by-point examination of printed variants. This step matters because it could reveal important economic and political interplays in the printing processes.

3) The cross examination of variant translations of the same sūtra (*tongjing yiyi zhi bijiao* 同經異譯之比較). The goal of this step is to clarify and preserve factual diversity as witnesses to logical, skillful, and transmission sequences, which will first help to identify correlations between multilingual translations with multiple variant Sanskrit texts and then reveal the logical sequences of doctrinal interpretations.[31]

While the previous three comparisons concerned with sūtras, the next three focus on commentaries. 4) The cross examination of variant commentaries (translated into or written in Chinese) of a sūtra accepted by different schools or commentarial traditions (*benjing shilun zhi bijiao* 本經釋論之比較). The analytic focus again is to illustrate the possibilities of multiple compilations of the Sanskrit texts subsumed under the same title by examining its transmission sequences.

5) The cross examination of different commentaries on variant editions of a sūtra (*tongjing yilun zhi bijiao* 同經異論之比較). This step entails a careful cross verification of different

[30] Notice here, Lü Cheng used the same word to describe six out of seven steps of cross examination
[31] Lü Cheng, "Comparative Hermeneutics," 25–26.

interpretations, which further highlights the importance of commentaries in elucidating the historical development of a certain sūtra.

The last two cross examinations further interrogate the "closedness" of a given scripture, in contrast with steps one to five that address one text as if it were a self-enclosed entity. Lü Cheng demonstrated his attentiveness to the fundamental openness of any Buddhist texts. Simply put, all Buddhist texts have complicated histories of oral recitation, compilation, collation, translation, and adaptation. As a scholar, Lü Cheng did not assume completeness of any scripture even when it is received as a closed text.

6) The cross examination of similar doctrines in different sūtras (*yijing tongyi zhi bijiao* 異經同義之比較). Here, Lü Cheng advised researchers to disentangle some of the hermeneutical nuances resulted from a constellation of similar concepts, especially parallels or feedback loops, in the process of transmission so that one could reach a fuller picture of a particular doctrine, which would then lead one closer to the doctrinal whole.

7) The cross examination of similar terminologies rendered in different sūtras (*yijing tongshi zhi bijiao* 異經同事之比較). Lü Cheng's use of *shi* 事 is idiosyncratic. Instead of the common meaning of *shi* as an event, Lü meant it to be something particular and concrete, more appropriately rendered as terminology. *Shi* is used in contrast with *yi* 義, an abstract concept that leads one up toward the doctrinal whole. The example Lü Cheng used to illustrate his definition of *shi* is *ālayavijñāna*, an essential term in Yogācāra. In cross-examining this term, Lü used six essential Yogācāra sūtras. Two of these sūtras have variant Chinese translations. After a lengthy cross check, Lü concluded as follows.

> …based on the sequences in the above chart, it is clear that the teachings of original purity (*xinxing benjing* 心性本淨) appeared first. Later, this pure mind was said to be Tathāgatagarbha. Next, Tathāgatagarbha was interpreted as the Buddha nature and the Dharmakāya. Later, Tathāgatagarbha became equated with pure consciousness (Skt: *āmalavijñāna*). This pure consciousness further evolved into ālayavijñāna when being polluted by illusions. Then, ālayavijñāna became ādānavijñāna (*atuona* 阿陀那)—the storehouse consciousness of all seeds.[32]

[32] Lü Cheng, "Comparative Hermeneutics," 40. This line of argument and this way of doing philology are unacceptable in contemporary academia. As clearly explained by Lambert Schmithausen in his seminal work on *ālayavijñāna*, given the plethora of close synonyms with storehouse consciousness and given the problem of dating of many Yogācāra texts, it is impractical to conduct an exhaustive study (which is what

This passage was the first time Lü Chen publicly presented his evidence for defending his claim that original quiescence (*xingji* 性寂) is the doctrinal whole and that the influential concept of original enlightenment (*xingjue* 性覺) in East Asia is a misconception.[33] In 1943, when Lü directly criticized Xiong Shili's 熊十力 (1885–1968) interpretation of Yogācāra, he recycled and defended his 1924 findings.[34]

Original quiescence lies at the heart of Lü's social imaginary. Using his own words in 1943: Original enlightenment would lead to a look inward (i.e. philosophical solipsism), and original quiescence would lead to renewal (i.e. soteriological and epistemic openness).[35] In other words, Lü's thorough scholarship is part and parcel of a socio-soteriological quest: to build a communism of Buddhist knowledge for renewing the society. Recall that, on June 22, 1922, when Wang Zhixin visited Ouyang and Lü, Wang valued Lü Cheng's epistemic openness by praising Lü's interpretation of Yogācāra as knowledge and truth that are "only for open examination by everyone." Written two years after Wang's impressionistic portrayal, Lü's 1924 essay on comparative hermeneutics discloses to us the concrete steps that Lü had taken to communalize Buddhist knowledge.

Lü Cheng attempted to do in this short essay) that link this term as both a distinctive label and an independent kind of consciousness (from six consciousnesses) with its Śrāvakayānist and Mahāyānist precursors. Schmithausen settles on a much more modest pursuit to map out the contexts and possible causes of the birth of the storehouse consciousness as a particular type of consciousness. See Lambert Schmithausen, *Ālayavijñāna: On the Origin and the Early Development of a Central Concept of Yogācāra Philosophy* (Tokyo: International Institute for Buddhist Studies, 1987), 9–10.

Note, however, most Chinese Yogācāra texts identify ādānavijñāna (which is also translated as *zhishou shi* 執受識 and *zhichi shi* 執持識, meaning "maintaining consciousness") with ālayavijñāna. For details, see DDB entry "阿陀那識" and "阿陀那." The identification of these two terms has soteriological implications.

[33] The topic is too broad to summarize here, for a manageable literature review on the emergence of original enlightenment in the Chinese context, see Jacqueline Stone, *Original Enlightenment and the Transformation of Medieval Japanese Buddhism* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press,1999), 3–10.

[34] Note that Lü Cheng never directly get involved in the debate about Xiong Shili's *Xin weishi lun* 新唯識論 [A New Treatise of Consciousness-Only] (Beijing: The Commercial Press, 2010 [1932]). But after Ouyang passed away in February 1943, Lü Cheng was angered by Xiong's disrespect of Ouyang and penned a series of articles to defend Ouyang's position. The earliest publication on this topic was a May 1949 article, published in a journal sponsored by an instituted established by Liang Shuming. Lü Cheng, "*Qixin* yu *Lengqie*"《起信》與《楞伽》[*Awakening Faith* and *Laṅkâvatāra Sūtra*], *Mianren wenxuyuan yuankan* 勉仁文學院院刊 [The Journal of the Mianren Institute of Literature] 1 (May 1949): folio 1–5. For details of this institute, see QGBKSY search word "勉仁文学院."

[35] For a brief analysis of the social implication for Lü, see Lin Chen-kuo, "The Uncompromising Quest for Genuine Buddhism," 360–74.

The effectiveness of Lü's reading technology could be attested by his discovery of the intertextual relation between *Yogācārabhūmi*'s section on *Vastusaṃgrahaṇī* (*She shi fen* 攝事分) (fascicles 83–98) and *Saṃyuktāgama*, a discovery that Mukai Akira 向井亮 rediscovered sixty years later.[36] This finding was first published in his essay "Report on Collating *Saṃyuktāgama*" (Za'ahanjing kanding ji 雜阿含經刊定記). Contemporary scholars also confirm the scholarly value of Lü's 1924 contribution. As is well-known, the Chinese translations of *Saṃyuktāgama* have long been deemed inferior, disorganized, replete with mistranslations, especially in contrast with their Pāli counterparts. This view became dominant because most Buddhologists at the time considered the Pāli Nikāyas as the "original."[37] Instead of buying into this putative origin story, Lü looked into the *mātṛka* (mother, or matrix; variously translated as *modalijia* 摩怛理迦, *mujing* 母經, *benmu* 本母) of *Yogācārabhūmi* for clues of organizing these ancient sūtras. Although Lü Cheng's discovery has been superseded by later scholarship,[38] it is undeniable that this discovery revealed a critical transitional stage from early Indian sectarian Buddhism to the rise of Yogācāra.

More importantly, I argue that what prompted Lü Cheng to investigate mātṛka in the first place was neither purely scholarly pleasure nor a quest for an urtext. Instead, I argue that Lü was driven by a desire to produce the soteriological authenticity of Yogācāra teachings. This soteriological

[36] Mukai Akira, "Yugashichiron no setsukotobun to Zatsuagongyō," 1–41.

[37] See for example, Masaharu Anesaki 姉崎正治, "The four Buddhist Āgamas in Chinese: A Concordance of Their Parts and of the Corresponding Counterparts in the Pāli Nikāyas," *The Transaction of the Asiatic Society of Japan* 35, no. 3 (1908): 1–148. Anesaki published a series of pilot studies on similar topic before this article, trying to reorganize Chinese Āgamas according to Pāli Nikāyas. For a detailed analysis of Anesaki's comparative studies, see Tai-shing Wut 屈大成, "Ziqi Zhengzhi youguan Zaahan zhengbian zhi yanjiu" 姉崎正治有關《雜阿含》整編之研究 [A study of Masaharu Anesaki's rearranging the order of Chinese Saṃyuktāgama], *Yuan Kuang Journal of Buddhist Studies* 26 (2015): 155–80.

[38] For the cutting-edge research and publication concerning Āgama studies, see the following website: http://agamaresearch.dila.edu.tw/agama-group. One methodological issue in Lü's article was the circular logic of using Yogācārabhūmi to organize Āgama and then to use their relation to prove the authenticity of Yogācāra, see, Bhikkhu Anālayo, *A Comparative Study of the Majjhima-nikāya* Vol. 2. (Taipei: Dharma Drum, 2011), 697–98 footnote 69. In this footnote, Anālayo cited monk Yinshun's work on Āgamas, but Yinshun clearly based his research on Lü Cheng's finding. It is important to point out that Lü Cheng never argued this was the final and only way of organizing Āgamas, all he concluded was that *Yogācārabhūmi* derived its doctrines on one sectarian tradition of Āgamas, which he later identified as Mahīśāsaka. Yogācāra's textual link to an early Indian Buddhist sect, for him, establishes the historical link between early Buddhism and Yogācāra school.

drive was revealed in another essay in the 1924 issue of *Inner Learning*, one that was not only excluded by Lü Cheng himself in his 1991 anthology but also overlooked by Satō in his 1926 review.

This critical essay is titled "Main Points of *Acclamation of the Holy Teaching*" (*Xianyangshengjiaolun* dayi 顯揚聖教論大意).[39] In the opening passages, Lü Cheng repeatedly stressed the *Yogācārabhūmi*'s internal rhetoric to justify of its own authenticity: Because it used the four Āgamas as its *mātṛka*—the mother of its doctrines—therefore, Yogācāra was neither Mahāyāna nor Hīnayāna, neither emptiness or existence, but the same with the four Āgamas. Taking cues from this internal rhetoric, Lü compared the *mātṛka* of *Yogācārabhūmi* and proved the historicity of this internal narrative. Not surprisingly, he fell short in contextualizing this internal rhetoric within a broader external social milieu, and instead simply celebrated this insider's view as a proof for the "holy teaching" of Yogācāra.[40] In the rest of this essay, Lü Cheng explicated the main points of this text through the traditional Chinese commentarial outline (*kepan* 科判). Given the soteriological fervor and the lack of Buddhological rigor in this essay, it is not surprising that Satō ignored Lü's article on the *Acclamation of the Holy Teaching*. In contemporary academia, many scholars celebrated Lü's scholarly achievement in discovering the link between *Āgamas* and *Yogācārabhūmi*. However, I must point out that, what motivated Lü's scholarly venture into this project was Lü's soteriological conviction that *mātṛka* was the key to establish the authenticity of Yogācāra.

Despite its soteriological goal, this interpretative technology bore the hallmark of Buddhology. With this ready-to-hand *technē*, the canon is transformed into a gold mine of authentic Buddha's insight, waiting to be excavated by a group of like-minded learners and to be carried further for releasing all from the snare of materialistic dreams. Instead of treating Buddhist texts as stable objects, this new *technē* encourages the researcher to heed to the fluidity of texts in their processes of transmission. Further, it not only sharpens the researcher's sensibility toward the communities

[39] Lü Cheng, "Xianyang shengjia lun dayi" 顯揚聖教論大意 [Main Points of *Acclamation of the Holy Teaching*], *Inner Learning* 1 (1924): 87–105. For the importance of this treatise T1602 in Yogācāra in East Asia, see DDB entry "顯揚聖教論" and the reference cited there. For the still contested relation between this text and *Yogācārabhūmi*, see Schmithausen, *Ālayavijñāna*, 261–62 (footnote 99).

[40] Lü Cheng, "Main Points of *Acclamation*," 87–88.

and traditions where varied textual practices were pursued but also broadens the researcher's purview by demanding comprehensive comparison.

Scientific Method and Intersubjective Cross Examination

I have demonstrated that, for Lü Cheng, the motivating question has always been "What is scholarship for?" His answer has always been consistent: Scholarship is for making a more livable world. In this section, I further illustrate this continual socio-soteriological motive after he transitioned into Buddhist studies. I unveil Lü's secret for being accepted as both a Buddhologist and a Buddhist. This secret is his implicit redefinition of science as intersubjective agreements established through rigorous comparison. Without a clear understanding of this implicit redefinition, we cannot fully capture the radical nature of comparative hermeneutics and Lü's anti-realist social project.

Throughout his intellectual life, Lü Cheng identified his own approach as scientific. However, in the wake of May Fourth, science was a site of contestation.[41] Buddhology,[42] Bergsonism, as well as Pragmatism, were all respected representatives of Mr. Science in this era. Given the indeterminate and evolving meaning of science at the time, we must analyze and pinpoint precisely what Lü meant when he claimed to be scientific in different stages of his career. We must also recognize that Lü never considered science from the perspectives of positivism and historicism.[43] As I have demonstrated in Chapter Two, Lü was dissatisfied with social Darwinism and science that left little room for human

[41] For broader Buddhists claims to be scientific, see Hammerstrom, *The Science of Chinese Buddhism*. For the rise of the popular narrative of Buddhism as the religion of science, see Donald Lopez, *Buddhism & Science: A Guide for the Perplexed*, (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2008).

[42] Buddhology is a branch of philology and philology (together with its predecessor textual-criticism) is one of the first humanistic discipline to acquire a scientific character. For a general history of philology and its complex relation with science, see D. C. Greetham, *Textual Scholarship: An Introduction* (New York: Garland, 1992), 295–346.

[43] By positivism, I refer to a broad range of doctrines concerning the philosophy and practices of science that became hugely popular in the 1920s and 1930s. It has been labeled as logical positivism, empiricism, scientism, and many others. In general, positivist doctrines are strongly anti-metaphysics (many consider metaphysical statements are not true or false but meaningless). These positivist doctrine also promote a scientific world-conception and dismiss any untestable statements. I consider the upwelling popularity of Mr. Science in the May Fourth China a branch of this philosophical school. For a general review of this school of thought, see, Creath, Richard, "Logical Empiricism," The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2020 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2020/entries/logical-empiricism/>.

agency in building an ideal society. Therefore, he launched an anti-realist aesthetic revolution to expose the untenability of an "objective" material world and to awaken the people from their materialist slumber. Lü's approach to philosophy of science is decisively anti-positivist. At the same time, the soteriological imperative to avoid solipsism fueled Lü Cheng's quest for an impersonal method of reading, which he defined as the essence of being scientific.

For Lü, to engage in the scientific enterprise was about sustaining the intersubjective relationality in society. In his imagined aesthetic society, other minded creatures, instead of its premodern role as beings waiting to be emancipated, adopted an active function. Other living beings became a crucial soteriological tool to keep oneself out of the solipsist trap. In Buddhist traditions, employing other beings as a tool for individual liberation is a well-tested spiritual technology. The eighth-century Indian philosopher Śāntideva already devised a detailed meditation of "exchanging self and other" to cleanse out egotism.[44] The lasting popularity of his *Bodhicaryāvatāra* in both East Asian and Tibetan Buddhism attests to the lasting efficacy of this method. However, in contrast to the preeminence of meditative experience in Śāntideva's text, in Lü Cheng's inner learning, religious epiphany could no longer sanction authenticity. When both the objective outside and the subjective inside were jettisoned, Lü imagined other minded creatures as nexus of a stable network of different streams of consciousness.

For Lü, to establish an intersubjective oneness, one must rely on the methodological rigor. The method itself, by cultivating pure seeds and distinguishing impure seeds in the consciousness, could brighten the universal moral agency necessary for building an aesthetic society. Like premodern Yogācāra philosophers, Lü took the moral agency in minded beings as inherent agentive karmic seeds stored in *ālayavijñāna*, despite his rejection of an ontological self or objective world or a divine principle as the bearer of this agency. Nevertheless, unlike premodern Buddhist thinkers, Lü Cheng reoriented Yogācāra doctrines for an individual soteriological quest into a justification for an

[44] For a summary of how other beings work in this path to liberation, Paul Williams, "General Introduction," in *The Bodhicaryāvatāra*, vii–xxvi.

ideal society. I will analyze Lü's mature doctrinal formulation in in Chapters Six and Seven. In this subsection, I sketch out Lü's inchoate thinking on the ideal sociality that he would like to establish.

In his new sociality, each sentient creature as one nexus in the web of the collective agency is easy prey to selfish desires, hidden bias, and unconscious limitations. However, when all subscribed to an impartial method of distinguishing true from false, pure from impure, then each could function as a beam of light for the other. Systematic comparison protects the purity of moral agency, but only when everybody practices it.

In Lü's new sociality, sentient beings are not the sole medium of moral agency. Similar to created objects such as artworks, texts are also an axiological medium, which promise to awaken the innate ethical sensitivity in all conscious beings.[45] Therefore, in Lü Cheng's rubric, the consensus in transmitted texts is taken seriously, as the cornerstone for establishing an intersubjective collective. For example, in the comparative studies of catalogs, Lü Cheng considered the Chinese and Tibetan catalogs useful even though their classification systems never existed in India, and many sūtras do not easily fit into these categories.[46] According to Lü, their heuristic value located in the overall agreement between the Chinese catalog and the classification system in Tibetan Kangur.[47] Implicit in this assumption is the common sense that if two independently developed traditions came into an agreement, then one should give that agreement more weight.

In addition, because texts were created objects, under Lü's rubric of doctrinal oneness, they were merely localized, limited instantiations. To understand the principles of adapting the ineffable for local circumstances, Lü Cheng paid particular attention to the immediate interpretative

[45] The createdness entails both being written and being transmitted through recitation. This is because in pre-Song China, the authenticity of a translation was largely premised upon the authenticity of the "translator" who was really the foreign monk who recited Buddhist teachings, for details see for example, Tanya Storch, *The History of Chinese Buddhist Bibliography: Censorship and Transformation of the Tripitaka* (Amherst; New York: Cambria Press, 2014), 3.

[46] The history of Doctrinal Classification in India, China, and Tibet is too broad to be effectively summarized here. Lü Cheng here only briefly mentioned the consistency between Chinese Doctrinal classification and the historical development of early Indian Buddhism. I understood it as his educated guess that Tibetan and Chinese classifications, though came later, could still be a good starting point to find out more about the history of early Indian Buddhism.

[47] Lü Cheng, "Comparative Hermeneutics," 18–19.

communities that produced these texts, highlighting the sources of moral agency that inhabited these produced works. In both the initial comparative examination of catalogs and the following six kinds of contextualization that Lü only mentioned in passing after laying out the six kinds of cross examination, Lü Cheng called our attention to the particular region, lineage, and historical period in which these interpreters and transmitters lived as well as the editorial choices went into the making of these texts.[48] Lü attended to these circumstances because he needed to contextualize a particular interpretation for reassembling the doctrinal whole.

Thus, Lü effectively redefined science as rigorous moral inquiry: an impersonal interpretative technology to reach the doctrinal oneness. This new interpretative technology provides Lü a powerful means to envision a global Dharma where every local tradition has a legitimate presence. It is fruitless to justify Lü's cosmopolitanism as a defensible political system both because Lü never cared much about politics and because the circular logic in Lü Cheng's method is self-evident. He first assumed the existence of a doctrinal coherence, then devised an impersonal technology to "discover" this presumed oneness. As a philosophical system, the circularity only reveals the inherent underdetermination in any system of thought. However, incompleteness does not undermine its coherence. In contrast, as a social theory, the circularity makes Lü's system lack of convincing power.[49] However, this circularity does not undermine its social function: refuting historicism. At the time, the Buddhological method manufactured a historical wholeness of Buddhism, from the alleged origin to the present day. Challenged by this historicism that leaves no room for Chinese Buddhism, Lü countered the historical wholeness with a doctrinal oneness that subsumed actual historical changes, hypothetical historical situations, and philosophical variations into a bigger and more complete picture. While both grand artifices of historicism and doctrinal oneness would crumble under further scholarly scrutiny, Lü's imagined doctrinal whole nonetheless offered a promising outlook of multiculturalism without Western universalism.

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[48] Lü Cheng, "Comparative hermeneutics," 18–19, 42.

[49] However, Lü's failure to theorize a political system based on Yogācāra causal enframing does not necessarily mean no defensible political theory could be establish upon the ontology of dependent-origination.

Furthermore, the social characteristics of comparative hermeneutics also predetermined its precariousness. Because comparative hermeneutics will only work if everyone subscribes to it, without a concerted effort and a devoted group, it will remain a shadow in ink. This was indeed its fate. As attested by the three different conference notes detailing three debates in this institute during 1923–1924, Lü Cheng was alone in applying this new reading technology.

Even more troublesome, Lü's research findings became either weaponized or ignored. For example, in the second research conference in 1924, the theme was *Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra* and its relation to *Awakening Faith.* An unnamed student questioned the authenticity of *Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra* because it taught the doctrine of perfuming of thusness, a key teaching in *Awakening Faith* that was discredited by the institute. Because *Awakening Faith* was known to be an indigenous concoction, a natural deduction would be that *Laṅkāvatāra* was also indigenous.[50] Lü Cheng put forth his argument that the wrong conceptions in *Awakening Faith* stemmed from Bodhiruci's (6th C.E.) mistranslations of the Sanskrit text.[51] Scholars of modern Chinese Buddhism could immediately identify the import of this argument, as the controversy of *Awakening Faith* was arguably one of most vehement and long-lasting doctrinal contestation in modern Chinese Buddhism.[52] However, it is crucial to note that Lü Cheng never directly participated in this debate as it was unfolding in the 20s and 30s. Rather, most of his articles on this topic were published after 1949. Lü participated in this debate indirectly. Ouyang vouchsafed Lü's argument at the end of this 1924 conference. The effect is that Lü Cheng's philological and doctrinal analysis became weaponized for other students of the institute to launch

[50] Lü Cheng, Feng Chaoru, *et.al.*, "Lengqie busiyi xunbian wei xianshi yi" 楞伽不思議熏變為現識義 [The Meaning of Transforming Inconceivable Perfuming into Manifesting Consciousness in Laṅkâvatāra Sūtra], *Inner Learning* 1 (1924): 267–70.

[51] For a more detailed doctrinal analysis of Lü Cheng's position on *Awakening Faith*, see Aviv, "Differencing the Pearl," 149–55. However, Aviv only used materials published after 1949, and mistook Lü Cheng as one of the major participants of this debates.

[52] This was a huge controversy in Republican Japanese and Chinese Buddhist communities. It started with Funahashi Suisai's 舟橋水哉 article in 1906, which questions the *Awakening Faith* as made-in-China, and many Japanese scholars followed suit. Ouyang was often seen as the one sparked this controversy in China by championing Funahashi Suisai and Mochizuki Shinkō's 望月信亨 (1869－1948) view, for details, see Aviv, "Differentiating the Pearl," 130–65; and Gao Zhennong 高振農, *Dasheng qixinlun jiaoshi* 大乘起信論校釋 [The Annotated Awakening of Faith] (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1992), 18–20.

their direct attack on monk Taixu, Tang Dayuan, and monk Yinshun who defended the authenticity of *Awakening Faith*.[53]

When Lü Cheng's arguments challenged Ouyang's convictions, however, Ouyang simply dodged the question by calling for further research instead of taking seriously Lü Cheng's analysis. The rest of the two conference records demonstrate these dynamics. For example, in the fourth research conference, Wang Enyang challenged Lü Cheng's disproval of the two means of knowledge in Bhāviveka's *Karatala-ratna* (*Dacheng zhangzhen* lun 大乘掌珍論; T 1578).[54] Ouyang considered Bhāviveka's teaching as unquestionable and brushed off Lü Cheng's analysis by declaring that *hetuvidyā* (Buddhist logic) should not be considered as secular logic.

Despite the initial failure to gain support from his cohort in the Institute, Lü pushed on with his project, redoubling his effort to convince others through rigorous comparison. The debate that happened during the fifth research conference is central to Lü Cheng's soteriological project. The central question in this debate was whether suchness (*zhenru* 真如) could be an indirectly perceived objective basis (*shu suoyuanyuan* 疏所緣緣). As is well-known, in Xuanzang's *Establishing Vijñānamātra*, the objective basis of perception (Skt: *ālambanam-pratyaya*; Ch: *suoyuanyuan* 所緣緣) is divided into two aspects, the directly perceived (*qin suoyuanyuan* 親所緣緣) and the indirectly perceived objective basis. To cut a long story short, these two terms are employed by Xuanzang to explain the existence of both seemingly real objects such as rivers and mountains and the existence of other minds. Indirectly perceived object is employed to explain the circumstances wherein the consciousness depends on the objects brought forth by other consciousnesses, or the objects transformed by one's own discriminating consciousness through grasping onto the objective aspect of one's own *ālayavijñāna*.[55] A good example is the eye consciousness that mistakes the paintings created by another stream of *ālayavijñāna* as really existing objects. This discussion happened during

[53] For a summary of Monk Taixu and Tang Dayuan's positions, see Aviv, "Differentiating the Pearl," 157–63. For Yinshun's position, see Shi Yinshun 釋印順 (1906–2005), *Dasheng qixin lun jiangji* 大乘起信論講記 [Lectures on the Awakening of Faith] (Xinzhu: Fuyan jingshe, 1972).

[54] Lü Cheng and Wang Enyang, "Zhangzhenlun erliang zhensi yi" 掌珍論二量真似義 [The Evaluation of True or False of the Dvi-pramāṇa in *Karatala-ratna*], *Inner Learning* 1 (1924): 271–78.

[55] For an incisive explanation of these terms, see Foguang dacidian 佛光大辭典, search term "疏所緣緣."

the fifth research conference when Lü Cheng proposed to discuss a claim made by another Buddhist revolutionary Huang Jusu 黃居素(1897–1986).[56]

In the ensuing discussion, Lü took pains to prove that suchness, both in its absolute sense (*shixing zhenru* 實性真如) and its objective aspect (*faxiang zhenru* 法相真如) can be an indirectly perceived object.[57] More importantly, Lü trusted that the suchness perceived by bodhisattvas who achieved subsequent awareness (Skt: *pṛṣṭha-labdha-jñāna*; Ch: *houdezhi* 後得智)[58] could be an indirectly perceived objective support grasped by ordinary beings. The critical doctrinal underpinning of Lü Cheng's position is that objective support is describing what can be grasped as really existing.[59] Chen Zhenru, another Buddhist revolutionary,[60] summarized Huang's assertion. Chen claimed that both Huang and Lü were right because absolute suchness cannot be an indirectly perceived object (thereby affirming Huang's point and misreading Lü's point), and the objective aspect of suchness can be an indirectly perceived object. Wang Enyang, on the other hand, was trying to prove that both Huang and Lü were wrong in that they both mischaracterized the two kinds of suchness. However, the central thrust of Chen, Huang, and Wang's objections was that if the suchness as perceived by the subsequent awareness could be grasped by ordinary beings as indirectly perceived objective supports, then because indirectly perceived objects require substance, to make

[56] We do not know much about Huang Jusu. However, there were several newspaper articles published in 1931 mocking Huang's mixing of politics and Buddhism, his connections with the Inner Learning Institute, his friendship with Chen Mingshu 陳銘樞. See, Yunyun 雲雲, "Huang Jusu bie zhuan" 黃居素別傳, *Shehui ribao* 社会日报 [The Social Daily News] (March 14, 1931): 1. He Manzi 河滿 子, "Huang Jusu bie zhuan bu" 黃居素別傳補, *Shehui ribao* 社会日报 [The Social Daily News] (March 16, 1931): 1. A key word search in QGBKSY with "黃居素" will also give many entries detailing Huang's political appointments in the 1920s and 1930s.

[57] Lü Cheng and Chen Zhengru, "Zhenru zuoshu suoyuanyuan yi" 真如作疏所緣緣義 [The Meaning of Thusness as the Indirectly Perceived Object], *Inner Learning* 1 (1924): 279–86.

[58] This is an established terminology in early Yogācāra teachings, its full expression is *pṛṣṭha-labdha-śuddha-laukika-jñāna*, which translates into subsequent mundane pure awareness. It specifically refers to way of seeing after one realizes the non-conceptual and ineffable perfected nature of things that nonetheless allows the enlightened being to function in samsara by seeing dependently arising things as essenceless.

[59] Lü Cheng and Chen Zhengru, "Zhenru zuo shusuoyuanyuan yi" 真如作疏所緣緣義, 283.

[60] His name is Chen Mingshu 陳銘樞. For his political career, see QGBKSY, search word "陳銘樞."

suchness available to be grasped as indirectly perceived objects would equate suchness with substance, which was a heterodox for Buddhists.[61]

To understand why this obscure doctrine mattered so much to Lü Cheng, one must recall Lü's aesthetic revolution. In this early phase of the revolution, Lü argued that absolute Beauty, as perceived by artists and materialized through their artwork, could awaken the innate aesthetic sensibility of the viewers and thereby expand the viewers' aesthetic potential. Art critics, similarly, by translating the visual and tonal experiences of absolute Beauty into verbal expressions, could further inspire future artists and expand the reach of the artwork. On the one hand, if one assumes that only the objective aspect of Beauty—a shadow or reflection of the ultimate reality—could be indirectly perceived by unenlightened beings, ordinary beings must go through a miraculous leap to reach the absolute. On the other hand, if other beings could indirectly perceive the absolute as expressed through the artists' subsequent awareness, then commoners could reach to the absolute without any leap of faith. Therefore, in Lü Cheng's vision, the absolute, as embodied in the subsequent awareness of the bodhisattva, must function as an indirectly perceivable object to unenlightened beings. Otherwise, ordinary beings would not reach the ultimate through appreciating artwork and reading Buddhist texts.

To deny the access to the absolute through other consciousnesses is to admit that the sacred texts are mere shadows of suchness in ink, the interpreters of texts are mere chasers of elusive shadows, and the commoners are mere prisoners of Plato's cave. Thereby scholarship is thoroughly devoid of any salvific efficacy.[62] Little wonder why Lü insisted that the truth of suchness can be an indirect objective basis.

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[61] Lü and Chen, "Zhenru zuo shusuoyuanyuan yi," 281, 283. Note that Wang Enyang's position is more extreme. For him, even for bodhisattvas who obtained subsequent awareness, the suchness that they perceived is still an indirectly perceived objective support, i.e. merely a shadow of true suchness.

[62] Note that, although the main scriptural sources cited in this debate came from Xuanzang and Kuiji, it is important to understand that subsequent awareness has long been established as the norm of the bodhisattva's salvific career to enable her to function in the mundane world while dwelling in the realm of the ineffable in Asaṅga's and Vasubandhu's works such as *Mahāyānasaṃgraha* and *Mahāyānasaṃgrahabhāṣya*, see Roy Tzohar, *A Yogācāra Buddhist Theory of Metaphor* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2018), 183–88.

The result of this debate was underwhelming.[63] Once more, instead of engaging with Lü's carefully crafted comparative studies, Ouyang simply commented that the question under discussion was too complex to reach any definitive answer and that one must thoroughly understand the meaning of *ālambana* before discussing this further. Under Ouyang's authority, Lü's innovative textual criticism either became weaponized to support Ouyang's position or shrugged off as provisional findings that needed further research.[64]

Despite Lü Cheng's failure to convert his peer, his innovative reinterpretation of science still warrants scholarly attention. In the historical studies of science in China and India, indigenization stands out as a dominant strategy. Contrary to the dichotomy of resisting or mimicking science, many Indian and Chinese elites in the colonial era opted to hybridize the universalist Western science with indigenous traditions and claimed themselves as the true representatives of the latter.[65] By staging oneself as the true inheritor of the indigenous knowledge, proponents of this strategy nonetheless acquiesced to the Western monopoly of the universal. Similarly, for some Buddhist practitioners in modern China, one popular strategy was to prove Buddhism compatible with science, using Western science as the standard to measure up the truth claims in Buddhism. This strategy effectively rendered Buddhism an indigenous science. Another frequently employed strategy is to buy into the

[63] This debate did not end here. The issue is too important to let go. Lü Cheng continued to labor on the true meanings of ālambana. His 1927 essay "Guan suoyuan shi lun huiyi" 觀所緣釋論會譯 [A Comparative Expositions of [the Chinese and Tibetan] Translations of the *Ālambana-parīkṣa*] in the fourth issue of *Neixue* further clarifies the distinctions of ālambana, ālambanam-pratyaya, and other relevant finer doctrinal points. For a detailed analysis of this 1927 essay and its scholarly achievement, see Dan Lusthaus, "Lü Cheng, Epistemology, and Genuine Buddhism," in *Transforming Consciousness*, 334–38. As I will discuss in chapter five, in his editions of *Essentials*, Lü Cheng further accentuated his own interpretation of indirectly perceived objective basis and the existence of other minded creatures through comparative collation.

[64] A similar dynamic manifested itself in the record of the 6th research workshop in May 1925, when Lü led the discussion on a certain doctrinal interpretation put forward by Xiong Shili in his *New Yogācāra Treatise* 新唯識論. See, Lü Cheng, etc., "A Discussion on the meaning of 'the Four Elements as the Ālambana of the Eighth Consciousness'" (dazhong weishi dibashi suoyuan taolun 大種唯識第八識所緣義討論), *Inner Learning* 2 (1925):211–18. Again, Lü Cheng's comments were utilized by other learners of the institute to openly refute Xiong's interpretations while Lü himself stayed out of the public view.

[65] For studies in the case of China, see for example, Benjamin Elman, " 'Universal Science' Versus 'Chinese Science': The Changing Identity of Natural Studies in China, 1850–1930," *Historiography East and West* 1 (2003): 68–116. For studies in the case of India, see for example, Prakash Gyan, *Another Reason: Science and the Imagination of Modern India* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999): 17–48.

divide of the material and the spiritual, then redefine Buddhism as a science of the mind, relegating Buddhism purely in a separate realm of individual psychology and utterly lack of socio-political potential.[66] Understandably, none of these known strategies posed any serious challenge to the Western definition of being scientific.

In contrast, Lü examined what he valued and what he could not accept and then redefined science on Buddhist terms. He rejected the unsubstantiated ontological claims in science. For Lü, like all Yogācārins, the existence of an objective world outside consciousness was still mired in dualistic illusion. The problem of philosophical dualism, when translated into the contemporary theory of mind, could be seen as the hard problem of consciousness: How seemingly identical physical neuro processes could be perceived by consciousness as varied feelings of painful, itchy, neutral, pleasurable, or irritative. To go beyond the dualistic confine, Lü reframed the social and the natural as manifestations of the intersubjective *ālayavijñāna*. Concomitantly, Lü also reformulated science as a comprehensive methodology to be enacted by committed learners to uncover this underlying ālayavijñāna clouded by selfish desires. Admittedly, Lü's reframing only paraphrased the hard problem of consciousness into a hard problem of objectivity in Yogācāra. This is because it would quickly become impossible when one explains how a seemingly objective existence could be explained away as the entangled feedback loops in the causal mental network. Nevertheless, the social function of Lü's paradigm is clear. For Lü, all knowledge produced by the impersonal comparative hermeneutics would then become public knowledge for the benefit of all sentient beings and for building a more livable world. By redefining science on Yogācāra terms, Lü injected moral purpose into the scholarly enterprise.

In short, Lü Cheng weaved received hermeneutical strategies into a new outlook of scientific rigor. More importantly, in stark contrast with Ouyang, nowhere in Lü's systematic method could one find room for authority grounded in *sui generis* religious experience or the miraculous power of the

[66] Both strategies are identified by Erik Hammerstrom. See, Hammerstrom, *The Science of Chinese Buddhism*.

Buddha. Rather, the miraculous power of the Buddha is scholarship itself, which is the only guardian of intersubjective agreement.

Toward a Phenomenological Naturalist Theory of Social Oneness

After a careful reading of Lü's methodology, we are now ready to investigate the more troubling aspect of Lü's new methodology. I have used the mining metaphor consistently in the previous sections to alert us of the destructive potential inherent in Lü's quest for a science of Buddhist learning. The question of violence is not a hypothetical one. Ouyang and Lü's project, in the short-term, disrupted rather than consolidated the already disintegrating Buddhist communal fabric, as evidenced by both the controversy around *Awakening Faith* and Yinguang's disparagement of Ouyang as an offspring of the monstrous egoistic demon.[67] In contemporary China, Lü's 1940 essay on the falsity of the *Śūraṅgama-sūtra* continues to provoke eruptions of ad hominem attacks.[68] As a scholar, I am obligated to investigate the causes behind this disruption of tradition and the ensuing contentions engendered by this new Yogācāra.

I argue that the perceived "violence" around this new Yogācāra and Lü's new methods should be more accurately understood as a force of aggressive nonviolence. I differentiate aggression and violence as follows. Aggression describes the intensity and vigor of an action. Violence or nonviolence, in contrast, prescribes moral values onto an action. I classify any action reifying or reproducing injustice as violent. Furthermore, I have no intention of wading into the moral judgement of what is and what is not violent. Instead, I use violence or nonviolence through the eyes of the historical actors themselves. Throughout Lü's revolutionary journey, he hoped to use reasoned arguments to build a just society grounded in interdependence. His social vision involved not absolute equality of

[67] Yinguang 印光, "Fu Li Jindan jushi shu" 复李觐丹居士书 [Reply to Layman Li Jindan], in *Yinguang Fashi wenchao* 印光法师文钞 [Collected Essays of Dharma Master Yinguang], online edition http://yinzu.org/3b04/ygdswc3b4-00068.htm, Accessed June 2014 – June 2019.

[68] Lü's essay is collected in to Xuanji 1991. For example, in 1991 monk Minsheng 愍生 published a long essay refuting each of Lü's evidence and defended the authenticity of the *Śūraṅgama Sūtra*. Minsheng's essay is still widely circulating in many online Buddhist sites and reprinted many times. See for example, Minsheng, "Bianpo Lengyang baiwei" 辨破《楞严百伪》[Refuting "One Hundred Falsehood of the Śūraṅgama Sūtra], http://foxue.163.com/17/0609/14/CMGE0KQ503240LQU.html, accessed March 2013–May 2018.

atomized individuals but a social formation grounded in interdependence. This interdependence, in his aesthetic phase, manifested as a provisional leadership of artists and art critics among the people. In his Yogācāra phase, he translated this vision in terms of inner learning, a group of devoted leaders committed to wielding comparative rigor as the instrument to excavate soteriological knowledge for all. In other words, Lü imagined his project as a nonviolent scholarly pursuit. For him, nonviolence entails joint learning—mutual trust between experts and ordinary people—that holds out the best hope to establish a society where every living process is recognized and respected.

At the same time, in Lü's vision, comparative hermeneutics must be aggressively pursued. This is because, in order to establish a society that affirms the life of all, one must dismantle existing bastions of privilege and unfair social structures that value one form of life over the other. These bastions of privilege, in Lü's vision, include monastic establishment grounded in the hierarchy of master and disciple, the political establishment sustained by power and control, and imperialist world order defended by military prowess. While all these local and global power structures constraint Lü's social vision, the most immediate institution that Lü tried to outsmart is Western and Japanese Buddhology.

I argue that Lü's mining mentality stemmed from an aggressive effort to undercut the Aryan myth and to forge a new Chinese myth of a Buddhist societism. In the 1920s, China saw the May-Fourth epistemic shift and revolutionary impulse, the import of the Aryan Myth and Durkheimian societism by way of Buddhology, Yogācāra hermeneutics, as well as late-Qing evidential scholarship. Lü Cheng was keenly aware of the pressure to justify his Yogācāra societism in this swelling tide.[69] Nevertheless, despite the prevailing wind of rationality and science, in this era, nobody seemed to know what science was, and rationality was often weaponized to silence dissenting voices. To add insult to injury, philology or the science of religion, the most relevant science to Lü's epistemic revolution had two faces: Both were imbued with political subtexts and consequently brought with them their own methodological violence.

[69] Lü, Fojiao yanjiu fa, 28.

The first face of Buddhology was the racist philology that championed the Aryan myth that contributed to the rise of German nationalism and anti-Semitism. Their positivist agenda rendered Chinese translation a corrupted copy of the urtext. The Chinese encounter with the Aryan myth stemmed from Yang Wenhui's long-term friendship with Nanjō Bun'yū 南条文雄 (1859–1927), a Japanese Buddhologist who studied in Oxford under Max Müller—a popularizer of the Aryan theory.[70] In 1968, Holmes Welch, the renowned scholar of modern Chinese Buddhism, credited Yang Wenhui, as the father of Chinese Buddhist revival for his vision of "Buddhism as a world religion in a scientific world."[71] However, other than documenting Yang's relations with Nanjō, Timothy Ricard (1845–1919), and Anagārika Dharmapāla (1864–1934), Welch never explained what he meant by "Buddhism as a world religion" and by "scientific world." Indeed, a closer examination of the writings by Yang Wenhui, Ouyang Jingwu, and Lü Cheng revealed that they understood science and religion in drastically different terms. The only common thread was the external force that they were reacting to—the science of religion. By the nineteenth century, philology has become the dominant research methodology in the scientific study of world religions. What linked philology together with natural sciences was the positivist agenda. In the science of Buddhism, the predominance of philology gave rise to the idealized image of original Buddhism.[72] Under the spell of positivism and the hunt for urtext, the Chinese Buddhist canon was devalued to a supplementary position.

The second face of Buddhology was the counter current that sought to undercut the Aryan myth. This was termed Durkheimian societism, an intellectual trend expressed in the methodological ritualism championed by the renowned French-school Indologists such as Abel Bergaigne, Sylvain Lévi, Charles Jean de la Valleé Poussin. As pointed out by Vogt and Strenski, Durkheimian societism

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[70] The other is Ernst Renan. For a detailed analysis of Müller's use of the Aryan Myth to justify the British imperial rule of India, South Africa, and many other colonies, see Chidester, *Empire of Religion*, 59-89. For the establishment of Indology in Japan, see Maejima Shinji 前嶋信次, *Indogaku no akebono* インド学の曙 [The Dawn of Indology] (Tokyo: Seikai seikai kankō kyōkai 世界聖典刊行協会, 1985). For a general discussion of how Müller and European scholars pushed the Japanese students to look for Sanskrit and Tibetan texts while at the same time commented that non-Brahmins cannot learn Sanskrit, see Jaffee, *Seeking Śākyamuni*, 3, 10.

[71] Holmes Welch, The Buddhist Revival in China, 10.

[72] For a brief historical account of the rise of science of Buddhism, see Donald Lopez, *From Stone to Flesh: A Short History of the Buddha* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2013).

has a strong moral bend because it seeks to discover scientific means to understand morality and to establish proper institutions to curtail selfishness and to gratify needs.[73] Although Durkheimian sociology has been criticized for privileging the social at the expense of the individual, Durkheim himself and many of the French Indologists put the question of the individual moral agency at the heart of their research.

Durkheimian societism had an intimate link with French Indology. Durkheim owed an intellectual debt to Sylvain Lévi in theorizing both the sacred and its relationship with ritual. Strenski has convincingly demonstrated that Lévi had a strong political motivation to study Buddhism and Indic culture: to undercut the Aryan myth.[74] As is well-known, German Aryanists pitted the "pure" Aryan against "corrupted" Semitic civilizations.[75] Lévi, in contrast, worked tirelessly to undermine the claims of a pure Aryan culture. In Lévi's view, Buddhism as a maritime culture undercuts a pure Aryan eternalism, methodological ritualism undercuts theism, and the defense of the integrity of post-Vedic religion undercuts the Aryan myth. Lévi saw Jewish culture (especially Talmudic Judaism) and Indian culture as mutually constituting and yet each beating according to its own rhythm.[76] Lévi's view on ritual and the sacred in Indian religion profoundly influenced Durkheim's alter ego Marcel

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[73] Ivan Strenski, *Durkheim and the Jews of France* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1997), 23. This observation of Durkheimian moral quest is confirmed independently aby another scholar Mark Sydney Cladis, whose monograph characterizes Durkheim's project as one of advancing "Rousseau's vision of a harmonious pluralist society in the context of industrial age." See Mark Sydney Cladis, *A Communitarian Defense of Liberalism: Emile Durkheim and Contemporary Social Theory* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992), 9. In addition, Sheldon Pollock's 1993 article, though not directly fault Müller for the racist Aryan theory, he did fault German Indology as a whole (especially Frauwallner and Würst) during the Nazi era as complicit in the racial cleansing, Pollock, "Deep Orientalism? Notes On Sanskrit and Power Beyond the Raj," 89–94. Instead of intervening in this on-going debate on the legacy of European Indology and philology, my purpose is to reveal the overlooked dynamics of the Aryan theory and Orientalism at the margins of the empire and to excavated understudied voices on this debate from the marginalized populations.

[74] Strenski, *Durkheim and the Jews of France*, 23.

[75] Strenski is far from alone in making these observations on Lévi's political motivation. For similar observations, see for example, R. Grünendahl, "History in the Making: On Sheldon Pollock's 'NS Indology' and Vishwa Adluri's 'Pride and Prejudice,'" *Hindu Studies* 16 (2012): 189–257. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11407-012-9115-1

[76] Strenski, *Durkheim*, 126–30.

Mauss and seeped into Durkheimian societism through close collaborations of Durkheim, Henri Hubert, and Mauss. [77]

Lü Cheng extensively read both streams of European Buddhology, as attested by the editor's notes in *Essentials of a New Buddhist Canon*, the remains of his once vast Buddhological library, and a few notebooks where he documented his readings of Russian, German, French, and English literature on Asian studies and Buddhist studies. Among the remains of his Buddhological library are dilapidated catalogs of Sanskrit manuscripts discovered by Hermann Beckh, B. H. Hodgson, P. Cordier, Japanese Buddhist studies journals, well-known Buddhist, Sanskrit, and Tibetan dictionaries, not to mention various monographs on specific Buddhist texts and the general history of Buddhism. Among these monographs, other than well-known Japanese scholars and scholars from the two schools of European Indology, there are also many penned by lesser-known scholars. These scholars include the Aryanist Laurence Austine Waddell (1854–1938), the orientalist Johannes Rahder (1898–1938), the Tibetologist Walter Evans–Wentz (1878–1965), the British Tibetologist Sir Charles Alfred Bell, the Christian scholar Clarence Herbert Hamilton, and many more. Equally important, the renowned Italian philologist, Mussolini's war-time representative in Japan who glorified a fusion of Zen and European war and preached racial purity,[78] Giuseppe Tucci (1894–1984), maintained a long-term relationship with this institute as attested by their collection of his monographs between the 1920s and 1950s.[79] All these scholarly writings in Lü's library exerted mythological violence despite their

[77] This is a very reductive rendering of Strenski's extensive research and nuanced portrayal of the complex relations between Lévi, Mauss, Henri Hubert, and Durkheim. For more details on the deep imprint of Lévi's Indology on Durkheimian conception of the sacred and ritualism, see Strenski, *Durkheim*, 116–48.

[78] For Tucci's war-time support of Fascism and his post-war quiet abandonment of Nazi ideals and continual scholarly activities, see https://www.umass.edu/wsp/current/sinology/profiles/tucci.html. Accessed September 10, 2018. It is important to note that morality and social transformation were Tucci's motivations in engaging in scholarship. When he worked in IsMEO (Italian Institute for the Middle and Far East), the official mission of IsMEO is to make it a "Moral body directly depending on Mussolini," see Enrica Garzilli, *L'esploratore del Duce. Le avventure di Giuseppe Tucci e la politica italiana in Oriente da Mussolini a Andreotti* (Roma: Memori/Asiatica Association, 2012), Vol. 1, 355–493.

[79] Lü's connections with Lévi and Tucci are also mediated by Tagore's international university Visva Bharati. In the 1920s, both European scholars taught and studied in Santiniketan. For Lévi's relation with Visva Bharati, see http://www.visvabharati.ac.in/SylvainLevi.html. Accessed September 5, 2018. For Tucci's long-term relation with this institute, see https://www.umass.edu/wsp/current/sinology/profiles/tucci.html. Accessed September 10, 2018. Tagore's

self-avowed "objective" "disinterested" research stance.[80] As a scholar at the margins of this colonial circuit of knowledge seeking to legitimize the study of Chinese Buddhism, Lü Cheng was caught between a rock and a hard place. He opted for the lesser evil, following the lead of Durkheimian societism.

Similar to Sylvain Lévi, Lü Cheng sought to undercut the Aryan myth. More concretely, he employed comparative studies to expose the unwarranted supremacy of Sanskrit texts and the concomitant European universalism. As pointed out by Strenski, like many contemporaneous Jewish intellectuals in France, Lévi considered critical history and philology powerful means to strengthen Judaism, even though these methods had an anti-Semitist origin.[81] In the same manner, both Lü Cheng and his counterparts in Japan, likewise, saw the transformative potential in Western scientific methods and historicism and valued their efficacy in uncovering the profound teachings of the Buddha mired in translations. For Lü, the moral obligation to build a more livable world and to resolve the modern crisis far outweighed the moral obligation to preserve the respectability and well-being of indigenous Chinese Buddhist institutions. As I have illustrated in Chapter Three, both Ouyang and Lü viewed Buddhism as a universal moral source for the globe and deemed traditional Chinese Buddhist monasticism an obstacle to realize their global vision. More importantly, for Lü, the spiritual authority of the monastics became an obstacle to his vision of a communism of soteriological knowledge.

To establish a communism of Buddhist knowledge, Lü must first dethrone religious experience in the Chinese Buddhist tradition and instead promote analytic methods. Lü valued analytic methods not because he devalued religious truth in Buddhism but because he deemed an open investigation and collective examination the best approach to actualize everyone's spiritual potential. Therefore, despite his mining mentality, Lü valued Chinese hermeneutics and strived to

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1923 visit to China and the ensuing activities to establish a Cheena Bhavana in his international university only accentuated the weight of French and Italian Indology among Chinese Buddhist intellectuals.

[80] The origin of religious studies in North America was no less violent. For a brief account of the racist past of religious studies in American universities, see Chidester, *Empire of Religion*, 289–92.

[81] Strenski, *Durkheim*, 148. These methodologies stemmed from the 19th century scholarly movement Wissenschaft des Judentums in German, which deeply informed Lévi's scholarship.

incorporate them into a broader comparative framework.[82] Methodological aggression seemed to him an acceptable growing pain to molt the old skin of mysticism so that Buddhism could take on a modern suit of reason and rationality.

Seen in this context, Lü's quest for a doctrinal whole and a scientific method are his way of countering the Aryan myth with a Chinese myth. In Lü's alternative global vision, Chinese tradition maintains its legitimacy as one of the localized instantiations of the doctrinal oneness. The doctrinal whole necessitates comparative studies of all extant translations, for which the Chinese canon could make a unique contribution because it preserved a vast range of Buddhist texts from a broad temporal and geographical expanse. Although Lü shared with French Durkheimian scholars the motivation to build a moral society through shared knowledge,[83] he could not resort to new rituals in creating a new *sacré*. His anti-realist propensity also prevented him from pursuing Durkheimian sociology. An impersonal method became his chief means to outsmart the Aryanists.

Lü's dilemma raises a much broader question that is still relevant today: What is scholarship for? Sheldon Pollock, in his 1993 seminal essay on orientalism, laments that humanities in German "failed to humanize" due to their implication in the nationalist agenda.[84] His proposal to heal this crisis of humanistic scholarship is to reclaim the moral purpose. He called for engendering "a transformed and transformative, an emancipatory Indology" embedded "within the framework of an emancipatory domestic culture and politics."[85] For Pollock, scholarship ought to be for human

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[82] Lü, *Fojiao yanjiufa*, 59–62. For other analyses of Lü's methods and his contribution to the "methodological turn" of modern Chinese Buddhism, see Gong Jun 龔雋, "Jindai Zhonguo fojiao jingxue yanjiu: Yi Neixue Yan yu Wuchang Foxueyuan wei li" 近代中國佛教經學研究: 以內學院與武昌佛學院為例 [A Study of Classic Studies in Modern Chinese Buddhism: Using the Inner Learning Institute and Wuchang Buddhist Seminary as Case Studies], *Xuanzang foxue yanjiu* 玄奘佛學研究 24 (2015. 9): 85–116. Another useful overview on this methodological turn is provided by Zhu Wenguang 朱文光, "Hanyu foxue yanjiu de fanfalun zhuanxiang" 漢語佛學研究的方法論轉向 [The Methodological Turn in the Study of Han Buddhism], http://buddhism.lib.ntu.edu.tw/FULLTEXT/JR-NX012/nx059526.htm, accessed April 2020. For the methodological contrast between Lévi's school and German Indologists, see for example, Strenski, *Durkheim*, 116–48.

[83] Strenski, *Durkheim*, 63–65.

[84] Pollock, "Deep Orientalism?" 112.

[85] Pollock, "Deep Orientalism?" 117. I think Pollock is successful in practicing this "emancipatory Indology" in his thorough historical reconstruction of the power dynamics behind the development of Sanskrit and

emancipation and for being a transformative force. Nevertheless, a century earlier in China, Yang Wenhui, Ouyang, and Lü Cheng already started such an emancipatory scholarship. As such, revisiting their less-traveled path to transform the world, their critique of global modernity, their social experiment with a different kind of emancipatory scholarship a century ago would open up new possibilities to go beyond the empire of religion.

Viewing from hindsight, the troublesome aspects of Ouyang and Lü's project could open up more candid conversations about the social responsibility of scholarship. When Pollock confidently prophesizes that "moving beyond orientalism finally presupposes moving beyond the culture of domination and the politics of coercion that have nurtured orientalism in all its varieties, and been nurtured by it in turn,"[86] his prescient tone eerily calls in mind Ouyang's equally self-assured prophecy that inner learning would bring true liberty and equality to the world. Moral goals aside, the details of what that emancipation looks like and how to achieve it evade my intellectual imagination. As I have argued in the previous chapter, Ouyang's vision of social liberty and equality is, in fact, a Foucauldian disciplinary regime. In spite of Ouyang's rejection of Western domination, he nonetheless reproduced the regime of domination coded in the spiritual message of the Buddha. The methodological aggression inherent in Lü Cheng's proposal is equally worrisome because Lü willingly used his methodology to produce cultural capital for Ouyang's social engineering. I hope, by prying open these troublesome aspects of Ouyang and Lü's social experiment, to ask the hard question of how to produce scholarship in a world still entrenched by cultures of domination and politics of coercion.[87] As I argue in Chapter Seven, Lü's social project demonstrate a promising path forward by adopting a mentality of entangled equality and by employing Yogācāra causal enframing

vernaculars in medieval India, Sheldon Pollock, *The Language of the Gods in the World of Men* (Berkeley; Los Angeles; London: University of California Press, 2006).

[86] Pollock, "Deep Orientalism?" 117.

[87] The continuing sway of the Aryan Myth could still be felt by the proliferation of "the Aryan nations" and "Aryan warriors" in contemporary America as one branch of the White supremacist movement. For details see Nicholas Goodrick-Clarke, *Black Sun: Aryan Cults, Esoteric Nazism, and the Politics of Identity* (New York: New York University Press, 2002). On a more uplifting note, recently scholarship by Judith Butler on the question of war and violence points out a more promising path for scholarship and social engagement. See Judith Butler, *Frames of War: When Is Life Grieavable?* (London: New York, 2009) and *The Force of Nonviolence: An Ethico-Political Bind* (London; New York: Verso, 2020).

as a democratic force: Because one's liberation is inevitably entangled with everyone else's, one must ceaselessly to acquire all skillful means to advance other's liberation.

1926: Buddhist Communal Rules and a New Social Oneness

Comparative hermeneutics is a means to an end. Lü hoped to employ the appeal of epistemic openness to invite more to join his revolution of the mind. In 1926, he turned to vinaya (monastic rules) studies to ground Ouyang's vision for the Institute onto firm textual bases. In contrast with Ouyang, Lü Cheng deemed compelling analysis alone would be responsible for producing knowledge to be examined by all, and thus the only trustworthy means to establish credibility of this new interpretative community.

Ouyang and Lü were not alone in a rush to build new institutions. Early 1920s' China saw a flourishing of Buddhist institutional reforms, many of which were inspired by the May Fourth spirit. This was the time when Taixu initiated his Saṅgha reform.[88] This was also the time when monk Hongyi (who was ordained in 1918) started to devote himself to revive the Vinaya school.[89] Not only monastic codes gained new cultural capital, but also traditional practices of conferring Bodhisattva precepts attracted more scrutiny and enjoyed increasing popularity.[90]

Ouyang's Institute was merely one of many similar institutional reforms. His quest for intellectual independence was simultaneously accompanied by a keen awareness to institutionalize

[88] For a brief discussion on Taixu's engagement with May Fourth and his ensuing reform see, Ritzinger, *Anarchy in the Pure Land*, 107–9.

[89] For Hongyi's turn to Buddhism in general and his focus on vinaya as a means to remedy vices brought by modernity, see Raoul Birnbaum, "Two Turns in the Life of Master Hongyi, a Buddhist Monk in Twentieth-Century China," in *The Making of Saints in Modern China*, ed. David Ownby, Vincent Goossaert, and Ji Zhe (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016), 161–208; "Master Hongyi Looks Back: A 'Modern Man' Becomes a Monk in Twentieth-Century China," in *Buddhism in the Modern World: Adaptations of an Ancient Tradition*, ed. Steven Heine and Charles S. Prebish (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 75–124; "Why was Vinaya Master Hongyi so interested in Vinaya?," for *Vinaya Revival in 20th-Century China and Taiwan*, project directed by Ester Bianchi and Daniela Campo, in preparation; Ying Lei, "Shadows of Karma," 167–263. The project by Ester Bianchi and Daniela Campo will teach us more about the appeal of vinaya among monastics striving to adapt to a modern world in China. My dissertation instead focuses on the broader appeal of vinaya studies to build a Buddhist democracy in the making of global Buddhism.

[90] See Ester Bianchi and Daniela Campo's collaborative project, https://vinayarevival.com/.

this new form of knowledge. In the second issue of *Inner Learning*, Ouyang, at the end of his lecture on the essence of inner learning, stressed that to engage in inner learning one must rely on a group who interact daily, live in a pleasant environment, and participate in deep reflections synchronized by the morning bell and evening drum.[91] More importantly, this interpretative community would include not only contemporaneous teachers and friends but also ancient texts and scholarly writings circulating in the global circuit of knowledge.[92]

In this new paradigm, a community to carry on the global Bauddha Dharma is simultaneously a historical community endowed with the textual presence of the historical Buddha, its early Saṅgha, earlier teachers, past masters, translators, bodhisattvas, in tandem with present co-religionists around the world. Simultaneously, the action of learning, reading, commenting, and printing texts was also a means to call-into-being future colleagues to join this collective endeavor. To summon the textual presence of the historical Saṅgha, Lü dived into vinaya studies.

