From the holdings of the Department of Special Collections , Princeton University Library, Princeton, NJ

These documents are either in the public domain, or can only be used for educational and research purposes (Fair use) as per U.S. Copyright law (text below). By accessing this file, all users agree that their use falls in the public domain or within fair use as defined by the copyrightlaw. We do not charge any permission or usage fees for the publication of images of material inour collections, including those provided by Princeton University Library, via our website, catalog, or directly from staff.For more information regarding copyright, credit, and citation please review the information onthe Copyright, Credit and Citation Guidelines page of our website.
https://library.princeton.edu/special-collections/policies/copyright-credit-and-citation-guidelines. If you have any questions, including how to order higher-quality images from the collection, contact Special Collections Public Services via our Ask Us! Form. https://library.princeton.edu/special-collections/ask-us

---

Doctoral Dissertations, 2011-2026 Classics

2019

Fifth-Century Athenian Imperialism and the Beginnings of Democracy in Western Asia Minor

Ejsmond-Frey, Alicia Madeleine

Princeton, NJ : Princeton University

---

http://arks.princeton.edu/ark:/88435/dsp01rb68xf74f

U.S. Copyright law: The copyright law of the United States (Title 17, §108, United States Code) governs the making of photocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. Under certain conditions specified in the law, libraries and archives are authorized to furnish a photocopy or other reproduction. One of these specified conditions is that the photocopy or reproduction is not to be used for any purpose other than private study, scholarship, or research. If a user makes a request for, or later uses, a photocopy or reproduction for purposes in excess of fair use that user may be liable for copyright infringement. This institution reserves the right to refuse to accept a copying order if, in its judgment, fulfillment of the order would involve a violation of copyright law. https://www.copyright.gov/title17/title17.pdf

FIFTH-CENTURY ATHENIAN IMPERIALISM AND THE BEGINNINGS OF DEMOCRACY IN WESTERN ASIA MINOR

Alicia Madeleine Ejsmond-Frey

A DISSERTATION

PRESENTED TO THE FACULTY

OF PRINCETON UNIVERSITY

IN CANDIDACY FOR THE DEGREE

OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

RECOMMENDED FOR ACCEPTANCE BY

THE DEPARTMENT OF

CLASSICS

Advisers: Nino Luraghi, Michael Flower

November 2019

© Copyright by Alicia Ejsmond-Frey, 2019. All rights reserved

Abstract

The coastal towns of Asia Minor were in a unique position in the fifth century, caught in the middle between the Athenian Empire to the west and the Persian Empire to the east. The Peace of Callias, if it existed, was meant to cease hostilities between the two powers but Persian intervention in towns allied with Athens continued over the course of the Pentecontaetia and the Peloponnesian War. In reality, it seems that neither side relinquished its claim to many of the towns of Asia Minor. As a result, towns like Erythrae, Miletus, Samos and Colophon found themselves torn between the two and beset by factional strife. With the exception of Samos, which never joined the tribute quota lists, there is good evidence that they continued to pay their Persian overlords even after they began paying tribute to Athens.

This dissertation argues for a history of Athens' allies on the coast of Asia Minor that tries to move away from Athenocentric assumptions about democracy and imperialism and focuses as much as possible on local evidence. The development of Athenian imperialism in the fifth century should be reconsidered in light of new developments in dating inscriptions. Now that the style of sigma used in an inscription no longer dictates its date, there is a need to reassess many Athenian inscriptions of the fifth century and their implications for the fifth century. In addition, recent scholarship has moved away from the idea that Athenian democracy was the original and the model for all other Greek democracies of the fifth century. Local evidence from Miletus and Erythrae suggests that both towns were interested in people power before Athens intervened in their political framework. In addition, I argue that Athens did not have a uniform procedure of setting up and supporting allied democracies but dealt with its allies on an ad hoc basis.

Table of Contents

Abstract iii

Acknowledgements v

Abbreviations vi

Introduction 1

Chapter 1: Samos 84

Chapter 2: Colophon 200

Chapter 3: Miletus 239

Chapter 4: Erythrae 342

Conclusion 452

Appendix A: The Regulations for Samos (*OR* 139) 460

Appendix B: The Regulations for Colophon (*IG* I³ 37) 461

Appendix C: The Regulations for Miletus and the Blutinschrift 463

Appendix D: The Regulations for Erythrae and inscriptions from Erythrae 466

Bibilography 471

Acknowledgements

It has been an immense privilege to be a part of the Classics department at Princeton and I thank everyone who has taught me and helped me through. I am particularly grateful to Nino Luraghi for guiding me through my dissertation, from my reading course in Princeton to our meetings in Oxford. I would like to thank Michael Flower and Lisa Kallet for their comments and their guidance throughout. I would also like to thank Stephen Tracy whose comments and thoughts about all the Athenian inscriptions in this study were invaluable.

I would like to thank all those who made my time at Princeton some of the best years of my life. These include the Flowers, the Edwards Collective, the Glee Club, the Chapel Choir, and my fellow graduate students Maggie Kurkoski, Daniel Healey, Erik Fredericksen and Brandon Green. I am grateful to Jill Arbeiter for fielding my many questions, especially after I had left Princeton for the UK. In Oxford I would like to thank Leah Lazar for her help and thoughts.

I thank my mother and brothers for acting as my cheerleaders during my dissertation and in general life. I would like to thank my husband, Julian, without whom this dissertation would never have been finished and who knows more about the three-bar sigma than he ever wanted to. I would like to dedicate this dissertation to the memory of my father, who always encouraged me to pursue my passion.

Abbreviations

IG I³	Lewis, D. (1981) *Inscriptiones Atticae Euclidis anno anteriores. Editio Tertia, Fasc. I. Berlin.*
IK Erythrai	Engelmann, H. & Merkelbach, R. (1972) *Die Inschriften von Erythrai und Klazomenai*. Bonn.
I.Milet	Herrmann, P., Gunther, W. & Ehrhardt, N. (2006) *Inschriften von Milet, Teil 3. Inschriften n. 1020-1580*. Berlin, New York.
ML	Meiggs, R. & Lewis, D. (1969) *A Selection of Greek Historical Inscriptions*. Oxford.
OR	Osborne, R. & Rhodes, P.J. (2017) *Greek Historical Inscriptions 478-404 BC.* Oxford.
RO	Rhodes, P.J. & Osborne, R. (2003) *Greek Historical Inscriptions 404-323 BC.* Oxford.

Introduction

The coastal cities of Asia Minor were in a unique position, geographically and politically, during the fifth century B.C. Located between west and east, between Greece and Persia, these cities acted as a kind of border between two different cultures and empires. In the fifth century they were first under the jurisdiction of the Persian Empire, then after the end of the Greco-Persian Wars many at various points joined the Delian League. If the Athenian colonisation of Ionia is not merely a piece of Athenian imperial propaganda, the Ionians will have felt a historic connection to their Mediterranean founders.[1] Even if it is largely an Athenian invention, there is evidence that it informed the relationship between the cities of Ionia and Athens during the Peloponnesian War.[2] Yet at the same time their proximity to the Persian Empire made influence and interference from the east inevitable. The extent to which individual satraps were acting under royal directive is contested, but there is evidence for both central and local Persian interest in Athens' Ionian allies.

It is sometimes assumed that the whole western coast of Asia Minor was in Athenian hands by the time of the Peloponnesian War. In fact, the coast opposite Lesbos, much of the Propontis and many areas to the south were still in the possession of the Persian king. After the failure of the Ionian revolt, Darius had confiscated land from the rebel cities and some of this must have remained in non-Greek hands for some time: as far as we know, the Carians from Pedasa settled in the hills of Miletus were still there when the Milesians returned.[3] J.M. Cook argues that the whole north shore of the Gulf of Smyrna was under Persian suzerainty; some of these towns' tribute might

[1] For the view that it was an Athenian invention see Sakellariou 1990:137; Kuciak 2013
[2] For example, the Samian *horoi* discussed in the relevant chapter.
[3] Hdt. 6.20

have been subsumed under Cyme's but there is no positive evidence for this.[4] Some parts very close to the cities of this study were definitely controlled by the Great King. Smyrna itself was on the coast close to Erythrae and never seems to have joined the Delian League; Sardis, the Persian capital, was not so far inland. Teuthrania and Halisarna, two towns just across the coast from Mytilene, were given to Demaratus by Xerxes I in 480 B.C. and were still in his descendants' control in the early fourth century, and there is no indication that either ever joined the Delian League.[5] Further north, Pharnabazus gave Larisa, Hamaxitus and Colonae along the Scamander away at the end of the fifth century although it is not clear whether he controlled them at the height of the Athenian Empire in the mid-fifth century.[6] If Artaxerxes also gave Themistocles Magnesia, Myus and Lampsacus, we have what looks like a policy of Persian kings claiming important Ionian towns and keeping them safe in the hands of their friends.[7] Themistocles was given the local produce of these towns, which suggests that the Great King's claim to them extended beyond tribute to other forms of revenue. He may have demanded these even when he was not asserting his right to tribute.[8] Nearby Cebren and Scepsis were paying tribute to Athens, and it is at least possible that they too were under the control of the satrap of Dascylium prior to Pharnabazus.[9] Iasus was in the hands of Amorges before 412, although he was in revolt.[10]

In the *daiva* inscription, dated c.480 B.C., Xerxes includes in his list of countries over which he holds sway "the Ionians who live on the salty sea and (those) who live

[4] Cook 1961:11
[5] Xen. *Hell.* 3.1.6
[6] Xen. *Hell.* 3.1.10; Cook 1961:10
[7] Thuc. 1.138.5; Briant 1998:562-3
[8] Descat 1989
[9] Xen. *Hell.* 3.1.15-28; *IG* I³ 259, 260, 263 (Cebren); *IG* I³ 260, 261, 262, 264, 265, 266, 267, 268, 269, 271, 272, 273, 279, 290 (Scepsis)
[10] Thuc. 8.28.2

beyond (literally: on the other shore of) the salty sea".[11] According to Xerxes these people pay tribute to him, do whatever he commands them, and abide by his laws. His list of subjects is assumed to predate the battle of Salamis, because it includes all Ionia and Skudra (Thrace); Herodotus records widespread Thracian revolts after Salamis.[12] Yet the list is meant to impress, not accurately inform. At any rate, the historicity of the text does not concern us: in Xerxes' eyes, all of Ionia was his. The Athenians in their turn appear to have laid claim to the Ionians even in archaic times. A fragment of Solon calls Athens "Ionia's oldest land", and Herodotus has Aristagoras of Miletus appeal to Athens on the basis that the Milesians are historically colonists from Athens.[13] This was around 499; by 478 the Athenians were possessive enough of the Ionian Greeks to be angered that the Spartans were wading into a decision about "their own colonists".[14] Even if this reflects the mood of Herodotus' time of writing more than the dramatic date of his story, this is evidence that by the second half of the fifth century the Athenians could allege a historical claim to Ionia. Euripides' *Ion*, performed after the Sicilian Expedition and perhaps as late as 410 after the beginning of the Ionian War, takes the myth of Athens' foundation of Ionia and turns it into propaganda.[15] As we will see in the forthcoming chapters, the Athenians exploited their mythical claim to Ionia to their advantage. Even if we are lacking in equivalent propaganda in our limited Persian evidence, it does not seem that any of the Persian kings renounced their claim to the Ionian cities either before or during the Peloponnesian war.

[11] Pritchard 1978:316. The precise date is contested but Xerxes' reign gives reasonably precise *termini*: 486-465 B.C.
[12] Herzfeld 1937:70; Hdt. 8.115-6, 9.89
[13] Aristot. *Const. Ath.* 5.2 = Solon fr.4; Hdt. 5.97.2
[14] Hdt. 9.106.3
[15] Bremmer 1997:12; Eurip. *Ion*. 1571-1605

Towards the end of Thucydides' *History*, the focus shifts eastward and zooms in on Ionia as the centre of action. The reason for this is the "Ionian War", as Thucydides may or may not have designated it, a war of even greater complexity what with the involvement of Persian actors, the intrigues of Alcibiades and ongoing political turmoil at Athens.[16] By 413/2, Tissaphernes was openly supporting the revolts of Chios and Erythrae and "barbarians" and demolishing the wall at Teos.[17] A correlation between fifth-century democracies and commercial activity has been argued for with respect to Ionia, Athens, Megara and Syracuse.[18] The Ionian cities' location on the coast meant that they could access trade routes more easily, and were generally more accessible to the likes of Athens and Sparta; thus, we find Samos and Miletus becoming outposts for each respectively towards the end of the war. Their location made them open to external influence and a convenient base for operations around Asia Minor and even in Persian-controlled territory.

At the end of the Peloponnesian War, these cities found themselves once again reluctantly bearing the Persian yoke when Artaxerxes II came to power. All the cities of this study underwent a profound transformation in the fifth century, from tyranny under Persia to oligarchies and democracies supervised by Athens and finally to Spartan-controlled decarchy. All of the cities seem to have suffered from in-fighting between oligarchs and democrats, the former group being dominated by a historically powerful family or class. As well as playing a part on the broader stage of the Peloponnesian War, these cities' internal political development merits its own attention.

On an individual as well as a national level, exposure to both empires had an impact. This is especially true of the upper classes, who by virtue of their wealth and

[16] Thuc. 8.11.3
[17] Thuc. 8.5.4-5, 8.20.2
[18] O'Neil 1995:35

trade links were more likely to maintain contacts in other cities; in the early sixth century the Mytilenean poet Alcaeus talks of being paid to fight on behalf of the Lydians and his brother for the Babylonians.[19] The elite Athenian Miltiades, father of Cimon, was a royal adviser in the Persian court and fought on behalf of Darius I, for which his eldest son was rewarded with a house and a Persian wife.[20] Themistocles famously had connections all over the Persian Empire, and took exile there; the Persian Zopyrus deserted from Persia to Athens in the second half of the fifth century.[21] Plutarch compares Pericles' Milesian mistress to an Ionian woman, Thargelia, who encouraged good relations between the powerful Greek men she kept company with and the Persian king.[22] We need not believe much about what he says about either Aspasia or Thargelia, but these anecdotes rely on there being contact between the upper classes in Ionia and the western Greeks in the mid-fifth century. Hippodamus of Miletus was resident at Athens until he was sent out to colonise Thurii.[23] Only a few well-known names survive anecdotally but these must represent a larger group who moved between the two worlds. Movement amongst the lower classes is less well-documented but certainly happened; one need only read the Persepolis tablets to find Greek labourers and even post-partum Ionian women in Persia.[24] Throughout the fifth century, Greek mercenaries were enlisted into Persian armies and the captain of Pissouthnes' mercenaries when he revolted from Darius was Athenian.[25]

[19] Alcaeus fr. 69, 350 Campbell
[20] Hdt. 4.137.1, 6.41.2-4
[21] Thuc. 1.138.1-2; Plut. *Them*. 26.1; Hdt. 3.160
[22] Plut. *Per*. 24
[23]Hesychius s.v. Ἱππόδαμου νέμησις
[24] *PF* 1224; *PT* 15, 21
[25] e.g. Thuc. 3.34; Ctesias *FGH* 688 F 14.38-40; Ctesias *FGH* 688 F 15.52-3; Hermippus *PCG* III *Phormophoroi* 63.18. A Greek helmet found in Cyprus suggests that a Greek was serving in the Persian army in 498 (Miller 1997:100).

The upper classes in the cities appear to have seen themselves as an international elite, with contacts all around the Greek world. This is as true of the second half of the fifth century as it is of the first. The Samian exiles make an alliance with Pissouthnes during the island's rebellion, and it is Alcibiades' aristocratic friends who effect the revolt of Miletus in 412.[26] Persian, Greek and Carian names appear in a law of Halicarnassus dated c.465-50.[27] Yet both elite and *demos* could take advantage of the claim that both empires had on them, calling in representatives from either side where convenient. When the Colophonians at Notium split into factions, one side calls in Athens, the other a Persian official.[28] Thus, geographical factors likely contributed to these cities' fortunes changing more rapidly than cities further inland. In a controversial passage, Herodotus has a Persian royal adviser say that all of the Ionian cities would prefer democracy to tyranny.[29] In the "Constitutional Debate" preceding Darius' accession, one Persian uses the argument, "let whoever wants to do the Persians wrong make use of the *demos*".[30] Whatever the historicity of these statements, they suggest an ideological tension between tyrannical Persia and democratic Athens.

Evidence abounds for the fear of tyranny – and sometimes specifically Persian tyranny - as a threat to democracy at Athens. In popular consciousness, the beginning of Athenian democracy went hand in hand with the end of tyranny, be that via the myth of the tyrannicides or Cleisthenes' expulsion of the last Peisistratid tyrant.[31] The Athenian myth of the tyrannicides draws on the tension between tyranny and democracy: according to the myth, Harmodius and Aristogeiton liberated Athens and

[26] Thuc. 1.115.4, 8.17.2
[27] *ML* 32; Miller 1997:94-5
[28] Thuc. 3.34.2-3
[29] Hdt. 4.137.2
[30] Hdt. 3.81.3: δήμῳ μέν νυν, οἳ Πέρσῃσι κακὸν νοέουσι, οὗτοι χράσθων.
[31] Isoc. 7.16

paved the way for democracy by their killing of its (supposed) tyrant.[32] A hymn preserved by Athenaeus credits the tyrannicides with giving Athens equality before the law (ἰσονόμους) by their single act of slaying Hipparchus.[33] As a result, the Athenians were always wary of the reverse: tyranny arising out of democracy. Aristotle alleges that ostracism was first introduced to prevent tyranny and it appears at least to have been a pretext for getting rid of powerful individuals.[34] For the Athenians, the ultimate tyrant was the Persian King himself. Herodotus has Miltiades evoke the tyrannicides in his speech on the eve of the first Persian invasion, implying that a Persian victory would place the Athenians under another tyranny.[35] Although the Athenians got away with their liberty, Xerxes' plundering of the statues of the tyrannicides in 480-79 symbolically represented the victory of foreign, tyrannical forces over democracy.[36] Aeschylus' *Persians*, itself an exploration of the differences between east and west and their competing claims to Asiatic Greece, contrasts Xerxes who is "not answerable to the state" with the Athenians who follow no master and "are called nobody's slaves".[37]

Fear of tyranny did not stop with the repulse of the Persians at Eurymedon. In Aristophanes' *Wasps*, performed in 422, Bdelycleon jokes that in Athens tyranny is still feared even though it has not been a threat for fifty years.[38] The mutilation of the Herms and the profanation of the mysteries were so feared because they were thought to have been part of a tyrannical conspiracy.[39] Similarly, a speech attributed to Andocides criticises Alcibiades, who was implicated in the scandal, for making a mockery of

[32] Cartledge 2016:23-4; Thuc. 6.53-9; Hdt. 5.55
[33] Athenaeus 15.50
[34] Aristot. *Ath. Pol.* 22.6; Plut. *Arist.* 7.2; Diod. 11.55.1
[35] Hdt. 6.109.3
[36] Paus. 1.8.5
[37] Aesch. *Pers*. 213, 241-2
[38] Aristoph. *Wasps* 488-95
[39] Thuc. 6.60.1

democracy by acting like a tyrant.[40] In Euripides' *Suppliant Women*, Theseus corrects the herald by telling him that no tyrant lives in Athens, "for this city is free and the *demos* rules in turn"; he goes on to enumerate the faults of a tyranny.[41] Although much of his evidence is from the Hellenistic period, David Teegarden provides several examples of anti-tyranny legislation in the Greek world and shows that it was a democratic phenomenon.[42] The oath sworn by incoming heliasts – which was still being sworn in Demosthenes' age - bound them not to vote for tyranny or help a man subvert democracy.[43] The tyrant stood for everything that democracy was not: he "ruled in his own interest, stood outside the law, inhibited equality, and prevented freedom".[44] Living where they did between the two empires, the Ionians will have felt this tension between tyranny and democracy particularly keenly. It is no wonder that their history is so complex and dynamic, susceptible to both internal *stasis* and external pressures from East and West.

Whether or not the Peace of Callias is historical, it certainly did not stop various Persian figures from meddling in the affairs of Athens and the Ionian cities throughout the war. Pissouthnes backed the Samian revolt and perhaps others.[45] The Athenian decrees concerning Sigeum and Erythrae, whether they date to the 450s or later, refer respectively to enemies "doing harm from the mainland" (i.e. Persia) and "those who fled to the Medes".[46] Reference to Persia combined with three-bar sigma guided a date in the first half of the fifth century for both inscriptions, but this is to assume that the

[40] Andoc. 4.27. Cf. also Thuc. 6.28, where Alcibiades is described as displaying undemocratic lawlessness, οὐ δημοτικὴν παρανομίαν.
[41] Eurip. *Supp*. 403-7, 429-56
[42] Teegarden 2014
[43] Dem. 24.149
[44] Mitchell 2006:180
[45] Thucydides records Persian interference at Colophon (Thuc. 3.34.2) and possibly Caunus, Anaea and Caria (Thuc. 1.116.2, 3.19; cf. Eddy 1973).
[46] *IG* I³ 14.27; *IG* I³ 17.15-16

Persian threat disappeared in 449. The Sigeum decree "displays all the characteristics of the late fine plain style"; the date of the regulations for Erythrae will be discussed in detail.[47] In a form of question-begging, inscriptions presenting Persia as a real threat have tended to be dated early on the assumption that Persia was not a threat after a certain date. As we will see, there is reason to believe that Persia was a perceived if not an imminent threat throughout the course of the war, especially in places of heavy Persian influence such as the western coast of Asia Minor. From inscriptions and from Thucydides' characterisation of Pissouthnes and Tissaphernes, it is evident that the satraps of Lydia and Caria and Lycia meddled in the conflicts of allied cities to their own ends, aiding and even installing anti-Athenian factions.[48] To the north, the satrap of Dascylium was happy at the start of the Peloponnesian War to give the Spartans an audience with the King, and later to give a permanent home to the Delians expatriated by Athens.[49]

Official communication between Athens and Persia did not cease in the second half of the century. Aristophanes refers to an embassy to the Great King "during the archonship of Euthymenes", in 437/6.[50] If we do not want to take a comic reference so literally, an embassy to Persia is preserved in Strabo, whose most likely date is the 430s.[51] On the brink of war in 431 B.C., both Athens and Sparta sent embassies to the Great King to seek military assistance.[52] In 425 and 424 Aristophanes is able to mock Persian ambassadors in Athens and Athenian delegations to Persia, and even Thucydides mentions the botched Athenian embassy to Ephesus in 425/4.[53] An

[47] Tracy 2016:220
[48] Thuc. 1.115, 3.31, 3.34, book 8 *passim*
[49] Thuc. 2.67.1, 5.1.1
[50] Aristoph.*Ach*.66
[51] Strab. 1.3.1 = Damastes *FGrHist* 5 F 8; Lewis 1977:60 n.70
[52] Thuc. 2.7.1
[53] Aristoph. *Ach*. 61, 80-126; Aristoph. *Kn*. 475-9; Thuc. 4.50.3

honorary Athenian decree of the last quarter of the fifth century honours a Clazomenian for his role in negotiations with the King.[54] Even during periods of seemingly no Persian involvement (i.e. 425-412 B.C.), minor details in Thucydides tell a different story.[55] Athenian activity in Persia is also mentioned, albeit in passing.[56] When Melesander is sent in 430/29 to collect tribute from Caria and Lycia he does not make it back from Lycia alive. Thucydides does not dwell on the incident but it shows the financial and strategic importance Athens attached to the region and the difficulty it had maintaining a firm grip on it. Then of course in 412 the Ionian allies begin to fall away. The level of intrigue at the outset of the Ionian war is exemplified by an anecdote told by Thucydides: a rumour led the Spartans to investigate certain Erythraean captives who had been released from pro-Athenian Samos, out of fear that they might be trying to hand Erythrae back to Athens.[57] The incident amounted to nothing, but Thucydides presumably includes it to exemplify the constant struggle between different political groups in each city.

The political upheavals of the Peloponnesian War and its precursors were the ideal setting for the emergence of democracy in Ionia. Matthew Simonton has outlined three necessary conditions for the emergence of democracy, the first two of which are particularly relevant to our study: "1) times had to be bad enough to give the demos good reason to risk uniting for political change; 2) certain members of the elite had to be alienated from the status quo enough to ally with the demos against their peers".[58] Divided Ionian loyalty between Athens and Persia, coupled with outright war, helped the towns of Asia Minor to meet both of these criteria during the fifth century. Given

[54] *IG* I³ 227.15-19
[55] Thuc. 5.1, 8.5.5
[56] Thuc. 2.69.1-2, 3.19.2
[57] Thuc. 8.33.3-4
[58] Simonton 2017b:20

these conditions of civil unrest and factional tension, not to mention Athenian influence, it is no great surprise to find democracy surfacing in Samos, Erythrae, Miletus and Colophon for the first time in these years of conflict. The question is when this happened for each town, and at whose behest.

For the above reasons, piecing together the history of the Ionian cities is central to our understanding of the workings of the Athenian Empire and the allies' attitude towards it. In addition, their history tells us about Persia's role not just in events at the turn of the century but also during the Peloponnesian War proper. This study intends to examine the political situation of four of the coastal cities of Asia Minor during the course of the fifth century, reconstructing their history using as much local evidence as possible. This is only possible to a certain extent, given how little there is available and how rapidly the political climate changed in each city during this period, but local inscriptions and coins provide a start. Of necessity Athenian epigraphy will play a large role, and some of the case studies have been chosen for the Athenian decrees concerning them whose dating has recently been questioned.

Every major history of fifth century Ionia, even the 2001 study of Miletus by Vanessa Gorman, has taken the traditional, early dates for these decrees for granted.[59] Harold Mattingly's challenging of the three-bar sigma orthodoxy, supported by the findings of Chambers, Galluci and Spanos in their laser analysis of the Athenian alliance with Egesta, has left many fifth-century decrees open for redating.[60] These include some concerning Ionian cities that would significantly change our understanding of their history. The belief that Athens became steadily more imperialistic over time, with the imperialism of Pericles differing qualitatively from the

[59] Gorman 2001; Balcer 1984a; Shipley 1983; Barron 1961
[60] Mattingly 1996; Chambers, Galluci & Spanos 1990

imperialism of Cleon, led to circular reasoning and overreliance on Great Man theory. Inscriptions were dated based on the harshness and overtness of their imperialism, rather than their most likely historical context. The supposed Peace of Callias was considered the definitive turning-point when Athens began openly to admit that the Delian League's purpose was not revenge against Persia. It was assumed, for example, that after the Peace of Callias, Athens began referring to its allies as "the cities that the Athenians rule". However, this is to assume that every decree that the Athenians produced became steadily more imperialistic and was entirely consistent in its tone and use of language. Polly Low has convincingly argued that judging such expressions by the standard of Thucydides while also using the inscriptions as a control against which to test Thucydides is circular and over reliant on the historian's own view of the development of the empire.[61] Thomas Figueira and Sarah Forsdyke have also produced interpretations of decrees starting from the decrees themselves rather than Thucydides' biased account.[62] This dissertation seeks to date the inscriptions based on their most convincing historical context rather than their tone. It will argue accordingly that the revolts of Miletus and Colophon and the regulations pertaining them should be dated within a short time of each other, to the early-to-mid 420s. Similarly it will question the conventional dating of the regulations for Erythrae.

In recent decades, there has been a shift in scholarly opinion about Athenian imperialism. Before it had been accepted that Cimon's Athens and Cleon's Athens were so distinct as to be identifiable in undated decrees. Recently, more emphasis has been placed on the practical aspects of running an empire and how these might have affected the Athenians' decision-making.[63] Moreover, the case has been convincingly argued

[61] Low 2005
[62] Figueira 1998; Forsdyke 2005
[63] e.g. Finley 2008; Low 2013

that Athens had an ad hoc approach to its allies rather than subjecting them to a one-size-fits-all imperialism that gradually intensified over time. This is important for our study because it affects how we interpret the decrees under discussion and it also affects the question of whether Athens had a blanket policy of installing and supporting democracies. It will be argued that factors such as geography and recent history affected the way that Athens dealt with its allies, and that this is borne out in the inscriptional and literary evidence.

Whose tribute?

The *Athenian Tribute Lists* published by Meritt, McGregor and Wade-Gery play a large part in helping us to understand Athens' relationship with its allies from 454 B.C. onwards. The lists were the cause of the sigma doctrine, for in the list for 447/6 B.C. there is a sudden and decisive change from three- to four-bar sigma; however, Stephen Tracy has shown that this was the doing of a single mason who cut the records of six consecutive years and "happened to prefer four-bar sigma".[64] The tribute quota lists record 1/60 of the total amount of tribute allies paid to Athens after the League treasury was transferred from Delos to Athens. The lists can suggest who paid in any given year, and can raise the possibility that certain groups did not pay. Though the lists are for the most part securely dated and unaffected by the three-bar sigma controversy, they have been scrutinised in recent years for the assumptions underlying many restorations. The very fragmentary lists attributed to the years 421/0 to 416/5 afford little certainty as to their order and composition.[65] In particular, Bjorn Paarmann has questioned such methods as making restorations in analogy with other lists, and postulating revolt based solely on a city's absence from the lists.[66] This study acknowledges the huge debt owed

[64] Tracy 2016:86-7
[65] Kallet 2004
[66] Paarmann 2007

to the editors of the lists, and the historical significance of the lists themselves, but is more cautious in filling in their many gaps.