A New Interpretative Community and World Renewal

The analytic focus in this subsection is the social implication of comparative hermeneutics. By design, Lü's methodology necessitates a different kind of textual community premised upon equal participation to enact comparative rigor. Lü's 1926 Prātimokṣa study, i.e., a study of the code of all monastic precepts without the exegesis and commentary,[93] was a cornerstone of his institutional reform. Although produced collectively, this essay was nonetheless Lü's first comparative study that utilized not only primary materials in Pāli, Sanskrit, Tibetan, and Chinese but also secondary literature in English, French, and Japanese. This research was the first-ever such extensive

[91] Ouyang, "Tan neixue yanjiu" 談內學研究 [On the Study of Inner Learning], *Inner Learning* 2 (1925): 9.
[92] Ouyang, "On the Study of Inner Learning," 9.
[93] *Prātimokṣa* literally means "toward liberation." It is the shortest part of a vinaya text. Each tradition organized their vinaya differently. Some mixed each code in *Prātimokṣa* with exegesis and commentary (these comments in the Pāli tradition are called Vibhaṅga) and many others make *Prātimokṣa* independent from Vibhaṅga. As expected, the *Prātimokṣa* part of the vinaya maintain a high degree of consistence across different traditions.

comparative analysis that later became the hallmark of Lü's scholarship.[94] More importantly, in the history of Buddhist studies, Lü's essay is also the first-ever comparative study of Prātimokṣa that utilized all extant multilingual sources. The next comparable scholarly studies were almost thirty years later, in 1955 by W. Pachow and in 1956 by the Austrian Aryanist Erich Frauwallner.[95] The very fact that Lü noted the imperative to engage with multilingual sources of vinaya put him at the cutting-edge of the Buddhological enterprise of his time.

The political import behind Lü's comparative studies is evident: Lü Cheng needed to defend the accuracy of Yijing's 義淨 (635–713) translation of vinayas without sounding like a Buddhist apologete.[96] The problem that Lü faced was that, in the 1920s, the scholarly consensus was that Chinese translations were not to be trusted, even including Xuanzang's and Yijing's who traveled to Indian, studied at length in Nālandā, and mastered Sanskrit. Well into the 1950s, reputable Indologists such as Frauwallner and Étienne Lamotte still judged Yijing's translation of the *Sarvāstivāda Vinaya* inferior to the corresponding Tibetan translation. Only until 2013 has the discovery of newly unearthed Sanskrit fragments definitively proved that, instead of being mistranslations, the textual divergences between Yijing's and Tibetan translations were because Yijing based his translation on a different Sanskrit original.[97]

Indeed, well into the Cold War era (1947–1991), the two political faces of philology continue to insert themselves into "objective" scholarship. Pachow's work was produced with considerable help from Tan Yun-Shan, the first president of Cheena Bhavana (China Hall) in Rabindranath Tagore's

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[94] Lü Cheng, Shi Cunhou, Feng Zhuo, and Liu Dingquan, "Zhujia jieben tong long" 諸家戒本通論 [A Comprehensive Study of Pratimokṣa in Various Sects], *Inner Learning* 3 (December 1926): 47–87, with an appendix on the sectarian history of Indian Buddhism, 87–101.

[95] W. Pachow, A Comparative Study of the Prātimokṣa on the Basis of its Chinese, Tibetan, Sanskrit and Pali Versions (Santineketan: Santiniketan Press, 1955). Erich Frauwallner, The Earliest Vinaya and the Beginnings of Buddhist Literature (Roma: IsMEO, 1956).

[96] Note that Lü Cheng was following Ouyang's lead who deemed vinaya studies one of the essential enterprise, see Ouyang, "On the Study of Inner Learning." However, Ouyang was not quite concerned with defending Yijing's translations. As for these detailed textual analyses, Ouyang delegated them to Lü Cheng himself to work out.

[97] For an incisive review of this issue regarding the accuracy of Yijing's translation, see Jens Borgland, "Underdetermined Matters: On the Use of Lay Witnesses in Buddhist Monastic Procedural Law," *Buddhism, Law & Society* 2 (2016–2017): 24.

World University Visva Bharati, and published by Visva Bharati's own publishing venue, Śantiniketan Press. Pachow's philological endeavor continues to be driven by a desire to understand the everyday life of the monastic members, following the advice of the Durkheimian societist Lévi.[98] In contrast, Frauwallner's methodology, though cleansed off its racial overtone, is still driven by the quest to find an urtext, at the expense of going through complicated intellectual acrobatics.[99] Unsurprisingly, the publishing venue of Frauwallner's renewed quest for an urtext is none other than IsMEO, which originated as a scientific mouthpiece of Mussolini's moral vision and where Tucci toiled for years.

To outmaneuver the European Buddhological myth, Lü resorted to comparative studies of all extant translations to demonstrate the vast divergences among these codes.[100] In particular, he highlighted the possible existence of different yet contemporaneous oral and textual transmissions of Indian vinayas. Consequently, he challenged the unwarranted presumption that Pāli Prātimokṣa is the closest to the original. Lü's marginalized status in the colonial circuit of knowledge production advantaged him to see through the crippled methodology at the time and pushed him to the vanguard of the field.

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[98] Pachow, *A Comparative Study of the Prātimokṣa*, 3. For Tan Yun-shan's role in this dissertation, see Pachow, *A Comparative Study of the Prātimokṣa*, dedication page. And Pachow, *A Comparative Study of the Prātimokṣa* (New Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass Publishers, 1999), reprint, ix–x.

[99] For an incisive critique of Frauwallner's futile search for a urtext and the intellectual acrobatics engendered by this desire, see Shayne Clarke, "Vinaya Mātṛkā-Mother of the Monastic Codes, or Just Another Set of lists? A response to Frauwallner's handling of the Mahāsāṃghika Vinaya," *Indo-Iranian journal* 47, No. 2(2004): 77–120.

[100] Lü's basic argument was that vinaya, like sūtra piṭaka, was transmitted orally for a long time before settling down as texts, therefore, one could talk about an original type of vinaya (possibly came into shape in the first Saṅgīti) yet it is impossible to talk about an exact original textual rendition of the earliest vinaya. For a more in-depth discussion about this existence of an original community and original intent based on oral tradition and came into being about several hundred years after the Buddha's nirvāṇa, together with the issue of translation, see Lü, *Fodian fanlun*, folio 2–9. Note that, this text represents Lü's acceptance of the Japanese scholar Fukaura's view points, which praised the quality of Chinese translated canon and which also resisted the urge to produce urtexts but rather focuses on the existence of a continuing evolving community originally led by the Buddha and the complex transmission history. For the evaluation of the Chinese canon, see Fukaura Seibun, *Bukkyō kenkyū*, 36–37. For the existence of an early monastic community and its transmission history, see Fukaura Seibun, *Bukkyō bungaku gairon* 仏教文学概論 [Summary of Buddhist Literature] (Kyoto: Nagata Bunshōdō, 1970), 71–95. Note both texts are modified edition of the 1925 and 1926 version, updated with most recently scholarly findings without modifying the key points relevant in translation and transmission.

The very position of Lü's essay in this issue of *Inner Learning* reveals the institutional building intention. In this issue, Lü's study is listed as the second essay, right after Ouyang Jingwu's *Instructions for the Institute—Explication of Teacher and Explication of Compassion.*[101] While Ouyang's essay aimed to inspire others with his passion and conviction, the technical prowess in Lü's essay supplemented this affective call with a measured, rational grounding.

To sharpen our understanding of Lü Cheng's own intention, one must read the essay backward. In concluding his essay and after critiquing monk Taixu's Saṅgha reform as groundless,[102] Lü Cheng proposed his own plan for Saṅgha reform: i.e., to build a genuine Saṅgha anew according to the true spirit of vinaya:

> What is the first step in establishing [a genuine Saṅgha]? I say, it starts with vinaya studies. As for the procedure, there should be several stages.
> 建立何由始？曰，由治戒學始。分其步驟，應有數層。
>
> First, search for the root Prātimokṣa, find the original intent of stipulating these precepts; do not be partial toward any sect; get rid of the confusion caused by sectarian obsessions.
> 一，尋繹根本戒，得制戒原意，不偏一家，以去部執之惑。
>
> Second, understand and cohere various sectarian editions based on the root Prātimokṣa so to reveal the Dharmic rules of adaptation and implementation in each sect.
> 二，以根本戒會通各家，見其適應實施之法則。
>
> Third, examine the Indian social realities throughout the history of Buddhist transmission to find out the economic principles of harmonious coexistence [of the Saṅgha in a society] in the root Prātimokṣa.
> 三，考校印土歷世佛教實況，以見根本戒內與世相洽之經濟原理如何。
>
> Fourth, survey and examine the history of our country and the current situation to investigate how to apply this root Prātimokṣa [in the contemporary world] and to provide a new interpretation.

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[101] Ouyang Jingwu, *Instructions for the Institute—Explication of Teacher and Explication of Compassion*《院訓·釋師·釋悲》, *Inner Learning* 3 (December 1926): 1–47. It was later collected into 1943《內外學》. Note that Ouyang's postscript was dated to the first month of 1927, on the day of Lantern Festival 上元日, discussing how the passing away of her elder sister a few days earlier compelled him to finish this instruction in time so that he could transfer the merits of this text to his sister. But the issue itself was dated to December 1926. It was entirely possible that the printer fudged the publishing date a bit, to follow the convention of publishing each issue in December of the year.

[102] Lü Cheng, etc., "Zhujia jieben," 86. Lü Cheng's critique of Taixu was very harsh, he faulted Taixu as flowing with the tides and extravagantly talking about grand plans.

四，再由我國往事及現狀，考究此根本戒之應用如何，而加以新解釋。

Fifth, based on the previous [stages of studies], establish monastic regulations and truly observe these precepts to establish a foundational *Daochang* [Ski: *vihāra*] of Bauddha Dharma.
五，由前種種創立僧制，真正持戒，以為佛法根本道場。

Each of these stages calls to mind his October 1922 plan for establishing a seed aesthetic community: identify and then explain correct knowledge to all commoners (steps 1–3), reform social institutions (steps 4 & 5), and cultivate the leaders (step 5).[103] In 1922, he diagnosed the chief vice of the actual society as trapped by the web of possessive desires.[104] Also in this 1922 essay, Lü criticized that existing social structures not only reify selfish desires but also encourage the expansion and gratification of selfish desires of a few individuals. In 1926, Lü further matured his critique of social structure and systems of oppression and looked to the Buddhist communal rules for an alternative, more equitable system. Lü Cheng invested in establishing a genuine Saṅgha precisely because of its tradition and reputation as an organization designed to cleanse both egoistic afflictions and structural inequalities.

Equally important, one must heed to the convergent goals as well as different strategies between Ouyang and Lü. Scholars have studied Ouyang's zeal for establishing an independent lay Buddhist community.[105] What existing scholarship fails to notice is that Ouyang relied on the miraculous transformative power of the Buddha for spiritual invigoration; scholarship merely served as an instrument to reach the ineffable. Like, Ouyang, Lü was equally determined to establish a new community. However, since his early days, comparative rigor was his primary strategy. Lü turned to vinaya for its organizing principles to support a new communal model of mutual spiritual growth.

This difference in strategies, instead of driving them apart, complimented each other, and strengthened their joined pursuit for renewing the world. Ouyang's confidence and charisma

[103] Lü Cheng, "Yishu yu meiyu," 8.
[104] Lü Cheng, "Yishu yu meiyu," 8. According to Lü, the social structures in this actual life is not only organized according to human possessive desires but also only allows the expansion of a few individuals' possessive desires. Thereby, this possessive organization and undemocratic structure are incompatible with aesthetic attitude.
[105] Cheng Gongrang, *Ouyang Jinwu sixiang yanjiu*, 569–72.

attracted many thinkers who longed for a magical potion to cure China's ills.[106] His *Instructions* in this issue of *Inner Learning* has a section devoted to the inconceivable power of great compassion, "Zhina neixueyuan yuanxun shi—shibei—weili san" 支那內學院院訓釋·釋悲·威力三 [An Explication of the Instructions for the China Inner Learning Institute—on Compassion—No. 3 Power]. In this section, he narrated Jātaka stories of the Buddha in his past lives heroically feeding his own body to his parents, cutting off her breasts to save a mother and the newborn, feeding himself to tigers and so on as evidence in support of the unimaginable yet transformative potential of bodhicitta (the conviction to become a Buddha for the benefit of others).[107] Lü Cheng, in contrast, sought to utilize an impersonal interpretative technology to extract the universal principles for establishing local communities. The communism of soteriological knowledge was the goal. His philological acumen and scholarly thoroughness attracted Buddhist intellectuals who invested in reason and democratic means to build a new moral ecology.

When these two authenticating strategies were published sequentially in the same journal, different readers could select whatever appealed to their vision. Furthermore, Lü's main ideas of re-establishing a genuine Saṅgha meshed perfectly with two of Ouyang lectures, "The Precepts Shall be Practiced Here and Today" and "On Precepts," summarized in the section of "Reports of this Institute" (*benyuan jishi* 本院事記).[108]

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[106] I suspect the allure of the magical and the paranormal was part and parcel of Chinese modernity, contrary to the received wisdom of modernization as disenchantment. The current dissertation is the first step to expose the inherent appeal of the paranormal in Chinese modern transformation. For a forceful and incisive analysis of the allure of the occult in Western modernity, especially through the influence of the critical theory of the Frankfurt School and the scientific positivism of the Vienna Circle, see Jason Ā. Josephson-Storm, *The Myth of Disenchantment*, 209–68.

[107] This section was first published in 1926 and 1927, in the third issue of the institute's journal *Inner Learning* 3, 1–48. It was then reprinted in 1941 in his own anthology, Ouyang, "Zhina neixueyuan yuanxun shi—shibei—weili san" 支那內學院院訓釋·釋悲·威力三 [An Explication of the Instructions for the China Inner Learning Institute—on Compassion—No. 3 Power], *Neixueyuan yuanxun* OJNWX 1: 25–38.

[108] Ouyang, "Jinri cifang yingyong lü" 今日此方應用律 [The Precepts Shall be Practiced Here and Today], *Inner Learning* 3 (1926): 161–63 and "Shuo jie" 說戒 [On Precepts], *Inner Learning* 3 (1926): 167–69. Note that these articles are categorized as lecture notes (given in 1924) under "benyuan jishi" 本院記事 in the table of content of this issue.

When Lü Cheng's scholarly due diligence complimented Ouyang's enchanted allure, the leap of faith would have seemed to be justifiable through reason and logic. When the Christian intellectual Wang Zhixin marveled at the epistemic openness of Ouyang's institute, one must realize that behind this awe was a similarly rooted desire to bridge the gap between the mundane and the sacred through rational inquiries. It would be a mistake to impose our present analytic lens that classifies Ouyang as the religious leader and Lü Cheng as the true scholar. As I have stressed in earlier chapters, both Ouyang and Lü felt compelled to use Buddhism to renew the society, and both found recourse in Yogācāra thought that allowed them to make use of a wide range of philosophical and soteriological tools to advance their shared agenda of transforming society.

Undercutting the Aryan Myth: Original Buddhism becomes Indianized Buddhism

Although Lü Cheng looked back to the past for inspirations, he nonetheless internalized the Buddhological gaze for building a future grounded in the narrative of development and progress. However, as I show in this chapter, Lü also subverted the Western story of progress with his own: He redefined original Buddhism as primitive and Chinese Buddhism as a perfection. Notably, Tagore, in his 1926 call to establish a China Hall in India, lauded Chinese Buddhism as a new, improved version of its Indian seeds.[109] As I demonstrate in the following, this narrative was not Tagore's wishful thinking. Instead, it coincided with the Inner Learning Institute's self-representation, though in a more tongue-in-cheek way compared with Tagore's panegyric.

First of all, although Lü Cheng looked for a root Prātimokṣa, under his rubric of a doctrinal whole, this root text became only a vehicle to uncover the "original intention of stipulating precepts." Once the root Prātimokṣa became abstracted out as an integral part of the eternal oneness, then a

[109] The earliest fundraising advertisements appeared in 1926. See "Taige'er chuangban Yindu Zhongguo xueyuan" 泰戈爾創辦印度中國學院 [Tagore Establishes Indian China Institute], *Dayun* 大云 6 (1926): 67–69. See also, See "Taige'er chuangban Yindu Zhongguo xueyuan" 泰戈爾創辦印度中國學院 [Tagore Establishes Indian China Institute], *Xindeng* 心燈 11 (1926): 9–10. Although these articles claimed to be translated into Chinese, I suspect the translator (most likely Tan Yunshan) tailored Tagore's English original for the Chinese audience. Irrespective of the true author of these advertisements, the key points support my argument that there existed a narrative of Chinese Buddhism as evolutionarily more advanced than its Indian ancestors.

particular vinaya transmission became localized as a manifestation of the doctrinal whole suited for the circumstances of a specific society in a specific space-time. For this reason, Lü Cheng likened the root Prātimokṣa as the embryo that evolved into all later forms of monastic practices.[110] Under the metaphor of evolution, the earlier became the primitive, a direct subversion of the Aryan logic that deemed the earlier, the purer.

There is a deeper motivation than undercutting the Aryan myth: to establish a democratic principle for engendering anew Buddhist way of life. By the early twentieth century, Western Buddhologists already equated early Indian Buddhism with Theravāda Buddhism in Sri Lanka. Japanese Buddhologists further equated them with foundational Buddhism (Jp: *konpon bukkyō* 根本佛教) and original Buddhism (Jp: *genshi bukkyō* 原始佛教), both alluding to its status as the original, pure source.[111] Despite Lü's adoption of the Japanese Buddhological term "foundation," in his uses, Lü Cheng consistently referred to early Indian Buddhism as mere the earliest instance of localization, the embryo that the Buddha tailored for the limited abilities of śrāvakas in the primitive culture of ancient India.

Lü's chief strategy is localizing every transmission. His logic is as follows. When every tradition becomes mere instances of localizing the whole, then all traditions should be put on an equal footing. Historical precedence alone no longer automatically guarantees purity but is relegated to mere historical sequences as traces leading to the doctrinal whole. Under this rubric, every tradition must justify their own authenticity by laying open their strategies for adapting the doctrinal whole and by demonstrating the consistency of their local adaptations with the Buddha's original intent.

Lü's strategic localization of early Indian Buddhism is achieved systematically. In the first step, Lü abstracted out a doctrinal whole from the particularities, which Lü termed the original intent of vinaya. Next, Lü turned from the doctrinal whole to the intermediate level: searching for different Dharmic rules (*faze* 法則) of adapting and implementing the original intent. Then in step three, Lü

[110] Lü Cheng, etc., "Zhujia jieben," 79–80.

[111] Richard Jaffe's recent monograph analyzed in detail how this quest for original Buddhism in modern Japan fueled a sustained fascination with Indian for half a century. See Jaffe, *Seeking Śākyamuni*.

zoomed out to the relationship between the Saṅgha and the society, i.e., the economic principles of a true Saṅgha, pointing out that all Indic forms of Buddhist Saṅgha must have adapted to the economic life of their respective social customs.

To prove his thesis of localization, Lü employed comparative studies of precepts regulating clothes and food of a monastic.[112] Supplied with ample evidence of how past vinaya masters adapted minute regulations on what was proper to eat, what could be used to make clothing, when and how to bath, and other daily activities tailored for a particular culture, Lü Cheng argued that those incidences proved that each vinaya transmission adapted to the economic life of their own localities. For Lü Cheng, Buddhist transformational teachings were not enough to reform the entirety of the economic life in one locale. Thus, the primary principle was to ensure that a genuine Saṅgha could harmoniously coexist with its surroundings. Harmonious coexistence, for Lü, must be grounded in the principle of nonparticipation or minimal participation: reducing desires and maintaining purity of intention.[113] And then, in steps four and five, Lü Cheng pointed out how to establish an authentic Chinese localization of this original intent.

This strategy of creating then localizing a doctrinal whole was by design a democratic means to recreate different localized modules. Unlike earlier weaponized doctrinal classifications that employed hierarchical inclusion to establish hegemony or exclusive similarity to weed out competitions, [114] Lü's localization enabled equally authentic reproduction of different seed communities that nonetheless would activate this doctrinal whole suitable to their own environments. The strategy of creating a doctrinal whole was not new. The cautionary tale of the blind and the elephant already reveals the rhetoric efficacy of a "whole picture." Generally speaking, this metaphor warns audiences against mistaking the part as the whole. However, in the history of Chinese Buddhism, the parable of the elephant and the blind has frequently been invoked in sectarian

[112] Lü Cheng etc., "Zhujia jieben," 82–83.

[113] Lü's hope for economic coexistence demonstrates that his revolution is not an economic revolution but more akin to an epistemic revolution, i.e., establishing a new knowledge production society to convince others to voluntarily join forces with the new path.

[114] Josephson, *The Invention of Religion in Japan*, 26–29.

debates and a key tactic of hierarchical inclusion. This parable is often employed to dismiss other schools as partial, fragmented, and thus inauthentic or mistaken. When retooled by Lü, because the impersonal method alone guarantees access to this doctrinal whole and because communism of knowledge promises democratic means to recreate local ecologies developed from the same seeds, the ancient tale adopted a novel use: building an imagined global order of localized communities.

Nevertheless, one shall not mistake this democratic intention as evidence of democratic reality. To begin with, all Lü's conclusions after comparative studies of Prātimokṣa echoed Ouyang's assertation that "Rather, one should find out the original intent and then practice it … therefore, study and research vinaya is what one shall value today."[115] Moreover, Ouyang's most strident critique of Chinese Buddhism was, in fact, its fragmentedness. Ouyang's invention of a Dharmalakṣaṇa school was aimed to create another holistic picture, one that subsumes both Buddhist traditions around the world and Western Buddhology. Though much gentler in tone than Ouyang, Lü Cheng prioritized the bodhisattva path over the śrāvaka path and refashioned Theravāda tradition as primitive Buddhism.

Lü never hesitated to employ hierarchical inclusion to prove the superiority of the bodhisattva path. He also subsumed the śrāvaka precepts into the bodhisattva frame as the first steps of a much more comprehensive bodhisattva path. Immediately after his comments on the economic adaptations of Saṅgha in ancient India, Lü Cheng pointed out that in early Mahāyāna, all Mahāyānists observed śrāvaka Prātimokṣa, including the famous Yogācārins such as Asaṅga and Vasubandhu. He further pointed out that existing commentaries on bodhisattva precepts in both *Yogācārabhūmi* (T1579) and *Da zhidu lun* 大智度論 (T1509) were developed from śrāvaka Prātimokṣa. However, Lü Cheng proclaimed that, because a bodhisattva cares about all sentient beings in every moment of her thought, what a bodhisattva shall observe must be much more than the two hundred plus śrāvaka precepts.[116] Therefore, bodhisattva precepts, in Lü Cheng's rubric, not only included monastic rules

[115] Ouyang, "Jinri cifang yingyong lü," 163. In this article, Ouyang also harshly criticized the Chinese Vinaya school and Chinese vinaya practices in general. Lü Cheng's comments after his extensive studies readily call into mind Ouyang's words. Due to the limitation of space, I will not list these echoes one by one here.
[116] Lü Cheng, etc., "Zhujia jieben," 83."

but also entailed a much broader and deeper set of guidance. To "prove" the superiority of the bodhisattva path, Lü Cheng relied on extensive comparative studies of all extant Prātimokṣa.

The impersonal method encourages epistemic openness while exposing Lü's arguments to further scrutiny. One set of Lü's claims warrant scholarly attention, namely, how he "proved" that each vinaya as mere a localization. His steps are as follows. First, because monastics practiced and recited it, therefore, they appended and collated Prātimokṣa.[117] Second, because of these appendages and collations, there were collections and compilations. [118] Third, because of these collections and compilations, there were commentaries and explanations.[119] Finally, because of these commentaries and explanations, there were revisions and new editions.[120]

This lengthy proof led to Lü's main conclusion that vinayas had always been recited, practiced, adapted, and revised throughout its transmission. Therefore, to establish a genuine Saṅgha, Lü argued, one does not need to stick to a particular transmission or to identify an urtext. Instead, Lü proposed that one must find out the original intent and principles of adaptations. Consequently, Lü Cheng replaced monastic authority on the authenticity-claims with comparative studies. The premise of a doctrinal whole, in Lü Cheng's use, shunned secrecy, localized all extant monastic transmissions, and equalized all Buddhist knowledge, and rendered them open for the public to examine.

If it sounds surprising to localize early Indian Buddhism as mere Indianized Buddhism, then, for Chinese Buddhist practitioners, it would have sounded even more startling when Lü Cheng claimed that authentic Saṅgha had never been established in China.[121] Moreover, Lü Cheng further faulted Baizhang's 百丈 *Pure Rules* (T2025) as a groundless fabrication, ignoring the fact that it had been practiced by all Chinese monastic establishments since the Yuan dynasty and had influenced monastic practices across East Asia.[122] Once the power of determining the authenticity of Prātimokṣa

[117] Lü Cheng, etc., "Zhujia jieben," 71.
[118] Lü Cheng, etc., "Zhujia jieben," 72.
[119] Lü Cheng, etc., "Zhujia jieben," 74.
[120] Lü Cheng, etc., "Zhujia jieben," 75–76.
[121] Lü Cheng, "Zhujia jieben," 84–86.
[122] For a brief history of *Pure Rules*, see DDB entry "敕修百丈清規." For a seminal work on the establishment of *Pure Rules* in China, see Yifa, *The Origins of Buddhist Monastic Codes in China: An Annotated Translation and Study of the Chanyuan Qinggui* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2002). For a useful

was wrenched out of the hands of monastic practitioners and given to scholars, a natural consequence was that reestablishing authentic Saṅgha must be grounded in scholarship. Not surprisingly, Lü Cheng dismissed Baizhang's revision of monastic rules. Baizhang, as a Chan master, did not measure up to Lü Cheng's retrospective prescription of scholarly authority. Instead, Lü only acknowledged the authenticity of vinaya texts translated by the famous scholar-translator Yijing and lamented that Yijing's authentic texts were never put into practice in the land of the middle kingdom.

When contextualized within Ouyang's global Bauddha Dharma, it becomes clear that, when Lü Cheng named the root Prātimokṣa as embryonic, he was conveying a sense of being the seeds of what could come later. Lü was hoping to reenact a teaching that has culminated in Xuanzang's and Yijing's translations and will be actualized by the Inner Learning Institute. While rejecting the specific mechanism of Darwinist evolution, Lü Cheng nonetheless adopted the progressive vision and made it explicit: Inner learning was a superior update of earlier embryonic forms.

Seen in this light, early Indian Buddhism became Indianized Buddhism—a localized primitive version of genuine teachings of the Buddha. For Lü, Indian Buddhism represents a primitive form that is limited by early Indian society yet nonetheless contains all the seeds of Nālandā learning, whose superior teachings were fully transmitted to China and China alone by Xuanzang and Yijing.[123] The evolutionary progress is thus rendered as one from the primitive Theravāda to the fully mature Chinese Yogācāra.[124]

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collection of essays on vinaya practices in East Asian, see Stanly Weinstein and William M. Bodiford, eds, *Going Forth: Visions of Buddhist Vinaya: Essays Presented In Honor of Professor Stanley Weinstein* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2005). For an in-depth study of monastic ordination and transmission practices since Ming dynasty, see Wu Jiang, *Leaving for the Rising Sun: Chinese Zen Master Yinyuan and the Authenticity Crisis In Early Modern East Asia*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), Ebook, Chapter 2 "Building a Dharma Transmission Monastery."

[123] Xuanji 1991, 874.

[124] Lü Cheng is not alone in refashioning early Indian Buddhism as primitive. Monk Yinshun, in his 1942 monograph *Buddhism in Indian* (*Yindu zhi fojiao* 印度之佛教) also made a similar point. But he defined primitiveness by likening the history of Buddhism in India like a human life, early Indian Buddhism was the childhood, early Mahāyāna Buddhism represented the youth period, and Tantric Buddhism was the senile period. See Yinshun, *Yindu zhi fojiao* 印度之佛教 [Buddhism in India], http://www.mahabodhi.org/files/yinshun/35/yinshun35-02.html. See also Yinshun, "Yindu fojiao shanbian de lichen" 印度佛教嬗變的歷程, in *Huayu ji* 華雨集, http://yinshun-edu.org.tw/zh-hant/book/export/html/2940. Accessed December 2018.

By localizing early Indian Buddhism as Indianized Buddhism, Lü sharpened his new paradigm—the doctrinal whole, to subvert the historical wholeness constructed by European Buddhologists who cursorily dismissed Chinese translations as derivative. In Lü's paradigm, every articulation of Buddhist teaching (including the Buddha's own discourses and including European scholarly editions of Buddhist texts) simply became a re-telling of the transcendent Truth tailored for the particular occasion. Thereby, Lü's method establishes the imperative to treat equally every form of localized Buddhist tradition for building an alternative but more egalitarian view of Buddhism as a world religion. In this new paradigm, the only path to reach the doctrinal whole was to mine the Chinese canon with his new interpretative technology. In this way, Lü promoted Chineseness for its more than two thousand years of effort to translate and preserve all transmitted texts throughout history. Chineseness was redefined as a historical community of scholar-translators who aspire to spread the words of the Buddha for the benefit of all beings.

A Social Turn of Yogācāra Soteriology

This chapter has demonstrated that Lü Cheng formulated comparative hermeneutics out of the soteriological imperative to avoid solipsism and the epistemological demand to make all Buddhist knowledge open for the public to examine. Lü's quest for a science of Buddhism reveals the fluidity of the meaning of science at the time. This fluidity enabled Lü Cheng to redefine the observable universe as etiological networks and to simultaneously reframe the scientific method as a rigorous comparison to unveil real causal connections. This retelling of science and soteriology reveals to us a shared political aspiration to use science as a social force to dismantle old regimes and to justify new policies.

More importantly, comparative hermeneutics marked the emergence of a new épistémè of Buddhism in modern China. It emerged alongside an upwelling of realism and scientism, a desire for fundamental cultural change, a grave doubt about the traditional Chinese way of knowing, and a fundamental distrust of scientism's saving power. It emerged when the educated elite sought alternatives means of constructing more robust solidarity for a harmonious society. While many of

Lü's contemporaries looked to social sciences and natural sciences for administering a new world, Lü's wariness of social Darwinism and realism pushed him toward Yogācāra causal framing for theorizing a new sociality grounded in solid scholarship and considered arguments. I am using "épistémè" in the Foucauldian sense, as indicated in his 1966 monograph *The Order of Things*. Épistémè refers to the historical construction of an *a priori* that grounds knowledge and its discourses. Thus, épistémè represents the condition of their possibility within a particular epistemological community. When traditional moral universe built around a religio-political state was replaced by a deterministic moral universe governed by Newtonian physics, biology, and social Darwinism,[125] Ouyang and Lü joined forces with many other intellectuals to initiate a new form of soteriological knowledge for collective emancipation from the iron cage of scientific determinism. Comparative hermeneutics marked a watershed moment in this epistemological revolution. This revolution of knowledge production entails a concerted effort to integrate Yogācāra and Western sciences into a new paradigm, redefining the meaning of society, science, Yogācāra, and soteriology.[126]

The three chapters in Part I have mapped out the contour of this epistemological revolution. More is at stake than accurately characterizing this modern form of Buddhist knowledge. Lü Cheng's creation of a Western-looking methodology with traditional hermeneutics pointed out another way to conceptualize the processes of cultural exchange. Instead of the tired metaphors of Sinification, conquest, or indigenization, Lü demonstrated how one could create new appearances by weaving together threads plucked out of Eastern and Western traditions. In general, nominalized verbs, such as Sinification and Indianization, nudge the reader to conjure up a pre-determined Chinese or Indian culture to be conquered by something foreign. In contrast, the metaphor of the social turn of

[125] Charlotte Furth, "Intellectual Change: From the Reform Movement to the May Fourth Movement, 1895–1920," in *An Intellectual History of Modern China*, 15–16.

[126] Like Foucault, my use of epistemological revolution is influenced by the French philosopher of science Gaston Bachelard's (1884–1962) notion of an "epistemological rupture" *rupture épistémologique*. For Foucault's intellectual debt to Bachelard, see Gary Gutting and Johanna Oksala, "Michel Foucault," *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Spring 2019 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2019/entries/foucault/>.

soteriology calls to mind a continual process, focusing scholarly attention to the actions, orientations, and intentions of the historical actors themselves. At the same time, the socio-soteriological binocular also redirects our thinking about traditions as repertoires and texts as instances of a long process that could be recycled and reorganized for coping with lived experiences that are continually changing and always in danger of becoming unraveled.

PART II. A NEW BUDDHIST CANON

In Part II, I study the most important scholarly production of the Inner Learning Institute—*Essentials*. Part II contains two chapters, Chapters Five and Six. I examine Ouyang's and Lü's contribution to the editing of a new Buddhist canon, respectively. I analyze Ouyang's and Lü's respective project of professionalizing Buddhist knowledge. I further highlight how a new myth of Chineseness was weaved together in this new canon.

CHAPTER 5. OUYANG'S VISION: THE STOREHOUSE OF A GLOBAL DHARMA

Tidying up the Storehouse for a New Global Dharma

Essentials of the Buddhist Canon (*Zangyao* 藏要, henceforth *Essentials*) embodies the intellectual symbiosis between Ouyang and Lü.[1] Ouyang oversaw the selection and organization of *Essentials* while Lü substantiated Ouyang's audacious vision with his meticulous comparative studies and abundant footnotes. Even though the authorship of *Essentials* has always been attributed to Ouyang, to appreciate the scholarly quality of *Essentials* fully, one must take seriously Lü's intellectual contribution. Equally important, as the cornerstone of the Inner Learning Institute's professionalization of Buddhist knowledge, *Essentials* and its making provide us a crucial lens to think through the revolutionary potential of scholarship.[2]

To appreciate the significance of this collaboration, I divide my study of *Essentials* into two chapters. In the current chapter, I focus on Ouyang's grand vision of remaking the Buddhist canon as a storehouse of a global Bauddha Dharma. Ouyang's trust in the magical power of the Buddha's words will serve as a backdrop for the next chapter. In the next chapter, I explain how Lü employed comparative hermeneutics as a scalpel to dissect canonical Chinese Buddhist texts into pieces and

[1] For easy access, I reference to the 1991 reprint of *Essentials* by Shanghai shudian 上海書店 in ten volumes. The officially listed author is Ouyang Jingwu. However, Lü did most of the multilingual comparisons in this volume. Ouyang only laid out the outlines and selected the texts for the first two collections. Therefore, when referring to editorial details, I refer to Lü if the work is clearly done by Lü. I refer to Ouyang if the work belongs to Ouyang. The format of reference is the following: Author, *Essentials* Vol. number, page numbers.

[2] Both Ouyang and Lü saw their own work as part and parcel of the social revolution. I already discussed Lü's aesthetic revolution phase. Ouyang interpreted revolution differently. On February 1, 1943, three weeks before his passing away, Ouyang penned a letter to a former student of the institute Meng Wentong. In this letter, he continued to urge Meng to embark on a revolutionary path with his scholarship "yanxue bi geming" 研學必革命. Ouyang, "Fu Meng Wentong shu" 覆蒙文通書, *Kunxue zazhu* 孔學雜著, OJNWX 14: 31. Note that Ouyang and Lü were not the only Buddhist revolutionaries who became interested in Yogācāra. Liang Shumin, another avid supporter of the institute and a renowned Yogācāra scholar who played a crucial role in popularizing Yogācāra philosophy among the May Fourth youth, in his 1942 autobiography, commented that "In the last several decades [referring to the decades leading up to and immediately after the 1911 revolution], many Chinese youth, often proceeded from learning (*qiuxue* 求學) directly to revolution (*geming* 革命). I am also one of them." Liang Shuming, "Wo de zixue xiaoshi" 我的自學小史, in *Liang Shumin quanji* 梁漱溟全集 vol. 2 (Jinan: Shandong ren min chu ban she, 1989), 685.

then stitching the deconstructed elements into a new societal vision. Working together, Ouyang and Lü presented to the world a Buddhist societal ideal of equality and freedom grounded not in individualism but in relationality and interdependence.

The organization of this chapter is two-fold. In the first section, I analyze Ouyang's outlines and synopses for the first collection of *Essentials*, illustrating how he reframed the canon in terms of his interpretation of Yogācāra as a social critique and a way out of the modern crisis. I further argue that Ouyang's Indo-philia has a limit. Underneath his rhetoric of reviving genuine Buddhism was a modern tide of professionalizing Buddhist learning rooted in the Chinese transmission of Yogācāra. I demonstrate that Ouyang's self-identification as both Yogācārin and Chinese stemmed from his alternative global history of Buddhism in which the Chinese translation played a key role. Within this new rubric of a global Dharma, Indic texts were valued as a crucial means in establishing the legitimacy of the new form of scholasticism—inner learning. The Chineseness embodied in inner learning presents Buddhism as a religion of translation, whose transmission hinged crucially on the genuine messages preserved in the texts translated by the Chinese scholar-translator-monk Xuanzang. By reframing Buddhism as an ever-evolving process of translation and transmission, Ouyang invented a new Chinese identity as concerted labor of translation in the past and renewed effort of clarifying ancient translations. Ouyang's new vision of being Chinese defies metaphors of Sinification, Westernization, modernization, or Buddhicization. Instead, it raises an important philosophical question: Is it possible to think about individual and group identities NOT in terms of drawing boundaries but in terms of maintaining concrete social bonds that allow certain lifestyles?

In the second section, I chronicle the Institute's activities during WWII, demonstrating how scholarship continued to be employed for eulogizing the dead and rallying cultural and financial support for Ouyang's institute.[3] In Ouyang's institute, scholarship itself became an engine of production, producing magical power, psychological consolation, and soteriological hope in a time of

[3] The mythological use of the canon is not new. Printing canon has always been seen as a way to accumulate merits, to protect the country, and to avoid disasters. Both Ouyang and Lü Cheng was keenly aware of this mythological aspect of the canon, see Lü, *Fodian fanlun*, folio 32.

desperation. Once we restore the political and religious subtexts in Ouyang's production of Buddhist knowledge, it becomes evident that the Foucauldian concept of power-knowledge (*le savoir-pouvoir*) accrued a soteriological flavor in the life of modern Yogācāra. Ouyang's vision of a global Bauddha Dharma also reveals to us an overlooked episode in the making of Buddhism as a world religion.

Ouyang: A New Canon and the Heart of the Nation

Essentials is the brainchild of Ouyang. While Ouyang saw himself a master of doctrinal analysis, Lü was allotted the actual task of editing: examining texts through philological tools and comparative studies.[4] Their shared goal was to reshape Buddhism into an antidote to modern depravities. Both the format and the organization of *Essentials* reflect Ouyang's conviction to remake the canon into a storehouse of a global Bauddha Dharma.

The project was officially launched in 1927, aiming for a total of six collections.[5] The first collection of twenty-five texts was printed in 1929. The second collection of twenty-seven texts was printed in 1935. Unfortunately, due to the escalation of the Sino-Japanese war in 1937 and Ouyang's passing away in February 1943, the project was cut short into three collections. The third collection was published barely before Ouyang's passing.[6] The third collection was published with neither Ouyang's outline nor Lü's editorial preface. However, the third collection contains twelve out of the fifty texts that were selected into Lü's 1943 *Five Disciplines of Buddhist Learning* (*Wuke foxue* 五科佛

[4] Ouyang himself envisioned this project as a collaborative one, where he himself specialized in philosophical and doctrinal analyses and Lü Cheng specialized on philological analysis multilingual comparative studies. See Ouyang, "Fu Chen Boyan shu" 覆陳伯嚴書, *Neixue zazhu 2* 內學雜著·下, OJNWX vol. 12: 7. Dated to December 1934.

[5] Today, other than Jinling Sūtra Press that has preserved the original paper matrixes of the first two collections of *Essentials*, only three Japanese university libraries still hold a reprint of *Essentials*: Bukkyo University 佛教大学, Ryūkoku University 龍谷大学, and the Institute for Advanced Studies on Asia at University of Tokyo. However, I discovered these are all post-1989 reprints.

[6] Because the three collections of *Essentials* are all post-1949 reprints, it is not clear when the third collection was printed. But before Ouyang passed away, he already talked about Essentials as a set of three collections. See Ouyang, "Zeng you Zangyao" 贈友《藏要》[*Essentials* as a Gift for a Friend], *Jingwu xiaopin* 竟無小品, OJNWX 16: 11. Neither do we know whether the extant third collection accurately reproduces the one printed in the 1940s.

學; henceforth, *Five Disciplines*).[7] Therefore, it is clear that, while the first two collections reflect more of Ouyang's doctrinal preferences, the third collection embodies more of Lü's scholarly focus. Working together, Ouyang and Lü imbued ancient texts with new meanings.

Old Format with New Contents: A Theory of the Path of Realm, Cultivation, and Result

Format matters. In plain sight, the physical appearances of *Essentials* lay open Ouyang's prioritization of the Chinese canon. The Chinese outlook also belies the typical portrayal of his project as a representative case of the Westernization of Chinese Buddhism. This accepted narrative is a conclusion primarily based on textual analysis of how Ouyang incorporated Western philology and Buddhology into inner learning, without heeding to the formal features of the printed pages. Even though *Essentials* was printed lithographically, its page design resembles thread-bound printed books.[8]

Not only the format but also the organization of *Essentials* stands out. The arrangement of texts follows the organizing principles of the first printed Chinese canon *Kaibao Canon* (*Kaibao zang* 開寶藏), printed in 971–983,[9] instead of following the widely acclaimed and newly edited *Taishō Canon*. As is well-known, when first launched in 1923, the editors of *Taishō Canon* rejected the traditional Chinese canonical catalog. Instead, they followed a new catalog based on Western

[7] In addition, sixteen other textbooks are not even included in any of the published *Essentials*. Only twenty texts that Ouyang selected in the first and second collections made it to *Five Disciplines*. Two other texts are selected chapters of important prajñāpāramitā scriptures that are important for both Ouyang and Lü.

[8] The decision to print *Essentials* lithographically instead of carving them into woodblocks was largely due to financial constraint and social turmoil experienced by the institute in 1927 and 1928. For details see, Anonymous, "Benyuan jishi" 本院紀事 [Records of the Institute], *Inner Learning* 4 (1927): 271–74. It is probably not a coincidence that the publishing house of *Essentials* named itself as a publisher mimicking Song style (*fangsong* 仿宋).

[9] *Kaibao Canon*, as whole set, is already lost. Nonetheless, it still set the standard for all later printed canons. For a brief history of this printed canon and its modern rediscovery, see, Li Fuhua 李富華, "Kaibao Zang yanjiu" 開寶藏研究 [A Study of Kaibao Canon], *Pumen xuebao* 普門學報 13 (January 2003): 1–16. For an extensive examination of Kaibo Canon and its history, see Tong Wei 童玮, *Bei Song Kaibao Dazangjing diaoyin kaoshi ji mulu huanyuan* 北宋《开宝大藏经》雕印考释及目录还原 [An Examination of the Carving and Printing of the Northern Song Kaibao Canon and a Reconstruction of its Original Catalog] (Beijing: Shumu wenxian chubanshe, 1991).

Buddhological chronology of Buddhist textual history.[10] The new historicist catalog, at the time, was celebrated by many Buddhist scholars. Both Ouyang and Lü Cheng closely followed the ongoing Taishō project. Most of the base texts of *Essentials* are from the Taishō edition and the *Small-type Edition Canon* printed by the Japanese Great Publishing House.[11] Lü notably considered the Taishō's new categorization as most proper to study the principles of the Buddha's teachings.[12] Therefore, their choice NOT to follow *Taishō Canon*'s footsteps is worthy of scholarly attention. At least a careful scholar ought to ask: If the institute's reputation as new and Indian were true, why would *Essentials* mirror both the format and the categorization of a traditional Chinese canon instead of the then cutting-edge Buddhological convention of Taishō?

The answer lies in Ouyang and Lü's redefinition of Chineseness. To understand why they cast their multilingual comparative studies in a Chinese mold, scholars must ask: What does the organization of the traditional Chinese Buddhist canon reveal about the implicit preferences of Buddhist teachings? The *Goryeo Canon*, which is a Korean edition based on the *Kaibao Canon*,[13] is structured according to Zhisheng's 智昇 *Records of Śakyamuni's Teachings Compiled During the Kaiyuan Period* (*Kaiyuan shijiao lu* 開元釋教錄 T2154; henceforth: *Kaiyuan Catalog*). Zhisheng's catalog groups the texts into three sets: Mahāyāna Tripiṭaka (*dacheng zang* 大乘藏), Hīnayāna Tripiṭaka (*xiaocheng zang* 小乘藏), and biographies. The relevant feature of this categorization is that

[10] Takakusu Junjirō 高楠順次郎, Watanabe Kaigyoku 渡邊海旭, eds., *Taishō shinshū daizōkyō* 大正新修大藏經, 85 vols. (Tokyo: Taishō Issaikyō Kankōkai, 1924–1932).

[11] Nihon gukyō shoyin 日本弘教書院 printed the *Shukusatsu daizōkyō* 縮刷大藏經 [Small-type Edition Canon] from 1880–1885. For a detailed analysis of this small-type canon and its impact on the Chinese Buddhist print culture and the adoption of modern type-set print technology, see Gregory Adam Scott, "Conversion by the Book: Buddhist Print Culture in Republican China" (PhD diss., Columbia University, 2012), 103–6.

[12] Lü, *Fodian fanlun*, folios 8, 33 and Lü, *Fojiao yanjiu fa*, folios 6–7. For Lü's overall appreciation and reception of European Buddhology by way of Japan, see Lin Chen-kuo, "Lü's Cheng's Uncompromising Quest for Genuine Buddhism," 348–50.

[13] This is an oversimplification. The Korean canon was printed twice. The first was based on the *Kaibao Canon* and the reprint was based on Song and Kitan canons. But the overall divisions and organizations remain the same. For a detailed analysis of the genealogy of different printed canons, see, Lü, *Fodian fanlun*, folios 26–33. For a collection of remnant canon catalogs and scholarly studies of canon catalogs, see CBETA's site, http://www.cbeta.org/data/budadata/interrelated.htm. For a brief survey of the printed canons, see Li Fuhua and He Mei, "A Brief Survey of the Printed Editions of the Chinese Buddhist Canon," in *Spreading Buddha's Word in East Asia*, 311–20.

it gives an impression of Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna as two separate but parallel lineages. *Kaiyuan Catalog* further subdivides Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna Tripiṭakas into the familiar tripartite structure of sūtras, vinayas, and śāstras. However, despite the layout of the pages that mimics the *Kaibao Canon*, the classifications of sūtras in *Essentials* follows a slightly modified system. According to Lü Cheng, this relatively new organization system was first put forth by the Yuan emperor Kublai Khan (Ch: Hubilie 忽必烈) in Zhiyuan 至元 reign (1264–1294). This canon has a quadripartite structure: The familiar tripartite of sūtras, vinayas, and śāstras is followed by the fourth division of biographies.[14] Then, the sūtra piṭaka is further divided into sections of Mahāyāna, Hīnayāna, and Tantra. The vinaya-piṭaka is divided into Mahāyāna vinayas (*dacheng lü* 大乘律) that is followed by Hīnayāna vinayas (*xiaocheng lü* 小乘律). As we will see in the end of Chapter seven, this arrangement of a seemingly separate but parallel Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna transmissions of vinaya became the toehold for Ouyang and Lü's invention of a bodhisattva community. Similarly, the śāstra-piṭaka lists Mahāyāna treatises first then Hīnayāna treatises. Because *Essentials* is an abridged canon, it only includes the first three sets, i.e., sūtras, vinayas, and śāstras, slashing the fourth set of biographies and omitting the sub-division of Tantra under the sūtra piṭaka. Despite these variations, this brief recount of the history of canon catalogs already points out the obvious: Both *Essentials* and the traditional Chinese canon catalogs prioritize Mahāyāna texts as an independent tradition parallel to the so-called Hīnayāna textual lineage.

In contrast with *Essentials* and *Kaibao Canon*, Taishō's editors prioritized Āgamas over Mahāyāna texts.[15] If Ouyang were trying to return to the Indian origin and if he were trying to present

[14] The famous *Nanjō Catalog*, which is a translation of a Japanese transmission of this Ming canon into English under the aegis of Max Müller in 1883, also follow the same structure. Nanjō Bun'yū, *A Catalog of the Chinese Translation of the Buddhist Tripitaka: The Sacred Canon of the Buddhists in China and Japan* (Oxford: Oxford Clarendon Press, 1883). For how this Ming canon got transmitted to Japan and finally obtained by Nanjō, see Wu Jiang, "Finding the First Chinese Tripitaka in the West: Early European Buddhology, the 1872 Iwakura Mission in Britain, and the Mystery of the *Ōbaku Canon* in the Indian Office Library," in *Reinventing the Tripitaka: Transformation of the Buddhist Canon in Modern East Asia*, eds. Jiang Wu and Greg Wilkinson (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2017), 3–40.

[15] For an outline of different structures of Buddhist canons in classical Chinese, see Wu Jiang, "The Chinese Buddhist Canon Through the Ages," in *Spreading Buddha's Word in East Asia*, 15–45. For a historical review of different devotional and social forces leading up to the making of Taishō canon, see Greg

himself as a legitimate Buddhologist, why did he refuse to follow the widely acclaimed Taishō model? We know that their rejection of the Taishō organization is not because of Ouyang's or Lü Cheng's ignorance of the Taishō project. On the contrary, Ouyang expressed his wish to improve upon Buddhist texts (including those from the Taishō edition) with careful textual comparisons so to ensure accessibility of these texts to all learners and scholars of his time and later generations.[16] I argue that Ouyang's preference of Mahāyāna teachings, as embodied in both the format and the organization of *Essentials*, demonstrates that Ouyang's engagement with contemporaneous scholarly methods has a deeper motive. Ouyang strived to promote Chinese leadership in producing Buddhist soteriological knowledge.

Here lies a Buddhist rethinking of individual and group identities grounded in interdependence. Instead of defining Chineseness as some unchanging essence, Ouyang and Lü grounded Chineseness in terms of cultural-historical relationality and soteriological responsibility. In both Ouyang's spiritocracy and Lü's aesthetic society, spiritual practices and textual scholarship played a crucial role in sustaining social bonds that enable scholarly and spiritual life. As for the soteriological responsibility of Chinese learners, it only became evident in the late 1920s. For example, at the end of the 1927–1928 combined issue of *Inner Learning*, there is an anonymous essay, "Records of the Institute," summarizing the recent developments in the Inner Learning Institute, most likely penned by Ouyang. In the section on *Essentials*, after listing ten drawbacks of the traditional Chinese canon, the author further lamented that Japan's Taishō canon that was praised by the contemporaneous scholars as an excellent and refined edition (*jingke* 精刻) was, in fact, full of errors (*emiu baichu* 訛謬百出). The author then commented that the undeserved reputation of Taishō reflected the sad reality that Westerners could not understand the profound teachings in Buddhism, and Japanese scholars could not organize Chinese texts in a comprehensible way. He finally

Wilkinson, "Taishō Canon: Devotion, Scholarship, and Nationalism in the Creation of the Modern Buddhist Canon in Japan," in *Spreading Buddha's Word in East Asia*, 284–310.

[16] Ouyang, "Fu Chen Boyan shu," *Neixue zazhu 2*, OJNWX 12: 7.

concluded that Chinese scholars must shoulder the responsibility of elucidating the profound Buddhist teachings.

For Ouyang, the task of Chinese scholars was to analyze Chinese Buddhist texts with both the philological methods in evidential scholarship and the philosophical methods in Song and Ming metaphysics and to polish the style and standardizing the writings.[17] In other words, the stated goal of producing *Essentials* is not to clarify historical facts but to manifest the genuine messages of the Buddha. Rather than a return to the Indian origin or a revival of the Chinese *Kaibao Canon*, the production of *Essentials* is the fruition of Ouyang's 1918 initiative to establish the Inner Learning Institute. Chinese scholars should shoulder the responsibility of a modern educator: They should practice inner learning and mine the Chinese canon for the antidote to the depravities of Western modernity.

Essentials marks Ouyang's first major textual project in transforming Yogācāra soteriology into an enterprise of social revolution. In his preface to the first collection of *Essentials*,[18] the collection that Ouyang deemed as the essentials of *Essentials* (*yaozhong zhiyao* 要中之要), he explicitly presented the organization of sūtras as a path of liberation. In this collection, Ouyang chose ten Mahāyāna sūtras to illustrate the correct tracks (*zhenggui* 正軌) of the bodhisattva vehicle (*pusacheng* 菩薩乘). Ouyang argued that the unchanging patterns of various correct tracks were as follows: 1) the perceptual realm (Ch: *jing* 境; Skt: *sthāna*), which is the objects of contemplation; 2) the cultivation (Ch: *xing* 行; Skt: *carya*), which refers to the necessary actions and contemplative exercises corresponding to the perceptual realms; and 3) the result of cultivation (Ch: *guo* 果; Skt: phala), which points to the attainment of the bodhisattva practice. For Ouyang, the ultimate attainment was none other than nirvāṇa without remainder, the goal that he set out in 1918. In and by itself, the soteriological path of *sthāna-carya-phala* does not say anything explicit about the social revolution. However, when informed by Ouyang's political utopia as a society governed by

[17] Anonymous, "Benyuan jishi," *Inner Learning* 4 (1927): 273.

[18] All the quotes in this paragraph come from the preface of the first collection of *Essentials*. Ouyang, "Zangyao diyi ji xu" 藏要第一輯敘, *Zangyao jing xu* 藏要經敘, OJNWX 7: 1–4. These prefaces were first published in August 1929, reprinted in November 1930. See also, Ouyang, *Essentials* Vol. 1, 1–4.

spiritocracy that I outlined in Chapter Three, this traditional Buddhist soteriology is now fully welded with social revolution.

Equally important, in this soteriology-cum-social revolution, experts of Yogācāra can notice a subtle promotion of Chineseness. This path of *sthāna-carya-phala* is not unique to Chinese Buddhist transmission. However, this path has been a prominent classification scheme in the Chinese Yogācāra system, especially in Kuiji's commentaries.[19] Furthermore, in Ouyang's oeuvre, this classification played a central role in his effort to cohere all Buddhist teachings into one holistic system.[20] Neither was Ouyang alone in using this scheme to organize a new form of Buddhism suitable for a modern world. Taixu, in his promotion of a new Maitreya cult, also used the same tripartite scheme to map out his view of a bodhisattva path.[21] Indeed, despite Ouyang's active engagement with Western Buddhological methods, he designed *Essentials* to be the storehouse of soteriological tools. He further situated inner learning within the long Buddhist tradition of a "theory of the path" literature that theorizes and expounds why particular sequences of practices could lead to nirvāṇa, instead of functioning merely as a training manual.[22]

The pattern of realm, cultivation, and result also explains the subtle distinction between Ouyang's organization of Mahāyāna text and the *Kaiyuan Catalog*. There are three critical features of

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[19] For example, Kuiji, in commenting on Xuanzang's *Cheng weishi lun*, classified Vasubandhu's thirty verses according to this scheme of sthāna-carya-phala, the first 25 verses belong to sthāna, the next four verses belong to carya and the last verse is phala (T1830.43.237c06-08). This classification is different from the classification system in Vasubandhu's own commentary, which classifies the first 24 verses as phenomena of vijñānamātra, the next verse explains vijñāna-mātratā, then the last four verses explain the stages of vijñāna practices (T1586.31.60a21).

[20] For example, in his 1922 essay *On Discerning Vijñaptimātra* (*Weishi jueze tan* 唯識抉擇談), he used this path to summarize all explanations of emptiness. His words are "ci erkong zongyi jing, xing, guoa san shangli" 此之二空總依境、行、果三上立 [These two kinds of emptiness are always established upon, the three (steps of) realm, cultivation, and result], http://www.guoxue123.com/new/0002/bfehyx/004.htm. The edition included in OJNWX is a shortened version of this online text, which is rediscovered and published online by Wang Leiquan 王雷泉 and his research group. In 1941, Ouyang further employed this scheme to organize the Yogācāra texts, See Ouyang, "Zhina neixue yuan yuanxin shi—shi jiao xun di san" 支那內學院院訓釋·釋教訓第三, *Neixueyuan yuanxun*, OJNWX 1: 88–93.

[21] Justin Ritzinger, *Anarchy in the Pure Land*, 172–202.

[22] See Pierre-Julien Harter, "Spiritual Exercises and the Buddhist Path: An Exercise in Thinking with and against Hadot," in *Buddhist Spiritual Practices: Thinking with Pierre Hadot on Buddhism, Philosophy, and the Path*, ed. David V. Fiordalis (Berkeley: Mangalam Press, 2018), 147–79.

Ouyang's new organization that warrant scholarly attention. The first is the new organization of sūtra-piṭaka. As is well-known, *Kaiyuan Catalog* sets organizational principles of Mahāyāna sūtras in the sūtra-piṭaka in all Chinese canons. A typical Chinese catalog organizes sūtras as collected in the five great divisions (*wu dabu* 五大部) that include prajñāpāramitā literature (*boruo* 般若), accumulators of jewels (*baoji* 寶積), great collections (*daji* 大集), avataṃsaka sūtras (*huayan* 華嚴), nirvāṇa sūtras (*niepan* 涅槃), and those outside these five great classes such as Āgamas. In *Essentials*, however, the ten selected Mahāyāna scriptures do not follow this scheme of five great divisions. At first sight, Ouyang's selection seems random: a selected section of the *Mahāprajñāpāramitā-sūtra* translated by Xuanzang, a selected section of the *Avataṃsaka-sūtra*, *Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra* (classified as outside the five great divisions in *Kaiyuan Catalog*), the *Nirvāṇa-sūtra*, the *Saṃdhinirmocana-sūtra* (outside the five great divisions), *Bodhisattva-piṭaka-sūtra* (*Dacheng pusazang zhengfa jing* 大乘菩薩藏正法經), the *Śrīmālā-sūtra* (classified under the accumulators of jewels), *Sukhāvatīvyūha-sūtra* (classified under the accumulators of jewels), the *Lotus Sūtra* (outside the five great divisions).

Instead of the *Kaibao* convention of five great divisions, Ouyang justified the selection and the ordering of the texts in terms of the tripartite path of realm, cultivation, and result. For example, he explained that the *Mahāprajñāpāramitā-sūtra* and the *Avataṃsaka-sūtra* explicate the cultivation of the correct tracks, where the first scripture explains the cause and result extensively and the second scripture lays out all different phenomena in various perceptual realms. In short, in the preface of *Essentials*, Ouyang clearly stated his intent to rearrange the sūtras into a roadmap of the bodhisattva enterprise of social transformation.

Second, Ouyang's selection of vinaya texts further reveals Ouyang's intent to recast the Chinese canon into textbooks for soteriological training. There are only two main vinaya texts in the first collection of *Essentials*. The first is the *Bodhisattva Prātimokṣa* (T1501). This is accompanied by the corresponding *Proceedings* (Skt: Karman; T1499) on conferring bodhisattva precepts. Both are selections from the foundational Yogācāra treatise *Yogācārabhūmi*. The second vinaya text is the *Ten Recitations Prātimokṣa* (*Shisong jieben* 十誦戒本) and its corresponding *Proceedings* on conferring monastic precepts. The parallel structure of the vinaya texts in both the bodhisattva path and the

monastic tradition further echoes the overall organization of *Essentials*—establishing a parallel but independent Mahāyāna-bodhisattva tradition. It is also important to note that Ouyang selected the chapters on bodhisattva precepts from Xuanzang's translation of the *Yogācārabhūmi* excerpts. This choice is an categorical rejection of the *Brahmajāla-sūtra* (*Fanwang jing* 梵網經) that is conventionally used in Chinese monastic ordinations since the Song dynasty. In addition, given the increasing popularity of Tibetan Buddhism in the Republican era and the increasing availability of newly translated Tibetan texts, it is surprising that Ouyang did not use any Chinese translations of the Tibetan transmission of bodhisattva precepts that are also based on the same root text from *Yogācārabhūmi*. Further, Ouyang identified the Yogācāra bodhisattva vinaya as the core of Mahāyāna vinaya and the key for bodhisattva cultivation. The prioritization of Yogācāra bodhisattva precepts in the Chinese transmission further highlights Ouyang's focus on forging a new path, outside monastic control but rooted in the Chinese textual lineage.

Third, as a theory of the bodhisattva path, Ouyang's preface of *Essentials* must also demonstrate completeness. Indeed, *Essentials* embodies Ouyang's quest to systemize all Buddhist teachings based Yogācāra classification system that serves as the storehouse of a global Bauddha Dharma. As pointed out by Zhang Zhiqiang 张志强, contrary to the received wisdom that portrays Ouyang as a sectarian and a staunch Yogācārin, the central concern of Ouyang's project is to truthfully present a complete Buddhist knowledge (*quanti foxue* 全體佛學).[23] Indeed, Ouyang's intent to cohere all teachings into one system is explicit in his sūtra selections in *Essentials*. As is well-known, the Yogācāra school in East Asia is founded by the great translator Xuanzang. It is commonly referred to as the Ci'en school (*Ci'en zong* 慈恩宗), the Dharmalakṣaṇa school (*Faxiang zong* 法相宗), the Vijñaptimātra school (*Weishi zong* 唯識宗), and the Yogācāra sect (*Yuqie xingpai* 瑜伽行派), often interchangeably.[24] The foundational texts of this school include six sūtras and eleven treatises, all

[23] Zhang Zhiqiang, Zhu Lu· Kong Fo· Xiandai sixiang, 247–66.

[24] For an in-depth analysis of the name of this school, its history, and its doctrines, see Fukaura Seibun 深浦正文, *Yuishikigaku kenkyū* 唯識學研究 [A Study of Yogācāra Learning] (Kyōto: Nagata Bunshōdō, 1954). Ci'en refers to Xuanzang's student Kuiji 窺基 (632–682), who is credited as the founder of Yogācāra school in China.

translated from Indian originals. If Ouyang were to revive Xuanzang's school, one would expect inclusion of all Yogācāra treatise into the first collection of *Essentials*. However, in the first collection, among the eleven chosen sūtras, only three belong to the traditionally classified Yogācāra sūtras, the *Avataṃsaka-sūtra*, the *Saṃdhinirmocana-sūtra*, and the *Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra*.[25] Similarly, out of the eleven Yogācāra treatises, Ouyang only included four into the first collection. Other selected treatises include a mixture of both abhidharma and Madhyamaka texts. This eclectic selection of both Yogācāra and non-Yogācāra texts already hints to us that Ouyang might be more ambitious than merely reviving Xuanzang's Yogācāra.

Unsurprisingly, Ouyang made explicit that his goal was to re-establish a holistic instantiation of all Buddhist teachings. In the preface, he declared that he hoped to use the first collection to demonstrate the consistency of Yogācāra teachings with abhidharma and Madhyamaka. In the sūtra piṭaka, Ouyang's primary organizing principle is to cohere Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna (*daxiao goutong* 大小溝通). In the vinaya piṭaka, the goal is to integrate and penetrate (*yuantong* 圓通). In the śāstra piṭaka, the aim is to explain all teachings (*xiang yiqiefa* 詳一切法) with special attention to distinguish Mahāyāna from Hīnayāna teachings (*duixiao* 對小), to defend one's own Mahāyāna positions (*zida* 自大), and to refute heterodox teachings (*jianwai* 揀外).[26] This contrasting stance between the Mahāyāna and the so-called Hīnayāna further echoes the organization principle of *Essentials* that represent two parallel but independent lineages. In 1935, Ouyang reiterated these principles in the subsequent collections of *Essentials* as well as prefaces for individual scriptures.[27] Therefore, Yogācāra, in Ouyang's paradigm, has never been a sectarian identity as defined by Gyōnen 凝然 (1240–1321) whose categorization of eight sects greatly influenced the modern transformation of

[25] For a complete list of these scriptures and treatises as well as their doctrinal importance and translation history, see Fukaura Seibun, *Yuishikigaku kenkyū* Vol. 2, 9–24. Merely counting the numbers of sūtras is simplistic. For example, Xuanzang broadly cited many Mahāyāna sūtras in his treatise *Establishing Consciousness-only*, including the *Śrīmālā-sūtra*.

[26] Ouyang, "Zangyao diyiji xu," in *Essentials* Vol.1., 3.

[27] Ouyang, "Zangyao di'erji xu" 藏要第二輯敘, in *Essentials* Vol. 5, 1–5. This essay is dated October 1935.

Buddhism in China.[28] On the contrary, Yogācāra provided Ouyang a set of organizing principles to cohere all genuine teachings of the Buddha into a doctrinal whole.

This doctrinal whole, when combined with Ouyang's soteriological intent, further sheds light on Ouyang's scholarly intent: to remake the canon as a storehouse of soteriological tools so to establish the bodhisattva enterprise of social transformation. While Zhang Zhiqiang correctly identifies Ouyang's panoramic vision, he misses the soteriological intent behind this quest for a doctrinal wholeness. To put it differently, *Essentials* is Ouyang's textbooks to initiate a paradigm change of Yogācāra from a path of enlightenment to a path of social revolution.[29]

Ouyang's theorization of genuine Buddhism as a socio-soteriological wholeness eerily calls to mind Durkheim's definition of religion as an oneness, "a religion is not necessarily contained within one sole and single idea, and does not proceed from one unique principle … it is rather a whole made up of distinct and relatively individualized parts."[30] Ouyang and Durkheim did not know each other. However, it is crucial to recognize that there is a common thread in their respective theorization of religion or Buddhism—the quest to oneness. This apparent convergence of ideas further reveals a shared horizon of concern: How to build a more robust solidarity.

A Global Dharma and A New Chineseness

As the above analysis has shown, despite Ouyang's admiration of Indian masters, his promotion of Yogācāra consistently points to his emphasis on the primacy of the Chinese translation enterprise. Ouyang's endeavor to revive all genuine Buddhist teachings provides ample signs to illuminate his intention to renew the world with a holistic Buddhism. Indeed, I would go further to argue that this

[28] In fact, Sumi Lee points out that Xuanzang and most of his disciples simply called themselves the followers of Mahāyāna teachings. In this sense, it is more accurate to characterize Ouyang as a true heir of Xuanzang and Kuiji, but not a follower of Yogācāra sect. Yogācāra school/sect is mostly a projection of contemporary category back to historical reality. See, Sumi Lee, "Redefining the Dharma Characteristics School in East Asian Yogācāra Buddhism," *The Eastern Buddhist* 46 no. 2 (2015): 46 footnote 20. For Gyōnen's impact on the formation of sectarian consciousness in modern China, see Schicketanz, *Daraku to fukkō no kindai Chūgoku Bukkyō*, 207–16.

[29] Indeed, thirteen years later, when Lü Cheng presented his own curriculum, he commented that *Essentials* was a preparation for establishing the Institute's learning. See, Xuanji 1991, 606.

[30] Émile Durkheim, *The Elementary Forms of Religious Life*, trs., Joseph Ward Swain, https://www.gutenberg.org/files/41360/41360-h/41360-h.htm, accessed April, 2020.

focus on the doctrinal whole underpins the Chineseness of his project. More importantly, by raising once more the not-so-new Sinological question of "What Counts as Chinese," the analysis in this subsection demonstrates the significance of the "foreign" Buddhism in the continuing unfolding of the Chinese identity.[31]

To grasp this new formulation of a Chinese cosmopolitanism, we must pull together two trains of thought. The first, as I have already discussed in Chapter Three, is that Ouyang held it to be a self-evident truth that only the Buddhist canon can lead to Dao. This vision is fundamentally a "Chinese cosmopolis." In Ouyang's vision, the Chinese script, the lingua franca of premodern East Asia, would take on a new role of the premier vehicle expressing and transmitting genuine Buddhist message, displacing all other codes. Under this rubric, Chinese Buddhist learning itself would become an essential component of political power, controlling its subjects through cultural appeal. This Chinese cosmopolis, like Pollock's "Sanskrit cosmopolis," is a form of voluntary cosmopolitanism to be achieved through learning, not through military might.[32] In its early stage, the global political implication of Ouyang's belief remains obscure. His goal to establish a spiritocracy grounded in the Chinese canon seems quite limited to the Chinese political reality. However, by tracing these scholarly activities leading up to the edition of *Essentials*, it gradually becomes clear that this spiritocracy is global in its ambition. *Essentials* marks the first step in Ouyang's agenda to build a Chinese cosmopolis.

Ouyang's promotion of Chineseness becomes prominent when viewed against Lü's vision. Lü's cosmopolitanism is a multilingual dream and is grounded in his view of Buddhism as a religion of translation. Lü Cheng joined forces with Ouyang in the mid-1920s. In editing *Essentials*, Lü transformed the Chinese canon into a treasure trove of Buddhological knowledge with his comparative hermeneutics. As I have demonstrated in Chapter Four, Lü Cheng identified Buddhism

[31] For the methodological significance of examining the mutual influence of Buddhism and Chineseness, see, Stephen F. Teiser, "Perspectives on Readings of the *Heart Sūtra*: The Perfection of Wisdom and the Fear of Buddhism," in *Ways with Words: Writing about Reading Texts from Early China*, ed., Pauline Yu (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000), 145.

[32] Sheldon Pollock, The Language of the Gods in the World of Men, 166.

as a religion of translation, and he dreamed of building a communism of Buddhist knowledge. For Lü, the Chinese script only holds a provisional advantage. As a comparatist, Lü holds it to be a self-evident truth that, to become a real Buddhist, one must master multiple languages. In contrast with Lü, Ouyang held fast to the Chinese transmission. Even though Ouyang valued Buddhist translations and encouraged his students to study canonical Buddhist languages, Ouyang deemed the Chinese canon itself enough to help one reach the doctrinal whole. Indeed, well into the early 1940s, when his health was already failing, Ouyang continued to praise Xuanzang's and Kumarajiva's translations and transmission as the only ones that traveled broad and far. The global reach of Xuanzang's and Kumarajiva's translations, for Ouyang, served as the proof that teachings arrived in China remained genuine.[33] All these signs illustrate Ouyang's dream of a Chinese cosmopolis.

The second train of thought lies in Ouyang's prioritization of Xuanzang's *Establishing Consciousness-only* in this new doctrinal system, which will be the focus of my analysis for the next subsection. While the first stream of thought establishes the fact that Ouyang prioritized the Chinese canon for its vast expanse and global heritage, the second thread reveals to us that Ouyang valued the profoundness of the Chinese transmission, which, in his mind, was best represented Xuanzang's Yogācāra treatise *Establishing Consciousness-only*. As such, in Ouyang's vision, the Chinese canon embodies both the breadth and the profundity of the doctrinal whole. Throughout his life, Ouyang reiterated that the combined breadth and profundity in *Establishing Consciousness-only* was a characteristic that could find no parallel in any other textual transmissions of the Buddha's words. Therefore, Ouyang's seeming return to an Indic origin is, in reality, a paradigm shift that retooled the Chinese Buddhist texts as a powerful weapon poised to uproot the sufferings in a modern world and to instantiate a Chinese cosmopolis on earth.

Consequently, in Ouyang's paradigm, Chineseness is remade not in opposition to a global identity but about connecting to a newly imagined global community of audacious Buddhist reformers. Chineseness, for Ouyang, entails both privileged access to Chinese texts and the

[33] Ouyang, "Jingke Dazangjing yuanqi" 精刻大藏經緣起 [Causes and Conditions of a Refined Print of the Buddhist Canon], *Neixue zazhu 1* 內學雜著·上, OJNWX 11: 2. This essay is dated to May 1940.

responsibility to excavate genuine soteriological messages from the Chinese canon. Consequently, when editing *Essentials*, Ouyang employed the Chinese format of *Kaibao Canon* to subsume multilingual contents and thereby transformed the canon into a new storehouse for a global Bauddha Dharma. Irrespective of the social influence of this new formation of Chineseness-cum-interdependence, Ouyang offers us a surprising way of understanding group identity. For Ouyang, a Group is bound together not based on essential characters but in cultural-historical relationality and soteriological responsibility.

To substantiate the cultural-historical relationality, Ouyang looked to Xuanzang's treatise as the chief means of authenticating his Chineseness-cum-interdependence. From the very beginning, Ouyang promoted this text in his Inner Learning Institute. In September 1922, Ouyang shocked the Chinese intellectual community with his new explication of Xuanzang's *Establishing Consciousness-only*. The notes of these three lectures were later collected and published as a booklet titled *On Discerning Consciousness-only* (*Weishi jueze tan* 唯識抉擇談).[34] In these lectures, Ouyang declared his unwavering confidence that Xuanzang's *Establishing Consciousness-only* epitomized the profundity of Vijñānamātra teachings. He trusted that *Establishing Consciousness-only* embodied the most profound teachings of genuine Buddhism because Xuanzang inherited it from his teacher Śīlabhadra (Jiexian 戒賢) in Nālandā Monastery and because Xuanzang mastered all Indian and Chinese commentarial traditions.

Ouyang's lecture series *On Discerning Consciousness-only* was a milestone in the modern transformation of Yogācāra. Many Scholars of modern Chinese Buddhism have studied the doctrinal innovation that distinguished the historically synonymous Dharmalakṣaṇa learning (*faxiang xue* 法相學) and Vijñānamātra learning (*weishi xue* 唯識學) as distinct schools. They also examined Ouyang's role in the modern controversy of *Awakening of Faith* (*Dacheng qixin lun* 大乘起信論, T1666).[35] Building upon recent scholarship on Ouyang's thought, in this subsection, I draw our

[34] These lectures were documented by his student Nie Ougeng 聂耦庚 and edited by Lü Cheng, see Cheng Gongrang, *Ouyang Jingwu foxue sixiang yanjiu*, 148–49.

[35] For Ouyang's role in the controversy of *Awakening Faith*, see Aviv, "Differentiating the Pearl,"138–49. For a doctrinal analysis of Ouyang's distinction of Dharmalakṣaṇa and Vijñāptimātra and its emergence as

attention to the broader intellectual network that was receptive to Ouyang's message. I argue that the appeal of Ouyang's new Yogācāra lied in their shared concerns of how to be both authentically Chinese and legitimately modern.[36]

Ouyang's reevaluation of Chinese Buddhist translations breathed fresh air into the central questions of the May Fourth era: What makes China uniquely Chinese and how to make China relevant in the international community of nation-states? Contrary to the wholesale rejection of tradition, which is typical of May Fourth iconoclasm, Ouyang's proposal is not about burning down the old mansion. Instead, Ouyang sought to light up the Chinese culture with a critical beam for refurbishing and rebuilding the dilapidated house called China. As I have outlined in Chapter Three, Ouyang's social project was to graft Yogācāra soteriology onto Confucian governance, which I term a spiritocracy. Ouyang pushed against a blanket rejection of Chinese traditions and simultaneously rejected a wholesale adoption of Western scientific methods. On the one hand, he rejected traditional Chinese hermeneutics but reaffirmed the Chinese canon as the treasure island of soteriological gems. On the other hand, he endeavored to use the evidential scholarship and Western Buddhology as the tools for refurbishing the timeworn Chinese mansion of the universal humanity that had been accessed by both Confucian sages and Buddhist masters alike.

At its core, Ouyang's social vision is one of joint-learning between experts and the commoners, where the goal of inner learning is salvation from the depraved modern world. Ouyang saw the Chinese scholars in his institute as the head geese of a global epistemological community who must shoulder the inevitable responsibility of setting the course and leading the flock onto the correct

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well as evolvement, see Cheng Gongrang, *Ouyang Jingwu foxue sixiang yanjiu*, 148–78. In contrast, Zhang Zhiqiang placed Ouyang's thought in a broader trend of the modern transformation of Chinese thought since late Qing and insightfully pointed out Ouyang's Dharmalakṣaṇa learning (*faxiangxue* 法相學) departed from the sectarian demarcation of Dharmalakṣaṇa school as a sect. See Zhang Zhiqiang, *Zhu Lu· Kong Fo· Xiandai sixiang*, 247–66. For Ouyang, Dharmalakṣaṇa learning entails a panorama of all of Buddhist teachings and Vijñānamātra learning entails a penetrative insight into the depth of the ocean of the Buddha's wisdom.

[36] I am not the first to figure out this broader connection. See Ying Lei, "Lu Xun, the Critical Buddhist," 400–28. Never was Ouyang a lone figure. Many other Buddhist intellectuals engaged in this much broader intellectual network. For Taixu as a republican thinker, see Pacey Scott, "Taixu, Yogācāra, and the Buddhist Approach to Modernity," in *Transforming Consciousness*, 168–69.

tracks. Despite the dilapidated state of the Chinese canon, Ouyang believed in its magical power. This belief is seen from his lectures on Xuanzang's treatise *Establishing Consciousness-only*. In these 1922 lectures, for the first time, Ouyang gave this treatise a pivotal position in his new framing of a global Bauddha Dharma.

In a 1924 speech in the fourth research workshop of the Inner Learning Institute, Ouyang restated his evaluation of Xuanzang's treatise as the universal apex of Vijñānamātra and considered the workshop a crucial historical juncture to start a timely conversation about Xuanzang's treatise.[37] Similarly, in his 1929 outline of the same treatise in *Essentials*, he commended this Chinese composition as the most excellent and the most profound among Vijñānamātra teachings.[38] Ouyang believed that consciousness-only teaching is the utmost skill-in-means among all dharma gates because it establishes *ālayavijñāna* and *kliṣṭamanovijñāna* (or *manas-vijñāna*; the seventh consciousness) as the causal explanation of worldly phenomena and thereby revealing a viable soteriological path.[39] Ouyang also valued Xuanzang's composition for its comprehensive integration and profound penetration of both Mahāyāna scriptures and the four Āgamas, thereby defying the traditional characterization of the Dharmalakṣaṇa teaching as limited to six sūtras and eleven treatises.[40] In addition, Ouyang advised his audience that any wisdom seekers should learn Xuanzang's treatise because of its ability to establish the truth and to destruct wrong views through analytic rigor.[41]

More importantly, Ouyang believed that Xuanzang's treatise offers the timely antidotes of the social problems in both the West and the East. Here also lies the appeal of Yogācāra teaching in a scientific world. As I mentioned in Chapter Three, the pitfalls of Western sciences lied in its wrong views similar to Vaiśeṣika (*shenglun* 勝論) materialism. This ancient Indic atomist school

[37] Ouyang, *Cheng weishi lun yanjiu cidi* 成唯識論研究次第, OJNWX 10: 1.
[38] Ouyang, "Cheng weishi lun," *Zangyao lun xu*, OJNWX 7: 38.
[39] Ouyang, "Cheng weishi lun," *Zangyao lun xu*, OJNWX 7: 53–54. Ouyang says, "Dacheng shanqiao qiaoyu laiye … liyou mona yiqie wuguo" 大乘善巧巧於賴耶… 立有末那一切無過 [The Mahāyāna teaching is very skillful because it establishes *ālayavijñāna* … because it establishes *kliṣṭamanovijñāna*, everything is faultless]
[40] Ouyang, "Cheng weishi lun," *Zangyao lun xu*, OJNWX 7: 41.
[41] Ouyang, "Cheng weishi lun," *Zangyao lun xu*, OJNWX 7: 44.

understands the reality as a composite of four really existing minute particles of earth, water, fire, and wind. The pitfall of Chinese thought lied in its mistaken views similar to Sāṃkhya (*shulun* 數論) idealism. This is another ancient Indic monist school that assumes a divine self (*shenwo* 神我; Skt: puruṣa)—a pure consciousness that engenders everything. Ouyang matched Sāṃkhya onto Chinese interpretations of the *Book of Change*.[42] For Ouyang, the antidote to both poisonous views was exactly dependent-origination grounded in Yogācāra consciousness-only (*weishi yuanqi* 唯識緣起) as expounded in Xuanzang's *Establishing Consciousness-only*.[43] In essence, Ouyang positioned his new interpretation of Xuanzang's Yogācāra as the middle-way out of the two extremes of Western materialism and Chinese philosophical solipsism.

Ouyang consistently positioned real Chinese scholars—scholars of his inner learning—as the experts in this joint-soteriological learning. This confidence is most clearly seen in Ouyang's unqualified promotion of the Chinese transmission of Yogācāra over its Indian tradition. He claimed that, to understand truly Xuanzang's Chinese composition, one must rely on Kuiji's 窺基 (632–682) commentary. When he proclaimed that Yogācāra teachings originated from India but only flourished in the East, he meant that Kuiji and his disciples extensively and accurately explicated the foundational doctrines of Vijñānamātra and spread it further east into Korea and later into Japan.[44]

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[42] Note, Ouyang's knowledge of Sāṃkhya seems to have limited to its early monist phase and does not include how Sāṃkhya developed into dualism. But Ouyang's comment on Chinese conceptions of the primal oneness (*taiji* 太極) and the complementary dual (*liangyi* 兩儀) seem to map onto the development of Sāṃkhya from monism to dualism.

[43] Ouyang, "Cheng weishi lun," *Zangyao lun xu*, OJNWX 7: 49–51. Note that *weishi yuanqi* 唯識緣起 is also called *laiye yuanqi* 賴耶緣起. This name is not how Xuanzang and Kuiji characterized their own theory of dependent origination. Rather, it stems from a later Huayan school's caricature of Dharmalakṣaṇa school's main teachings. See DDB, entry "賴耶緣起" for details and further references. Lü and Ouyang both embraced these labels to characterize their own doctrinal stands.

[44] Ouyang, "Cheng weishi lun," *Zangyao lun xu*, OJNWX 7: 56–57. Unfortunately, this equation of Kuiji's Yogācāra with Xuanzang's contradicts most recent scholarship and is most likely an anachronic projection influenced by the Japanese reception of Yogācāra. As early as 1965, Mitsukawa points out key doctrinal differences between Kuiji's and Xuanzang's Yogācāra with regard to their positions on Bhāvaviveka's Madhyamaka. See Mitsukawa Toyoki 光川豊芸, "*Daijō shōchin ron* kanken: Chūgan, Yuishiki kōshō ni okeru ichishiten toshite"「大乗掌珍論」管見 – 中觀・瑜伽交涉における一視點として[A perspective on the *Daijō shōchin ron*: An Aspect of the Exchanges between Madhyamaka and Yogācāra], *Indogaku bukkyōgaku kenkyū* 13, no. 2 (1965): 613–618, https://doi.org/10.4259/ibk.13.613. Recently, Hayashi Kana has pointed out that some inconsistencies in the traditional legend that Kuiji was the sole inheritor of Xuanzang's Yogācāra, see Hayashi Kana 林香奈, "Jion Daishi no denki no saikentō" 慈恩大師の伝記の再検

Although many of the central Yogācāra writings were lost, Ouyang felt lucky that enough of the essential teachings of this school remained so that one could conduct detailed examinations and careful analysis.

This promotion of Chineseness did not escape the concerning eyes of at least one contemporaneous scholar. Clarence Hamilton in 1931 commented that "In editing the great *Ch'eng-wei-shih-lun* … Hsüan Chuang's [Xuanzang] translations are taken as basic and the alternate readings of other translations are given on the margins of the pages."[45] However, Hamilton missed the soteriological subtext of Ouyang's project and instead valued *Essentials* as a scholarly edition. For Ouyang, these treasured Chinese Yogācāra texts also afforded Chinese scholars an inescapable socio-soteriological responsibility: Along with the privileged access to the doctrinal whole, Ouyang deemed it essential that the Chinese scholars and the Inner Learning Institute should take leadership to ascertain all authentic Chinese translations and to render these texts accessible to all.[46]

For Ouyang, this kind of careful scholarship itself is a revolution. Inner learning is never about satisfying intellectual curiosity. Instead, the mission was to save the world with penetrative wisdom. This soteriological conviction was embodied in his method of deliberation and then selecting a resolution, namely, *jueze* 抉擇. While many scholars have highlighted the innovation in Ouyang's research methods in *On Discerning Consciousness-only*, I further point out that the that Ouyang packaged his new methods in an old bottle. The critical term in Ouyang's methodology is *jueze* 抉擇, often alternatively rendered in its homophonous variant *jueze* 決擇.[47] The second variant 決擇

討 [A Reconsideration of the Biography of the Great Master Jion Ki], *Indogaku bukkyōgaku kenkyū* 59, no. 1 (2010): 242–46, https://doi.org/10.4259/ibk.59.1_242. More importantly, as Sumi Lee convincingly argues, this identification of Kuiji as the only legitimate inheritor of Xuanzang's Yogācāra stems from the Japanese scholar Gyōnen's 凝然 (1240–1321) sectarian construction of eight schools based on three countries (India→ China→ Japan) that aimed to promote the link from Japanese Buddhism to Indian Buddhism, intentionally sidestepping the Korean transmission. See, Sumi Lee, "Redefining the Dharma Characteristics School," 55. For Gyōnen's impact on the formation of sectarian consciousness in modern China, see Schicketanz, *Daraku to fukkō no kindai Chūgoku Bukkyō*, 207–16.

[45] Clarence H. Hamilton, "Hsüan Chuang and the Wei Shih Philosophy," *Journal of the American Oriental Society*, 51, no. 4(Dec 1931): 291–308. His comment on Ouyang appeared on page 291.

[46] Ouyang, "Fu Chen Boyan shu," *Neixue zazhu 2*, OJNWX 12: 7.

[47] Ouyang used both terms interchangeably. For example, in his preface of Y*ogācārabhūmi*, he frequently referred to the "division of discernment" (Skt: viniścaya-saṅgraha; Tib: *rnal 'byor spyod pa'i sa rnam par*

frequently appears in *Yogācārabhūmi*, the foundational treatise in Yogācāra school translated by Xuanzang, which Ouyang devoted six years of his life from 1911 to 1917.[48] In his various writings, Ouyang used these two variants interchangeably. Therefore, it is safe to assume that when he used *jueze*, he was harking back to *Yogācārabhūmi,* and his audience would have understood as so. After all, both variants sound and mean the same. When he named his new method *jueze*, he is harking back to the traditional interpretative method whose Indic original *viniścaya* (vi-niś-√ci) denotes two senses: to deliberate and to resolve. Similarly, the Tibetan translation of this term *gtan la dbab pa* (གཏན་ལ་དབབ་པ་) also conveys a sense of "to isolate something so that it is clearly seen as a distinct entity … but not necessarily mean 'to determine' something."[49] It is not a coincidence that Ouyang employed this ancient word to package his new hermeneutic strategy.

Throughout Ouyang's explication, *jueze* was not used as the typical Chinese sense of "selecting definitive teachings" but was used as a method for selecting appropriated antidote to cure certain worldly depravities. The Chinese use makes Ouyang sound more sectarian and less analytical than what the text itself conveys. The reason is that the phrase "definitive teaching" carries a strong connotation of doctrinal classification. Different Chinese doctrinal classifications draw different lines between convenient and definitive teachings as a means to promote one's own doctrinal system as definitive while relegating other systems as merely convenient teachings.[50] Nevertheless, throughout his essay, Ouyang used the term *jueze* in the sense of "discerning various teachings while analyzing and narrating proper teaching as a resolution for a certain social or epistemological problem." Ouyang's formula is as follows: discerning A and B while analyzing B, as in "discerning the two truths while analyzing the worldly truth" (*jueze erdi tan sudi* 抉擇二諦談俗諦). All ten points in his lecture

gtan la dbab pa bsdu ba རྣལ་འབྱོར་སྤྱོད་ཡིད་ས་རྣམ་པར་གཏན་ལ་དབབ་པ་བསྡུ་བ) 決擇分 T1579 fascicles 51–80 as the homophonous variant 抉擇分.

[48] For Ouyang's transition from Xuanzang's translation of *Yogācārabhūmi* to Xuanzang's composition *Establishing Consciousness-only*, see Cheng Gongrang, *Ouyang Jingwu foxue sixiang*, 108. In addition, 決擇 is also a commonly used word in Xuanzang's translation of viniścaya in Abhidharmic texts.

[49] Illuminator, dictionary entry, "གཏན་ལ་དབབ་པ་"

[50] For an analysis of the sectarian power-play implicit in doctrinal classification, see Josephson, *The Invention of Religion in Japan*, 22–43.

notes follow the same grammatic pattern.[51] What they denote together is not a sense of differentiating the truths from falsities, but differentiating one teaching from the other so that one can choose the most proper tools to resolve doubts, to extinguish worldly sufferings, and to decide the right directions toward liberation.

Naturally, all ten points have a prominent soteriological function. For example, in the first one, discerning the substance and the function while discussing the meaning of the function (*jueze tiyong tan yong yi* 抉擇體用談用義), Ouyang made it clear that to analyze *yong* 用 (function) is to clarify different paths of practice. In this scheme, to discern the path of liberation, one must understand the underlying causal framing of all phenomena in the perceptual world. This Yogācāra causal enframing is explained in Xuanzang's terminologies. For example, within this discernment of the substance and the function, Ouyang put forth finer distinctions. He explained that the substance of the substance is none other than one true-reality realm (*yizhen fajie* 一真法界) because it is the reliance of all conditioning processes (Ch: *zhuxing* 諸行; Skt: *saṃskāra*). Seeds are the substance of function because they are the reliance of all the conditioned (Ch: *youwei* 有為; Skt: *saṃskṛta*). Ouyang believed that once one understands the causal functions of seeds and the truth of one true-reality realm, then one naturally sees which path would lead to nirvāṇa and which path would confine one to saṃsāra.

Another example of *jueze*'s soteriological intent is the third point, on discerning two cognitions while analyzing the subsequent awareness (Skt: *pṛṣṭhalabdha*; Tib: *rjes thob* རྗེས་ཐོབ་) (*jueze erzhi tan houde* 抉擇二智談後得). Ouyang explained that the goal of discussing the subsequent awareness is to help others (*suoyi xuqi houdezhi yi wuta ye* 所以須起後得智以悟他也). This statement offers a doctrinal elucidation of Ouyang's March 1922 lecture note, "Buddhist Dharma is neither philosophy nor religion but what the world needs now." In this essay published six-month earlier, he argued that this subsequent awareness is the foundation of the Dharmalakṣaṇa learning, the Vijñānamātra learning, and all learnings of skill-in-means,[52] without offering finer doctrinal

[51] Ouyang, *Weishi jueze tan*, OJNWX 10.

[52] Ouyang Jingwu, "Ouyang Jingwu xiansheng shuo fofa," *Wenzhe xuebao* 1 (March 1922): 1–24. This is recorded by Wang Enyang 王恩洋. I refer to the online version for ease of use. http://www.guoxue123.com/new/0002/bfehyx/001.htm. Accessed July 2018 to June 2019.

explanations because the lecture was delivered to college students. In contrast, in his September 1922 lectures delivered to students of the Inner Learning Institute, he offered ample doctrinal explanations and urged his students to learn all skill-in-means. For Ouyang, the goal of learning all skill-in-means was two-fold: 1) to arrive at the subsequent awareness through insight into consciousness-only teachings and 2) to incisively choose the most causally efficacious tools to set things right in this tumultuous time. In Ouyang's project, scholarship is compassion; knowledge is salvation.

To sum up, Ouyang reoriented Xuanzang's Yogācāra as a social revolution. Ouyang's paradigm not only presented the Chinese Yogācāra as the soteriological storehouse containing all antidotes to all worldly sufferings but also functioned as the grounding of the Chinese identity in a global community of Buddhist reformers. Ouyang imagined a Chinese cosmopolis as grounded in global Buddhist teaching. This new world Buddhism is hinged upon a new political order, a spiritocracy. Ouyang believed that the legitimacy of this globalized Buddhist identity lied in its efficacy to lead all toward nirvāṇa. Ouyang was confident that the Chinese script has a special place in this new world because the doctrinal whole has been competently encoded in the Chinese canon. This global imagination is not just a plan on paper. Ever since 1918, Ouyang not only actively promoted his inner learning among Chinese intellectuals but also established a new department in his Institute—The Department of Communication—whose sole mission was to communicate with scholarly and religious institutes in other countries. In 1927, Ouyang went one step further by editing a new Buddhist canon for remaking Yogācāra soteriology into a path of transforming the world into a Chinese cosmopolis.

War and Peace: Producing Knowledge for the Republic

Essentials not only encapsulates Ouyang's wish to renew the globe but also has functioned as a magic amulet to protect the nation and to appease the war dead. Soon after the publication of the second collection of *Essentials* in 1935, the threat of Japanese invasion became imminent. In 1937, with the advancement of the Japanese army, the Nationalists decided to relocate the seat of the government

and many universities from Nanjing to Chongqing 重慶. The Inner Learning Institute was also forced to join this strategic retreat. Unsurprisingly, due to the chaos of the war, they lost most of the Institute's once vast library and rich collection of woodblocks of scriptures.[53] Once the Institute settled in Jiangjin 江津, a district under the jurisdiction of Chongqing, they resumed their scholarly publishing and research, but on a much smaller scale. The publishing plan of *Essentials* was also reduced from the originally planned six collections to three. Nevertheless, Ouyang still saw Buddhist knowledge as a source of magic power and an essential force to save China from the destructive war.[54]

Ouyang was always publicly vocal about the magic powers inherent in Buddhist knowledge. In 1938, when he opened a fundraising exhibition of the Institute's books and woodblocks to cover the cost of relocation, he ended this essay with a plea to all-powerful bodhisattvas to remedy his powerlessness (*dali Pusa zhuyu wuli* 大力菩薩助予無力).[55] In May 1940, Ouyang suddenly redoubled his publishing effort, calling for a new edition of a complete canon. The chief purpose of this new complete canon was to eradicate sufferings and to console the dead souls of loyal soldiers (*kezang bakutong yi wei zhonghun* 刻藏拔苦痛以慰忠魂). Ouyang argued for the efficacy of this project in terms of original quiescence:

> Cognition and consciousness do not disappear. The loyal souls must exist within heaven and earth. The Dharma that is quiescent pervades all dharma realms. There are no corners that [the quiescent dharma] does not reach. As such, loyal souls are destined to encounter in [Dharmic] quiescence.
> 神識不滅，忠魂必在天地間，而法之有寂，周遍法界無所不至，如許忠魂必皆遇于寂中也。[56]

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[53] Ouyang, "Zhina Neixue yuan jingban tushu zhanlan yuanqi"支那內學院經版圖書展覽緣起 [An Exposition of the Exhibition of Woodblocks and Scriptures of the China Inner Learning Institute], *Neixue zazhu 1*, OJNWX 11: 1–3. This essay was first published in *Neixue zakan* 內學雜刊 [Miscellaneous Publications of Inner Learning] in January 1938.

[54] Ouyang, "Zeng you Zangyao," *Jingwu xiaopin*, OJNWX 16: 11. In this short letter, Ouyang claimed Essentials as the container of the ultimate virtue and most essential path (*zhide yaodao* 至德要道).

[55] Ouyang, "Zhina Neixue yuan jingban tushu zhanlan yuanqi," 3.

[56] Ouyang, "Jingke Dazangjing yuanqi," *Neixue zazhu 1*, OJNWX Vol. 11: 1-2. It was first published in *Neixue zakan*《內學雜刊》 in May 1940. The earlier passage essentially reframed the act of printing canon as an efficacious ritual for comforting the dead souls.

It is essential to understand that, at this time, his son Ouyang Ge 歐陽格 (1895–August 1940), the commander of the Yangtze River defense department from August 14, 1937 to June 28, 1938, was imprisoned by the Nationalist government for his inability to stall the Japanese military advance toward Nanjing. Scholars of modern China could immediately recognize the importance of Ouyang Ge's duration as the commander: The notorious Nanjing Massacre started from December 13, 1937 and lasted well into February 1938. Many Chinese and foreign news agencies reported this massacre immediately. By June 1938, the inability of the National Army to stall the Japanese advance and to protect the Chinese citizens had pushed the public anger to boiling point.

Right after Ouyang Ge was imprisoned in June 1938, Ouyang wrote a letter to his son. In this letter, Ouyang proposed to his son an audacious project of printing a new complete canon with each fascicle appended with the names of soldiers who died during the March–April 1938 battle of Tai'erzhuang 台兒莊, a battle notorious for its human casualties.[57] In August 1940, Ouyang Ge was executed for ineffective leadership in combat, retreat without fighting, and embezzlement.[58] Contextualizing Ouyang's scholarly endeavor with the conditions of war and personal tragedy,[59] it is evident that Ouyang invested in the miraculous power of the Buddha's words for alleviating personal pain as well as national suffering. Scholarship is not an intellectual game. For Ouyang, scholarship is salvation.

On a frigid winter morning, February 23, 1943 at 7 am, Ouyang lied on his right side and peacefully breathed out his last.[60] Along with his last breath also went the ambitious project of a new complete canon. Publishing and editing new collections of *Essentials* already came to a halt. Ouyang's

[57] Ouyang, "Yu Ge'er" 諭格兒 [Instructions for [My] Son [Ouyang] Ge], *Jingwu xiaopin*, OJNWX 16: 14.

[58] Guo Yanling 郭雁翎, "Ai Ouyang Ge" 哀歐陽格 [Mourning Ouyang Ge], in *Xinli* 新力 [New Force] Vol. 5 Issue 23 (1940): 10. Jian Jizhe 尖記者, "Woguo haijun zhuanjia Ouyang Ge zhisi" 我國海軍專家歐陽格之死 [The Death of Our Nation's Navy Expert Ouyang Ge], in *Xingguang* 星光 [Star Light] (1946): 5–6.

[59] Note that, at this time, Ouyang Ge was his only surviving child. His younger son Ouyang Dong drowned himself at the age of nineteen while swimming in the Yangtse river in 1923. His daughter died of pneumonia in 1915. In both cases, Ouyang alleviated his personal loss by devoting more on Buddhist studies. Cheng Gongrang, *Ouyang Jingwu foxue sixiang yanjiu*, 18–29.

[60] Lü, "Qinjiaoshi Ouyang xiansheng shilüe," 354.

many abortive projects once more demonstrated the precarity of a scholarly enterprise. In an age of extremes, competitive righteousness always seems to fare better than considered arguments.

Ouyang's global vision and social ambition set the backdrop for Lü Cheng's multilingual comparative studies and recensions of Chinese texts. Ouyang's bold claims won him enough financial support, which in turn enabled Lü and other learners in this institute to engage with considered arguments and nuanced analysis. In the next chapter, I will dive into the riches of interlinear notes embedded in the pages of *Essentials*. By shedding light on these overlooked corners, I illustrate how Lü dissected Yogācāra texts with comparative hermeneutics and then stitched these dissected elements into a theory of intersubjective social oneness, one footnote at a time.

Knowledge-Power-Salvation

This chapter has analyzed Ouyang's soteriological objectives in editing and printing *Essentials*. In one aspect, this study is a footnote for Ouyang's spiritocracy, whose social and political context I have analyzed in Chapter Three. *Essentials* served as the soteriological foundation of Ouyang social reform. When editing *Essentials*, Ouyang not only offered a new theory of the path to nirvāṇa applicable to contemporaneous society but also mapped different levels of a spiritocracy onto different stages on the bodhisattva path. In his prefaces, Ouyang further redefined all worldly phenomena in terms of Yogācāra causal theory. Through editing *Essentials*, Ouyang reinvented the Chinese identity as a scholarly spirituality traced back to Xuanzang's work and life as a translator-scholar-monk and elevated the Chinese translations into the premier vehicle of expressing genuine Buddhism. As such, Ouyang reframed the Chinese canon as the storehouse of all soteriological gems capable of resolving all worldly sufferings.

In another aspect, Ouyang's vision for *Essentials* also serves as the backdrop to understand how Lü Cheng and Ouyang differ in their effort to reform society with Yogācāra scholarship. While both Lü and Ouyang view Buddhist knowledge as a powerful means to revolutionize the world, as I demonstrate in the next chapter, in contrast with Ouyang's spiritocracy, Lü strived to build a deliberative democracy—the goal he set out in his December 1918 call for an aesthetic revolution.

Both Lü and Ouyang reverted the comparative gaze from the European and Japanese Buddhologists by redefining Chineseness. However, Ouyang largely internalized this gaze. He redirected it toward the Chinese and Indian traditions to mine soteriological treasures for his own agenda—establishing a Chinese cosmopolis. In contrast, Lü democratized this comparative gaze as a procedure of engaging in careful and constructive mutual criticism whose sole purpose is to further one another's spiritual progress collectively. This procedure was first implemented in his editing of *Essentials* but only matured in his 1943 training program of *Five Disciplines and Three Cycles*. Putting side by side these two visions of a global future and two ways of employing Buddhist knowledge as salvific power, many illuminating insights into the modern transformation of Buddhism will emerge.

CHAPTER 6. LÜ'S VISION: AN ARCHIVE OF SOTERIOLOGICAL KNOWLEDGE

Intersubjective Social Oneness: Another Myth with Footnotes

Since the late eighteen century, footnotes became central to the global production of Buddhist knowledge.[1] However, this new form of textual criticism is fraught with tension. The renowned historian of religion, Bruce Lincoln notes, that "scholarship is myth with footnotes."[2] A classic myth with footnotes is the Aryan theory popularized by Müller, Oldenburg, Frauwallner, and their fellow philologists and Sanskritologists, that inadvertently served the interests of Fascism and still underpin many White supremacists ideologies in the contemporary world.[3] However, simultaneously, footnotes also expose any "theory to critique, making it vulnerable to critical disputation over the relation between theory and evidence."[4] These tensions only expose the all-pervading political subtexts in the process of producing "objective," "disinterested" knowledge. In this chapter, I demonstrate that, when Lü was thrown into the powerplays inherent in imperialist footnote practice yet striving to subvert it, he deployed many maneuvers in producing *Essentials*. Lü's footnote strategies and tactics embedded in *Essentials* could serve as a mirror to reflect upon the troubled relations between scholarship and moral purpose.

Using the edition of *Essentials* as a window, I both analyze Lü's retelling of an alternative global history of Buddhism and illustrate how Lü's comparative hermeneutics dismantled the European universalism inherent in the gaze of comparing without being compared.[5] Moreover, I also

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[1] For the European perspective on this global conversation see, Donald Lopez, ed., *Curators of the Buddha*. For a prehistory of the Western perception of the Buddha before the emergence of Buddhology in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century, see Donald Lopez, *From Stone to Flesh*.

[2] Lincoln Bruce, *Theorizing Myth: Narrative, Ideology, and Scholarship* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1999), 209.

[3] For a historical analysis of these ideologies, see Nicholas Goodrick-Clarke, *Black Sun: Aryan Cults, Esoteric Nazism and the Politics of Identity*. To be more accurate, Max Müller was against the European philologist presumption of a pure inflectional language—the Aryan language, see Tomoko Masuzawa, "On the Possibility of the Common Origin of Language," in *The Invention of World Religions*, 221–28. According to Masuzawa, Müller employed scholarly diligence to fight against the rampant misuse of the term "Aryan" without avail, see Masuzawa, 229.

[4] David Chidester, *Empire of Religion*, 278.

[5] For the role of Buddhism in the making of world religion as an academic category, see Tomoko Masuzawa, *The Invention of World Religions*.

uncover Lü's thinking on the potential and responsibility of Buddhist scholarship. My focus in this chapter is not to provide an extensive assessment of Lü's scholarly achievements. Indeed, scholars like Lin Chen-kuo commend the "high standard of textual-philological criticism" in the editing of *Essentials* and expresses regret for the lack of academic interests in this high-standard work.[6] To the best of my knowledge, Lü's scholarly findings have been superseded by contemporary academic research. More importantly, with the insight of the implicit knowledge-power-salvation paradigm in the making of *Essentials*, it is more fruitful to examine the powerplays involved in its making and to ask how Lü's intellectual labor compels us to reflect upon what we mean by "the social" and "scholarship."

Instead of typecasting his early work in the straightjacket of academic studies, I take seriously Lü's self-identification as a Buddhist revolutionary and use this identity as the starting point of my inquiry. As I have demonstrated in Part I, before the establishment of the Communist regime in 1949, Lü Cheng never expressed doubt about his identity as a Buddhist revolutionary.[7] Well into 1954, two years after the Inner Learning Institute was officially dissolved, he still publicly identified Buddhist learning as a powerful means to transform this unsatisfactory world.[8] He never openly gave up his dream of reforming this world with Yogācāra scholarship. Therefore, I focus the analytic lens on the Lü's socio-soteriological vision and ask the following questions. How has he produced soteriological knowledge for engendering and sustaining a different kind of social bond that breaks out the limitations of individualism and social contract theories and that supports an aesthetic life of all beings?

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[6] Lin Chen-kuo, "Lü's Cheng's Uncompromising Quest for Genuine Buddhism," 351.

[7] According to his 1959 autobiography, he only rescinded this identification in 1949 and started to saw himself purely as a scholar of Buddhism when his hometown Danyang was "liberated" and he started to read Chairman Mao's writings and "deepened" his understanding of "revolution." Lü Cheng, "My Autobiography," 85. I will analyze this conversion from Buddhist revolutionary to Buddhist scholar in my concluding chapter.

[8] These thoughts appeared a series of lecture notes in 1953–1954. I will analyze relevant passages later in this chapter. See Lü, Xuanji 1991, 1330–79. For now, it suffices to note that, at this time, he no longer uses revolution 革命 to interpret *āśrayaparivṛtti* and consistently uses *gexin* 革新 (renewal) to explain this Buddhist term.

The organization of this chapter is two-fold. In the first section, I focus on Lü Cheng's editorial prefaces in *Essentials* and his new formatting of Xuanzang's most celebrated treatise *Establishing Consciousness-only* (*Cheng Weishi lun* 成唯識論, T1585).[9] Xuanzang's treatise has long been thought as a translation of Dharmapāla's (c. 530–561) commentary on Vasubandhu's (Tib: Dbyig gnyen དབྱིག་གཉེན་; Ch: Shiqin 世親; fl. 4th–5th C.E.) *Thirty Verses on Consciousness-only* (Skt: *Triṃśikā-vijñapti-kārikā*; Ch: *Weishi sanshi song* 唯識三十頌; henceforth: *Triṃśikā*) combined with excerpts from the works by nine other well-known Yogācāra masters, including Sthiramati's (Tib: Blo gros brtan pa ཟླ་གྲོས་བརྟན་པ་; Ch: *Anhui* 安慧 or 安惠; c. 700). I explain how comparative hermeneutics operated as an engine of production, which professionalized Buddhist learning and promoted Xuanzang's Yogācāra as the powerhouse of a global social transformation.

In particular, I explain, step by step, how Lü negotiated the tension of being both Chinese and Indian with this professionalized Buddhist learning. More specifically, Lü wielded comparative hermeneutics as a scalpel and carefully dissected Xuanzang's composition-translation into two independent layers: the main commentaries and the extensive subcommentaries, each with an independent authorial voice. He first exhaustively identified the convergences and differences between Sthiramati's and Dharmapāla and Xuanzang's doctrinal positions in the main commentaries and thereby authenticated the Indianness of Xuanzang's Yogācāra. In contrast, in his footnotes for the extensive subcommentaries, Lü identified Xuanzang as the primary author, accentuating the independence of Xuanzang's doctrinal lineage from Sthiramati's.[10] This dual-voice in one text allowed

[9] The title is often back translated into Sanskrit as *Vijñapti-mātratā-siddhiḥ-śāstra*.

[10] This is no easy task. It is well-known that Xuanzang's disciple Kuiji was also keen to distinguish Xuanzang's teaching from Sthiramati's. For an incisive analysis of Kuiji's investment in shore up Xuanzang's Indianness and how Kuiji manufactured an image of Xuanzang as the only authentic inheritor of the true Nālandā Dharma lineage from Dharmapāla to Śīlabhadra then to Xuanzang, see Lusthaus, *Buddhist Phenomenology: A Philosophical Investigation of Yogacara Buddhism and the Ch'eng wei-shih lun* (New York: Routledge, 2013), 405–412. However, Lusthaus pointed out that when Kuiji defended Xuanzang's independence from Sthiramati, Kuiji often resorted to erroneous attributions and remained unaware of Xuanzang's allusion to Sthiramati, see Lusthaus, *Buddhist Phenomenology*, 363, 399–405. By the time of Lü Cheng, the Sthiramati's text in Sanskrit was already edited by Sylvain Lévy. As such, Lü could no longer rely on Kuiji's commentary. He must invent other ways of defending Xuanzang's doctrinal independence, i.e., separate Xuanzang's compositions into two textual layers penned by two different authorial voices.

Lü to claim Xuanzang's translation-composition as both authentically Indian and uniquely Chinese and thereby justified the treatise's status as a global powerhouse.

In the second section, I excavate Lü's intellectual labor in bringing forth a phenomenologically naturalist theory of the social oneness grounded in Yogācāra interdependence. I demonstrate how Lü systematically accentuated certain inchoate phenomenologically naturalist doctrines in Xuanzang's treatise, one footnote at a time. These doctrinal elements singled out by Lü would later become the theoretical foundation of his training program to lead all toward an intersubjective social oneness. To begin with, Lü consistently downplayed Sthiramati's pan-metaphorical claims and instead stressed Xuanzang's Yogācāra causal enframing that reoriented dependent-origination as the ground for the objective reality in a perceivable world. And then, Lü further developed Xuanzang's causal enframing into a social theory explicating an intersubjective social oneness. To achieve this end, Lü foregrounded key doctrines such as intersubjective agreement (Ch: *jicheng* 極成; Skt: *prasiddha*) and indirectly perceived objective support (Ch: *shu suoyuanyuan* 疏所緣緣).[11]

To illustrate the social function of these doctrines, in each section, I must outline the historical arch of how Lü used these doctrines at different times. Often, I must either go back to the 1920s, demonstrating the soteriological significance of a specific doctrine, or leap into 1943, outlining how each doctrine played out in Lü's training program *Five Disciplines*. Recall that in the 1920s, Lü relied on Western aesthetics for sustaining a social oneness without resorting to physicality outside consciousness. While editing *Essentials*, Lü found in Yogācāra a new storehouse of tools for theorizing sociality in terms of phenomenological naturalism.[12] Simultaneously, the ancient soteriological method *āśrayaparivṛtti* (Ch: *zhuanyi* 轉依), which could be legitimately translated as "revolution of

[11] I am borrowing the use of enframing (*Gestell*) from Heidegger, who gave *Ge-stell* a more active sense of *Her-und Dar-stellen* (producing and presenting). In a similar manner, Xuanzang's causal enframing sets up the world of sentient and insentient beings to exhibit the world as a coherent causal network with feedback loops whose causal consequences are harnessed for liberation. See Martin Heidegger, "The Question of Technology," in *Basic Writings*, ed., David Farrell Krell (Harper Perennial, Modern Thought, 2008), 326.

[12] By phenomenological naturalism, I follow Christian Coseru's lead. He employs this framework to interpret consciousness as a "structure of comportment, an intentional orientation and attunement to the world of actions, objects, and meaning" and to explain consciousness "in causal terms without reducing the contents of awareness to noncognitive elements." Christian Coseru, *Perceiving Reality: Consciousness, Intentionality, and Cognition in Buddhist Philosophy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 3–4.

consciousness," replaced aesthetic empathy and artistic sensibility as the foundation of Lü's theorization of a new social (r)evolution. In 1943, Lü Cheng further weaved these inchoate elements of phenomenological naturalism into a curriculum for revolutionizing consciousness for all.

In the conclusion section, I juxtapose Lü's take on the social responsibility of scholarship with the question posed by Chidester: As scholars ensnared in the imperialist history of comparative religions, how could we take responsibility of this problematic past and take on the new responsibility of going beyond our own limitedness and situatedness? While Chidester styles his question as to how to "be in the empire of religion without being of it,"[13] as I explain, Lü's lifetime quest has been to discover a means to be in this unsatisfactory world without being of it. Even though Lü started his exploration with Western aesthetics and Buddhology, he eventually discovered in Yogācāra soteriology essentials means to achieve his goal, namely, weaving together a bodhisattva path for aspirating learners to abide in this world while transforming it into an ideal society through concerted, conscious acts. Reading Chidester and Lü side by side, I hope their critical reflections not only illuminate each other but also spark new insights in our search for a way beyond the empire of religion.

Rectifying the Perceptual World through Multilingual Comparison

Essentials is the central site of Lü Cheng's continual revolution of the consciousness. Through his meticulous textual criticism, Lü not only firmly moored Ouyang's grand vision of a global Dharma onto thorough comparative studies but also transformed Buddhist learning into a new profession. In this new profession, scholars are valued for their ability to fathom the doctrinal whole and to make manifest various local implementations of this universal oneness through multilingual studies. Just like art critics whose task is to awaken the commoners' innate aesthetic sensitivity through verbal translations of perceptual-aesthetic experiences, editors of a Chinese Buddhist texts must take on a new responsibility of elucidating the doctrinal whole through attentive cross-cultural comparisons.

[13] Chidester, *Empire of Religion*, xviii.

The task of the scholar is then to open the readers' eyes to a new way of living together substantiated by causal connections among all living processes.

The toolkit to initiate this social transformation is comparative hermeneutics. In his editorial prefaces, Lü detailed the various steps to apply these tools, demonstrating the power of comparative hermeneutics to uncover the golden bits of soteriological knowledge scattered in the vast mine of the Chinese translations. In the following, through a close reading of these editorial prefaces, I show Lü Cheng's chief strategies to professionalize Buddhist learning.

Professionalizing Buddhist Learning

Lü's editorial prefaces in the first and second collections best illustrate his new formulation of Buddhist knowledge. For Lü, like his teacher Ouyang, soteriological efficacy and transformative potential constituted the heart of what counts as Buddhist knowledge. However, in contrast with Ouyang's hope for a spiritocracy, Lü relied on rigorous methods alone to build up and sustain intersubjective social oneness. As I demonstrate in the next chapter, these methods became central for Lü's effort to build a deliberative democracy. In the current study, I illustrate the implied professional standards of inner learning, as manifested in Lü's self-training into a Buddhist professional through editing *Essentials*.

The two sets of editorial prefaces in the first two collections of *Essentials* disclose Lü's growth into a bodhisattva scholar. The preface in the second collection is more mature in two senses. First, Lü Cheng systematically mapped sequences of collation in the preface onto the seven steps of comparative hermeneutics that I analyzed in Chapter Four. Second, in contrast with his practice of writing one preface for each text in the first collection, Lü gathered all information about multilingual primary texts into one preface for the second collection as a whole in order to present relevant information in a centralized fashion. Reading these two sets of prefaces, it becomes clear that while collating the texts in the first collection, Lü Cheng was still experimenting with comparative strategies, one text at a time. By the time of the second collection, Lü Cheng already mastered what he hoped to achieve: establishing the doctrinal oneness through systematic comparison.

Lü established this imagined doctrinal oneness through three rounds of comparative collation/edition, matching onto the latter six steps of comparative hermeneutics. Recall that in 1924, Lü laid out a seven-step comparative procedure for extracting authentic messages from translated texts. The first step of comparing catalogs is implied by the selections of authentic texts for cross examination. The first round of collation involves comparative studies of different print editions (*kejiao* 刻校), mapping onto the second step of comparative hermeneutics. The second round of edition involves comparative studies of variant translations (*yijiao* 譯校), mapping onto the third step of comparative hermeneutics. The third round of edition involves cross examinations of texts in different transmissions and comparisons of variant interpretations (*leijiao* 類校), roughly corresponding to steps four to seven in his 1924 outline. The third round of collation is the core of Lü's study of the intertextuality of different sūtras and treatises. The elucidation of intertextuality is Lü's chief tactic to authenticate Ouyang's stated goal of cohering and interpenetrating all Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna teachings with *Essentials*.

This neat three-fold structure organizes the unruly multilingual variations into a coherent oneness encoded in the Chinese script, which also clearly spells out the professional standards for later scholarly studies in the Inner Learning Institute. For a text under scrutiny, sometimes, the second round of comparing different translations becomes unnecessary because of the lack of variant translations, such as *Mahāprajñāpāramitā-śāstra* (Ch: *Da zhidu lun* 大智度論), a commentary on the *Mahāprajñāpāramitā-sūtra* attributed to Nāgārjuna that only exists in Chinese. In addition, many texts in the first and second collections do not go through the third round of comparing variant interpretations due to the lack of different transmissions or lack of incongruent interpretations.[14] In

[14] Sometimes the boundaries between the first round of comparing variant prints and the second round of comparing variant translations become blurred. This blurring reflects Lü Cheng's own unexamined textual presumptions. For example, in collating Dharmakṣema's (Ch: Tanwuchan 曇無讖) translation of the *Nirvāṇa Sūtra*'s (Ch: *Da banniepan jing* 大般涅槃經; T374) chapter "Kaśyapa's Questions" (Jiaye pin 迦葉品), Lü Cheng claimed that he only went through the comparison of different prints due to lack of variant translations. And yet, in the same page, when listing primary sources of collation, he nonetheless listed the detailed information about Tibetan translation of this Chinese text. At the first sight, the logic in this case seems justifiable. The Tibetan text is a translation of the Chinese translation. Therefore, it does not represent an independent translation and shall not be considered as a comparison of "variant" translations. However, what remains unsaid is the same logic of "derivative" that European Buddhologist held against

other cases, because of the rich variety of divergent interpretations, Lü Cheng must conduct comparisons for different layers of the texts. A good example is his collation of Nagarjuna's *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā*, a canonical philosophical treatise of Madhyamaka, where Lü cross-examined variant transmissions of the root verses independently from their prose commentaries.[15] Despite the myriad procedural adjustments, the overall structure of Lü's scholarly edition neatly maps onto his 1924 outline of comparative hermeneutics.

More significantly, this neatly-organized comparative procedure authenticates Ouyang's characterization of Dharmalakṣaṇa learning as the comprehensive presentation of all genuine Buddhist teachings. A good example is Lü's edition of *Mahāratna-pratimaṇḍita-sūtra* (Ch: *Moheyan baoyan jing* 摩訶衍寶嚴經), a text with multiple variant translations. The text itself extols the bodhisattva practices and excoriates the inadequacy of the *śrāvaka* path.[16] In this edition, in addition to comparing all Chinese and Tibetan variant translations, Lü Cheng also marked up the main text with section headings derived from *Yogācārabhūmi*'s "Division of Discernment" (*she jueze fen* 攝決擇分). This section, as shown in its title, highlights Ouyang's promotion of *jueze* as a new hermeneutical method. In *Essentials*, Lü appended the relevant *Yogācārabhūmi*'s commentary on this text at the end of his collation, emphasizing the parallels between these two scriptures.[17] In 1943, when he put forth his new curriculum *Five Disciplines*, Lü further identified *Mahāratna-pratimaṇḍita-sūtra* as the foundation of bodhisattva piṭaka (*pusazang* 菩薩藏) and the root of *Yogācārabhūmi* teachings.[18] By equating *Yogācārabhūmi* with complete bodhisattva teachings through textual

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Chinese translations: Because the Chinese texts are translated from the "original" Sanskrit, therefore, as derivatives, they do not provide any "new" information. See, Lü Cheng, *Essentials* Vol. 2, 1–2. To further complicate the issue, in many texts where only official went through the first two rounds of comparison, Lü Cheng still supplied occasional footnotes demonstrating intertextual links among different sūtras and śāstras.

[15] Lü Cheng, *Essentials* Vol. 2, 907–10.

[16] Included in 3rd collection under the name, *Baoji jing · Puming hui* 寶積經· 普明會 (T310, fascicle 112). Lü appended a section of Yogācārabhūmi that commented on this sūtra, T1579.738c28–747b26.

[17] Note that, because volume three of *Essentials* was most likely published after Ouyang passed away in 1943, I choose to discuss the hermeneutic strategies of *Five Disciplines* together with *Essentials*, to underline the methodological continuity in both collected works.

[18] Xuanji 1991, 587.

analysis and editorial reformatting, Lü imbued a scholarly aura onto Ouyang's claim that Dharmalakṣaṇa learning is the ultimate manifestation of the doctrinal whole.