The towering testimony of the tribute lists can also cause us to forget that there is good evidence that the Ionian cities paid tribute to Persia from 494 until at least the 440s and perhaps (sporadically) all the way through until and beyond 412, when Darius II made a concerted effort to direct tribute away from Athens.[67] Sometimes it is countered that the chorus in Aeschylus' *Persae* claim that the whole of Asia will no longer pay tribute to the Persians.[68] In the same breath they boast that the King's power has completely perished, which is manifestly untrue; verses from a tragedy should not be interpreted as historical truth. The first tribute quota lists are often used as evidence for membership of the early Delian League, but the cities that were paying in 453 were not necessarily paying (or even members) in the 470s and 460s. Moreover, even if they were, it cannot be assumed that they automatically fell out of the Persian orbit. Some argue that Xerxes gave up his claim when the Delian League was founded in the 470s, but this is based on the assumption that these towns could only pay one master.[69] As Briant notes, the professed purpose of the Delian League was revenge, not the liberation of the eastern Greeks. Though its purpose undoubtedly changed, there is limited evidence for Persian territorial losses during the early years other than those mentioned by Thucydides, some of which already belonged to the Delian League.[70] Plutarch claims that before the battle of Eurymedon, Cimon ensured that "from Ionia to Pamphylia, the whole of Asia was clear of Persian arms", but his *Life of Cimon* is essentially a eulogy.[71] As we will see, there is more evidence for Persian arms in Ionia than Plutarch is

[67] Diod. 10.25; Hdt. 6.42; Thuc. 8.5.5
[68] Aesch. *Pers*. 584-90
[69] Cawkwell 1968; Balcer 1989:9, 19
[70] Briant 2005:555-6; Thuc. 1.94-8
[71] Plut. *Cim*. 12.1

interested in telling us. For example, we may have little evidence for Persian naval patrols during peacetime, but this is just as true of Athenian patrols; it does not mean that they did not happen. We are only able to postulate the presence of Athenian naval squadrons in Caria in 450 because the tribute lists feature an unusual set of Carian towns for that year.[72] If there is not much piracy in the sources it is arguably because of an Athenian and Persian naval presence for which almost no evidence remains.[73] The same is true for tribute collection: we are woefully underinformed about both Athens and Persia's strategies for collecting tribute, yet we know that both empires had systems in place for doing so.

By 412 we find Tissaphernes claiming tribute from the maritime cities for the Great King and excluding both the Spartans and the Athenians from it.[74] The satrap was in arrears "because he could get nothing out of the Greek cities because of the Athenians". For how long the cities had been in arrears is a question we should like to know the answer to. What is clear is that the Athenians and the Persians were aware that they were in competition when it came to extracting money from their allies in Asia Minor, and that the Persians were reliant on "Greek" tribute. Not only this, but Tissaphernes was in competition with Pharnabazus; the latter was trying to encourage the cities in his satrapy to revolt from Athens so that he could get their tribute.[75] The settlement between Athens and Persia in 408 concerning Calchedon is a notable exception; there, it was stipulated that Calchedon would continue paying the same amount to Athens, although whether in addition to or in place of its Persian tribute is not specified.[76] Some historians think that the Ionian revolt was used as an excuse for

[72] Meritt, McGregor & Wade-Gery 1950:7
[73] Wallinga 1989:176
[74] Thuc. 8.5.5, 8.18.1, 8.36-7
[75] Thuc. 8.6.1
[76] Xen. *Hell*. 1.3.9

Persia to resume tribute collection in Asia Minor but there is evidence to the contrary.[77] Certainly by the end of the war, tribute was at the forefront of the Great King's mind, for both treaties between Sparta and Persia emphasise his right to – and Sparta's exclusion from - the money and "other things" of his own territories.[78]

Herodotus, recounting the tribute set for the Ionian cities by Artaphrenes in 493, claims that the assessment remained the same up until "this day", i.e. after the beginning of the Peloponnesian War and as late as the 420s.[79] The meaning of the passage is disputed so it is worth quoting in full: ταῦτά τε ἠνάγκασε ποιέειν, καὶ τὰς χώρας μετρήσας σφέων κατὰ παρασάγγας, τοὺς καλέουσι οἱ Πέρσαι τὰ τριήκοντα στάδια, κατὰ δὴ τούτους μετρήσας φόρους ἔταξε ἑκάστοισι, οἳ κατὰ χώρην διατελέουσι ἔχοντες ἐκ τούτου τοῦ χρόνου αἰεὶ ἔτι καὶ ἐς ἐμὲ ὡς ἐτάχθησαν ἐξ Ἀρταφρένεος: ἐτάχθησαν δὲ σχεδὸν κατὰ ταὐτὰ καὶ πρότερον εἶχον.[80]

"He [Artaphernes] compelled them to do this, and having measured out their land in parasangs which is what the Persians call thirty stades, having measured them out in this way he imposed tributes on each of them, and they [the tributes] continue to exist across the region from that time, continuously, and still up to my time as they were assessed by Artaphernes; they were assessed roughly the same amount as that which they had paid before."

The testimony of Herodotus suggests that in fact the Ionian cities were at least expected to be paying tribute to Persia throughout the Peloponnesian War. This is the most natural way to translate what Herodotus says, for he rather labours the point: the tributes assessed for each one (ἑκάστοισι) of the cities continue to exist (διατελέουσι

[77] Balcer 1989:19
[78] Thuc. 8.18.1, 8.37.2
[79] Hdt. 7.137 refers to an event in 430 and the written *Histories* probably evolved out of oral presentations given from the 440s until the 420s (Stadter 1992:783).
[80] Hdt. 6.42.2

ἔχοντες), they continue in that particular region (κατά χώρην), always (αἰεί), from that time (ἐκ τούτου τοῦ χρόνου) even right up to my time (ἔτι καὶ ἐς ἐμὲ). Herodotus does not say that Artaphrenes' assessment provided the basis or "scale" for Athens' assessment of its allies, nor would this make sense given the huge fluctuations that we find in the tribute lists and the fact that Artaphrenes and Aristides did not assess the same places.[81] J.A.S. Evans has argued that the antecedent of οἵ could be ἑκάστοισι rather than φόρους, but that would leave the phrase διατελέουσι ἔχοντες lacking in an object.[82] Evans would take the object to be φόρους from the previous clause but elsewhere when Herodotus uses the phrase transitively to mean, "continue to have", he provides a clear and immediate object.[83] Herodotus uses the same phrase intransitively, in a very similar passage to 6.42, to mean, "continue to remain ever since that time".[84] Thus although Evans' interpretation is not impossible, it is not the most natural rendering of the Greek. Elsewhere we might accuse Herodotus of imprecision, but here it is unfair to disbelieve a statement that he makes so emphatically: the Persian tribute remained the same from 493 for half a century or longer.

This is not to say that the Ionian cities paid what they were assessed for. It has been convincingly argued that over time the amount received was far less than the amount demanded, which according to Herodotus was 466 Athenian talents (grouped together with several other districts).[85] Diodorus follows Herodotus while Dio Chrysostom relates a tradition in which Xerxes imposes tribute on the Greeks after his victory at Thermpoylae, but he himself doubts the story.[86] Whatever the precise details,

[81] Contra Meritt, McGregor & Wade-Gery 1950:234
[82] Evans 1976
[83] Hdt. 1.32.9: ὃς δ᾽ ἂν αὐτῶν πλεῖστα ἔχων διατελέῃ ; Hdt. 9.26.5: καὶ ἄλλα γέρεα μεγάλα, τὰ διατελέομεν ἔχοντες
[84] Hdt. 5.86.3
[85] Murray 1966:146-7; Hdt. 3.90.1 (400 Babylonian talents)
[86] Diod. 10.25; Dio 11.149

the Persian Kings may have consistently demanded tribute from Ionia from as early as 493, but received only a fraction of that amount.[87] Perhaps the cities did pay, but most of the money was exhausted on running expenses before it had a chance to reach Susa.[88] Xenophon has the newly appointed satrap Tithraustes demand the "ancient tribute" from Agesilaus in 395, adding to the impression that the Great King felt comfortable asking for tribute even if he did not rely on getting it.[89] Nor does it seem that all of the tribute owed by those paying on two fronts was literally doubled by their obligation to the Great King, for some areas were assessed for relatively modest amounts considering their wealth and size. The whole of Lycia and its dependencies was paying only 10 talents in their only secure entry in the tribute quota lists.[90] It has been argued that this was because Athens' real interest in Lycia lay not in its money but its location as the gateway to the eastern Mediterranean.[91]

Tribute does not tell the whole story about allied contributions to the empire. Thucydides barely mentions cleruchies but Plutarch lists the Chersonese, Naxos, Andros, Thrace and Italy as recipients of Periclean cleruchies.[92] Diodorus and Andocides provide further evidence of cleruchies in the Chersonese, Naxos and Euboea.[93] Establishing cleruchies had the double advantage of earning Athens revenue and allowing Athenian cleruchs to keep a close eye on the local population. It is clear also that in some cases cleruchies were a social leveller, in that they could help reduce the wealth and power of local oligarchs. In 506, the Athenians left 4000 cleruchs on Euboea on the land of the "horse-breeders".[94] Herodotus elaborates that these horse-

[87] 400 Babylonian talents is reckoned to be 466 Athenian talents Murray 1966:149).
[88] Cawkwell 1968:4
[89] Xen. *Hell*. 3.4.25
[90] *IG* I³ 266 col.III.34
[91] Bryce 1986:106-7
[92] Plut. *Per*. 11.5
[93] Diod. 11.88.3; Andoc. *De Pac*. 9
[94] Hdt. 5.77

breeders were what the "fat men" of Chalcis were called; Plutarch similarly says that they were so called for their wealth and reputation.[95] On the eve of the battle of Marathon, Herodotus says that Athens sent these same 4000 cleruchs to help the Eretrians against the Persian invasion.[96] Whatever the Athenians' official line for setting up cleruchies, they had the major advantage of providing watch-posts for Athens and defending Athens' interests around the empire. In the case of the cities of Asia Minor, this was particularly important given the Persian influence in the area. Moreover, as we will see in the case of Samos, the evidence for cleruchies reminds us that contributions to Athens could come in more than one form.

A double obligation to pay tribute might explain why some Ionian cities were assessed for such low amounts. Thucydides, in one of his rare remarks acknowledging the Athenian practice of collecting tribute, notes that persuading the Ionians to revolt would have deprived Athens of its "greatest revenue", yet the tribute lists do not in any way bear this assertion out.[97] What Thucydides says is also in conflict with the notion (derived mainly from the quota lists) that all Ionia hit its "Dark Age" in the fifth century as compared to the sixth.[98] Yet perhaps Ionia's low tribute indicates something other than poverty; it is a leap of logic to assume that an area's assessment was directly correlated to its wealth. The poverty of fifth-century Ionia is not a universally accepted theory.[99] Nor is the link between wealth and monumental building: Chios was a major slave-owning and ship-contributing state, yet one would not deduce this from its archaic remains.[100] One way to reconcile Thucydides with the (patchy) epigraphical and

[95] Plut. *Per*. 23.2
[96] Hdt. 6.100
[97] Thuc. 3.31
[98] Cook 1961:9
[99] Shipley 1987:146-8; Osborne 1999b; Kallet 1993:140-3
[100] Hdt. 6.8.1; Thuc. 1.116-7, 2.56.3, 6.31.1, 8.6.4 ; 8.40.2; Osborne 199b:322-3

archaeological evidence is to consider that Ionia's low tribute may reflect that it was contributing to Athens via means other than tribute, such as raw materials, the revenue from cleruchies, triremes and land troops.[101] In fact, we find the Ionian allies contributing forces to the Delian League as soon as they have joined by helping the Athenians to besiege Sestos.[102] The evidence suggests "not that Ionia's economic resources had been severely weakened after the suppression of the Ionian revolt in 494 but rather that their financial yield went to Athens".[103]

Thus, an alternative explanation for the Ionian cities' low tribute assessment is that some of them were paying on two fronts, to both Athens and Persia. This should give us pause when considering Persian influence in the region. Thucydides does not mention Persian tribute but there is enough evidence from elsewhere to suggest that paying two masters was not unheard of. Xenophon says that Myrina and Gryneium were given to Gongylus of Eretria as a reward for Medising during the Persian wars, yet the two towns also appear consistently on the Athenian tribute lists.[104] This would mean that two Aeolian towns were being ruled by a pro-Persian Greek and paying deference if not also tribute to both to Athens and Persia. In the *Anabasis* he tells how in Pergamum he was entertained by Gongylus' wife Hellas, who advised him to capture a Persian living in the plain.[105] Twenty-five kilometres from the coast opposite Mytilene, Greeks and Persians were living side by side, and probably had done for some time – even if by the turn of the fourth century they wanted to kill each other. If there is any truth in the anecdote that Xerxes gave Themistocles government of Magnesia,

[101] e.g. Thuc. 1.105.2, 3.3.1, 3.50.2, 4.42.1 4.108.1, 6.43
[102] Thuc. 1.89.2
[103] Kallet 1993:143
[104] Xen. *Hell*. 3.1.6; *IG* I³ 261, 265, 266, 268, 270, 272, 273, 279, 280, 281, 282, 283 (Myrina); *IG* I³ 260, 261, 264, 265, 270, 271, 272, [279], 280, 283 (Gryneium)
[105] Xen. *Anab*. 7.8.8-9

Lampsacus and Myus, then the Great King laid claim to these cities even though the latter two were probably members of the Delian League.[106] Xenophon also says that Gongylus' brother controlled Gambrium and Palaigambrium very near Lampsacus.[107] If these were given to him after the Persian wars in a similar manner to his brother, these towns right next to each other at the entrance to the Hellespont were all Persian gifts to Medising Greeks but some were allied to Athens and some were not. Lampsacus and Myus survive on the tribute lists almost from the beginning, so at the very least we have Artaxerxes playing their master barely a decade before they join Athens' roster.[108] The cities may have been politically autonomous, but they were still rentiers on the King's land.[109] Small details such as this hint at greater Persian involvement than survives in the sources.

Not only the epigraphic record is Athenocentric. Thucydides may have downplayed the role of Persia because of his interest in presenting a bipolar power dynamic between Athens and Sparta until the final years of the war, or he may simply not have had as much access to information about Persia.[110] His portrayal of Amorges and Tissaphernes, intentionally or not, makes him seem uninterested in Persian affairs unless they prove a point or directly affect the course of the war. If it is true that Athens allied with Amorges and supported his revolt, as is almost certain and can be deduced from Thucydides' narrative alone, the historian did not deem it important to make the fact explicit.[111] It has been argued that Tissaphernes comes across as enigmatic

[106] Hdt. 9.104; Thuc. 1.89.2; Thuc. 1.138.5; Plut. *Them*. 29.7. Myus' proximity to Miletus means it is also likely to have been an original member.
[107] Xen. *Hell*. 3.1.6
[108] *IG* I³ 260 (plausibly restored), 261, 262. Artaxerxes cannot have received Xerxes any earlier than his accession in 465/4; it may have been even later.
[109] Wade-Gery 1958:212-4
[110] Andrewes 1961; Wiesehöfer 2006
[111] Andoc. 3.29; Thuc. 8.19.1, 8.28.2-4, 8.54.3; Westlake 1977

precisely because Thucydides had limited access to Persian sources.[112] Even those who argue that Thucydides attached great importance to the Persian narrative acknowledge that his treatment of it tells us more about Athenian attitudes towards Persia than Persia itself.[113] He declined to tell his reader much about the Anatolian allies of Athens that we know from other sources. For example, Ctesias records a revolt of Caunus followed by a failed Athenian assault on the town, during the reign of Artaxerxes, that receives no mention by Thucydides.[114] His love of set pieces means that he records the revolt of Mytilene in minute detail, yet entirely passes over trouble in Erythrae and Miletus and makes only a fleeting reference to the loss of Colophon. Scholars have often used Thucydides to prove that the "Peace of Callias" was historical and was not broken,[115] but this is circular reasoning if Thucydides did not feel the need to focus on Persia in the first place. Judging Thucydides by a modern set of historiographical standards is to some extent inevitable but often misleading. In general, arguments made on the basis of Thucydides' silence are weak given that the historian neither appears nor professes to be interested in giving a comprehensive history of Asia Minor.

Scholars might not have had to battle for so long over the dates of revolts, or indeed over dating criteria, had Thucydides recorded the struggles of the Ionian cities more fully, or in some cases, at all. The result is that it is easy to overlook their experience of the war and to view Persia as Thucydides presents it: a major presence at the beginning and end of the fifth century, but only a distant or even a pacified threat in the middle. This is save for one small clue, in Thucydides' famous passage on the "truest cause" of the war. He states that during the Peloponnesian war "never had so

[112] Westlake 1985
[113] Hyland 2004
[114] Ctes. *Pers*. 74 (Gilmore 1888:165-6)
[115] Badian 1987

many cities been taken and wasted, here by [the] barbarians, here by Greeks fighting Greeks".[116] In Thucydides' narrative itself there are few instances of towns being taken by barbarians, but his comment may betray a degree of Persian interference that the narrative does not reflect.

Any study of this period inevitably relies heavily on Thucydides, but one of the aims of this study is to get away from a completely Athenocentric perspective and try to uncover the experience of a particularly interesting group of Athens' allies who by their sheer geographical location will have felt the looming presence of Persia a lot more acutely. Though the evidence is scant, few of the coastal cities of Asia Minor show no indication of being susceptible to Persian influence in the fifth century and many seem to have suffered from in-fighting. Once Athens starts losing its grip on its empire, Thucydides makes the Athenian Phrynichus claim that the allies would never prefer servitude under an (Athenian-approved) oligarchy or democracy to freedom under whatever constitution they happened to have.[117] Similarly, he has Brasidas claim that he is in Greece to free the Hellenes, and the Acanthians are seduced by the offer even if their fear for their harvest also plays a part.[118] According to Thucydides at least, freedom was more important than politics. For all of Athens' allies, secession from Athens meant falling under the direction of Sparta. For the Ionian cities, claimed as they were by the Great King, freedom was an even more distant memory and hardly an achievable goal. If they could not strive for *eleutheria*, what were they striving for? And is there any evidence that these cities came to democracy of their own accord?

One problem a historian of the fifth century faces is how to recognise a democracy when she sees one. Clearly, the term "democracy" has developed over the

[116] Thuc. 1.23.2
[117] Thuc. 8.48.4
[118] Thuc. 4.86.1, 4.88.1

centuries. The ancient historian has both to come up with an acceptable definition of democracy and grapple with the sources' varying conceptions of democracy, given that at the beginning of the fifth century the Greeks were in the process of defining it themselves. Different authors describe political and social groups differently. A second problem to address is whether or to what extent Athens showed a general interest in spreading democracy to other states, for this will affect our interpretation of events in Asia Minor. Thus it will be necessary to define our terms – oligarchy, democracy, aristocrats, oligarchs and *demos* – and to consider whether Athens had a policy of promoting democracies throughout the empire. It will also be useful to consider the limits of our non-literary evidence, which is often incomplete.

The Athenian Tribute Lists

The tribute lists form a crucial part of our understanding of Athens' relationships with its allies and yet they are woefully incomplete. There are many lacunae and missing years; well over half the original fragments are lost. Of what remains, some fragments cannot easily be associated with one particular year. There are some assumptions underlying the volumes of the *ATL* and the restorations made in them, which it is useful to set out in order to understand the limits of their use as evidence.

The first point to make, though obvious, is that since no list is complete, it cannot ever be certain that a community did not pay in any given year. What is more, not enough is known about the system of tribute collection and recording to rule out the possibility that some states gave money directly to generals in the field or contributed in other ways. When the authors of the *ATL* posit a revolt, they cite as evidence the city's absence from the tribute lists for more than one year in a row. Yet no city has a complete record. Moreover, some cities have no record: Samos never appears on the tribute lists but contributed to the empire in various ways across the space of over half

a century. Colonies like Amphipolis do not appear, but from other sources we know that it was a valuable source not only of tribute but timber and silver too.[119] For the names that do appear, the authors of the *ATL* believe that the choice of ethnic over toponym can indicate an ally's status as a *polis*; a question more pertinent to our study is whether an ethnic always indicates the place whence the tribute came or merely the origin of the group that paid.

It is not only the "who", the "why" and the "whence" that get in the way of using the quota lists as evidence, but also the "when". The *lapis primus* is archon dated and the early lists are numbered, but for many years the prescript is lost and after 430 B.C. the lists are few and short. There is only one archon-dated list after 430.[120] The arrangement of the fragments is a subject of continuing debate and a dissertation topic in itself. The better-preserved lists and larger fragments can usually be dated with some certainty. Yet a lot of guesswork is involved and a number of years remain a mystery. These include the "missing list" of 449/8 and the lists for the periods 430-26 and 421-415, which are so fragmentary and sparse as to afford no certainty. The state of the lists from the 420s means that they cannot corroborate known revolts in that period; Scione and Mende revolted in 424, a year for which no list even survives.[121] It is generally assumed, on the basis of Thucydides, that the lists stopped in 414/3 when a five percent harbour tax was introduced.[122] However, there are those who argue for a reintroduction of tribute before 410 and the fragments from the third assessment period could in theory

[119] Thuc. 4.108.1; Strab. 7.34-5
[120] *IG* I³ 285
[121] Thuc. 4.120-3
[122] Thuc. 7.28.4

be assigned any date pre-404 B.C.[123] It is also assumed that tribute was paid and recorded in a similar way prior to 454, but this too is subjective to debate.[124]

The authors of the *ATL* provide a commentary on the text in which they explain many restorations. Of the 25th list they justify restoring the ethnics for Miletus and Myus from –ιοι by saying that the two "form a natural couplet".[125] Iasus is fully restored because it is "appropriate" with Chalcis (also restored). Mletus and Myus do appear together on a list nine years previously but that is the only such instance; on two other lists they are either entirely restored or restored only from –οι and –ι.[126] In the latter case, Miletus and Myus both occur separately earlier on in the list and no explanation is provided for the restoration of the pair again at the end of the inscription; presumably the authors believe that these represent late payments but this is just a guess when neither the amount nor the crucial part of each name survives.[127] Later in the 25th list, the ethnics for Isindus and Lebedus are restored from only –ι and –οι on the basis that the only other candidates are Miletus and Myus, and these have both already been restored. It is easy to see how the edition can begin to look like a house of cards. Even where such restorations are statistically likely, it should be borne in mind that they are not certain.

The editors often build an argument for revolt around a town's absence from the lists for a sequence of years. With such incomplete records, arguments *e silentio* can only be tentative. It is impossible to know for sure why a city might not appear on a list. To take a random example, Acanthus first (probably) appears on the tribute lists

[123] Meiggs argues that tribute was reintroduced after the failure of the harbour tax (1972:369).
[124] Robertson 1980:112-9; Figueira 267-8
[125] *IG* I³ 281; Meritt, McGregor & Wade-Gery 1939:191
[126] *IG* I³ 273, 265
[127] The reader is referred to Meritt 1937:76-97 and Meritt & West 1928 but these do not cover the appendix names of list 8. The editors point to correspondences between list 7 and list 8 but Miletus and Myus do not appear on the seventh list.

in 450/49 although the authors of the *ATL* speculate that it was one of the original members.[128] In the year 450/49, only the first two letters of its entry are secure and there is not enough space to restore its normal quota amount of 3 talents. Another possibility is that this is the town beginning with Ἀκρ- that recently showed up on a new fragment of the first list, although that too has a quota corresponding to 3 talents, too long for the space.[129] Later on, contributors such as the Ἀκρόθοιοι show up on other payment records;[130] although it is very unlikely that the payment in 450/49 belongs to a group only attested once in a document connected to the Peace of Nicias, it is at least worth pointing out that Acanthus' presence on the fifth list is not completely secure. Its absence for the years 454/3-451/0 leads the authors to urge that it originally contributed ships, but we have no other evidence for this. After a three-year gap, Acanthus appears again in 446/5 and continues to appear regularly until 442/1.[131] There is then a seven-year gap before Acanthus reappears paying tribute in 435/4. In the next five lists Acanthus pays four times, its final extant payment coming in 429/8.[132] This is still five years before Acanthus is known to have revolted at Brasidas' instigation.[133] This is also despite Thucydides explicitly stating that according to the Peace of Nicias in 422/1, Acanthus was to pay the tribute it had paid in Aristides' day.[134] Without the literary record it might be assumed that Acanthus seceded and stopped paying for good in 429/8. If one were to look at Acanthus' record knowing nothing of Thucydides, the most obvious window in which to theorise a revolt would be between the years 442/1 and 435/4. Yet as it stands, we have no reason to believe that Acanthus was in revolt

[128] Meritt, McGregor & Wade-Gery 1950:223; *IG* I³ 263
[129] Meritt 1972
[130] *IG* I³ 77 col. V.33
[131] *IG* I³ 266, 267, 268, 269, 270
[132] *IG* I³ 279, 280, 281, 282
[133] Thuc. 8.44
[134] Thuc. 5.18.5

during that period. Instead, Acanthus' only known revolt falls in a period that the evidence of the tribute lists does not cover. This should make us think twice about associating gaps in the record with revolt.

Absence is one thing but speculation is also necessary when a town appears paying less than usual, appears twice, or appears separately from its neighbours. This is a point demonstrated by the authors of the *ATL* by restoring the Milesians in the list from 447/6 B.C., despite the fact that the Milesians already appear unrestored.[135] If indeed the Milesians did pay twice in the year 447/6, one can only guess whether this was political or merely practical. The authors of the *ATL* all consider Erythrae, Miletus, Latmus and Myus to be in revolt in 454/3 because of their absence from the first list.[136] This is a lot to glean from a list whose first and second columns are full of lacunae and heavily restored, and whose fifth and sixth columns both contain gaps.[137] In the year 452, Boutheia appears to pay late because it appears towards the end of the list; they connect this to the "revolt" of Erythrae.[138] None of this is disprovable, but underlying it are the assumptions that towns that do not appear are in revolt and towns that appear late paid late due to unrest.

Comparison of the quota lists with the literary evidence and other decrees demonstrates further that a town's tribute record is only part of the story. The only actual figure of individual tribute that Thucydides gives us is four talents to be paid by Cythera from 424 onwards, yet Cythera does not appear once on the lists.[139] The decree for Methone implies that Methone had been paying tribute before and would continue to pay the tithe to Athena after the decree was passed, yet Methone only appears

[135] *IG* I³ 265. col.I.108, II.75
[136] Meritt, McGregor & Wade-Gery 1950:298
[137] *IG* I³ 259
[138] *IG* I³ 260 col. X.5; Meritt, McGregor & Wade-Gery 1950:298
[139] Thuc. 4.57.4

unrestored in the lists twice.[140] Aegina's tribute fluctuates enormously on the extant records and disappears completely for seven years between 440/39 and 434/3, even though its only known revolt was quelled in 457, before the lists began.[141] Similarly, Sigeum only begins to feature on the quota lists in 449 but a decree of 451/0 tells us that its absence before then is not due to disaffection.[142] Imbros was an Athenian dependency up until 404, and yet it appears beyond doubt on the lists only seven times.[143]

One problem is that we do not know everything about how tribute was collected. We do not know, for example, whether cities transported their own tribute to Athens, individually or in groups, or Athens sent round ships collecting tribute. Showing how much tribute each city paid was not even the main purpose of the lists, and it is easy to lose sight of the fact that we are dealing only with the tithe to Athena. The main purpose of the lists was to record "the quota paid to Athena on the *surplus* of each year's tribute, the *aparche* on the *phoros* that was sent to Athens rather than spent in the field by shipyards, squadrons stationed at naval bases, or garrisons".[144] It is usually assumed that the total was counted at Athens. This means that if payment sometimes went straight to the fleet and never made it back to Athens, this would not show up on the epigraphical record. This line of reasoning is in fact endorsed by the authors of the *ATL*, who consider it most likely that the partial payments of some cities in 448-6 reflect only the "balance" sent to Athens, with the rest of their contribution made directly.[145] Ron Unz has calculated a fourfold increase in tribute assessments for Ionia and Caria

[140] *IG* I³ 61; *IG* I³ 282, 290
[141] *IG* I³ 259, 264, 265; Thuc. 1.108.4. Chios' name is restored from a single chi in *IG* I³ 264 but its amount and position correspond with its entry for the following year.
[142] Rhodes 1992:59
[143] *IG* I³ 265, 266, 269, 270, 271, 282, 285
[144] Unz 1985:30
[145] Meritt, McGregor & Wade-Gery 1950:59

between 430/29 and the reassessment of 425/4.[146] The reason for this, he suggests, is that tribute was being paid directly to the army or navy stationed in the area. This will have meant that much of the tribute paid would not be reflected in the quota lists. Comparing tribute payments across time is tricky given the state of the lists, but Unz's thesis rightly considers the individual circumstances of the allies. Erythrae, Miletus and Samos were all used as naval bases during the course of the war, and this may well affect their tribute record.

Much is made of *syntely* (joint contributions), *apotaxis* (separate contributions) and cases where a group of citizens pays from a different location but the separate payment of a dependent community does not always signal that the main ally was in revolt. A new fragment of the second tribute list brought to light that a dependent community of Phocaeans had paid separately from the Phocaeans, and their entries were listed side by side; clearly Phocaea was not refusing to pay, and for reasons unknown to us a community of Phocaeans paid separately.[147] Two (barely extant) speeches of Antiphon, on behalf of cities that felt their burden of tribute was too great, show that allies could and did petition to have their tribute reduced.[148] In the case of the Samothracians, Antiphon drew attention to the poverty of natural resources on the island, surely to convince his Athenian audience that they could not afford to keep up their assessed level of payment. We do not know whether Antiphon's petitions were successful but their very existence warns against the assumption that a city's tribute was only ever reduced in the aftermath of a revolt. The very idea that Athens was always

[146] Unz 1985:34-8
[147] *IG* I³ 260 col. VIII.7-9; Rhodes 1992:59
[148] Antiphon *On the Tribute of Lindus* and *On the Tribute of Samothrace*; *IG* I³ 61

so magnanimous as to reduce the burden of tribute following a revolt is not beyond question.[149]

It is not even beyond question that by virtue of appearing on a list, a town would not have been in revolt or *stasis*. The authors of the *ATL* themselves claim that Miletus was in revolt in 454 despite its name appearing three times on the *lapis primus*; two of the entries make clear that Milesians are paying from other territories, but there may be instances where payment from elsewhere was recorded less carefully.[150] Occasionally the name of the town is recorded on the list, such as Neandrea or Sambactys. Yet most of the time it is the name of the people – "Milesians" or "Erythraeans". Thus, if the town itself was in revolt, it is still possible that "Milesians" or "Erythraeans" paid – but separately or from elsewhere. Boutheia is variously attested as "the Boutheians" and "Boutheia" without any hint as to whether the variation is significant. To complicate matters further, "Boutheia" only ever appears fully restored except in a single entry – ια.[151] There are also cases where a town appears on the lists at a time when its loyalty to Athens is questionable. As we will see, the "Colophonians" continue to pay tribute well after the town was lost to the Persians. The town of Colophon may have decided to continue paying tribute, or alternatively the entries may reflect payments from "the people of Colophon" from elsewhere.