To further prove the superiority of Dharmalakṣaṇa learning in contrast with early Indic Buddhism, Lü also produced new compositions. One example is the *Outlines of Kathāvatthu* (Ch: *Lunshi biaomu* 論事標目; Points of Controversy), which Lü recommended his students to read together with the edition of the *Treatise of the Wheel of the Different Divisions of the Tenets* (T2031) in *Essentials.* This text is Lü's summary of a Pāli text that culled more than 200 debates. Lü chose this text to demonstrate the inconsistencies in *śrāvaka* teachings.[19] From the contemporary scholarly standard, Lü's position seems overly sectarian. However, in the early twentieth century, by accentuating the lack of doctrinal coherence in the Pāli canon, Lü's power maneuver effectively subverted the prevailing view of Pāli/early Indian Buddhism as the "pure" "original" version and thereby increased the appeal of a "renewed" Chinese Yogācāra.

In short, Lü employed comparative hermeneutics to justify Ouyang's theorization of a comprehensive Dharmalakṣaṇa learning. With his masterful weaving of multilingual intertextual connections, Lü materialized Ouyang's panoramic vision of the doctrinal oneness into the concrete existence of *Essentials*. Simultaneously, he also exemplified how a bodhisattva scholar shall produce soteriological knowledge in the scientific world.

Recasting Xuanzang's Treatise into a Perfect Embodiment of the Doctrinal Whole

To transform the Chinese canon into the storehouse of a global Bauddha Dharma, Lü also marshaled all available scholarly tools to recast *Establishing Consciousness-only* as a perfect embodiment of the doctrinal whole. When Ouyang proclaimed *Establishing Consciousness-only* the only effective antidote to the global crisis of modernity 1922, he only laid out ten principles as the scaffold for his new

[19] Edited from Pāli Kathā-vatthu, based on A. C. Taylor's 1894–1897 edition. Lü used it to collate another text titled *Yibu zonglun lun* 異部宗輪論 T2031 and Tibetan translation *bshung lugs kyi bye brag bkod pa'i 'khor lo* འཕྲུང་ལུགས་ཀྱི་ཕྱེ་བྲག་བཀོད་པའི་འཁོར་ལོ. Because T2031 is included in the first collection, I count this text within the first collection. For Lü's evaluation of this text, see Lü, Xuanji 1991, 597.

mansion of universal humanity. The actual recasting of Xuanzang's treatise into a new château for an aesthetic life began with Lü's editorial labor.

Lü Cheng's goal in collating Xuanzang's canonical composition is two-fold. The first is to establish this treatise as a perfect embodiment of genuine Buddhism. The second is to restructure Xuanzang's Yogācāra causal enframing as a unique Chinese transmission and reframe Xuanzang's phenomenologically naturalist doctrines as ontological justifications for an aesthetic society outside the discourse of scientific realism and social Darwinism.

There is an inherent contradiction in this two-fold goal. To achieve the first goal, Lü must prove the continuity of Xuanzang's Yogācāra with its Indic ancestors. To achieve the second goal, Lü must demonstrate the departure of Xuanzang's Yogācāra from both its Indic forefathers and its Tibetan siblings.

Lü resolved this contradiction by dissecting the text into two sub-strata, each sub-strata with independent authorship. He systematically separated the extensive subcommentaries (*guangshi* 廣釋) from the root verses and primary commentaries. Stylistically, on the printed pages, he indented all sections of extensive subcommentaries by two characters lower than the primary commentaries. This visual reformatting makes it easier to spot the beginnings of extensive subcommentaries and the ends of verses with their corresponding primary commentaries and thereby visually conditions the readers to heed to the potential doctrinal differences in the two textual layers. Once the text is visually formatted into two strati, Lü then moved on to prove their different authorships.

It is no easy feat to establish Xuanzang's composition as authentically Indic. In the intellectual climate of the early twentieth century that problematized the authenticity of any Chinese translation, Xuanzang's Dharmapāla adopted an ambiguous status similar to Plato's Socrates. This was in stark contrast with its premodern fame when Xuanzang's translation was widely respected as an accurate rendering of authentic Indic voices and when Xuanzang's truthfulness to Dharmapāla's transmission was never under scrutiny. To reestablish Xuanzang's authenticity in the prevailing wind of skepticism, Lü Cheng first had to prove that Xuanzang indeed combined Sanskrit treatises and rendered them faithfully.

To prove the authentic Indianness of Xuanzang's composition, Lü Cheng carefully lined up all extant variant translations and interpretations embedded in Xuanzang's commentary on *Triṃśikā*, highlighting the intertextual references to earlier sūtras and śāstras. As expected, Lü Cheng conducted three rounds of comparative edition. When comparing variant interpretations, i.e., the essential step of establishing intertextuality, Lü utilized five primary texts. In addition to Sthiramati's Sanskrit commentary edited by the French Indologist Sylvain Lévi, Lü also included the Tibetan translations of Sthiramati's commentary on *Triṃśikā* (Tib: sum cu pa'i bshad pa, སུམ་ཅུ་པའི་བཤད་པ) translated by Viśeṣamitra (Tib: Khyad par bzhes gnyen ཁྱད་པར་བཞེས་གཉེན་; Ch: Shengyou 勝友) and of Vinītadeva's (Tib: 'Dul ba'i lha འདུལ་བའི་ལྷ; Ch: Lütian 律天) commentary on Sthimarati's commentary,[20] Paramārtha's pre-Xuanzang translation/interpretation of the same verses (T1587), and Kuiji's commentary on Xuanzang's composition.[21]

In collating the thirty root verses, Lü carefully documented all instances where Xuanzang's translation seemingly diverged from either Paramārtha's earlier translation or Sthiramati's edition or Tibetan translations. These meticulous footnotes on root verses and primary commentaries provide detailed evidence for Lü's two claims: 1) Xuanzang's translation of the root verses was within the acceptable range of faithful translations and 2) Xuanzang's translation consistently demonstrated its doctrinal connection with Dharmapāla's lineage. I use the term "Dharmapāla's lineage" to include the later developments of Dharmapāla's doctrines, including the philosophical positions of Śīlabhadra, who was Xuanzang's teacher in Nālandā. In his 1927 comparative study of another Yogācāra text, Lü Cheng argued that Xuanzang's translation of this treatise as a truthful translation of the meaning (*zhongshi zhi yiyi* 忠實之意譯), faithful to what he learned (*xinyu suoxue* 信於所學), and not limited to Dharmapāla's teaching itself but instead following a later development stemmed

[20] Both Tibetan texts are taken from Quni 曲尼 reprint of the Derge edition.

[21] My research of these difficult texts has benefited greatly from two DILA's online tools. The first is a digitized edition of *Cheng weishi lun* that is meticulously lined up with major Chinese commentaries (http://vms.dila.edu.tw/main.html). The second is a digitized collection of all existing translations of *Triṃśikā* (http://dev.ddbc.edu.tw/~duncan/VM/ui.html). Accessed January–December 2018.

from Dharmapāla (*wanqi bianben zhi shuo* 晚起變本之說).[22] In collating the root verses, by first demonstrating the overall convergence of Xuanzang's translation with pre-Dharmapāla transmission and then pinpointing the rare cases where and how Xuanzang revised, reinterpreted, and rephrased the verses through Dharmapāla's doctrinal lineage, Lü Cheng persuasively established the breadth and mastery of Xuanzang's Yogācāra learning.[23]

The extensive subcommentaries are the sites where Lü established the newness of Xuanzang's Yogācāra: In the subcommentaries, Xuanzang exclusively advances Dharmapāla's doctrinal system. As is well-known, Dharmapāla's Yogacara is mostly preserved in Chinese translation. To foreground the uniqueness of Xuanzang's doctrinal system, Lü Cheng meticulously underlined the absence or minimal presence of Sthiramati's positions by marking each section of the subcommentaries with an interlinear note showcasing the absence of Sthimarati's interpretation.[24]

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[22] Lü Cheng, "Fu lun Zangyiben tezheng" 附論奘譯本特徵 [Addendum: On the Distinctive Features of Xuanzang's Translation [of Ālambana-parīkṣa]], *Inner Learning* 4 (1927): 36–41. I disagree with Dan Lusthaus's characterization of Lü Cheng's assessment of Xuanzang as "remaining sufficiently independent" instead of a "blind follower" of Dharmapāla, see Dan Lusthaus, "Lü Cheng," 336. In my reading of Lü's text, Lü Cheng was trying to establish that Xuanzang's translation was faithful to his own lineage. But Lü insisted that Xuanzang's lineage does not represent the only accurate interpretation of Yogācāra school (as Tang Chinese Buddhists would like to believe p42(632)), thereby opening up the possibility of other authentic interpretations (e.g. Dignāga's interpretation preserved in Tibetan traditions) of Yogācāra that differed from Xuanzang's lineage. The implication of this interpretation is also evident: Lü Cheng was trying to convince other learners about the imperative of learning Sanskrit, Tibetan, and Pāli, and to apply comparative hermeneutics in studying all translated texts in order to arrive at the doctrinal whole. I don't read Lü's evaluation of Xuanzang as an implicit way of declaring his own scholarly independence. I saw Lü Cheng as trying to establish the legitimacy of an impersonal method instead of blindly assuming Xuanzang's translations as the final words (which was exactly the attitude of his cohorts in the institute, see Chapter four, subsection "Redefining Science as Intersubjective Cross Examination.")

[23] These interlinear notes not only documented variations in interpretations but also changes in format in Xuanzang's composition by remixing a verse with the immediate comments before or after the verse. Differences in Sanskrit and Tibetan editions are also carefully documented in these interlinear notes. Lü Cheng, *Essentials* Vol. 4., 565 fn 6–10, 596 fn 3–5, 633 fn2–10, 665 fn2–3, 671 fn1–5, 678 fn2–3, 685 fn1–5, 693 fn1–2, 698 fn1–3, 704 fn1–3, 709 fn1–2, 721 fn1–3, 731 fn1–7, 739 fn1–4, 741 fn1, 744 fn1–3, 746 fn1–3, 750 fn1–3, 773 fn2–4. Note that Lü Cheng was consistent in pointing out Xuanzang's divergent doctrinal interpretations from Sanskrit and Tibetan editions in Xuanzang's translation of other canonical Yogācāra texts such as *Viṃśika* and *Mahāyānasaṃgraha*, due to the limit of space I will not list all Lü's relevant interlinear notes.

[24] The majority of these interlinear notes merely stated that in the rest of the subcommentaries there is no corresponding passages in Sthimarati's text. At the same time, there are a few instances where Kuiji commented that Xuanzang's subcommentaries combined Sthimarati's interpretation, Lü Cheng carefully refuted Kuiji's comments and demonstrated that in the Sanskrit text by Sthiramati, no corresponding

To stay true to scholarly due diligence, Lü Cheng also thoroughly documented the cases where the views in the subcommentaries might resonate with Sthiramati's. [25] Through strict textual comparisons, Lü Cheng demonstrated that the extensive subcommentaries in Xuanzang's composition have a fundamentally different texture and tenor from both the root verses and the primary commentaries. In this way, Lü established the possibility that the subcommentaries could be Xuanzang's truthful translation of *Triṃśikā* following the hermeneutic tradition of Dharmapāla.

Next, by comparing the doctrinal positions of Xuanzang's translations of Dharmapāla's other texts, Lü demonstrated that the subcommentaries in Xuanzang's composition are doctrinally consistent with Dharmapāla's lineage.[26] Though not a water-tight proof, comparative hermeneutics enabled Lü to accentuate the plausibility of a different Indian lineage stemmed from Dharmapāla, transmitted to Śīlabhadra, and preserved only in Xuanzang's text.

In particular, Lü Cheng strived to prove the doctrinal independence of Xuanzang from Sthiramati. It is not easy to delink Xuanzang from Sthiramati because, in Kuiji's commentary on Xuanzang's composition, Kuiji mentioned Sthiramati in almost a hundred different instances, many of which are simply erroneous attributions.[27] In his footnotes, Lü carefully documented and then refuted Kuiji's claims of Xuanzang's convergence with Sthiramati. In this way, he substantiated the doctrinal independence of Xuanzang's composition and thereby established the independence of Chinese Yogācāra from the Tibetan and Indic traditions.

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concepts are present, see Lü, *Essentials* Vol.4, 591 fn1, 599 fn1, 602 fn1, 639 fn1, 642 fn3, 651 fn1, 663 fn1, 731 fn9, 732 fn1.

[25] See Lü, *Essentials* Vol. 4, 575, fn1, 602 fn3, 609 fn2, 613 fn2, 619 fn1, 632 fn1 and 3, 643 fn1, 668 fn3, 697 fn1, 703 fn3, 728 fn1, 756 fn1.

[26] Lü Cheng used T1571 and T1624 mostly, see for example, Lü, *Essentials* Vol. 4, 576 fn 7, 577 fn1. Unfortunately, Xuanzang seemed to have translated only these two texts of Dharmapāla. The other Dharmapāla's text *Cheng weishi baosheng lun* 成唯識寶生論 T1591 was translated by Yijing.

[27] Kuiji used two homophonic Chinese names to refer to Sthiramati, Anhui 安慧 and Anhui 安惠. T1830. For an analysis of Kuiji's exterior motive in making these attributions to Sthiramati, see Lusthaus, *Buddhist Phenomenology*, 399–400, 405–412.

Equally important, for Lü, the relative textual independence of subcommentaries also showcased both the perfection and completeness of Xuanzang's teachings.[28] In this layer of Xuanzang's composition, not only did Xuanzang extensively cited āgamas and abhidharma texts but he also broadly utilized Mahāyāna scriptures outside the traditionally admitted canonical Yogācāra texts of six sūtras and eleven śāstras. This broad citation practice is in stark contrast to Xuanzang's limited citations in the primary commentaries that mostly combined nine other Indic masters' views. For example, in the subcommentary on establishing *ālayavijñāna*, Xuanzang summarizes all previously established arguments from other well-known Yogācāra texts to prove the existence of *ālayavijñāna.* This extensive proof is one of the lengthiest passages that extends almost three fascicles.[29] One key passage in this proof of *ālayavijñāna* is the reframing of the four kinds of nourishment. This argument reframes *ālayavijñāna* as the very ground that sustains life for all sentient beings.[30] As I show in at the end of this section, this reframing was further recast by Lü in the 1940s to provide a phenomenological naturalist explanation of social oneness, a theory that he continued to promote in the 1950s.

The critical example to demonstrate the perfection of Xuanzang's teaching lies in Xuanzang's extensive reframing of the bodhisattva path in terms of Yogācāra causal enframing. The key passages are the primary exposition and the subcommentary under verse eighteen. The root verse itself reads as follows.[31]

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[28] Perhaps, it is more consistent to label this voice as Dharmapāla's. However, without further evidence (e.g. earlier Sanskrit texts of Dharmapāla's commentaries), it is safer to characterize these subcommentaries as Xuanzang's interpretation of Dharmapāla.

[29] T1585.7c20–19a28. The other lengthy extensive commentaries include the section on establishing the manovijñāna, T1585.19.b7–26.a11, and the first fascicle that is devoted to elaborating on the opening verses that proclaim the names of the seventh and eighth consciousnesses.

[30] T1585.17b11–c24. Key phrase is, "yishushi shi shengshi xing" 異熟識是勝食性.

[31] I consorted to two Chinese translations of Sthiramati's commentary. Huo Taohui, *Anhui "Sanshi weishi shi" yuandian yi zhu* 安慧《三十唯識釋》原典譯註 [Sthiramati's Commentary on *Triṃśikā-vijñapti*: A Chinese Translation with Notes and Interpretations] (Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press of Hong Kong, 1980). Xu Fancheng 徐梵澄, "Anhui 'Sanshi weishi shu shi" 安慧《三十唯识》疏释 [Sthiramati's Commentary on *Triṃśikā-vijñapti*] in *Xu Fancheng wenji* 徐梵澄文集 [An Anthology of Xu Fancheng's Essays] (Shanghai Shi: Shanghai sanlian shudian, 2006), 385–422. Both translators as well as Lü Cheng noted Xuanzang's divergence from Sthiramati in translating this verse.

Xuanzang	Sanskrit	Tibetan[32]
由一切種識	sarvabījaṃ hi vijñānaṃ	rnam shes sa bon thams cad pa
Because the consciousness of all seeds	Because the consciousness is the container of all seeds,	The consciousness is the container of all seeds.
如是如是變	pariṇāmas tathā tathā	phan tshun dag gi dbang gis na
changes in this way and in that way.	the change in this way and in that way	By means of the mutually dependent force,
以展轉力故	yāty anyonyavaśād yena	de lta de ltar 'gyur bar 'gro
By means of the unfolding and mutually dependent force,	transforms by means of the mutually dependent force.	[it] changes in various ways.
彼彼分別生	vikalpaḥ sa sa jāyate	des na rnam rtog de de skye
various discriminations arise.	various discriminations arise.	Because of that, various discriminations arise.

While both the Chinese and the Tibetan translations remain within the bounds of acceptable interpretations of the Sanskrit verse, the two translations differ from each other in two noticeable occasions. The first is the different positions of the transitional adverb "because" (Skt: *hi*; Tib: *des na*; Ch: *you* 由). The slight variation of position by itself does not change the overall sense of the verse: Ālayavijñāna is the root cause of all changes seen in the transformations of the first six consciousnesses. However, it is quite peculiar that not only Lü Cheng but also contemporary translators of Sthiramati's commentaries commented that Xuanzang *added* the transition adverb "because" in translating this verse.[33] Although these modern translators of Sthiramati may have falsely faulted Xuanzang on this grammatic minutia, it points to the scholarly consensus that Xuanzang tells an entirely different causal story from Sthiramati's commentary and its Tibetan counterparts.

Before comparing these two causal stories, I must clarify one more grammatic minutia. Curiously, Lü remains silent about the second divergence in translation. This is Xuanzang's

[32] For the Sanskrit and Tibetan texts of the thirty verses, I use Buescher's scholarly edition. The philological differences will not affect the strength of my argument. Hartmut Buescher, ed., *Sthiramati's Trimsikavijnaptibhasya: Critical Editions of the Sanskrit Text and Its Tibetan Translation* (Wien: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenachaften, ÖAW, 2007).

[33] Interestingly enough, Lü Cheng and Contemporary translators of this treatise Huo Taohui and Dan Lusthaus all see Xuanzang added the sense of "because", presumably they all see "hi" as an emphatic particle without real meaning. But when "hi" is used enclitically, following the first word in the sentence, it often means "on account of," "because," "for." See also Lü Cheng, *Essentials* Vol. 4, 709fn1,2.

translation of *anyonyavaśād* as "the unfolding and mutually transforming force" (*zhanzhuanli* 展轉力). As has been pointed out by Ui Hakuju, Huo, and Lusthaus, this Chinese phrase *zhanzhuanli* extends the Sanskrit meaning of mere spatial interdependence into both temporal and spatial mutual influence.[34] The consequence of this extension is significant. This is because this verse itself does not specify what is dependent on what. This ambiguity opens the door for telling a different causal story.

In Sthiramati's prose, he makes it clear that the mutual dependence is between the first six consciousnesses and the storehouse consciousness or the eighth consciousness *ālayavijñāna*. The role of seeds in Sthiramati's commentary only functions as a double negative: to distinguish *ālayavijñāna*, the consciousness that contains all seeds, from the first six consciousnesses that do not have the function of storing karmic seeds.[35] This does not mean that karmic seeds are not important in Sthiramati's causal framework. On the contrary, the thrust of Sthiramati's causality is to distinguish the true causal story of the transformation of consciousness (i.e., produced by the latent activities in *ālayavijñāna*) from the wrong yet commonsensical etiology (i.e., the external objects cause the rise of eye consciousness and so on).[36] However, by and large, the causal story is explained in terms of how the storehouse consciousness interacts with other six kinds of consciousness to engender different appearances (Skt: *vijñapti*): Experiences engendered by the first six consciousnesses leave impressions (Skt: *vāsanā*) in the storehouse consciousness; the fruitions of these impressions became seeds; the fruition of seeds under right conditions engender appearances of external objects. The focus of this causal story is to explain why apparently real experiences in the first six consciousnesses should be understood in terms of the functioning of impressions and seeds in the

[34] Huo, *Sthiramati's Commentary*, 116–17 note 3. Huo credited Ui Hakuju for pointing out this extended meaning in Xuanzang's interpretation. Dan Lusthaus, *Buddhist Phenomenology*, 334–35. Lusthaus interprets this different interpretation as part of Xuanzang's "recasting of pariṇāma (alterity) in terms of discrimination (vikalpa) and karmic conditioning" (Lusthaus, 321, 334–35). Note that Lusthaus's comparison of Xuanzang's and Paramārtha's translations demonstrate that Xuanzang is not alone in extending the meaning of this Sanskrit term to fit their respective causal framing of the worldly phenomenon.

[35] Buescher, *Sthiramati's Trimsikavijnaptibhasya*, 110–1. 2.1.2.1.1 Skt: vijñānaṃ hy asarvabījam apy astīty ataḥ sarvabījam ity āha| Tib: rnam par śes pa sa bon thams cad pa ma yin pa'aṅ yod pas sa bon thams cad pa źes bya ba smos so||

[36] Roy Tzohar, *A Yogācāra Buddhist Theory of Metaphor*, 169, footnote 25.

storehouse consciousness. Sthiramati does not spill much ink on detailed characteristics of karmic seeds. This causal story substantiates Sthiramati's conclusion at the end of verse seventeen that explains everything in the perceptual world as appearances only (Skt: *vijñaptimātrakam*). Thus, the chief function of seeds in Sthiramati's causal story is to establish a pan-metaphoric theory of language.

In contrast, in Xuanzang's interpretation, the functioning of the agentive karmic seeds in *ālayavijñāna* takes center stage. These seeds provide an exhaustive causal description of all phenomena in the perceptual world and in laying out a direct soteriological path.[37] In particular, in his subcommentary on verse three and four on the characteristics of *ālayavijñāna*, Xuanzang explains in detail the six characteristics of true agentive karmic seeds stored in *ālayavijñāna*, for which Kuiji provided a length commentary defending Xuanzang's new definition of seeds with quotes from *Yogācārabhūmi* and *Mahāyānasaṃgraha*.[38] Xuanzang also spills much ink explaining the four characteristics of that which can be karmically impressed (Skt: *vāsanā*; Ch: *suoxun* 所熏)—*ālayavijñāna* and that which can deposit karmic impressions (Skt: *vāsanā*; Ch: *nengxun* 能熏)—the first seven consciousnesses.[39] It is also important to note that Xuanzang translated the end of verse seventeen *vijñaptimātrakam* not as appearances-only but as consciousness-only (*vijñānamātrakam*; Ch: *weishi* 唯識). This interpretation will adopt a new significance in Lü's theorization of social oneness, which I explain in the next section. Here, it is sufficient to note that, when combined with the "because of" in the first line, verse eighteen in Xuanzang's translation tells a different causal story: [Everything is consciousness-only] because the consciousness that is the storehouse of all seeds engenders all changes in this way and that way [due to the workings of karmic seeds in *ālayavijñāna*]. Thus, Xuanzang is not concerned with the efficacy of language. Instead, his focus in verse eighteen is to use the metaphor of seeds to explain all causal processes in both temporal and spatial dimensions.

[37] T1585.31.40a03–13

[38] T1585.9.b7–c5. T1830.309b11–312b27.

[39] T1585.9c5–10a11. T1830.312.c1–315.a27. Note that Xuanzang translate the same Sanskrit term *vāsanā* into multiple Chinese terms. This is just a fact of translation. It is difficult to establish one-to-one correspondance in translation

This intention to tell a different causal story underpins Xuanzang's translation of *anyonyavaśād* as "the unfolding and mutually transforming force."

When all causal processes in the perceptual world are explained in terms of the functioning of agentive potentials in the storehouse consciousness, it is properly summarized as Yogācāra causal enframing (*weishi yuanqi* 唯識緣起). Once more, in the interlinear notes, Lü Cheng documented Sthiramati's different perspective in narrating this causal story and highlighted the different causal forces and different karmic processes in Xuanzang's and Sthiramati's retellings.[40]

Xuanzang repeatedly foregrounds Yogācāra causal enframing throughout this treatise. In the main prose exposition for verse eighteen, Xuanzang interprets the transformation of consciousness in terms of three kinds of perfuming (Skt: *vāsanā*; Ch: *xunxi* 熏習),[41] positing this force as the enabler of transformations that is framed in terms of a tautological wholeness—the seeing and seen parts.[42] This retelling of the *ālayavijñāna* causal story also appears much earlier and in much more elaborate forms in Xuanzang's commentary on verse three to five, the key passages explaining *ālayavijñāna*.[43] Furthermore, in his subcommentaries on verse three to five, Xuanzang explains in great detail how seeds could be planted through the process of perfuming.[44] Equally important, seeds as agentive potentials also appear in Xuanzang's subcommentary of the first verse, where he intentionally translate *vijñānapariṇāma* as that which is transformed by/from consciousness (*yishi suobian* 依識所變) and *pariṇāmaḥ* as that which can transform (*nengbian* 能變), accentuating the agency embedded in consciousness.[45] Then, in the subsequent subcommentary, Xuanzang employs the seed

[40] Lü Cheng, *Essentials* Vol. 4, 709fn4–6.

[41] T1585.40a12. Note that *xunxi* 熏習 has multiple Sanskrit equivalents, see DDB search word "熏習" for a more extensive list.

[42] T1585.40a13–14. As pointed out by Lusthaus, the significance of this tautological closure in Xuanzang's system, seen in conjunction with Xuanzang's divergent interpretation of verse seventeen, lies in its key role in determining whether Xuanzang's Yogācāra is a form of idealism or phenomenology, Lusthaus, *Buddhist Phenomenology*, 434–437.

[43] See for example, T1585_.31.0010a03–05.

[44] T1585_.31.0009a29–b07.

[45] The Sanskrit verse is as follows: ātmadharmopacāro hi vividho yaḥ pravartate /vijñānapariṇāme 'sau pariṇāmaḥ sa ca tridhā //. Lü duly noted Xuanzang's translation inaccurate because it added meaning not in the original verse. Lü, *Essentials* Vol. 4, 565 fn 8.

metaphor to refute other theories about consciousness and the objective worlds as well as to explain the possibility of salvific accomplishments.[46] All Xuanzang's discussions about seeds and perfuming boil down to one thing: How shall one embark on the path of liberation.

In the ensuing subcommentaries on verses eighteen and nineteen, Xuanzang further elaborates on his Yogācāra causal enframing. Not surprisingly, Lü Cheng made sure to clarify that this subcommentary is Xuanzang's pen-ship.[47] In this lengthy section, Xuanzang provides a comprehensive review of four conditions (*siyuan* 四緣), which Xuanzang borrowed from *Yogācārabhūmi*. After providing a brief definition of these terms,[48] Xuanzang links the four conditions to their fifteen supports and ten conditional processes that lead to different soteriological achievements.[49] Then, in verse nineteen, this Yogācāra causal paradigm of four conditions and three types of perfuming is applied to explain the life-cycle of sentient beings, subsuming the traditional interpretation of twelve-link dependent-origination into his totalizing causal theory.[50] Next,

[46] See for example, T1585.2b5–7. In commenting on this explication, Kuiji also employed the seed metaphor to explain the continuity in memory, T1830.251b6–10. See also T1585 4c25–26 where Xuanzang uses the seed metaphor to explain appearances of good and bad and Kuiji elaborates Xuanzang's short comment in terms of the fruition of seeds 1830.275a20–b23. All these explications build up the momentum to explain three kinds of [salvific] achievements 成就 in T1585.5.b2–6, which Kuiji elaborates in great detail and links to ninety kinds of obstacles on the path of liberation in T1830.278b14– 279 c21. These accomplishments are then employed to illustrate the functionings of meditative practices (four dhyānas) later in T1585.5c3–13, which Kuiji explicates further in T1830.282c16–283b16.

[47] Lü Cheng, *Essentials* Vol. 4, 709fn8.

[48] T1585.40a21–b5.

[49] T1585.42a14–43a3. DILA website provides a very helpful table on how four conditions lead to fifteen reliances, then causes, and their respective achievements. http://vms.dila.edu.tw/main.html 四緣依十五處成十因表. Note that the ten conditioning processes is further reduced to two types, the productive conditioning that corresponds to the first of the four conditions—hetu-pratyaya and the supportive conditioning that includes the last three of the four conditions.

[50] T1585.43b2–45c5. This section is Xuanzang's own subcommentary. Note also that, Xuanzang's interpretation of *erqu xiqi* 二取習氣 significantly differs from Sthiramati's. For Sthiramati, grāha-dvayavāsanā (which is translated as *erqu xiqi* 二取習氣) means the karmic tendency to grasping the two—the self and the mine. However, Xuanzang interprets grāha-dvayavāsanā as two kinds: the tendency to grasp language and the tendency to grasp the self and the mine. See, T1585.43b15–16, which reads "erqu xiqi, yingzhi jishi, wozhi, mingyan erzhong xiqi"二取習氣，應知即是我執、名言二種習氣. This is not a mistranslation. Xuanzang used doctrines of two kinds of seeds, namely *mingyan xunxi zhongzi* 名言熏習種子 (seeds perfumed through language), *wojian xunxi zhongzi* 我見熏習種子 (seeds perfumed through ego) in *Mahāyānasaṃgraha* (T1594.137c29–138a11) to reinterpret this verse. This reinterpretation reveals Xuanzang's resolve to reframe all soteriological teachings (including language itself) in terms of ālaya-pratītyasamutpāda.

throughout his subcommentaries under the penultimate verse, i.e., the section devoted to explicating the stages of liberation and the process of revolutionizing the basis (Skt: *āśrayaparivṛtti*; Ch: *zhuanyi* 轉依), Xuanzang consistently employed the concept of undefiled and defiled seeds to map out various aspects of the path of revolutionizing consciousness.[51]

To put it differently, Xuanzang's translation of *anyonyavaśād* as "the unfolding and mutually transforming force" reveals his doctrinal commitment to Yogācāra causal enframing. In this new causal paradigm, the mechanism of revolutionizing consciousness is encoded in terms of the fruitions of undefiled and defiled karmic seeds. For Xuanzang, the convincing power of this Yogācāra causal enframing lies in its soteriological efficacy.

Likewise, Lü Cheng was also committed to this Yogācāra causal enframing. He was keen to employ it to push against social Darwinism and commodity fetishism. Further, in his paradigm, agentive karmic seeds stored in *ālayavijñāna* formed the core of a universal moral agency that promises a utopia. When editing Xuanzang's treatise, his early vision of an aesthetic revolution was fully encoded in the Yogācāra soteriology of revolutionizing the storehouse consciousness (Skt: *āśrayaparivṛtti*; Ch: *zhuanyi* 轉依).

Lü's resolve to develop a defensible Yogācāra evolutionary theory was initially evidenced by his 1922 refutation of Zhang Taiyan's equating of Bergsonian *élan vital* with *ālayavijñāna*. In 1929, by accentuating the textual and lineage independence of the subcommentaries, Lü proved that this comprehensive reframing of all Buddha's teachings was unique to Dharmapāla's transmission mediated through Xuanzang's translation. First, Ouyang proclaimed *Establishing Consciousness-only* the most profound among all genuine Buddhist teachings, a sharp weapon (*liqi* 利器) to dispute myriad wrong interpretations of *Vijñaptimātra*, and the only refuge (*yigui* 依歸) for Buddhist reformers around the world.[52] Later, Lü substantiated this claim with solid scholarship. As I demonstrate in the next section, Lü also systematically accentuated the uniqueness of Xuanzang's

[51] T1585.31.50c17–57a19. Xuanzang used a variety of terms to describe the pure and contaminated seeds, such as *ranzhong* 染種 or *zhangzhong* 障種 or *fannaozhangzhong* 煩惱障種, and *wulouzhong* 無漏種 or *jingzhong* 淨種 for undefiled pure seeds.

[52] Ouyang, "Cheng weishi lun" 成唯識論, *Zanyao lun xu*, OJNWX 7: 42, 44.

Yogācāra causal enframing and the efficacy of Yogācāra intersubjectivity in bringing forth liberation. In so doing, Lü authenticated Ouyang's vision of a global Chineseness and the "natural" leadership position of the Inner Learning Institute, imbuing Ouyang's social project with the aura of a new scholarly myth.

Embroidering a Social Oneness, One Footnote at a Time

Despite Lü's endorsement of Ouyang's, Lü is a revolutionary in his own right. As I demonstrate in this section, Yogācāra studies marked his continual pursuit of an aesthetic society. Using his editorial labor as a window, I show how Lü systematically promoted philosophical naturalist elements in Xuanzang's *Establishing Consciousness-only*. I further explain how these elements later contributed to his theorization of an intersubjective social totality. Last, I show how Lü foregrounded the efficacy of Xuanzang's new formulation of Yogācāra intersubjectivity in emancipating the society in its entirety.

Yogācāra philosophy contains many inchoate elements of phenomenological naturalism. Since its inception in ancient India, proponents of Consciousness-only doctrines labored to explain the seemingly objective world and the existence of other minded creatures in terms of causal processes within consciousness.[53] To dislodge intersubjective agreements from physicality, early Yogācāra scriptures, such as *Mahāyānasaṃgraha* attributed to the founder of Yogācāra, Asaṅga (Tib: Thogs med ཐོགས་མེད་, Ch: Wuzhuo 無著; fl. 4th C.E.), resort to the common characteristics of *ālayavijñāna* as an explanation for the shared experiences of mountains, rivers, earth, sky, and other elements of a receptacle-world (*qi shijian* 器世間).[54] The great synthesizer Vasubandhu, in his renowned treatises *Triṃśikā* and *Trisvabhāvanirdeśa*, provided a coherent and extensive explanation of the totality of the perceptual world including both the perceived receptacle-world and the world of sentient beings in terms of directed causal processes linking together mental appearances, and thereby established the

[53] For an in-depth analysis of Vasubandhu's causal framing, see Jonathan Gold, *Paving the Great Way: Vasubandhu's Unifying Buddhist Philosophy* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2015), 59–93.

[54] For an in-depth analysis of relevant doctrinal innovations in *Mahāyānasaṃgraha*, see William S. Waldron, *The Buddhist Unconscious: The Ālaya-vijñāna in the Context of Indian Buddhist Thought* (London & New York: Routledge Curzon Taylor & Francis Group, 2003), 160–69.

doctrinal foundations of Vijñaptimātra school.[55] Once the world becomes fully comprehensible in terms of causal mental processes, Sthiramati, in his commentary of Vasubandhu's *Triṃśikā*, drives home a radical pan-figurative interpretation of language, denying any realistic linguistic claim of entities outside consciousness and instead asserting words as mere figures (Skt: *upacāra*) whose meaning lies in the underlying mental causal links.[56] The central thrust for these Yogācāra doctrinal innovations mentioned above is to affirm the possibility of attaining liberation through the words of the Buddha.[57] Xuanzang is no exception. Although a full treatment of Xuanzang's doctrinal inheritance and innovation warrants an independent book-length study, in this section, my goal is more modest.

I argue that the appeal of Yogācāra in modern China is also a result of new interpreters such as Ouyang and Lü who made ancient doctrines speak to contemporaneous issues. There are three critical doctrinal developments in Xuanzang's treatise that Lü Cheng drew upon to formulate his intersubjective social oneness.

The first relates to Yogācāra intersubjectivity: a finer distinction of the common and uncommon characteristics (*gong bugong xiang* 共不共相) of *ālayavijñāna* to account for both seemingly objective and seemingly subjective experiences. A related development is to further refinement of objective supports (Ch: *suoyuanyuan* 所緣緣; Skt: *ālambana-pratyaya*) into two categories: directly/indirectly perceived objective basis (*qing/shu suoyuanyuan* 親/疏所緣緣). The function of this new doctrine is to account for the existence of other minded creatures, and the

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[55] Gold, *Paving the Great Way*, 128–75.

[56] Roy Tzohar, *A Yogācāra Buddhist Theory of Metaphor*, 170–71. The book itself is a detailed analysis of the intellectual environment that nurtured this pan-figurative turn and how Sthiramati provided a coherent and defensible linguistic theory. But the idea that the meaning of a word lay in the kind of causal stories a word tells has appeared much earlier in both Asaṅga's and Vasubandhu's writings and has been discussed respectively by William Waldron and Jonathan Gold.

[57] For language and our boundedness in saṃsāra in *Mahāyānasaṃgraha*, see Waldron, *The Buddhist Unconscious*, 167–68. For Vasubandhu's defense of the meaning of doctrines in terms of its soteriological efficacy, see Gold, *Paving the Great Way*, 174–75. Roy Tzohar's treatment of the soteric possibility as well as efficacy of the Buddha's teachings is much more extensive and is hinged heavily on the Yogācāra intersubjectivity constructed through figurative speaking, see Tzohar, *A Yogācāra Buddhist Theory of Metaphor*, 178–204.

objective supports created by other streams of consciousness. For Lü, indirectly perceived objective basis played an essential role in cementing the centrality of scholarship and textual analysis in building intersubjective accord.

The second doctrinal development is a more elaborate argument for *vijñānamātra* as the basis for establishing intersubjective agreements (Skt: *prasiddha*; Ch: *jicheng* 極成) and disagreements (*bujicheng* 不極成) that treat both sameness and difference in the perceptual world on equal footing. Working in tandem with directly/indirectly perceived objective basis, this finer point enables Lü to justify the seemingly objective aspect of society in terms of the intersubjective and the interdependent. As such, these doctrines provide an alternative social vision outside the determinate moral universe predicted by the "natural" law of social Darwinism. By making the objective reality of the social totality a derivative of the intersubjective that is causally dependent on fruitions of karmic seeds in *ālayavijñāna*, these two doctrines empower human beings to transform society at large through revolutionizing consciousness.

The third doctrinal development further establishes social oneness in terms of Yogācāra causal enframing. This is a reinterpretation of one true-reality realm (*yizhen fajie* 一真法界), a mythical ideal world that was reinterpreted by Lü as an outcome of collective acts of purifying consciousness. Instead of focusing on detailed descriptions of one true-reality realm, Lü drew our attention to the processes that could lead us there. Lü emphasized that, society is a collection of individual streams of *ālayavijñāna* who are bound together in saṃsāra through their consumptions of four kinds of nourishment (*sishi* 四食). Because of this interdependence, the porous individual could choose to work together to revolutionize *ālayavijñāna*. These individual streams of consciousness—beings with deluded self—could be released from their unsatisfactory existences through hearing and internalizing (*wenxun* 聞熏) the continual flow of the same true teachings in the dharma realm (*fajie dengliu zhengfa* 法界等流正法). In the 1930s, these fine doctrinal points were buried deeply in the interlinear notes of *Essentials*. A full manifestation of Lü's new interpretation of the social oneness grounded in *ālaya-pratītyasamutpāda* would only take shape in his 1943 lecture series.

The task of this section is to identify and clarify Lü's editorial strategies in accentuating these doctrines. In three subsections, I hone in on these three doctrines. In each subsection, I first demonstrate how Lü Cheng accentuated the universal appeal of these doctrines through multilingual interlinear notes. Then I situate Lü's editorial decisions within the long arch of his social project of revolutionizing consciousness, highlighting Lü's take on the social responsibility of scholarly studies.

Accentuating Yogācāra Intersubjectivity

Xuanzang and Kuiji refined the categories of common and uncommon characteristics of *ālayavijñāna* to enable detailed discussions of both shared and individual experiences of the phenomenological world. In established categories, while the common characteristics could account for the shared experiences of seemingly objective existences such as mountains and rivers and while the uncommon characteristics could account from the seemingly private existences such as eyes and bodies, they fail to explain, for example, why different sentient beings see the same mountain yet experience it differently and why the eyes and bodies generated by one sentient being could be perceived by another stream of consciousness.

To account for the interactions between different streams of consciousness, Xuanzang and Kuiji further subdivided common and uncommon characteristics of *ālayavijñāna*. To account for the individuated experiences of a seemingly same object, Xuanzang and Kuiji created a new term—the uncommon among the common (*gong zhong bugong* 共中不共). This term summarizes Xuanzang's explanation for why when humans see water in the river yet hungry ghosts see puss. To explain why the six sense faculties and their corresponding objects (such as paintings and eyes, music and ears) stemming from the uncommon characteristics of one sentient being could sometimes be perceived by another minded creature, Xuanzang and Kuiji created another new term—the common among the uncommon (*bugong zhong gong* 不共中共).[58] These two new categories matter because they help explain how one minded creature could relate to and communicate with another in a partially shared

[58] Xuanzang, T1585.10c12–T1585.11a20; Kuiji, T1830.321b6–T1830.326.a5.

perceptual world, without presuming an ontologically primary entity outside consciousness and without dismissing different subjective experiences as derivatives of an objective physicality.[59]

Not surprisingly, Lü Cheng employed careful interlinear notes to underline that these doctrinal innovations belonged to Xuanzang and Dharmapāla's lineage, not from Sthiramati. At the beginning of this subcommentary, Lü explained in the interlinear note that the ensuing text comments on graspings (*zhishou* 執受), *āyatanas* (Ch: *chu* 處; refers to twelve sense spheres), and *vijñaptis* (Ch: *liao* 了; refers to distinctions or appearances) that are absent in Sthiramati's commentary.[60] Equally important, later in the text, when Kuiji wrongly attributes a particular doctrine to Sthiramati, Lü Cheng pointed out that Kuiji's attribution was wrong.[61] Lü's notes made it clear that Xuanzang's transmission of Yogācāra is independent from Sthiramati's and the doctrines about the common within the uncommon and the uncommon within the common belong solely to Xuanzang's lineage.

To further explain how one sentient being could influence another sentient being, Xuanzang differentiated the established Yogācāra doctrine objective basis (Skt: *ālambana*) into two categories: directly and indirectly perceived objective support. While the former agrees with traditional interpretations of *ālambana*, the latter is a new concept. *Shu* 疎 in Chinese connotes a sense of distance. It accounts for the phenomenon that, under certain circumstances, entities directly created by one stream of consciousness could be perceived by another sentient being as substantial entities.[62]

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[59] To be more accurate, Kuiji invented these two new terms to summarize Xuanzang's extended explanations of why graspings (*zhishou* 執受), āyatanas (*chu* 處), and vijñapti (*liaobie* 了別) are all consciousness-only. Xuanzang's definition of graspings include both seeds (three kinds of perfumed dispositions) as well as sense faculties and their bases (T1585.10a14–17).

[60] Lü Cheng, *Essentials* Vol. 4, 599 fn 1.

[61] Lü Cheng, *Essentials* Vol. 4, 602 fn 1. T1585.11a11–12 & T1830.326a16–b19. Here, Lü Cheng seems to have forgotten one strategies he constantly uses to justify inconsistences in Chinese translations: Kuiji might have read a different transmission of Sthiramati's Sanskrit text than the one discovered in the early twentieth century.

[62] T1585.40c16–19. Dan Lusthaus also succinctly explains the profound philosophical ramifications of this doctrine: Pushing against an idealist portrayal of the world, this doctrine enables an explanation of the intersubjective in terms of phenomenological naturalism. Lusthaus, *Buddhist Phenomenology*, 501–2. Note also that Lusthaus translates this term as "remote ālambana." For an analysis of how remote ālambana resolves the problem of other minds in Chinese Yogācāra, see Jingjing Li, "Through the Mirror: The Account

While the new category of the common among the uncommon characteristics describes this phenomenon, the indirectly perceived objective support is invented to explain the causal processes behind such a phenomenon.

This invention might have stemmed from the Indic master Dharmapāla. However, after being transplanted on the Chinese soil, the indirectly perceived objective support gradually developed into a powerful means for the bodhisattvas to liberate all beings. Xuanzang's discussion on this topic is limited in his extensive subcommentary on the *ālambana* section alone.[63] In Kuiji's commentary, however, indirectly perceive objective support is employed in a much broader range of doctrinal explanations: both for justifying consciousness-only doctrines and for refuting heterodoxic positions such as the Sāṃkhya's eternal divine self and Vaiśeṣika's really existing external elements.

However, in Lü Cheng's employment, this concept not only functioned as a critical strategy to establish the robustness of intersubjectivity but also operated as the pivot for collective emancipation through scholarship. Both uses have crucial socio-soteriological ramifications.

First, because suchness is an aspect of the consciousness of the bodhisattva with subsequent awareness, if suchness as an aspect of bodhisattva consciousness could be grasped by ordinary beings as indirectly perceived objective support/remote *ālambana*, then ordinary beings could be enlightened without falling into the trap of ontological realism because suchness merely appears *as if* it exists outside. This socio-soteriological significance underpinned the 1924 debate when Lü and his cohort in the Institute argued back and forth on whether suchness could function as the indirectly perceived objective support. Lü Cheng insisted that objective support is merely describing what can be grasped as external objects, and thereby, the suchness understood by bodhisattvas with subsequent awareness could be indirectly perceived by ordinary beings. To prove his point, in his 1927 essay "Guan suoyuan shilun huiyi" 觀所緣釋論會譯 [A Comparative Expositions of (the Chinese and Tibetan) Translations of the *Ālambana-parīkṣa*], Lü Cheng identified all central passages

of Other Minds in Chinese Yogācāra Buddhism," *Dao* (2019) 18: 435–51, https://doi.org/10.1007/s11712-019-09674-3.

[63] T1585.40c14–41.a5.

supporting his interpretation with a circle beside the relevant Chinese characters.[64] Eight years later, in the second collection of *Essentials* published in 1935, in his collation of Yijing's translation of Dharmapāla's *Ālambana-parīkṣa-vṛtti* (*Guansuoyuanyuan lun shi* 觀所緣緣論釋; T1168), he not only incorporated his 1927 findings but also systematically accentuated the passages that explain *ālambana* as the aspect of consciousness (Skt: *vijñāna*) that appears *as if* 如 it exists outside by indenting other texts lower than the essential lemmas.[65] In particular, to stress the centrality of consciousness-only doctrines, he used a footnote to equate *shi* 識 with *vijñāna* and then linked *shi* with a rephrase of Yogācāra causal enframing. This paraphrase in this footnote implies that, even though indirectly perceived objects are termed *zhi* 質 (substance), these substances only appear as so, and they are, in reality, mere *vijñāna*.[66]

Lü's decade long scholarly studies on this doctrinal point also unveiled to us the second socio-soteriological ramification of suchness as indirect objective support: the possibility of enlightenment through scholarly studies. Lü's firmly believed in the soteriological efficacy of scholarship. He demonstrated his belief through his actions: Because all authentic texts were seen as narrated by buddhas and bodhisattvas with subsequent awareness and then written down, if suchness as encoded in the texts cannot be indirectly perceived by ordinary beings, then the soteriological efficacy of textual studies would be moot. However, if suchness could be indirectly perceived, then texts would no longer be mere shadows in ink, and ordinary beings would not be condemned to the eternal cave of darkness perceiving mere shadows of the ultimate reality. Lü analyzed and compared

[64] Lü, "Guan suoyuan shilun huiyi" 觀所緣釋論會譯, *Inner Learning* 4 (1927): 1–33.

[65] For the lemmas accentuated, see Lü, *Essentials* Vol. 7, 308–9. Note that Lü Cheng is not intentionally misleading his readers, the central theme of this treatise is to prove that ālambana is a manifestation of consciousness as if they are objects outside consciousness. His new edition merely accentuated this point through page design and interlinear notes. In addition, in his footnote on page 309 explaining "shi you pixiang gu deng" 識有彼相故等, he also cited another version of the lemma, "yishi shiti gu. Youshi pi yinyuan gu" 以是識體故, 又是彼因緣故." Both passages express the same meaning, the body of [the seemly existing object] is consciousness, and consciousness is its cause. This footnote further accentuates the meaning of "[appearing as if things outside] whose body is consciousness—i.e. its causes and conditions."

[66] Recall that those who objected Lü's position insisted that indirectly perceived objects are substances while directly perceived objects are substanceless. This position was popular among the Institute's alumni such as Xiong Shili and Liang Shuming.

all these textual interconnections over the years just to prove his 1924 argument that remote *ālambana* is merely describing that what can be grasped as objective support and is, in reality, a manifestation of a distant stream of *ālayavijñāna*. If this assertation could be refuted, then all of Lü's scholarly endeavors would be wasted effort because they cannot lead to collective liberation.

Prasiddha and the Social Function of Yogācāra Intersubjectivity

Once Lü established the ontological viability of intersubjective accord, Lü's next task is to explain how such a possibility of communication could be realized in daily activities. *Prasiddha* (intersubjective agreement; Ch: 極成) is Lü's primary tool in demonstrating how intersubjective accord in an aesthetic society could be formed when there is no objective world out there.

The term itself is best known as a terminology in Buddhist logic (Skt: hetuvidyā), describing a theorem or axiom to be accepted by both parties in a debate. In the oeuvre of the great Tibetan Buddhist scholar Sakya Paṇḍita (1182–1251), this term is skillfully employed to solve the problem of the meaning of language in the Yogācāra system. As is well-known, in linguistic realism, the meaning of a word is tied to its objectively existing referent, independent from subjective experiences. The word "tree" is meaningful because trees exist outside consciousness. However, when there are no trees out there, how do people agree on the meaning of tree? Sakya Paṇḍita's answer is elegant: The relations of words and their non-existing referents are maintained by linguist conventions only. However, these linguist conventions are not arbitrary. Preferably, they are maintained by a group of expert scholars. Thereby, a word only becomes *prasiddha* (well-known) through concerted and intentional maintenance of linguistic conventions by devoted scholars.[67] Thus, in Sakya Paṇḍita's paradigm, *prasiddha* is used to justify the necessity of an elite interpretative community whose task is to guard correct linguistic conventions and thereby guarantee the purity of Dharma. Despite its elitist orientation, this Tibetan interpretative tradition reveals the essential role of *prasiddha* for establishing intersubjective accord without resorting to objectivity.

[67] Gold, *The Dharma's Gatekeepers: Sakya Paṇḍita on Buddhist Scholarship in Tibet* (Albany: State University of New York, 2007), 64. For Sakya Paṇḍita's refashioning of prasiddha, see 76–89.

To understand Lü's use of this term, scholars must distinguish the dual functions of *prasiddha*: its philosophical function in establishing the possibility of intersubjectivity and its social function of how and by whom intersubjective agreements are maintained. Lü shared with Sakya Paṇḍita the philosophical conviction of using *prasiddha* to establish intersubjectivity without prioritizing material physicality. However, instead of seeing *prasiddha* as the precarious linguistic conventions to be carefully guarded by specialists, Lü took the existence of *prasiddha* as self-evident, just like how realists consider objectivity self-evident. Further, Lü considered *prasiddha* an indisputable proof of the possibility of collective perceptual experiences, evidencing the "fact" that shared karmic seeds generate intersubjective agreements. As such, for Lü, the social function of *prasiddha* is to enable collective and democratic processes of moral inquiry for building an aesthetic society. As I explain later in this section, Lü's inherited Xuanzang's take on *prasiddha* and put it into theorizing an intersubjective social oneness. Once the social oneness is grounded in Yogācāra terms of *prasiddha* at the macro level and shared karmic seeds at the micro-level, all the Yogācāra apparatus for arguing against realism and idealism become readily available for Lü's refutation of social Darwinism and Chinese vitalism.

Lü's naturalistic take on *prasiddha* stems from his need to justify a different kind of sociality. In contrast to the social function of *prasiddha* in Sakya Paṇḍita's paradigm to justify the necessity of an elite group, Lü philosophical position on seeing *prasiddha* as self-evident enables him to justify the need to build a democratically organized interpretative community from the ground up. Once *prasiddha* became a "natural" condition, Lü deemed the validity of these well-known conventions to be maintained by scientific methods alone—comparative hermeneutics. The divergences in interpretations are to be understood in terms of common or uncommon characteristics specific to a local group of sentient beings bound together by their shared karmic seeds. This democratic potential is further guaranteed by the affirmation of all human beings' innate intellectual potential, i.e. their potential to expand their own intellectual horizon by discussing with others while following rigorous procedures of engaging in intellectual pursuit. Ideally, when as everyone expands their own intellectual horizon, shared pure karmic seeds would grow, and intersubjective discords would

diminish. Thus, in Lü's vision, an aesthetic society is an epistemological community where the members commit themselves to rigorous studies and resolve to elevate themselves toward the universal through ever-present scholarly due diligence.

Lü retooled this Yogācāra doctrine into a social theory in three stages. In *Yogācārabhūmi*, *prasiddha* already adopts a broader connotation and often refers to things generally accepted as true. Moreover, *prasiddha* is also further refined into two senses: a generally acknowledged truth (Ch: *shijian Jicheng* 世間極成; Skt: *lokaprasiddha*; Tib: *grags pa* གྲགས་པ་) and a universal truth established by reason (Ch: *daoli jicheng* 道理極成; Skt: *yuktiprasiddha*; Tib: *rigs pas grags pa* རིགས་པས་གྲགས་པ་).[68] In Xuanzang's *Establishing Consciousness-only*, this term further adopts an implication of being the rational foundation of intersubjective resonance. For example, in the subcommentary defending the arguments for the existence of *ālayavijñāna*, in the sub-argument that Mahāyāna teachings are words of the Buddha, Xuanzang repeatedly uses *prasiddha* and *yuktiprasiddha* to convey the sense of intersubjective consensus.[69] Not surprisingly, in editing Xuanzang's composition-translation, Lü's first step was to establish that this subcommentary is Xuanzang's own interpretation.

The utmost evidence for the societist turn of *prasiddha* comes under the commentaries under verse seventeen, a central verse of *Triṃśikā* that establishes the truth of consciousness-only.

Xuanzang	Sanskrit	Tibetan
是諸識轉變	vijñānapariṇāmo 'yaṃ	rnam par shes par gyur pa 'di
These transformations of consciousness,	That transformation of consciousness	This transformation of consciousness
分別所分別	vikalpo yad vikalpyate	rnam rtog yin te de yis gang
are mental discriminations and the mentally discriminated.	is a conceptual discrimination. That which is conceptually constructed,	is a mental discrimination. And because of that, that which
由此彼皆無	tena tan nāsti tenedaṃ	rnam brtags de med des na 'di
Because of this, both of those do not exist,	thus, does not exist. Therefore,	is mentally imputed does not exist. Hence, this
故一切唯識	sarvaṃ vijñaptimātrakam	thams cad rnam par rig pa tsam
therefore, everything is consciousness-only.	all this is mere mental representation.	all is mere mental representation.

[68] T1579.30.486b13 & T1579.30.486b13. For a brief introduction of these terms, see DDB, search terms "世間極成" and "道理極成."

[69] T1585.14c25–15a17.

As seen from the above translations, there are two critical differences in Xuanzang's interpretation that establish a new Yogācāra intersubjectivity.[70] The first difference is the interpretation of *vikalpa*. Admittedly, in the stanza itself, this interpretation can still be reconciled with the Sanskrit and Tibetan editions. This is because the Sanskrit verb *vikapyate* is a passive construction of *vi-√kḷp*. Similarly, the corresponding Tibetan *rnam brtags* also conveys a passive sense. Both terms can be legitimately reconciled with the Chinese translation (*suo fenbie* 所分別), which functions as a noun denoting "that which is the discriminated."

Despite the convergence of meaning of this term in all three renditions, they serve different grammatical functions in their respective contexts. In Xuanzang's translation, this second line, if translated back into Sanskrit literally, should be *vikalpa* (Ch: *fenbie* 分別; an action noun from vi-√kḷp) and *vikalpita* (Ch: *suo fenbie* 所分別; the past participle of vi-√kḷp) in apposition, serving as the predicate of the first line which is the subject of this sentence—the transformations of consciousness.[71] In contrast, in both the Sanskrit and the Tibetan editions, *vikalpo* (rnam rtog) alone serves as the predicate of the first line. The second half, yad vikalpyate (gang rnam brtags), serves as the subordinate clause of the following line. This new paraphrase does not change the overall meaning of the verse: Because all are mere mental discriminations, therefore, everything is consciousness only.

However, Xuanzang's paraphrase significantly changes the scheme of interpretation concerning why everything is mental discrimination. In both Xuanzang's main prose expositions and Kuiji's commentary on this passage, it is clear that both *fenbie* 分別 and *suo fenbie* 所分別 are glossed as two independent nouns in apposition and the basis for such distinction stems from Dharmapāla's distinction of the seeing part (Ch: *jianfen* 見分; Skt: *darśana-bhāga*) and the seen part (Ch: *xiangfen*

[70] For Sthiramati's understanding of intersubjectivity, see Tzohar, *A Yogācāra Buddhist Theory of Metaphor*, 178–208.

[71] The Chinese language rarely distinguishes singular from plural nouns, in this line the character *zhu* 諸 makes it clear that what follows is a plural noun. My translation follows the interpretation of Xuanzang's subcommentary T1585.38c19–21 and Kuiji's commentary T1830.487a17–26)

相分; Skt: *nimitta-bhāga*).[72] More importantly, while Kuiji attributes this two-part interpretation of consciousness to Sthiramati, Lü Cheng, in his new collation, carefully pointed out that this distinction of seeing and seen parts of consciousness does not exist in the Sanskrit edition of Sthiramati's commentary.[73] The seeing and seen parts stand out as the unique feature of Chinese Yogācāra. Here also lies Lü's second step in accentuating Xuanzang's unique retelling of the Yogācāra causal story: highlighting the Chineseness of the doctrinal innovation of the seeing and seen parts.

Lü's third stage of intervention is related to the second interpretative difference in this verse. This distinction has been identified by many contemporary scholars as Xuanzang's mistranslation. The issue is Xuanzang's translation of *vijñaptimātra* (mental-representation-only) as consciousness-only (Ch: *weishi* 唯識; Skt: vijñānamātra).[74] In contrast to contemporary scholars who identify these

[72] T1585.38c19–21. Dharmapāla's theorization of consciousness is a bit more complicated. It is a four-part system. For a brief introduction of this doctrine, see DDB and *Foguang dacidian* 佛光大辭典, search term "四分." For a brief explanation of the soteriological significance of two parts related to self-consciousness, see Jingjing Li, "From Self-Attaching to Self-Emptying: An Investigation of Xuanzang's Account of Self-Consciousness," *Open Theology* 3 No. 1 (2017): 184–97.

[73] Lü Cheng, *Essentials* Vol. 4, 704 fn1. Needless to say, Lü also duly noted the key doctrinal interpretation in the verses. Lü Cheng, *Essentials* Vol. 4, 703 fn2.

[74] Both Huo Taohui and Xu Fancheng noted this difference in their translation of Sthimarati's text in modern Chinese. Zhou Guihua, in his 2004 article, identified this as a mistranslation first noticed by Japanese scholars a century ago and considered Lü's footnotes insufficient to correct this "mistranslation." Furthermore, Zhou identifies this mistranslation as the primary culprit 罪魁 for the thousand years of Chinese misreading of the essential Indian Yogācāra established by Asaṅga and Vasubandhu. See Zhou Guihua 周贵华, "Weishi yu weiliaobie—yige 'weishi xue' jiben wenti de zai quanshi" 唯识与唯了别——一个"唯识学"基本问题的再诠释, *Zhexue Yanjiu* 哲学研究 (2004.3): 59–65. To further elaborate on this point, Zhou published a monograph. Zhou Guihua, *Weixin yu liaobie: genben weishi sixiang yanjiu* 唯心与了别: 根本唯识思想研究 (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, 2004). Unfortunately, this research primarily engages with Chinese and Tibetan translated texts and only consorts three Sanskrit treatises by Vasubandhu and Sthiramati while omitting key Sanskrit texts attributed to Asaṅga and Vasubandhu e.g. Bodhisattvabhūmi, Śrāvaka-bhūmi, Abhidharma-kośa-bhāṣya. Neither does this research incorporate contemporaneous English, French, or German scholarship on this issue. As such, it is difficult to evaluate the main claims of the book that the difference between vijñapti and vijñāna is the key to understand the Chinese misreading of Indian Yogācāra. What I can say with confidence is that Zhou's characterization of Lü's scholarship is in accurate. Lü already pointed out that Xuanzang's translation represented a later development stemmed from Dharmapāla's interpretation of Yogācāra *wanqi bianben zhi shuo* 晚起變本之說, see footnote 56 for details. Lü is quite careful in laying out the historical changes of interpretation in these terms. As Lü has clearly pointed out, in an earlier interlinear note, the historical evolution from vijñapti- to vijñāna-mātra. See Lü Cheng, *Essentials* Vol. 4, 589 fn5, "*weishi yuanming wei liaobie zhe yi dang yuci*" 唯識原名唯了別者意當於此 [vijñāna-mātra is originally named vijñapti-mātra, whose meaning should be as such]. Lü's insistence on equating vijñapti with vijñāna, most likely, stems from his doctrinal position, rather than lack of attentiveness to historicity.

two differences as Xuanzang's mistranslations,[75] I value these differences as crucial evidence that Xuanzang was driven by different soteriological concerns from his Indian predecessors. I am not alone in making this argument.