The case of Colophon ought to make us think twice about the assumption that if a town appears on the Athenian tribute lists, it must not be paying to Persia. It has been argued on the basis of the tribute quota lists that many Ionian and Carian towns including Gargara and Zeleia had actually been lost to Persia by 440, but the lists involved are too fragmentary and many of the towns do reappear in later years; what is

[149] Unz 1985:37
[150] Meritt 1972; *IG* I³ 259 col.III.19; col. VI.19-22
[151]Fully restored: *IG* I³ 269, 272, 273, 274; partially restored: *IG* I³ 270.

more likely is that these places found themselves answerable to both empires.[152] Similarly, it has been assumed from the tribute reassessment list of 425 that Artaxerxes lost territory on the north shore of Asia Minor, but a town's appearance on the list tells us nothing about its status as a tributary of Persia.[153] This is even more the case for a town like Cerasus, which makes its sole, restored appearance in the reassessment decree. Such a place may easily have been optimistically assessed without ever paying, thus providing no evidence that it broke from Persia. Telmessus appears on the reassessment even though Thonemann argues that the Lycian Arbinas conquered it around 430.[154] Either the Athenians were being optimistic, or Telmessus was paying tribute while under Arbinas' control.

The Athenians were not completely systematic in recording tribute from divided communities, as we will see in the case of Erythrae. Several towns appear for the first time in the 430s. Yet rather than having avoided any obligation for two decades or more, they may previously have been paying in *syntely* with other towns.[155] Therefore, although they are "absent" from earlier lists, they still contributed. The processes of collecting and recording tribute are relatively opaque to the modern historian. In later assessment periods, rubrics were introduced that help to demystify the process somewhat, as do the Cleinias, Cleonymus and tribute reassessment decrees.[156] Yet sometimes additional information presents more questions than answers; the debate about what some rubrics mean is ongoing.[157] Even if the lists accurately reflect the order in which allies paid (which is in itself an assumption), this does not tell us when in the

[152] Olmstead 1948:343; Eddy 1973:248-52; *IG* I³ 271-3
[153] Olmstead 1948:353; *IG* I³ 71
[154] Thonemann 2009:170
[155] Lepper 1962:42-6
[156] Lepper 1962; *IG* I³ 34; *IG* I³ 61; *IG* I³ 71
[157] Paarmann 2007a:13. In particular, it is debated whether the rubric πόλες αύται ταχσάμεναι denotes towns that volunteered to pay and assessed themselves.

year payment actually happened. Put simply, if Thucydides says that a town revolted in 453 yet it appears on the list for 454/3, the payment may have been made before or after the revolt. It may even have been made during the revolt. It is therefore not possible to say definitively that a town was or was not in revolt in a particular year based on the evidence of the tribute lists.

If the lists alone cannot tell us when a town revolted, what can they tell us? In their entirety, they give us a good idea of general trends in payment and collection, and a sense of how many allies were paying tribute at one time. As evidence for an individual town's history and relationship with Athens, they must be used carefully. Used in conjunction with other types of evidence, they can bolster an argument for revolt. It is a reasonable assumption that a city in revolt would not pay tribute (even if loyalists or exiles did) so where there is literary evidence to suggest a revolt, the tribute lists can support it. It is also a reasonable assumption that if a town appears on the list, it was not in revolt, unless of course the payment was not "official".

The lists are immensely helpful in reinforcing arguments based on other grounds. While arguments *e silentio* may not carry much weight, the lists can of course tell us for certain who did pay as long as we provide for the possibility that payment came from a minority or exiled community. Caution should also be employed when dealing with names that are fully or almost fully restored. My own approach to restorations has been to discount cities that have been restored or to cite an inscription in square brackets where there appears to be sound reasoning behind restoring a name. It is worth remembering that the lists were not primarily intended to tell us about inter- or intrastate politics. They recorded the sixtieth paid as an offering to Athena, not the entire amount of tribute that each town paid. Yet despite their limitations the quota lists are an important source for the relationship between Athens and its Ionian allies.

Athens: the birthplace of democracy?

A related question is whether the emergence of democracy across Greece in the fifth century should be attributed to Athens' influence. Wolfgang Schüller put the spread of democracy down to Athens' maritime empire, arguing that democracy in the allied cities would not have lasted without external help.[158] Although this is true in some cases, Schüller's study suffers from its narrow scope, focusing only on cases of known Athenian intervention rather than places that may have been independently democratic. De Ste Croix has famously argued that the majority (indeed the *demos*) of Athens' allies welcomed its intervention and interference into their politics; underlying this argument is the assumption that the Athenians wanted to, and did, impose democracy on its allies.[159] Although de Ste Croix is persuasive in his argument that Athens often favoured the democrats in the allied cities, it does not follow that Athens actually set up democracies in those cities where positive evidence is lacking. In contrast, Robinson's comprehensive study of democracy all across Greece (and not just in states allied to Athens) shows that democracy could, and did, emerge and endure without Athens' help.[160] Robinson suggests that other states, such as Argos, and Syracuse, encouraged a trend towards popular government long before the Peloponnesian War had begun.[161] Similarly, Simonton argues Athens was not "the first example of democracy after which all future instances patterned themselves", but nevertheless notes the importance of external help in the consolidation of democracies.[162] As will be seen in the coming chapters, Herodotus presents even the Persians as interested in promoting democracy after the Ionian Revolt. Athenian democracy certainly had direct and indirect influence

[158] Schüller 1979
[159] De Ste Croix 1954
[160] Robinson 2011
[161] cf. Hdt. 6.83, Aristot. *Pol*. 5.1303a (Argos); Diod. 11.68.5-6, Aristot. *Pol*. 5.1312b (Syracuse)
[162] Simonton 2017b:24

on the rest of Greece, but assuming Athenian influence behind every democracy is a leap of logic. In fact, the development of democracies all over the world and at many points in time that arose "organically" (in the sense that they were not imposed or imitative) shows that people do not need an external example of democracy to become interested in people power for themselves.[163]

As for the idea that the rise of democracy in Ionia must be linked to Athens, not all of the evidence points in this direction. Evidence to suggest that democracies arose independently can be found in Teos, which shows democratic leanings in inscriptions from the early fifth century.[164] Similarly, Chios' constitution in the first half of the sixth century already showed signs of popular rule: an inscription found on the island talks of a demarch, laws of the people and a *boule demosie*.[165] In addition, the poor response to Themistocles' call for Ionian unity at Salamis could be explained by the existence of democracies already, which may have quelled the Ionians' desire for freedom.[166] Even before the Ionian Revolt, Herodotus could claim that the Naxian *demos* had booted out the "fat cats" (the παχεῖς) and taken control.[167] Since "men of property" had been instrumental in the Ionian Revolt, perhaps Mardonius felt that democracy was his only choice if he wanted to prevent further trouble.[168] This is clear from the fact that it was the men of property in Samos who were unhappy with the way their generals had "dealt with the Medes" (i.e. decided to abandon rebellion and side with them) and left Samos as a result. This is not to say that men of property are always ruling oligarchs, but in pre-democratic Ionia when Herodotus talks of οἱ τι ἔχοντες he likely means aristocratic

[163] Dahl 1989:30-3
[164] *SEG* 31:985; *ML* 30. On epigraphic grounds, and due to the banning of setting up an *aisumnetes*, the former is dated c.480-50 and the latter c.470 (Graham 1992:54).
[165] *ML* 8
[166] Hdt. 8.22; Quinn 1981:3
[167] Hdt. 5.30; Cartledge 2016:153
[168] Hdt. 6.22

men who were in power. Such a decision to change the constitution for the sake of stability would be comparable to the Athenian decision to impose democracy on rebellious Samos in 439.

This study thus acknowledges that Athens may have had reason to set up new and support existing democracies where it was beneficial, but will not assume that it did so in a particular place simply because it seems to have done so elsewhere. In Robinson's words, since democracy has shown itself to be a self-propagating phenomenon in the sixth century, "there is no *a priori* reason to think Athenian intervention would be a necessity for its continuing appearances in the fifth century."[169] That the Athenians encouraged democracy does not mean that behind every new democracy lay Athenian influence. Nor does it mean that democracy in allied cities was dependent on Athenian friendship. There is nothing in Thucydides or elsewhere to suggest that Acanthus abandoned its democracy when it voted to leave the Delian League by a secret vote in 424, especially since Brasidas makes plain that he is not interested in changing their constitution.[170] This study will therefore not equate friendship with Athens with democracy, or revolt with a return to oligarchy, unless supported by other evidence. Nor will it assume that anti-Athenian groups are anti-democracy and vice versa. It is an association fallacy to think that anti-Athenian equals anti-democratic equals oligarchic. Where Athens appears to have encouraged or set up a democracy, the geographical and historical circumstances of that particular ally will be explored.

In a similar vein, this study will try to steer clear of a totally binary way of thinking. It will not assume that a formal change to oligarchy proves the previous

[169] Robinson 2007:120
[170] Thuc. 4.86-8

existence of a democracy, or vice versa, since the transition may only be from a moderate to a radical form of the same constitution. As Simon Hornblower has convincingly shown, it is likely that when an oligarchy was forcibly imposed on the Chians in 412, this replaced a moderate oligarchy rather than a democracy.[171] The example of Chios is illuminating because it also demonstrates Athens' ad hoc approach to setting up democracies: Athens seems to have allowed Chios to remain an oligarchy throughout its control of the island, and when it had reason to suspect revolution, merely requested that the Chians dismantle their new walls.[172] The possibility will be entertained that there were more than two factions in some cities, not simply pro-Athenian democrats and pro-Spartan oligarchs. To think only in binary terms is to oversimplify some very complex political situations. Paul Cartledge points out that the political struggles that Solon arbitrated were not twofold but tripartite: between the aristocracy, the "nouveau riches" and the *demos*.[173] Although Thucydides presents the struggle during the Peloponnesian War as purely bipartite, parts of his narrative tell against this interpretation. As we will see in the case of Samos, there must have been more than two factions involved in the *stasis* of some towns. One recent interpretation of the revolt of Caunus puts forward the theory that the man who foiled Athens' attempt to recover the town also tried to resist the subsequent Persian takeover.[174] The study is a reminder that anti-Athenian and pro-Persian are not one and the same. There must have been some individuals and groups who were bold enough to dream of independence from both.

[171] Hornblower 2008 s.n. 8.9.3, 14.2, 24.4 and 38.3
[172] Thuc. 4.51
[173] Cartledge 2016:52
[174] Hyland 2018

The terms "oligarch" and "democrat" themselves are not helpful, for they encourage the modern reader to think of ancient Greek politics in terms of party politics. It is easy to equate oligarchy with conservatism and democracy with socialism but the fact is that the politically minded ancient Greek did not think in these terms and did not identify with a single political organisation in the way that his modern equivalent does today. Moreover, the modern political party "flies in the face of the ancient, individualistic if not voluntarist, conception of democratic entitlement, empowerment, and participatory rule."[175] There were certainly groups of democrats and oligarchs, but these were more informally organised around a particular individual or ideology; there was no such thing as a paid-up party member. Especially in times of *stasis*, allegiance could shift quickly and dramatically. This is something that Thucydides brings out in the Corcyra affair and applies to all episodes of *stasis*: society became divided not into political groups but simply into two camps of people who did not even trust their own affiliates.[176] There was a spectrum of affiliations and allegiances, which could change rapidly, and recognising this will affect how we interpret the evidence. Sometimes, with the limited evidence available, it is more easily said than done.

The exact date of the birth of democracy at Athens is itself up for debate. Some argue that democracy (or at least its basic institutions) should be traced back to Solon at the beginning of the sixth century.[177] Yet since the Peisistratids happily adapted their rule to fit Solon's reforms – indeed, Aristotle claims that their tyranny obliterated them - we cannot seriously call "democracy" any time before the end of the Peisistratid

[175] Cartledge 2016:295
[176] Thuc. 3.83: τὸ δὲ ἀντιτετάχθαι ἀλλήλοις τῇ γνώμῃ ἀπίστως ἐπὶ πολὺ διήνεγκεν. ἀντιτετάχθαι is a military metaphor that implies two sides at war with each other, but then we find out that even those within the parties are not on the same side.
[177] Wallace 2007:69; Aristot. *Pol*. 1273b

tyranny in 510 B.C.[178] Herodotus puts it plainly when he says that Cleisthenes "gave the Athenians their democracy"; this will have been two years later when the Athenians made the decision to dissolve their existing government.[179] Cleisthenes reorganised society in such a way as to reduce aristocratic influence and give citizens a more active role in democracy via their demes.[180] As a result – or as a result of the revolutionary events leading up to this - some scholars put the beginning of democracy in 508.[181] Yet Cleisthenes left untouched the powers of the Areopagus and the Solonian property requirements that barred everyone save for the wealthy from accessing the major magistracies.[182] For these and other reasons, many ancient and modern historians consider Ephialtes' reforms of 462/1 to be the definitive moment that Athens became a democracy in the sense that we understand for second half of the fifth century.[183] The Ephialtic reforms increased the sovereignty of the people by transferring the political powers of the Areopagus to the democratically elected Council of Five Hundred and the Heliaea.[184] These reforms introduced true accountability, for now all officials were answerable not to an aristocratic body but to the *demos*, any of whom could bring charges against them regardless of their social standing.[185]

As is to be expected, change did not happen overnight and happened gradually over the years as a result of many people's reforms.[186] For instance, Aristotle reports that ostracism was first introduced around the turn of the century and the sortition of

[178] Thuc. 6.54.5-6; Hdt. 5.55; Aristot. *Ath. Pol*. 22.1
[179] Hdt. 6.131.1; Hdt. 5.66; Aristot. *Ath. Pol*. 20
[180] Hdt. 5.66; Ober 2007:96-7; Raaflaub 2007:145-6; Birgalias 2009:25
[181] Ober 1996:32-52; Ober 2007; Cartledge 2007:163-6; Lane 2014:79; Cartledge 2016:59
[182] Aristot. *Ath. Pol.* 7.3, 23.1, 26.2, 41.2
[183] Aristot. *Const. Ath*. 25.2; Plut. *Cim*. 15.2; Ostwald 1986:15-6; Rhodes 1992b; Raaflaub 2007
[184] Aristot. *Ath. Pol.* 25.1-2; Aristot. *Pol*. 2.1274a; Diod. 11.77.6; Plut. *Mor*. 812d; Paus. 1.29.15
[185] Ostwald 1986:79-80; Cartledge 2016:110
[186] See Ober 1996 and Rose 2012:317-63 for *demos*- rather than individual-focused accounts of the development of democracy.

archons shortly after the Battle of Marathon, in 487/6.[187] It was only in the 450s, after the death of Ephialtes, that the archonship was extended to the third property class.[188] His chronology is in places confused, but its overall impression is of democracy developing piecemeal over several decades. Similarly, the changes that Pericles introduced were not a single set of reforms attributable to a specific date.[189] For our purposes, it does not matter so much who was responsible for the changes or precisely how they unfolded over the course of the late sixth and early fifth centuries. It matters more that by the time Athens began interfering in the constitutions of its allies, "Athenian democracy" and "Athenian-style democracy" were fixed enough concepts to be identifiable as such to the modern historian. Since the Ephialtic reforms were responsible for taking away power from the Areopagus and giving it to the assembly and jury-courts, this study acknowledges 462/1 as the turning-point for Athenian democracy as we know it. Thucydides considers the expulsion of the tyrants in 510 B.C. to be the beginning of freedom for the Athenians, but he does not go so far as to claim that it was the beginning of democracy.[190] We might say that Athenian democracy began to emerge in Solon's time but was only crystallised at the time of Ephialtes' reforms. The particular characteristics of Athenian democracy will be returned to below.

The emergence of democracy in Ionia is an even more vexed topic, all the more so because Herodotus makes a surprising claim that places it earlier than expected. It is generally assumed that democracies cropped up at different times across Ionia, spurred on in many cases by Athenian encouragement or downright enforcement. This would

[187] Aristot. *Ath. Pol.* 22.3-5
[188] Aristot. *Ath. Pol.* 26.2
[189] Plut. *Per*. 9, 11.2, 37.3; Aristot. *Pol*. 2.1274a; Aristot. *Ath. Pol*. 27.4
[190] Thuc. 8.68.4

have happened no earlier than the formation of the Delian League in 478 and, in some cases, much later. Yet Herodotus claims – and even he warns that the story is incredible - that in 492, after the Ionian Revolt had failed, the Persian general Mardonius went around Ionia setting up democracies in place of the existing tyrannies.[191] If we take Herodotus at face value, Ionia did not have to wait for Greek leadership for its first taste of democracy. That Herodotus' "democracy" is historical is not universally accepted; though he uses the precise term δημοκρατία, some find it implausible that Mardonius would have the resources or the inclination to go about instituting democracies all over Ionia. These argue that Herodotus is imprecise with his definitions and when he speaks of democracy he "connects with the word not more than the general meaning of a free and unmonarchical constitution";[192] by democracy he really means non-tyranny.[193] They would take Herodotus' statement to mean more loosely that Mardonius established non-autocratic governments throughout Ionia. As previously noted, Herodotus does have Histiaeus claim in 514 that if it were not for the Persians, the Ionian cities would choose to be governed by democracy rather than tyranny. Many believe this observation to be anachronistic.[194]

Herodotus' testimony ought not to be dismissed out of hand. Elsewhere, he uses the term ἰσονομία or ἰσηγορία to describe characteristics of democracy rather than the institution itself, so it is not as simple as that he carelessly uses the blanket term "democracy" to describe anything that is not oligarchy or tyranny.[195] In the

[191] Hdt. 6.43
[192] Ehrenberg 1950:527, following Schaefer 1948:503
[193] Marek believes that what is meant is merely the limiting of the power of the nobility, pointing out that at Chios a *boule demosie* was established in the early to mid sixth century (2016:141). Balcer thinks that all that is meant is constitutional governments, which in most cases would have been oligarchies (1979:265). Cartledge similarly thinks these were "moderately oligarchic regimes" (2016:152).
[194] Hdt. 4.137.2; Raaflaub 2004:206-7; Marek 2016:141
[195] Hdt. 3.142, 5.37, 5.78

"Constitutional Debate" set in 521, he has the Persian nobleman Otanes say that majority rule has the finest name, *isonomia*: πλῆθος δὲ ἄρχον πρῶτα μὲν οὔνομα πάντων κάλλιστον ἔχει, ἰσονομίην.[196] Here, *isonomia* is not the same as democracy but it is its defining feature. Otanes immediately follows up his statement with some other features of democracy: determining offices by lot, holding the people in those offices accountable, and bringing all deliberation into the public sphere. Over time those who supported democracy may have appropriated *isonomia* for themselves, as Otanes does in this speech, but in theory any constitution based on the rule of law can claim to have equality before the law.[197] The question is equality of what, and for whom?[198] Herodotus shows an awareness of this fact, presenting *isonomia* as an essential part of democracy, but not exclusive to it.

As Vlastos argues, Herodotus must have deliberately used the word because although the idea of democracy was beginning to be formulated, the word *demokratia* was not yet in use.[199] Further, it literally has the finest name in that it does not come with the negative connotations of mob rule that the word "democracy" came to have.[200] Note however that Otanes does not actually say that *isonomia* involves "the power of the assembly to discuss and decide all questions of public policy".[201] This is rather a lot to infer from βουλεύματα δὲ πάντα ἐς τὸ κοινὸν ἀναφέρει ("it brings all discussion into the public domain"). All that this means is that deliberation is public rather than private; the phrase ἐς τὸ κοινὸν quite often means "in public" rather than "shared by all

[196] Hdt. 3.80.6
[197] Lane 2014:201; Nippel 2016:18-9
[198] Sen 1982:353-69
[199] Vlastos 1953:337-9
[200] Cartledge 2007:158. However, Cartledge thinks that this is the only reason Herodotus chooses the word rather than there being a qualitative difference between the two concepts.
[201] contra Vlastos 1953:337

citizens".[202] Thus, while *demokratia* gives all citizens a share in public debate, *isonomia* does not necessarily. Alternatively, the essential difference between the two may be that *isonomia* does not necessarily entail direct political participation.[203] This would make modern democracy closer to ancient *isonomia* than *demokratia* because it is a representative rather than a direct democracy. Meanwhile, ancient *isonomia* would be a moderate or less developed form of democracy that looked quite different from the final Athenian version. Herodotus even implies that it is compatible with tyranny when he describes how Aristagoras made pretence of giving up his tyranny while instituting equality before the law at Miletus.[204] Equality is not the same as democracy for "treating politics as a matter for equal citizens does not yet settle which citizens are to be considered equal".[205]

Thus, we can say that principles such as *isonomia* and *isegoria* are key functions of democracy but not synonyms for it. The latter term, *isegoria*, Herodotus uses of Athens when it had got rid of tyranny, making the argument that Athens was better able to fight its neighbours and grow in power once its men were working for themselves rather than a master.[206] The word literally means "equality of speech", which was certainly an important aspect of Athenian democracy. In Pericles' funeral oration, the discussion of public matters even by manual labourers is a point of pride and an essential precursor to action.[207] In the aforementioned passage of Herodotus, however, equality of speech does not so much represent "democracy" as "freedom", for it is not exclusively in a democracy that men are free and eager to achieve for themselves. His

[202] e.g. Xen. *Anab*. 5.6.27; Plat. *Theaet*. 165a; Plat. *Laws* 681c. More frequently it appears with this meaning without the particle, e.g. Aesch. *PB* 844; Aesch. *Eum*. 408; Aristoph. *Birds* 457; Plat. *Laws* 796e
[203] Huizinga 1945:96-8; Nippel 2016:364
[204] Hdt. 5.37; Nakategawa 1988:268
[205] Lane 2014:201
[206] Hdt. 5.78
[207] Thuc. 2.40.2

point is more broadly that in a society where people are free to act as they please, they will be more ambitious than when working for a master. The chapter in question describes a time immediately after the removal of the tyrant Hippias, when Athenian democracy was in its earliest infancy.

Herodotus is clearly capable of distinguishing between *isonomia*, *isegoria* and *demokratia*, so his use of the latter term in this case should not be dismissed. It is one thing to use *isonomia* to mean democracy, but it would be very careless for Herodotus to claim that Mardonius established democracies when he vaguely meant equality. Diodorus Siculus half-corroborates Herodotus by mentioning that Mardonius' predecessor Artaphernes "restored to the cities their laws", although this is done on the advice of Hecataeus of Miletus and seems suspiciously to fit Herodotus' literary trope of the wise adviser.[208] If Mardonius really did set up democracies, then Persia was not so pro-tyranny as to go against the populist tide in Greece.[209] The only evidence that contradicts Herodotus' statement is the possibility that the tyrant Strattis of Chios was not deposed. [210] Mardonius will not have instituted democracies out of some ideological fervour but because tactically it was a way of keeping the cities quiet and minimising the incentive to bring in outside help. A democracy sympathetic to Persia was a lesser evil than a democracy in defiance of Persia.

Herodotus' understanding of constitutional developments in the Greek world is not always reliable, but this should not make us predisposed to disbelieve him. In the

[208] Diod. Sic. 10.25.4; Raaflaub 2009:105
[209] Barron 1961:384; Lewis 2009:46.
[210] Herodotus (8.132.2) is supposedly evidence that Strattis was still ruling in 480. Yet Strattis first comes onto the scene in 512 B.C., 33 years previously. If this is Strattis II, there may have been a hiatus when Mardonius deposed the tyrants in 492. Even if it is the same man, there is no knowing that his rule was uninterrupted for those 33 years. Austin cites Samos, Halicarnassus, Lampsacus and Cos as places where tyranny can be found soon after (1990:306); yet given how short the *floruit* of a tyrant can be, all these examples prove is that Mardonius did not rid the East Greek world of tyrants for good.

absence of any serious evidence to the contrary, it is sensible to follow Herodotus and accept that Mardonius set up democracies in Ionia, even if many of these were short-lived and undoubtedly looked different to later democracies set up under the Athenian Empire. There is some evidence that democracies were forming this early elsewhere in Greece. Aristotle gives the example of Tarentum, which became democratic "a short time after the Persian Wars" - from Herodotus we can deduce the exact date, 473 B.C.[211] Acragas became a democracy the year after.[212] As for the argument that 492 is "too early", it is circular reasoning to deny evidence for early democracies on the basis that there is no evidence for democracies so early. Eric Robinson identifies several democracies by 550 although his classification is not universally accepted.[213] Inscriptions from Elis during the last quarter of the sixth century make reference to a council of 500 and plenary assembly (δάμοι πλεθύοντι) and decisions of the *damos*.[214] There is literary and epigraphical evidence to support the theory that both Mantinea and Elis were democratic by the time they failed to show up at Plataea in 479.[215] There is (admittedly late) evidence for people's power or even democracy at Megara and its colony Heraclea as early as the sixth century, if only for a very brief time.[216] Again, the evidence has been questioned and construed as a fourth-century projection onto the

[211] Aristot. *Pol*. 5.1303a; Hdt. 7.170.3-4
[212] Diod. 11.53.5
[213] Cartledge 2016:50, 146, 321 contra Robinson 2011:219-22
[214] *I. Olympia* 7.5, 11.7; Robinson 1997:108-11. The council of 500 might be fully assembled depending on the meaning of ἀϝλανέος (Robinson 2007:116).
[215] Robinson 2011:34-40; Cartledge 2016:154; Thuc. 5.29.1, 5.47; Aristot. *Pol*. 6.1318b; Strab. 8.3.2; *IG* V.2 323
[216] Robinson 1997:114-7; Wallace 2007:56-7; Plut. *Mor*. 295c-d; Aristot. *Poet*. 1448a; Aristot. *Pol*. 1304b. Of Megara, Aristotle says that comedy was invented "at the time of their democracy"; this is reckoned to be 581-561 B.C. (Marmor Parium *FGrHist* 239 A 39). Of Heraclea, Aristotle says that right after its sixth-century foundation κατελύθη... ὁ δῆμος ("the people were put down"). Although he does not use the specific term "democracy", he implies it by giving several other examples of democracies being overthrown. At the very least, he is saying that the power was in the hands of the people.

archaic era.[217] Regardless of Robinson's radical thesis, and whether or not Herodotus is right to credit Cleisthenes with the foundation of Athenian δημοκρατία before the sixth century was out, a process of democratisation had started in Athens and other cities long before Mardonius is claimed to have jumped on the bandwagon.[218]

Did Athens promote democracies in its empire?

The Athenian *demos* believed that democracy was the best form of government; Pericles' funeral oration is the most famous articulation of the belief but it is by no means the only one.[219] Whether they considered it so superior as to want to extend its reach is another matter. The question is an important one, for if the Athenians had a policy of promoting democracy we would expect to find them interfering in the politics of the towns under investigation. Several ancient sources claim that Athens actively promoted democracy in allied cities. Some even specify that this was the experience of the Greek cities of Ionia: Xenophon says that in the 390s, these cities were no longer democratic "like they were in the time of the Athenians", or decarchies like they were under Lysander.[220] Diodorus comments that it was the Spartans' policy to put government in the hands of the leading men, while the Athenians made a habit of establishing democracies.[221] Aristotle, writing admittedly in the second half of the fourth century, is of the impression that "the Athenians used to put down oligarchies everywhere and the Spartans democracies".[222] Although putting down oligarchies is different to setting up democracies, it would be natural to assume that the two go hand

[217] Forsdyke 2005b
[218] Hdt. 6.131.1
[219] Hdt. 5.78; Thuc. 2.34-46 esp. 2.37; Thuc. 6.39; Aesch. *Pers*. 241-2; Eurip. *Supp*. 349-53, 403-8; Eurip. *Hipp*. 422; Eurip. *Herac*.182-3. For Aeschylus' *Persae* as a "hymn to democracy" see Cartledge 2016:83-5
[220] Xen. *Hell*. 3.4.7
[221] Diod. 13.48
[222] Aristot. *Pol*. 5.1307b; Aristot. *Pol*. 4.1296a

in hand; the oligarchies had to be replaced by something. Surely enough, later he explicitly says that both of the great Greek powers set up the constitution that they themselves had, adding that it was "not looking out for the interest of the cities but for their own interests."[223]

Isocrates goes further, claiming that the Athenians favoured the πλῆθος everywhere, and that the allies paid tribute not for Athens' sake but "to preserve their own democracy and freedom".[224] They were also anxious, says Isocrates, not to fall under the dominion of the Spartans, who set up oligarchies in their subject cities. Elsewhere he says that his Athenian ancestors tried to set up their own constitution in allied cities out of goodwill, because they enjoyed it so much themselves.[225] We may suspect his claim that the allies lived under democracy for 70 years free from tyranny, *stasis* or Persian interference.[226] That Isocrates was working in the early- to mid-fourth century and in the genre of oratory must be borne in mind; the *Panegyricus* was composed around 380 and the *Panathenaicus* around 340 B.C. Moreover, Isocrates is deliberately harking back to the good old days of empire in order to encourage Athens to fight Persia and regain supremacy. Yet his is only one of several voices: the Old Oligarch alleges that the Athenians took the side of the lower classes because it is the lower classes of a city that favour the *demos*, and Athenians preferred those similar to themselves.[227] Elsewhere he claims that the Athenian *demos* "disenfranchise those of high birth (οἱ χρηστοί), take away their money, drive them out and kill them and increase the power of the poor".[228] As always, the testimony of the Old Oligarch must

[223] Aristot. *Pol*. 4.1296a
[224] Isoc. 4.103-6; 12.68
[225] Isoc. 12.54
[226] Isoc. 4.106
[227] [Xen] *Ath. Pol.* 3.10
[228] [Xen] *Ath. Pol.* 1.14

be taken with a grain of salt, but it should not be dismissed out of hand; it is a valuable piece of contemporary writing.

More pertinently, the historian Thucydides time and time again either implies or explicitly states that Athens helped establish democracies and gave assistance to them in need. He puts the sentiment into the mouths of speakers like Diodotus, who says to his fellow Athenians, "in every city the *demos* is your friend".[229] The reverse of this – that the oligarchs are not Athens' friend - is made apparent at Chios, where the impetus to revolt in 412 comes overwhelmingly from the oligarchs, who get the *polloi* to agree to revolt largely by surprising them.[230] The Mytilenean envoys at Olympia attribute being allowed to keep their oligarchy to the court that they paid to the commons in Athens, and yet even they thought this would not last going by Athens' conduct towards others.[231] Mytilene is exceptional in Thucydides' narrative for having remained autonomous and oligarchic right up until its rebellion in 427. It is clear that the Mytileneans feared losing their privileged status, and thus losing the freedom to choose their own constitution, or so Thucydides has them say. Especially in the relationship between subject and ruler, constitutional assimilation appears inevitable.

The assimilation of constitutions is not only explored in Thucydides' speeches but also borne out in his narrative. When some Athenians think the unthinkable and entertain the hope of ending democracy during the campaign of Tanagra, it is to the Spartans that they turn.[232] When Athens turns to oligarchy in the last years of the war, it is because they believe (rightly or wrongly) that a more moderate constitution will gain Tissaphernes' confidence.[233] It is the oligarchy of the Four Hundred at Athens that

[229] Thuc. 3.47.2
[230] Thuc. 8.14
[231] Thuc. 3.11.7
[232] Thuc. 1.107.4
[233] Thuc. 8.53-4

sues for peace with Sparta in 411.[234] When in 436 the democratic Epidamnians want to get rid of their own *dunatoi*, they only enlist the help of oligarchic Corinth after unsuccessfully appealing to democratic Corcyra.[235] The later Corycraean affair is complex, but roughly speaking the Athenians are on the side of the *demos* and the Spartans support the oligarchs; it is to the Athenian Nicostratus that the *demos* appeals during the revolution, while Sparta lends assistance to the revolting oligarchs.[236] In 425, the Athenians come back to the aid of the Corcyraean *demos* by joining them in attacking the oligarchic exiles on Mount Istone. The leaders of the *demos* are so anxious to get their revenge that they underhandedly encourage the exiles to break their truce with Athens in order to get control of them.[237] Similarly, in book 4, when some Boeotians make overtures to Athens "wishing to change their constitution and make it a democracy just like Athens'", it is clear that in their experience the Athenians not only help the *demos* in cities but also help it to come to power.[238]

According to Thucydides, it is not only the Athenians who act in this way, but their allies also tend to favour fellow democracies: like sides with like. The Mantineans gladly allied with Argos out of enmity towards the Lacedaemonians and due to their also being a democracy.[239] The Argive anti-democrats enlisted the help of Sparta in 418/7 to topple the democracy there.[240] Meanwhile the Boeotians did not make an alliance with Argos because Argos was democratic and therefore less useful

[234] Thuc. 8.70
[235] Thuc. 1.24-5. Whibley uses the fact that Corcyra later helps the exiled Epidamnian oligarchs to argue that Corcyra was at this point an oligarchy (1896:130-1; cf. Thuc. 1.26). However, the Corcyraeans only got involved out of anger that their colony had been handed over to the Corinthians, by which point the latter had already taken the side of the democrats.
[236] Thuc. 3.75, 72
[237] Thuc. 4.46
[238] Thuc. 4.76
[239] Thuc. 5.29
[240] Thuc. 5.76.2

(ξύμφορος) to them than oligarchic Sparta.[241] Argos itself, on the verge of making an alliance with Sparta, turned instead to Athens, reflecting that they had an ancient alliance and Athens was also governed by a democracy like itself.[242] Indeed, the terms of the eventual four-way alliance between Athens, Argos, Mantinea and Elis suggest that all four were democracies at the time.[243]

It is a recurring theme in Thucydides that democracies side with democracies, and oligarchies with oligarchies. After reporting the *stasis* at Corcyra in 427, Thucydides comments that all of Greece convulsed, with the leaders of the *demos* bringing in the Athenians, and the *oligoi* bringing in the Lacedaemonians.[244] The Thebans, in their speech to the Spartans after the surrender of Plataea, accuse the Plataeans of "Atticising".[245] The charge of Atticism is so serious that for the Thebans, it undoes all of the Plataeans' good deeds against the Persians. Since Plataea was likely the only Theban democracy at this time, [246] the charge is not just that Plataea sided with Athens but that it sided with democracy against oligarchy. For the oligarchs in Thucydides, "the concept of Atticism came to stand for the international form of Athenian democracy and the dangerous influence they believed it exercised".[247] The other town that the Thebans accuse of Atticism is Thespiae, in 423 B.C.[248] Thucydides undermines their claim by adding that the Thebans had always wanted to take down Thespiae's wall. Yet their supposed pretext turns out to have some foundation, for by

[241] Thuc. 5.31
[242] Thuc. 5.44
[243] Thuc. 5.47.9
[244] Thuc. 3.82.1
[245] Thuc. 3.62.1
[246] Thuc. 2.2, 2.72-4, 3.65; Robinson 2011:55
[247] Cogan 1981:17
[248] Thuc. 4.133.1

414 we find the Thespian *demos* trying to overthrow the oligarchy and, when they fail, fleeing to Athens for refuge.[249]

Syracuse is a notable exception to the rule because it is democratic yet hostile to Athens, and helps the *dunatoi* put down a democratic revolution in Leontini in 422.[250] The theme of opposition between democracy and oligarchy, and the struggle between its proponents, is even brought out by Athenagoras' speech to his fellow Syracusans before the Sicilian Expedition.[251] The Sicilian Expedition proves that it is not only allied cities that the Athenians allegedly interfered with. Thucydides' own reason for the failure of the Sicilian Expedition supports his hypothesis about Athens supporting democracies: he says that the Athenians struggled in Sicily because, the cities already being democratic, they could not create dissension by changing their government.[252] His comment suggests that it was standard practice for the Athenians to gain supporters in the allied cities by taking advantage of local rifts and holding out the promise of democracy to the people, and this is generally borne out in his narrative. This is not to say that the historian's account is devoid of nuance. His meticulously detailed "catalogue of ships" two chapters later proves his point that the Syracusan and Athenian allies chose their sides on the basis not of kinship but an assortment of opportunism, chance and compulsion.[253]

The general rule that like sides with like is exemplified by the fact that once Athens becomes an oligarchy, it reverses its policy in accordance: envoys are sent to try and establish oligarchies in as many of the allied cities as possible.[254] Moreover, in

[249] Thuc. 6.95.2
[250] Thuc. 5.4
[251] Thuc. 6.39
[252] Thuc. 7.55.2
[253] Thuc. 7.57
[254] Thuc. 8.64

the same chapter Thucydides comments that once the allied cities were allowed oligarchy, they were hungry for actual freedom, implying that Athens had previously encouraged democracy in those cities and that quite a few of them had been democratic. The very fact that Athens was now offering its allies oligarchy suggests that – for the majority of the allies at least - it had not previously been an option. The next chapter begins with Peisander following orders and abolishing "the democracies in the cities"; Thucydides is vague about precisely which cities, but this only serves to bolster the impression that Athens as a general rule (up until the oligarchic coup) encouraged democracies in the allied cities.

Of course, that Thucydides presents this as a universal truth does not mean that it was one.[255] Yet, there is plenty of more nuanced evidence in Thucydides' narrative to support his hypothesis. It is telling that when the leaders of the Megarian *demos* got into serious trouble in 424, they immediately resolved to betray the town to Athens rather than allow the return of the oligarchs. For the democratic leaders at least, if not for the rest of the populace, the overthrow of democracy was a more chilling prospect than loss of autonomy. The Megarian oligarchs evidently had the support of the Peloponnesian allies, for Thebes had given them Plataea to occupy after they were exiled.[256] It is also telling that after the ensuing battle in which Brasidas and the Spartans were perceived to have won, as soon as the Athenians leave Megara, the Megarians set up a narrow oligarchy.[257] This is despite the fact that those who effected this change of constitution were in the minority, something that Thucydides makes special note of.

[255] Brock 2009 argues that it is not.
[256] Thuc. 3.68.3
[257] Thuc. 4.66-74

During Brasidas' march north, it is the oligarchs in Torone and Mende who invite him in, and it is the *demos* at Mende who aid Athens.[258] The revolt of Chios in 412 is the work of the few (ὀλίγοι) in concert with the Spartan Chalcideus and Alcibiades, who take the many (οἱ πολλοὶ) by surprise.[259] The impression that Thucydides gives is of a small group of oligarchs working secretly with their Spartan connections and keeping their plans hidden from the democratic masses.[260] At Argos, changing allegiance from Athens to Sparta goes hand in hand with overthrowing the democracy and setting up an oligarchy "favourable to the Lacedaemonians"; the Spartans also reduce Sicyon's government to a smaller number.[261] This is direct and unsolicited intervention on the part of the Spartans; nobody called them in and no Spartan ally called on them to act thus. On the contrary, Thucydides' pointed αὐτοί emphasises that the Spartans and the Spartans alone went to Sicyon to change its constitution: αὐτοὶ οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι ἐλθόντες.[262] Xenophon's *Hellenica* bears out Thucydides' statement that the *oligoi* in the cities tended to call in the Spartans. In Thasos, Rhodes, Phlius, and Tegea we find the (usually wealthy) oligarchs requesting help from the Spartans in the early fourth century.[263] In the case of Rhodes, Xenophon says that the Spartans were aware that if the *demos* won, all of Rhodes would be the Athenians', but if the wealthier classes (πλουσιώτεροι) won, it would be their own. Elsewhere an almost identical prophecy is made about Sicyon.[264] The Mantineans

[258] Thuc. 4.110.1; 4.123.2; 4.130.4-5
[259] Thuc. 8.14
[260] Chios appears to have been a democracy by this point, because revolt from Athens cannot be effected without approval by the assembly (Thuc. 8.14.2; O'Neil 1995:39-40).
[261] Thuc. 5.81-2
[262] Thuc. 5.81.2
[263] Xen. *Hell.* 1.1.32, 4.8.20, 5.3.10-2, 6.5.10
[264] Xen. *Hell.* 7.1.44

support the Spartan Agesilaus "because they happened to be an aristocracy (ἀριστοκρατούμενοι).[265]

Moreover, there are known instances of Athens not just supporting the democrats but even interfering with the political constitutions of its allies. In Thucydides, one explicitly stated instance is Samos, where Pericles wasted no time in setting up a democracy once trouble arose.[266] A second is Boeotia, where Demosthenes installed a democracy on the Athenian model, at the initiative of some Boeotian democrats.[267] A third, this time in Diodorus, is Paros, which was an oligarchy until Theramenes "restored freedom to the *demos*" in 410.[268] A combination of evidence from Diodorus and Plutarch leads to the conclusion that the Athenians colonised Thurii in Italy and made it a democracy in the mid-440s.[269]

This is not to say that Athens had a consistent and coherent policy of setting up democracies in allied cities, or that there was always an ideological motivation behind it; Athens seems to have had a more pragmatic and *ad hoc* approach. Establishing democracies was a way of making sure that a new group of people would be in charge of the city, a necessary shake-up when the previous leaders had been responsible for revolt. It was also a way of curbing the power of the local elite by allowing them to maintain a degree of power (which seems to have been inevitable) but in a system that limited the power of individuals. Actions such as installing a cleruchy seem to have spread the wealth, since it was landowners whom the cleruchies hurt. Yet it will have been something of a balancing act: Athens also needed financial contributions from its allies, and there were benefits to being able to rely on a wealthy ruling class. Athens

[265] Xen. *Hell*. 6.4.18
[266] Thuc. 1.115
[267] Thuc. 4.76.2
[268] Diod. 13.47.8
[269] Diod. 12.11.1-3; Plut. *Per*. 11.5

may simply have supported democracies because it found them more sympathetic to its cause and easier to control. This is what Aristotle implies when he says that Sparta and Athens set up oligarchies and democracies for their own advantage.[270] As Thucydides notes in the case of Thasos, once the allied cities got a moderate government and freedom of action they went after absolute freedom. This meant that as soon as Athens made Thasos an oligarchy it revolted.[271] Thucydides' concept of freedom here may be coloured by his own political leanings, for elsewhere he uses the metaphor of slavery to describe the Athenian Empire.[272] Yet beneath the rhetoric may lie the valid point that Athens found it easier to control democracies. Otherwise, it is difficult to explain the cumulative evidence of Athens both siding with and installing democracies.

That this is not just Thucydides' own view is supported by the fact that he puts almost the same point into the mouth of the Athenian general Phrynichus. He predicts that the allies will be no more drawn to an Athenian oligarchy than to the present democracy: rule by the "best men" would be just as oppressive as rule by the *demos*, and in the allied states the *demos* was their refuge from the violence of the "best men".[273] In other words, the *demos* was their security against the ill will of the aristocrats. Phrynichus is generalising and trying to argue a point, but that does not mean that his speech has no historical value. Phrynichus' main argument that he is trying to push is that the allies did not care about having oligarchy instead of democracy but freedom instead of servitude. Yet underlying his rhetoric are the assumptions that Athens' allied friends were democrats, and offering oligarchy to its allies was a novel (and ill-advised)

[270] Aristot. *Pol*. 4.1296a
[271] Thuc. 8.64
[272] Thuc. 1.98.4. Thucydides' political leanings and his views on the Athenian Empire have been much discussed and deduced from passages such as 8.97.2 (see Finley 1942:19-35; de Ste Croix 1954:31-7; Raaflaub 2006; Bagby 2011:129-37).
[273] Thuc. 8.48.5-6

thing for Athens to do. Events of 411 also tell us that by that point Athens was very interested in tampering with its allies' political arrangements, so there is no reason why Athens would not have taken such an interest earlier on in the war. Thasos itself may have been one of the recipients of democracy when it was reduced in 463, for when the oligarchs took over in 411 they considered themselves to be "setting right" the constitution, making it possible that the "right" constitution had been in place until Athens intervened in Thasos' revolt, disembarking on the island and attempting to colonise Amphipolis with ten thousand Athenians.[274] However, exceptions such as Mytilene remind us that Athens was capable of leaving allies to govern themselves, and warn against the assumption that Athens had a blanket policy.

Roger Brock makes the important point that both the Old Oligarch and Thucydides talk of the Athenians taking sides during *stasis*: they do not claim that their enthusiasm for setting up and aiding democracies extended to peacetime.[275] This makes sense, if we consider Athens' motivation to be making its allies as stable and as unlikely to revolt as possible. Athens may only have deemed it necessary to intervene when things went wrong. Similarly, since many of the above quoted sources were writing at or after the end of the fifth century, what may have been true for the Peloponnesian War proper may not apply to the early years of the Delian League or the rest of the Pentecontaetia. Our one securely dated instance of early Athenian interference in an ally's constitution – Samos – could be an isolated or rare incident, with Athens only developing a habit of protecting and promoting democracies as the war progressed. The question of the date of the Old Oligarch will pervade this study; here it suffices to note that if one accepts an earlier date for the composition of the treatise, such as the 440s

[274] Thuc. 1.100; Brock 2009:153
[275] Brock 2009:151-2

or any date pre-431, then one of our sources attests to Athens' consistent promotion of democracy even before the outbreak of the war. However, it will be argued that the Old Oligarch should be placed in the 410s or the years leading up to the end of the war.

One of the reasons that oligarchs might encourage oligarchies, both in their own towns and elsewhere, is the fear of losing power. Simonton speaks of "pan-elite coordination" against the democratic enemy, by which he means oligarchs' support for each other within their own towns.[276] One can also detect pan-elite coordination on an interstate as well as an intrastate level. The rise of democracy caused oligarchs to unite against a common enemy and define their identity as oligarchs, rather than simply elites. As oligarchs, their aim was to keep power away from the *demos*. Similarly, the fragility of democracy and the challenges it faced, not just in being set up but in surviving, made Athens an active supporter of other democracies as well as defensive of its own. Moreover, from a sociological perspective it makes sense that some towns needed external influence to become democracies. Simonton, in his discussion of how oligarchs maintained control over the rest of the citizenry, adduces the example of the so-called Prisoner's Dilemma.[277] In the Prisoner's Dilemma, two criminals are faced with the choice of informing on each other and receiving a reduced prison sentence, or co-operating with each other and serving only a year due to there being insufficient evidence to prosecute them on the principal charge. They have no contact with the other prisoner and therefore can only guess how they will behave. Because betraying the other criminal overall offers a greater reward than staying silent, purely rational prisoners will betray each other. This is despite the fact that if they both co-operated, they would serve a lesser sentence. In the Prisoner's Dilemma, collective action is

[276] Simonton 2017b:33
[277] Simonton 2017b:66-7

thwarted by individual rationality and the inability of individuals to predict each other's actions. Classical Greek oligarchs were able to capitalise on this to ensure that "[s]o long as the members of the demos viewed the potential costs of collective action as outweighing the potential benefits of overthrowing the oligarchy and establishing a democracy, they would fail to initiate resistance".[278] In these conditions, it will have taken either *stasis* (often triggered by external factors) or external interference for change to take place.

A Peace (or two) of Callias?

The historicity of the "Peace of Callias" and its renewal has long been debated and it is not the purpose of this study to contribute to the debate.[279] The arguments on both sides are strong: on the one hand, the fifth-century silence on the subject and on the other, the many fourth-century references and the curious "other business" that places Callias in Susa in 449/8.[280] If Callias made peace in 449/8 this will have been with Artaxerxes I, and a possible renewal is thought to have happened in 424/3 at the start of Darius II's reign. The sources, which talk not only of Callias but a certain Epilycus, point towards both dates. Plutarch talks of a "notorious peace", Andocides boasts that his mother's brother Epilycus secured a truce with the Great King, and Isocrates perhaps alludes to the terms of a peace treaty.[281] Demosthenes claims that Callias negotiated the peace, Lycurgus describes a similar agreement delineating the boundaries of each empire, and even Plato talks of men who warred against the barbarians and obtained peace.[282] Diodorus confidently goes into detail about the terms of the Peace: the Greek cities of Asia are to be autonomous, the Persian satraps are not to venture more than three days'

[278] Simonton 2017b:67
[279] See Badian 1993:1-72; Robertson 1976
[280] Hdt 7.151
[281] Plut. *Cim*. 13; Andoc. 3.29; Isoc. 4.118-20, 7.80, 12.59
[282] Dem. 19.273; Lyc. 1.73; Plat. *Menex*. 241d-242a

journey to the sea, and the Athenians are not to send troops into Persian territory.[283] Theopompus has seen the inscription containing the treaty himself, yet denies its authenticity because its alphabet was Ionic.[284] Yet none of these sources has the advantage of being contemporary, and many are orators pushing an agenda. The debate has raged so long precisely because there is no satisfactory answer to whether there was a formal peace with Persia. If the peace were historical, what impact would it have on our study?

Some studies of the Athenian Empire have viewed the "Peace" in the middle of the fifth century as a watershed moment, which transformed the Confederacy into an Empire and effectively re-enslaved Ionia.[285] This was particularly tempting when some decrees concerning Ionian cities were dated early. This view will be challenged, since there is no longer good reason to date many decrees with three-bar sigma to the 450s and 440s. This is not to deny that Athens behaved imperialistically in these years, but the Peace, if such a thing existed, should not be used to explain the spuriously dated revolts of Miletus, Erythrae and Colophon. Moreover, the tone and content of these decrees need to be re-examined. Another line of argument is that the "Peace" gave Persia a stronger claim over the Ionian cities, and Artaxerxes may even have stipulated that they were to be unwalled in the terms of the treaty.[286] By 427, all the cities of Ionia were apparently unwalled but it is unknown when and why this happened.[287]

The Athenians, for their part, might have stipulated that the Greek cities of Persia should henceforth pay tribute to them and not to the Great King. A tricky passage of Isocrates has been taken to suggest this. The Greek runs thus: μάλιστα δ' ἄν τις

[283] Diod. 12.4.5
[284] Theopompus *FGrHist* 115 F 153
[285] e.g. Balcer 1984a
[286] Cawkwell 1997b:123-5
[287] Thuc. 3.33.2

συνίδοι τὸ μέγεθος τῆς μεταβολῆς, εἰ παραναγνοίη τὰς συνθήκας τάς τ᾽ ἐφ᾽ ἡμῶν γενομένας καὶ τὰς νῦν ἀναγεγραμμένας. τότε μὲν γὰρ ἡμεῖς φανησόμεθα τὴν ἀρχὴν τὴν βασιλέως ὁρίζοντες καὶ τῶν φόρων ἐνίους τάττοντες καὶ κωλύοντες αὐτὸν τῇ θαλάττῃ χρῆσθαι: νῦν δ᾽ ἐκεῖνός ἐστιν ὁ διοικῶν τὰ τῶν Ἑλλήνων, καὶ προστάττων ἃ χρὴ ποιεῖν ἑκάστους, καὶ μόνον οὐκ ἐπιστάθμους ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι καθιστάς.[288] The "treaties that have been published recently" are supposed to refer to the Peace of Callias. The confusion is over whether Isocrates is saying that the Greeks used the Peace of Callias to set the amount that the Asiatic Greeks were to pay the Great King, or that they set the tribute for some of their own tributaries which were in Isocrates' day back in Persian hands.[289] The latter meaning is preferable since none of the other sources claim that Athens controlled the amount that the Ionians paid Persia. The point that Isocrates is making is that in the good old days Athens levied taxes on Asia Minor, where now Persia levies taxes on Asia Minor. Contrasting past glory with present ignominy is a theme of the speech, as signalled by the opening of the above quoted section: "One may best understand our reversal of fortune, if he compares the treaties." Isocrates' rhetorical agenda in contrasting past glory with present ignominy undermines his claim somewhat.

It is also unlikely that Athens would have demanded to dictate Persian tribute in the terms of the "Peace". The matter of tribute was a contentious topic and besides, the Ionian cities are hardly likely to have been paying the Great King regularly between 478 and 449 B.C. Oswyn Murray makes the good point that Athens might deliberately have left out the matter of tribute from a treaty with Persia, so that the threat of paying arrears to Persia could be levelled against any Ionian looking to defect.[290] At any rate,

[288] Isoc. 4.120
[289] Gomme 1944:331-9; Cary 1945
[290] Murray 1966:156

it is implausible that Artaxerxes would have made such a concession, if only for fear of looking weak. Since Isocrates is so vague in the first place, being specific only in claiming that this was the case for some (ἐνίους) of the tributaries, it makes little difference. The passage hardly provides evidence either way for who was claiming tribute from the Ionian cities in the mid-fifth century. It certainly does not provide evidence that the "Peace" contained a specific clause detailing what was to happen with the Asiatic Greeks' tribute. As for the bearing that such terms would have on their autonomy, both Thucydides and Xenophon suggest that being assessed for tribute and being autonomous were not mutually exclusive.[291] In the treaty between Athens and Sparta that Thucydides quotes, it is stipulated that the cities that Sparta is to hand over to Athens will be "autonomous and paying the tribute from Aristides' time". Thus, it is not unthinkable that even if a peace was made, Athens could at the same time demand the Asiatic Greeks' autonomy and concede that they remain tributary to Persia.

The evidence is too flimsy to prove that Athens made peace with Persia, or that this affected either side's claim to tribute from the Asiatic Greeks. If a peace treaty was made, both sides broke both the spirit if not the letter. Athens' sending of tribute-collecting ships to Caria and Lycia, and adding even more Asiatic cities as far as Pamphylia to the tribute reassessment of 425/4 while increasing the tribute of those already paying, must have been a provocation.[292] If a satrap like Pissouthnes was capable of sending ships to help an Athenian ally revolt, he was also capable of illicitly exacting tribute from an Athenian ally.[293] This is assuming that these were reluctant; some cities might have been quite willing to keep their Persian neighbours on side by continuing contributions.

[291] Thuc. 5.18.5; Xen. *Hell.* 3.4.25
[292] Thuc. 2.69; 3.19; *IG* I³ 71 col.I.110-col.II.160 (Pamphylia: col.II.156-7)
[293] Thuc. 1.115.4

What is clear is that both sides made some claim over the Ionian cities, and neither side was willing to relinquish this claim. Herodotus twice says outright that the Persians considered the whole of Asia to be theirs.[294] During negotiations with Athens in 412/1, Alcibiades on behalf of Tissaphernes demanded that all of Ionia be given back.[295] Thucydides is convinced that both Alcibiades and Tissaphernes made the demand in the full knowledge that it would be rejected. That the demand was made at all tells us that Tissaphernes wanted to claim the Ionian Greeks exclusively for himself but acknowledged that this was not the reality. It need not mean that Tissaphernes had absolutely no claim to the Asiatic Greeks at that time. Peace or no peace, it is unsurprising that control of the Ionian Greeks was an attractive prospect, not least for financial reasons. There is a strong case for arguing that various Persian governors and both Artaxerxes and Darius II were interested in controlling Asia Minor, whether or not this interest was formalised by a peace treaty.

Political terminology

The terms used in this enquiry need to be defined, for it only gets us so far to say that democracy is the rule of the people and oligarchy the rule of the few. Ancient democracy did not entail complete social equality or total participation. Any comparison of modern and ancient western democracy is quick to point out that only recently has the enfranchised citizenry become synonymous with the adult population of a state.[296] Even then, there are exceptions such as the incarcerated. There are also similarities: in neither ancient Athenian nor modern western democracies would citizenship be acquired through the mere fact of migration.[297] The Athenian metic is not

[294] Hdt. 1.4.4, 9.116.3
[295] Thuc. 8.56.3-4
[296] e.g. Finley 1985:15-6; Robinson 1997:29 Rhodes 2003:7; Ober 2005:1; Farrar 2007:178; Kagan 2009:99; Cartledge 2016:33-41; Nippel 2016:25
[297] Nippel 2016:360

so dissimilar from the American Green Card holder. Athenian democracy did not entail political representation by an elected professional as it does today, but even more radically, it meant – in theory at least - the direct participation of all citizens in political decision-making.[298] This extended far beyond legislation to choosing who was a citizen, choosing who was a civic official, and deciding questions of public policy ranging from the corn supply to major decisions of war and peace.[299] This would be unworkable in most modern democracies, owing to their size and economy. There are evidently some major differences between what would pass for a democracy in the ancient world and in the present day. For the modern reader, it is a paradox that in Athenian democracy well over half the population was excluded from the civic body, but the alternative – to deny that it was a democracy at all – is anachronistic. Having accepted this paradox, we need a working definition of ancient democracy.

Setting aside comparisons between ancient and modern, ancient democracies varied hugely between themselves. In Greek cities under the Roman Empire, the ancient sources describe some periods as democratic even though it is clear that the word meant little more than "legal protection and social certainty practised by good government" and was in practice akin to a monarchy or an oligarchy.[300] Some modern scholars have similarly drawn attention to the democratic aspects of Middle and Late Republican Rome.[301] Even in comparing democracies from the same century it is important to bear in mind that local conditions (e.g. size of population, geography and size of town) will have made Samian democracy or Milesian democracy very different from Athenian democracy. Although the exceptionality of Athenian democracy ought not to be

[298] Robinson 1997:25-6; Nippel 2016:84
[299] Lane 2014:117-8; cf. Aristot. *Ath. Pol.* 43.4
[300] Nippel 2016:83; c.f. Cassius Dio 56.43.4, Aelius Aristides 26.90 (Behr 1981:93), Philostratus *Vita Apollonii* 5.35
[301] Millar 2002:157-82

overemphasised, there must have been a world of difference between it and, for example, the incipient democracy at Erythrae that the Athenians appear to have imposed.[302] The bar for what constitutes a democracy will necessarily be set low because there is simply not enough evidence to assess how democratic some of these democracies were. Moreover, a major challenge for the student of Athenian democracy is that most of our evidence for it – and almost all our evidence for the theory of it – comes from the fourth century. Although [Pseudo-] Aristotle is indispensable to our understanding of Athenian democracy, the *Constitution of the Athenians* was written towards the end of the fourth century.

It is not true that democracy was not theorised about in the fifth century. Pindar's second Pythian ode, composed in 470 B.C. or thereabouts, compares the rule of a tyrant to that of the turbulent rabble (ὁ λάβρος στρατός) and the wise (οἱ σοφοί).[303] His is an early, elite take on the tripartite division of constitutions that was entering public consciousness. Such pieces of writing as Herodotus' "constitutional debate" show how an increasing opposition and competition between oligarchy and democracy as abstract ideologies developed in the mid-fifth century.[304] In Herodotus, Thucydides (as discussed) and various other authors, the struggle between oligarchs and democrats is a recurring theme.[305] Yet the two constitutions are not necessarily polar opposites and can in reality function in similar ways. What is in theory a democracy can function like an oligarchy, as has been argued is the case for both the United States and the United Kingdom.[306] The Iron Law of Oligarchy dictates that "every political organisation at every level or scale ultimately and necessarily for largely operational reasons begets

[302] *IG* I³ 14
[303] Pind. *Pyth*. 2.86-8
[304] Hdt. 3.80-2; Bleicken 1979:160-1
[305] Hdt. 5.30.1, 6.91.1; Plut. *Arist*. 13.1; Aristot. *Pol*. 5.1301b, 5.1303b, 6.1321a
[306] Michels 2001; Gilens & Page 2014; Mount 2012

functional oligarchy".[307] Michels makes this argument about modern democracy but a similar case can be argued for many ancient democracies.

The second problem is the state of the evidence. Matthew Simonton is right to stress the ideological difference between ancient Greek democracy and oligarchy, but even if we subscribe to his belief that most ancient democracies are readily distinguishable from oligarchies, a lack of evidence – not just an anachronistic view of the exclusiveness of ancient democracies – can complicate matters.[308] In assessing the ancient evidence we have to know whom the assembly was made up of and where the real power lay. Often, the state of the evidence – be it a fragmentary inscription or an imprecise classical author – does not permit certainty. A primitive version of democracy would look very similar to a primitive version of oligarchy, both featuring some kind of assembly with groups of people making proposals and accepting or rejecting them.[309] The potential for ancient democracy to blur into oligarchy will be borne in mind, though a lack of evidence makes it difficult to discern the extent to which this happened in cities outside Athens.