Dan Lusthaus, in his 2002 monograph, singles out this passage and points out Xuanzang's conflation of *vijñāna-* and *vijñapti-mātra* as one of the central pieces of evidence for repudiating earlier scholars' such as Louis de la Vallée Poussin's characterization of Xuanzang's Yogācāra as metaphysical idealism.[76] Lusthaus's argument is worthy of rehearsing here. First, he lays out Xuanzang's alternative model of consciousness in terms of the seeing and seen parts, identifying *vikalpa* as the seeing part and *vikalpyate* as the seen part.[77] He then analyzes how Xuanzang's alternative model of consciousness resembles Husserlian phenomenology in that they both "reject the notion of a univocal referent independent of sense."[78] Lusthaus argues that there is an implied plurality in the referent: Not only are there many different streams (Skt: sāntana) of consciousness, but also one can perceive entities engendered by other consciousnesses.[79] Lusthaus eventually argues that, if a theory admits the existence of other perceptual objects within yet independent from one's perceptual field, then this theory cannot be characterized as a metaphysical idealism.[80] Instead of joining this philosophical debate, as an intellectual historian working on modern Chinese Buddhism, I examine the soteriological implications of this issue for Lü. The significance of Lusthaus's characterization of Xuanzang's Yogācāra is that there exist inchoate elements of a phenomenological naturalism in Xuanzang's treatise.

Here also lies Lü's third step of editorial intervention to prioritize *prasiddha* as the evidence for the ontological primacy of intersubjectivity. Lü Cheng was keenly aware of the historical and philosophical significance of translating *vijñapti* as consciousness. I argue that he opted for this

[75] Zhou Guihua is the most vocal in characterizing Xuanzang's interpretation as a mistranslation. Both Xu Fancheng and Huo Taohui merely noted this difference.
[76] Louis de la Vallée Poussin, *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi: La Siddhi de Hiuan-Tsang* (Paris, P. Geuthner, 1928–29).
[77] Dan Lusthaus, *Buddhist Phenomenology*, 434–37.
[78] Dan Lusthaus, *Buddhist Phenomenology*, 442.
[79] Dan Lusthaus, 487–91.
[80] Dan Lusthaus, 491.

translation because of his commitment to its specific causal framing of all phenomenon in all Dharmadhātus, whose central tenet posits that all phenomena in the perceptual world arise from karmic seeds stored in streams of *ālayavijñāna*.[81] Lü Cheng showcased his accurate understanding of different shades of meanings and different connotations in various translations of *vijñapti* in Xuanzang's treatise. Lü meticulously noted all instances of Xuanzang's deviation from its original meaning as well as other Chinese characters that could be mistaken as a translation of *vijñapti*.[82] Lü's acumen in identifying the polysemic nature of this term demonstrates both philological proficiency and mastery of Buddhist Sanskrit. If scholars respect Lü's refrain from faulting Xuanzang's equating of *vijñaptimātra* as consciousness-only in verse seventeen as a mistranslation, then scholars should consider the possibility that this silence is not a scholarly slip.

I argue that Xuanzang's consciousness-only system is uniquely advantaged to offer a defensible philosophy in justifying the ontological stableness of intersubjectivity without resorting to scientific realism. Lü's silence reveals to us his confidence in the truth of Xuanzang's causal enframing. The core of Xuanzang's causal enframing is the concept of seeds as agentive potentials stored in *ālayavijñāna*. We already encountered Lü's emphasis on this causal story in his 1922 refutation of Bergsonian *élan vital*. However, in 1922, Lü only employed the concept of agentive potential to push against the argument that nature has any transformative power. In Lü's early experimentation with Western aesthetics, other than a vague reference to Lippsian *einfühlung*, Lü never thoroughly explained how sentient beings, without an objective world out there, could reach an agreement and be cohered together as a social oneness. Other than a grand gesture toward a universal Beauty, Lü never explained the details on how to avoid philosophical solipsism. In editing *Essentials*, Lü finally fleshed out a defensible social theory in terms of Yogācāra theory of consciousness.

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[81] I have consistently referred to this causal story as Yogācāra causal enframing or Xuanzang's causal enframing throughout this dissertation.

[82] For example, Lü Cheng, *Essentials* Vol. 4, 565 ft10, 589 fn5. In addition, Lü Cheng thoroughly documented all instances where the Chinese translation of vijñapti *liaobie* 了別 could be confused with translations of completely different terms such as upalabdhi *liaojing* 了境 (Tib: *dmigs pa* དམིགས་པ་ or *snang pa* སྣང་བ་) due to similarity in form and in doctrinal context, see Lü, *Essentials* Vol. 4, 658 fn2.

Lü moored his early ideal society of intersubjective agreement onto the Yogācāra term *prasiddha*. In concluding the prose explication of verse seventeen, Xuanzang comments and Kuiji elaborates as follows:

> **Xuanzang**: Therefore, in everything, there is merely consciousness[83] because there are intersubjective agreements in erroneous discriminations.
> **T1585. 39a1–2**: 是故一切皆唯有識, 虛妄分別有極成故。
> **Kuiji**: I explain [as follow]: All dharmas, such as the conditioned, the unconditioned, the true, and the false, in all [of these dharmas], there is mere consciousness. This is because [the consciousness] can turn into erroneous discriminations.
> **T1830.487c24–25**: 述曰：有為、無為，實、假等法，皆唯有識，以能轉變虛妄分別。

Xuanzang understands intersubjective agreement as the proof for consciousness-only, so did Lü Cheng. Kuiji pushes Xuanzang's argument one step further by identifying consciousness as the agentive force that could engender erroneous discriminations that manifest *as if* entities outside consciousness. For Kuiji, the shared causal story grounded in the transformation of consciousness is what makes intersubjective consensus possible.[84] It is also important to note that, for both Xuanzang and Kuiji, *prasiddha*, when used to justify consciousness-only doctrines, means "intersubjective agreement."[85] Once we accurately translate *prasiddha* as intersubjective accord, then it becomes

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[83] Dan Lusthaus translates this sentence as "Therefore everything is 'only existent in consciousness'…" Lusthaus, *Buddhist Phenomenology*, 439. I disagree with this translation. The verb *you* 有 in Chinese does not function in this way. *You*'s grammatical function resembles more of the Tibetan verb *yod* ཡོད, in that the phrase "A 有 B" resembles "A ལ B ཡོད." Both translate as "there is B in A." Lusthaus's translation equates *you* 有 with the true link-verb in English "to be" and, unnecessarily accentuates the ontological implications of this phrase.

[84] Lusthaus translates *jicheng* 極成 as "ultimately established." Lusthaus, *Buddhist Phenomenology*, 439. This literal translation, while not wrong, causes a philosophical confusion: How could Yogācārins admits erroneous discriminations as ultimately established? As I have pointed out earlier, throughout *Establishing Consciousness-only*, Xuanzang consistently used *prasiddha* to indicate consensus either by worldly convention or by reason. To be sure, when referring to the use of this term by the twenty Nikāya schools, *prasiddha* indeed means "ultimately established" because this is the doctrinal position of Nikāya schools. And when Xuanzang quoted Nikāya school thoughts, he follows this convention of *prasiddha* as ultimately established. However, one cannot uncritically apply this sense of prasiddha in Xuanzang's own Yogācāra system. The central tenet of Yogācāra philosophy is that what have been grasped as "ultimately established" by Nikāya schools and Abhidharma literature merely appear as if so because of an underlying causal framework grounded in *ālayavijñāna*.

[85] My point could be further substantiated by Kuiji's commentary immediately following the quote from Xuanzang's treatise. In his commentary on this passage, Kuiji raised an objection by the twenty Nikāya schools, which basically says that because there exist ultimately established [things] therefore the Yogācāra doctrines are not tenable. Kuiji offers his own refutation of this objection, which basically clarifies that vijñaptimātra (*weiyan* 唯言) only refutes the existence of things outside consciousness and because suchness and mental functions are not separate from consciousness, they all have a body (*gu ti jieyou* 故體

evident that Xuanzang translates vijñaptimātra as consciousness-only because he trusted the soteriological potential of Yogācāra dependent-origination grounded in *ālayavijñāna*. For Xuanzang, *prasiddha* is only a natural manifestation of the truth of consciousness-only. In contrast to realist thinkers who take it to be a self-evident truth that intersubjective agreement is a natural manifestation of the truth of objective reality, scholars can detect a philosophical naturalist attitude in Xuanzang's composition-translation that takes intersubjective agreement as a natural outcome of consciousness-only.

To accentuate the uniqueness of Xuanzang's causal enframing, Lü Cheng again employed interlinear notes in three distinctive ways. First, he summarized Sthiramati's main point in explicating this verse, underscoring the divergence of Xuanzang's interpretation (especially the use of *prasiddha*) from Sthiramati's.[86] Second, in Xuanzang's subsequent subcommentary, Lü played up Xuanzang's intention to prove consciousness-only by noting the absence of Sthiramati's voice on this issue in another interlinear note.[87] The opening of this subcommentary is vital because it unwaveringly declares that "it is not that once other positions are repudiated, then one's own position shall be established. One must explain and ascertain this teaching [of consciousness-only]."[88] For readers familiar with the historical debates between Madhyamaka and Yogācāra schools, this sentence immediately calls to mind the Yogācāra critique of the deconstructive (or *ad absurdum*) method ascribed to Nāgārjuna's Madhyamaka.[89] This proclamation also reveals to us the intent of this subcommentary: to defend Yogācāra causal enframing, i.e., *ālaya-pratītyasamutpāda*, by establishing a coherent, defensible theory of consciousness-only.

皆有). This interpretation points out that the existent body [i.e., consciousness] is what has been mistaken as the ultimately existing body of things outside consciousness.

[86] Lü Cheng, *Essentials* Vol.4, 705 fn1.

[87] Lü Cheng, *Essentials* Vol.4, 705 fn2.

[88] T1585.39a5–6. The Chinese original reads, "fei potayi jiyi biancheng, ying geng [kan] quechen, chengci jiaoli" 非破他義己義便成; 應更[勘]確陳, 成此教理.

[89] For a recent study on this topic, see Jay L. Garfield and Jan Westerhoff, *Madhyamaka and Yogacara: Allies or Rivals?* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015). On how this debated played out in Xuanzang's lineage, see Mitsukawa Toyoki, "*Daijō shōchin ron* kanken," 613–18.

Third, to further shore up the legitimacy of Xuanzang's translation of *vijñaptimātra* as consciousness-only, in Xuanzang's subsequent proof of consciousness-only doctrine, Lü duly alerted the reader where Xuanzang combines Vasubandhu's *Viṃśika* (*Twenty Verses of Consciousness-only*) to refute the existence of entities outside consciousness.[90] Experts of Yogācāra philosophy will immediately recall that Vasubandhu, in the opening prose of *Viṃśika*, defines *citta*, *manas*, *vijñāna*, and *vijñapti* as different names of the same concept that is consciousness-only. Naturally, in Lü's collation of *Viṃśika*, he also underscored this doctrinal assertion with an interlinear note, justifying Xuanzang's translation of *vijñaptimātra* with cross examinations of multilingual texts.[91]

Once Lü established that the truth of consciousness-only theory was a unique contribution of Dharmapāla's lineage, he further promoted *prasiddha* as the evidence of a true causal explanation of the perceptual world. Lü's insistence on the intersubjective agreements established by reason (Ch: *daoli jicheng* 道理極成; Skt: *yuktiprasiddha*; Tib: *rigs pas grags pa* རིགས་པས་གྲགས་པ་) further calls to mind his early proposal that argued for a universal Beauty reachable by thorough comparatives studies of all aesthetic trends. Rather than presuming an objective world outside consciousness, Lü presumed an intersubjective flow of consciousness only understandable through Xuanzang's Yogācāra causal enframing. Therefore, in the late 1920s, after he devoted full time to Yogācāra studies, some of his earliest works were on multilingual comparative studies of Buddhist logic (Skt: hetuvidyā; Ch: *yinming* 因明).[92] While his intent in engaging with Buddhist logic was largely unspecified (other than the fact that Buddhist logic is a central branch of Yogācāra philosophy), by 1943, Buddhist logic became a key ingredient in establishing institutionalized bodhicitta (a reinvention of the traditional dual of wisdom and compassion as a trained attitude of examining truth claims) as the signature of *Five Disciplines*. I will explain the meaning of institutionalized bodhicitta in the next chapter. Here, it is essential to note the continual clout of logic in establishing intersubjective agreements. In Lü's

[90] Lü Cheng, *Essentials* Vol.4, 707 fn3. T1585.39b27–c9.

[91] Lü Cheng, *Essentials* Vol.4, 495 fn3. *Viṃśika*: cittaṃ mano vijñānaṃ vijñaptiś ceti paryāyāḥ; Xuanzang's translation reads, "xin yi shi liao, ming zhi chabie" 心意識了名之差別, which claims that the names of citta, manas, vijñāna and vijñāptis are different names for the same thing.

[92] These include three essays on Buddhist logic published in *Neixue* and were later collected into his anthology of Buddhist studies, see Xuanji 1991, 151–243.

worldview, unenlightened beings who desire liberation would need to work together through rigorous textual analysis and self-cultivation to rediscover the most essential *prasiddha*—the truth of consciousness-only.

One Ture-reality Realm and Aesthetic Society

While Lü's highlight of indirectly perceived objective support and *prasiddha* identifies fundamental mechanisms in sustaining intersubjectivity, to fully appreciate the significance of consciousness-only doctrines in Lü's revolutionary thinking, we must contextualize his doctrinal preferences in the long arc of his scholarship from the aesthetic revolution in the 1920s to the training program *Five Disciplines* in the 1940s. As I demonstrate in this subsection, Lü gradually merged his vision of an aesthetic society with Xuanzang's vision of one true-reality realm (*yizhen fajie* 一真法界). It is vital to recognize Lü's doctrinal innovation in this synthesis. Although this doctrine is crucial in Lü's theorizing of an intersubjective social oneness, it appears only once in Xuanzang's treatise, in the main commentary after verse twenty-five.[93]

To understand how one true-reality realm connects with Lü's vision of an aesthetic society, we must understand how consciousness-only doctrine functions in Xuanzang's overall soteriological paradigm. Immediately following the consciousness-only defense of apparent entities in the subcommentary of verse seventeen, Xuanzang offers a unique argument for establishing the truth of consciousness-only doctrine in explaining the existence of other minded creatures. In this argument, other minded creatures are explained as outside one's own directly perceived objective support, hinting toward the existence of other streams of consciousness as indirectly perceived objective support.[94] Reading this passage readily reminds us of Lü Cheng's argument for suchness as the indirectly perceived objective support in the 1920s. More importantly, for intersubjectivity to have any ontological primacy over subjective experiences, one must allow all sentient beings to possess their own mental streams containing eight kinds of consciousnesses, including the seeing and the

[93] T1585.48,a21.
[94] T1585.39c9–16.

seen parts as well as suchness manifested through the nature of emptiness. This point is precisely Xuanzang's argument.[95] The "consciousness" in consciousness-only doctrine refers not to one referent but a collection of consciousnesses intertwined through dependent-origination.[96]

To fully account for and elucidate the causal functions of these streams of consciousness, Xuanzang devotes most of his subcommentary under verse eighteen to the four kinds of mental causal conditions (*siyuan* 四緣). In these four mental conditions, *ālambana*—both the directly and indirectly perceived objective support—is expounded under the third kind of causal conditions.[97] Together these four conditions explain all phenomena in the perceptible world, including the seemingly robust subjective-objective divide, by positing everything as arising from interrelations between the eight kinds of consciousness. The culmination of this true reality of consciousness-only (*weishi shixing* 唯識實性), as Xuanzang puts it after verse twenty-five, lies in one true-reality realm,[98] a realm consisting of many purifying and purified streams of *ālayavijñāna*. In and by itself, Xuanzang uses one true-reality realm to establish the supremacy of consciousness-only teachings over earlier teachings of skandha (Ch: *yun* 蘊), āyatana (Ch: *chu* 處), and dhātu (Ch: *jie* 界), four noble truths (Ch: *sidi* 四諦), and two kinds of emptiness as such (*erkong zhengru* 二空真如).[99] The supremacy of this teaching, for Xuanzang, lies in its efficacy as the practices of the utmost path (*zuisheng dao* 最勝道).

For Lü Cheng, however, the appeal of Xuanzang's causal paradigm lay not only in its supremacy over other Buddhist teachings but also in its efficacy in building an aesthetic society. Lü systematically accentuated two aspects of Xuanzang's commentary: subsequent awareness and the free flow and equal access to the same [genuine Dharma] in the Dharma realm. Both are essential for Lü's construction of a communism of Buddhist soteriological knowledge. The first aspect concerns with the prominent role of subsequent awareness (Skt: *pṛṣṭhalabdha*; Ch: *houde zhi* 後得智) in

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[95] T1585.39c20–22.
[96] T1585.39c24. The Chinese original reads, "zongli shiming" 總立識名 [Together they are called consciousness].
[97] T1585.40a21–43a5.
[98] T1585.38a17–21. The Chinese original reads, "shengyi shengyi, wei yizhen fajie" 勝義勝義，謂一真法界 [The ultimate of the ultimate is called one true-reality realm].
[99] T1585.48.a21–23.

explaining a bodhisattva's ability to awaken deluded beings. As convincingly argued by Tzohar, the motivation behind Sthiramati's pan-metaphorical claim is to explain how a buddha or bodhisattva abiding in nonconceptual states could convey their profound realization to ordinary beings.[100] Sthiramati in verse twenty-two comments that, mediated through subsequent awareness that understands everything in this world as mere metaphors, the ineffable "can be translated back into an exhaustive knowledge of causal relations." Thus, the ineffable does not lie outside language but becomes the very ground of the meaning of language, substantiating the causal efficacy of words and syntax.[101] For Xuanzang, the meaning of language is no longer a central concern. Instead, Xuanzang aims to provide an exhaustive description of causal processes and karmic conditionings that would lead to the ultimate salvation. Hence, in Xuanzang's main prose expositions, he first accurately rephrases Sthiramati's explanation of the subsequent awareness.[102] Then in the ensuing subcommentary, Xuanzang explicitly points out subsequent awareness could function to explain the ineffable in skillful means.[103]

The crucial role of subsequent awareness in the bodhisattva enterprise only becomes fully manifested in Xuanzang's subcommentary to verse twenty-nine.

無得不思議	Unobtained and inconceivable
是出世間智	[This] is the supramundane cognition
捨二麤重故	Because of having abandoned two kinds of obstacles
便證得轉依	One achieves the revolution [of consciousness]

This verse itself agrees with the Sanskrit and the Tibetan editions, other than a minor point where *acitta* (unthought) might be misread as *acintya* (inconceivable).[104] Unthought itself indicates a lack of individualized agent while inconceivable indicates a sense of transcending ordinary deluded consciousness. Both Xuanzang's subcommentary and Kuiji's commentary explicate this term in both senses. In the first sense, they both gloss it as denying the existence of the grasper, echoing *acitta*,

[100] Tzohar, A Yogācāra Buddhist Theory of Metaphor, 180–88.
[101] Tzohar, *Metaphor*, 188.
[102] T1585.46b26–c13. See also Lü Cheng, *Essentials* Vol. 4, 734 fn2.
[103] T1585.47a23–25.
[104] Huo, *Sthiramati's Commentary*, 148 fn1 and Lü Cheng, *Essentials* Vol.4, 750 fn2. Both considered this difference as a likely mistranslation.

unthought.[105] Only in the second sense does Xuanzang and Kuiji adopt the meaning of ineffable, maybe from *acintya*.[106] The Chinese term *busiyi* 不思議 accurately captures both senses.

Furthermore, the dual meaning of this term perfectly serves Xuanzang's Yogācāra causal enframing: Unthought demonstrates the inherent lack of individualized agent and inconceivable captures the miraculous power of the supramundane cognition in bringing forth liberation. Xuanzang's interpretation diverges significantly from Sthiramati's. Sthiramati combines verse twenty-nine and thirty and then comments briefly on the joy and beauty of the ineffable. In contrast, Xuanzang separates these two verses and provides a detailed description of the ten stages of the bodhisattva path, ten great practices of perfection (pāramitā), ten great results, eleven obstacles to be abandoned, ten kinds of suchness leading toward nirvāṇa, and the two kinds of revolutions of the consciousness (*āśrayaparivṛtti*)—turning away [the defiled] and turning toward [purification], after verse twenty-nine.[107]

Subsequent awareness in Xuanzang's soteriological paradigm becomes paramount in explaining why and how bodhisattvas could make the ineffable comprehensible to the unenlightened commoners. For example, the last four of the ten pāramitās, i.e., the perfection of skill-in-means (Ch: *fangbian boluomi* 方便波羅蜜; Skt: upāya-pāramitā), the perfection of vow (Ch: *yuan boluomi* 願波羅蜜; pranidhāna-pāramitā), the perfection of power (Ch: *li boluomi* 力波羅蜜; Skt: bala-pāramitā), and the perfection of wisdom (Ch: *zhi boluomi* 智波羅蜜; Skt: jñāna-pāramitā) are all subsumed into subsequent awareness.[108] Another apt example is the cognition with unrestricted activity (Ch: *cheng suozuo zhi* 成所作智; Skt: anuṣṭhāna-jñāna; Tib: *bya sgrub ye shes* ཡེ་ཤེས་བྱ་སྒྲུབ་), also known as the ability to fulfill one's aspiration to emancipate all sentient beings. This cognition is an essential power for any

[105] T1585.50c22–23 and T1830.573.c7–8.
[106] T1585.50c23–24 and T1830.573.c14–16.
[107] T1585.51a20–57a10. This section also includes many arguments for the supremacy of the bodhisattva path over the śrāvaka path as well as prescriptions for how to overcome obstacles.
[108] T1585.52a4–6.

bodhisattva to fulfill their great vow. Predictably, this supernatural power is subsumed under subsequent awareness in Xuanzang's subcommentary.[109]

Equally important, in this section, Xuanzang also elaborates on a key doctrine that is central to both Ouyang's and Lü's social goal, i.e., nirvāṇa reframed as original quiescence (*xingji* 性寂). For Xuanzang, this originally quiescent nature is equally possessed by all sentient beings and a spiritual potential that could be realized by all.[110] Although Xuanzang himself is known for his conviction that there exist icchantikas (Ch: *yichanti* 一闡提), those who could never achieve enlightenment, Lü Cheng himself never truly accepted Xuanzang's doctrinal position. Instead, Lü consistently proclaimed that icchantika was a skill-in-means, and original quiescence was the ultimate teaching. In this way, Lü's new revolutionary paradigm is now equipped with the powerful tools acquired by the bodhisattva with subsequent awareness and sanctified by the guarantee that all beings possess the potential (original quiescence) to be enlightened. As such, his early vision of an aesthetic revolution now morphed into the bodhisattva enterprise of leading all toward one true-reality realm. The only constant in this morphology is the moral conviction: If enough commoners could awaken their bodhicitta/aesthetic sensibility and join forces, then collective emancipation would be achieved.

The second aspect of Xuanzang's Yogācāra that attracted Lü was the new understanding of the free flow and equal access to the same [genuine Dharma] in the Dharma realm (*fajie dengliu* 法界等流).[111] For Lü, the existence of indirectly perceived objective support and the possibility of intersubjective consensus also guaranteed the free flow and equal access to the same [genuine Dharma] in the Dharma realm. This doctrine appears only twice in Xuanzang's subcommentaries. In the first instance, it explains how the desire for liberation (*chushi xin* 出世心) arises in the context when Xuanzang extensively comments on the characteristics of karmic seeds in *ālayavijñāna*. In the

[109] T1585.56b25, c21–29. Note also that, judging from the frequency of this term, in Kuiji's commentary, the role of subsequent awareness becomes even more prominent.

[110] T1585.55b7–12. The original passage in Xuanzang's treatise reads, "qixing Benji guming niepan" 其性本寂，故名涅槃 [because its nature is originally quiescent, therefore, it is called nirvāṇa].

[111] These concepts are used in a few esoteric sūtras to justify secret transmissions outside exoteric traditions. Xuanzang and Kuiji used it to justify the Yogācāra soteriology grounded in the transformation of ālayavijñāna.

second instance, it explains how sentient beings could learn to acquire (*xi suocheng* 習所成) a Mahāyāna gotra (Ch: *zhongzing* 種姓, i.e. become an aspiring bodhisattva) by listening to this free flow of genuine Dharma.[112] Kuiji further links this obscure doctrine with subsequent awareness: Kuiji asserts that subsequent awareness engenders great compassion, great compassion engenders response bodies (Skt: *nirmāṇakāya*; Tib: *sprul sku* སྤྲུལ་སྐུ), and the dharma spoken by these response bodies are exactly this free-flowing genuine Dharma.[113]

To put it differently, the manifestation of suchness as words and texts (in Lü Cheng's understanding) provides all sentient beings free and equal access to the authentic salvific message. With the help of these two doctrines, Lü Cheng found justifications for his ideal of a communism of Buddhist knowledge. As I explain in the next chapter, in Lü's vision, thanks to these two doctrines, all sentient beings are assumed to have equal awakening potential and are guaranteed free and equal access to all soteriological knowledge. In this new social vision, intelligence is assumed to be innate to all, and intellectualism is no longer an automatic synonym to elitism.

Although a comprehensive treatment of Xuanzang's reframing of Yogācāra soteriology warrants an independent book-length study, my analysis has shown that Xuanzang systematically accentuates the implicit role of subsequent awareness in earlier Yogācāra treatises, marshales in passages scattered in earlier Yogācāra texts, and then fully spelles out an exhaustive Yogācāra causal paradigm that promises to bring all to liberation. Kuiji's commentary further accentuate Xuanzang's new interpretations in his own explication of the Yogācāra soteriology. Lü Cheng, by accentuating Xuanzang's authorship of the subcommentaries, further stressed the importance of Xuanzang's soteriology and the associated doctrinal highlights of subsequent awareness and linked it with a quite obscure doctrine of the same and equal flow [of genuine Dharma] in the Dharma realm.

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[112] T1585.8b13–15, under Xuanzang's subcommentary establishing the various characteristics of karmic seeds in ālayavijñāna, with Kuiji's commentary T1830.305b25–29. The second instance T1585.48b8–10 under the commentary of verse 23–25 on establishing Vijñaptimātratā, is not Xuanzang's reiteration of previous masters' views. Kuiji's commentary on this section is T1830.556a13–26.

[113] T1830.556a14–18.

With this understanding of subsequence awareness and the free flow and equal access to genuine Dharma, we are now ready to examine Lü's extension of Xuanzang's only mention of one true-reality realm into his own vision of an aesthetic society. This phrase appears in Xuanzang's commentary under verse twenty-three to twenty-five, summarizing earlier Yogācāra masters' explication of *vijñānamātratā* (the truth of consciousness-only). Xuanzang employs one true-reality realm to explain the ultimate of the ultimate (*shengyi shengyi* 勝義勝義).[114] Kuiji does not use this term in his commentary. However, in Lü's 1943 training program, this term adopted a new afterlife as the ultimate goal of the bodhisattva path and the ultimate goal of his educational program.[115] The detailed analysis of Lü Cheng's social project has to wait until the next chapter. Here, I only summarize how Lü weaved all essential elements of phenomenological naturalism in Xuanzang's Yogācāra into a new evolutionary theory. The four conditions provide an exhaustive description of how the perceptual world functions as mental causal interactions. The indirectly perceived objective support plays a crucial role in explaining how advanced bodhisattvas could impart their salvific knowledge to ordinary beings and thereby enable them to join the bodhisattva enterprise. Another Key to this Yogācāra causal framing is intersubjective resonance, which only becomes possible because of different kinds of shared seeds in *ālayavijñāna*. Simultaneously, the metaphors of shared and unshared seeds also explains the seemingly stable objectivity and subjectivity without emptying the moral agency in forging social relations through concerted acts of consciousness. In Lü's Yogācāra social theory, intersubjectivity replaced the role of the objective world in realist social theories. The ontological primacy of intersubjective agreement also becomes essential in proving the existence of other minded creatures. The existence of others proved essential to Lü's social theory: Human beings must strive to co-evolve toward the collective emancipation denoted as the one true-reality realm.

Despite Lü's extensive reliance on Yogācāra doctrines, his new social evolutionary theory is simultaneously Western. It is a societist interpretation of Yogācāra causal enframing. Recall that in the 1920s, Lü Cheng rejected realism as the antidote for China's crisis and derided the social

[114] T 1585. 48a21–27.
[115] For a detailed analysis of Lü Cheng curriculum, see the next chapter on *Five Disciplines*.

Darwinist explanation as a form of devolution detrimental to the spiritual development of the people. Instead, he envisioned an aesthetic society progressing on an ever-expanding spiral. He believed that the basis for a spiritual sociality is aesthetic sensitivity, and the driving force behind social development is a desire to expend life and to rid of petty ego. In the 1930s, through editing *Essentials*, Lü Cheng was able to identify and weave together diverse elements in Xuanzang's Yogācāra naturalism to formulate a new ontological explanation for both the possibility of establishing an aesthetic society and for the concrete soteriological path to realizing this ideal sociality.

Lü never explicitly spelled out this theory. However, he hinted toward this vision on multiple occasions. In a short talk on November 13, 1945, merely two months after Japan officially surrendered to the Allied forces and the Soviet Union, Lü Cheng put forth a societist interpretation of *pratītyasamutpāda* as follows.

> The twelve links of dependent origination (Skt: *pratītyasamutpāda*) only explain the continual life and death. If one understands that sentient beings exist because of nourishments, then if one needs nourishments, naturally, one needs to hope for and to acquire support. Thereby, life could unfold. The desire to become virtuous also becomes manifest. Nourishments include four kinds: physical food, sensory contact, mental nourishment, and sustenance of consciousness [all grounded in *ālayavijñāna*]. First, one needs basic sustenance. Next, one seeks peace and ease. Further, one hopes for and obtains [a sense of] fulfillment. All of these are nourishments. All sentient beings, relying on these four kinds of nourishment, could expand their life and move upward. Based on this [teaching of four nourishments], the Bauddha Dharma grounds its provisional teachings and strategies upon the reality of sentient existence. Because sentient beings abide relying on nourishments and therefore have the desire for eternity, happiness, ego, and purity, they further demand emancipation. This is all sentient lives' desire to become virtuous.[116]

The above passage is a retelling of Xuanzang's Yogācāra causal story, only now told from the perspective of ordinary beings. The doctrine of four nourishments itself appeared much earlier before any known Yogācāra treatise. Pre-Xuanzang Yogācāra treatises such as *Yogācārabhūmi* and *Mahāyānasaṃgraha* reinterpret this doctrine in terms of various Yogācāra doctrines such as āśrayaparivṛtti and ālayavijñāna. Xuanzang further explicitly interprets this doctrine in terms of Yogācāra eight consciousnesses: the nourishment of sensory contact is reinterpreted in terms of the

[116] Xuanji 1991, "Fofa yu shijian" 佛法與世間, 444. He drew many more scriptures to prove his interpretation of Xuanzang's Yogācāra causal enframing, e.g. T1599.31.0452c16 and T1599.31.0453a21. In his lecture series *Five Disciplines*, Lü constantly referred to this retelling of Yogācāra causal enframing to justify the relation between scholarship and social activism. I analyze these lectures in the next chapter.

first six consciousnesses, the mental nourishment is reclassified as a form of the fourth nourishment, and the fourth nourishment—the sustenance of consciousness—is redefined in terms of ālayavijñāna.[117] And yet, unlike Xuanzang's concern on how advanced bodhisattvas could save others, Lü Cheng worried about how aspiring bodhisattvas could liberate both themselves and others. The doctrine of four nourishments proved useful for Lü to argue for the necessity of a community in which everyone's liberation is tied up with everyone else's liberation due to the functioning of four nourishments. Pushing against social Darwinism, Lü Cheng offered his own Yogācāra social evolutionary theory that grounds the possibility and development of the social oneness in terms of dependent origination grounded in *ālayavijñāna* and manifested as four kinds of nourishments of life. When Lü left aesthetics behind, he carried forward the vision of an aesthetic life, a vision now firmly moored onto Yogācāra soteriology.

Lü was neither the first nor the only one who reformatted karmic connections into an evolutionary theory. As early as 1897, when Yan Fu "translated" Thomas Huxley's *Evolution and Ethics*, a work that extended Charles Darwin's biological evolutionary theory into the realm of the social and ethical, Yan already compared evolution with Buddhist dependent origination and Indic concept of karma and rebirth. For Yan, it was natural to remake karmic retribution in the image of evolutionary theory. Neither were Chinese intellectuals alone in reinterpreting karmic cosmology along the line of evolutionary theories. In early twentieth-century India, many Indian thinkers such as Sri Aurobindo (1872–1950) and Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan (1888–1975) also reframed karma and rebirth in Vedānta as an evolutionary theory of spiritual progress and self-fulfillment.[118]

Neither was Lü unique in reframing dependent origination as a social evolutionary theory. Lü's proclivity to redefine the social was predetermined by the prevailing concerns among Chinese thinkers. For example, in 1897, when Yan Fu was translating *Evolution and Ethics*, he was also

[117] T1585.17b11–24. Kuiji and Huizhao extensively commented on the sustenance of consciousness depends on and relates to ālayavijñāna. See T1830. 367c24–28 and T1832. 737a14–b28.

[118] Robert N. Minor, "In Defense of Karma and Rebirth: Evolutionary Karma," in *Karma and Rebirth: Post Classical Developments*, ed. Ronald W. Neufeldt (New York: State University of New York Press, 1986), 15–40.

translating Herbert Spencer's *The Study of Sociology*, another work that applied biological evolutionary theory to explain group dynamics. In the 1920s and 30s, many Chinese Buddhists such as Taixu and Miaokong picked up the suggested parallels of dependent origination and evolutionism in Yan's translations. They offered their own reinterpretation of evolutionism along the line of karmic retribution.[119] One can detect a similar trend in modern Indian intellectuals who employed the post-classical concept of "group karma" to delineate the responsibilities of the individual, the family, the nation, and the environment.[120] Ouyang's concept of a mind-heart of the nation also belongs to this tide. Central to these shared concerns across national boundaries was to use ancient ethics to remedy the perceived moral depravities brought by "the survival of the fittest." Lü's reframing of society as Yogācāra intersubjective processes was merely one among many similar proposals, albeit a scholarly myth with footnotes.

Beyond the Empire of Religion: Fight Myth with Myth

My exploration of the interlinear notes reveals two embedded legitimizing functions for the Chinese recast of a global Bauddha dharma. On the one hand, employing his new tool—comparative hermeneutics, Lü subsumed Western footnote practices into Chinese textual criticism. This move toppled the interpretative authority long held by ordained clergy in Buddhist traditions and simultaneously elevated the global status of Chinese translations by providing the first scholarly recension of many Chinese texts that were valued by Buddhologists around the world. On the other hand, the cultural capital accrued through these new textual productions also secured the Institute's *raison d'être*, i.e., an independent lay-led institution championing social equality and freedom, outside the controls of either the state or the monastic.

Consequently, the institute was perceived by Buddhist monastics and Western observers alike as unbearably elitist and overly exclusive and therefore failed its manifest goal of democratizing the society. This gulf between its self-identification and public perception offers us a new lens to think

[119] Hammerstrom, *The Science of Chinese Buddhism*, 136–42.

[120] Austin B. Creel, "Contemporary Philosophical Treatments of Karma and Rebirth," in *Karma and Rebirth*, 5–7.

through the responsibility of scholarship and the possibility of being "in the empire of religion without being of it."[121]

Joining Chidester's search for a way out of the imperialist history of comparative religion, my examination of the hermeneutic maneuvers illustrates the political implications of philology and its democratic potential. Far from a neutral tool that produces "disinterested" observations, footnote has largely shielded European Buddhologists from the comparative gaze by enshrining itself on the pedestal of objectivity. When Lü reverted this comparative gaze, he put both European Buddhological discoveries and Buddhist texts on equal footing, and thereby transformed both into goldmines for extracting genuine soteriological knowledge. Furthermore, by offering an intersubjective ontology as the basis of both social dynamics and scholarly pursuit, Lü indirectly problematized the positivist agenda inherent in philological and Buddhological studies.

Unlike his teacher Ouyang who thrived in polemic debates, Lü disliked full-frontal confrontations. Lü preferred to illustrate the right path with the naïve trust that, once the right path was illuminated, all other wrong paths would naturally fall out of view. His lifelong effort to build a right path brought forth both a new professionalization of Buddhist knowledge and a new social theory: Buddhist knowledge were mined for its power as social critiques of modern depravities, for its soteriological potential to revert the Darwinist devolution, and for its efficacy in building a new sociality grounded in compassion and wisdom of emptiness.[122]

Here, also lies Lü's implicit answer to Chidester's question on the social function of scholarship: Like a lotus absorbing nutrients from mud yet blooms above the mud, a scholar absorbs soteriological knowledge from this unsatisfactory and often violent world yet establishes a new world above the muddy water through the vigorous pursuit of Beauty and Truth.[123] Rather than feigning an objective attitude and disinterestedness, Lü was explicit in his goal: Scholarship should

[121] Chidester, *Empire of Religion*, xviii.
[122] Xuanji 1991, "Tan yuanxue" 談院學, 435. Dated June 2, 1943.
[123] Xuanji 1991, "Fofa yu shijian," 442–43.

be a vital force in revolutionizing consciousness and in bringing forth social transformation.[124] Alternatively, to rephrase Lü's answer in Pollock's style: You transcend *world sufferings* by mastering and overmastering those discourses through study and critique… You cannot simply go around *this world* to overcome it … you must go through it.[125] In short, like the second-century Madhyamaka master Nāgārjuna, Lü Cheng conjured up an imaginary being—an intersubjective oneness—to negate the "deluded" views of the society stemming from scientific realism and social Darwinism.[126]

Equally important, Lü's retelling of Yogācāra causal enframing is not a distortion of Xuanzang's doctrines but rather a change of viewpoint, which led to Lü's focus on a different set of doctrines. From the traditional scriptural stance, the sūtra ventriloquizes an enlightened being instructing the commoners why and how one shall embark on the bodhisattva path. From this top-down instructive gaze, Xuanzang's primary goal is to prove Vijñānamātra—the truth of consciousness-only, to refute critiques, to dismantle wrong interpretations, and to persuade unenlightened beings to embark on the Yogācāra soteriological journey. In contrast, in Lü's new bodhisattva profession, the mining mentality inherent in comparative hermeneutics becomes a tool of organized skepticism for establishing intersubjective accord and a reliable means for building a deliberative democracy on Buddhist terms. As I discuss in the next chapter, this bottom-up investigation laid the bricks for the democratic turn of Buddhist soteriology.

With this decentered gaze of inquiry, Lü transcended the inherent hierarchies in the Aryan theory and the instructive gaze of the sūtras by mastering and overmastering extant discourses. Simultaneously, comparative studies evolved from the earlier function of a moral compass in Lü's

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[124] Lü emphasized the social function of inner learning on multiple occasions in 1943–1946, see for example, Xuanji 1991, 414, 438–39, 443, 448–53.

[125] Sheldon Pollock, "Crisis in the Classics," *Social Research: An International Quarterly* 78 No. 1 (2011): 39. The original words are "You transcend inequality by mastering and over mastering those discourses through study and critique. You cannot simply go around the tradition to overcome it … you must go through it."

[126] One central Madhyamaka argument against realism is that everything is illusory, including Nāgārjuna's famous statement that "everything is emptiness" is also empty, void of realist reference. Texts attributed to Nāgārjuna often explain this self-referential paradox in terms of its heuristic efficacy, see, Nāgārjuna and Jan Westerhoff, *The Dispeller of Disputes: Nāgārjuna's Vigrahavyāvartanī* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 27–29.

aesthetic revolution to a concrete method for building a new kind of social bond that would foster moral reasoning and considered arguments as means to resolve doubt and settle dispute. In this new paradigm, Yogācāra doctrines such as indirectly perceived objects and intersubjective agreement became the cornerstone of a communism of knowledge. In this new public court of Buddhist knowledge, everyone is assumed to have equal spiritual potential. Everyone is expected to practice comparative hermeneutics and to engage in debates through moral inquiry and nuanced understanding of texts. More importantly, everyone is expected to nurture their resolve to save all sentient beings through learning and teaching.

It is in this sense that I characterize Lü's project as deliberative democracy. Lü took seriously the intense intellectual demand on any citizens of democracy, sanctified everyone's intellectual potential with Yogācāra doctrines, and designed a path for all to develop fully their intellectual potential.

Furthermore, the ideal citizens for this deliberative democracy are not imagined to be mere rational thinkers. On the contrary, compassion is a crucial characteristic of new citizens. This compassion combined with the wisdom of emptiness is alternatively called *bodhicitta*. Rationality is just a tool to harness the affective power of compassion. In the Buddhist worldview, emotion and rationality are always mutually constitutive. As convincingly demonstrated by Anālayo, the historical Buddha had always treated deluded views by analyzing its affective underpinnings, mainly because a rationalization of a particular view is often a manifestation of desire and attachment.[127] Lü Cheng's social project picked up these premodern characteristics and integrated both rationality and emotional education into the path of spiritual growth.

As I demonstrate in the next chapter, in Lü's new curriculum of Buddhist learning, one must first cultivate great compassion. Textual analysis only functioned to avoid solipsist traps. In other words, Lü imbued scholarship with a new generative function: planting and nurturing the seeds of

[127] Anālayo, *Satipaṭṭāna: The Direct Path to Realization* (Windhorse Publication, 2004), 163.

great compassion in diligent learners. This new type of Buddhist emotional education, which I term institutionalized bodhicitta, is the focus of the next chapter.

PART III. SCHOLARSHIP, SOCIAL CONSCIOUSNESS, AND ACTIVISM

In Part III, I evaluate the intellectual and Buddhological contributions of Lü's Yogācāra socio-soteriology and analyze in detail the normative features of Lü's institutional revolution. Part III contains one chapter. In Chapter Seven, I first map out the scope and structure of Lü's socio-soteriological revolution, illustrating how he reinvented foundational Yogācāra concepts of *āśrayaparivṛtti* and *trisvabhāva* into a project of social reform. Then I summarize three critical normative structures of Lü's training program: 1) how Lü refashioned critical thinking as institutionalized bodhicitta, 2) how he reframed bodhisattva precepts into communal rules for deliberative democracy, and 3) how he refashioned six perfections as guidelines for social activism. All three elements—critical thinking, democratic quest, activism—are continuing developments of Lü's quest for an aesthetic society. Ouyang pioneered the social turn of Yogācāra soteriology. Lü Cheng brought Ouyang's dream into fruition and reformulated aesthetic revolution in terms of Yogācāra path of revolutionizing consciousness (Skt: *āśrayaparivṛtti*).

CHAPTER 7. PROFESSIONALIZING BUDDHIST KNOWLEDGE: SCHOLARSHIP AND MORAL PURPOSE

Knowledge is never neutral. The founders of Inner Learning Institute never shied away from claiming the moral purpose of knowledge production: scholarship for China's salvation. While *Essentials* laid the foundation of Lü's revolution, the capstone is the Institute's Learning (*yuanxue* 院學) as enacted in his training program *Five Disciplines of Buddhist Learning* (*wuke foxue* 五科佛學; henceforth *Five Disciplines*). Once Lü theorized social-oneness in terms of Yogācāra causal enframing, he quickly moved to the institutional building. Through institutionalization, Lü sought to actualize his vision for a communism of soteriological knowledge. Without the support of a physical and structured presence, no intellectual innovation could last.

Both Ouyang and Lü were keenly aware of the imperative of building new institutions to sustain their salvific knowledge production. However, Ouyang and Lü adopted drastically different means to institutionalize soteriological knowledge. As I have discussed in Chapters Three and Four, Ouyang envisioned his Inner Learning Institute as a branch of a Yogācāra government. In contrast, Lü remained loyal to Guyau's ideal of voluntary association and imagined a democratic institution for a communism of Buddhist knowledge. Lü's and Ouyang's divergent paths reveal not only the inherent heterogeneity of becoming modern but also the malleability of Yogācāra doctrines. Within the same China Inner Learning Institute, this ancient tradition had been legitimately adapted into to both a Nationalist government and a voluntary participatory democracy.

In this chapter, I give an overview of Lü's professionalization of soteriological knowledge, highlighting how Lü integrated Buddhist scholarship with a soteriological and moral purpose. Lü Cheng's mature thinking was first entirely laid out in his 1943 *The Lecture Outline of Five Disciplines of Buddhist Learning* (*Wuke foxue jiangxi gangyao* 五科佛學講習綱要). However, its seeds sprouted much earlier in the 1920s, as an aesthetic attitude in a joint-learning enterprise leading to an aesthetic life. After Lü turned to Yogācāra studies, in 1926, Lü further framed this affect as an attitude

of being scientific, critical, and comparative.[1] By 1943, when he launched his training program, the earlier aesthetic attitude morphed into critical thinking guided by *hetuvidyā* (Ch: *yinming* 因明 or *li* 理) and wisdom (*zhi* 智 or *hui* 慧) and grounded in great compassion.[2] In Lü's interpretation, the basic bodhicitta, i.e., the resolve to become a buddha out of altruistic concerns for other sentient beings, became the foundational work ethics for a new institution. The chief responsibility of this new institution was to enable all to live a life of Bauddha Dharma (*fofa rensheng* 佛法人生) in one true-reality realm.[3] In *Five Disciplines*, he finally fleshed out the details of how this joint-learning process could actualize his revolutionary dream.

The structure of this chapter is three-fold. I first outline the overall structure of *Five Disciplines*, illustrating its structural resemblance with a scientific enterprise for producing Buddhist knowledge. In the second section, I magnify and then analyze the stitches underlying this new outlook, illustrating how Lü transformed the Yogācāra path of three-natures into a social evolutionary theory. Then, in section three, I zoom into three crucial normative structures of Lü's iteration of inner learning: 1) institutionalized bodhicitta, 2) reinvented bodhisattva precepts for deliberative democracy, and 3) the redesigned six perfections as social activism.[4] In the concluding section, I show

[1] As I have discussed in Chapter Four, critical thinking was salient in his 1924 essay on comparative hermeneutics and in his 1926 monography *Fojiao yuanjiu fa* in which Lü repeatedly described his own method as comparative studies, scientific-cum-critical method to reach the Buddhist principle and the perfect theory.

[2] Lü's uses of *li* 理, *zhi* 智 and *hui* 慧 are complicated. There are several reasons. First, there are many Sanskrit terms that were translated as either *zhi* 智 or *hui* 慧 or the combination of these two terms with many other qualifiers in different doctrinal systems. This complicated history of translation is further compounded by different processes of indigenization in Chinese commentaries that extended Sanskrit senses of all kinds of prajñā, jñāna, or vidyā into a Chinese system of wisdom and knowledge. Furthermore, Lü Cheng further extended the Chinese terms by imbuing them with Western senses of rationality, intelligence, judgment, and reason. It is beyond the reach of the current dissertation to disentangle all these layers of meanings. I intend to highlight the general pattern and main strategy in *Five Disciplines* that accentuates the spirit of rationality and reason in traditional hermeneutics and where Lü interfaced them with modern sense of criticism.

[3] Lü Cheng, *Lü Cheng foxue lunzhu xuanji* 呂澂佛學論著選集 [Selected Writings on Buddhist Studies by Lü Cheng], (Jinan: Qilu shushe, 1991). Throughout this dissertation, this anthology is abbreviated as Xuanji 1991. Xuanji 1991, 453.

[4] Bodhicitta is the bedrock of all forms of Mahāyāna Buddhism. For a philologically rigorous intellectual history of bodhicitta, see Dorji Wangchuk, *The Resolve to Become a Buddha: A Study of the Bodhicitta Concept in Indo-Tibetan Buddhism* (Tokyo: International Institute for Buddhist Studies of the International College for Postgraduate Buddhist Studies, 2007).

how Lü intended to use this Buddhicized scholarship to initiate a societal paradigm shift of revolutionizing consciousness.

These structural characteristics are central to Lü's reinvention of Yogācāra soteriology into an aesthetic society. The process of transformation itself is grounded in *āśrayaparivṛtti* (Ch: *zhuanyi* 轉依), whose Sanskrit meaning could be legitimately rendered as "revolutionizing consciousness" and yet the sense of "fundamental break" remains obscure in its Chinese translation "transformation of the basis." In Lü's new design, the springhead of this path is original quiescence, i.e., nirvāṇa as a cause; the perfection of this path is one true-reality realm, i.e., nirvāṇa for all as an outcome. By grounding the alpha and omega of social evolution in terms of gradual and collective realization of nirvāṇa, Lü activated the abstract doctrinal whole in a new era of scientism and evolutionism. In this Buddhicized social evolution, institutionalized bodhicitta replaced aesthetic attitude, six perfections replaced aesthetic appreciation as the nourishment for an aesthetic life, and bodhisattva precepts became the guardians of this democratic process.

The Institute's Learning: From Soteriology to Disciplinary Studies

Five Disciplines are the foundational education project for cultivating aspiring bodhisattvas. Lü Cheng started this program on October 1, 1943. This was merely seven months after Ouyang passed away. *Five Disciplines* also marked Lü's first independent lecture series that formally launched a full-scale educational project termed the Institute's Learning (*yuanxue* 院學).[5] Although the term learning (*xue* 學) resembles secular disciplinary studies, which at the time already became associated with science (*kexue* 科學) and Buddhist studies (*foxue* 佛學), it would be a mistake to simply swept it under the rug of secularism. On the contrary, in his June 2, 1943's public commemoration of Ouyang, Lü made it clear that the core of the Institute's Learning was soteriology. He characterized this learning as a scholarly-moral-spiritual pursuit, "through analyzing the facts of how verbal and recorded teachings

[5] Xuanji 1991, 605.

unfold, one seeks Truth born from contemplation and practice."[6] In one sentence, Lü knitted ancient salvific instructions into a state-of-the-art discipline of Buddhist studies.

This grand lecture series ended in a hurry. Although Lü Cheng listed fifty texts and divided them into three progressive cycles in his blueprint (see Table 1), mostly taken from *Essentials*, he only finished lecturing the twelve texts in the first cycle and three out of the nineteen listed texts in the second cycle. These lecture notes were recorded by his students and colleagues in the 1940s, re-edited by Lü and his former students and colleagues, and published in 1991. All lecture notes are included in his anthology, *Selected Writings on Buddhist Studies by Lü Cheng*.[7] Concerning the significance of the remaining un-explicated sixteen texts in the second cycle and the nineteen texts in the third cycle, one can only make an educated guess based on his outline and the marginalia in the surviving books and notes from his once vast Buddhological library.[8]

Table 1. The Curriculum[9]

	The First Cycle	The Second Cycle	The Third Cycle
The Essential Teaching	**Original Quiescence**	**Revolutionizing Consciousness (Skt: *āśrayaparivṛtti*)**	**One True-reality Realm**
Abhidharma	*Dhammapada* *The Heart of Abhidharma*	*An Abhidharmic Reading of the Four Āgamas* *Root Verses of Abhidharma-kośa-bhāṣya* *Root Verses of Mahāyānābhidharmasūtra* *Compendium of Abhidharma*	*Compendium of Dharma* *Treatise on Entering Abhidharma* *Treatise on the Four Noble Truths* *Selections from Kathā-vatthu*

[6] Xuanji 1991, "Tan Yuanxue" 談院學 [On the Institute's Learning], 435.

[7] Lü Cheng, *Lü Cheng foxue lunzhu xuanji* 呂澂佛學論著選集 [Selected Writings on Buddhist Studies by Lü Cheng], (Jinan: Qilu shushe, 1991). Throughout this dissertation, this anthology is abbreviated as Xuanji 1991.

[8] I could not find sources revealing when and why Lü Cheng had to cut short this lecture series. One possibility is that after the end of the Japanese invasion in 1945, the institute had other more pressing issues to wrestle with, e.g., the institutional difficulty of moving back to their Nanjing site due to mismanagement during the war, loss of students due to a new migration pattern among students after the war, and the problem of gaining continued economic support after the Nationalist lost its control of China proper.

[9] In this chapter, I only give the English translations of the texts in Lü's curriculum. For readers interested in the corresponding Chinese, Tibetan, Sanskrit, or Pāli titles, please see Appendix III.

Prajñā	*The Diamond Sūtra* *Root Verses of Resources for Bodhi*	*The Vimalakīrti Sūtra* *The Sūtra on the Great Perfection of Wisdom* *The Treatise on the Great Perfection of Wisdom* *Fundamental Verses on the Middle Way*	*The Great Perfection of Wisdom · The Mañjuśrī Chapter* *A Compendium of the Perfection of Wisdom* *Commentary on The Four Hundred [Stanzas of Madhyamaka]* *Jewels in the Hand Treatise*
Yogācāra	*The Great Ornament Sūtra* *Verses Distinguishing the Middle and the Extremes*	*Noble sūtra of the Explanation of the Profound Secrets* *Yogācāra-bhūmi: Bodhisattva-bhūmi* *Acclamation of the Holy Teaching* *Compendium of the Great Vehicle*	*Seven selected Chapters from the Avataṃsaka Sūtra* *Explanation of the Investigation of Objective Bases* *The Jewel-Arising Treatise on Establishing Consciousness-only* *Selections of Establishing Consciousness-only*
Nirvāṇa	*The Sūtra of the Lion's Roar of Queen Śrīmālā* *Treatise on the Nonduality of Mahāyāna Dharmadhātu*	*The Lotus Sūtra* *Mahānirvāṇa Sūtra—The Chapter of True Dharma* *Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra* *Stanzas from the Treatise of the Ultimate One-Vehicle Jewel Lineage*	*The Great Cloud Sūtra—The Chapter on the Great Assembly* *The Sūtra on the Invisible Splendor of the Mahāyāna* *Treatise on the Buddha-Stage Sūtra*
Vinaya	*Vaipulya Sūtra of the Pure Vinaya* *Yogācāra Bodhisattva Prātimokṣa Karman*	*The Inquiry of the Householder Ugra*	*Collection of Six Perfections Sūtra* *Acts of the Buddha*
Supplementary Readings	*The Path of Liberation* *Six Doors of Teaching Dhyāna*	*Introduction to Logic* *Flower Ornament Sūtra· the Chapter on Cultivating Compassion*	*Selected Passages from Compendium of Validities* *Sūtra of the Questions of Bodhisattva Ākāśagarbha· The Section on Deciding and Selecting*

Activated and Applied Soteriological Knowledge

Lü Cheng was keen to make the Institute's Learning an activated, applied knowledge (*huoxue* 活學), or translated alternatively as a living tradition of learning. The key to activate this knowledge is to "seek" (*qiu* 求), which Lü equated with an aspiration (*yu* 欲) and a conviction to awaken bodhicitta (*faxin yuanwang* 發心願望).[10] Lü urged his students to apply this aspiration and conviction to their daily life without even a momentary respite (*yike bushe* 一刻不捨). This ceaseless effort, for Lü, is what makes the Institute's Learning an applied and activated learning. Lü mapped the continuing application in daily life onto the soteriological path of ten stages in the *Avataṁsaka Sūtra* (T287).[11] It is also telling that Lü ended this brief talk by making Ouyang the embodiment of this ceaseless application of the great bodhisattva vow.[12] By stitching together the bodhisattva vow, ceaseless application, Avataṁsaka's ten stages, and Ouyang's exemplary life, Lü Cheng effectively redesigned the ancient soteriology into a profession of Buddhist learning.

In this new profession, soteriological conviction dons a new clothing of work ethics. In the opening lecture, Lü proclaimed a two-pronged goal for this new profession: the soteriological goal of carrying on the Dao (*yi Dao wei jiren* 以道為己任) and the institutional goal of cultivating an energetic and pragmatic ethic (*gangjian wushi zhi feng* 剛健務實之風).[13] While the first point professed the soteriological intent of inner learning, the second expectation is the focus of this section, i.e., the work ethic that Lü Cheng hoped to inculcate into the conveyers of this new Buddhist knowledge.

In his lectures, Lü repeatedly emphasized the importance of *Five Disciplines* as the root of the Institute's Learning.[14] The centrality of Lü's systemization of inner learning was immediately recognized by his contemporaneous Buddhist intellectuals as "the stroke that dotted the eye of the

[10] Xuanji 1991, 438.
[11] Xuanji 1991, 438.
[12] Xuanji 1991, 439.
[13] Xuanji 1991, 607.
[14] See for example, Xuanji 1991, 604. Lü repeatedly made this point throughout his lectures on *Five Disciplines*. But three essays stand out with regard to his soteriological intent: Xuanji 1991, "Tan yuanxue," 435–39; Xuanji 1991, "Neiyuan foxuewuke jiangxi gangyao" 內院佛學五科講習綱要, 585–604; and "Neiyuan foxuewuke jiangxi gangyao jiangji" 內院佛學五科講習綱要講記, 605－42.

dragon," an idiom emphasizing the finishing touch that gives artwork a soul.[15] In both the immediate reception in the 1940s and the contemporary academic evaluation, Lü's project has been perceived as a return to the Indian origin, namely, the monastic and Tantric learning center named Nālandā (ca. 700–1200). This reception is understandable because Ouyang and Lü themselves repeatedly stressed their intention to re-establish genuine Buddhism modeled after Nālandā learning.

However, it is crucial to understand that both Ouyang and Lü described their wish as "establishing" (*jianli* 建立) a Nālandā in China.[16] Instead of cursorily equating establishing with revival, scholars must look into the context and background of these phrases, namely, the shared concerns of leading China out of the Darwinist jungle and establishing an alternative future grounded in interdependence, cooperation, and mutual respect. Once we take seriously both the social context, the distinctively modern features of *Five disciplines* emerge.

From Nālandā Scholasticism to Disciplinary Studies

Lü dressed up ancient Nālandā scholasticism in the modern suit of disciplinary studies, i.e., *kexue* 科學—a widely accepted translation of science by the 1920s. Recall that Lü named his new training program *wuke foxue* 五科佛學, where the second character *ke* and the fourth character *xue* combines into *kexue*—science. Recall also that, in Chapter Four, I demonstrated how Lü redefined *kexue* (science) as rigorous comparative studies. In 1943, when Lü identified his training program as both *ke* and *xue*, he further institutionalized his new interpretation of science. In this sense, when Ouyang and Lü talked about re-establish Nālandā learning, they pushed forward Yang Wenhui's project of invigorating (*zhenxing* 振興) Buddhism: making Buddhism a first-rate religion in the globe.[17] When grafted onto the ideal of Nālandā, a Tantric monastic center that gained an international reputation

[15] See for example, Su Yuanlei, "Zhina Neixue zhi fazhan: Lü Qiuyi jushi xueshuo juyao" 支那內學之發展: 呂秋一居士學說舉要 [The Development of the Chinese Inner Learning Institute: Introducing Lü Cheng Jushi's Studies], *Juexun* 覺訊 3, no. 8 (July 1949): 3.