That an oligarchy can in turn look like a democracy is evident from the fact that Isocrates describes the Spartan constitution as "most democratic", presumably because it involves a high degree of citizen participation; elsewhere he says that theirs is the only workable kind of democracy.[310] It may surprise us to hear the Spartan arrangement described in these terms, but this is because Sparta became the self-styled – or at least Thucydides-styled - antithesis of Athenian democracy during the Peloponnesian War.[311] The Spartans considered themselves a society of equals; hence those who enjoyed full

[307] Cartledge 2016:307; Michels 2001:224-34
[308] Simonton 2016:3-4
[309] Robinson 1997:20
[310] Isoc. 7.60-1; 12.178
[311] Thuc. 1.70, 1.77, 1.84, 2.37, 3.37

citizenship being called ὁμοῖοι.[312] Yet events of the fifth century made them the natural counter image to Athens and its democracy.[313] Aristotle also claims that Sparta's aristocracy evolved into a democracy, because the ephors were chosen from the entire citizen body and due to their power the kings had to curry the *demos*' favour.[314] Elsewhere he describes the Spartan constitution as mixed because it places a high value on equality but all its offices are elective rather than chosen by lot.[315] All citizen males had an equal vote in the assembly.[316] Plutarch attributes to the seventh-century lawgiver Lycurgus the principle that "to the *damos* (the people) belong *kuria* (power) and *kratos* (strength); he adds that for a time the people had the power (κύριος ἦν) to make the final decision on motions laid before them by the elders and kings.[317] A similar sentiment is found in Diodorus and although the textual tradition is undoubtedly complex, both authors allege that Lycurgus was interested in people power.[318] Spartan society, though not a democracy, had many features that we would consider democratic.[319]

It is no easier to define oligarchy, for the word has so many connotations of wealth, hereditary status and political power. Often we find that the oligarchs in a city are synonymous with the wealthy; this is certainly true of oligarchies defined by a high property requirement. Aristotle and Xenophon both equate "the few" with "the rich", the latter explicitly.[320] Despite this, it is clear that in practice not all oligarchs are wealthy, and not all wealthy people are oligarchs. As for the main difference between

[312] Xen. *Hell*. 3.3.5; Xen. *Const. Lac.* 13.1; Aristot. *Pol*. 5.1306b
[313] Bleicken 1979:171
[314] Aristot. *Pol*. 2.1270b
[315] Aristot. *Pol*. 41294b
[316] Aristot. *Pol*. 2.1272a
[317] Plut. *Lyc*. 6.1-3; Tyrt. 4.3-10 West
[318] Diod. 7.12.6. Diodorus preserves *nike* instead of *kuria*, which in this context would also mean "authority" or "mastery".
[319] Andrewes 1966:16; Powell 1988:106
[320] Xen. *Hell*. 4.8.20, 7.1.44; Aristot. *Pol*. 4.1390a40-b3; Aristot. *Rhet*. 1.8

democracy and oligarchy, it is not a simple question of majority versus minority rule. As Aristotle points out, nobody would call a constitution in which the rich were in the majority, and only an unfortunate few lost out on enfranchisement, a democracy.[321] Aristotle concludes from this that government in the interest of the rich is oligarchy; government in the interest of the poor (however few) is democracy.[322]

The overlap between democracy and other forms of government is something recognised even by Thucydides, in his observations that the era of Pericles was in practice rule by the first citizen, and (in the mouth of Phrynicus) that in all cities the better classes were the ones who made and benefited from the decisions of the *demos* anyway.[323] The historian further blurs the lines between (moderate) oligarchy and democracy when he claims that the expansion of the oligarchy of the Four Hundred back to Five Thousand was the end of oligarchy altogether.[324] The ensuing modern debate about whether the regime was more of a moderate oligarchy or a moderate democracy only serves to emphasise how similar the two can look.[325] Thucydides also has the Athenian ambassadors from Samos essentially describe the oligarchy of the Five Thousand as a kind of modified democracy.[326] Although this is a sophistic argument designed to trick the Athenians into accepting the proposed reforms, moderate forms of both constitutions evidently had some overlap. The Eupatridae continued to be a prominent family in Athens under democracy, and political dynasties such as the Alcmaeonidae continued to produce the likes of Pericles.[327]

[321] Aristot. *Pol*. 4.1290a
[322] Aristot. *Pol*. 3.1280a
[323] Thuc. 2.65.9; 8.48.6
[324] Thuc. 8.98.4
[325] Kagan 1987:117-9; Cartledge 2016:163-4
[326] Thuc. 8.53.1, 8.65.3
[327] Isoc. 16.25-6; Thuc. 1.126-7

Ancient political terminology

To add to the confusion, it is not always clear what ancient authors mean by the terms that they use. Even though Herodotus explicitly defines democracy, oligarchy and tyranny in his constitutional debate, his use of the terms elsewhere remains opaque. Herodotus is not afraid to make sweeping statements about oligarchy and democracy, but not all his readers believe them. As mentioned earlier, he makes two important statements about constitutional change in Asia Minor, both radical enough to have caused serious doubt as to their accuracy. The first is an argument put forth in a debate, around 512 B.C., that were it not for the Persians all the Ionian cities would choose democracy over tyranny.[328] The second is that after the Ionian Revolt, the Persian general Mardonius deposed all the tyrants in Ionia and replaced them with democracies.[329] The first is disbelieved because it is anachronistic, the second because of a suspicion that Herodotus uses the term "democracy" to mean anything that is not tyranny. This is aside from the fact that both broadly deal with "Ionia" as though it were one politically homogeneous state, rather than a group of cities with different political stories. Elsewhere, it is not always clear whether by ἰσονομία Herodotus means full democracy or merely political equality.[330]

Thucydides uses the same key terms to denote rather different groups of people; to take an example, δυνατοί is used variously to mean oligarchs, the political elite in a democracy, the landed gentry, or merely the wealthy. More rarely, Thucydides uses the term *oligoi* to mean "the oligarchs", and even then there is confusion: when he finally reveals that Chios was an oligarchy in 412, the fact that the oligarchs are wary of incurring the wrath of the *plethos* suggests that they were feeling the strain of being a

[328] Hdt. 4.137
[329] Hdt. 6.43
[330] e.g. 3.142.3; 5.37.2

minority and were not in total control.[331] Thucydides also uses the word δῆμος variously to denote the citizen body, the actual institution of democracy, or the democratic faction in a city.[332] The word is even used in the same sentence to mean both a democratic faction and "the many" who made up the democratic body at Samos.[333] In one of his comments on mob mentality in the wake of the Sicilian Expedition, one suspects that Thucydides' criticism of the *demos* is levelled at both the people and the institution.[334] On occasion, the word means nothing more than "the poor", as when he points out that even the *demos* were made worse off by the Peloponnesian ravaging of the Attic countryside.[335] The historian can use the word to mean those who play little part in making decisions: the starving Mytilenean *demos* are not particularly democratic and only have any agency in their own fate once they are emboldened by having arms.[336]

Sometimes Thucydides identifies a group by what they are not: all we know of the men in Argos whom the Spartans targeted in 418/7 is that they did not want democracy.[337] Although in this case we might reasonably guess that these were oligarchic sympathisers, oligarchy and democracy were not the only options available. The variety of terms used by Thucydides suggests that the situation in many cities was more complex. Moreover, when the Athenians decide to depose the Four Hundred and hand over government to the Five Thousand, Thucydides calls this the end of the oligarchy, despite also noting that membership is determined by a property qualification and pay for office is scrapped.[338] That Thucydides does not consider this an oligarchy

[331] Thuc. 8.9.3; Hornblower 2008:785
[332] Examples of each: Thuc. 3.70.3; 1.107; 3.72
[333] Thuc. 8.73.2
[334] e.g. 8.1.4
[335] Thuc. 2.65.2
[336] Thuc. 3.72.2-3
[337] Thuc. 5.76.2
[338] Thuc. 8.97-8

– even if only in comparison to the narrower rule of the Four Hundred - shows how tricky precise definitions can be.

Thucydides twice uses the term ἀριστοκρατία, "aristocracy", and both times it is interchangeable with oligarchy. In a passage discussed above, the new Thasian oligarchy in 411 is described as "aristocracy allied to Athens" and the Thasian revolt comes as a surprise "to those who had set up the oligarchy of the Athenians".[339] The terms ἀριστοκρατία and ὀλιγαρχία signify the same thing. In his analysis of *stasis* during the war, Thucydides criticises their leaders, on the one side saying specious things in support of political equality, *isonomia*, on the other in support of moderate aristocracy.[340] Since Thucydides begins his chapter by commenting on the tendency of democrats to call in Athens and oligarchs to call in Sparta, one can infer that the men who say fine things about equality are democrats, and those who extol the virtues of aristocracy are oligarchs. Thus, oligarchy is equated with aristocracy. It is also clear that Thucydides believes that these men are less interested in political ideals than personal gain, but this is irrelevant for our purposes: genuine or not, political alignment was the cause of conflict all over Greece.

Thucydides does not favour the term *isonomia* as much as Herodotus but interestingly, in a speech of the Thebans it is oligarchy rather than democracy that is attributed the adjective *isonomos*.[341] Equality in this sense must be that between aristocrats, rather than the masses. It is a reminder that the proponents of almost any constitution can claim equality, depending on how widely it is distributed. In the noun's only other occurrence, *isonomia* is aligned with democracy and *dunasteia* with

[339] 8.64.3-5
[340] Thuc. 3.82.8
[341] Thuc. 3.62.2

oligarchy.[342] In this passage Thucydides expresses his belief that Brasidas would not have been able to march through Thessaly if the town had enjoyed *isonomia* rather than oligarchy. Here it seems that *isonomia* must mean "democracy", since it is contrasted with oligarchy. Once again, like sides with like; the implication is that the Thessalians allowed Brasidas in because they were governed by an oligarchy like Sparta. Yet Thessaly is also something of an anomaly: Thucydides notes in the same breath that the oligarchic Thessalians had historically sympathised with Athens.

Thucydides often uses the term αὐτόνομος. The Mytileneans claim that of all the allies only they and the Chians were autonomous, while the Aeginetans complain of their loss of autonomy and the Samians regain theirs in 411.[343] The scope of the word is much debated - in what sense were autonomous allies able to self-govern? And which allies were these? It has been argued that Aegina's loss of autonomy in 457 entailed the imposition of democracy, but this is uncertain.[344] Thucydides only says that Aegina had to surrender its walls and ships and pay tribute.[345] In Thucydides, the word is sometimes equated with absolute freedom and independence, as in Diodotus' speech in the Mytilenean debate.[346] In Brasidas' speech to the Acanthians, autonomy is contrasted with empire, implying that the two are not compatible.[347] Thucydides himself suggests as much when he says that at the outset of the Delian League the allies were autonomous.[348] Autonomy did not have everything to do with tributary status, however, since as we have seen, Thucydides describes certain allies as autonomous and tribute-paying in the same breath.[349] When the Mytileneans claim that only they and Chios

[342] Thuc. 4.78.2-3
[343] Thuc. 3.10; 1.67; 8.21
[344] Lintott 1982:99
[345] Thuc. 1.108.4
[346] Thuc. 3.46
[347] Thuc. 4.87
[348] Thuc. 1.97.1
[349] Thuc. 5.18.5

were left autonomous by Athens, they likely exclude Samos because Samos' constitution had been interfered with in 439; here autonomy primarily means the freedom to choose one's own constitution. This is confirmed by Aristotle's statement that only Chios, Lesbos and Samos were not ruled tyrannically, being allowed to have their own governments and rule their own subjects.[350] Although the word can mean much more – and must do, because Chios, Lesbos and Samos were not the only members of the Delian League allowed to retain an oligarchy - for our study this is the most important meaning: an autonomous ally gets to live by its own laws, and by extension, under its own constitution. The definition of autonomy will be discussed in relation to Samos, the only town in our study for which there is evidence that its autonomy was both lost and regained during its membership of the Delian League.

The Old Oligarch is even more imprecise than Thucydides, as previously noted, because he is generalising and heavily biased against the *demos*. In the same breath he talks of "the poor and the *demos*" and "the bad, the poor and the commons" and he equates the poor with madmen.[351] The noble on the other hand are wealthy, and the wealthy are good; rarely does he speak of oligarchs but rather "the noble", "the useful men", "the best element" and so on.[352] The Old Oligarch's oversimplification of political terminology should make us wary of his broad generalisations about factions in Greek cities and Athens' relationship with them. This is true even of statements that appear specific, such as the information he gives about Athens' support of oligarchs in Boeotia and Miletus.[353] The Old Oligarch's pamphlet is a political treatise, so although

[350] Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 24.2
[351] [Xen] *Ath. Pol.* 1.2, 1.4, 1.9
[352] [Xen] *Ath. Pol.* 1.1-7, 1.14, 2.19
[353] [Xen] *Ath. Pol.* 3.11

he is unlikely to completely fabricate a historical event, he is at complete liberty to present it in a biased, exaggerative or chronologically inaccurate manner.

Although Xenophon's testimony is less important for our time period, it must be noted that his terminology is not straightforward either. Take, for example, his use of the term *demos*. As Raphael Sealey points out, when he says that the Boeotian *demos* was in exile at Thebes in 379/8 due to the setting up of narrow oligarchies in all the cities, he cannot mean that all the common people had migrated to Thebes or there would have been nobody left for the oligarchs to rule.[354] It is more likely that Xenophon means that a small group of politically active (democratic) men had been forced to move to Thebes by the change of regime. Important for our purposes is that Xenophon clearly expected his audience to be able to understand this nuanced definition of the word *demos*. It is a greater challenge for the modern reader also to appreciate similar nuances in all the authors mentioned above.

Aristotle's terminology is easier to decode because he is writing political theory. It need only be noted here that in his works, there are two words that imply democracy: not just δημοκρατία but also πολιτεία. The latter is not democracy but a mixed constitution inclined towards democracy. Aristotle's main challenge as a source, as mentioned above, is the fact that he was writing in the mid-fourth century under a different democracy to that of the fifth century.

Diodorus, writing as late as the mid-1st century B.C., is even further removed from our time period but nevertheless his account of fifth-century history is valuable. It suffices to note that like Thucydides, Diodorus does not appear to distinguish between aristocracy and oligarchy. For example, he attributes *stasis* at Samos to one party

[354] Sealey 1973:287; Xen. *Hell.* 5.4.46

preferring democracy and the other, aristocracy (ἀριστοκρατίαν).[355] In the next sentence these "aristocrats" are identified as "opponents of democracy", suggesting that for him the terms "aristocrat" and "oligarch" are broadly interchangeable. Similarly, Diodorus uses the term "aristocracy" to describe the narrower constitution that replaces democracy at Argos in 418.[356] Thucydides calls the same thing an oligarchy.[357] Diodorus adds the detail that it was easy for these thousand men to get power into their own hands because they were already prominent due to their wealth and brave deeds; these were probably the thousand picked to fight at Mantinea who had been extensively trained at the public expense.[358] In this particular case, Diodorus might use the term aristocracy because these men were considered to be the "best", not just the few. Yet generally, rather like Thucydides, Diodorus is happy to interchange the two terms.

A distinction not always made clear by the ancient sources is that between revolt and *stasis*. The key difference is that the former is an external action taken by an ally in defiance of Athens, while the latter is internal civil strife. Sometimes our authors come into conflict, as when Diodorus claims that Samos revolted in 440 but in Thucydides it is only a dispute with neighbouring Miletus.[359] Sometimes an author's wording is ambiguous, such as when Thucydides tells of an uprising by the Samian people against the *dunatoi*: does an uprising always imply lack of power, and in this case does it amount to revolt as Diodorus claims?[360] Then there are cases where evidence points towards political trouble but is vague on the details. The regulations for Miletus, IG I³ 21, are such an example. The distinction is an important one, because a

[355] Diod. 12.27.3
[356] Diod. 12.80
[357] Thuc. 5.81.2
[358] Thuc. 5.67.2
[359] Diod. 12.27.1; Thuc. 1.115.2
[360] Thuc. 8.21; Diod. 13.34.2

city can experience political discord without revolting outright from Athens, and these seeming technicalities change our understanding of the relationship between different factions in an allied city, and between that city and Athens.

Modern terminology

As we have seen in our discussion of *isonomia*, although equality before the law is the foundation of democracy, it is not quite its definition. In this study, a democracy is defined as a constitution that actually gives power to the people via voting rights or democratic institutions such as offices and councils elected by lot. In other words, it is "the institutionalization of popular control over the state".[361] It will be borne in mind that councils and popular assemblies (and even ones elected by lot) can exist in oligarchies.[362] An assembly and council existed in Athens before Solon's reforms; indeed, the council, assembly and courts all continued to exist under Peisistratus' tyranny and the oligarchy of the Four Hundred.[363] If Solon did indeed create a council of 400, there are the further questions of how it was elected and from whom.[364] What matters for a democracy is whether these popular assemblies are sovereign, although this is not easy to tell from inscriptional evidence alone.[365] Further, mention of a *demos* or even participation of the *demos* in decision-making does not necessarily entail democracy.[366] Various early Cretan laws speak of decisions of the people.[367] A late seventh-century law from Tiryns mention the *damos* (people) and even an *aliia* (popular

[361] Robinson 1997:33
[362] cf.; Aristot. *Pol.* 2.1266a, 2.1272a, 4.1300a, 4.1298b; *ML* 8
[363] Simonton 2017b:16; Thuc. 6.54.6, Aristot. *Const. Ath.* 13.4, 14.3, 16.8. In response to the oligarchy of the Four Hundred, in 409 B.C. the restored Athenian democracy made sure to curtail the powers of the Council through which they had exercised their power (*IG* I³ 105).
[364] Aristot. *Ath. Pol.* 18.4; Plut. *Sol.* 15.3. For a discussion of the problems, see de Ste Croix 2004:83-9
[365] Nippel 2016:33
[366] Simonton 2017b:15
[367] *IC* IV 10 q*.1;*IC* IV 25 c.1 (first letter uncertain); *IC* IV 78.1; *SEG* 35.991 a.1; *SEG* 27.631 a.6

assembly), and appears to hold one magistracy (the *hieromnamon*) accountable to the people.[368] A seventh-century inscription from Corcyra uses the word *damos* and its cognates four times in only six lines.[369] The famous "constitutional law of Chios", dated to the second quarter of the sixth century, is full of references to the *demos* and even to a popular council, a *boule demosie*.[370] Whether this meant that the council was "popular" in the sense that it represented the whole citizen population, rather than that it was concerned with public business, remains debated.[371] Robinson argues that the law is evidence of a democracy in Chios around 600 B.C., and the possibility should not be ruled out solely on account of its early date. The controversy surrounding the law from Chios is emblematic of the problem that much of our evidence poses: there is simply too little to say for certain that it bespeaks a democracy. A lack of evidence means that the apparent role of the *demos* must on occasion suffice to posit a democracy.

Another hallmark of democracy is the institution of certain systems to encourage the even spread of power. For example, fifth-century Athens saw the introduction of jury pay and the payment of expenses for incumbent *prytaneis*, which made it easier for the poorer members of society to participate in politics.[372] Another way of ensuring broad participation in politics and the sharing of political power was to elect people to office by lot and limit the number of times a single person could hold that office. In Greek political thought, sortition is on the whole associated with democracy and election with oligarchy.[373] Similarly, the rotation of offices and

[368] *SEG* 30.380 = Nomima 78 (Van Effentere & Ruzé 1994:294-9). The law also has something similar to a democratic prescript, but crucially it does not name the *damos* as the official governing body but merely names "a procedural step to be taken in specified circumstances" (Simonton 2017b:12).
[369] *IG* IX,1 867; Simonton 2017b:13
[370] *ML* 8 = *SEG* 47.1309
[371]Robinson 1997:90-101; Cartledge 2016:54-5; Simonton 2017b:13-4
[372] Plut. *Per*. 9.3; Thuc. 2.37.1
[373] Aristot. *Pol*. 4.1294b, 6.1317b, 6.1318a; Plat. *Rep*. 557a

limitations on holding office more than once are usually associated with democracy. There are notable exceptions that will be discussed in the relevant chapters.[374] Sortition and rotation of offices were not democratic practices in and of themselves, but were used by democracies as a means of limiting individual power.

Oligarchy, on the other hand, is defined as the limiting of power to the few rather than the many by only allowing a minority to vote and take part in government and politics. These few are the elite of wealth, birth, talent, and education.[375] Whereas a democracy might delegate power to individuals, for example by electing its lawmakers, an oligarchy will reserve exclusive authority to the ruling elite.[376] With regard to the question of how many the few must be, Whibley defines an oligarchy as "a form of government in which supreme government is held by a privileged class, small in proportion to the total number of free men in the state".[377] The essential point is that the power rests with a minority, not just *de facto* but also *de iure*. An oligarchy might have an assembly, but it will not be sovereign or independent, with the real power settled in elite councils that rarely exceed a hundred members.[378] It may employ sortition and rotation of offices but those eligible for office will be a privileged group rather than the entire citizen body. Practices like sortition might be implemented more practically than ideologically, for example to prevent tyranny rather than in the belief that as many people as possible should engage in political life. In an oligarchy we will expect to find the concentration of power amongst the few, achieved by restrictions such as property qualifications and hereditary office holding.

[374] e.g. Aristot. *Pol.* 5.1303a; *ML* 2; *SEG* 9.1
[375] Strauss 2013:25
[376] Robinson 1997:15
[377] Whibley 1896:18
[378] Whibley 1896:157

In terms of discerning between oligarchy and aristocracy, oligarchy is literally "rule by the few" and aristocracy "power for the best" but the semantics only get us so far. The main difference between oligarchy and aristocracy is that the latter implies hereditary power and family ties more than the former Aristocracy is government based on "virtue", oligarchy government based on wealth. In ancient times the latter also implied something positive – "the rule of those who deserve to rule", i.e. the best.[379] Hence, the Old Oligarch prefers to speak of aristocrats (οἱ χρηστοί – literally, "the useful men") because he fervently believes that the elite of wealth and birth are the best in each city.[380] Since we are not making value judgments about the different types of constitution, this distinction is irrelevant for our purposes. When it is claimed that the USA and the UK are oligarchies, the point is that they are *de facto* controlled by the wealthy and politically important, not by royals or the "nobility". This is despite the fact that the UK is a monarchy. The distinction is less meaningful in an oligarchy, where the oligarchs are likely also to be aristocrats and the very existence of an oligarchy makes power hereditary. This study will only use the term "aristocrats" when the hereditary power of a certain group is particularly relevant.

Aristotle provides a useful rule of thumb when he says that democracy is when every free citizen is sovereign and oligarchy is when only the rich are.[381] In other words, the basis of democracy is freedom whereas the basis of oligarchy is wealth.[382] Elsewhere he provides several more useful markers of democracy: a sovereign assembly, election of officials by all from all, election by lot, no property qualification for office, a limit on repeat office-holding, and sharing out offices as much as

[379] Cf. Thuc. 3.82.8; Xen. *Hell.* 5.2.7; Aristot. *Pol.* 4.1294a
[380] [Xen] *Const. Ath.* 1.1-7, 1.9, 1.14, 2.19
[381] Aristot. *Pol.* 4.1290a-b
[382] Aristot. *Pol.* 4.1294a

possible.[383] In contrast, he considers to be oligarchic the election of officials by and from specific groups, incentives and privileges for higher property classes, hereditary or co-opted office, and preliminary deliberation and preliminary elections that only involve the whole *demos* in later stages.[384] He says that property qualifications are oligarchic, whereas democracies admit citizens to the assembly on either no or a very small property qualification.[385] Aristotle's are not perfect definitions, only working ones, nor should we expect any democracy to exhibit all the features he describes. A major limitation of his and Plato's definitions of democracy is that they were both writing in the fourth century, so their experience was of a later form of Athenian democracy. The point of this study is not to evaluate how "democratic" ancient democracy was, but rather to examine the spread of what the ancient Greeks defined as democracy, and the role Athens had in it. When distinguishing between democracy and oligarchy, the main consideration will be whether there was the opportunity for widespread participation and representation, even if ideologically it is clear that in some cities some democrats were more equal than others.

The contemporary political theorist Robert Dahl provides five criteria for historical democracies. These are: effective participation by the citizens; voting equality at the decisive stage; enlightened understanding in terms of access to information; control of the agenda; and the citizen body comprising all non-transient and non-mentally defective adult members of the community.[386] A political framework need not fulfil all five criteria to be considered a democracy, and indeed the first two criteria alone suffice for Dahl's narrow definition of democracy. Dahl's definition, like

[383] Aristot. *Pol*. 2.1272a, 6.1317b, 6.1322b
[384] Aristot. *Pol*. 4.1298b
[385] Aristot. *Pol*. 4.1294b
[386] Dahl 1989:106-31

Aristotle's, is best applied as a rule of thumb when assessing an ancient city's constitution.

Sometimes it is claimed (by scholars ancient and modern) that Athens set up a democracy "on the Athenian model" in certain allied towns.[387] It is worth defining Athenian democracy in order to clarify what a democracy on the Athenian model would look like. Some defining features of Athens' democracy were: its sovereign assembly of the *demos*, membership of which was open to all citizens; all citizens having an equal share in the democracy; the equal right of any citizen to speak freely and vote in the assembly, illustrated by the herald's invitation, "who wishes to address the assembly?"; freedom of speech (*parrhesia*); the principle that one citizen equalled one vote no matter what their social or financial status, symbolically expressed by the practice of voting by show of hands (χειροτονία); an ideological link between military service and political enfranchisement; the separation of executive, legislature and judiciary even if it was not a true "separation of powers";[388] the publication of laws and decrees; its Council of 500; its law court (Heliaea), in which the *demos* exercised its power by making decisions as the jury; justice and the power of the law; pay for jurors to ensure widespread participation; pay for other public services such as the *prytaneis, dikastai, bouleutai* and *nomothetai*; fragmentation and rotation of administrative offices; rotation of *prytany* between each of its ten tribes, determined by lot each month; the principle of governing and being governed in turn, expressed by limits on repeat office-holding and sortition for almost every magistracy; election by all from all for magistracies that

[387] e.g. Thuc. 4.76

[388] Cartledge (2007:157) asserts that Athenian democracy did not have separation of powers because the *demos* "in principle held power and ruled equally in all the relevantly operative spheres". There was a lot of overlap; for example the council was both judicial and executive (Birgalias 2009:28-9). Yet broadly speaking, there were different bodies in charge of deliberating, legislating and adjudicating, even if there was no "government" in the sense that we know.

were elective; no property qualification; scrutiny before assuming office (*dokimasia*); a process of account and audit after office (*euthyna*); other checks on officials such as the assembly's vote in each prytany on the conduct of its generals; laws against subverting democracy; keeping written records of meetings and decisions and publicising the latter; protection against tyranny; centralisation and the unification of smaller towns (e.g. via Cleisthenes' tribal reforms); and ostracism.[389] As far as the law courts go, the right of every citizen to a fair trial and equal treatment before the law, which enabled equality via justice, were key features of Athenian democracy.[390] Equal treatment meant that laws had to be applicable to everybody and could not be directed against an individual.[391] A citizen's legal rights included the inviolability of the individual's house (so that it could not be searched or even entered without permission), the guarantee of a trial selected at random from the public, the right to defend oneself, public proceedings, and secrecy of voting.[392] The inviolability of the house is hardly likely to crop up in inscriptional evidence, but where efforts have been made to implement rules found in the Athenian legal system we might suspect Athenian influence. Allied towns need not display all of the features just outlined but evidence that they had some might lead to the conclusion that an Athenian-style democracy had been established.

This study will take four cities in Asia Minor and use them as case studies to determine the political experience of those cities on the border between east and west. This will inform the question of what, if any, policy Athens employed towards its allies'

[389] Thuc. 2.40.2, 8.67.3; Aristot. *Ath. Pol.* 8, 9, 21, 22, 27, 41-5, 48, 54, 59, 61, 62, 68; Aristot. *Pol*. 2.1261a, 2.1274a, 3.1281b; 3.1284a, 4.1291b, 4.1294a, 4.1297b-1298a, 6.1317b-1318b, 6.1322b; Eur. *Supp*. 353, 406, 433-4, 438-9; Eur. *Hipp*. 422; Plut. *Per*. 9; Aeschin. 1.27, 1.104, 3.4; Dem. 24.149; Lys. 15.2; Diod. 12.38.2; [Xen] *Ath. Pol.* 1.2-3
[390] Thuc. 1.77.1; Aristot. *Pol*. 5.1310a; Aristot. *Ath. Pol.* 9.1
[391] Dem. 23.86-9
[392] Nippel 2016:60-1

constitutions. Each case study will extend into the Archaic and Hellenistic periods in order to provide context for the city's fifth-century political development. A lack of evidence poses the greatest problem for this study and the temptation must be resisted to argue *ignotum per aeque ignotum* for want of more information. The purpose of this investigation is twofold: to gain a better sense of the realities of political life in Asia Minor using local as well as Athenian material, and to understand how Athens attempted to control an area still very much under the influence of the Persian empire.

Chapter 1: Samos

Such was Samos' enduring loyalty to Athens during the Peloponnesian War that in 405 B.C., on the eve of their defeat, the Athenians voted equal citizenship and independence for the island.[393] However, the relationship between the two states had not always been so positive. In the second half of the fifth century, Samos was politically divided and drawn to the brink of civil war on more than one occasion. Its constitution between the years of 440 and 412 is a mystery; before 440, it is not much clearer. The varying accounts of Thucydides, Plutarch and Diodorus on these years force the historian to prioritise, largely between Thucydides' silence on the one hand and Plutarch and Diodorus' abundance of unverified detail on the other. The *Lives* of Plutarch are not the most straightforward source, especially since he is writing about the lives of individuals, not historical events. Sometimes he appears merely to be embellishing on his sources; moreover, he writes in the late first century A.D.[394] Similarly, his *Quaestiones Graecae*, though not biography, are closer to aetiology than history. Diodorus purports to be writing history but is writing more than three centuries after the end of the Peloponnesian War, and both his sources and his chronology are problematic. Herodotus, too, proves a tricky source for the early years; his account of constitutional development across Greece and Ionia appears anachronistic at times, and his history of archaic Samos is frequently mythologised. Aside from telling tall stories, Herodotus weaves a narrative of the island's naval glory that seems coloured by the collapse of Samian naval power post-440.[395] Dionysius of Halicarnassus mentions a

[393] *IG* I^3 127
[394] Plut. *Alex*.1.2-3.
[395] Luraghi 2001

Euagon of Samos who wrote before the Peloponnesian War, but unfortunately this is lost to us.[396] So is Aristotle's *Constitution of the Samians*.[397]

Before allying with Athens, Samos was under Persian control. First the Persians and then the Athenians took advantage of its strategic position between east and west, and as late as 440 B.C. we find the Persians involved in events on the island. Samos' location, sandwiched between two empires, is important to remember when piecing together its politics in the fifth century. Herodotus tells a story, doubtless exaggerated, about the Greeks being unwilling to venture any further towards Persia than Delos for fear of the enemy, "and as for Samos, they imagined wrongly that it was as far away as the Pillars of Hercules [the straits of Gibraltar]".[398] Though the truth of this statement has been questioned, the anecdote serves to highlight Samos' position as the furthest point west of the Persian Empire, and east of the Delian League. Because of this, it was both strategically desirable and susceptible to pressure from both sides.