[16] Xuanji 1991, 606. Ouyang, "Tan neixue yanjiu" 談內學研究 [On Inner Learning and Research], *Inner Learning* 2 (1925): 5.

[17] Yang Wenhui, "Zhina fojiao zhenxing ce er" [Strategies for Invigorating Chinese Buddhism, Part II], 333.

as a scholastic institute since the nineteenth century, Ouyang and Lü's brand of inner learning also adopted new significance.

The trope of Nālandā allowed Lü to sidestep the political discourse and instead focused on a Buddhist cosmopolitanism as the foundation for China's legitimacy in a globalized world. Lü used Nālandā to negotiate two sets of conflicting identities under the condition of colonial modernity. The first is the aforementioned tension of being both modern and authentically Buddhist, one that was created by the emerging state secularism. This contradiction was a structural one set forth by the state secularist policy that violently demarcated a secular sphere devoid of any religious elements. As a result, in the Republican era, religion became a political category in twentieth-century China.[18] The second was how to be authentically Chinese and yet claim legitimate access to Indian Buddhist teachings. This dilemma appeared as soon as Buddhism landed on the Chinese soil in the first century CE. By the tenth century CE, it subsided after a long Sinification process. However, in the early twentieth century, this Chinese-Indian dilemma flared up once more because of the imported Aryan myth that devalued Chinese Buddhism as a later inauthentic and corrupted degeneration of the pure original Buddhism.[19]

Confronted with the political demand of the secular state and the renewed cultural anxiety of being both Chinese and Indian, Lü imagined a Buddhist cosmopolitanism to sidestep the political

[18] For a concise analysis of the mutual constitutedness of the secular and the religious in modern China, see Michael Szongyi, "Secularization Theories and the Study of Chinese Religions," *Social Compass* 56, no. 3 (2009): 312–27. For an ecological analysis of the entanglement of religion, culture, and politics, see Goossaert and Palmer, *The Religious Question in Modern China*. For recent scholarship on the impact of Buddhism on Chinese political modernity and cultural modernity, see Kiely and Jessup, *Recovering Buddhism in Modern China*.

[19] Many scholarly discussions on the Sinicization of Buddhism or the Indianization of China examined various negotiations of this productive tension in premodern China. The literature is too vast to be included here. Two seminal works on this issue are E. Zürcher, *The Buddhist Conquest of China: The Spread and Adaptation of Buddhism In Early Medieval China* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1959) and Peter N. Gregory, *Tsung-Mi and the Sinification of Buddhism* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1991). For the making of the Aryan myth and the corresponding construction of an "original" Buddhism, see for example, Donald S. Lopez, *From Stone to Flesh*. There have been diverse means of making sense of being Chinese and being Buddhist in the early twentieth century. Although Ouyang and Lü embarked on a path of globalizing Buddhism, others opted to continue the Sinicizing Buddhism, see for example, Wei Wu, "Indigenization of Tibetan Buddhism in twentieth-century China" (PhD. Diss., Princeton University, 2017).

constraints and to bypass the dictate of cultural nationalism. For Lü, Buddhism is a religion of translation and Chineseness is crucially hinged upon its translation enterpreise. In his own narrative, he hoped to implement the enterprise of the genuine Buddhism that once thrived in Nālandā, whose teachings were brought back and translated by Xuanzang (fl. c. 602–664) and Yijing (635–713), but whose tradition was soon lost in India and was only genuinely established in China.[20] By foregrounding the translation enterprise crucial to the spread of Buddhism to China, Lü Cheng created a new vision of Buddhist cosmopolitanism embodying a "religion of translation,"[21] one in which the Chinese translations played a crucial role in preserving the genuine messages of the Buddha.

From Buddhism as a religion of translation, there naturally emerged the new professionalized learning grounded in comparative hermeneutics. Given the linguistic diversity and rich histories of translation, Lü saw a dire need to systemize comparative studies of all preserved scriptures. As is well known, in the 7th and 8th century CE. when Xuanzang and Yijing visited the Nālandā Monastery, it was already a thriving learning center full of Buddhist professionals. Pintu Kumar argued that the Nālandā monastery represented the beginning of a new education system—*mahāvihāra* that not only systemized Buddhist knowledge and standardized the curriculum but also made them more available to commoners. The mahāvihāra system extended the transmission of knowledge outside the Brahmanical *gurukula* system that was grounded in a domestic setting where one teacher imparts everything he knows to his pupils through oral transmission. To support this new mode of knowledge transmission and systemized learning, it requires a campus setting where a group of teachers with different specializations imparts their expertise to a diverse body of students

[20] Harking back to Nālandā is by no means a unique strategy of legitimization. Many other religious movements in Tibet, China, and Japan utilized this move. In fact, Nālandā revival has much larger impact beyond the Buddhist sphere. It has functioned to create a pan-Asian educational model since the early twentieth century, see for example, Andrea Marion Pinkney, "Looking West to India: Asian Education, Intra-Asian Renaissance, and the Nalanda Revival," *Modern Asian Studies* 49, no. 1 (2015): 111–49.

[21] I borrowed this phrase from Salomon, who characterized Buddhism as a religion of translation thanks to the flexible linguistic policy documented in Buddhist scriptures, see Richard Salomon, *The Buddhist Literature of Ancient Gandhāra: An Introduction with Selected Translations* (Wisdom Publications, Inc., 2018), 59–60.

through multiple approaches. On this campus, students benefit from a vast library and engage in not only reciting and chanting but also transcribing, writing, and translating.[22] When Lü Cheng harked back to this moment in history, what he valued the most was the system of five specialized learnings (Skt: *vidyā*; Ch: *ming* 明). In Lü's new iteration, five specialized learnings became remodeled into five disciplinary studies. Because disciplinary studies *kexue* also became the accepted translation of science, Lü's *Five Disciplines* effectively gives the ancient Nālandā scholasticism a modern make-over.

Equally important, mimicking the Nālandā model does not entail a return to the Indian origin but enacts a renewed vision of Chineseness. In this modern rendition of professionalized knowledge, Chineseness naturalized the leadership of Chinese learners in a worldwide joint-soteriological quest. According to Lü's own words in 1943, his intention to build a new institute started when he lectured on the history of Indian Buddhism from 1925 to 1926. In his last lecture, Lü pointed out that his teaching of Indian Buddhism ended with the chapter on Nālandā Mahāvihāra. In the 1940s, when recounting this detail, he explained his reasons as follows: His teaching ended with Nālandā because he wanted to underline "the fact that Indian Buddhist Learning ended here [with Nālandā] and Chinese Buddhist Learning started from here [the Nālandā learning]."[23] To substantiate his claim that Xuanzang and Yijing transmitted genuine Nālandā teaching to China, Lü provided further textual evidence. He singled out two essential texts in the Nirvāṇa discipline of the third cycle, *The Sūtra on the Invisible Splendor of the Mahāyāna* (*Dacheng miyan jing* 大乘密嚴經 T681) and *Treatise on the Buddha-Stage Sūtra* (*Fodi jinglun* 佛地經論 T1530). For Lü, these two texts marked the peak of Nālandā Buddhism and the beginning of the Chinese transmission of genuine Buddhism (see Table 1).[24] Because Lü selected these two texts into the Nirvāṇa discipline in the third cycle, whose essential

[22] For Nālandā's institutionalization of Buddhist learning, see Pintu Kumar, *Buddhist Learning in South Asia: Education, Religion, and Culture at the Ancient Śrī Nālandā Mahāvihāra* (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2018), 101–92. For the increasing ritual significance of writing and translation, see Kumar, *Buddhist Learning in South Asia*, 152, 261. Similarly, in examining Tantric practices in monastic centers, Wedemeyer pointed out that traditional monastic-lay distinction was no longer meaningful and instead he suggested a new category: the professionals who were well-versed in Buddhist philosophy, proficient in Sanskrit language and logic, and who mastered special skills regarding rituals and worldly affairs such as medicine and architecture, Christian Wedemeyer, *Making Sense of Tantric Buddhism*, 181–87.

[23] Xuanji 1991, 606–7.

[24] Xuanji 1991, 638–39.

teaching is one true-reality realm, it is evident that Lü considered these two texts as the ultimate goal of his Institute's Learning. Unsurprisingly, the two texts that explicate nirvāṇa as one true-reality realm, i.e., the peak of genuine Buddhism, only survived in China thanks to the Chinese translation enterprise.

This narration is a persuasive one for those eager to see Chinese Buddhism as a respectable member of the worldwide Dharma family. Nālandā served as the model for Lü's new learning institute both because it was the educational hub after Vasubandhu and because Xuanzang and Yijing extensively translated texts produced in this hub of Buddhist scholasticism.[25] Promoting Nālandā scholasticism enabled Lü to ground his new professionalization on an earlier model, thus justifying authenticity through historicity. The focus on translation allowed Lü to reinvent Buddhism as a religion of translation while simultaneously show-casing the contribution of Chinese translations in the process of making Buddhism global. At the same time, translation requires expertise in classical languages, mastery of the vast Buddhist literature and history, as well as proficiency in philosophical and doctrinal matters. At the turn of the twentieth century, Lü's effort should be seen alongside both the massive tide of professionalizing knowledge production and the parallel wave of professionalization in monastic communities. Riding this upwelling tide, Lü's model accrued new

[25] Xuanji 1991, 605. Both Ouyang and Lü presented their vision of inner learning as a revival of Nālandā learning. As early as 1924, Ouyang already explicitly mentioned that his wish had always been to establish China's Nālandā, "yanyu Suyuan, naizai jianli Zhina zhi Nalantuo yi"言余素愿，乃在建立支那之那爛陀矣, not only because Western (Indian) Buddhism ended with Nālandā but also because Nālandā learning included the broadest possible Buddhist teachings after the Buddha passed away. However, in 1924, it is not clear that Ouyang viewed Nālandā's educational structure as a model for his new institution. He seemed only care about the actual content of Nālandā learning. At this point, Ouyang's institutional plan still lacked its distinctive form of Nālandā's five sciences. See Ouyang, "Tan neixue yanjiu" 談內學研究 [On Inner Learning and Research], *Inner Learning* 2 (1925): 5. Nālandā as an institutional model only appeared in the late 1930s. According to Lü, in the spring of 1939, when Lü lectured on *Introduction to Buddhist Learning* (*Foxue gailun* 佛學概論), he expressed to Ouyang the desire to model the Institute's Learning after Nālandā. According to Lü, Ouyang applauded this idea and then deliberated on the scale of Nālandā learning, established new disciplines, adding and subtracting when appropriate. In Lü's mind, when Ouyang published his blueprint of the educational program, *Shijiao* 釋教 [On Teaching], in 1941, it was the first time, that Ouyang self-consciously tried to establish Yogācāra in China following the Nālandā model, see Xuanji 1991, 606.

cultural capital such that Buddhology, philology, and historiography also became part and parcel of this new profession of Buddhist learning.

Another way that Lü's Nālandā model promotes the status of Chinese Buddhism is his analysis of the transmission history of *Yogācārabhūmi* (*The Foundation for Yoga Practitioners* Ch: *Yujia shidi lun* 瑜伽師地論). *Yogācārabhūmi* is a foundational, encyclopedic compendium of Yogācāra teachings that is only fully preserved in Chinese and Tibetan translations.[26] After recounting the learning and travel of the famed Tang monk-translator-scholar Xuanzang, Lü Cheng commented that what truly motivated Xuanzang's travel to Northern India was his keen awareness of the significance of *Yogācārabhūmi* as the foundation of all Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna teachings. In Lü's interpretation, all Buddhist masters in the Western regions (*xiyu* 西域) were convinced that "without this treatise (referring to *Yogācārabhūmi*), one cannot spread Dharma."[27] In other words, Lü Cheng justified his educational innovation by excavating the voices in old texts: resurrecting Nālandā learning is always about the mission to carry on genuine Buddhist teachings for the present situations and a better future.[28]

The key phrase to understand Lü Cheng's institutional-building intent is "establishing according to Dharma" (*rufa jianli* 如法建立).[29] It was the society that needed to be revolutionized, and it was this actual life that needed to be reformed,[30] not Dharma. For him, genuine Saṅgha has

[26] For a modern translation and a detailed textual and translation history, see Ulrich Timme Kragh, *The Foundation for Yoga Practitioners*.

[27] Xuanji 1991, 416.

[28] For a background on other efforts to revive Xuanzang, see Benjamin Brose, "Resurrecting Xuanzang: The Modern Travels of a Medieval Monk," in *Recovering Buddhism In Modern China*, 143–76. Note that while Xuanzang's bone relic adopted multi-layers of local and international meanings in its modern travels, in Lü Cheng's paradigm, it was Xuanzang's textual relic (the translated Indic texts) that operated as the ground for a global Buddhism.

[29] Xuanji1997, 129–30. Even though this is Lü's comment on Taixu's reform, this statement also reveals his own intent— reform Saṅgha is not the goal. To establish anew a genuine Saṅgha is a the only means to transform the society collectively.

[30] Ouyang himself consistently demonstrated his revolutionary intent. Similar to Lü Cheng, Ouyang interpreted revolution as a total transformation of one's mind-heart. More importantly, for him, deep learning inevitably leads to this revolution of the mind, see Ouyang, "Fu Mengwentong shu" 覆蒙文通書, *Kongxue zazhu* 孔學雜著 OJNWX 14: 31–32. The letter is dated to February 1, 1943, three weeks before Ouyang passed away.

never been established in the middle kingdom (China) and has died out in India with the dissolution of Nālandā. Xuanzang and Yijing merely preserved the written words gesturing toward this holistic Buddhism.[31] Editing *Essentials* was only the first step—extracting true messages of the Buddha for establishing a living tradition anew.[32] To activate and apply this knowledge in ink, Lü launched his *Five Disciplines*.

In short, the Nālandā education model underpins Lü's project of professionalizing Buddhist learning for his own time. The resonance with science makes the Institute's Learning modern. The resemblance to Nālandā Buddhism makes the Institute's learning authentically Buddhist. The centrality of Chinese translation makes it authentically Chinese. In short, Lü's imagined Nālandā cosmopolitanism allowed him to redefine the authenticity of Buddhism outside the political categorization of "religion" and simultaneously resolved the renewed anxiety of being both Chinese and Indian.

Redefining Disciplinary Studies on Buddhist Terms

More than mimicking Nālandā learning, Lü rewove a new tapestry of disciplinary studies from the textual ruins of Nālandā scholasticism. In Lü's outline, five disciplines include four disciplines of teaching (i.e., Abhidharma, Prajñā, Yogācāra, Nirvāṇa) and the fifth discipline of Precepts (i.e., Vinaya).[33] Most noticeably, Lü's five disciplines differ from the five disciplines of Nālandā: Hetuvidyā, Abhidharma, Prajñā, Yogācāra, and Vinaya.[34] In addition, Lü's blueprint also diverges significantly

[31] For scholars familiar with Chinese history, one would argue that there has been a Ci'en school (Ci'en zong 慈恩宗) of Yogācāra established by Xuanzang's student Kuiji 窺基 (632–682). However, in Lü's narration, Ci'en school lasted no more than thirty years and Xuanzang spent most of his energy not on establishing the true teachings but on translating texts, see for example Lü Cheng, "The Five Disciplines of Buddhist Learning Transmitted by Master Xuan Zang and Master Yi Jing" 奘淨兩師所傳的五科佛學, in Xaunji1991, 293–300. Therefore, Lü justified his claim that no living tradition according to Nalanda learning has ever been established in China.

[32] Xuanji 1991, 606.

[33] Note that, I use capitalized version to indicate the names of the disciplines in both Nālandā's and Lü's curriculums and the lowercase version to indicate either the concept itself or the body of texts. For example, to distinguish Nirvāṇa as the discipline and nirvāṇa as the doctrine, I use capitalized Nirvāṇa to denote the discipline and nirvāṇa to denote the doctrinal interpretation.

[34] Xuanji 1991, 293–300.

from Ouyang's curriculum outline, where teaching and precepts are two separate categories, as seen in *On Teaching* and *On Vinaya*. In Lü's new program, both vinaya and teaching are meshed into five disciplines and arranged progressively into three cycles. Furthermore, in *Five Disciplines*, hetuvidyā is no longer an independent subject. Nirvāṇa came to its stead. These reshuffles reveal three doctrinal innovations, which effectively redefined *kexue* in terms of a new interpretation of nirvāṇa as both original quiescence and one true-reality realm.

The first doctrinal innovation implicit in this reshuffle is a remapping of Yogācāra soteriology as a dual-track path following a double-helix. Careful readers will recall from Chapter Two that Lü envisioned an aesthetic revolution to include both a temporal dimension, i.e., the religious yearning for eternity, and a social expansion to embrace all forms of life and all living processes. In Lü's 1943 enactment of revolutionizing consciousness, the temporal and social dimensions were redesigned into a double-helix. The temporal dimension is now represented by three cycles, leading to ever more penetrating insight. The social dimension is now represented by the link between two-intertwining strands in this three-stage evolution: teaching and vinaya.

In this dual-track evolution of three cycles, the teaching leg represents the principles of localizing the doctrinal whole, thereby enacting a textual snapshot of a historical moment. In each cycle, the four disciplines of Abhidharma, Prajñā, Yogācāra, and Nirvāṇa map out the localized historical trajectory of Buddhist development in India that culminated in Nālandā. For Lü, this microhistory of Nālandā learning encoded vital principles for localizing the doctrinal whole and thus needs to be mined for guiding contemporaneous enactment of the doctrinal whole. Together, the three snapshots of localization principles in history also map out a temporal progression of revolutionizing consciousness.

The social dimension is represented by the link between the two strands of learning and vinaya practice, namely, applying the true teaching under new circumstances. Lü reframed vinaya discipline in all three cycles as the connective thread of all Buddhist practices, sewing diverse applications of the doctrinal teachings together into one path. The link between teaching and vinaya is the application of principles of localization to suit the learners' social milieu. Once the principles of

localizing the doctrinal whole are excavated from the textual remains of Nālandā, the task of the Institute's learners is to apply these principles as guidelines for continual enactments in the present and the future. Together, the strand of the doctrinal learning and the strand of vinaya reenact the traditional dyad of knowledge (*zhi* 知) and practice (*xing* 行) as two mutually dependent and equally indispensable branches of the path. Supported by two branches of knowledge and practice, a learner would go through three cycles of continual enactment, with each cycle advancing closer to the collective oneness that Lü termed "one true-reality realm."

The second doctrinal innovation is that Lü reinvented hetuvidyā as critical thinking and integrated it into the work ethics of the Institute. This innovation is also a critical normative feature of Lü's *Five Disciplines*, i.e. institutional bodhicitta, which I will discuss together with two other normative features in the third section. To make a long story short, Lü abstracted Buddhist logic into a methodology, and then merged it with compassion, and reframed it as an attitude of learning and guidance for practice on the bodhisattva path. Lü's logic-cum-compassion embodies the energetic and pragmatic work ethic that Lü hoped to inculcate in the Institute's learners.[35]

The third doctrinal innovation implicit in Lü's reshuffle lies in his invention of Nirvāṇa as an independent discipline. This invention institutionalized Lü's theorization of the doctrinal whole. As seen from Table 1, Lü's textual selection demonstrates a new systemization of Buddhist teachings that echoes Ouyang's goal of connecting Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna (*guantong daxiaocheng* 貫通大小乘). Lü Cheng's choices of texts also reveal his emphasis on 1) the legitimacy of Chinese transmission and 2) the consistency of Abhidharma and Mahāyāna.[36] Furthermore, Lü's lecture notes consistently demonstrate that *Yogācārabhūmi* is the text that Lü drew from to weave all five disciplines together. All these hints point to Lü's goal of establishing a doctrinal oneness.

[35] Again, Lü Cheng is taking cues from Ouyang, who asserted that one must study hetuvidyā as a preparation for public debates. See Ouyang, "Neixueyuan yuanxun · shijiao disan" 內學院院訓·釋教第三, *Neixueyuan yuanxun* OJNWX 1: 97.

[36] This is evident in his choice of root text for edition on the *Diamond Sūtra* (*Nengduan jingangjing* 能斷金剛般若經), *Madhyāntavibhāga* (*Bian zhongbian lun* 辯中邊論), and *Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra* (*Ru lengqie jing* 入楞伽經).

In Lü's new paradigm, all teachings converge to a new interpretation of nirvāṇa on Yogācāra terms and congealed in the new discipline called Nirvāṇa. The pivot that summed up diverse teachings into one path is *āśrayaparivṛtti* (revolutionizing consciousness), the essential teaching of the second cycle. The springhead of this path is original quiescence—nirvāṇa as a cause. The perfection of this path is one true-reality realm—nirvāṇa as an outcome. In short, the new discipline Nirvāṇa is the doctrinal oneness, which is the alpha and omega of the continuing process of revolutionizing consciousness.

In Lü's own words, nirvāṇa marks both the root (*genben* 根本) and the ultimate goal (*guisu* 歸宿) of this collective bodhisattva path and hence legitimizes the dynamic wholeness in his training program.[37] Immediately after this statement, Lü Cheng also identified the disciplines of Prajñā and Yogācāra as both the real application (*shijian* 實踐) and the finger that points toward home (*zhigui* 指歸). As the root cause, nirvāṇa is manifested as the originally quiescent consciousness (*xingji zhi xin* 性寂之心).[38] As the home or the ultimate goal, nirvāṇa is manifested as the achievement of the Buddhahood. In other words, nirvāṇa itself is reimagined as a path, including both the beginning and the end, both the cause and the effect, enabled by and enabling diverse social and historical configurations in different space-times. In this new discipline of Nirvāṇa, Lü's social imaginary of a Yogācāra logic of infinite spiritual progress (See Fig. 4 in Chapter One) fully reveals itself.

Lü stressed this theme over and over in his lecture notes on multiple sūtras and treatises, especially the two texts in the discipline of Nirvāṇa (T353 and T1626) in the first cycle. When Lü Cheng had to cut his planned lecture series short, instead of following the designed five disciplines from Abhidharma to Vinaya in the second cycle, Lü Cheng directly skipped to the discipline of Nirvāṇa. Lü only had time to elaborate on the first three sūtras (*The Lotus Sūtra* T262, *The Nirvāṇa Sūtra* T374,

[37] Xuanji 1991, 767.

[38] Xuanji 1991, 1094. In his condensed lecture of the second cycle, he started the lecture with the chapter on skill-in-means (*fangbian pin* 方便品) from the *Lotus Sūtra*. He further points out that while the first cycle explicated that the root of the Institute's Learning is original quiescence, the second cycle taught that one must activate this original quiescence and then apply exhaustively the potential and function of original quiescence. He further commented that, to become a Buddha, a saint, or a virtuous man, one only need to apply exhaustively this potential and function of this original quiescence innate in all sentient beings.

and *The Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra* T672). This selection further highlights the moral purpose of inner learning: leading all toward nirvāṇa.

In Lü's redesign, the nirvāṇic nature of all things enables all to achieve Buddhahood.[39] This innate Buddhahood (also named as *Tathāgatagarbha*) is the same for Buddhas and sentient beings.[40] In Chapter Six, I have demonstrated how Lü consistently reframed Xuanzang's consciousness-only doctrines as a form of phenomenological naturalism. Here, we must understand Lü's use of *xin* 心 as an originally quiescent mind-heart, i.e., the pure *ālayavijñāna* that is shared by buddhas and commoners alike. Lü grounded all dharmic teachings, be it vidyā, prajñā or jñāna, in this new nirvāṇic nature.[41] For him, this original quiescence is the ontological basis of Yogācāra causal enframing and thereby substantiates intersubjectivity and social evolution.

Through these reshuffles, the scattered traces of Nālandā learning in ink were collected and then weaved into a new form of professional training on the Chinese canvass. In so doing, Lü achieved two goals. One the one hand, he redefined social evolution in terms of Yogācāra soteriology, revolutionizing consciousness. On the other hand, he professionalized traditional Buddhist learning and commentarial studies as a communism of soteriological knowledge, a scholarship imbued with moral purpose. For Lü, scholarship is salvation.

A Buddhicized Social Evolution: Three Cycles of Collective Renewal

While nirvāṇa provides ontological grounding for revolutionizing consciousness, Yogācāra soteriological path governs the temporal progression in this double helix. Lü laid out his curriculum in three cycles (*sanzhou* 三周), firmly grounded in the Yogācāra soteriological path—*zhuanyi* 轉依 (Skt: *āśrayaparivṛtti*). Simultaneously, Lü also packaged this path into an institutional format, with three stages hinting toward the Yogācāra doctrine of three natures (Ch: *sanxing* 三性; Skt:

[39] Xuanji 1991, 1094.
[40] Xuanji 1991, 1214.
[41] Xuanji 1991, 1148. For more on Chinese interpretation of Vasubandhu's use of *tathāgatagarbha*, see Keng Ching, "Yogācāra Buddhism Transmitted or Transformed? Paramārtha (499–569) and His Chinese Interpreters" (Ph.D. diss., Harvard University, 2009), 401–4.

trisvabhāva).[42] I will discuss the relation between three cycles and three nature in the last part of this subsection. The focus in the follow analysis is the relation of this three-stage path with *āśrayaparivṛtti* and Lü's aesthetic revolution. Traditionally, *āśrayaparivṛtti* is primarily interpreted as a transformation of basis. This is testified by Xuanzang's Chinese translation of *āśrayaparivṛtti* as *zhuanyi*, where *zhuan* indicates transform and *yi* means basis. Nevertheless, this term can also be legitimately translated as revolution or a fundamental renewal of the base consciousness.

I have consistently used "revolutionizing consciousness" to translate Lü's use of *āśrayaparivṛtti*. My intention is to foreground Lü's consistent definition of revolution as a fundamental change of attitude toward all living beings and living processes since his 1920s' quest for an aesthetic up until the 1943 moment. Seen against this backdrop, one can readily recognize the fact that *Five Disciplines* is the fruition of the seeds of aesthetic revolution.

This new professionalization of Buddhist soteriological knowledge, I argue, distinguishes Lü's inner learning from other counter-currents of evolutionism. Undoubtedly, Lü was not the first to enchant social evolution with a Buddhist cosmology. Many Buddhist thinkers, including Taixu, in the 1920s and 1930s, likened evolutionary thinking with Buddhist spiritual progress.[43] By and large, the making of the scientific Buddha in China resembled and echoed narratives of Western converts and Buddhologists.[44] As an outlier of this trend of making Buddhism scientific, Lü's making of the scientific Buddha started from a remaking of science that I have discussed in Chapter Four and in the previous section of the current chapter.

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[42] For a systematic study of *āśrayaparivṛtta* in Indian Yogācāra tradition, see Ronald Mark Davidson, "Buddhist Systems of Transformation: Āśraya-parivṛtti/-parāvṛtti Among the Yogācāra (India)" (PhD Diss., University of California, Berkeley, 1985). See particularly, Part II Chapter Five "Psycho-Ontological Transformation," 228–46 that explicitly deals with the merging of transformation of basis and three natures. Earlier chapters of this dissertation have mapped out the pre-history of *āśrayaparivṛtta*. Note that Davidson choose to translate *āśrayaparivṛtti* as "fundamental transformation" in order to maintain the multivalence inherent in the Sanskrit tatpuruṣa compound. However, I choose to translate it as "revolutionizing consciousness" because that was Lü Cheng's interpretation of this compound.

[43] Hammerstrom, *The Science of Chinese Buddhism*, 135–38. For Taixu's enchanted social evolutionary thinking, see Justin Ritzinger, "Bodhisattva of Progress," in *Anarchy in the pure land*, 171–212.

[44] For a brief outline of the making of the scientific Buddha, see Donald S. Lopez, *The Scientific Buddha: His Short and Happy Life* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2012).

Only after Buddhisizing science did Lü begin to don Buddhism a scientific garb. Seen from this angle, *Five Disciplines* is Lü's rectification of social Darwinism: He substituted the sanctification of self-interest and competition with a spiritualized evolutionary theory grounded upon Buddhological study and comparative rigor. Recall that, in 1918, Lü identified the root cause of modern depravity as superficial learning and arbitrary judgment in 1918. In 1921 he criticized Zhang Taiyan for manufacturing false analogies. Since then, the increasingly popular sentiment of framing evolution as Buddhist spiritual progress only strengthened his conviction to distinguish fisheyes from pearls: Spiritual progress could only be activated by scholarly due diligence.

Lü's Yogācāra socio-soteriological evolution is at its core an institutionalized learning that leads one to "enter the Way":[45]

> The Lectures of *Five Disciplines* are established according to our late teacher [Ouyang Jingwu]'s treatise *On Teaching*. The aim is to directly point to the essential and the subtle so that one can pursue advanced studies step by step. For this reason, [I] have edited and arranged many texts, divided them into three cycles. Each cycle is organized by one essential theme. If [one] studies them frequently and analyzes them repeatedly, after three to five years, one could surely enter the Way.
> 五科講習乃依先師釋教之說而立，意在直指精微，以階深造，故編次群書，三周區別。周各以一要義貫通，反覆研尋，曆三五載，亦可入道矣。

The above passage lays out the Institute's Learning as a soteriological path. This path must be practiced sequentially, with each cycle lasting three to five years, and with the goal of entering the Way. It is important to note that Lü Cheng framed this training program as something that directly points to the essential and the subtle (*zhizhi jingwei* 直指精微), calling to mind his rejection of superficial learning. It is also important to note that Lü designed this program to be accessible to all, in a limited time frame (9–15 years) in this very life. Compared with the premodern bodhisattva ideal that demands eons of practices and many lifetimes, Lü's training program is a fast track.

Equally important, this fast track requires three cycles, with each cycle calling to mind the Mobius band of aesthetic revolution: Helping others eventually lead to self-interests and awakening others eventually feeds back to one's own enlightenment. As I explain later, this path culminates in

[45] Xuanji 1991, 585.

the third cycle, when one true-reality realm is fully manifested (see Table 1). The rest of this section is a step-by-step illustration of these three cycles.

The First Stage

The first stage grounds the path of liberation directly onto the realization of original quiescence:

> The first cycle is focused on the original quiescence of consciousness. Once [one] realizes that the consciousness exists at this moment, then this learning happens. Therefore, if consciousness exists, then this learning exists. It is different from external molding. This is called knowing the root.
> 初周，主於心性本寂，自覺有此心，而後有此學，故心存則學存，異於外鑠，此之謂知本[46]

As I have pointed out in the previous section, original quiescence, in Ouyang and Lü's interpretation, is a synthesis of different terminologies such as original purity and nirvāṇa in terms of Yogācāra hermeneutics. According to their doctrinal interpretation, all of these terms are equated with or derived from *ālayavijñāna*. In Lü's vision, the realization of original quiescence is what enables learning and marks the beginning of revolutionizing consciousness.

By grounding learning onto a universal and originally quiescent consciousness inherent in all living beings, Lü redefined education as a soteriology of unlearning misinformation and of activating the universal moral agency. Simultaneously, he differentiated this Institute's Learning from other Western education systems such as Cai Yuanpei's aesthetic education, which, in Lü's view, committed the fatal sin of environmental determinism and would only perpetuate Darwinist devolution.

Learning is more than acquiring objective knowledge. Lü Cheng grounded learning in a path motivated by a moral purpose and a form of cultivation grounded in sustained meditative insight.[47] To substantiate this claim, Lü Cheng first equated original quiescence with the early Indian Buddhist claim "The nature of the mind-heart is originally pure but defiled by guest dust" (*xinxing benjing kechen suoran* 心性本淨客塵所染).[48] Lü identified this passage as the foundation of all Buddhist teachings through his years of meticulous multilingual comparative analysis and integrated this

[46] Xuanji 1991, 585.
[47] Xuanji 1991, 610.
[48] Xuanji 1991, 609. For Lü's doctrinal analysis, see Lü Cheng, "Comparative Hermeneutics," 40. See also Chapter 4, footnote 32 for a reiteration of Lü's argument.

concept in his explications of five sūtras and seven treatises in the first cycle. Lü contended that, once one realizes that this original quiescence is not different from the momentarily arising and disappearing of psychological events in *ālayavijñāna*, then this initial realization could inspire one to emulate the sage (*jianxian siqi* 見賢思齊). The phrase of emulating the sage echoes his 1920s theme of aesthetic awakening as a means to emulate the artists and art critics—leaders of the joint-awakening enterprise. In 1943, Lü not only reframed these notions on Buddhist terms but further argued that, if one could maintain this insight of original quiescence without forgetting, then Buddhist learning indeed sprung from the inside instead of a transformation under external pressure.[49]

Lü presented this reweaving of scholastic effort and meditative insight in the very first text in his curriculum: *Dhammapada*, an original translation upon which the famous Indigenous scripture the *Forty-Two Sections Sūtra* is grounded.[50] It is telling that Lü Cheng began his program with the Chinese translation of a sūtra outside the four Āgamas.[51] Ostensibly, Lü justified his choice by arguing that, because the language was plain yet intimate and rich in meaning, the text must be an accurate record of the Buddha's words.[52] However, to unpack the unsaid meanings in Lü's embedded discourse, one must understand two subtexts. First, the *Forty-Two Sections Sūtra* has long been seen by the Chinese Buddhists as an authentic translation of an Indian original and associated with the legend of how Buddhism was introduced to China. Second, the 1750 French translation of the *Forty-*

[49] Xuanji 1991, 610.

[50] For a detailed analysis, see, Okabe Kazuo 岡部和雄, "Shijūnishōkyō' no seiritsu to tenkai. Kenkyūshiteki oboegaki" 四十二章經の成立と展開── 研究史的覚え書き[On the Formation and Development of the *Forty-Two Sections Sūtra*], *Komazawa daigaku bukkyōgakubu kenkyū kiyō* 駒澤大學佛教學部研究紀要 25 (1967): 103–18. However, it is worth mentioning that, in the 1940s, Lü Cheng already knew about this thesis and commented on it in his 1950s lectures *Zhongguo foxue yuanliu lue jiang* 中国佛学源流略讲 (lectured in 1953, published in 1979). See Lü Cheng, *Zhongguo foxue yuanliu luejiang* 中國佛學源流略講 [Lectures of A Summary of the Origin and Development of Chinese Buddhism] (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1979).
Tang Yongtong in his monograph already proposed this thesis. See Tang Yongtong 湯用彤, *Han Wei Liangjin Nanbeichao Fojiao shi* 漢魏兩晉南北朝佛教史 (Shanghai: Commercial Press, 1938).

[51] *Dhammapada* was included in the Pāli Canon's Khuddaka Nikaya (Minor Collection), the fifth division of the Pāli Sutta Piṭaka that is known to be the repository for materials that were left out of the four Āgamas/Nikayas. Lü Cheng was aware of this fact, Xuanji 1991, 643.

[52] Xuanji 1991, 643. See also, Xuanji 1991, 644–45 on Lü's evaluation of three different Chinese translations of this scripture.

Two Sections Sūtra by Joseph de Guignes (1721–1800) is also the earliest European translation of Buddhist texts and is believed to be a representative of the "original teaching" by early European Buddhological circles.[53]

By starting *Five Disciplines* with an earlier version of this legendary text that was accepted by both European Buddhologist and the Chinese Buddhists as original, Lü Cheng made an implicit claim to the legitimacy of both Chinese translations and the Institute's Learning: Comparative studies of Chinese translations of *Dhammapada* and extant Pāli and Sanskrit editions proved that Chinese translations preserved all variant editions of this text.[54] Implicit in his agenda is a meta-narrative: Only comparative hermeneutics have the power to uncover the real history of transmitted texts and to extract the essential messages of the Buddha.[55]

Doctrinally, *Dhammapada* also enabled Lü to ground his own interpretation of original quiescence onto the earliest layer of transmitted Buddhist teaching. He opened his lecture by pointing out that the central tenet in this text was precisely the "originally pure heart defiled by guest dust" (*xinjing keran* 心淨客染).[56] Simultaneously, Lü also twisted this well-known phrase for establishing bodhisattva learning by framing perfuming through hearing (*wenxun* 聞熏) as the most proper method of washing off guest dust.[57]

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[53] For the intertwined history of this scripture and the European quest for an Ur-tradition, see Urs App, *The Birth of Orientalism* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2010), Chap. 4. "De Guignes's Chinese Vedas," https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt3fhvfk. Accessed March 2018 – March 2019.

[54] Xuanji 1991, 644.

[55] Unfortunately, Lü Cheng's assertion of a urtext of *Dhammapada* dating back to the Buddha's lifetime is not a defensible one. As carefully analyzed by Richard Salomon, the bewildering variations among multiple versions of this widely circulated scripture in Gāndhārī and other languages attests to multiple oral transmissions before this scripture was written down. Therefore, any textual-critical methods to reconstruct a urtext would be futile. For details, see Richard Salomon, *The Buddhist Literature of Ancient Gandhāra*, 183–92. However, Lü Cheng was not relying on textual analysis alone to justify his choice. He used both *Dhammapada*'s plain and intimate diction and rich meaning as markers of its authenticity. Lü was consistent in combining textual-critical methods with philosophical analysis. Also note that, Lü's claim is much more modest: He admits the existence of multiple versions of this scripture (mainly three types, short, middle, and long, with variations) but insists that the message among different versions remains consistent. See, Xuanji 1991, 643–44.

[56] Xuanji 1991, 662.

[57] Xuanji 1991, 662.

To repurpose this doctrine for bodhisattva learning, Lü Cheng first identified hearing and learning as the foremost practice for an aspiring bodhisattva.[58] And then, Lü Cheng argued that *Dhammapada* was a pivot in all Buddhist learnings because of its equal emphasis on hearing, taking refuge, learning, and realization. To strengthen his claim of Yogācāra as the complete teaching, Lü further asserted that all tenets in *Dhammapada* were precisely the essential teachings in the reputed founder of Yogācāra Asaṅga's *Acclamation of the Holy Teaching* (Skt: *Ārya-śāsana-prakaraṇa Ārya-deśanā-vikhyapāna*; Ch: *Xianyang shengjiao lun* 顯揚聖教論 T1602).[59] Notice that Asaṅga's *Acclamation of the Holy Teaching* is also the critical text in the Yogācāra discipline of the second cycle, one that Lü valued as a critical text for selecting and deciding (*jueze* 抉擇) the proper training with wisdom.[60] By opening *Five Disciplines* with *Dhammapada*, Lü effectively claimed the Institute's Learning as the legitimate heir of genuine Buddhism in the languages of the Chinese tradition, the Buddhological discourses, and his new Yogācāra.

To further tie *Dhammapada* to what he identified as the foundational tenet—original quiescence—Lü Cheng linked *Dhammapada*'s teaching of original purity with another reputed founder of Yogācāra Vasubandhu's interpretation in *Distinguishing the Middle from the Extremes* (Skt: *Madhyāntavibhāga*; Ch: *Bian zhongbian lun* 辯中邊論 T1600; henceforth MAV), a critical text in the Yogācāra discipline of the first cycle. Lü argued that MAV reframes the original purity of consciousness in terms of extinguishment (*jimie* 寂滅) and quiescence (*jijing* 寂靜).[61] Employing arguments in MAV, Lü Cheng mapped out a progression from earlier limited teaching of original purity to a more developed concept of original quiescence, which then culminated in the Yogācāra teaching of the perfected nature. Unsurprisingly, Lü buried this argument in an interlinear note as follows:

> The Perfected Nature: In old translation, the perfected is actualized-ness. This is to say it is quiescent by nature. It is not other things that make it quiescent. This is known as its innate nature, which is actualized purity and cleanness.

[58] Xuanji 1991, 662.
[59] Xuanji 1991, 646–47.
[60] Xuanji 1991, 623–24.
[61] The passage Lü cited is T1600.0466b13.

圓成實自性 (舊譯圓成為成就性, 谓其自性本寂, 非餘法使然, 即本性成就清淨之谓).[62]

None of his chosen terms deviates from what has been used in earlier Chinese translations. Nevertheless, the new conceptual construction of a doctrinal progression is evident: from *Dhammapada*'s original purity to original quiescence in MAV, and then to the Yogācāra doctrine of the perfected nature. Long before making this claim, Lü already devoted his time and energy in substantiating this new doctrinal progression by making historical and philosophical connections, a task he started as early as 1924 when he first wrote about comparative hermeneutics. Recall that, in Chapter Four, I mentioned in passing that Lü Cheng demonstrated the significance of "cross examination of similar terminologies rendered in different sūtras" (*yijing tongshi zhi bijiao* 異經同事之比較) through a chronological comparison of all variant interpretations of *ālayavijñāna*, from original purity to *Tathāgatagarbha*, to the Buddha nature, and many other ontological synonyms of the ultimate reality.[63] In 1943, the import of this case study in Lü's 1924 methodological reflections became fully manifested. Original quiescence lies at the heart of his soteriological curriculum.

The Second Stage

While the first cycle puts the Institute's Learning on firm ontological ground, the second cycle paints a bright future for those on the path: Once the original quiescence manifests itself in the first instance, the consciousness itself would propel one toward the unstoppable process of abandoning afflictions and approaching purity.

> This second cycle is to exhaust the function of consciousness. Once the characteristics of quiescence become manifest, then true wisdom abundantly upwells. Thus, [the process] of discarding afflictions and turning toward purity will surely be set on track and fundamentally transforms the basis [i.e. the storehouse consciousness] thusly yet unstoppably.
> 次周，盡心之用，寂相著明，則真智沛發，捨染趨淨必循軌轉依而不可遏.[64]

The significance of this passage should not be underestimated as Lü asserted that the texts in the second cycle mark the authentic doctrinal lineage (*zhengzong* 正宗) of all five disciplines.[65] The

[62] Xuanji 1991, 861.
[63] Lü, "Comparative Hermeneutics," 40.
[64] Xuanji 1991, 585.
[65] Xuanji 1991, 589.

function of original quiescence (*jixiang* 寂相) is to enable the transformation of basis—revolutionizing consciousness. However, because one is still in the afflicted state (*xianju ranwei* 現居染位), the only path to arrive at a momentary realization of original quiescence is "perfuming through hearing" (*wenxun* 聞熏).

As such, Lü Cheng presented the revolution of consciousness in terms of a continuing balancing act between nature and nurture. For him, the basis (Ch: *yi* 依; Skt: *āśraya*) is exactly *ālayavijñāna*. In Lü's interpretation, even though *ālayavijñāna* is quiescent by nature, because of one's afflicted present status, it has been functioning as the basis of all worldly suffering and perpetuating this actual life. Therefore, perfuming through hearing becomes the only means to create an opportunity of direct realization (*dangxia zijue* 當下自覺) of this original quiescence. After the initial manifestation of original quiescence, if one could continue to hold this meditative insight in mind, then original quiescence itself guarantees one's continual action of abandoning affliction and transitioning toward nirvāṇa. This process is precisely what Lü deemed "revolution" (Ch: *zhuan* 轉; Skt: *parivṛtti*).[66]

In this way, *āśrayaparivṛtti* allows Lü to naturalize his social evolutionary theory in terms of a Yogācāra phenomenological naturalism. By differentiating original quiescence as the cause and nirvāṇa as the result, Lü could naturalize this revolution of consciousness on Yogācāra causal enframing. Original quiescence and nirvāṇa were presented as a Möbius band: When viewed locally, there are always two sides: the cause that is in the distant past, i.e., original quiescence, and the effect that is in the distant future, i.e., nirvāṇa. Nevertheless, when viewed globally, there is only one side. This global oneness and local duality enable Lü Cheng to naturalize this new path of liberation: Because of the oneness of cause and effect, liberation is bound to happen; Because of the temporary duality due to the limitedness of the mortals, transformation of basis is a natural force (*ziran zhi shi* 自然之勢) that is unstoppable like an inundated river (*jianghe peiran* 江河沛然).[67] While the imagery of an inundated river as the natural force of kindness has a productive literary life in Chinese culture,

[66] Xuanji 1991, 610.
[67] Xuanji 1991, 610.

in Lü Cheng Yogācāra socio-soteriology, it molted into a new afterlife. In contrast to the tropes of natural selection and survival of the fittest that naturalized competition and self-interest, the metaphor of a bountiful river depicted an idyllic flow of compassion destined to wash away all worldly sufferings.

The Third Stage

In the third cycle, one sees the social characteristics of Lü Cheng's project. Posited as the ultimate, the essence of the third cycle is one reality realm (Ch: *yifajie* 一法界), which includes both the material environment (living processes and natural cycles) and the sentient realm (all living beings).

> The third cycle is to expand the reach of the function of [original quiescence]. Both the Buddha and sentient beings possess this consciousness. Interconnective resonances and karmic links are relying on the same [consciousness] and are thus equal. This is called "one reality realm." The ultimate goal of this learning is to apply great vows without limit and to aspire for the perfection and purification of the whole realm.
> 三周，充用之量，佛與眾生遍具此心，交感緣起，依等而相同，謂之一法界，弘願行於無極，期全界之圓淨，斯乃此學之終鵠也。[68]

Here, instead of interpreting nirvāṇa as the extinguishment of afflictions, Lü Cheng portrayed the fruition of revolutionizing consciousness in the positive term of manifesting dharmakāya. This dharmakāya is equated with one true-reality realm in Xuanzang's treatise, otherwise known as dharma-realm dependent-origination (Ch: *fajie yuanqi* 法界緣起).[69] In 1945, Lü further expounded that one true-reality realm is inherent in the streams of consciousnesses (*xin xiangxu* 心相續) in all beings and processes.[70] In this way, the ever-expanding double helix is set up. It foretells an ever-

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[68] Xuanji 1991, 585, see also 596, 610

[69] This interpretation of perfected nature is from the three kinds of absence of nature 三無性 in Xuanzang's *Establishing Consciousness-only* T1585.09.0048a03.

[70] Lü further elaborated this identity of one-reality realm with dharmakāya and nirvāṇa in an essay "Explicating 'Dharma-Realm" (*fajie shiyi* 法界釋義) (undated but most likely lectured in 1944–1945), Xuanji 1991, 415–18. In this short essay, Lü further explained that the meaning of Dharma-realm should follow the interpretation of the *Treatise on the Buddha-stage Sūtra* T1530. This text about the Buddha's realm is included in the Nirvāṇa discipline of the third cycle. Lü valued this treatise for its illustration of one true-reality realm and the fruition of the originally quiescent *ālayavijñāna*. See, Xuanji 1991, 638–39. In this short essay, Lü further equated Dharma-realm with the realm of nirvāṇa (*niepan jie* 涅槃界), which lives in the living beings' streams of consciousness (*fajie bianyu youqing xinxiangxu zhong* 法界遍於有情心相續中), and which is manifested through shared phenomena (*wei gongxiang zhi suo xian ye* 為共相之所顯也).

expanding global community of sentient beings in a distant yet reassuringly bright future, calling forth "a blossoming field in a mountainside" with abundant flowers in all hues of color.[71]

More importantly, conceiving "community" in terms of momentarily arising and disappearing streams of consciousness redefines the meaning of community itself fundamentally: Contrary to the common perception of community as a given identity or an authentic collective, as Lü theorized it, a community of aspiring bodhisattvas only exists in its joint striving for the common—one true-reality realm, not as a substance but as a process and as a continual project. In other words, Lü grounded the reality of community in terms of an ontology of becoming. At this point, Lü's early quest for an aesthetic society entirely morphed into a call for an ecology of compassion, calling forth a continual collective effort to awaken oneself and others to our interrelatedness through the process of revolutionizing consciousness.

The path interweaves two strands of action: the strand of textual analysis cemented to the strand of vinaya practice. Textual study provides intersubjective guidance for vinaya practice, and vinaya practice both purifies guest dust in the consciousness and actualizes soteriological insight gained from textual analysis. Equally important, textual analysis always precedes vinaya: One must know the correct path before putting it into practice. In particular, to actualize one true-reality realm, a world where all living beings are perfected, one must "study each discipline in turn, know how to decide and select wisely" (*zhuxi geke, shanzhi jueze* 逐習各科, 善知抉擇).[72] As for what counts as "wisely," Lü also made it clear: The worthy teachings always illuminate different means to benefit all sentient beings—the Mahāyāna path that is mapped out by the Institute's Learning. Lü proclaimed,

> The ultimate Mahāyāna teachings illustrate the intimate relations between sentient beings and buddhas. They are not separable. They are one reality realm. Therefore, the closer one approaches the ultimate, the more one becomes involved with sentient beings.
> 大乘之究竟在說生佛關係之密切，彼此不離，為一法界，故愈究竟，則愈近眾生[73]

To drive this message home, in the nineteen selected texts for this ultimate stage, Lü included not only texts conforming to this soteriological goal but also texts advocating for "wrong" paths of

[71] Lü, "Meishu fazhan de tujing," 29.
[72] Xuanji 1991, 604.
[73] Xuanji 1991, 631.

emancipation. One the one hand, to prove that the Institute's Learning embodies the doctrinal whole, Lü must convince other learners that Yogācāra coheres all genuine Buddhist teachings, including Madhyamaka and Avataṃsaka teachings. Therefore, Lü included a selection of *Avataṁsaka Sūtra* under the discipline of Yogācāra in the third cycle. The most crucial chapter in Lü's selection is the chapter on the bodhisattva ten stages, the *Daśabhūmika Sūtra* (Ch: *Shidijing* 十地經). This sūtra is not only included in the twenty-sixth chapter of the canonical eighty-fascicle *Avataṃsaka Sūtra* but is also circulated independently with multiple Chinese translations. Moreover, there are two treatises on this sūtra that are preserved in Chinese translations, one attributed to the Madhyamaka master Nāgārjuna (*Shizhu piposha lun* 十住毗婆沙論 T1521) and the other attributed to the founder of Yogācāra Vasubandhu (*Shidijing lun* 十地經論 T1522). Lü further commented that,

> This [*Avataṃsaka*] sūtra best illustrates that Yogācāra learning reaches its ultimate in the [one true-reality] realm.
> 瑜伽學究竟於法界，故以斯經居其首也[74]

By selectively highlighting chapters of the *Avataṃsaka Sūtra*, Lü effectively incorporated the well-known concept popularized by the Avataṃsaka school, namely, one true-reality realm, into his new Yogācāra.

On the other hand, to demonstrate the "wrongness" of other paths, Lü also relied on selective readings of foundational texts. For example, all four treatises under Abhidharma were included to demonstrate volatilities of the Hīnayāna doctrines (*Xiaocheng zhi shanbian* 小乘之善變) and the Hīnayāna propensity to "discard" sentient beings.[75] Another important example is Lü's critique of Bhāviveka (Ch: Qingbian 清辨; Tib: slob dpon ཟླབ་དཔོན་, c. 500 – c. 578). In the discipline of Prajñā, Lü included Bhāviveka's *A Mahāyāna Treatise on Jewels in Hand* (Skt: *Mahāyāna-hastaratna-śāstra*; Ch: *Dacheng zhangzhen lun* 大乘掌珍論 T1578) as a counter-example. Lü identified this text as misinformed teaching on emptiness that artificially severs Madhyamaka from Yogācāra teachings and thereby falls into the nihilist trap, and detaches sentient beings from buddhas.[76] Lü claimed that

[74] Xuanji 1991, 634.
[75] Xuanji 1991, 631. "小乘究竟趨於斷滅，是愈究竟愈離眾生，而大違一法界之義也." For Lü's summaries of all four texts to demonstrate this point, see Xuanji 1991, 596–97 and 629–31.
[76] Xuanji 1991, 632–33.

he selected Bhāviveka's text to put a stop to the harmful teachings and to throw into relief the beneficial principles.

For contemporary scholars, Lü's remarks could hardly count as defensible scholarly findings, especially when the historical relations between Madhyamaka and Yogācāra are still hotly debated.[77] However, when contextualizing these claims within Lü Cheng's aspiration to repurpose Yogācāra soteriology for building an ideal society, the inaccurate remarks only further illustrate Lü's intention to establish the superiority of the Institute's Learning. He was confident that comparative hermeneutics was the only viable gatekeeper to ward off subjective impositions, to reduce selfish dispositions, and to ensure the flourishing of truly universal intersubjective existence. By 1943, stitched by careful executions of comparative hermeneutics, the grand tapestry of aesthetic society gradually morphed into one true-reality realm.

From Three Natures to Three Stages

Despite its new focus on the collective and the communism of Buddhist knowledge, *Five Disciplines* is firmly grounded in Yogācāra soteriology. Seen from the perspective of an individual practitioner, this new social evolutionary path conforms to traditional Yogācāra theory of the path. There are two vital soteriological terms that Lü Cheng drew upon, namely, three natures (Skt: *trisvabhāva*; Ch: *sanxing* 三性)[78] and the transformation of basis (Skt: *āśrayaparivṛtti*). Each term also represents a unique soteriological model. In Chapter Six, I pointed out the centrality of *āśrayaparivṛtti*—revolutionizing consciousness—in Lü's reframing of Xuanzang's soteriology. In verse twenty-nine of Xuanzang's treatise, Xuanzang mapped out a ten-stage path for the bodhisattva journey grounded in *āśrayaparivṛtti*, with each stage marked by various miraculous achievements and ineffable insight. For a modern reader, merely familiarizing oneself with a wide range of terminologies would have

[77] For recent academic debates on this topic, see for example, Jay L, Garfield and Jan Westerhoff, eds., *Madhyamaka and Yogacara*.

[78] For a systematic study of 三性 (Skt: *svabhāva-traya*, *trividhaḥ svabhāvaḥ*; Tib. *ngo bo nyid gsum po*, *ngo bo nyid rnam pa gsum*), see M. D'Amato, "Three natures, Three stages: An interpretation of the Yogācāra 'trisvabhāva'-theory," *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 33 (2): 185–207. In this article D'Amato discussed how in MSA/Bh and other key Yogācāra treatises, the āśrayaparivṛtti is linked to trisvabhāva. See also Davidson Ronald Mark, "Buddhist Systems of Transformation."

seemed impossible. Therefore, in Lü's *Five Disciplines*, instead of following Xuanzang's ten-stage model, Lü chose three natures to delineate the progressions on the path of revolutionizing consciousness.

Merging three natures with revolutionizing consciousness is no easy task. To achieve this end, Lü had to smooth out many historical twists and philosophical inconsistencies in order to assemble the two soteriological models into one path. Fortunately, Lü identified many precedents. As pointed out by D'Amato, in a variety of crucial Yogācāra treatises, three natures, *āśrayaparivṛtti*, and dependent-origination are merged in different ways.[79] Lü's task was to identify these scattered elements of merging three natures with *āśrayaparivṛtti* and then reassemble them into a social evolutionary theory for building an aesthetic society. Comparative hermeneutics played a crucial role in Lü's modern remaking of Yogācāra into this Institute's Learning.

The doctrine of three natures adopted many soteriological roles throughout its historical developments. Despite its origin as an ontological model of reality, in its later uses, it gradually morphed into a path of liberation. These three natures include the imagined nature (Skt: *parikalpita-svabhāva*; Ch: *bianji suozhi xing* 遍計所執性), the dependent nature (Skt: *paratantra-svabhāva*; Ch: *yitaqi xing* 依他起性), and the perfected nature (Skt: *pariniṣpanna-svabhāva*; Ch: *yuanchengshi xing* 圓成實性). The most common understanding of the three natures theory is an ontological one, explaining the existence of all entities as consisting of three different natures. According to the basic Buddhist tenet, anything composite cannot be ultimately real. The three natures theory claims that all entities have a composite of three natures and thus restates Nāgārjuna's well-known doctrine of emptiness. Furthermore, as Åke Boquist demonstrates in his dissertation, this ontological understanding of three natures already implied a path of liberation: The basic formulation is that

[79] M. D'Amato, "Three natures, Three stages." D'Amato explained these features in many passages. For example, D'Amatodiscusses how MSA and the commentary (MSA/Bh) link three natures to āśrayaparivṛtti (D'Amato, 192), how verse MSA/Bh 11.44–49 links liberation vimukti to the transformation of the dependent-characteristic (the second in three natures) (D'Amato, 194) and then links the transformation of dependent nature to āśrayaparivṛtti (D'Amato, 195) and later MSA/Bh defines realization of mind-only doctrine as one stage in the path of liberation (D'Amato, 204). This realization of mind-only doctrine also marks a central stage in the path of liberation and features an important doctrinal commitment in both Xuanzang's treatise and Lü's own training program.

when the imagined nature is eliminated from the dependent-nature, one is left with how things really are—the perfected nature.[80]

This implication of a path is not incidental. Scholars agree that Yogācāra doctrines emerged out of the concern for a systematized soteriology. For example, in *Ornament to the Mahāyāna Sūtras* (Skt: *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra*; Ch: *Zhuangyan jinglun* 莊嚴經論; abbr. MSA) and its commentary (abbr. MSA/Bh), the three natures theory could be interpreted as a "soteriologico-ontological model" where the three ontological realizations are arranged as three progressive stages of practice, culminating in the perfected nature.[81] Furthermore, it was in MSA that the doctrine of three-natures became associated with the doctrine of transformation of basis and presented a systemized soteriological path.[82]

This systemized transformation of basis in MSA is further developed in MSaṃ (*Compendium of the Great Vehicle*) and MAV (*Distinguishing the Middle and the* Extreme).[83] Davidson points out two significant features of MSaṃ. First, the author of MSaṃ integrates various doctrines—the three natures, suchness, and dharmadhātu—into a "well-oiled structure."[84] Second, MSaṃ establishes for the first time that all dharmas in saṃsāra are "initially peaceful" by identifying all dharmas as having three natures. This doctrinal innovation in the 4th century CE. becomes a critical element of justifying bodhisattvas' continued presence in saṃsāra without being contaminated by worldly afflictions.[85] As for MAV, Davidson illustrates that, despite the cursory gesture toward *āśrayaparivṛtt*i and lack of clear articulation of the relation between three natures and *āśrayaparivṛtti*, the author of MAV has provided a structure of "a graded series of realizations." The main thrust of MAV's graded realization

[80] Åke Boquist, "Trisvabhāva: A Study of the Development of the Three-nature theory in Yogācāra Buddhism" (PhD. Diss., University of Lund, 1993). Note that Boquist translates *pariniṣpanna-svabhāva* as "consummate nature." I chose the more commonly used translation "perfected nature."
[81] D'Amato, "Three Natures, Three Stages," 185, 204.
[82] Ronald Mark Davidson, "Buddhist Systems of Transformation," 6–10.
[83] Davidson, "Buddhist Systems of Transformation," 241–43.
[84] Davidson, "Buddhist Systems of Transformation," 279.
[85] Davidson, "Buddhist Systems of Transformation," 282–83.

is that after realizing all perceptions of phenomena as mere appearances (Skt: *vijñaptimātratā*), even this realization could become an obstacle to the path and thus must be abandoned.[86]

Lü Cheng drew extensively from MSA, MSaṃ, and MAV in designing the Institute's Learning, with each text illustrating a different aspect of the Institute's learning as a genre of path theory. First of all, Lü assigned MAV (*Distinguishing the Middle and the Extreme*) as the only treatise in the discipline of Yogācāra in the first cycle.[87] As the first Yogācāra treatise introduced to the learners, its significance in Lü's program is self-evident. This is the text that Lü collated in the 1920s and published in the first collection of *Essentials*.[88] In his 1943 explication, Lü opened his lecture by claiming that "The learning of Buddhist learning is nothing more than the path and the result" (*foxue zhixue buyue dao guo*) 佛學之學不越道果, echoing Ouyang's framing of *Essentials* in terms of sthāna-carya-phala.[89] He then directly pointed to MAV's structure of "a graded series of realizations" toward realizing the truth of mere-appearances (*vijñaptimātratā*).

Equally important, Lü Cheng employed MAV to justify the Yogācāra expansion of Nāgārjuna's foundational text *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* into the realm of practice: from emptiness to transformation (*youkong ruhua* 由空入化).[90] For Lü Cheng, MAV is valuable as a skill-in-means that integrates Nāgārjuna's *reduction ad absurdum* style of teaching into a disciplined soteriology. Lü deemed MAV teachings a skillful sequence (*fangbian cidi* 方便次第) appropriate to the Chinese situations.[91] When explicating the stages of the path of liberation in MAV, Lü Cheng further elaborated this skillful sequence as follows:

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[86] Davidson, "Buddhist Systems of Transformation," 296–97.

[87] Lü Cheng, "Bian zhongbian lun jiangyao" 辯中邊論講要 [Recorded lecture notes on *Madhyāntavibhāgaṭīkā*], in Xuanji 1991, 854–922. This was first lectured in 1943. The structure of this lecture, like all his other lecture notes, follows closely the structure of the original text, but is always opened with a philological examination of the authorship and this history of the text.

[88] Lü did not have access to the Sanskrit text, which was only discovered in 1928 and published much later. He only collated Xuanzang's translation with an earlier Chinese translation by Paramārtha and the Tibetan translation and the Tibetan translation of Sthiramati's commentary on this text. The Tibetan translation is attributed to Jinamitra (Tib: rgyal ba'i bshes gnyen རྒྱལ་བའི་བཤེས་གཉེན་).

[89] Xuanji 1991, 855.

[90] Xuanji 1991, 854.

[91] Xuanji 1991, 862.

> This skill-in-means is established according to the depth of the nature of consciousness, i.e., according to three natures… First, one shall realize the reality of the imagined nature. Then, one enters into the reality of the dependent nature. Eventually, one actualizes the perfected nature… What is called "equality and skill-in-means" is nothing more than the sequences that follow the nature [of original quiescence] and proceed towards nirvāṇa.
> 此之方便，乃順心之自性淺深次第而立，即依三性… 先通達計執實相，次入依他實相，最後則成圓成實相也… 所謂平等方便無他，順性趣寂之次第而已.[92]

In other words, as the first Yogācāra treatise in *Five Disciplines*, MAV functions to cohere all preserved Buddhist teachings into one soteriological path modeled after the three natures. The only difference is that, in Lü's new iteration, three natures is translated into three cycles. The first stage is to get rid of the imagined (by realizing original quiescence). This stage is followed by the abandonment of the dependent (the process of transforming basis/revolutionizing consciousness). Then the path culminates in the realization of the perfected (one true-reality ream).

Once the path is clarified, in order to present the complete picture of Buddhist learning, then one must also specify the result of this path. Lü clarified this endpoint of the path as one true-reality realm on multiple occasions. For example, when concluding the "Chapter on Truth" (*zhenshi pin* 真實品) of MAV, Lü first identified its tenet as to prove the consistency of three natures with Madhyamaka doctrine of emptiness. Then Lü argued that the truth of three natures was encompassed by the essential teaching of one true-reality realm.[93] Similarly, when concluding the "Chapter on Attaining the Fruit" (*deguo pin* 得果品), Lü pointed out that all the stages of attainment on this path must be established according to the varying degrees of manifested purity of one true-reality realm.[94]

Over the years, Lü's focus on different Yogācāra treatises changed, demonstrating his gradual gravitation towards texts with a more explicit bend on soteriology. In his earlier search, Lü concentrated on MSA (*Ornament to the Mahāyāna Sūtras*) and MSaṃ (*Compendium of the Great Vehicle*), both of which were collated and included in the first collections of *Essentials,* and played a central role in his own search for a Yogācāra social evolutionary theory. However, in his 1943 training program that represented Lü's mature theory, Lü gave differentiated treatments of these two texts.

[92] Xuanji 1991, 862.
[93] Xuanji 1991, 896.
[94] Xuanji 1991, 906.

Although MSA represented a crucial stage in Lü's search for a proper path of revolutionizing consciousness, it did not feature as a textbook in Lü's *Five Disciplines*. As early as 1924, Lü already published a short commentary on MSA in *Inner Learning*—the institute's academic journal, highlighting the significance of MSA in the bodhisattva path.[95] In this 1924 text, Lü Cheng incisively distinguished the doctrinal differences between MSA, a representative text of the old Yogācāra learning (*weishi guxue* 唯識古學) and *Yogācārabhūmi* as translated by Xuanzang, a text representing the new Yogācāra learning (*weishi jinxue* 唯識今學). In particular, Lü Cheng pointed out that MSA posits both the imagined and the dependent natures as illusory. He argued that these two natures should be abandoned. Moreover, he recommended that one should pursuit the perfected nature as the goal.[96]

The reason that MSA is not a textbook in *Five Disciplines*, I suspect, lies in the fact that the soteriologico-ontological model of three natures in MSA is still in its inchoate stage. Indeed, Lü Cheng identified this text as a transitional text from Dharmalakṣaṇa to consciousness-only thought. Furthermore, in this 1924 essay, Lü did not explicitly emphasize the three natures theory as a soteriological path. On the contrary, he only mentioned in passing that the soteriological path, as seen in Mahāyāna eight practices (*Dacheng bashi* 大乘八事) of MSA, could be interpreted through the doctrine of three natures.[97]

In contrast with MSA, MSaṃ features much more prominently throughout Lü's Yogācāra studies. Lü included it in the Yogācāra discipline of the second cycle, the cycle where one learns the orthodox of all five disciplines. Lü Cheng's attention to this text manifested early on in his Yogācāra career. In 1925, he translated it from Tibetan to Chinese. This is the only full translation that Lü Cheng

[95] Lü Cheng, "Lun Zhuangyan jinglun yu Weishi guxue" 論莊嚴經論與唯識古學 [On *Mahāyānasūtrālamkāra* and Ancient Learnings of Yogācāra], *Inner Learning* 1 (1924): 63–88. Lü's analysis of this treatise agree with D'Amato's. See D'Amato, 194–95 and 205.

[96] Xuanji 1991, 76–77.

[97] Xuanji 1991, 70–72. Lü devised quite a lengthy and roundabout way to connect the Mahāyāna eight practices with three natures. The information relevant to my argument is that, throughout his lifetime, Lü made the moral purpose behind his scholarship evident.

undertook on in his career. Later, not only did he frequently quote from it while lecturing on *Five Disciplines* but also employed it as guidance in the 1960s to edit a new complete Buddhist canon.[98]

Lü is justified in characterizing MSaṃ as the orthodox Yogācāra teaching. MSaṃ, the *Compendium of the Great Vehicle*, represents a much more mature "well-oiled structure" that integrates all fundamental Yogācāra teachings such as three natures, suchness, and dharmadhātu.[99] It is important to note that dharmadhātu in Chinese is the dharma realm (*fajie* 法界), which Lü reframed as one true-reality realm. Equally important, MSaṃ, by justifying the original quiescence of all dharmas in saṃsāra in terms of their three natures, validates bodhisattvas' continued presence in this defiled world without being contaminated by worldly afflictions.[100] MSaṃ's doctrinal innovation provides vital evidence for Lü to justify his refashioning of a social evolution toward an aesthetic society in terms of the Yogācāra soteriology of original quiescence as the cause and nirvāṇa as the ultimate outcome.

At the same time, Lü Cheng's attention to MSaṃ further illustrates his consistent intent to prove the legitimacy of Chinese translations and to map out the doctrinal whole appropriate for modern China. In the preface of the 1925 translation of the Tibetan translation of MSaṃ into Chinese, Lü used both historical and doctrinal analysis to prove the authenticity of both the old and the new Yogācāra schools in medieval China. He first pointed out the translation history of this text: the Tibetan translation is about 150 years after Xuanzang's translation, while Xuanzang's is again 100 years later than Paramārtha's translation. Lü argued that all these localized versions inherited genuine teachings of Asaṅga and Vasubandhu precisely because one finds striking consistency among all these translations despite their different sectarian inheritances.[101]

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[98] Lü Cheng, "Xizang chuanben She dacheng lun" 西藏傳本攝大乘論 [The Tibetan Transmission of *Mahāyānasaṃgraha*], *Inner Learning* 2 (1925): 101–28.

[99] Davidson, "Buddhist Systems of Transformation," 279.

[100] Davidson, "Buddhist Systems of Transformation," 282–83.

[101] Lü, "The Tibetan Transmission of *Mahāyāna-saṃgraha*," 101. It is telling that in China Paramārtha's old school is name the school of MSaṃ (Shelun xuepai 攝論學派). For an extensive analysis of this old school and its eventual demise due to the impact of Xuanzang's translation of *Yogācārabhūmi* and his treatise *Cheng weishi lun*, see Sheng Kai 圣凯, *Shenlun xuepai yanjiu* 摄论学派研究 [A Study of the School of *Mahāyāna-saṃgraha*] (Beijing: Zongjiao wenhua chubansh, 2006).

Instead of privileging the Chinese lineage, Lü argued for a comprehensive comparison of all extant schools. His reasoning is simple. Lü argued that because each transmission lineage localized the true intent for their own social milieu, therefore each transmission actualized only a segment of the doctrinal oneness. Consequently, one must rely on the comprehensive comparison to splice together these remnants in order to arrive at the full picture. As an example, he pointed out the ambiguities in Xuanzang's translation: Xuanzang often used one Chinese phrase to translate multiple Sanskrit terms. At the same time, these Sanskrit terms were often rendered into different Tibetan terms. Therefore, Lü argued that a triangulation of known Sanskrit terms, different Chinese texts translated by different hands, and Tibetan renditions would prove essential to uncover the true intent of Asaṅga and Vasubandhu.[102]

Equally important, for both Ouyang and Lü, MSaṃ was crucial because it has established a comprehensive bodhisattva path: MSaṃ is the compendium of all bodhisattva teachings and the compass to travel in the vast ocean of Buddhist practices.[103] Lü's propensity to employ MSaṃ to integrate all Buddhist teachings into a bodhisattva path persisted into the 1960s: When Lü Cheng published his new catalog of a complete canon, he explicitly mentioned that he followed the principle of MSaṃ to all Mahayana texts as a bodhisattva path, whose etiological relations are arranged according to six pāramitās and whose stages of progress are mapped out according to ten-bhūmi.[104]

Drawing from canonical scriptures of Yogācāra, Lü Cheng meticulously interweaved different strands of earlier bodhisattva practices into a curriculum to be practiced in an institutional setting by a group of learners.[105] The Institute's Learning is by design an upwardly expanding field of

[102] Lü, "The Tibetan Transmission of *Mahāyāna-saṃgraha*," 102–03.

[103] Ouyang, "Shelun dayi" 攝論大意 [A Summary of *Compendium of the Great Vehicle*], in *Inner Learning* 2 (1925): 91. This essay is a transcription of two lectures, we do not know who transcribed them. The metaphor of "compass" (*fanbian zhinanzhen* 方便指南針) in the sea of Dharma (*fahai* 法海) appears later in *Essentials*, published in 1937. See Ouyang, *Essentials* Vol 3, 63.

[104] Lü Cheng, *Xinbian Hanwen Dazangjing mulu* 新編漢文大藏經目錄 [A New Catalogue of the Chinese Buddhist Canon] (Jinan: Qilu chubanshe, 1980), 4–5. This is also included in Xuanji 1991, 1621–893. For a summary of different bodhisattva careers in Yogācāra and the presentation of transformation of basis as dharmakāya, see Davidson, "Buddhist Systems of Transformation," 362–406.

[105] Many scholars have analyzed bodhisattva ideals in early Buddhism. The scholarly consensus is that bodhisattva narratives were both developed by and aimed at elite practitioners. For bodhisattva ideals in

knowledge produced through rigorous comparative studies. Lü's prioritization of textual knowledge was intimately linked to his desire to establish a communism of knowledge.

Consequently, under Lü's leadership, meditative experience was no longer the determining factor sanctioning one's textual analysis. On the contrary, one's meditative insight must be both guided and sanctioned by careful scholarship. Comparative hermeneutics becomes the sole measuring stick for one's spiritual progress. Draped in the new cloth of disciplinary studies, traditional soteriological tools such as three natures adopted the modern outlook of social (r)evolution.

Critical Thinking, Communal Rules for a Democracy, and Guidelines for Activism

There are three more normative structures that are central to the merging of social justice and soteriology in Lü's program: a Buddhicized critical thinking, a reinvention of bodhisattva precepts as communal rules for a deliberative democracy, and a refashioning of six pāramitās as guidelines for social engagement. Due to the limited space, I summarize my main arguments in the following. I will publish the doctrinal and philosophical analysis in other forms.

First, in *Five Disciplines*, Lü Buddhicized the scholarly spirit of the day, i.e., "critical thinking" as an institutionalized bodhicitta. Traditionally, the basic sense of bodhicitta means the conviction to delay one's own nirvāṇa and instead to lead all sentient beings into nirvāṇa. Lü's institutionalized bodhicitta contains two prominent structural features: 1) a cultivated attitude of critical thinking grounded in empathy and 2) an organized practice of skeptical inquiries into truth claims. This institutionalized bodhicitta not only underpins the qualities of learners in Lü's new bodhisattva profession but also marks an entirely new ideal type of bodhicitta absent in all premodern ideal types.[106]

Pāli and early Buddhist Sanskrit literature, see Reiko Ohnuma, *Head, Eyes, Flesh, and Blood*. For bodhisattva ideals in early Chinese Buddhist literature, see Jan Nattier, *A Few Good Men: The Bodhisattva Path According to the Inquiry of Ugra* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2003).

[106] Wangchuk, Chapter 7, "A Typology of Bodhicitta," in *The Resolve to Become a Buddha*, 195–234. According to Wangchuk, there are five ideal types of bodhicitta in premodern settings, 1) ethico-spiritual; 2) gnoseological; 3) ontological; 4) psycho-physical; 5) semeiological.

Institutionalized bodhicitta marks the distinctive new structure of Lü's Buddhist profession. Professionals in this career—aspiring bodhisattvas—voluntarily subject themselves to "organized skepticism" in order to establish interpretative authority and to gain the trust of the general public. This new normative feature reveals a remarkable resemblance of what Merton identified as the normative structures of science.

Robert Merton, the American sociologist who coined the term in 1942, argued that normative structures such as "organized skepticism" represent a distinctively new way for a group to establish public trust. In his analysis of science, Merton diverged from the dominant discourses, empiricism's promotion of experiments and critical rationalism's advancement of falsifiability, to name a few, that deemed trustworthiness grounded in the scientific methods. On the contrary, Merton argued that the normative structures of science established the trustworthiness of a scientific enterprise. He identified four institutional features of a scientific enterprise in his time: a quest for universalism, a communism of knowledge, disinterestedness, and organized skepticism.[107] In Merton's study, organized skepticism represents an essential self-correction mechanism and promises to eliminate false claims over time. It is the group dynamics not the methods that establish authority in their collective truth claims and in gaining public trust.

In significant ways, Lü's intersubjective framing of the Buddhist learning in general and the Institute's Learning in particular resembles Mertonian normative structures of science. Indeed, once critical thinking, empathy, and skepticism become institutionalized practices, then the collective wisdom produced under these institutional constraints gain maximal freedom from subjective propensities and individual limitations. I Chapter Three, I demonstrated Lü's quest for the universal Truth and Beauty in his aesthetic revolutionary phase. This quest for universalism is a central thread in all his scholarship. In Chapter Four, I analyzed Lü's quest for a communism of soteriological knowledge. In this current subsection, I further shed light on the third and fourth structural aspects

[107] Robert King Merton, "The Normative Structure of Science," in *The Sociology of Science: Theoretical and Empirical Investigations*, ed. Norman W. Storer, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1973 [1942]), 267–78. See also the online edition, https://www.panarchy.org/merton/science.html.

of the Institute's Learning, namely, institutionalized bodhicitta that combines organized skepticism and a critical attitude.

Institutionalized bodhicitta entails both a critical attitude similar to Mertonian disinterestedness and a Buddhicized organized skepticism. With regard to disinterestedness, Merton defines it as "a distinctive pattern of institutional control of a wide range of motives which characterizes the behavior of scientists." In contrast to the prevailing understanding of disinterestedness as an attitude of detachment or pure objectivity, or a pure intellectual pursuit for knowledge production, Merton defines disinterestedness as a form of "institutional control" of motives. In other words, for Merton, disinterestedness is not an individual trait but a institutional structure that requires individual scientists to conform to the institutional norm and to be subject to the institutional control. With regard to organized skepticism, it is "both a methodological and an institutional mandate" and that requires "temporary suspension of judgment and the detached scrutiny of beliefs in terms of empirical and logical criteria."[108] That is to say, what makes an enterprise scientific, in Merton's paradigm, is an organizational principle that integrates empiricist methodology and falsifiable hypotheses into the structure of the scientific institution. In this sense, a scientific enterprise is extremely conservative, in that, for every novel truth claim to be accepted, the burden of proof is on the advocate of this new claim to provide both empirical data and applicable methods of falsifying this new claim. Ideally, as a group, other scientists are obligated to examine the data and to experiment different ways to disapprove this new claim. Only when they exhaust all possible ways of disproving this new claim and only when multiple experiments and multiple data sets demonstrate this new claim as the best possible explanation, then this new claim is accepted as a provisional truth.

Similarly, in Lü Cheng's 1943 training program, institutionalized bodhicitta is designed to be a cultivated attitude in evaluating truth claims, conducting textual analysis, and engaging in discussions. It demands a temporary suspension of faith in the literal correctness of sacred texts by

[108]Merton, "The Normative Structure of Science," 276, 278. For a more extensive discussion on "organized skepticism," see Merton, "Science and the Social Order," in *The Sociology of Science*, 264–66.

positing all texts as limited localizations of a transcendent wholeness. As localized embodiments of the doctrinal whole, texts necessitate constant reinterpretation to suit evolving circumstances. Simultaneously, institutionalized bodhicitta requires detached scrutiny of past interpretations in light of new etiological conditions and local situations. In Lü's design, comparative hermeneutics is not only essential for personal awakening but also indispensable in establishing societal trust and sustaining moral authority.

Consequently, this Institute's Learning is also a new institute to usher in social equality by practicing the episteme of compassion.[109] In this paradigm of socio-soteriological knowledge production, only true knowledge can lead to a meaningful change of behavior patterns at both the individual and the collective level. Through its potency in initiating behavioral change, Lü's Yogācāra integrated scholarship into activism, incorporated social engagement into the path of liberation, and reimagined the possibility of an equitable democracy on soteriological terms. To put it differently, despite its normative features resembling Mertonian scientific enterprise, Lü's Buddhicized scientific community is not a group but a collective path: a never-ending revolution of consciousness.

Second, Lü perfected the Yogācāra socio-soteriology with a democratic turn. He redesigned bodhisattva precepts as communal rules for democratic participation in deliberation processes. The redesign of bodhisattva vinaya is a culmination of Lü's long march toward revolutionizing consciousness. In *Five Disciplines*, the practice of the episteme of compassion logically compels the learner-cultivators to actualize bodhicitta through moral deliberation and principled social engagements.

This redesign of bodhisattva vinaya represents a central thread in the prehistory of socially engaged Buddhism: vinaya as the rules of a new institution of social equality. In republican China, the vinaya renewal was a topos in the Buddhist revival. As incisively pointed out by Daniela Campo and Ester Bianchi, various strands of vinaya renewal efforts launched by the monastics reveal to us

[109] I am using "épistémè" in the Foucauldian sense, as indicated in his monograph *The Order of Things*. Episteme refers to the historical construction of an *a priori* which grounds knowledge and its discourses and thus represents the condition of their possibility within a particular epistemological community.

important institutional innovations in a time of perceived Dharmic degeneration.[110] For both Buddhist practitioners and many scholar-observers at the time, the road to Buddhist revival is synonymous with the revival of an idealized monastic life.[111]

However, against this dominant trend of revitalizing monasticism, there was also a concomitant subcurrent seeking to justify social engagements with bodhisattva ideals. Justin Ritzinger's ground-breaking monograph on Taixu's Maitreya cult reveals to us one crucial characteristic of this undercurrent. In Taixu's new moral framework, bodhisattva practices as inscribed in the *Yogācāra Bodhisattva Prātimokṣa* took on a central role for its active promotion of self-sacrifice, mutual aid, as well as the civic duty to fight against injustices and oppressions.[112] More importantly, bodhisattva precepts became integrated into the new path of liberation in Taixu's Maitreya cult: Rebirth in Maitreya's inner court in Tuṣita heaven became possible through "ethical work in the world" alone even without any meditative insight.[113] This new way of integrating engaged actions into soteriology is a hallmark of socially-engaged Buddhism (SEB), as theorized by Lai Rongdao and Jessica Main.[114]

In contrast, Ouyang and Lü's vinaya revival took a much less-traveled path: establishing an independent bodhisattva group outside monastic control. Indeed, Lü's redesign of bodhisattva vinaya unveils a forgotten vinaya renewal initiated by lay practitioners to domesticate democracy on Chinese soil. On this less-traveled path, the jewel of Saṅgha was redefined as a democratic group of a

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[110] Daniela Campo, "A Different Buddhist Revival: The Promotion of Vinaya (*jielü* 戒律) in Republican China," *Journal of Global Buddhism* 18 (2017): 129–54. Ester Bianchi, "Yi jie wei shi 以戒為師: theory and practice of monastic discipline in modern and contemporary Chinese Buddhism," *Studies in Chinese Religions* 3, no. 2 (2017): 111–41.

[111] A representative view is seen in Holmes Welch's classic, *The Buddhist Revival in China*. In concluding this monograph, Welch lamented that the trends of redirecting "from the religious to the secular" meant Buddhism's "eventual demise as a living religion." Welch, *The Buddhist Revival in China*, 264. One redirection "from the religious to the secular" that Welch lamented the most, is the loss of an idealized monastic way of life, because "now people want Buddhism to be like Christianity, with monks coming out in the public." Welch, *The Buddhist Revival in China*, 268. For an incisive analysis of Welch's secular myopia and blindness, see Ying Lei, "Holmes Welch (1921–1981) and the Study of Taixu in the Anglophone World," forthcoming.

[112] Justin Ritzinger, *Anarchy in the Pure Land*, 182–87.

[113] Justin Ritzinger, *Anarchy in the Pure Land*, 191.

[114] Main and Lai, "Reformulating 'Socially Engaged Buddhism' as an Analytical Category."

few monastics and a large number of lay bodhisattvas. The Inner Learning Institute's renewal of the *Yogācāra Bodhisattva Prātimokṣa* enacts an institutional force in the making of a Buddhist social consciousness. This lay vinaya renewal discloses the road not taken by many self-avowed Buddhist reformers. This overlooked vinaya revival is worthy of scholarly attention because this experiment opens up a new potentiality of becoming modern: Instead of the continual spiritual control of the hierarchal Saṅgha, Lü's toiled for a lay-led, self-governed, and socially engaged democracy.

There are three steps in Lü's domestication of democratic values and practices on Buddhist terms.[115] In the first step, Lü justified the leadership of aspiring bodhisattvas in the joint-soteriological enterprise. In particular, Lü undertook some sophisticated doctrinal gymnastics to redefine this new identity of aspiring bodhisattva as "the support of the world," worthy of respect and worthy of being called the jewel of Saṅgha. In the second step, Lü manufactured an unbroken lineage of Mahāyāna vinaya outside the monastic transmission. Lü's maneuver was necessary because, historically, the bodhisattva community has never established an institutional existence outside the monastic leadership. To legitimize an independent bodhisattva institution, Lü had to create a semblance of historicity that was firmly grounded in an independent textual lineage of Mahāyāna vinaya. Recall that I mentioned in passing in the introduction of this dissertation that, in *Essentials*, Ouyang and Lü adopted an organizational principle that separated Mahāyāna vinaya from the so-called Hīnayāna vinaya (i.e., monastic precepts). The significance of this seemingly obscure choice only becomes evident when scholars heed to their intent to establish a separate but parallel transmission of bodhisattva institution. In the third step, Lü reconstructed six perfections (Skt: *pāramitā*) into the chief means to arrive at the core of Yogācāra soteriology—the truth of consciousness-only (Skt: *vijñānamātratā*; Ch: *weishi xing* 唯識性). In so doing, Lü repurposed the episteme of compassion into a rallying call for activism.

[115] It is equally valid to say that Lü democratized Buddhist soteriology. It is a matter of perspective. If we look at Lü's vinaya reform from the lens of the social, then it is a rupture of updating Buddhism to match democratic demands of the day. If we look at it from the lens of the soteriology, then it is clearly a continual Buddhicization of imported concepts and even Lü's tactics of Buddhicization recycled many well-tested Buddhist hermeneutical strategies.

The third step in Lü's democratic turn also embodies the third normative structure of Lü's *Five Disciplines*, a Buddhicized social activism grounded in a reorientation of six perfections (Skt: pāramitā). In Lü's rendition of Yogācāra social activism, the focus is on the intention behind the action. This focus on intention is both opposed to Lü's contemporaneous Chinese Christian understanding of activism and contemporary academic studies of engaged Buddhism, whose focus is on the actions themselves.[116] There are two central drawbacks of the action-based definition of activism. The first drawback is that it projects Christian or liberal democratic value judgments onto Buddhist practices and thereby precludes the Buddhist emic narrative of intention-based activism. The outcome of this drawback is a reification of the discourse of Protestant Buddhism as the determining feature of Buddhist modernism. The second drawback is that it remains blind to varied doctrinal justifications to seemingly same actions. The outcome of this drawback is the reproduction of an essentialized Buddhism that cloaks diverse Buddhist responses to the modern condition.

The action-based understanding of social activism is best seen in the Christian Methodist Wang Zhixin's view, in which Wang faulted Buddhism as quietism for its focus on meditation and internal purification.[117] In 1922, when Wang Zhixin praised Buddhism as compatible with science, he simultaneously criticized Buddhism for its perceived lack of social engagement in contrast to

[116] These actions are measured according to the modern values such as nonviolence, quest for equality, and fight against structural injustice. Recent studies notice the use of Buddhist soteriology to justify such social quests but fail to investigate, when, how, and why soteriology merged with sociality. See for example, Sallie B. King, *Socially Engaged Buddhism* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2009), 2–4. Extant scholarship on SEB also systematically screened out the violent turns of many new Buddhist movements, failing to acknowledge that such troublesome manifestations of Buddhism are also justified on Buddhist soteriology. The failure to compare and contrast why similar Buddhist doctrines had been employed to justify either "engaged" or "disengaged" or even violent Buddhist social movements had led to a prevalent cultural misconception of Buddhism as always has been progressive, enlightened, and scientific. For a broad ranged discussions of Buddhist warfare and the theoretical justifications for violence in Buddhist theology, see Michael K. Jerryson and Mark Juergensmeyer, *Buddhist Warfare* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010). Another notable work on this topic is: Michael Zimmermann, *Buddhism and Violence* (Lumbini, Nepal: Lumbini International Research Institute, 2006). For the role of violence in Taixu's Buddhist reform, see Xue Yu, *Buddhism, War, and Nationalism*.

[117] It is astonishing to see that for both Wang Zhixin and Holmes Welch, authentic Buddhist practice meant meditation practices and internal purification, despite their divergent evaluations of this "uniquely" Buddhist spiritual life. Wang dismissed it as escapism while Welch mourned for the demise of this contemplative way of life embodied by monastics.

Christian churches. Even when he praised Lü's teaching of hetuvidyā as the best means to spread the Word and the speedy path to wisdom, he had an exterior motive—learning hetuvidyā to convert others to Christianity.[118] When he criticized the lack of social engagement in Buddhism, what he focused on were two of the six perfections in Mahāyāna teachings. The first was the perfection of diligence (Skt: *vīrya*; Ch: *jingjin* 精進), which he criticized as bending toward internal purification, whereas Christian teachings were more focused on social activism.[119] The second was the perfection of dhyāna, which he interpreted as quiet contemplation, whereas the Christian prayer always encourages one to go from peaceful prayers to social engagement.[120] Implicit in Wang's criticism is the action-based categorization of social activism, which excludes the possibility that internal change is the seed for sprouting behavioral change and for initiating desired social actions. Under the action-based rubric, the contemporary Buddhist activist angel Kyodo williams's message, "without inner change, there can be no outer change; without collective change, no change matters," seems an oxymoron.[121]

What the action-based definition missed is that internal changes are central to Mahāyāna teachings about activism because it is crucial to purify intention to guarantee the purity of the action. In Lü's 1943 rendition, both pāramitās were interwoven into the institutionalized bodhicitta as the proper work ethics of this Institute's Learning. Action based on pure intention is central to Buddhist soteriology throughout history. One can readily detect the prioritization of inward purification over social action in Thich Nhat Hanh's 1964 call for actualizing Buddhism. The "actualization of Buddhism in today's world" is a term prefiguring Nhat Hanh's 1967 neologism of "socially engaged Buddhism." In this 1964 essay, he defined social engagement as the result of practicing one's realization of the

[118] Wang Zhixin, *Jidujiao zhi Foxue yanjiu* 基督教之佛學研究 [A Christian Study of Buddhist Learning], forwarded by Reiechelt, (Shanghai: Shanghai guangxuehui, 1924), 89–90, 95. In these pages, Wang Zhixin valued hetuvidyā as "Buddhist science" (*foxue zhong de kexue* 佛學中的科學) and "the most sophisticated rhetoric" (*zui jingmi de xiucixue* 最精密的修辭學).
[119] Wang Zhixin 王治心, Jidu jiao zhi foxue yanjiu, 53.
[120] Wang Zhixin, Jidujiao zhi foxue yanjiu, 57, 73.
[121] angel Kyodo williams, "It's Not About Love Afterall," https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PztCw49OQ2g

truth.[122] He then warned his readers that, without a real metamorphosis (Fr: *à défaut de métamorphose réelle*) that sprang from the actualization of the Buddhist truth, philanthropic activities are merely embarrassing decorations like the modern clothes draped on an old lady.[123] For many engaged Buddhists, authentic Buddhist social activism must be guided by soteriological intention. Lü is no exception. Whereas Wang Zhixin pitted internal purification against social activism, Lü, by redefining the social as intersubjective consciousness, integrated mental purification and social activism into one path.[124]

In sum, Lü's *Five Disciplines* enacts one among many possible paths of merging activism with soteriology. The imported category of social reality inspired Lü to theorize a social totality on Yogācāra naturalist terms. This Yogācāra social totality is no longer a group of individuals but a collective path of revolutionizing consciousness. Lü's Yogācāra social (r)evolution not only formed the moral core of his scholarship but also informed his engagement with other imported concepts such as science, critical thinking, and social engagement.

In Lü's Yogācāra socio-soteriology, social activism is neither about expressing spirituality nor about conforming to liberal democratic values. On the contrary, for Lü, activism must be an actualization of Buddhist soteriological goals, and liberal democratic values must be accepted or reinterpreted based on their relevance to the soteriological path. Indeed, Lü's reformulation of critical thinking as organized skepticism grounded in compassion, redefinition of bodhisattva vinaya as rules of democracy, and refashioning of six perfections as guidelines of worldly engagements provide concrete examples of how activism and soteriology were merged into one path.

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[122] Thich Nhat Hanh, *Aujourd'hui le Bouddhisme*, trs. Lê Văn Hào (Cholon, South Vietnam: La Boi, 1964), 129. "Le Bouddhisme n'est pas un enseignement mais la mise en pratique de cet enseignement, le résult de cette réalization."

[123] Thich Nhat Hanh, *Aujourd'hui le Bouddhisme*, 132.

[124] In a similar manner, Lü's *Five Disciplines* is not what Welch lamented as "sterile philosophizing and academic studies in libraries and museums." Welch, *The Buddhist Revival in China*, 268. It is not surprising why Welch translated "Neixueyuan" as "the Metaphysical Institute," claimed that "religious cultivation, in fact, was banned. Though residents at the institute observed certain ascetic principles." Welch, *The Buddhist Revival in China*, 117–20. But the scholarly consensus to this day is that Lü's approach is purely academic.

A Collective Spiritual Evolution

This chapter analyzed Lü's endeavor to recast knowledge production and democratic values in the Yogācāra soteriological mold. As the renowned intellectual historian Wang Hui pointed out, the heart of the May Fourth political imagination is "culture and morality." The core project of May Fourth was to rediscover forgotten yet "natural" patterns (*wen* 文) to stimulate collective transformations (*hua* 化) that would call forth a new political subject and more egalitarian state politics.[125] In other words, the May Fourth intellectuals already indigenized the colonial concept of civilization by translating it as *wenhua* 文化, i.e., engendering collective transformation according to natural patterns. Lü Cheng, after briefly experimenting with aesthetic solutions to the crisis of the Republic, turned to Yogācāra to engender new social patterns that would resolve the modern crisis brought out by social Darwinism, excessive materialism, and rampant individualism. WWI was what stimulated the cultural turn in the May Fourth era. Lü's experience during WWII, when he first lectured on *Five Disciplines* while the Japanese incendiary bombs were pouring down, only confirmed Lü's diagnosis of the modern disease and his resolve to impede the further unfolding of the Darwinist dystopia.

Yogācāra provided Lü key inspirations to rethink the concepts of liberty and equality. When Lü reframed Yogācāra causal enframing into a phenomenological naturalist explanation of social evolution, intersubjectivity grounded in aesthetic resonances found a new theoretical formulation, namely, the dependent origination of one true-reality realm equated with *ālayavijñāna* dependent-origination. This new societal vision not only aptly captured the imagination of Lü's contemporaries but also continues to find its contemporary reincarnations. For example, after Wang Hui reflected on the long Chinese revolution and critical examination on different conceptualizations of equality, he proposed the use of Zhang Taiyan's "equality of all things" to resist the logic of neoliberalism and financial capitalism. For Wang Hui, Zhang Taiyan's theoretical framework is more appealing than "the meaninglessness and abstractness of the life-world and the consequent legitimizing of unequal social relations" and promises new social possibilities that "enable us to overcome the alienation of human

[125] Wang Hui, *China's Twentieth Century*, 48, 109.

beings, of labor, and of things."[126] By now, it should be commonplace to mention that Zhang's "equality of all things" is borrowed from the *Avataṃsaka Sūtra* injected with Yogācārin sensibilities.

Seven decades earlier than Wang Hui's rethinking of equality, Lü Cheng already contemplated the questions such as equality of what, freedom from what, liberty to do what. Lü offered one true-reality realm as the ultimate goal. It is almost beside the point that Lü Cheng saw equality as equality in pluralism and difference, freedom as freedom from limitations of selfishness and ignorance, liberty as liberty to both individual flourishing and collective progress. It is also beside the point to measure Lü Cheng's social thinking on Wang Hui's terms and to see if one true-reality realm would promote a "trans-systemic society" and "trans-societal system."[127]

The central methodological intervention of this chapter is to illustrate the significance of the global perspective in understanding the socio-religious transformation of modern China. Only under this global lens, did Lü's social vision come into scholarly purview: Yogācāra causal enframing provided Lü and many like-minded intellectuals with a fresh angle to imagine a drastically different social evolution, outside the discourses constrained by imported modernities.

The global flow of Darwinism and the philosophy of Buddhism overdetermined that it is not a coincidence that Lü transformed the central Buddhist doctrine of dependent-origination into a social theory. As early as 1897, when Yan Fu published his "translation" of Thomas Huxley's *Evolution and Ethics*, he not only mixed in Hubert Spencer's social Darwinism but also contrasted various Western and Indian etiologies with Buddhist karmic theory. This translation was the first documented incidence where Buddhist karmic retribution was employed to explain what makes modern society cohere together.[128] Historically, dependent-origination had long been employed to justify the bodhisattva path. Lü Cheng's new theorization was driven by the pressing question of the twentieth century, i.e., how to build a democratic society that transcends the logic of capitalism and social Darwinist competition. As a result, dependent-origination adopted a decisive social turn.

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[126] Wang Hui, *China's Twentieth Century*, 282–83.
[127] Wang Hui, *China's Twentieth Century*, 252–83.
[128] In premodern societies, Buddhist doctrines largely served to justify monarchy rules and society itself was mere a subset of this political entity.

Once we correctly characterize modern Yogācāra as a social turn of Buddhist soteriology, Lü's evolutionary thinking also becomes evident: Because the original quiescence innate in the mind-heart of all sentient beings is merely polluted by guest dust, the path of purifying consciousness is simultaneously a social evolution where the gradual purification lead to the eventual realization of the utter interconnectedness of all beings in this world. This spiritual evolution would eventually lead to the realization of the all-encompassing one true-reality realm.

The Darwinist twist in Lü Cheng's Yogācāra social theory was made explicit in his November 15th, 1944 talk for friends of the institute, titled "On Learning and Self-Awakening." In this short lecture, Lü Cheng commented that human life is unique because of its potential to go beyond biological limit and to transform its environment.[129] However, the ground for this transformative potential is fully explained in terms of a Buddhist social-self:

> There are two teachings about self in the Bauddha dharma. One is from the perspective of ontological reality in epistemological findings and the other is from the perspective of affective empathy of values. The former is what the Bauddha dharma refutes. The latter is what the Buddha dharma relies on. An error that is the breadth of a single hair can lead one a thousand miles astray. This point, one must clearly distinguish… The affective empathy of values is seen from the sense of freedom and this sense of self springs from the deepest part of human consciousness. It is also the springhead of genuine learning and knowing. Therefore, following the teachings from the Bauddha dharma, one must not be content with one's own actual situation. One must vigorously exert oneself (Skt. *anikṣipta-dhura*), [130] enthusiastically accumulate merits, develop one's potential to achieve sainthood and Buddhahood. Furthermore, one must not be content with the actual situation of all sentient beings. Instead, one should save all sentient beings in this world. "I shall enable all to enter nirvāṇa which entails extinguishing worldly afflictions and releasing all from sufferings."
> 唯佛法之說有我，有從認識中之實體而言，有從價值之感受而言。前者為佛法之所破，後者乃佛法之所依。毫釐之差，千里之謬，不可不辨…價值之感受從自在義而說我發於人心之最深處，實為真學問之源泉。由是佛法之教人，不以一己之現實為足，必勇猛精進，積極功德，求充己之量而為聖為佛。又不以眾生之現實為足，必盡世界所有眾生，我皆令入無餘涅槃而滅度之.[131]

In this short paragraph, Lü Cheng redefined the social-self as an affective empathy of values (*jiazhi zhi ganshou* 價值之感受), fusing aesthetic empathy and social values with Buddhist learning. His

[129] Xuanji 1991, 448 .
[130] This is a reference to *Yogācārabhūmi* T 1579.30.333b3.
[131] Xuanji 1991, 452–53.

earlier diagnosis of this actual society, now termed "one's actual situation" and "the actual situation of all sentient beings," remained the same. His earlier vision of an aesthetic society, now termed a social-self of "affective empathy of all values," was reinterpreted in terms of the cause—original quiescence, and the result—nirvāṇa for all. Contrary to the early Indian Buddhist doctrine of no-self, Lü Cheng promoted a Buddhist social-oneness informed by evolutionary thinking.

Armed with this Buddhicized social evolutionary theory, Lü defined learning as the chief means to build an enterprise of collective salvation. Here also lies his explicit statement equaling social engagement with Buddhist learning:

> If learning exists in the cosmos, then it is Buddhist learning. If genuine human life exists, then it is a human life [in accordance with] the Bauddha dharma. Nevertheless, one must acknowledge that [this genuine human life] arises out of one's self-awakening. If one were confined to the Hīnayāna teachings and if one were afraid of talking about self, then one will consider sentient beings as floating duckweed drifting with the wind. Then, who could carry on the myriad deeds of six pāramitās and the limitless enterprise [of releasing all into nirvāṇa]?
> 宇宙間有學, 則佛學而已, 有真正人生, 則佛法人生而已. 然此出於人之自覺, 不可不知也. 彼一往拘泥小乘之義, 而懼說我者, 視眾生有如水面浮萍, 隨風飄蕩, 六度萬行, 無邊事業, 複伊誰負之哉.[132]

What becomes evident is Lü Cheng's impassioned call to revolutionize society through bodhisattva cultivations. Learning, for him, starts with textual analysis but aims for socially engaged projects as embodied in the bodhisattva deeds of six pāramitās: the perfection of donation, observing precepts, forbearance, exertion, meditation, and wisdom, all of which are skill-in-means grounded in great compassion. Note that by the end of 1944, the incessant Japanese air raids of Chongqing that started in 1938 had eased up a little. However, no one knew for sure when the war would end. In hindsight, one could not help but wonder how anyone could continue studying ancient Buddhist texts when the bombs kept falling. Nevertheless, what came through in this short passage is a deep conviction that only a Buddhist soteriology could lead all out of the perceived Darwinist nightmare. Against the backdrop of war-time destruction, to intellectuals like Lü, the project of revolutionizing consciousness must have seemed not only relevant but also direly needed.

[132] Xuanji 1991, 453.

CHAPTER 8. CONCLUSION: FROM SOCIO-SOTERIOLOGY TO ENGAGED BUDDHISM

> Radical Dharma is insurgence rooted in love, and all that love of self and others implies. It takes self-liberation to its necessary end by moving beyond personal transformation to transcend dominant social norms and deliver us into collective freedom. [1]
> —Rev. angel Kyodo williams, Sensei, in *Radical Dharma*, 2016

> One shall not be content with this actual life; one must practice with bravery and dedication; one must accumulate merits so that one could fully develop one's own [spiritual] potential; so that one could achieve sainthood and Buddhahood. Furthermore, one shall not be content with sentient beings' actual life; one must exhaust all sentient beings in the world by leading all toward nirvāṇa without remainder and by extinguishing all [worldly sufferings].
> 不以一己之現實為足，必勇猛精進，積集功德，求充己之量而為聖為佛。又不以眾生之現實為足，必盡世界所有眾生，我皆令入無餘涅槃而滅度之。[2]
> —Lü Cheng, in "On 'Learning' and 'Human Self-Wakening,'" 1943

Why study Lü Cheng, a Buddhist revolutionary who calls to mind the consummate dreamer Don Quixote? This was the most frequently raised question when I presented my dissertation chapters in various conferences and workshops. When scholars interrogate the relevance of this Quixotic figure, they typically ask one of the following questions: Can one justify this study in terms of Lü's actual impact in contemporary society? Can one justify the investigation of *Essentials* based on the merit of its scholarly value? Can one justify these studies based on its contribution to various scholarly conversations, e.g., in the fields of modern Chinese Buddhism, the studies of Chinese Yogācāra, Buddhist studies, Chinese religions, and history of modern China? All these standards, while useful, follow an unreflective positivist or historicist research program. Thereby, these unexamined presumptions preclude the potential of effectively problematizing the implicit linear temporal discourse that depicts modernity as a product in Europe and then spread elsewhere.[3] Methodologically, these approaches also leave the hierarchical construct of Western methods vs.

[1] angel Kyodo williams, Rod Owens, and Jasmine Syedullah, *Radical Dharma: Talking Race, Love, and Liberation* (Berkeley, CA: North Atlantic Books, 2016), preface, xi.
[2] Xuanji 1991, 452.
[3] Chakrabarty, *Provincializing Europe*.

Eastern materials unexamined. Concretely, following this linear time, the category Buddhist modernism functions merely as a time marker, lacking analytic mileage and failing to investigate what it means to be Buddhist and what it means to be modern.

To historicize this East-West hierarchy and to take studies of Buddhist modernism beyond the historicist lens, the current dissertation has proposed a new standard of evaluation: To what extent can Lü's intellectually stimulating adventure provide new vocabulary and vantage points to deepen our understanding of the modern transformation of religion? Lü's Yogācāra socio-soteriology presents a viable theoretical framework to rethink the meaning of doing science without committing to scientific realism, to theorize a phenomenological naturalist understanding of social reality as intersubjective oneness, and a philosophically defensible theory of a universal moral agency to challenge Western concepts of individual and free will. Indeed, through Lü's discerning eyes, scholars gain valuable insights into how to examine the Western materials and practices under the Buddhist methodological lenses. Equally important, socio-soteriology also explains the meaning of being Buddhist and being modern for Yogācārins in modern China: The soteriological quest makes it authentically Buddhist, and the critique of the structural inequalities in Western social theories makes it modern.

More importantly, socio-soteriology has methodological implications beyond the studies of China and Buddhism: It opens up a new avenue to understand religious modernisms in the global South. I am using Buddhist modernism to illustrate this broader methodological implication. As seen in the two opening quotes, Lü Cheng's revolution unveils a seismic shift that could overturn conventional understanding of a central category in Buddhist modernism, i.e. socially engaged Buddhism (henceforth: SEB). In conventional wisdom, SEB refers to new Buddhists movements that promote liberal-democratic agendas such as medical welfare, charity, environmental conservation, and human rights, seemingly representing yet another case of Western standards vs. Eastern movements. However, through the binocular lens of the socio-soteriological, scholars could see how and why the premodern soteriological equality became retooled to criticize social injustice and to justify quests for economic, political, and social equality.

This merging of soteriological equality and societal justice represents a distinctively new feature of Buddhism in the modern era. As is well known, in premodern settings, the doctrines of Buddhist soteriological equality coexisted with and even supported communal or social hierarchy. Only in modern times, especially in SEB movements, can scholars recognize a redefinition of soteriological equality in terms of structural justice and social equality.

Lü's case demonstrated one way of how Asian actors extended, transformed, and appropriated both ancient soteriological tools and imported Western concepts for social ends. Through Lü's incisive analysis of social reality as an independent category, his theorization of a universal moral agency without resorting to Western conceptions of atomized individual and free will, and his conceptualization of social consciousness and intersubjectivity outside the ambit of social contract theories, scholars gain insight into some implicit internal logic underpinning this seismic shift that we call modern. This socio-soteriological lens promises to identify broader patterns and global connections outside the colonial gaze and thereby deepen scholarly understanding of Buddhist modernist movements and the discursive field emerging from these movements that led to the rise of SEB, the continuing unfolding of this branch of global Buddhism, and the understudied agency of Asian actors in bringing forth this new forms of Buddhism.

Equally important, while my dissertation analyzes a Buddhist case, the method of seeing through the socio-soteriological binocular applies to other forms of modern religious movements. In particular, it enables scholars to ask a new set of questions in examining the socio-religious changes: How have historical actors in the global South dealt with this new category of Durkheimian social reality? What moral sources were employed by these actors to resolve what kinds of pressing social and moral issues? How were moral sources from religious traditions extracted, extended, transformed, and appropriated to wrestle with real or perceived pressing social concerns? What intellectual and institutional innovations did they propose in their effort to come to terms with these modern issues?

More concretely, the binocular lens uncovers three critical features of SEB that have been occluded by the liberal-democratic evaluation. The first and foremost signature of SEB is a self-aware

and informed effort to theorize a Buddhist social consciousness, which may or may not align with democratic values. This feature has been pointed out by Main and Rongdao Lai in their effort to go beyond seeing SEB as "moral praise and authenticity" for Buddhist groups that conform to liberal-democratic values.[4] Historically, Buddhism has devised many skillful practices to deal with worldly sufferings. However, in premodern settings, charities and welfare relief efforts are predominantly understood in terms of gaining spiritual merits. The theology supporting these seemingly engaged charity works is rarely about identifying, exposing, and dismantling structural injustices.

Only in the modern era, has the Buddhist tradition begun to grapple with perceived or real systems of oppression. Furthermore, many reform-minded practitioners redefined nirvāṇa in terms of dismantling bastions of privilege. I include both perceived and real systems of oppression to enable a more in-depth analysis of diverse forms of Buddhist nationalism as represented by Ouyang and Dai Jitao and many modern Japanese Buddhist intellectuals. While these Buddhist nationalists theorized social consciousness on Buddhist terms and attempted to resist the unjust world-order imposed by global capital and Western imperialism, in their theorization of an alternative world-order, they also reproduced systemic oppression against women or other Asian countries.[5] For scholars of religion and historians, these "failed" experiments provide valuable information on the multiple origins, complicated trajectories, varied doctrinal innovations, and the agency of Asian Buddhists in the making of SEB. Methodologically, these experiments also offer instructive lessons about how to be "in an empire of religion without being of it."[6]

Furthermore, the socio-soteriological lens enables scholars to identify two more features of SEB. Buddhist social consciousness alone does not fully capture the newness of SEB. A second dominant signature of a fully developed SEB is the self-awareness that one person alone can never beat a system. In a fully developed SEB, there must be a collective realization that, to dismantle bastions of privilege, one must establish another more equitable system. Simultaneously, there must

[4] Main and Lai, "Reformulating 'Socially Engaged Buddhism' as an Analytical Category."
[5] Zu, "Ouyang Jingwu's Must-Read Classics for Laity."
[6] Chidester, *Empire of Religion*, xviii.

be an imagination of new social structures such as systems of nonduality, multiculturalism, equality, solidarity, or nonseparation combined with the invention of new institutional forms to implement these alternative societal visions. Both angel Kyodo williams's and Lü Cheng's visions demonstrate these two features of a mature SEB: 1) a theorization of Buddhist social consciousness and 2) a rallying call to inspire others in this joint force assisted by a platform for sustaining these collective efforts.

However, in contrast with angle Kyodo williams's radical Dharma, Lü's new Yogācāra still belongs to the socio-soteriological movements that predated SEB. The reason lies in social reception: Thirdly but not least, for mature forms of SEB to be recognized as valuable and accepted by the larger society as legitimately Buddhist, there must be other social conditions conducive to its continual flourishing. As I have demonstrated in this dissertation, Lü is primarily remembered today as a Buddhologist not because of his lack of social consciousness or institutional innovation but because of the lack of social support. I argue that Lü's Yogācāra revolution failed to gain traction as a revolution because of the lack of necessary social conditions in his lifetime. To sustain a movement that abstains from power and control and that relies on deliberative rigor and voluntary association as the means to achieve salvation, two necessary prerequisites are economic equality and equal access to education. Despite Lü's failure to mobilize and seize on the shared experience of the two World Wars to mold the trajectories of Chinese modernity, his new idea—justifying social and intellectual equality on Buddhist spirituality—nonetheless raises questions that are still disturbing us today: If everyone is endowed with infinite intellectual potential guaranteed by one's innate Buddha nature, then what social conditions hindered the development and continuing flourishing of that potential? What kind of social bonds do we need to build so that everyone could fully actualize that innate nature?

I take figures like Lü Cheng seriously because they are crucial to human imagination. In a time dominated by Darwinist competition, Lü pushed the boundary of what is thinkable. Instead of following the destructive excitement typical of his time and thereby reproducing power and control, Lü channeled his revolutionary energy into a sustained commitment to building a social solidarity

that affirms all lives and all living processes. He lifted the ideals of equality and freedom outside the myth of the atomized individual and the corresponding theories of social contract.[7] Drawing from ancient Yogācāra doctrines, Lü then theorized the meaning of life, equality, freedom, and sociality in terms of relationality and interdependence. Starry-eyed dreamers in the past and the present continue to inspire later generations to think beyond *what is* and to take seriously the central question of *what ought to be*. As I have demonstrated throughout the chapters, Lü's analytic thinking and revolutionary project best articulated the assumptions, theories, and practices that underpinned the thinking of several generations of Buddhist intellectuals who endeavored to use culture and civilization as China's salvation.

Understanding the Political Modernity Through the Socio-Soteriological Lens

Idealistic dreamers like Lü also provides us an alternative perspective to examine the Chinese political modernity: Instead of analyzing the full-frontal clash of religion and politics, figures like Lü who disavowed politics and power enable us to understand the powerplay sideways. More often than not, historical figures embroiled in political controversies tend to be power-holders themselves. Therefore, to pay attention to conflicts and controversies would systematically give more visibilities to the dynamics between the oppressed and oppressors. Because the oppressors were often the colonialists, the research questions themselves overdetermine that it is difficult to get away from the colonial gaze. Looking at the political issues sideways opens up more opportunity to uncover marginalized voices and reveal overlooked maneuvers outside the dichotomy of the oppressor and the oppressed. Thus, the current study offers a complementary view of the Chinese political modernity and the religious question through the lens of the social.

A quick analysis of Lü Cheng's journey in Communist China demonstrates the efficacy of the socio-soteriological lens in examining the impact of local and national politics in the transformation of Buddhism. As I have discussed in the dissertation, in his early twenties, as a May Fourth youth, Lü

[7] I see social contract theories imagined by Locke and Rousseau as a reproduction of power and control because of its implicit sexist hierarchy. See Carole Pateman, *The Sexual Contract* (Cambridge [Cambridgeshire]: Polity, 1988).

rode on the tide of liberal and progressive thought and formulated his aesthetic society as a society built upon voluntary association that renders political power structure outdated. After he turned toward Yogācāra for moral inspirations to replace the Darwinist jungle law, he still imagined a collective future grounded in karmic connections without the interference of the state. In this section, I further demonstrate that, even after Lü explicitly rejected the label of Buddhist laity in the 1950s, by asking how he integrated Buddhist spiritual exercises for a new social imaginary, we can recognize the continuing themes of Buddhicizing society cloaked in Marxist language.

In the 1950s, Lü Cheng and his cohort reformulated their earlier revolutionary visions into one of how to integrate Buddhism with socialism. Lü's writings in the early 1950s continue to demonstrate a propensity to Buddhicize Marxism, employing Yogācāra conception of *pratītyasamutpāda* to justify a mass democracy and echoing Dalai Lama's syncretism of Buddhist teaching and Marxist social critique.[8] Compared with his pre-1949 use of *pratītyasamutpāda*, Lü Cheng not only updated his vocabulary with Marxist terminologies such as objectivity (*keguan* 客觀) and practice (*shijian* 實踐) but also shifted his emphasis on explicating three kinds of *pratītyasamutpāda*. Recall that in preaching his *Five Disciplines and Three Cycles*, he extended the twelve-link dependent-origination (*yegan yuanqi* 業感緣起) that explains the individual's life cycles to the Yogācāra interpretation of four nourishments (*sishi* 四食). More broadly, he grounded his Yogācāra social evolutionary theory on *ālayavijñāna* causal enframing (*laiye yuanqi* 賴耶緣起) and dharma-realm dependent-origination (*fajie yuanqi* 法界緣起). In his post-1949 publications, Lü intentionally down-played the role of the first two kinds, which focused more on the soteriological goals of Yogācāra. Instead, Lü concentrated his energy in demonstrating the compatibility of dharma-realm dependent-origination with historical materialist interpretation of natural phenomena. Both

[8] Most of his arguments are laid out in three essays: "Zhenjue yu chulin" 正覺與出離 [Right Realization and Transcendence] in Xuanji 1991, 1330–342 (December 28, 1953), "Yuanqi yu shixiang"緣起與實相 [Dependent-origination and Real Phenomenon] in Xuanji 1991, 1343–357 (April 28–May 28, 1954), "Guanxing yu zhuanyi"觀行與轉依 [Seeing, Practicing, and Āśrayaparivṛtti] in Xuanji 1991, 1369–380 (June 25, 1954). The 14th Dalai lama have commented on Marxism numerous times in his career. For his most recent comments on the compatibility of Buddhism and Marxism in the context of critiquing capitalism, see Dalai Lama XIV and Sofia Stril-Rever, *A Call for Revolution: A Vision for the Future (written from private conversations with His Holiness)* (NYC: William Morrow, 2018).

changes reflected Lü Cheng's tactics to harmonize his own Yogācāra social theory with Marxist historical materialism.[9]

The shifts and turns in Lü Cheng's social theory after 1949 are closely tied to the political ups and downs. In the early 1950s, the communist government continued its moderately accommodating religious policy developed during the Yan'an decade (1935–1945). This policy considered religious actors an integral part of the United Front and advocated for a state-sponsored program of promoting atheist education while allowing religion to come to its own "natural death."[10] Under this policy, Lü Cheng self-identified as a scholar of Buddhist studies while continuing his effort to Buddhicize Marxism and build a new doctrinal whole.[11] In 1952 Lü Cheng closed the door of the China Inner Learning Institute. He reasoned that the national research program made his private effort redundant. He was then incorporated into the new communist academic bureaucracy and, in 1957, was elected member of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences.[12]

Riding this inclusive tide, Lü Cheng continued his Buddhicization effort, sidestepping the Communist politics with his Buddhicized tactics. He wrote on Buddhist dialectics—hetuvidyā, Tibetan and Chinese Buddhist history, arguing for the consistency of Buddhist teaching with Marxism and Hegelian dialectics. He also reframed Buddhist renunciation as consistent with social engagement and revolution, mostly trying to Buddhicize historical materialism.[13] For example, in 1966, he published an outline for a new Buddhist canon. This outline was first edited during October 1943 and December 1946, when he lectured on *Five Disciplines*.[14] The 1966 new edition largely retained its pre-1949 structure and goal. This new canon aims to present a comprehensive

[9] For a summary of Hegelian philosophy, see Herbert Marcuse, *Reason and Revolution: Hegel and the Rise of Social Theory* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., 1954). The titles of Lü's articles are telling: "Fojia bianzheng fa" 佛家辯證法 [Buddhist Dialectics], *Xiandai Foxue* 1954 no.1 (also in Xuanji 1991, 1392–401) and "Fojiao luoji: Facheng de yinming shuo" 佛教邏輯—法稱的因明說 [Buddhist Logic—Dharmakīrti's Hetuvidyā], *Xiandai Foxue* 1954 no. 2–4.

[10] For details of CCP religious policy and its history, see Xue Yu, *Zhongguo Fojiao de shehuizhuyi gaizao*, 1–66.

[11] Since the 1950s, he started to consistently deny the label of *jushi* 居士—Buddhist laity, and claimed on multiple occasions that he had no religious beliefs.

[12] Lü, "My Autobiography," 79, 86.

[13] Xuanji 1991, 1392–401.

[14] Lü [1959] 2007, "My Autobiography," 86.

understanding of Buddhist essence and principle (*quanpan yili* 全盤義理) and to outline the central thread of meaning throughout the history of Buddhism (*yuanshi yaozhong zhi yi* 原始要終之義). Not surprisingly, Lü Cheng found his inspiration from a canonical Yogācāra text, Msaṃ (*Compendium of the Great Vehicle*), penned by Vasubandhu (4th to 5th century C.E.) who is the great systemizer of Buddhist doctrines and who paved the way for Mahāyāna system of thought.[15] Under Lü's new conception of a doctrinal whole, the sūtra collection is divided into five sections: 1) Accumulator of Jewels (*baoji* 寶積), which, according to Lü, represents the early Indian effort to collect and systemize Mahāyāna teachings; 2) prajñā (*boruo* 般若), which, according to Lü Cheng's reading of Vasubandhu, explains the Mahāyāna path in terms of cause and effect; 3) avataṁsaka (*huayan* 華嚴), which explains the path in terms ten stages; 4) nirvāṇa (*niepan* 涅槃), which explicates the outcome of the path; and 5) āgama (*ahan* 阿含) for Theravāda teachings.[16]

Notice that what stood out in this 1966 catalogue is that 1) Lü Cheng still considered Buddhism neither as a religion nor as a philosophy, but as a path of practice that leads to nirvāṇa for all sentient beings, 2) this path must incorporate holistic Buddhism, a doctrinal whole as the guidance on this path, and 3) the Chinese counterpart of the Pāli canon Āgama still comes after other more "holistic" Mahāyāna scriptures. By and large, before the Cultural Revolution (1967–1976), Lü Cheng stayed true to his principle: He continued to propagate genuine Buddhism and "could not bear even the slightest distortion to sell Buddhist Dharma as a personal favor." [17]

However, starting from the late 1950s, the radical branch of the Communist Party started to take hold, and Mao Zedong increasingly adopted a hostile stance toward religion and advocated for employing governmental apparatus to eradicate "religious remainders" in society completely.[18] When the Cultural Revolution erupted in 1966, Lü Cheng was forced to return to his hometown

[15] Xuanji 1991, "Xinbian Hanwen Dazangjing mulu" 新編漢文大藏經目錄 [The Catalogue of a New Chinese Buddhist Canon], 1621–893. In particular, in pages 1626 and 1635, Lü explicitly mentioned that he was inspired by the organizing principles in *Mahāyānasaṃgrahaśāstra*. For Vasubandhu's contribution to the rise of Mahāyāna Buddhist philosophy, see Jonathan C. Gold, *Paving the Great Way*.