It is the purpose of this chapter to weigh up the evidence and provide a constitutional history of Samos in the fifth century, with particular focus on the years 440-412 B.C. During this time, the island experienced at least one revolt from Athens and one episode of internal *stasis*. Samos' constitution also changed at least once, from an oligarchy to a democracy. The epigraphic evidence for this period from Samos itself is scarce and ambiguous, but it provides an insight into Samos' experience of Athenian rule. We are lucky to have some fifth century coins from this period that elucidate some of the political workings of the island. The most common coin imagery is a lion's scalp on the obverse and ox or bull on the reverse, all associated with Samos' patron goddess

[396] Dion. Hal. *de Thuc*. 5.2
[397] Aristot. fr.529-37 (Bekker 1870:1565-7)
[398] Hdt. 8.132

Hera; variations on these continue into the fourth century.[399] The lion in particular features on coins from the Archaic period to the Hellenistic period, and this kind of recurrent imagery does not tell us much about political change during the fifth century except when a break in minting is detectable. Fortunately, other coins such as those with an olive-branch pattern are more informative and will be discussed at length. It is frustrating not to have access to Aristotle's lost *Constitution of the Samians*, or the contemporary local historiographers of whose works we cannot avail ourselves.[400] Our literary sources, though Athenocentric, can nevertheless be used to form a sense of Samos' experience. It is first useful to frame the events in the context of Samos' constitutional development in the archaic period, for which we have the testimony of Herodotus and Thucydides.

The Achaemenid Empire to the Delian League

The first we hear of Samos in Thucydides is in his "Archaeology". In his account of early sea powers in the archaic period, Thucydides mentions a certain Ameinocles who went to Samos "nearly three hundred years ago" to build four ships.[401] Then there was the tyrant Polycrates, who possessed "a powerful navy in the reign of Cambyses, with which he reduced many islands".[402] Herodotus corroborates this depiction of Polycrates, claiming that the tyrant was the first "of the human race" to aim at mastery of the sea.[403] It is clear from both historians' accounts that Samos possessed a considerable naval force well before the Persian or Peloponnesian Wars. Samos was

[399] *SNG Turkey* 1.1 640 (5th century B.C.), 664-71 (4th century B.C.); 1.2 1518-21 (5th century)
[400] Euagon (*FGrHist* 535 T 1); Aethlius (*FGrHist* 536 F 2); Stesimbrotus of Thasos (*FGrHist* FF1, 8, 29). For a discussion of their dates see Tober 2013:195-202)
[401] Thuc. 1.13.3
[402] Thuc. 1.13.6. Polycrates gets an even more tangential mention at 3.104, when Thucydides tells the story of his conquering Rhenea and linking it to Delos with a chain. In that passage, too, Thucydides emphasises the tyrant's naval strength.
[403] Hdt. 3.122

also militarily strong, and Herodotus tells an anecdote about Arcesilaus of Cyrene gathering an army there in the mid-sixth century.[404] A small detail foreshadows events of the fifth century: Arcesilaus convinced men to fight by promising them a redistribution (ἀναδασμός) of land. The redistribution of land and curtailing of aristocratic power will play a large part in local politics during the Peloponnesian War.

As for Samos' constitution in archaic times, first there were tyrants: Herodotus mentions Amphicrates, "king" of Samos, and a tyranny appears to have arisen out of the office of *aisymnetes*.[405] Theodorus Metochites gives the name of this tyrant as Phoebias.[406] Then Plutarch tells us that after the tyrant Demoteles was deposed, his monarchical government was dissolved and the Geomoroi took control of the state.[407] However, their control did not last long, for Plutarch goes on to say that the Samian fleet, sent to aid their colonists, combined forces with their Megarian captives and overthrew them, "liberating" the polis.[408] Although Plutarch is a late and often unreliable source, he evidently had access to the lost *Constitution of the Samians* because he cites it twice in his *Life of Pericles*.[409] He may also be passing on a tradition from Douris of Samos, whom he likewise cites.[410] Therefore Plutarch's account is likely to be accurate in at least its basic details. John Barron estimates the overthrow of the Geomoroi to have happened in or before the 590s B.C.[411] The victorious sailors rewarded with citizenship those of the Megarians who wished it and established a regime "unlikely to have been very different from the last".[412] Some consider this a

[404] Hdt. 4.163
[405] Hdt. 3.59
[406] Müller 1821:668
[407] Plut. *Quaes.Gr*.57
[408] Plut. *Quaes.Gr*.57
[409] Okin 1985:11-4; Plut.*Per*.26.3, 28.1
[410] Plut.*Per*.28.1-3
[411] Barron 1961:176-7
[412] Shipley 1987:53

democratic victory but Plutarch makes no mention of democrats, and freedom is different to democracy.[413] What is clear from the episode is that already at the beginning of the sixth century, people power was becoming a possibility. It "illustrates the *potential* for democratic rule in the archaic period of Greece, even though it appears such did not actually establish itself at Samos at this time".[414]

The identity of the Geomoroi is important for our study because they were to continue in power up until the end of the fifth century. The Geomoroi were an oligarchy; their name suggests a landed gentry. Perhaps the Samian Geomoroi claimed descent from the very first landholders in order to set themselves apart from the *nouveau riches*; this is a phenomenon that has been termed the "aristocracy of original settlement".[415] Hesychius, the Alexandrian chronicler, calls them the ones who "on the basis of owning land direct public affairs".[416] Tradition has it that the Geomoroi possessed both wealth and political power. In archaic Syracuse, the wealthy landowners shared the same name.[417] When exactly the Geomoroi were established in Samos is not known. As Luraghi notes, the idea that they could be traced back to the foundation of the island and the original division of land might simply be self-posturing.[418] Moreover, Plutarch's account of the overthrow of the Geomoroi in the sixth century echoes fifth century events enough to have been called into question.[419] Thus, they may not have existed since the eleventh century B.C. or been annihilated in the sixth, but we can say at least

[413] e.g. Ferngren 1966:34. White on the other hand argues that Polycrates' father Aeaces could have seized the opportunity of *stasis* following the overthrow to establish himself as tyrant (1954:38).
[414] Robinson 1997:119
[415] Whibley 1896:115-6
[416] Hesychius s.v. γαμόροι
[417] γαμόροι: Hdt. 7.155
[418] Luraghi 1994:284-5
[419] Lupi argues that Plutarch's account is derived from Thucydides and projects events from 412-403 onto sixth century Samian history, as ancient authors were wont to do when evidence was lacking (2005:260-8).

that they were an identifiable group by the end of the archaic period. When in 412 the commons rise up against the δυνατοί of Samos, the latter are explicitly associated with the Geomoroi, and the confiscation and distribution of their land shows that they were still landowners.[420] Clearly, they retained some power and land until the end of the fifth century, whatever the truth to Plutarch's story about the Samian generals destroying their power almost 200 years previously.

The regime set up by the generals did not last for long, and not long after, one thousand Samians were killed in a war with Priene.[421] Priene and Samos were to have a long history of warring over land, and a Hellenistic arbitration between the pair mentions an incident in 644 when Lygdamis and the Cimmerians booted some Samians out of Batinetis, which was on the mainland.[422] Thus we can trace the displacement of Samians from the mainland as far back as the seventh century. This provides the backdrop to the situation in the fifth century, in which the movements of the Samian diaspora become increasingly difficult to follow. Around this time, during the war with Aeolis, Syloson I seized power after distracting his countrymen with a festival of Hera.[423] He seized the city and became tyrant. That the Samians had previously elected him general suggests that Samos chose its officers of state by popular election as early as the sixth century.[424] This is possible given the context of the Samian sailors' recent revolution; it would be unsurprising if there were more citizen participation after the overthrow of the Geomoroi. It is, however, too much to infer that Syloson himself had "democratic leanings" or that Samos was ruled by a popular government; there is no

[420] Thuc. 8.21
[421] Plut. *Quaes.Gr*.20
[422] *IG* XII.6.1 155; Magnetto 2008:99
[423] Polyaen. 6.45
[424] Robinson 1997:119

evidence that Samos was a democracy before.[425] Syloson seized the city and became tyrant. It is not known for how long he himself reigned, but that he was a blood ancestor of his successors is suggested by his sharing a name with one of them.[426]

At some point in the archaic period, an Ionian league of twelve cities – those who called themselves "the Ionians" - was formed, including Samos.[427] Herodotus describes the group as an ethnic organisation with a common cult centre, the Panionion. This group was eventually to have a political focus, with the onset of the Ionian Revolt.[428] An incident happened, perhaps in 585, that suggests that at this time the Samians were allied to one of the factions in Miletus.[429] Soon after the Samian battle with Priene, the latter fought another battle with Miletus in which Samos was not involved.[430] Nevertheless, when Bias of Priene was sent to negotiate the settlement, he went to Samos rather than Miletus. This relationship stands in contrast to that between Samos and Miletus in the lead-up to the Samian revolt.[431]

In the mid-sixth century Samos, like the other towns of Asia Minor, was added to the Lydian empire of King Croesus and then was subsumed into the Persian Empire around 546.[432] The next tyrant of Samos may have been Aeaces, father of Polycrates, though it is not certain that he himself was a tyrant.[433] In 524 B.C., his son Polycrates

[425] Ferngren 1966:38-9
[426] Syloson II; the name is not common (Shipley 1987:70)
[427] Hdt. 1.142
[428] Roebuck argues that the "original nucleus" of the league dates back as far as the tenth century B.C. (1955:32).
[429] Barron (1961:186-7) deduces the date from a pun on "darkness" and a solar eclipse predicted in that year.
[430] Plut. *Quaes.Gr*.20
[431] Thuc. 1.115
[432] Hdt. 1.26-8
[433] Bowra (1936:260) and Carty (2015:49) think that he was not. Shipley (1987:70-1) and White (1954:38) argue that he was; so does Barron (1964a), who further argues that he was in fact the father of a different Polycrates and the grandfather of the famous Polycrates who seized power in the 530s. However, this would contradict Herodotus, who explicitly states that Aeaces was Polycrates' father (2.182, 3.39). It was more common for sons to be named after their

used the pretext of his invasion of Egypt to send the men he most suspected of revolution on a fake mission to Cambyses, instructing Cambyses not to send the men back.[434] Having got free of their guard, these men appealed to Sparta, who along with the Corinthians made an unsuccessful attempt to topple Polycrates' power.[435] Eventually, however, the devious Persian satrap Oroetes succeeded in toppling his power, proceeding to murder and crucify him.[436] Thus Polycrates' rule came to an end around 522 B.C.[437] The story that Herodotus tells makes clear that Polycrates managed to retain independence from Persia for the duration of his reign: Oroetes was allegedly goaded into killing Polycrates by another satrap who taunted him for not having conquered the island. Filling in the gaps in Herodotus' account, it has been speculated that Polycrates' delegate and successor Maeandrius had a hand in his death.[438] The kind of bloody power struggles that Polycrates experienced as tyrant did not give way to peace once tyranny ended, but merely changed shape into factional strife in the fifth century.

Herodotus' account of the Spartan attack implies that Samos was walled at the time.[439] The archaeological remains of the first phase of the wall do not rule out that this is the wall referred to by Herodotus, though he is too vague to be certain.[440] There is no reason to doubt an archaic origin for the wall. If it is the same wall, this wall existed and successfully protected the island for perhaps a century until Pericles with great difficulty besieged the island in 441 B.C. Samos' independence from Persia under

---

grandfathers than their fathers, and according to Herodotus, Polycrates' brother had a son called Aeaces (6.13.1).
[434] Hdt. 3.44
[435] Hdt. 3.45-56
[436] Hdt. 3.125
[437] White 1954:36
[438] Roisman 1985:262
[439] Hdt. 3.54.1
[440] Kienast 1978:100-1

Polycrates was a short spell in the grand scheme of Persian interference in the island's affairs. From Polycrates' death to the battle of Plataea, Samos was "mostly a pawn in the hands of Persia".[441]

According to Herodotus, upon Polycrates' death his delegate Maeandrius offered to establish something akin to democracy – the word Herodotus uses is ἰσονομία - in Samos.[442] Some have argued that Herodotus makes no distinction between ἰσονομία and δημοκρατία; for him, the former is merely a synonym for the latter.[443] Others have argued that whatever Maeandrius promised, he was not serious about fulfilling it since he clung to his tyranny and never reattempted to liberate his fellow people.[444] There is the additional problem of the similarities between this story and the "constitutional debate" between Persian nobles in book 3; in both Herodotus appear to retroject contemporary political thought onto archaic history.[445] Leaving aside Herodotus' intention and judging by the context, what Maeandrius set up was probably not *de facto* democracy, for Maeandrius' speech does not say that the people deserve to make their own laws, but rather that they do not deserve to be ruled by one man who is no better than them. He claims that he is going to put Polycrates' power literally "in the middle" but he does not say that it will be equally divided; the only hint of equality that we get is from the word ἰσονομία.[446] Equality before the law does not necessarily entail equal participation or representation. As we have seen in the introduction, the term ἰσονομία can be laid claim to by oligarchs and democrats alike depending on who is being counted as equal. The entire passage, which includes Maeandrius setting up an altar to

[441] Shipley 1987:103
[442] Hdt. 3.142.3
[443] Ehrenberg 1950:526
[444] Roisman 1985:265-6
[445] Raaflaub 2004:110-1; Hdt. 3.80-2
[446] Hdt. 3.142.3

Zeus Eleutherios and granting freedom to his people, is more concerned with the abolition of tyranny than the establishment of democracy.[447]

Above all, Maeandrius' cries of freedom probably meant freedom from Persia, given the heavy Persian interference in Samian affairs at this time.[448] Whatever his offer, after negative reception by the Samian people Maeandrius soon rescinded it and around 517, when Polycrates' brother Syloson returned to reclaim his throne, he made a quiet exit.[449] Darius re-established Syloson as tyrant, supposedly in return for a "flame-coloured" cloak he had given the Persian king years before.[450] Herodotus notes drily that evidently the Samian people had no desire to be free. As Nino Luraghi shows, the story gains an extra level of significance when read in the context of the 430s, which is when Herodotus was writing.[451] To an Athenian audience, contemporary Samians, who had just revolted and been stripped of their autonomy, will not have seemed too keen on freedom either.

The Persians allegedly depopulated the island before handing it over to Syloson, but the Persian general Otanes was later prompted to repopulate it by a "dream and a disease that he contracted in his genitals";[452] this is scarcely to be believed.[453] A slightly

[447] Ehrenberg sees Herodotus as making no distinction between this and δημοκρατία (1950:526).
[448] Mitchell argues that Mardonius aimed at aristocratic control but freedom from Persia (1975:86).
[449] Hdt. 3.142-4
[450] Hdt. 3.139-40
[451] Luraghi 2001:12
[452] Hdt. 3.149
[453] Shipley believes that none of the depopulation stories about Samos have much credibility (1987:105). This one seems particularly mythologised. Constantakopoulou sees in the story an anti-tyrant tradition that "inflated the negative consequences of tyranny for Samian society" (2007:127). Such stories may have been made up in the fifth century, once Ionia had been liberated from tyranny.

different tradition attributes the depopulation to Syloson himself for his harsh rule of the island, giving rise to the proverb, "Thanks to Syloson there is plenty of room".[454]

Next came Aeaces II, son of Syloson. Aeaces was "high in Darius' favour" and accompanied him on his Scythian expedition.[455] Yet he was only tyrant of Samos "until he was deposed from his rule by Aristagoras of Miletus, just like the other Ionian tyrants" at the beginning of the Ionian Revolt in 499 B.C.[456] Herodotus specifically states that Aristagoras gave Miletus ἰσονομία "so that the Milesians would willingly join in his revolt", then proceeded to do the same thing all over Ionia.[457] Again, precisely what this means is unclear but it is unlikely to have been democracy. There is a clear difference between promising freedom from rule by one man, and freedom to set up all the institutions required to function as a democracy. There is also a difference between (passive) political equality and the (active) handing of political power to the masses. Otanes recognises this in his panegyric on democracy. He says that the rule of the masses has the finest name, ἰσονομία (political equality), but that is not all: it also determines offices by lot, demands accountability from those in power, and brings decisions into the open.[458] The first fight for freedom did not go well for the Ionians, denied help by Sparta and given only brief, token assistance by Athens.[459] Though deprived of their Athenian allies, the Ionians persisted.

At the battle of Lade in 494, the Samians fought again alongside the rest of Ionia for freedom from Persia, until fatigue led to insubordination and the Samians lost hope

[454] Strab. 14.1.17
[455] Hdt. 4.138
[456] Hdt 6.13
[457] Hdt. 5.37.2
[458] Hdt. 3.80.6
[459] Hdt. 5.50; 5.99-103. The Athenians sent twenty ships and promptly withdrew after their first military setback.

that they could prevail against the Persian forces.[460] The allied Ionians barely had more than half the fleet that the Persians could boast.[461] At the Persians' bidding, Aeaces convinced most of the Samians to save their possessions and desert the Ionian alliance, and all but eleven ships deserted.[462] Their captains were later rewarded with a monument seen by Herodotus. The captains were perhaps aristocrats opposed to tyranny and Persian rule because both diminished their own power.[463] After their desertion, the "men of property" in Samos fled to Zancle in Sicily before Aeaces was reinstated, in order to avoid "enslavement" to him and the Persians.[464] Their original plan had been to populate a new city in Sicily, but when they arrived to find Zancle unprotected, they seized the existing town instead. Samian-looking coins found in Zancle and Rhegium appear to corroborate this.[465] As anticipated, the Persians reinstated Aeaces, sparing only the Samians' city and temples out of all Ionia as a reward for their cowardice at Lade.[466]

Then in 492, claims Herodotus, after the failure of the Ionian Revolt the Persian Mardonius deposed all the Ionian tyrants and set up democracies in their stead.[467] The fact that Maeandrius and Aristagoras had both recently offered ἰσονομία to the people makes such a move less radical than it otherwise would have been, for they already enjoyed some kind of equality in the sense that they were no longer ruled by a tyrant. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, it is best to accept Herodotus' statement at face value and assume that democracy was instituted at Samos and prevailed until 480

[460] 6.12-13
[461] The Ionians had 353 ships, the Persians had six hundred – perhaps more, if Herodotus is rounding down (Hdt. 6.8-9).
[462] Hdt. 6.13-4
[463] Balcer 1984a:263
[464] Hdt. 6.22-4; Thuc. 6.4
[465] Gardner 1882:237; Robinson 1948; Barron 1966:40-5, 178-9, Plates VI-VII
[466] Hdt. 6.25
[467] Hdt 6.43

B.C. at the latest. In 492, the case for installing democracy at Samos had been furthered by the fact that at least some of the "men of property", who had been most opposed to Persian rule, had apparently fled to Zancle. The democracy installed by Mardonius will have endured for just over a decade, if it lasted from 492 until the brief reappearance of tyranny in 480 after the battle of Salamis.

That Herodotus' "democracy" is historical is not universally accepted; though he uses the precise term δημοκρατία, some find it incredible that Mardonius would have the resources or the inclination to go about instituting democracies all over Ionia. These argue that Herodotus is imprecise with his definitions and when he speaks of democracy, he "connects with the word not more than the general meaning of a free and unmonarchical constitution";[468] by democracy he really means non-tyranny.[469] They would take Herodotus' statement to mean more loosely that Mardonius established non-autocratic governments throughout Ionia. Herodotus does have Histiaeus claim around 522 B.C. that if it were not for the Persians, the Ionian cities would choose to be governed by democracy rather than tyranny; however, many believe this observation to be anachronistic.[470]

Herodotus is clearly capable of distinguishing between *isonomia* and *demokratia*, so his use of the latter term in this case should not be dismissed. Diodorus Siculus half-corroborates Herodotus by mentioning that Mardonius' predecessor Artaphernes "restored to the cities their own laws".[471] If Mardonius really did set up democracies, then Persia was not so pro-tyranny as to go against the populist tide in

[468] Ehrenberg 1950:527, following Schaefer 1948:503
[469] Marek believes that what is meant is merely the limiting of the power of the nobility, pointing out that at Chios a *boule demosie* was established in the early to mid sixth century (2016:141). Balcer thinks that all that is meant is constitutional governments, which in most cases would have been oligarchies (1979:265).
[470] Hdt. 4.137; Marek 2016:141
[471] Diod. Sic. 10.25.4

Greece.[472] The only evidence that contradicts Herodotus' statement is the possibility that the tyrant Strattis of Chios was not deposed. [473] On the other hand, the poor response to Themistocles' call for Ionian unity at Salamis could be explained by the existence of democracies already, which may have quelled the Ionians' desire for freedom.[474] Moreover, since "men of property" had been instrumental in the Ionian Revolt, perhaps Mardonius felt that democracy was his only choice if he wanted to prevent further trouble. If his main concerns were the payment of tribute and keeping the peace, he may have felt that this would be better achieved under a democracy.

Tension with the upper classes is evident from the fact that it was the men of property in Samos who were unhappy with the way their generals had "dealt with the Medes" (i.e. decided to abandon rebellion and side with them) and left Samos as a result [475] This is not to say that men of property are always ruling oligarchs, but in pre-democratic Samos when Herodotus talks of τοῖσί τι ἔχουσι he likely means aristocratic men who were in power. Such a decision to change the constitution for the sake of stability would be comparable to the Athenian decision to impose democracy on rebellious Samos in 439. In 492, the case for installing democracy at Samos had been furthered by the fact that at least some of the "men of property", who had been most opposed to Persian rule, had apparently fled to Zancle. The fact that Maeandrius and

[472] Barron 1961:384; Lewis 2009:46.
[473] Herodotus (8.132.2) is supposedly evidence that Strattis was still ruling in 479 B.C. Yet Strattis first comes onto the scene in 512 B.C., 33 years previously (Hdt. 4.138). If this is Strattis II, there may have been a hiatus when Mardonius deposed the tyrants in 492. Even if it is the same man, it is not certain that his rule was uninterrupted for those 33 years. Perhaps Strattis was imposed by the Persians after the Ionian revolt (O'Neil 1995:39). Austin cites Samos, Halicarnassus, Lampsacus and Cos as places where tyranny can be found soon after (1990:306); yet given how short the *floruit* of a tyrant can be, all these examples prove is that Mardonius did not rid the East Greek world of tyrants for good. Shipley thinks that Theomestor's appointment "should mean that there was no new regime in Samos" (1987:108). But continuity between tyrants cannot be assumed; Polycrates clearly did not immediately succeed Aeaces, if indeed the latter was a tyrant (see above).
[474] Hdt. 8.22; Quinn 1981:3
[475] Hdt. 6.22

Aristagoras had both recently offered ἰσονομία to the people makes such a move less radical than it otherwise would have been, for they already enjoyed some kind of equality in the sense that they were no longer ruled by a tyrant. Moreover, Plutarch's tale of the uprising against the Geomoroi shows a move towards popular rule even if democracy itself is unlikely.As Robinson notes, "we cannot pretend that the absence of any further democratic accounts in our sparse sources for archaic political history means that there *were* none".[476] In the absence of evidence to the contrary, it is best to accept Herodotus' statement at face value and assume that democracy was instituted at Samos and prevailed until 480 B.C. at the latest.

Tyranny was to make the most fleeting of reappearances on the Samian political stage. Theomestor is the last recorded tyrant at Samos until the third century B.C.[477] Shipley thinks that Theomestor's appointment "should mean that there was no new regime in Samos", but continuity between tyrants cannot be assumed. [478] Polycrates clearly did not immediately succeed Aeaces, if indeed the latter was a tyrant. Thus, it seems that Theomestor succeeded a decade of democracy. Xerxes, having succeeded Darius to the Persian throne in the mid-480s, set him up as tyrant in recognition of his exceptional fighting at Salamis in 480. [479] Herodotus adds that another Samian, Phylacus, was awarded "much land" by the King for the same reason, and such land-grants to Greeks indicate the contact between Greece and Persia that must have continued despite the formation of the Delian League. This will be important when considering the claim the Great King had over the coastal cities of Asia Minor during the Peloponnesian War.

[476] Robinson 1997:119
[477] The next tyrant was to be Douris, a historian and self-professed descendant of the Athenian general Alcibiades (Plut.*Alc*.32).
[478] 1987:108
[479] Hdt. 8.85

Xerxes had sent four hundred ships to Samos to keep an eye on the Ionian cities that were suspected of being hostile.[480] This demonstrates Samos' strategic importance for spying on the rest of Ionia; towards the end of the war, the Athenians will use Samos for just such a purpose.[481] During the battle, the Samians fought valiantly on behalf of Persia, despite Themistocles' pleas on the basis of kinship for the Ionians to defect. However, with the Greek victory at Salamis, the Samians' fortunes – and doubtless their outlook, now that emancipation from Persia seemed within reach - were about to change. It is easy to see why Xerxes reimposed a tyrant at this point, before the Samians had openly defected but after a battle which must have awoken in many the desire to live free of Persian rule. Already (some of) the Ionians had twice entreated Sparta and the other Greeks to free Ionia.[482]

It was not long before the Samians openly defected, resulting in a remarkably short reign for Theomestor. The timeline of events leaves only a year for Theomestor to have been in power, between the battles of Salamis and Mycale (480-79). According to Herodotus at least, Samos played no small part in the Greek victory at Mycale. The Greeks moored in Samian territory, taking advantage of its favourable location.[483] Even before the battle of Mycale the Persians were beginning to suspect the Ionian Greeks, disarming the Samian hoplites and sending the Milesians into the countryside to separate them from the rest of the army.[484] Herodotus gives a good reason for the Persians' mistrust: the Samians had set free five hundred Athenian prisoners captured by Xerxes. Three Samians ambassadors secretly went over to Delos and persuaded the Spartan general there to intervene, having appealed more successfully than

[480] Diod. 11.27.1; Hdt. 8.130
[481] Plut. *Alc*. 25.3
[482] Hdt. 8.132
[483] Hdt. 9.96
[484] Hdt. 9.99

Themistocles to ties of kinship; they swore an oath of alliance with the Greeks.[485] Finally, the disarmed Samian hoplites openly switched sides, aiding the Greeks "when they saw that victory hung in the balance"; this emboldened the other Ionians to follow suit.[486] Diodorus says that the Samians and Milesians had decided to support the Greek cause from the start.[487] Herodotus' wording suggests that the Samians were more opportunistic than idealistic: they supported the Greeks only once they saw that a Persian victory was not inevitable. If they were interested less in Greek liberation than in ending up on the right side of history, this will not be the first time: events in 412 and 411 will bear a striking resemblance.

The events of 412 echo those of the Persian War years in another way. Herodotus does not record an official transfer of the Persian base from Cyme to Samos, but his narrative makes clear that the island was strategically important for the Persians. Darius' forces used Samos as a base on their way to Greece in 490 when they wanted to avoid Athos and take advantage of independent Naxos.[488] After Salamis, Xerxes' fleet mustered at Samos, where some of his ships had spent the winter.[489] There they stayed, keeping watch in case Ionia revolted. Samos was the perfect base from which to keep an eye on the rest of Ionia, as the Athenians were to discover in 412.[490] Thus the island was important to both Persia and Athens for the same reason. Samos' convenient geographical position between Ionia and the West should be borne in mind, for it helps to explain the factionalism on the island and Persia's continued interference there well after open hostilities between Athens and Persia had ceased.

[485] Hdt. 9.90-2; Diod. 11.34
[486] Hdt. 9.103
[487] Diod. 11.36
[488] Hdt. 6.95
[489] Hdt. 8.130
[490] Thuc. 8.27.4

Theomestor must have been deposed by the time the Greeks arrived in Samos to discuss what to do with the Ionian Greeks in 479.[491] Otherwise the possibility of moving them out of Ionia would not have been broached. It is unclear what constitution came into place after the end of his reign; we know that "the Samians" had sent messengers to Delos to ask the Greeks to drive the Persians out and restore their freedom, but all we know of these men is that they were clearly anti-tyranny.[492] Whether they were part of a democratic or oligarchic faction is unknown. Most scholars assume the latter, and that they went on to establish an oligarchy, for the setting up of a democracy would have been "an inexplicable break from the past".[493] However, the first institution of democracy is necessarily going to be a break from the past. As Josiah Ober states, a "business as usual" approach to history tends to deny the occurrence of sudden and dramatic changes.[494] Besides, in this case it is only a break from the past if we believe that Samos had not already experienced a democracy after the Battle of Lade. Barron believes that an oligarchy is unlikely, given that the Geomoroi will have been weakened after their emigration in 494 in the aftermath of the Lade.[495] Coins do not seem to indicate political change c.490-70 but nor do they rule it out.

Barron suggests that a tyranny was in place, linking this to the abandonment of building the Heraeon around 470 B.C.[496] However, his argument linking a re-inscribed third-century epigram for the Samian commander Maeandrius with a hypothetical tyrant Maeandrius II in the 480s and 70s is not strong. He argues that the reinscribing of the monument will have coincided with the resumption of work on the Heraeon in

[491] Hdt. 9.106.2
[492] Hdt. 9.90
[493] Shipley 1987:109
[494] Ober 2007:91
[495] Barron 1961:400
[496] Barron 1961:401-5; *IG* XII.6.1, 278

the early third century. The government of c.275 will have deliberately reinscribed the distich and resumed the building work as tribute to this tyrant. For one thing, if there was meant to be a name-association between a commander and a tyrant both named Maeandrius, the latter is more likely to have been the known tyrant Maeandrius I.[497] The name Maeandrius is not uncommon: there is a Maeander river, a Maeander town, and the name Maeandrius occurs frequently in inscriptions.[498] An ideological association between the commander's name and that of an otherwise unknown tyrant is farfetched.