[16] Xuanji 1991, 1625–627,

[17] Xuanji 1991, 447

[18] Xue Yu, Zhongguo Fojiao de shehuizhuyi gaizao, 31, 36.

Danyang, Jiangsu, and his lifetime collection of Buddhist texts together with personal research notes got lost. He stopped writing ever since.

The analytic lens of the socio-soteriological enables me to take seriously Lü's societist experiment from 1918 to 1966 and to uncover a sustained effort of Buddhicizing society through revolutionizing consciousness that was cast into the shadows by the nationalist narratives. Far from dismissing the import of the political power structure, the socio-soteriological binocular foregrounds the tactics employed and the difficult choices made by Buddhist intellectuals like Lü to get around structural constraints.

By examining Chinese political modernity from the social perspective, this dissertation also raises another question: What is the intellectual responsibility of citizens in a democracy? Lü's answer is as many as necessary. In essence, Lü's project is a non-elitist intellectual one because he was firmly convinced that every human being could master all forms of knowledge necessary for bringing forth an ecology of compassion. In contrast to Ouyang's top-down instructive gaze, Lü adopted a democratic stance. For Lü, a spiritual democracy grounded in organized skepticism is necessary because Yogācāra causal enframing exposes the inconvenient truth: The liberation of one stream of consciousness is ultimately intertwined with every other streams, therefore liberation is only possible when one takes on the responsibility of learning all skillful means so to purify one's own stream of consciousness through moral deliberation with others as equal partners.

This is the first time in the history of Buddhism that Buddhist spiritual equality was utilized to justify intellectual and social equality. Lü's proposal is in stark contrast with Ouyang's spiritocracy that employs spiritual equality to justify a sexual and spiritual hierarchy. At the same time, Lü's training program of 9–12 years is also in stark contrast with the premodern bodhisattva path that requires eons of training over many lifetimes. Indeed, his goal is to actualize the innate, infinite intellectual potential in all in this very life. For him, economic and political institutions are only legitimate if they help bring forth this social goal. In his joint-learning enterprise, there is no predetermined elite class. The leadership of the Inner Learning Institute is provisionally determined on the quality of its scholarship. What he sketched out was a path toward an ever-expanding inclusive

community. The leader in this path of revolutionizing consciousness is an epistemological community composed of all those willing to broaden their compassion and willingness to learn how to do so.

Although Lü's proposal is extremely idealistic given its lack of recognition of the economic and political inequalities of his time, his proposal fundamentally changed the starting point of the conversation: If we fully acknowledge intellectual and social equality of all humans, how shall we organize the institutions and economic-political life so that everyone has equal opportunity to develop their innate potentials? This question is particularly relevant when we acknowledge the intense intellectual demands on the individual in any democracy. A democratic government asks the individuals not only to make a living and care for their families but also to obey the law, help form public values, and set the direction of public policy by electing officials who manage public affairs. More importantly, in a globalized world where citizens of any given country are deeply involved with the economic-political-social life of citizens in many other places, meaningful participation in the "public sphere" also demands basic literacy in global politics and plural cultures. Mere horse sense is no longer sufficient for any citizen to make informed political decisions. As eloquently argued by Jill Lepore, the mass democracy that has been experimented in the United States in the last century is no longer merely hypothetically vulnerable to ideological manipulation but has already been actualized as a business of opinion polling, political advertising, and data collection.[19] In a world of information overflow, uninformed citizens would not be able to govern themselves. Being intellectual is no longer the privilege of the elite class but has become a prerequisite of being an ordinary, informed citizen.

Lü Cheng's experiment to initiate a deliberative democracy in the early twentieth wrestled with this thorny issue of the intense intellectual demand of a democratic society. Although he remained optimistic about the intellectual potential of his fellow learners, the historical reality proved him wrong. After 1949, the mass democracy (*Renmin minzhu* 人民民主) in mainland China soon devolved into the chaos of the Cultural Revolution. The Nationalist government in Taiwan only

[19] Jill Lepore, *These Truths: A History of the United States* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2018), 418–19, 452, 574.

abandoned martial law and turned to mass democracy in 1987.[20] Equally important, the Chinese Buddhist organizations under both political systems decided to abandon the inchoated republicanism in the early Saṅgha and instead embraced the centralized control as the modus operandi. In the PRC, the Buddhist Associate of China (Zhongguo Fojiao Xiehui 中国佛教协会) as an extension of the state apparatus fundamentally restructured monastic communities to suit the centralized power of the state.[21] In Taiwan, the famous Four Mountains all adopted the corporate model to run their religious organizations.[22] Lü's ecology of compassion gave way to other non-democratic forms of Buddhism: Chinese Buddhist political organs, Taiwanese Buddhist corporations, and Tibetan Buddhist corporations of compassion.

What remains of this failed attempt is a shared conviction that genuine Buddhism has always been socially engaged. In the early twentieth century, when leading intellectuals such as Cai Yuanpei proclaimed the demise of religion in public life, Lü's Yogācāra social theory offered a powerful rejoinder. Irrespective of the different paths taken, an overlooked driving force behind these quests and debates is a desire to find a more harmonious way to live together. Lü is by no means unique in his quest for social solidarity: He turned to Buddhism for soteriological knowledge that promises to cultivate compassionate, informed citizens of a caring global community. Viewed from this light, Lü's failure still haunts us today: Can we imagine a different kind of societal coexistence outside the logic of capitalism, the Darwinist competition, and the solipsist trap?

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[20] However, the Nationalist monopolization of the meaning of revolution occurred much earlier in the Nanjing Decade, See for example, Brian Tsui, *China's Conservative Revolution: The Quest for a New Order 1927–1949* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018), 26–67.

[21] Ji Zhe 汲喆, "Secularization as Religious Restructuring: Statist Institutionalization of Chinese Buddhism and its Paradoxes," in *Chinese Religiosities: Afflictions of Modernity and State Formation*, edited by Mayfair Mei-hui Yang, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008), 223–60.

[22] For an overview of how the political environment made corporation the preferred model of Buddhist organizations in Taiwan, see Charles B. Jones, *Buddhism in Taiwan: Religion and the State, 1660–1990* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 1999), 189–98. This section is using the Fo Guang Mountain as an example.

More Than a Buddhist Story: a Global, Inter-religious Perspective

More broadly, the socio-soteriological lens could also help identify the global forces in shaping the modern transformation of religions.[23] If we look around us today, many more Quixotic projects enter into our purview, e.g., Rabbi Lerner's and Valarie Kaur's revolutionary love,[24] respectively; Rev. angel Kyodo williams's radical Dharma, Dalai Lama's call for a revolution of compassion.[25] In all these movements, the quest for tangible structural change and more equitable policies that promote economic equality is seamlessly merged with the soteriological goal of their respective religious traditions. In other words, the extension of soteriological goals to include societal transformations is not limited to new Buddhist movements. Instead, the socio-soteriological turn seems a through-line that cut across religious divisions. This through-line calls for a more serious comparative study of the intersection of modern religious movements with Durkheimian sociology and social Darwinism.

Rather than arguing for any actual historical link underpinning these echoes crossing space and time, the socio-soteriological inquiry brings into focus the universal concerns that animate concreted solutions in diverse cultures and distant countries: What is the role of human agency in a world governed by scientific laws? How do we build a just and caring society in a time dominated by structural injustice? How does one live a meaningful life in an ethically-neutral universe? In many aspects, the methodology employed in this dissertation owes its inspiration to Jaqueline Stone's analytic method "hermeneutical triangulation," which understands any interpretation by historical actors as an experiment to reconcile 1) personal needs and aspirations, 2) the external demands at a particular historical junction where the actors themselves lived, and 3) the content of the received

[23] To be sure, global connections are central to premodern formations of Buddhist identities as well. See, Ann Heirman, Christoph Anderl, and Carmen Meinert, eds., *Buddhist Encounters and Identities across East Asia* (Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2018). Although my own research interests are firmly grounded in the modern era, the research questions I am raising here are not confined to the specific time period.

[24] Michael Lerner, *Revolutionary Love: A Political Manifesto to Heal and Transform the World* (Oakland: University of California Press, 2019). Valarie Kaur, *The Revolutionary Love Project* https://valariekaur.com/the-revolutionary-love-project/. Accessed March 2019–March 2020.

[25] Dalai, A Call for Revolution.

tradition.[26] Stone employed this triangulation to analyze three modern activist heir groups of the Kamakura Buddhist reformer Nichiren (1222–1282). Building upon Stone's insight, my proposed analytic lens examines the global history of how new forms of activism and meanings of nirvāṇa become molded by the concerted quest for a different kind of sociality. It also sheds light on how these new quests for structural change relate to the globalization of Durkheimian sociology, and how these projects emerge and thrive at the nexus of both the spiritual and the social.

In addition, this binocular sheds light on a shared spiritual horizon that emerged together with the secular power-knowledge discourse, pointing toward a much larger imagined community that sought to transcend national and ethnic boundaries. By a shared spiritual horizon, I refer to an attitude of reorienting religious traditions to build an alternative society, a world full of love, empathy, and care. This shared spiritual horizon becomes visible when scholars examine how various historical and contemporary actors in the global South have aimed to retool religious and theological concepts for building an alternative collective path outside the Western Enlightenment discourse of civilization and progress.

In Japan, since the late nineteenth century, many religious thinkers, philosophers, and biologists looked back into Buddhist, Shinto, Confucian, Christian traditions as well as scientific discourses for inspiration to find goodness, morality, and the divine within nature and evolution.[27] In the Indian subcontinent, in the nineteenth century, one finds modern Vedānta schools that reformulated the concept of "group karma" for theorizing our obligations to each other in a just society.[28] Throughout India, one also finds the revival of Buddhism from 1890 that culminated in the 1956 Dr. Ambedkar's Dalit (the oppressed class) Buddhist movement for establishing a caste-free,

[26] Jacqueline Stone, "Nichiren's Activist Heirs: Sōka Gakkai, Risshō Kōseikai, Nipponzan Myōhōji," in *Action Dharma: New Studies in Engaged Buddhism*, ed. Christopher Queen, Charles Prebish, and Damien Kewon (New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003), 88–89.

[27] Clinton G. Godart, Darwin, Dharma, and the Divine: Evolutionary Theory and Religion in Modern Japan (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2017).

[28] Austin B. Creel, "Contemporary Philosophical Treatment of Karma and Rebirth," in *Karma and Rebirth*, 5–7.

fair society.[29] Similarly, there were concerted efforts of making Islam relevant in establishing spiritual capitalism, building a civil public sphere, and sustaining world peace.[30]

Simultaneously in the Americas, one finds similar social turns in Christian theology. In the late nineteenth century North America, one finds the Social Gospel movement that tied salvation with good works of bettering industrialized society. In the mid-twentieth century Latin America, one finds Liberation Theology that synthesized Christian theology with far-left political ideologies. Should it be a surprise that both movements developed a new doctrine of "social sin" to fight against structural injustice?[31]

Even though it is impossible to pin down the diverse religious engagement with the social to one single cause, an overview of their discourses point to a common quest: How does one formulate a meaningful worldview after Darwin?[32] Indeed, each movement mentioned above drew from different religious traditions. However, what they have in common is a concern for imagining a new sociality that not only takes care of people's material needs but also heeds to the innate human aspirations for love, care, justice, and spiritual growth. This soteriological framework inherent in religious traditions could have injected deeper meanings and more fulfilling rewards into the everyday capitalist activities and thereby endowed social engagement an engaging allure. Consequently, the socio-soteriological analytic lens opens suggests new perspectives in

[29] Surendran, "The Indian Discovery of Buddhism."

[30] For a good review on this topic, see for example, Toseef Azid, and Lütfi Sunar, eds., *Social Justice and Islamic Economics: Theory, Issues and Practice* (Abingdon, Oxon; NYC: Routledge, 2019).

[31] For the history and analysis of the concept of "social sin" in North American Social Gospel movement, see, for example, Matthew Bowman, "Sin, Spirituality, and Primitivism: The Theologies of the American Social Gospel, 1885–1917," *Religion and American Culture: A Journal of Interpretation* 17 no. 1 (Winter 2007): 95–126. For the concept of social sin and structural sin in the later Liberation Theology, see, for example, Brian Lewis, "Social Sin," *Compass* 48 no. 2 (Winter 2014): 18–21; see also, Conor M. Kelly, "The Nature and Operation of Structural Sin: Additional Insights from Theology and Moral Psychology," *Theological Studies* 80 no. 2 (2019): 293–327.

[32] For the impact of Darwinism around the globe, see for example, Alexander Vucinich, *Darwin in Russian Thought* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988); James Pusey, *China and Charles Darwin*; Adriana Novoa and Alex Levine, *From Man to Ape: Darwinism in Argentina, 1870–1920* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2012); Marwa S. Elshakry, *Reading Darwin in Arabic, 1860–1950* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2013); Bernhard Lightman, *Global Spencerism: The Communication and Appropriation of a British Evolutionist* (Leiden: Brill, 2015).

understanding post-modernity, post-secularity, and the function and meaning of being religious in the era of globalized inequality.

Together, these socio-spiritual movements deserve scholarly attention because they push the boundary of what is thinkable within a scientific yet unjust world. Looking through their eyes, scholars gain a different perspective to understand social injustice and thereby to recover the aspirations and social imaginations of the marginalized people or those who sidestepped power strongholds.

More specifically, this shared spiritual horizon of concern alerts us that the birth of socially engaged Buddhism is not just a Buddhist story. Instead, it points out the need to understand SEB as a movement that grew out of a simultaneous social turn of religious traditions and inter-religious cross-breeding, whose exact contour is still waiting to be drawn by scholars with a discerning eye.

This dissertation has taken the first step in mapping out a global pre-history of socially engaged Buddhism. A brief review of the birth of SEB can already reveal its complicated origins. It is well-known that the renowned Vietnamese Buddhist monk Thich Nhat Hanh first coined this English term in 1967, when he credited the Chinese monk Taixu's reformist movement (1911-present) as an inspiration.[33] However, in 2008, Thich Nhat Hanh changed his story and retrospectively linked SEB to his 1964 Vietnamese term *dao phat di vao cuoc doi* (lit: Buddhism entering life).[34] Recent studies by DeVido and others have also pointed out a range of Chinese, Vietnamese, and French terms that are seen to be equivalents of the English term SEB.[35]

Despite the murky origins of SEB, it is undeniable that Thich Nhat Hanh's movement only gained traction after the Civil Rights activist Martin Luther King nominated Thich Nhat Hanh for the

[33] The earliest printed record of this new term in English is in Thich Nhat Hanh's 1967 book, see Nhất Hạnh, *Vietnam: Lotus in a Sea of Fire* [1st ed.] (New York: Hill and Wang, 1967). In this 1967 narration, Thich Nhat Hanh credited the Chinese monk Taixu for inspiring his own Buddhist reform.

[34] Thich Nhat Hanh, "History of Engaged Buddhism: A Dharma Talk by Thich Nhat Hanh—Hanoi, Vietnam, May 6–7, 2008," *Human Architecture* 6 no. 3 (2008): 29–36.

[35] For in-depth analysis of the emergence of this term SEB, especially the influence of the Chinese Monk Taixu and international politics in the 1920s Vietnam, see Elise D. DeVido, "The Influence of Chinese Master Taixu on Buddhism in Vietnam," *Journal of Global Buddhism* 10 (2009): 413–58.

Nobel Peace Prize in 1967 for this Buddhist monk's promotion of world peace.[36] Moreover, it is also undeniable that in Thich Nhat Hanh's 1967 monograph, it is the Catholic mythic, Trappist monk, theologian, writer, avid reader of Eastern religions,[37] and social activist,[38] Thomas Merton (1915 – 1968) who prefaced it. In Merton's preface, he highlighted Thich Nhat Hanh's movement a "renewed and 'engaged' Buddhism." This brief recount indicates three phases of the transformation of Buddhism in Vietnam that led to the rise of SEB as we know it today: 1) the emergence of a Buddhist social consciousness under the colonial condition, 2) the increasing awareness of monastic reform as a means to resist structural injustice imposed by the French colonial rule since the 1930s, and 3) its international recognition as a new and engaged Buddhism since 1967 as a result of inter-religious dialogues.

This new lens also puts a timely correction to the unexamined use of SEB in existing studies. Scholars often apply this new label SEB to diverse modern Buddhist movements that originated much earlier and outside Vietnam. Some scholars even claimed that SEB has become the fourth vehicle (yāna) of Buddhism, anachronistically merged Dr. Ambedkar's words in October 1956 that termed his own Dalit Buddhist movement a *navayāna* (new vehicle) with Thich Nhat Hanh 1967 first use of SEB. They often justify this cursory equation based on the convergence of both movements with literal democratic values and once again ground their scholarship on an unexamined belief in the hierarchy of Western values vs. Eastern practices.[39]

To revert this Western gaze and to avoid anachronistic projection, it is helpful to examine the global circulation of ideas before 1967 through the socio-soteriological lens. The binocular illuminates how Buddhist social consciousness emerged from diverse local responses to the global

[36] Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., "Nomination for Thich Nhat Hanh for the Nobel Peace Prize," January 25, 1967, http://www.hartford-hwp.com/archives/45a/025.html.

[37] For his exploration of Eastern religions, see for example, Thomas Merton, *On Eastern Meditation*, ed. Bonnie Bowman Thurston (New York: New Directions Pub. Corp., 2012).

[38] For Merton's activism, see for example, James Thomas Baker, *Thomas Merton, Social Critic: A Study* (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2009).

[39] Christopher S. Queen, "Introduction: A New Buddhism," in *Engaged Buddhism in the West*, ed. Christopher Queen (Boston, Mass.: Wisdom Publications, 2000), 22–26. For an English translation of Dr. Ambedkar's famous Oct. 14th, 1956 speech where he first mentioned this new way (navayāna), see http://www.columbia.edu/itc/mealac/pritchett/00ambedkar/txt_ambedkar_conversion.html.

rise of social reality as an independent category and how different socio-soteriological movements gave rise to the international recognition of SEB as both a cultural force and a legitimate Buddhist movement. In this way, this new lens enables scholars to critically examine shared threads between known SEB groups on the same footing with different forms of seemingly anti-engaged Buddhism, e.g., Buddhist Nationalism, Theravada Buddhist society, Sōka Gakkai, and analyze how different political formations such as conservative social hierarchy and imperialism has impacted a broad spectrum of modern Buddhist quests for a new sociality in Asian settings.

Once we start exploring this complicated history of the emergence of Buddhist social consciousness, it becomes evident that the birth of SEB in 1967 is an outcome of multiple global and inter-religious dialogues. The dialogue between Dr. King and Thich Nhat Hanh was merely one recent episode. To do our scholarly due diligence, we ought to ask more probing questions: Was it a mere coincidence that Thich Nhat Hanh's SEB only gained international attention after he met Dr. King? How has this reception history molded the continual doctrinal innovations in SEB movements? To what extent did Black Social Gospel shape the birth of SEB and its later trajectories? To what extent is SEB a form of Black Buddhism? How has the international consciousness, e.g., the mid-twentieth century fervor of Afro-Asia solidarity, the global trend of "Darker Nations" unite,[40] Howard and Sue Thurmans' six-month southern Asian trip that culminated in a "Pilgrimage of Friendship" in India, the rise of Dr. Ambedkar's Dalit Buddhist movement, and Dr. King's fascination with Eastern spirituality represented by Gandhi and Tagore, molded the emergence and continual unfolding of SEB?

The ensuing rise of diverse international Buddhist organizations such as Taiwan's Tsu-Chi, Japan's Sōka Gakkai, Thich Nhat Hanh's Order of Interbeing and many others also compel us to view the emergence of SEB as a multicentered nonlinear process. The Buddhist path to modernity was not a linear history about European and North American invention of a Protestant Buddhism through their colonial adventures and romanticization of the exotic East. On the contrary, it involved many

[40] See for example, Vijay Prashad, *The Darker Nations: A People's History of the Third World* (New York: New Press, 2007).

crisscrosses of people, ideas, books, translations, and objects. More than a few Western spiritual seekers who looked to the East, the rise of SEB involved several generations of Buddhist actors around the globe who endeavored to revive genuine Buddhism in their own locale. And yet, their dreams were no less global than the Western universalism: They hoped to spread their respectively renewed Buddhisms to the West in order to awaken the globe from the spell of materialism and to save the world from the Darwinist competition.

To See a World in a Grain of Sand

I consider it my scholarly due diligence to uncover these marginalized voices by refusing to evaluate their impact solely on the number of followers. In contrast to monk Taixu's endeavor that can claim a direct link to the birth of SEB, Lü's societal experiment is hardly registered in the minds of contemporary Chinese Buddhists. The only cultural memory remained of him is his scholarship. His marginalized revolutionary vision nonetheless reveals to us many similar social imaginaries during the May Fourth era that drew moral sources from the Buddhist past.

Undoubtedly, as the only lay-led community that has functioned as the citadel of textual authenticity, with neither imperial sanction nor monastic guidance, the Inner Learning Institute's scholarly reputation hinged crucially on Lü's intellectual achievements. In contemporary Chinese society, academia has definitive power in adjudicating the authenticity of any Buddhist text. Furthermore, if Buddhist monasteries want to claim authenticity, they often have to ground their claims in solid evidence and rigorous research methodology.[41] From hindsight, Lü was precocious in his 1924 proposal of comparative hermeneutics, the first Buddhicized scientific method that not only established his national and international status as a Buddhologist but also won the China Inner Learning Institute its independence from both monastics and nationalist government. His

[41] Douglas M. Gildow, "Buddhist Monastic Education," 11. This power play between the secular academic institutions and the monastics is actually more complex and Gildow's dissertation provides a much more nuanced analysis.

professionalization of Buddhist learning with systematic footnotes still wins him admirers in academia to this day.[42]

However, I hope this dissertation has unveiled a much bigger picture of this new form of Buddhist scholarship: The project of the Inner Learning Institute was a spirited revolution of consciousness, reconceptualizing Buddhist scholarship as social critiques to build an intersubjective oneness. As such, the history of the Institute and Lü's lifetime endeavor provide us a new window to understand more broadly the religious transformation in modern China.

Heeding attention to the global vision and revolutionary intent, this recount of Lü's revolutionary journey highlights a critical feature of the modern transformation of Buddhism in China: More than a this-worldly turn and a disenchantment that indicates a devaluation of religious truths, Lü's scholarship affirmed the value of Yogācāra spirituality that served to bring forth the social turn of Buddhist soteriology, the refutation of the commodity fetishism, and enchantment of social evolution.

Equally important, by tracing Lü's continual effort to reorient Buddhist doctrines to justify diverse social imaginaries, I also unveil the Buddhist footing of the long Chinese socialist experiment from 1911 to 1976. I argue that "China's long *societist* experiment" must include novel Buddhist experiments—experiments that interrogated the imported category of social reality and extended it into the realm of soteriology.[43]

Perhaps a bonus of seeing the Chinese revolution as a societist experiment is as follows. It helps us to recognize that the spirit of the May Fourth is much more than an echo of the French Revolution. The May Fourth spirit enacted by Lü and his cohort still finds its contemporary resonances around the globe, as manifested in the Quixotic impulses in Rabbi Lerner's and Valarie Kaur's revolutionary love, Rev. angel Kyodo williams's radical dharma, and Dalai Lama's call for a

[42] For example, the renowned Buddhist studies scholar Huang Xianian identified the institute's journal Inner Learning as the precursor of the academic studies of Buddhism. See, Huang Xianian 黄夏年, "Zhongguo jindai fojiao xueshu kanwu de xianqu 'Nei xue'" 中国近代佛教学术刊物先驱《内学》[The Forerunner of Modern Chinese Buddhist Studies Journal], *Sheijie zongjiao wenhua* 世界宗教文化 no. 2 (2006): 61.

[43] Wang Hui, *China's Twentieth Century*, 8.

revolution of compassion. We should recognize the May Fourth spirit as part of a global spiritual aspiration: an ever-renewed search for a human moral agency in the Darwinist jungle imbued with the uneasiness of uncertainty, a spirit of open exploration, a sense of mission, and, most importantly, hope.

APPENDIX I. EXTANT SCHOLARLY WRITINGS BY LÜ CHENG[1]

I. Collations

Zangyao 藏要[Essentials of a New Buddhist Canon]. Reprint of 1929–1935. Nanjing: Jinling Sūtra Press, 2002.

Xinbian hanwen dazangjing 新编汉文大藏经目录 [*A New Catalogue of the Chinese Buddhist canon*]. First edition. Jinan: Qilu shushe, 1980.

Han Zang Fojiao guanxi shiliao ji 漢藏佛教關係史料集 [A Collection of Historical Materials related to Sino-Tibetan Buddhism]. Chengdu: Huaxi xiehe daxue Zhongguo wenhua yanjiusuo 華西協合大學中國文化研究所, 1942.

II. Monographs (including translated works)

Xiyang meishu shi 西洋美術史 [The History of Western Arts]. Shanghai: The Commercial Press, 1922.

Shengming lue 聲明略 [A Summary of Hetuvidyā]. Nanjing: Zhina Neixue yuan, January 1922.

Meixue qianshuo 美學淺說 [A Elementary Introduction of Aesthetics]. Shanghai: The Commercial Press, 1923.

Meixue gailun 美學概論 [A Summary of Aesthetics]. Shanghai: The Commercial Press, 1923.

Xiandai meixue sichao 現代美學思潮 [Modern Trends in Aesthetics]. Shanghai: The Commercial Press, April 1923.

Wanjin meixue sichao 晚近美學思潮 [Recent Trends in Aesthetics]. Shanghai: The Commercial Press, July 1924. Reprint of Modern Trends of Aesthetics, April 1923.

Yindu fojiao shi luo 印度佛教史略 [A Summary of the History of Indian Buddhism]. Shanghai: The Commercial Press, 1925.

Fodian fanlun 佛典汎論 [A Summary of Buddhist Scriptures]. Shanghai: The Commercial Press, October 1925.

Fojiao yanjiu fa 佛教研究法 [Methodologies in Studying Buddhism]. Shanghai: The Commercial Press, 1926.

Yinming gangyao 因明綱要 [An Outline of Hetuvidyā]. Shanghai: The Commercial Press, 1926.

Secaixue gangyao 色彩學綱要 [An Outline of the Theory of Colors]. Shanghai: The Commercial Press, 1926.

Guohua jiaocai gailun 國畫教材概論 [A Summary of Textbooks of Chinese Painting]. Shanghai: Zhonghua [Chunghwa] shuju, 1927.

[1] For a partial collection of Lü's works on Buddhism, see http://buddhism.lib.ntu.edu.tw/DLMBS/author/authorinfo.jsp?ID=36121.

Xizang foxue yuanlun 西藏佛學原論 [On the Origin and Essence of Tibetan Buddhism]. Shanghai: The Commercial Press, 1933.

Yindu foxue yuanliu luejiang 印度佛學源流略講 [Lectures of A Summary of the Origin and Development of Indian Buddhism]. Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chuban she, 1979.

Zhongguo foxue yuanliu luejiang 中國佛學源流略講 [Lectures of A Summary of the Origin and Development of Chinese Buddhism]. Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1979.

Yinming ruzheng lilun jiangjie 因明入正理論講解 [Lecture and Explanation of Nyāya praveśatāka śāstra]. Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1983.

III. Journal and Newspaper Articles[2]

"Meishu geming" 美術革命 [Aesthetic Revolution]. *New Youth* 新青年 6, no. 1 (January 15, 1919).

Cheng Shu 澄叔 [Lü Cheng]. "Liboshi meixue dayao" 栗泊士美學大要 [An Outline of Lippsian Aesthetics]. *Dongfang zazhi* 東方雜誌 17, no. 5 (1920).

"Meishu de jichu" 美術的基礎 [The Basics of Arts]. *Dongfang zazhi* 17, no. 9 (1920).

"Shuo mei yishi de xingzhi" 說美意識的性質 [On the Nature of Aesthetic Consciousness]. *Meiyu* 美育 1 (1920).

"Meishu piping de genju" 美術批評的根據 [Grounds for Art Critique]. *Meishu* 美術 [Fine Arts] 2, no. 4 (March 1921).

"Meishupin yu meishujia de renge" 美術品與美術家的人格 [On Artwork and the Mettle of the Artist]. *Fine Arts* 2, no. 4 (March 1921).

"Wanjin de meixuehsuo he meide yuanli" 晚近的美學說和美的原理, *Jiaoyu zazhi* 教育雜誌 14, no. 2 and no. 3 (February and March 1922).

"Weilaipai huajia zhi zhuzhang" 未來派畫家之主張 [The Viewpoints of Futurist Artists]. *Fine Arts* 2, no. 4 (March 1921).

"Bogesen zhexue yu weishi" 柏格森哲學與唯識 [Bergsonian Philosophy and Yogācāra]. *Minduo* 民鐸 [The People's Bell] 3, no. 1 (December 1921).

"Meishu piping shi zenyang yihuishi? " 美術批評是怎樣一回事? [What is Aesthetic Critique]. *Xuedeng—Shishi xinbao fukan* 學燈—時事新報副刊 [The Lamp of Learning: A Supplementary Section of *The New Newspaper of Current Events*]. July 14, 1921.

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"Shicen wuxiong zuoyou" 石岑吾兄左右[To my brother Shicen]. *Jiaoyu zazhi* 14, no. 1 (January 1922).

"Du Zhang Dongsun zhi 'Du dongxi wenhua jiqi zhexue'" 讀張東蓀之《讀東西文化及其哲學》[On Reading Zhang Dongsun's 'On reading Eastern-Western Culture and Their Philosophy]. *Xuedeng*. March 29, 1922.

[2] I omit the pager numbers because the page numbers are not necessary to locate these articles online. All articles are accessible through the online database—Quan guo bao kan suo yin 全国报刊索引 https://www-cnbksy-com.ezproxy.princeton.edu/. Accessed March 2015–March 2020.

"Meishu fazhan de tujing" 美術發展的途徑 [The Path of Aesthetic Development], *Fine Arts* 3, no. 2 (May 1922).

Lü Cheng and Tang Zhe'an 唐哲安. "Guanyu 'yishu piping he chuangzuo' wenti taolun de jifengxin" 關於'藝術批評和創作'問題討論底幾封信 [Several Letters Discussing the Issues of Art Critique and Creation]. *Fine Arts* 3, no. 2 (May 1922)

"Meishu chengxing zhi jingguo" 美術成形之經過 [The Path of the Formation of Art]. *Xuedeng.* November 24, 1922.

"Lü Cheng zhi Li Shicen han" 呂澂致李石岑函 [A Letter From Lü Cheng to Li Shicen]. *Minduo* 3, no. 2 (1922).

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"Yishu yu meiyu" 藝術與美育 [Art and Aesthetic Education]. *Jiaoyu zazhi* 14, no. 10 (October 1922).

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"Xianyang shengjia lun dayi"《顯揚聖教論》大意 [Main Points of *Acclamation of the Holy Teaching*], *Inner Learning* 1 (1924): 87–105.

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Lü Cheng and Feng Chaoru 馮超如, "Lengqie busiyi xunbian wei xianshi yi" 楞伽不思議熏變為現識義 [The Meaning of Transforming Inconceivable Perfuming into Manifesting Consciousness in Laṅkâvatāra Sūtra]. *Inner Learning* 1 (1924): 267–270.

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Lü Cheng and Shi Yicang. " 'Guansuoyuan lun' huiyi" 《觀所緣論》會譯 [A Comparison and Translation of *Investigation of Ālambana*]. *Inner Learning* 4 (1928): 123–155.

"Lun Zang yiben zhi tezheng" 論奘譯本之特徵 [On the Characteristics of Xuanzang's Translation]. *Inner Learning* 4 (1928): 156–164.

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Lü Cheng and Shi Yincang. " 'Yinming zhengli men lunben' zhengwen" 《因明正理門論本》證文 [An Exegesis of *Hetuvidyā-nyāya-dvāra-śāstra*]. *Inner Learning* 4 (1928): 237–264.

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"Lüxue chongguang de xianjue wenti" 律學重光的先決問題 [The Prerequisites for Reviving Vinaya Studies]. *Xiandai foxue* 1953, no. 8.

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"Zhengjue yu chuli" 正覺與出離 [Right Awakening and Naiṣkāmya]. *Xiandai foxue* 1953, no. 10 and 11.

"Fojiao bianzhengfa" 佛家辯證法 [Buddhist Dialectics]. *Xiandai foxue* 1954, no. 1.

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"Huayan zong" 華嚴宗 [The Huayan School]. *Xiandai foxue* 1954, no. 8.

"Chan zong" 禪宗[The Chan School]. *Xiandai foxue* 1954, no. 11 and 12.

"Guanyu Xuanzang fashi shengzu niandai yu liuxue Nalantuo si de zhengwu" 關於玄奘法師生卒年代與留學那爛陀寺的正誤 [Correcting Mistakes about Dharma Master Xuanzang's Birth and Death Year and His Studying Abroad in Nālandā Monastery]. *Xiandai foxue* 1954, no. 12.

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"Lueping fanyinben yanyi *Tianyan lun* yiwen ji jiaokan" 略評翻印本嚴譯《天演論》譯文及校勘 [A Brief Comment on the Reprinted Yan Fu's Translation *Tianyan lun*—its Translation and Collation]. Edited by Xiao Yongming. Zhongguo zhexueshi 2012, no. 4.

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"*Lengqie* guanwang yi"《楞伽》觀妄義, May 26, 1930

"*Jingangjing* sanyi" 《金剛經》三義, September 12, 1937

[3] All of the lecture notes are collected in Xuanji 1991. Here, I only list the title of the lecture notes. I will also list the date of a lecture note, if known.

"*Lengqie—rulaizang zhang* jiangyi"《楞伽-如來藏章》講義, April 1943

"Tan yuanxue" 談院學, June 2, 1943 (A talk given on the Hundred-day Memorial Ceremony of Master Ouyang's passing away)

"Tan zhenru" 談真如, June 4, 1943

"Neixue yuan foxue wuke Jiangxi gangyao" 內院佛學五科講習綱要, drafted by September 1943.

"Neixue yuan foxue wuke Jiangxi gangyao jiangji" 內院佛學五科講習綱要講記, given on October 1, 1943 in Sichuan

"Tan 'xue' yu renzhi zijue" 談 "學"與人之自覺, talk given on November 25, 1944, the Institute's Fellows' Forum

"Fofa yu Shijian" 佛法與世間, talk given on November 13, 1945, the Institute's Fellows' Forum

"Foxing yi" 佛性義, , talk given in July 1946, the Institute's Fellows' Forum

"Zhongxing yi" 種性義, August 1, 1946

"Tan fomie niandai" 談佛滅年代, October, 1946

" *Bian zhongbianlun* yaoyi" 《辯中邊論》要義

"Fajie shiyi" 法界釋義

"*Fajujing* jiangyao"《法句經》講要

"*Apitan xinlunsong* jiangyao"《阿毗曇心論頌》講要

"*Nengduan jingangboruo jing* jiangyao" 《能斷金剛般若經》講要

"*Putiziliang lun song* jiangyao"《菩提資糧論頌》講要

"*Moheyan baoyanjing* jiangyao"《摩訶衍寶嚴經》講要

"*Bianzhongbianlun* jiangyao"《辯中邊論》講要

"*Shengmanfuren shizihou jing* jiangyao"《胜鬘夫人獅子吼經》講要

"*Dacheng fajie wuchabie jing* jiangyao"《大乘法界無差別經》講要

"*Qingjing pini fangguang jing* jiangyao"《清淨毗尼方廣經》講要

"*Yuqie pusajieben* jiemo jiangyao"《瑜珈菩薩戒本》羯磨講要

"*Jietuodoa lun—fenbieding pin* jiangyao"《解脫道論-分別定品》講要

"*Liumen jiaoshou xidinglun* jiangyao"六門教授習定論講要

"*Miaofa lianhuajing—fangbian pin* jiaoyao"《妙法蓮華經-方便品》講要

"*Da banniepan jing—zhengfa fen* jiangyao"《大般涅槃經-正法分》講要

"*Rulengqie jing* jiangji"《入楞伽經》講記

"*Baizilun* shi"《百字論》釋

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APPENDIX II. SELECTED SECONDARY STUDIES ON LÜ CHENG IN CHINESE [1]

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Du Jiwen 杜继文. "Lü Cheng foxue sixiang chutan—wei jinian jinling kejingchu chengli 130 zhounian zuo" 吕澂佛学思想初探—为纪念金陵刻经处成立 130 周年作. *Shijie zongjiao yanjiu* 世界宗教研究 1998.1:31–35.

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[1] I omitted publications that are less than two pages or only mentions Lü Cheng in passing.

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APPENDIX III. FIVE DISCIPLINES AND THREE CYCLES

Table 1. The Curriculum

	The First Cycle	The Second Cycle	The Third Cycle
The Essential Teaching[1]	**Original Quiescence** [2]	**Revolutionizing Consciousness (Skt: *āśrayaparivṛtti*)** [3]	**One True-reality Realm** [4]
Abhidharma	*Dhammapada* [5] *The Heart of Abhidharma* [6]	*An Abhidharmic Reading of the Four Āgamas* [7] *Root Verses of Abhidharma-kośa-bhāṣya* [8] *Root Verses of Mahāyānābhidharmasūtra* [9] *Compendium of Abhidharma* [10]	*Compendium of Dharma* [11] *Treatise on Entering Abhidharma* [12] *Treatise on the Four Noble Truths* [13] *Selections from Kathā-vatthu* [14]

[1] *Yaoyi* 要義

[2] Xingji 性寂

[3] *Zhuanyi* 轉依; Skt: *āśrayaparivṛtti*. This cycle is most essential, Lü deemed it the true essence of all disciplines (*geke zhengzong* 各科正宗)

[4] *Yizhen fajie* 一真法界. It is used interchangeably with *yifajie* 一法界.

[5] Lü used the edition in *Essentials*, collated with both Pāli and several Chinese translations.

[6] *Apidamo xin lun* 阿毗達摩心論 T1550

[7] *Siahan pitan du* 四阿含經毗曇讀. I cannot identify this treatise. But Lü deemed it an essential text to illustrate the profound teaching of *āśrayaparivṛtti* (*zhuanyi* 轉依) that was implied but not properly understood by the Hīnayānins, Xuanji 1991, 589–90. According to Lü, this treatise of Abhidharmic Reading of Four Āgamas has 16 volumes and multiple translations in Jin 晉 and Song 宋 dynasties, which the Institute had collated. He commented that, based on this treatise, "one can know that [in the four Āgamas] there has been the original meaning of 'āśrayaparivṛtti'. It is a pity that Hīnayāna Abhidharma never truly understand this [deep] meaning" (*kezhi yuanyou 'zhuanyi' zhiyi. Xihu Xiaocheng Pitan Zhong bude qijie ye* 可知原有「轉依」之義。惜乎小乘毗曇終不得其解也). See also Xuanji 1991, 61819.

[8] *Apidamo jushe lun song* 阿毗達摩俱舍論頌. The root verses extracted from T1558 and T1559.

[9] *Dacheng apidamo jing song* 大乘阿毗達摩經頌. Reconstructed from Mahāyānasaṃgrahaśāstra (1st collection of *Essentials*) and *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra* (2nd collection of *Essentials*).

[10] *Dacheng Apidamo jilun* 大乘阿毗達摩集論 T1606. Skt: *Abhidharma-samuccaya*. Lü suggests reading it alongside T1605, *Dacheng Apidamo zajilun* 大乘阿毘達磨雜集論. T1605 is compiled by Sthiramati and translated by Xuanzang.

[11] Zhufa jiyao jing 諸法集要經 T728. Skt: Dharma-samuccaya.

[12] Ru apidamo lun 入阿毘達磨論 T1554. Skt: Abhidharma-āvatāra-prakaraṇa.

[13] *Sidi lun* 四諦論 T1647.

[14] *Lunshi biaomu* 論事標目. Lü himself selected and edited this text based Pāli *Kathā-vatthu*, using A. C. Taylor's edition 1894–897. Lü used it to collate *Yibu zonglun lun* 異部宗輪論 T2031 and the Tibetan translation *Bshung lugs kyi bye brag bkod pa'i 'khor lo* བཤུང་ལུགས་ཀྱི་བྱེ་བྲག་བཀོད་པའི་འཁོར་ལོ.

Prajñā	*The Diamond Sūtra* [15] *Root Verses of Resources for Bodhi* [16]	*The Vimalakīrti Sūtra* [17] *The Sūtra on the Great Perfection of Wisdom* [18] *The Treatise on the Great Perfection of Wisdom* [19] *Fundamental Verses on the Middle Way* [20]	*The Great Perfection of Wisdom · The Mañjuśrī Chapter* [21] *A Compendium of the Perfection of Wisdom* [22] *Commentary on The Four Hundred [Stanzas of Madhyamaka]* [23] *Jewels in the Hand Treatise* [24]
	The Great Ornament Sūtra [25]	*Noble sūtra of the Explanation of the Profound Secrets*[27]	*Seven selected Chapters from the Avataṃsaka Sūtra* [31]

[15] *Nengduan Jingangjing* 能斷金剛經. Lü used the edition from *Essentials*, collated with multiple Chinese translations and the Sanskrit and Tibetan versions.

[16] *Puti ziliang lunsong* 菩提資量論頌. This is a collection of root verses extracted from the treatise T1660 attributed to Nāgārjuna. This is a representative of what P. J. Harter named the genre of "path literature" in Buddhism, a theory of bodhisattva path. See Pierre-Julien Harter, "Spiritual Exercises and the Buddhist Path: An Exercise in Thinking with and against Hadot," in *Buddhist Spiritual Practices*, 147–79.

[17] Weimojie suoshuo jing 維摩詰所說經 T475. Skt: Vimalakīrti-nirdeśa-sūtra.

[18] Mohe boruo boruomi jing 摩訶般若波羅密經 T223. Skt: *Mahā-prajñā-pāramitā-sūtra*.

[19] Da zhidu lun 大智度論 T1509. Skt: Mahā-prajñā-pāramitā-śāstra.

[20] Zhonglun song 中論頌 T1564. Skt: Mūla-madhyamaka-kārikā.

[21] *Da boruojing · Manshushili* fen 大般若經·曼殊室利分 T220, fascicles 574 and 575.

[22] Fomu boruo yuanji yaoyi lun 佛母般若圓集要義論 T1518. Skt: *Prajñāpāramitā-saṅgraha-kārikā*. Tib: shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin ma bsdus pa'i tshig le'ur byas pa ཤེས་རབ་ཀྱི་ཕ་རོལ་ཏུ་ཕྱིན་མ་བསྡུས་པའི་ཚིག་ལེའུར་བྱས་པ་. I have photocopy of Lü's own collation of this text with the Tibetan translation. This text is not included in *Essentials*. This text is attributed to the Yogācārin Dignāga.

[23] *Guang bailun shi* 廣百論釋 T1571. This treatise is attributed to Dharmapāla in Nālandā, translated by Xuanzang. It is a commentary on the influential Madhyamaka treatise by Āryadeva, Nāgārjuna's chief disciple, *Catuḥśataka-śāstra-kārika* also translated into Chinese by Xuanzang *Guang bailun* 廣百論 T1570.

[24] *Dacheng zhagnzhen lun* 大乘掌珍論 T1578. Skt: *Hasta-maṇi* or *Mahāyāna-karatala-ratna-śāstra*. Tib: This Mādhyamika work from the Svātantrika sect is attributed to Bhāvaviveka.

[25] *Moheyan baoyanjing* 摩訶衍寶嚴經 T351. Skt: *Mahāratnapratimaṇḍita-sūtra*. It is also known as *Kāśyapaparivarta*. Lü included it in the 3rd collection of *Essentials* under a different title—*Bajijing puminghui·fu yujia shi* 寶積經普明會·附瑜伽釋 [The Sūtra of the Heap of Jewels—The Chapter of Bodhisattva Universal Radiance's Assembly]. Lü considers it equivalent to the Tibetan translation (translated by Viśeṣamitra, Ch: Shengyou 勝友; Tib: Khyad par bzhes gnyen ཁྱད་པར་བཞེས་གཉེན, titled "The Chapter of Kāśyapa" (*jiashepin* 迦葉品; Tib: *'od srung gi le'u* འོད་སྲུང་གི་ལེའུ).

[27] This sūtra is widely considered by both Buddhists and scholars alike as the most important sūtra of the Yogācāra school. *Jie shenmi jing* 解深密經 T676. Skt: *Ārya-saṃdhi-nirmocana-sūtra.* Tib: *dgongs pa nges 'grel* དགོངས་པ་ངེས་འགྲེལ. For an English translation see, Thomas F. Cleary, *Buddhist Yoga: A Comprehensive Course* (Boston: Shambhala, 1995).

[31] *Huayan qipin song ben* 華嚴七品頌本 T279. As indicated in the table, this is Lü's own selection of seven chapters from the Tang translation of the *Avataṃsaka Sūtra*. The most important chapter in Lü's selection is the chapter on the bodhisattva ten stages, *Daśabhūmika Sūtra* (Ch: *Shidi jing* 十地經), which was also

Yogācāra	*Verses Distinguishing the Middle and the Extremes* [26]	*Yogācāra-bhūmi: Bodhisattva-bhūmi* [28] *Acclamation of the Holy Teaching* [29] *Compendium of the Great Vehicle* [30]	*Explanation of the Investigation of Objective Bases* [32] *The Jewel-Arising Treatise on Establishing Consciousness-only* [33]

circulated independently and has multiple Chinese translations. Most importantly, there are two treatise on this sūtra that are preserved in Chinese translations, one attributed to the Madhyamaka master Nāgārjuna (*Shizhu piposha lun* 十住毗婆沙論 T1521) and the other attributed to the founder of Yogācāra Vasubandhu (*Shidijing lun* 十地經論 T1522; Skt: *Daśabhūmikasūtra-śāstra*). For the other six selected chapters, see Xuanji 1991, 633–634.

[26] Bian zhongbian lun song 辯中邊論頌 T1601. Skt: Madhyānta-vibhāga-kārikā.

[28] *Yuqie shidi lun bendifen pusadi* 瑜伽師地論本地分菩薩地 T1579. This is a chapter of the hugely influential and encyclopaedic compendium of Yogācāra school translated by Xuanzang. But this chapter itself was also circulated independently and had been translated into Chinese multiple times before Xuanzang's time.

For the purpose of this chapter, it is particularly interesting to note that, in Ouyang's preface of this text in 1940, he periodized the bodhisattva paths into four cycles (*sizhou* 四周). But this is periodized in terms of explication sequences: The first cycle explains the cause and effect on this path; the next three cycles explain the differences among the bodhisattva achievements or effects of bodhisattva practices. This is different from Lü Cheng's three cycles that map out progressive stages on this path. Ouyang, "Zangyao diyiji xu · Yuqieshidilun pusadi" 藏要一輯敘·瑜伽師地論菩薩地, *Essentials* vol. 4, 8–10.

[29] *Xianyang shengjiao lun* 顯揚聖教論 T1602. Skt: *Ārya-deśanā-vikhyapāna*. Recall that, as early as 1924, Lü commented on this treatise. Inspired by the text's emphasis on *mātṛka* (the mother of doctrines), Lü started his research on the mātṛka of *Yogācārabhūmi* and the four *Āgamas*. See, Lü Cheng, "Xianyang shengjia lun dayi" [Main Points of *Acclamation of the Holy Teaching*], *Inner Learning* 1 (1924): 87–105.

[30] She dacheng lun ben 攝大乘論本 T1594. Skt: Mahāyānasaṃgrahaśāstra.

[32] *Guansuoyuan lun shi* 觀所緣緣論釋 T1168. Skt: *Ālambana-parīkṣa*. Note that this is the treatise that Lü translated and collated with Tibetan and Sanskrit versions in 1927. Lü, "Guan suoyuan shilun huiyi" 觀所緣釋論會譯, *Inner Learning* 4 (1927): 1–33. I have demonstrated the significance of this text for theorizing a Yogācāra intersubjectivity in Chapters Three and Six. In 1943, Lü further claimed this text as the ultimate teaching of Yogācāra on the subject of objective basis (Skt: *ālambana*). See, Xuanji 1991, 634.

[33] *Chengweishi baosheng lun* 成唯識寶生論 T1591, this is Dharmapāla's commentary on Vasubandhu's *Viṃśika*. The central theme is the same as Vinītadeva's 調伏天 (or 律天; Tib: 'Dul ba lha/Dul ba'i lha/Dul ba lha) commentary titled "Weishi ershilun shishu 唯識二十論釋疏" [Explications of *Viṃśika*], which, according to Lü, explicates the phrase "sanjiesuoyou weishiyixin" 三界所有，唯是一心 [all that exist in the three realms is only one mind] in the *Avataṁsaka Sūtra* (T0279.10.194a26). For detailed analysis of this theme in Vinītadeva's treatise see, Liao Bensheng 廖本聖 and Shi Huimin 釋惠敏, "Zangben Tiaofutian 'Weishi ershi lun shishu' zhushi yanjiu" 藏本調伏天《唯識二十論釋疏》譯注研究 [The Tibetan Edition of Vinītadeva's nyi chu pa'i 'grel pa ཉི་ཤུ་པའི་འགྲེལ་པ།], *Chung-Hwa Buddhist Journal* 15 (2002):29–92. Though not explicitly stated, I suspect that Lü was trying to "correct" the popular rendering of Yogācāra teaching by the Chan masters as in "the three realms are only mind, the myriad dharmas are only consciousness" (*sanjieweixin wanfaweishi* 三界唯心萬法唯識) in the Republican era. For a survey of the common use of this phrase, see Hammerstrom, "The Expression "The Myriad Dharmas are Only Consciousness" in Early 20th Century Chinese Buddhism."

			Selections of Establishing Consciousness-only [34]
Nirvāṇa	*The Sūtra of the Lion's Roar of Queen Śrīmālā* [35] *Treatise on the Nonduality of Mahāyāna Dharmadhātu*[36]	*The Lotus Sūtra*[37] *Mahānirvāṇa Sūtra—The Chapter of True Dharma* [38] *Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra* [39] *Stanzas from the Treatise of the Ultimate One-Vehicle Jewel Lineage* [40]	*The Great Cloud Sūtra—The Chapter on the Great Assembly* [41] *The Sūtra on the Invisible Splendor of the Mahāyāna* [42]

[34] *Cheng Weishilun jieben* 成唯識論節本 T1585. This is a selection of Xuanzang's treatise. For the details of selected chapters, see Xuanji 1991, 635–36.

[35] *Shengman shizihou jing* 勝鬘獅子吼經 T353. Skt: *Śrīmālādevī Siṃhanāda Ekayāna Mahopāya Vaipulya Sūtra*. Lü recommended this to be read in conjunction with multiple alternate Chinese and Tibetan translations, see Xuanji 1991, 924.

[36] *Dacheng fajie wuchabie lun* 大乘法界無差別論 T1626. Lü recommended it to be read in conjunction with multiple alternate Chinese and Tibetan translation, see Xuanji 1991, 947–48.

[37] *Miaofa lianhua jing* 妙法蓮華經 T262. Lü considered this sūtra to be the overview of the Nirvāṇa discipline. Xuanji 1991, 625.

[38] *Dabanniepan jing· zhengfa fen* 大般涅槃經·正法分 T374, the section title "Ture Dharma" 正法 is not included in the original translation. Rather, he followed the sectioning from *A Treatise on the Nirvāṇa Sūtra* (*Niepanlun* 涅槃論) T1527 attributed to Vasubhandu. In *Essentials*, Lü provided a preface linking the old sectioning with his own sectioning, and justified his new sectioning of this scripture, see *Essentials* vol. 9, 1–8. I discuss the significance of this sūtra and the new sectioning in the next chapter.

[39] *Dacheng rulengqie jing* 大乘入楞伽經. Skt: *Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra*. The scripture that Lü included in his *Five Disciplines* is a Tang translation T672, a later version than the one translated then included in *Essentials* 楞伽阿跋多羅寶經 T670. For his justification for using this translation, see Xuanji 1991, 1216–217. However, in collating T670, Lü referred to all three translations of the *Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra* as well as Tibetan and Sanskrit editions, for Lü's collating notes, see *Essentials*, vol. 1, 881–82.

[40] *Jiujing yicheng baoxing lun ji* 究竟一乘寶性論偈 T1611. Lü only selected the verses in this text. Lü valued the stanzas in this text because they provide the method of reading the nirvāṇa sūtras and Tathāgatagarbha teachings—*jueze*, i.e. "discerning various teachings while analyzing and narrating a proper teaching as a resolution for a certain social or epistemological problem." See Xuanji 1991, 625. Unfortunately, Lü never lectured on this treatise so it is difficult to see what he understood as the "proper teachings" to build an intersubjective social oneness. However, given that the theme of the second cycle is *zhuanyi* 轉依 or *āśrayaparivṛtti*, my educated guess is that Lü wanted to use the Yogācāra definition of *āśrayaparivṛtti* to reinterpret Tathāgatagarbha doctrines. For the meaning of *āśrayaparivṛtti* in this treatise, see Takada Ninkaku 高田仁覚, "Hōshōron ni okeru tenne ni tsuite"寶性論における轉依 (āśrayaparivṛtti) について [On Āśrayaparivṛtti in the *Ratna-gotra-vibhāga Mahāyāna-uttaratantra-śāstra*], *Indogaku Bukkyogaku Kenkyū* 印度學佛教學研究 6, no. 2 (1958): 501–4.

[41] *Dafangdeng dayun jing · dazhong qiandu* 大方等大雲經·大眾揵度 T992. This is a selection from this sūtra. Lü considers this to be a different transmission of the *Nirvāṇa Sūtra*. Lü valued this chapter because it explicitly linked nirvāṇa with the theme of one true-reality realm grounded in dharma-realm dependent-origination (*fajie yuanqi* 法界緣起).

[42] *Dacheng miyan jing* 大乘密嚴經 T681. Skt: *Mahāyāna-ghana-vyūha-sūtra*. Lü valued this sūtra for its illustration of the Buddha's insight as originated from the originally quiescent *ālayavijñāna*. See, Xuanji 1991, 637–38.

			Treatise on the Buddha-Stage Sūtra [43]
Vinaya	*Vaipulya Sūtra of the Pure Vinaya* [44] *Yogācāra Bodhisattva Prātimokṣa Karman* [45]	*The Inquiry of the Householder Ugra* [46]	*Collection of Six Perfections Sūtra* [47] *Acts of the Buddha* [48]
Supplementary Readings	*The Path of Liberation* [49] *Six Doors of Teaching Dhyāna* [50]	*Introduction to Logic* [51] *Flower Ornament Sūtra· the Chapter on Cultivating Compassion* [52]	*Selected Passages from Compendium of Validities* [53] *Sūtra of the Questions of Bodhisattva Ākāśagarbha· The Section on Deciding and Selecting* [54]

[43] *Fodi jinglun* 佛地經論 T1530. Skt: *Buddhabhūmi-sūtra-śāstra*. Lü valued this treatise for its illustration of the Buddha's realm, i.e., one true-reality realm and the fruition of the originally quiescent *ālayavijñāna*. See, Xuanji 1991, 638–39.

[44] *Qingjing pini fangguang jing* 清淨毗尼方廣經 T1489. I will discuss Lü's use of this text in Chapter Eight.

[45] *Pusa jieben jiemo* 菩薩戒本羯磨 T1499. I will discuss Lü's use of this text in Chapter Eight.

[46] *Yujia zhangzhe suowen jing* 郁伽長者所問經. Lü's base text is a chapter from The Sūtra of the Heap of Jewels—the Nineteenth Chapter, The Assembly of the Elder Ugra (*Dabaoji jing· Yujia zhangzhe hui di shijiu* 大寶積經·郁伽長者會第十九 T310. 82). See also T322 and T323. I will discuss Lü's use of this text in Chapter Eight.

[47] *Liudu ji jing* 六度集經 T152. This is a Chinese translation of the Jātaka stories.

[48] *Fosuoxing zan* 佛所行讚 T192. This is a Chinese translation of the Jātaka stories.

[49] *Jietuodao lun* 解脫道論 T1648. I will discuss Lü's use of this text in the last section.

[50] *Liumen jiaoshou xiding lun* 六門教授習定論 T1607. I will discuss Lü's use of this text in the last section.

[51] Yiming ruzhengli lun 因明入正理論 T1630. Skt: Nyāyapraveśa.

[52] Dafangguangfo huayan jing · xiucifen 大方廣佛華嚴經·修慈分 T306.

[53] *Jilianglun jieben* 集量論釋節本. *Compendium of Validities* (Skt: *Pramāṇasamuccaya*) is a key text on Buddhist logic. I will discuss Lü's use of this text in the last section.

[54] Daji xukongzang suowen jing—juezefen 大集虛空藏所問經·抉擇分 T404. Skt: Mahāsaṃnipata-Ākāśagarbha-paripṛcchā-nirvedhabhāgīya. I will discuss Lü's use of this text in the last section.

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[1] Most of the non-Chinese items housed in Jinling Sūtra Press remain uncatalogued. In the winter of 2016, I catalogued the non-Chinese items that I was allowed to access. For access to this catalogue, please contact Jinling Sūtra Press.

[2] These items remain unarchived. I have obtained photographs of these items and am allowed to use relevant materials in my dissertation. But I do not have permission to circulate them.

[3] As for July 2017, Tao Fung Shan Christian Center is still cataloguing its collections. For access to the partial catalogue, please contact them directly.

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Printed Works in Chinese

Abbreviations:

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OJNWX Ouyang Jingwu. *Ouyang Jingwu xiansheng neiwai xue* 歐陽竟無先生內外學 [The Inner and Outer Learnings of Mr. Ouyang Jingwu], 30 vols. Chongqing: Zhina neixueyuan shuyuan, 1943. Nanjing: Jinling Sūtra Press, 2008.[5]

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[4] In editing *Essentials*, for Tibetan translations, Lü relied on the Dergé edition and some Peking edition of the Tibetan Canon acquired during the 1930s. Both editions are available online through Buddhist Digital Resource Center. Because philology is not the primary focus of this dissertation and because my study so far has not identified significant philological differences that are relevant to my historical, social, and philosophical arguments about Yogācāra socio-soteriology, I decide to reference the standard scholarly editions of Tibetan texts. For Lü's use of Tibetan references, readers should resort to Lü's editorial notes. For the same reason, I also reference Chinese translations through the standard Taisho edition.

[5] Articles from the OJNWX are cited by the volume and original folio number: e.g., Ouyang, "Title of essay," *Title of Volume 16* OJNWX 16: 10–12, indicates volume 16 of *Ouyang Jingwu xiansheng neiwaixue*, whose separate volume title is *Title of Volume 16*, and the cited item is in folios 10–12. Note that the folio numbers are arranged continuously only within one text but not within a volume. If the whole volume is cited, the title of this volume is not repeated: e.g., Ouyang, *Title of Volume 21*, OJNWX 21: 57–58 indicates volume 21 of *Ouyang Jingwu xiansheng neiwaxue*, whose volume title is *Title of Volume 21*, and the cited passage is in folios 57–58.

[6] There are three printed collections in this anthology. The first collection of twenty-five texts was printed in 1929. The second collection of twenty-seven texts was printed in 1935. In 1943, after Ouyang's passing away, the project was aborted. The third collection was not a coherent or planned publication. Rather, some of the texts were first published and circulated as independent texts during WWII (1937–1945) and were assembled together after 1949. For a summary of its publication and printing history, see the preface of this edition. In this 2002 reprint, there are ten volumes.

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[9] This journal contains many scholarly edited Sanskrit texts that Lü used to collate *Essentials*.

[10] All online sources are accessed March 2015–March 2020.

[11] I use Taisho instead of CBETA because Lü and Ouyang used many Taisho editions as their base texts in editing *Essentials*.

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