This is all bearing in mind that the third-century inscription is not for the tyrant, but a commander named Maeandrius who died in 469 in the battle of Eurymedon. We do not know why his epitaph was considered important enough to be replaced in the third century, but it was not uncommon to commemorate archaic events in Hellenistic times; an example is the second-century Milesian epigram thought to commemorate the Lelantine War.[499] There are many reasons why building work on the Heraeon might have stopped in 470, other than that it had unwelcome associations with a tyrant who has left no trace in the sources. Two of these reasons Barron puts forward himself: either the temple became ill-omened, or funding ran out.[500] Colin Kraay's reading of the numismatic evidence would conversely make Samos a democracy from 480 to 475, yet this seems too much to interpret from an alternation between round and square reverse dies.[501]

---

[497] Barron 1961:401-5
[498] e.g. *IG* XII.6.1 6 l.11 (Samos); CIG 2943 l.7; CIG 6851 l.17; SGDI 2563 l.12; SEG 15.668 l.44; SEG 15.697 l.25; SEG 38.503 l.5; *I. Milet* 1.3 n.33 l.10; *I. Milet* 1.3 n.138 l.50. The Milesian *stephanephoros* lists (*I. Milet* 1.3 n.122) feature the name 4 times and a list of officials from Coloe features it twice (SEG 57:1189 l.54-6).
[499] Robert 1967:536-8
[500] Barron 1961:401-2
[501] Kraay 1976:333 (see below)

We are lacking in positive evidence either way, but it seems marginally more likely that an oligarchy succeeded Theomestor's brief rule. A loss of some aristocrats after Lade does not make an oligarchy impossible, since we need only imagine that the anti-Persian oligarchs fled to Zancle; the rest doubtless remained. As Shipley points out with reference to the Samian revolt of 440, there may easily have been two groups of oligarchs with differing allegiances.[502] Herodotus is vague in his designation of those who left for Zancle; he refers to them obliquely as τοῖσί τι ἔχουσι.[503] Being propertied they may have been from ruling families, but Herodotus gives no indication of how large scale an exodus this was. In fact, the names Herodotus gives for the three men who later "capitalized on family links with Sparta" to bring them in against the Persians at Mycale are all aristocratic.[504] Their names are Lampon of Thrasycles, Athenagoras son of Archestratides, and Hegesistratus son of Aristagoras.

Edouard Will makes two good arguments against assuming that a democracy was set up.[505] First, the actions and connections required to depose Theomestor, clearly without public funding, make it certain that the men who carried them out were wealthy and well-connected aristocrats. Second, the Samians whom the Persians disarmed out of mistrust were hoplites, suggesting that unlike the Athenian navy they were not from the lowest classes. There is some debate about the correlation between warrior class and social class, but both Aristotle and the Old Oligarch equate serving as a hoplite with coming from an elite, wealthy background.[506] Aristotle explicitly says that *to hoplitikon* is more for the well-off than the poor.[507] This is in part because in the early

[502] Shipley 1977:122
[503] Hdt. 6.22.1
[504] Shipley 1987:108-9; Hdt 9.90
[505] Will 1969:306-7
[506] The debate is summarised in Kagan 2013. Aristot. Pol. 4.1297a; [Xen] *Ath. Pol.* 1.2
[507] Aristot. *Pol*. 6.1321a

polis, armour was privately owned and training as a hoplite required leisure time.[508] The ability to bear arms seems to have been used as a kind of property qualification in many oligarchies. The fact that Aristotle considers there to be a "class that bears arms" suggests that not every citizen could afford to do so.[509] Draco's constitution gave power to "everyone who provided themselves with a suit of arms".[510] In the Athenian oligarchy of 411, the Five Thousand was composed of those who could supply a hoplite's outfit.[511] If the impetus for breaking off from the Persians came from the propertied classes, it is likely that these same instigators of defection seized the power afterwards. Thus, given the evident power and wealth of the aristocrats at the time and the absence of external pressure, it is most likely that the government constituted an oligarchy.

Samos in the Delian League

In the wake of the battle of Mycale, Samos joined the Hellenic League along with Chios and Lesbos; all three islands had an interest in keeping piracy down and could use the protection that the League offered.[512] The Samian representatives at Delos had already pledged allegiance to the Greeks but as the authors of the *ATL* point out, this had been done in secrecy so they may have felt the need to make it official.[513] Soon after, Samos joined the newly founded Delian League, being sworn in by Aristides.[514] Thucydides does not explicitly name Samos but implies that all members of the Hellenic League, bar Sparta, joined the Delian League under Athens' leadership. Samos, Chios and Lesbos were – at the beginning at least – autonomous allies, allowed to keep their own

[508] Hdt. 7.145; Whibley 1896:41-2; Van Wees 2004:55-6
[509] Aristot. *Pol*. 2.1265b, 3.1279b, 3.1288a
[510] Aristot. *Ath. Pol.* 4.2
[511] Thuc. 8.97.1
[512] Hdt. 9.106.4
[513] Meritt, McGregor & Wade-Gery 1950:188
[514] Aristot. *Ath. Pol.*23.5; Thuc 1.95-6

governments. For this Aristotle describes them as the guardians of the empire.[515] All three contributed ships rather than tribute to the war effort, perhaps along with some other larger states that possessed the manpower; Thucydides is vague about which cities contributed ships and which money.[516] Contributing ships – and having walls - allowed Samos to retain its independence and identity as an individual state capable of self-defence, in contrast to the tribute-paying allies. This does not mean that paying tribute was incompatible with the Greeks' conception of autonomy – for Xenophon and Thucydides both suggest otherwise – but the burden of tribute must have at least damaged other allies' sense of independence.[517] We will return to the question of Samos' autonomy later.

The privilege of having walls seems not to have lasted, for Thucydides mentions that by 427, the cities of Ionia were unwalled and Samos certainly was after its revolt.[518] As for tribute, Samos likely did not entirely escape this requirement either. Diodorus tells us that after the battle of Lade, Artaphernes imposed tribute on the Ionian cities and Herodotus adds that this was still the case at his time of writing (in the second half of the fifth century), so it may not be true that Samos was not paying tribute.[519] It is likely that Samos was, but to Persia.

According to Plutarch, it was these same three islands that pushed for Athenian governance of the League, trying to persuade Aristides to assume leadership.[520] Nor was their hostility to Spartan leadership merely voiced; Plutarch records that a Samian and a Chian captain allegedly went so far as to run down Pausanias' trireme

[515] Aristot. *Ath. Pol.*24.2
[516] Thuc. 1.96.1
[517] Thuc. 5.18.5; Xen. *Hell.* 3.4.25
[518] Thuc. 3.33.2
[519] Diod. 10.25; Hdt. 6.42
[520] Plut.*Arist.*23.4-5

deliberately. This may be the stuff of legend, though Diodorus and Aristotle also record stories of Ionian discontent with Sparta.[521] Pausanias' high-handed behaviour appears to have offended most of the Greeks and in particular the newly liberated Ionians; at their behest Athens took charge of the Delian League.[522]

Samos' participation in early League activities is well documented. Directly after Mycale, it helped Athens besiege and capture Sestos.[523] Epigraphic evidence attests to its contribution to other battles. From a third-century copy of an inscription we know that the Samians distinguished themselves at the battle of Eurymedon, with the commander Maeandrius capturing eight Persian ships.[524] A marble block found in Samos possibly records Samian fighting on behalf of the League in Egypt between 464 and 454.[525] It is the base of a monument celebrating the taking of fifteen Phoenician ships by the Samians at Memphis. The epigram also mentions the "Medes and Hellenes". The possibility that this inscription belongs to a later date cannot be ruled out, but the Athenian and allied support of the Egyptian revolt against Persia provides the most likely context.[526] Two fragments of a dark marble base found in Samos likely also commemorates the Samian contribution to fighting in Egypt.[527] The fragments record an award made by the rebel Egyptian king Inarus to a commander who was most likely Samian, given the find-spot, although the commander's ethnicity is restored. A

[521] Meiggs doubts the story (1972:42). Diod. 11.46.5; Aristot. *Ath. Pol.* 23.4.
[522] Thuc. 1.95; Plut. *Cim.*6.2-3. Herodotus tells a different story, in which Athenian ambitiousness plays a large part (8.3.2). Quinn sides with Herodotus (1981:8).
[523] Thuc. 1.89; Hdt. 9.114. Herodotus merely says that "the Athenians" besieged Sestos but Thucydides adds the allies from Ionia and the Hellespont "who had already revolted". Even if one takes Herodotus' statement literally that of the Ionians only islanders were admitted into the League (9.106.4), these already-revolted Ionians are Samos and Chios (Hammond 1967:46).
[524] Dunst 1972:149-52 no.22. For discussion and a photograph of the epigram see Wade-Gery 1933:97-101. The number eight is restored.
[525] *IG* XII.6.1, 279; Fornara 1983b:78 no.77; *ML* 34; *OR* 110
[526] Thuc. 1.104
[527] *RO* 110b

later Peloponnesian dedication at Olympia commemorating their victory at Tanagra mentions Ionians among Athens' allies; Samos may have played a part in this battle too.[528] Ctesias says that some 6,000 of the Delian League soldiers were captured by Megabyzus during fighting and used for his own revolt against the Persian King; it is likely that some of these were Samian.[529]

It would be interesting to know what the Samians' attitude towards Athens was at this time. The financial burden of military service and tribute may have become a strain by this point, even if Athens was still able to claim that it was money well spent on protection against the Persian threat.[530] Sarah Bolmarcich argues that membership was not onerous for the aristocrats of Samos, for unlike their fellow aristocrats in other parts of the empire, they did not have to shoulder the burden of tribute.[531] However, they did have to fund the Samian fleet, and in matters of financial contribution, perception can differ substantially from reality, as shown today by the propaganda surrounding Britain's decision to leave the European Union. On the other hand, as we will see, Samos' eventual revolt was triggered by a border dispute with Miletus, not resentment towards Athens.

Samian *horoi*

Piecing together the constitution for the period 469-54 is equally difficult as for the previous period, as the sources are silent. Barron argues that "the democrats were in power throughout", after the supposed deposition of Maeandrius II.[532] He adduces as evidence "democratic" coinage bearing an olive branch symbol, and *horoi* (boundary

[528] Paus. 5.10.4; *ML* 36
[529] Ctesias *FGH* 688 F 14.38-40
[530] Balcer 1984a:377
[531] Bolmarcich 2009:60-1
[532] Barron 1961:409

markers) that marked out territory sacred to Athens.[533] The title Ἀθηνᾶ Ἀθηνῶν μεδέουσα ("Athena protectress of Athens") identifies the goddess specifically with Athena Polias, the patron goddess of Athens, to whom the plots of land must have been dedicated.[534] These *horoi* are generally considered evidence that Athens confiscated property in Samos after the island's revolt in 440 B.C., and that as was customary, a portion of the land was consecrated to the gods. Barron's main argument is that some of the *horoi* feature three-bar sigma and thus suit a date pre-445 better than their conventional date post-440 B.C. He believes the *horoi* to be a Samian expression of solidarity with Athens, rather than evidence for later Athenian interference at Samos. He dates the *horoi* to 454, the year of the transfer of the League treasury to Athens at Samos' suggestion; included in this Samian display of initiative, Barron suggests, was a proposal to consecrate *temene* to Athena throughout the empire.[535] The Samian *horoi* will be treated fully below in what I argue is their proper context, the aftermath of the Samian rebellion of 440 B.C.

The numismatic evidence

The only other alleged evidence for democracy during the period 469-54 is a series of coins bearing an olive branch motif. This could merely be a sign of support for Athens (regardless of Samos' own constitution) or indeed could symbolise something other than democracy. In Barron's own words, Samos was a "notable grower of olives"; Aeschylus applies to the island the adjective ἐλαιόφυτος (olive-planted) and Anacreon might also mention olives in relation to Samos.[536] Since Samos was a famed producer of olive oil, it is at least possible that this (rather than any democratic leanings) may

[533] Barron 1964b:35-48. Facsimiles of the *horoi* are provided at 49-50.
[534] Meiggs 1972:296-7
[535] Barron 1964b:48
[536] Barron 1966:83. Aesch. *Pers*. 882-3; Anacreon fr. 98 Page

have inspired the choice of symbolism. In fact, Samos continues to produce coins bearing olive branches, sprays and wreaths right into the third and possibly the second century B.C.[537] As Barron also notes, after 321 Samos was actually hostile to Athens so would hardly have meant the olive branch to be a "symbol of Athenian domination".[538] That Samos was famed for growing olives explains the persistence of the motif throughout centuries of Samian history better than its sometime association with Athens.

What does seem to indicate Samian allegiance to Athens is an issue of tetradrachms with small owls on them that Barron dates c.465/4 B.C.[539] These coins are a variation on an earlier coin whose obverse shows a lion mask and reverse shows an amphora and the head and shoulder of an ox.[540] Barron considers the symbolism of the owl to be a nod to the Delian Confederacy. Barron's dating may have been influenced by his belief that the democrats were in power for the whole period 469-54 and that minting ceased after Samos' revolt. Where a series is not lettered – or indeed even where it is - dating with precision is difficult, but the addition of the owl must be an expression of loyalty to Athens. The owl issue need not mean that Samos was actually a democracy at the time, but only that it wanted to show solidarity with Athens. The tetradrachms in Barron's classes II-VII are all dated in sequence with extreme precision, but the order of the sequence is open to debate. Barron himself gives four possible chronological schemes for his coin classes II-VII, adopting scheme B. The schemes are as follows:

A **B** **C** **D**

[537] *SNG Copenhagen* 1685-9 (c.394-65 B.C), 1691 (c.394-65 B.C.), 1697-1701 (c.322-305 B.C.), 1708-11 (c.205-129 B.C.)
[538] Barron 1966:82
[539] Barron 1966:52, 184-5, Plate X
[540] Barron 1966:182-3, Plate X

II	490/89-486/5	482/1-478/7	467/6-563/2	461/0-457/6
III	485/4-469/8	477/6-461/0	462/1-446/5	456/6-440/39
IV-V	468/7-463/2	460/59-455/4	445/4-440/39	439/8-434/3
VI-VII	462/1-448-7	454/3-440/39	439/8-425/4	433/2-419/8

As will be shown, there is reason to opt for later dates than Barron advocates for; if we were to adopt his scheme C or D, this would push the owl issue back 15 or 21 years respectively to 450/49 or 444/3.[541] Any date pre-440 would be plausible, since as far as we know Samos was loyal to Athens for the entire period from joining the Delian League to its revolt. Barron freely admits that the durations that he provides for each class are only tentative, so we must remember that there is a fairly wide margin of error where dating is concerned. Direct die-links and lettered series can help to a certain extent We can only hope to come up with a rough chronology that best fits the facts at hand.

In 454, after the Egyptian defeat, Plutarch claims that Samos instigated the transfer of the League treasury from Delos to Athens, although he elsewhere attributes it to Pericles, and Diodorus to Aristides.[542] Regardless of who proposed the transfer, the Egyptian disaster may have renewed fears of a Persian invasion, so the move need not be seen as imperialistic. It may have been recognised as more practical or safe for the moneys to be housed on the Athenian acropolis. At least up until this point, Athens had enjoyed good standing and popularity at Samos. However, some scholars believe that

[541] Barron 1966:82

[542] Plut.*Arist*.25.2; Plut.*Per*.12.1; Diod.11.47.1. In the latter passage of Plutarch Pericles is blamed for it and accused of imperialism, although the passage is not irreconcilable with the possibility that Samos first made the suggestion. For a later dating of the transfer, see Plommer 1967:214. He points out that if the proposal occurred in Aristides' lifetime, this provides a *terminus ante quem* of 468.

the political tide turned almost immediately after the transfer of the treasury was complete.[543]

Barron argues ingeniously that from 454 until the revolt, the Geomoroi started an oligarchic revolution and reclaimed power.[544] Barron arrives at this conclusion from the study of a coin series depicting an olive branch.[545] Working on the basis that each known letter (from beta to xi) represents a year in an alphabetic sequence, Barron traces the series back to 453/2. He associates a particular coin type, which features an ox wearing an ornamental collar, with the festival of Hera, which had provided the opportunity for several sixth-century coups. From the production of this coin he infers an oligarchic coup in 454/3. Barron goes so far as to narrow down the date of the coup to February 453. It seems unlikely that some six months earlier the Samians could have proposed the transfer of the league's funds to Athens, but Barron argues that the coup was partly a reaction to this.[546] The catalyst for this coup will have been the Egyptian disaster: "During the winter, no doubt, the satrap was busy with his bribes. The position of the democrats, Athenian lackeys for 15 years, rapidly became untenable, and the Geomoroi seized power."[547] Persian bribery is a feature of both Thucydides' and Plutarch's account of the revolt of Samos, and Persian involvement in 453 too is likely enough.[548]

One objection Barron anticipates is that the "democratic" olive branch still featured on the new issue; he counters this with the argument that the oligarchy may have wished not to show "open hostility" to Athens for the moment.[549] Another

[543] Balcer 1984a; Barron 1961
[544] Barron 1961:427
[545] Barron 1966:59-64, 189-93, Plates XII-XIII
[546] Barron 1966:89-91
[547] Barron 1961:428
[548] Plut.*Per*.25.2, Thuc 1.115.4
[549] Barron 1961:428

objection envisaged by Barron is that if Samos coined without interruption until spring 440/39, this would have been in contravention of the Coinage Decree. However, any of the proposed later dates for the Coinage Decree would remove this problem.[550] Barron's own solution is to suppose that Samos did indeed continue to mint in "open defiance" of Athens for seven years, shedding "important new light on Athens during the forties".[551] He is followed by Samuel Eddy, who sees an increase in surviving Samian coins in 442/1 as evidence that Samos was at that time already preparing for war and amassing a war fund.[552]

There are simpler ways to explain the olive branch series, without supposing that the Coinage Decree dates to the 440s and applied to autonomous allies, and that Athens put up with a seven-year Samian rebellion against it. Eddy's hypothesis about a war fund in 442 is not secure, relying as it does on surviving coins accurately reflecting Samian mint production. That seven specimens survive from the year 442/1 could easily be an accident of luck. A gap in coining post-440 can be explained in other ways: after a major disturbance it would not be surprising to find a gap in coining, not necessarily at the behest of Athens.[553] Moreover, the coins depicting a bull's harness may well invoke Hera, but its associations are many. One of them, as Plommer points out, is Samian democracy; the coin type reappears in Barron's Series Ten, which begins in 412, and thus may commemorate the democratic triumph in that year.[554] Plommer accordingly suggests that the coins could commemorate the democracy set up by Pericles in 440, and then reappear with the democratic uprising. The ox on the Samian

[550] Mattingly 1961; Pritchett 1965; Vickers 1996; Kallet 2001:214
[551] Barron 1966:87. Meiggs also believes that an oligarchic regime defied the decree, but that nevertheless Samos was not in open revolt from Athens at this time (1972:171).
[552] Eddy 1973:249-50
[553] Figueira 1998:151 following Erxleben 1970:82
[554] Plommer 1967:214 on Barron 1966:97

coins is not actually harnessed - its collar is only ornamental and not designed to pull a processional chariot.[555] To associate with the "ornamental ox" coin type not only a festival of Hera, but specifically one during which an oligarchic coup - against a democracy for which there is no evidence - took place is tendentious to say the least.[556] If the Geomoroi were in power for a fifteen-year period leading up to the Samian revolt, we would expect some comment in the literary sources. By far the most economical explanation of the known facts is that the oligarchs who were in power in 440 had been in power since 479.

Kraay and Harold Mattingly both suggest that the olive branch coin hoard should be dated after the Samian revolt.[557] It seems logical that the Samians would adopt a typically Athenian motif after their subjugation in 439, to show loyalty to Athens. Mattingly agrees that the letters on the coins mark a series of fifteen years, but down-dates these years to between 439 and 425, corresponding to Barron's Scheme C. Samian minting of coins would then have stopped in the year that Mattingly places the Coinage Decree, 425 B.C.[558] Kraay extends the series to a period of nineteen years, from c.435 to 415, corresponding roughly to Barron's Scheme D.[559] Barron had ruled out Schemes C and D for several reasons, none of them compelling.[560] The first was that if the "constant olive" were a symbol of Athenian conquest, we would not expect the olive branch to appear on four coins dated c.468/7. As argued above, the olive branch was

[555] Will 1969:311
[556] Will rightly describes it as a house of cards: "La fragilité de cette château des cartes n'échappera à personne" (1969:311).
[557] Mattingly 1981b:81-5; Kraay 1976:332-4. Gardner dates the series 407-394 B.C. (1882:47) but it is hardly likely that during such a tumultous period, in which Athens lost control of Samos, the island would be consistent in producing coins with an Athenian motif.
[558] Mattingly 1961
[559] Kraay 1976:332. Kraay also notes an unusual oscillation between square and round reverse dies and links the changes to changes between democracy and oligarchy (333). However, this would mean that there was an otherwise unknown oligarchic revolution in the 470s and an also unknown reversion to democracy in the 450s.
[560] Barron 1966:82-3

multivalent and might have represented Samos' olive oil production. Alternatively, since Samos had been a member of the Delian League from its very foundation, it may have been meant to evoke Athens. Another argument was that Scheme D in particular leaves a gap in minting between 479 and 460, when Samos was autonomous and would have had no reason not to mint. Related to this is the fact that a Samian tetradrachm showed up in the Zagazig hoard of c.470, which "proves that the minting of that class in fact began earlier than the date allowed by Scheme D".[561] Both of these difficulties can be resolved by extending Schemes C and D by a few years and postulating gaps elsewhere. Barron is extremely precise in his dating sequence, but nothing ties any of the coins to a particular year and where internal dating is relied on so heavily, there are myriad ways to shuffle the cards. He rightly points out that classes V-VII form a continuous stylistic sequence and IV-VIII are all connected by the olive branch on their reverse, but this is not the case for the earlier classes. Alternatively, perhaps there was such a gap in minting; Barron himself acknowledges that the stylistic gap between classes I and II necessitates an "appreciable interval" between the two.[562] He also only gives tentative durations for each class, "remembering that all but [the lettered series] are subject to a wide margin of error".[563]

Schemes C and D would also make Samos contravene the Coinage Decree, unless one wants to date the decree to around the time of Aristophanes' reference to it in 414, and there are good reasons for doing so.[564] Lisa Kallet has argued that peace time is the most likely time that a state like Athens would begin to take stock and make

[561] Barron 1966:83
[562] Barron 1966:50
[563] Barron 1966:67
[564] Aristoph. *Birds* 1040-1

such large changes, that would have taken years to pass, let alone put into effect.[565] That is, if we are convinced that the decree was effective in banning allies from minting their own coins in the first place. The efficacy of the Coinage Decree has long been debated, and Thomas Figueira has questioned its scope and its ramifications.[566] If, as Figueira suggests, many allied mints continued to operate regardless of any ban, this also refutes Barron's point that Samos would not have minted at all after the suppression of its revolt in 439.[567] Kraay notes that in the mid-430s Aenus and Abdera seem to have resumed minting, making it possible that by this time the decree was becoming unworkable; this may be especially true for Samos, which was saddled with an indemnity and needed coinage with which to pay it.[568] This is if we believe that the ban included silver coins and applied to (originally) autonomous allies such as Samos in the first place.[569] The opening lines of the decree are so badly preserved that it is possible that they set out the scope and limitations of the ban.

On the later dating of c.435 to 415, there is the intriguing possibility that Samos paid its indemnity with these coins bearing the olive branch motif.[570] If it seems unlikely that Athens would have allowed Samos to mint coins immediately after its revolt, it must be remembered that financially crippling Samos would have defeated the point of

[565] Kallet 2001:205-15. Figueira argues that the play alludes to a separate piece of monetary legislation, the details of which are now lost to us (1998:216).
[566] Figueira 1998
[567] Barron 1966:85. Barron argues that after its revolt, Samos ceased to be autonomous and would have lost the right to mint its own coins. It is likely that Samos lost its autonomy after the revolt (see below n.169); however, this still does not guarantee that its unusual case was within the purview of the Coinage Decree. Gallo believes that regardless of the scope of the ban, local minting was too widespread to be a sign of disaffection (2005:250).
[568] Kraay 1976:332
[569] As a "litmus test", Figueira uses the example of Chios, who remained in high standing with Athens until its revolt in 412; he reaches the conclusion that Chios minted continuously "although its output may have slackened in the last third of the century" (1999:165). He posits that there may have been gaps in Chios' minting output, but other explanations should be sought before postulating Athenian interference. Figueira reinterprets the Coinage Decree as not prohibiting the minting of silver.
[570] Shipley 114 n.12

imposing an indemnity. The evidence is insecure enough as to provide no firm answer, but a date post-439 for the coin series is the more economical explanation of the facts. Kraay's chronology has the added advantages of allowing for a pause after the revolt, when some disruption is to be expected, and finishing the year before Kallet dates the Coinage Decree and a few years before the *stasis* of 412.[571] It should be borne in mind that the letters in a series could indicate any space of time, not necessarily a year, between them. Whether the series came to an end in 425 or 415, minting then ceased until the restoration of Samian autonomy in 412.

It is important to note that even if Barron's chronology is right, this does not prove his hypothesis that an oligarchic coup took place after the Egyptian disaster. In this case, as with Barron's posited democracy from 469-54, even if all of his assumptions are correct the evidence does not add up to his conclusion. Barron's theory is based on the assumption that if Samos was friendly to Athens in the period before 454, it must have shared its form of government. However, the possibility that the two states were on good terms while under different constitutions cannot be dismissed. Similarly, Barron associates oligarchy with hostility to Athens post-454: he identifies actions such as the overstriking of an Athenian tetradrachm as a sign of open hostility, a "public gesture of defiance".[572] This is a lot to infer from only one secure instance of overstriking, with no secure date; furthermore, Kraay points out that this could have been a purely practical act of reusing metal.[573] Given how widely circulated Athenian coins must have been, it should be no surprise to find them used as blanks when Samian coins were needed and unstruck metal was not readily available. The overstriking has

[571] If the olive branch was intended as a display of loyalty to Athens, it would then be no coincidence that the series stopped just before the fallout of the Sicilian Expedition.
[572] Barron 1966:84
[573] Kraay 1967:196

even been interpreted in the opposite way, as a sign of Athens' and Samos' closeness for the coin to have ended up in Samian hands in the first place.[574] Barron's conflicting statements that the oligarchy of 454-40 was both hostile (in overstriking coins and defying the Coinage Decree) and supportive towards Athens (in continuing to mint coins bearing the "democratic" olive-branch) make his argument even less convincing. Moreover, the same "ornamental ox" coin type that supposedly heralded the end of democracy in 454 is also associated with the restoration of Samian autonomy in 412; that the same symbol would celebrate the restoration of oligarchy and then democracy is another contradiction that Barron leaves unexplained.[575] Central to Barron's thesis is the belief that around 456-3 both Miletus and Erythrae fell into Persian hands, and that Samos must have followed suit. Yet as we will see, this picture of widespread revolt in Ionia in the 450s is a house of cards.

Jack Balcer follows a similar line, hypothesising that by 453 the oligarchs and the democrats had become "bitterly divided", with the democrats loyal to Athens and the oligarchs repenting of the decision to move the League treasury to Athens.[576] By 440, clearly the oligarchs had had enough, but whether this discontent stretches back as far as fifteen years previously can only be guessed. If they had been so fed up in 454, one wonders why they would not have revolted from Athens there and then, seizing the opportunity of Athenian weakness after the Egyptian disaster.[577]

We know that when Pericles sailed to Samos in 440 to intervene, it was an oligarchic government that he broke up.[578] The question is how long that oligarchy had

[574] Gardner 1888:46
[575] Will 1969:311-2
[576] Balcer 1984a:407
[577] Will makes a similar argument, though his is based on the belief that Miletus and Erythrae both revolted around that time; he asks why, if its neighbours were revolting around it, Samos did not follow suit (1969:309).
[578] Plut.*Per*.25.1, Thuc 1.115

been in power. If Barron's hypothesis is correct, Athens tolerated an oligarchy at Samos only from the Egyptian disaster until civil strife broke out in 440 B.C. However, the evidence for any change in constitution in the years 479 to 440 is minimal, and even if Barron's dating of fifth-century coin types is correct, all it proves is that there was an oligarchy in the period 454-40, which is undisputed. A new coin series does not have to signify a change in government; Legon (who follows Barron's dating) suggests that the new series was the result of Samos' loss of ships in the Egyptian expedition, coupled with the transfer of the League treasury to Athens.[579] If we were to follow Barron's dating, he could be right that the coin series is oligarchic without being correct in postulating a coup in 454. Legon draws a parallel between Samos and the other two ship contributors, Chios and Lesbos, who both had at least oligarchic institutions if not regimes throughout this period; thus it was clearly possible actively to support Athens while under an oligarchy.[580] In the absence of any other evidence, it is best to assume that Samos was oligarchic for the entire period 479-440 B.C. The positive evidence for an oligarchy is not much, but it is as follows: in 479 the tyranny was overthrown by a handful of men who may have had an interest in narrow rule, and Pericles arrived in 440 to find an oligarchy.

The Samian revolt

After the 'Archaeology', this is when we next hear of Samos in Thucydides.[581] Thucydides' account of Samos' revolt is notably long and detailed. It has been suggested that this is because the fate of Samos marked a "watershed in the story of

[579] Legon 1972:147-8
[580] Legon 1972:147. It seems likely that Chios was oligarchic up until its revolt in 412 (Quinn 1969).
[581] Thuc. 1.115ff. This is excluding a brief proleptic mention of the Samian revolt in the Corinthian speech at 1.41.

Athenian imperialism"[582]; thus the story of the island's reduction is made a set-piece which takes pride of place between the Thirty Years Peace and Thucydides' account of the immediate causes of the war.[583] The Samos affair happens at the peak of Athens' power, in an excursus designed to emphasise Athens' power and Spartan fear of it, the "truest cause" of the war. Gone are the days of the League synod; if Athens did consult with any of its allies over whether to attack Samos, no trace has been left in the sources. Thucydides presents Athens as subduing Samos without warning either its allies or Samos itself, conforming to his narrative of increasing Athenian power and imperialism. Alternatively, Thucydides may have dwelt on the fate of Samos because he could actually remember it without having to rely on untrustworthy evidence.[584] Whatever the reason for its length and detail, the Samos episode allows for (relatively) uncomplicated analysis of the internal workings of an allied city and Athens' involvement in them.

What was the cause of the Samian revolt after almost four decades of staunch loyalty to Athens and the Delian League? If contributing ships had afforded Samos a privileged position among the allies, it was clearly not enough by 440. The immediate cause was a disagreement between Samos and neighbouring Miletus over possession of Priene.[585] Border disputes between Samos and Priene itself had been going on since the early sixth century, and would continue for centuries to come, but territory dispute

[582] Wecowski 2013:165

[583] Thuc. 1.118. Wecowski gives a (by no means exhaustive) list of events that Thucydides passes over in order to pass straight to Corcyra and Potidaea: the foundation of Amphipolis, Athens' alliance with Acarnania, Lesbos' appeal to Sparta for aid, the accession of Methone to the Delian League, the Megarian decree and Pericles' Pontic expedition in 436/5. He also points out that in skipping straight from the Peace to the Samian revolt, Thucydides passes over the foundation of Thurii and alliances with parts of Sicily and southern Italy (2013:154).

[584] Westlake 1969:48

[585] Thuc. 1.115; Plut.*Per*.25. Plutarch gives the detail that Samos was trying to get possession of Priene; Thucydides merely says that the quarrel was "about Priene". Gomme suspects that the disagreement was over land in the *chora* of all three towns (1945:349). Disagreements between all three towns were to last for centuries (Ager nos. 26, 74, 99, 160).

with Miletus is new.[586] It has been suggested that Pericles, in need of a pretext for attack, deliberately provoked Samos to revolt.[587] Evidence for this has been sought in the addition of Marathesion, a Samian dependency according to Strabo, to the list of tribute-payers.[588] This would be a calculated affront to Samos, whose economy relied to some extent on its produce.[589] Plutarch also attributes personal motives to Pericles: according to the biographer, Pericles attacked Samos to gratify his lover Aspasia, a Milesian by birth.[590] Both allegations seek to find personal motive where none is needed; that the Samians were in dispute with their neighbours over possession of land in between them is motive enough.

As for Athens' motives, it is enough that it felt obliged to protect Miletus and pre-empt Persian intervention, especially given the geographical proximity of both states to the empire of the Great King.[591] The Syracusan Hermocrates may present allied wars with one another as a pretext for Athenian despotism, but the allies were probably required to have the same friends as Athens.[592] Moreover, Athens may well have been enticed by the chance to convert Samos to democracy; perhaps it even thought there

[586] *I.Priene* 12, 24, 28, 37, 500
[587] Nesselhauf 1933:48 with n.4
[588] Strab. 14.1.20
[589] It is worth noting that Marathesion's first appearance in the *ATL* is in 442/1 (*IG* I^3 270) not 443/2 (*IG* I^3 269), so its joining the list in the previous year is only speculative. Marathesion's appearances in the *ATL* are so sporadic as to merit no firm conclusions. It only appears for certain in three lists: 442/1, 433/2 and 432/1. Its name is conjectured in two further lists: 443/2 and 439/8. Gallo notes that Marathesion's addition to the list was accompanied by a reduction in Ephesus' tribute, suggesting that Marathesion was in Ephesus' sphere of influence (2005:252-3). The absence of Marathesion and Priene could conceivably indicate that the exiles at Anaea had got control of the coastal area there (Fantasia 1986:132), but there is simply not enough evidence.
[590] Plut.*Per*.24.1
[591] Ostwald 2009:57. Legon mentions both of these motives, saying "Athens might well have felt under obligation to provide Miletus with protection, having been deprived of its own" (1972:148). If the revolt of and regulations for Miletus are down-dated to the 420s, this argument cannot stand – but this does not mean that Athens did not feel a duty to intervene to protect a loyal ally.
[592] Thuc 6.76; Meritt, McGregor and Wade-Gery 1950:229

was a "widespread desire for democracy" on the island.[593] Certainly, there were certain private citizens from Samos who took Miletus' side in the hope of "revolutionising the government".[594] It should not be assumed that Athens was always looking for an excuse to convert its allies to democracy, but the Old Oligarch may have had a point that Athens felt better able to control the aristocrats in allied cities when their power had been limited.[595] In the case of Samos, it is noteworthy that Athens did not impose a democracy in reaction to *stasis*: as far as we know, Samos had no political problems except for a few people who quietly wanted democracy. Since Athens did not change Samos' constitution in order to stabilise it – indeed, it had the opposite effect – it is plausible that they thought it easier to control a democratic ally.

Thucydides does not say that Athens issued any kind of warning to the Samians before intervening; they may even have been oblivious to Miletus' complaints. In his account there are two distinct phases to Athens' response: the first is Pericles' expedition to set up a democracy, and the second is a harsher response once the Samians have actually revolted. Diodorus claims that the Samians revolted before Pericles had even set sail, but given that there seems to have been no resistance to his first expedition, this is unlikely.[596] There was *stasis* in the city, but that does not entail full-on revolt from the League. If Samos had already revolted by this point, it is inconceivable that Pericles would have left the island with walls and a fleet.[597] Plutarch, on the other hand, says that the Athenians ordered the Samians to stop and submit the case to arbitration, but they refused.[598] If this is true, it at least partially absolves the Athenians of

[593] Quinn 1981:12
[594] Thuc. 1.115.3
[595] [Xen] *Ath. Pol.* 1.14
[596] Diod. 12.27.1
[597] Quinn 1981:11
[598] Plut.*Per*.25.1

unwarranted aggression. Given that Thucydides' account does not explicitly contradict what Plutarch says, we may give the latter the benefit of the doubt and believe that Athens at least offered to arbitrate, even if the offer was only token. Nor did Samos take the offer seriously, since Athens' invasion seems to have come as a surprise.[599]

The Samian quarrel with Miletus took place in the sixth year after the conclusion of the Thirty Years Peace, so in the spring or summer of 440. In response to the complaints of some Milesians, and "certain private persons [in Athens] from Samos itself, who wished to revolutionise the government", the Athenians sailed to Samos with forty ships and set up a democracy in the place of the oligarchy.[600] If Barron is right,[601] or if we wish to take Herodotus literally,[602] this was not the Samians' first taste of democracy. Athens' actions appear to have been unpopular, for the Corinthians later claim that the Athenians have them to thank for dissuading Sparta from getting involved.[603] Sparta's very posing of the question in the first place suggests that it was in favour of intervening. Indeed, this was the last major Athenian action tolerated by Sparta before the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War.[604] At this stage perhaps they did not want to appear to support the Persians. It is noteworthy that Athens felt justified in overthrowing the government of a supposedly sovereign ally when it had not even (yet) revolted; for this, it could be viewed as "one of the grosser examples of Athenian imperialism in the mid fifth century".[605] Traditionally, the clash has been interpreted as

[599] Samos can have been warned by Athens and still have been unprepared for invasion; see below (contra Legon 1966:129).
[600] Thuc. 1.115
[601] Barron 1961:409 (see above)
[602] Hdt. 6.43
[603] Thuc. 1.41. Cartledge suggests that when Sparta called a League Congress it had already decided in favour of intervening because of its "special relationship" with Samos (1982:263). Athens' decision was presumably also unpopular with those (perhaps aristocratic) enemies of Pericles who spread the rumour that he sided with Miletus for the sake of Aspasia.
[604] Hornblower 1991:188
[605] Samons 2004:114-5

one between a completely autonomous, oligarchic state and a recently subdued, recently democratised one.[606] This view will be challenged, since both revolts of Miletus in the 450s and 440s are based on flimsy evidence. Nevertheless, it is likely that Miletus, who sided with the Samian democrats, was itself democratic by this point.

The Athenians took one hundred hostages from Samos, fifty boys and fifty men, and deposited them on Lemnos, before returning home.[607] Diodorus diverges from Thucydides in saying that 80 young men were taken as hostages.[608] A garrison was stationed on Samos and a fine exacted - eighty talents, if Diodorus is not exaggerating.[609] Despite being unpopular, Athens' initial treatment of Samos was fairly lenient.[610] The city was (for the time being) allowed to keep its walls and fleet, meaning that it retained its non-tributary status. Presumably this was because Samos had not yet revolted and surrendered immediately with no resistance.[611] Athens' leniency was however soon to be a cause for regret. Those of the Samians who had fled the island – oligarchs, we must presume – made an agreement with the remaining oligarchs in Samos and a military alliance (συμμαχία) with the satrap Pissouthnes and caused a revolt.[612] These oligarchs were based at Anaea, a small coastal town on the mainland opposite Samos.[613] The word Thucydides uses suggests a formal alliance, although it

[606] Busolt 1885:542-3
[607] Thuc. 1.115.3
[608] Diod. 12.27.2
[609] Diod.12.27.2
[610] Athens' unpopularity in taking child hostages – "dragging children from their mothers and fathers and taking them as hostages" – is (retrospectively) voiced in Isocrates' *On the Peace* (section 92).
[611] Whether this was intended or not is unclear; Samos may simply have been caught off guard, not expecting such a swift reaction from Athens. Quinn suggests that the reason Samos was so unprepared when Athens intervened was simply that relations between them were good enough that the Samians "deceived themselves into thinking it would turn a blind eye to their war" (1981:12).
[612] Moreover, Balcer notes a pattern of exiled or otherwise marginalised oligarchs bringing in Persian support (1984:34). One example is Pharnaces' settlement of Delian exiles in 422 (Thuc. 5.1).
[613] Thuc. 3.32.2, 4.75.1

must be meant rather more loosely of the exiles' arrangement with the oligarchs in Samos. Thucydides calls these latter the δυνατώτατοι, which probably means "the aristocrats" (i.e. those who had until recently been in power under the oligarchy) rather than those who were "most powerful" in the city now a democracy had taken hold. This must be when some men from Samos appealed to Sparta for help but were refused. Thus, both Persia and Sparta were tempted to intervene, even if the latter did not go so far as to break the Thirty Years' Peace. Moreover, the anti-Athenians in Samos must have been a highly organised and powerful group to achieve what they did and seek aid from both Sparta and Persia. It is possible that the Samians had been confident of Persian support even before they defied Athens in 440; the prospect of naval assistance would have made resistance to Athens' naval might much less of a gamble.

Samos was now in open revolt. It is possible that other states were also encouraged to join in.[614] Around the same time, Byzantium revolted; Thucydides hints that this was in concert with the Samian uprising.[615] Plutarch says that during Pericles' first expedition, hostages, opponents of democracy and Pissouthnes all individually tried to bribe Pericles out of his decision to set up a democracy, but he ignored all of them.[616] The satrap allegedly went so far as to send Pericles 10, 000 gold coins. It is easy to imagine how such rumours may have circulated, although the anecdote is unique

[614] Kagan 1969:172-3.
[615] Thucydides says ξυναπέστησαν ("they revolted together"), suggesting that the two revolts were linked. Balcer (1984b:29) and Rhodes (2010:73) interpret the verb to mean that Byzantium even revolted in support of Samos; Balcer also speculates that Persian money was involved. But Fornara thinks what he says is more like a "footnote" and argues that secrecy was the key to the Samian conspirators' success, making it unlikely that they encouraged anyone else to revolt in concert (1979:8). Despite the evidence of the *ATL* it is unlikely that any other cities actually did revolt; Thucydides would have mentioned them alongside Byzantium, and it is natural for there to be some variation in the tribute lists from year to year (Nesselhauf 1933:48). Adcock counts 12 Carian cities which do not reappear on the *ATL* after 440 (1940:172); yet these may not be connected to the Samian revolt.
[616] Plut.*Per*.25.2

in reflecting well on Pericles.[617] This seems like the kind of biographical detail that Plutarch would invent, yet regardless of whether Plutarch is guilty of embellishing his sources, Persian money and military assistance were clearly a factor in the developments at Samos. Thucydides vaguely speaks only of an "alliance" with Pissouthnes, but the satrap is the obvious candidate for providing the seven hundred mercenaries employed to recover the hostages and a military alliance may have been the prerequisite for such assistance. Diodorus makes it explicit that Pissouthnes "gave [the Samians] 700 soldiers".[618] These may well have been Greek mercenaries, though unfortunately neither historian records their ethnicity.

That Pissouthnes provided only pay and not his own soldiers for the rebellion hardly exposes him as one anxious to break a treaty by subterfuge; if this were the case, the satrap would not have taken the overthrown Athenian officials into his possession or made an alliance with the oligarchs in the first place.[619] It may have been more expedient to use mercenaries and seems to have been standard Persian practice. In Thucydides the word ἐπίκουρος (mercenary) is generally used of those serving tyrants or oligarchical factions (e.g. Thuc. 2.33.1; 2.70.3; 3.18.1; 3.34.2; 4.46.2; 6.55.3; 8.28.4; 8.38.3). The fact that they were mercenaries does not mean that they were foreign, simply that they were paid. A good example of this is in Thucydides' brief interlude on Colophon: he uses ἐπικούρους to describe Pissouthnes' soldiers, but he also describes some as *barbaroi* (foreigners) to distinguish them from the Spartan mercenaries, meaning that they were probably Persian troops, not foreigners.[620]

[617] This leads Busolt to accept it, since Plutarch's source, Douris of Samos, is generally not a fan of Athens' (1885:542-3).
[618] Diod.12.27.3
[619] Contra Eddy 1973:245
[620] Thuc. 3.34.2

Pissouthnes had a hand in unrest at Samos, Colophon and possibly other places such as Caria and Caunus, and not a single of his interventions inspired any comment in the literary record.[621] Eddy suggests that Pissouthnes co-ordinated the people of Anaea and Caria when they attacked the Athenians in Caria, which is why around the same time certain Ionian exiles were confident that they could get him to join them in rescuing Mytilene.[622] It would be no surprise for Pissouthnes to continue backing the Anaeans in Caria in the 420s, for he had originally helped them to revolt against Athens. The Ionian exiles' confidence that Pissouthnes would make war with them amounted to nothing, for the Spartan Alcidas rejected their proposal. Note that according to Thucydides, Alcidas' stated reason was not that such an alliance would break any Peace, or that he did not believe that Pissouthnes would agree to join in. Alcidas refused because he wanted to get home as soon as possible.[623] That Pissouthnes would want to involve himself in the war is taken for granted by both the Ionian exiles and Alcidas. Their confidence was not unfounded, for in the same year and three chapters later we find Pissouthnes helping the pro-Persians at Notium.[624] Despite the sequence in which Thucydides reveals these events in Ionia, Pissouthnes must have been helping the faction in Notium for some time before Paches arrived so the Ionian exiles will have been aware of his readiness to intervene.

Pissouthnes' involvement, going so far as to take charge of the captive Athenian garrison and officials, tells against the historicity, or at least the efficacy, of the Peace of Callias; his actions merit no comment about a breach of peace in our sources. Even if he broke only the spirit, not the letter of the Peace, it is strange that his direct

[621] Thuc. 3.34.2 (Notium/Colophon), 3.19.2 (Caria)
[622] Eddy 1973:255; Thuc. 3.31.1
[623] Thuc. 3.31.2
[624] Thuc. 3.34.2

interference in a dispute between Athens and its ally is treated as nothing exceptional.[625] Pissouthnes may have been acting independently of royal policy, yet this is nowhere mentioned and satraps seem generally to have obeyed royal directive.[626] Samian oligarchs rescued the hostages all the way from Lemnos, turned the Athenian garrison and officials over to Pissouthnes and made preparations for an attack on Miletus.[627] Plutarch attributes the freeing of hostages to Pissouthnes and Thucydides implies as much when he mentions the stealing of hostages and the handing over of the garrison to Pissouthnes in one breath.[628] The garrison presumably went inland to Sardis, for Thucydides makes a point of stating that Pissouthnes was in control of Sardis at the time.

Badian compares Pissouthnes' role to that of the International Red Cross, but the IRC is a politically neutral humanitarian movement while Pissouthnes was a Persian noble in a formal alliance with the Samian oligarchs who had a lot to gain from stirring up trouble for Athens.[629] Samos was both navally powerful and a potential source of tribute, and the oligarchs' revolt furnished Pissouthnes with a reason to assert his claim to the island over Athens'. Diodorus acknowledges this in his account, saying that Pissouthnes furnished mercenaries "hoping by these means to be lord over (κυριεύσειν) Samos".[630] This could be an inference from Thucydides, but since several details in Diodorus' account differ from Thucydides', Diodorus may be working from a different tradition.

[625] The authors of the *ATL*, who believe in the historicity of the Peace of Callias, argue that it was not breached (Meritt, McGregor & Wade-Gery 1950:307).
[626] For a convincing argument for "general principle of satrap adherence to royal directive" see Waters 2010 and Cawkwell 1997a:47-9.
[627] This was a round trip of some 640km (Lewis 1992:143).
[628] Plut.*Per*.25.3; Thuc. 1.115.5
[629] Badian 1987:22
[630] Diod. 12.27.3

The fact that the fate of the hostages is unknown does not (as Badian argues) make Pissouthnes' action neutral; the initial act of taking the hostages would hardly have been perceived as such by Athens regardless of whether or not they were killed. Both of the verbs used by Thucydides (ἐκκλέψαντες, ἐξέδοσαν) imply deception and betrayal. Badian makes much of the fact that in Thucydides account Pissouthnes appears passively to allow the taking of hostages from him, but this is simply because Thucydides characteristically describes all the key features of the revolt in one very long sentence with the Samians as its subject.[631] The difference between "the Samians collected mercenaries from Pissouthnes" and "Pissouthnes furnished mercenaries" is a point of grammar. In fact we find the latter phrasing in Diodorus' account: ὁ μὲν Πισσούθνης ἔδωκεν αὐτοῖς στρατιώτας ἑπτακοσίους ("Pissouthnes gave them 700 soldiers").[632] Plutarch even alleges that Pissouthnes stole the hostages "and in other ways equipped [Samos] for the war", but he is clearly using Thucydides as a source because he uses the same verb, ἐκκλέψαντος (stolen away), that Thucydides uses of the Samian oligarchs.[633] Badian's translation of ἐπικούρους as "volunteers" is again a technicality; however eager their assistance, they were being paid for by Pissouthnes and this would have been viewed as a breach of peace. Thucydides makes clear the strength of the term ἐπίκουρος in the speech of the Corinthians, who tell the Athenians that they cannot become ἐπίκουροι of Corcyra while remaining allies with Corinth. Even here, where the word's meaning is not "mercenaries" but "helpers", helping an ally's enemy is a breach of treaty. In almost every other instance Thucydides simply uses the term to mean "mercenaries".[634]

[631] Thuc. 1.115.4-5
[632] Diod. 12.27.3
[633] Plut. *Per*. 25.3
[634] Thuc. 2.33, 2.70, 3.18, 3.34, 3.73-4, 3.85, 4.46, 4.129-31, 6.55,6.58, 8.28, 8.38

In January 439, Pericles made his second expedition to put down the revolt. The Samian fleet was on its way to Miletus when news came of the arrival of the Athenians and it had to turn back to face them.[635] Pericles and his forty-four triremes decisively defeated the Samian contingent of seventy ships, and Pericles proceeded to besiege Samos with forty more Athenian ships and twenty-five from Lesbos and Chios. Hearing rumours of a Phoenician fleet coming to aid Samos, Pericles took sixty ships personally to meet them. An otherwise unknown Samian, Stesagoras, had already gone with five ships to bring them to the island along with some "other people" (ἄλλοι). Thucydides is frustratingly vague, but the plan sounds well orchestrated and suggests that the Samian oligarchs had co-ordinated with oligarchs from other towns to secure Persian support.

The Samians briefly gained the upper hand after winning a naval battle with the depleted Athenian contingent; after this they were able to bring in supplies to the island for several weeks.[636] However, this ended as soon as Pericles returned with his ships; the Phoenician ships apparently never materialised. Perhaps their intention was only ever to distract the Athenians; it certainly worked, reducing Athens' forces to a size that gave the Samians the advantage until Pericles' return. Lewis suggests that a bargain was struck whereby the Great King held off sending the Phoenician fleet on the condition that Athens give up some of its tributaries in Caria.[637] Whatever the Great King's final decision, Stesagoras must have approached the Phoenician fleet in advance to enlist their help against Athens and Artaxerxes must have agreed to mobilise them. An undertaking requiring such resources would have to have been approved at the

[635] Thuc. 1.116; Diod. 12.27.4; Plut.*Per*.25.3
[636] Thuc. 1.117
[637] Lewis 1977:60 n.70

top.[638] For our purposes, it matters little how real a threat the Phoenician ships were, for the fact that Pericles believed in them tells us that even if there was a Peace of Callias, it was not expected to end Persian interference in Asia Minor. Nor is there any indication that Pissouthnes returned the hostages he had moved to Sardis for safekeeping.

The revolt of Caunus

It is noteworthy that Thucydides singles out the town of Caunus, in addition to the general area of Caria, as a source of Phoenician ships.[639] This is Thucydides' only mention of the town before it becomes an important base for Spartan operations in 412.[640] Caunus must have revolted at some point prior to this, but Thucydides is silent. Ctesias narrates a revolt of Caunus at some point between Megabyzus' death c.440 and Artaxerxes' death in 425.[641] The revolts of Samos and Caunus may be connected, and it is conceivable that Pissouthnes encouraged both since he certainly gave military aid to Samos. Instrumental in helping the Athenians try to recover Caunus was a Persian rebel, Zopyrus, son of the satrap Megabyzus. The Caunians surrendered, but a Caunian named Alcides then struck and killed Zopyrus with a rock as he was entering the town. Ctesias adds the detail that afterwards Zopyrus' grandmother Amestris avenged his death by impaling Alcides; this suggests (even if we are to believe only the gist of the tale) that after Caunus' revolt it fell back under Persian rule. Ctesias' account gives the impression that Athens failed to recover the place, though he does not make this clear because the focus of the story is Zopyrus' misfortune in being killed by a rock. What is most intriguing is the possibility that Alcides was not just a traitor to the Athenian cause

[638] Lewis 1977:58
[639] Thuc. 1.116.3
[640] Thuc. 8.39, 41-2, 57, 108
[641] Ctesias *FGH* 688 F 14.45 (Gilmore 1888:165-6)

but also to the Persian cause, which was what led to his execution by the Persian royal family.[642] We might assume that by wanting to harm Athens, Alcides was pro-Persian, yet perhaps he – and other Caunians - aimed at freedom from both.

Caunus' relationship with both empires is more complex than simply oscillating between the two. Caunus stood on the border between Lycia and Caria and was a member of the Delian League; it appears on the tribute quota lists from 453/2.[643] Geographically, it was separated from anti-Athenians in the region by a mountain, a river and a lake. By the time of the Peloponnesian War, it seems that much of the area was hostile to Athens: as well as Melesander's defeat in 430/29, Thucydides additionally mentions a Carian attack on tribute collectors in 428/7.[644] During and after the Samian affair, Caunus continues to appear for certain on the Athenian quota lists in 441/0, 440/39, 438/7 and several more years up until 421/0.[645] In the reassessment of 425 its tribute is suddenly raised from half a talent to ten talents.[646] This means that Caunus was sending ships to help an anti-Athenian cause around 440, yet it did not stop paying Athenian tribute during that period. As a long-standing Athenian ally in an area that did not respond kindly to Athenian tribute collectors, its inhabitants must have had mixed allegiances. It would be impossible to tell from the evidence of the tribute lists alone that Caunus was actively helping to fight Athens at that time. Perhaps it was paying to both Athens and Persia; at the very least it was aiding both. Moreover, the *terminus ante quem* for the revolt that Ctesias relates is 425, yet we find Caunus

[642] Hyland 2018
[643] *IG* I^3 col.VII.8
[644] Thuc. 2.69, 3.19
[645] *IG* I^3 271 col.I.64; *IG* I^3 272 col.I.70; *IG* I^3 274 col.III.5; *IG* I^3 279 col.col.I.9; *IG* I^3 281 col.I.29-30 (two unknown groups "from Caunus"); *IG* I^3 285 col.II.11 (first two letters restored but no other known town's name would fit -ύνιοι)
[646] *IG* I^3 71 col.II.98

continuing to pay tribute after that year. This suggests either that certain Caunians continued to pay despite the disaffection, or that the town changed hands multiple times.

Further evidence for the Persian claim over Caunus can be found in the trilingual Xanthus stele, discovered in 1967 and dated to the late fifth or early fourth century depending on its authorship.[647] The inscribed pillar is part of an elaborate funerary monument for the deceased dynast. Face *a* of the inscription (in Lycian) is most interesting for our purposes because it presents a series of military victories during the Peloponnesian War. Opinion is divided on precisely which events are referred to, and the issue largely rests on whether the narrator was focusing on recent history or whether he was producing a kind of *res gestae* (life works) or *laudatio* (funerary oration), either of which would list his achievements throughout his reign.[648] The condition and the language of the Lycian text leave much in the dark, but mention of Sparta, Athens and Tissaphernes situates the action in the Peloponnesian War. It cannot be proven that the narrator is referring to events of the Archidamian War as well as the Decelean War, but it is seems likely. There is no reason to suppose that he was particularly concerned with events of the 410s. The monument also features a frieze depicting his military achievements. It would be strange for a funerary monument of this kind to celebrate only a portion of the dynast's life rather than his entire career c.440-400 B.C. If our chronology is correct and face *a* covers the period 430-28, this means that Caunus was under Achaemenid governance at that time. In other words, the Xanthus stele corroborates Ctesias' account of the revolt of Caunus.

In the Lycian inscription, a victory over a certain Melesander (Lycian "Milisantra") is boasted of.[649] This is probably the Melesander from Thucydides rather

[647]TAM I 44; Childs 1979
[648] Childs 1981:68; Thonemann 2009:168
[649]TAM I 44.a.44-5; Briant 1998:583

than a later Melesander dubiously restored from four certain letters in a record of loans made by the treasurers of Athena.[650] It is better to connect the name to a known event in 430/29 than an unknown event and person in later years. A few lines later the narrator states that the governor (Lycian "haxlaza") at Caunus ordered another Persian to resist an "Ionian" army at/on Mycale opposite Samos.[651] This incident has been associated with the Athenian Lysicles' trouble with the Carians and Anaeans in 428, for the battle took place on or near Mount Mycale.[652] Since there is also mention of Iasus and Amorges it could, however, fit Thucydides' narrative of a Spartan attack on Iasus and the capture of Amorges in 412.[653] The problem with this is that the narrative would jump from 429 to 412 in the space of five lines, and this would also mean that the entirety of face *b* of the inscription would cover a few months between autumn 412 and spring 411.[654] Moreover, the grammar of the section makes Amorges conqueror rather than conquered.[655] Interpretation of this passage has naturally focused on the part of Amorges career best known to us: its end. It seems that in fact we are presented with events early in his career that are otherwise poorly attested. Amorges must have helped the Carians and Anaeans to fight Lysicles and the Athenians.

The beginning of face *c* of the Lycian text may concern dealings between Sparta and Tissaphernes "when they were fighting against Athens", although the sense of the text is obscure and its state incomplete.[656] The narrator of the text claims to have acted as arbiter between two of the three parties mentioned; Melchert rules out Athens on the

[650] Bryce 1986:107-8 contra Thompson 1967; ***IG*** **I³** 371.3
[651] TAM I 44.a.51-5
[652] Thuc. 3.19; Schürr 1998:151-5; Hyland 2018:23. Thucydides' "hill of Sandius" has not been precisely identified but he says that Lysicles went up from Myus, which is just southeast of Mount Mycale.
[653] Thuc. 8.28; Thompson 1967; Childs 1981:64
[654] Thonemann 2009:174
[655] TAM I 44.a.44, 48; Thonemann 2009:177-8
[656] TAM I 44c.1-2; Melchert 1993:31

basis that Caunus had "no known connections" to Athens, but this is only true of the last years of the war.[657] As we have seen, Caunus was still paying tribute to Athens at least up until the Peace of Nicias. Melchert takes for granted that the negotiations must be those between Sparta and Tissaphernes in the last stages of the war.[658] By that time Caunus had fallen into Spartan hands and was a key point of contact between the Spartans and Tissaphernes. If we are to assume that the dynast's achievements are listed in chronological order, Melchert must be right that the text concerns a later time.

If this interpretation is correct, the Xanthus stele tells us about Persia's claim to Caunus at a time when the town was still paying tribute to Athens. The inscription shows a rare Persian perspective and tells a different story about Caunus to Thucydides'. It presents Caunus as purely Persian territory under threat from the Athenians, although its function as propaganda may conceal the more complex truth. Thucydides does not mention Caunus' revolt or Zopyrus' role in trying to put it down. Nor does he tell us that the Carians and Anaeans who attacked Lysicles in 428 did so on the orders of a Persian *haxlaza* at Caunus and with the help of Amorges. The most that the historian does is hint at early signs of Caunian disaffection in his narrative of the Samian revolt. Hidden in Thucydides' narrative are indications of Persian involvement in the affairs of Athens' eastern allies (and vice versa) on a large scale. This makes Samos' revolt less of an isolated incident than Thucydides has us believe. Samos may only have felt confident to revolt in the first place with the promise of Persian backing. The example of Caunus reminds us that neither Thucydides nor the tribute lists tell the whole story, and shows how complicated international relations were for towns caught between east and west. It warns against the assumptions that

[657] Melchert 1993:34
[658] Thuc. 8.17-8, 36-7, 57-8

towns that revolted ceased to pay tribute, and that an anti-Athenian was necessarily a pro-Persian. It also presents the possibility that Caunus and Samos revolted within a short time of each other with the help of Pissouthnes.

The aftermath of the Samian revolt

Forty more Athenian and thirty more Lesbian and Chian triremes came to Pericles' aid, and the siege of Samos was renewed by both land and sea. Diodorus adds the detail that Pericles built siege machines with which to destroy the Samians' walls; he claims that Pericles was the first ever to do so, but this is unlikely.[659] After a minor naval engagement Samos' fate was sealed.[660] After a total of nine months' resistance, the island surrendered. In total, Athens had dispatched some sixteen generals and 239 ships to deal with the Samian problem.[661] The fighting was close enough that Thucydides is later able to proclaim, "So nearly did Samos strip Athens of its sea power".[662] The Samian fleet, though considerably larger than Pericles', had proved no match for it. Thucydides must mean that if the Phoenician fleet had arrived, the Athenian fleet would not have stood a chance. If there was a Peace of Callias, it did not stop the Persians from contributing to the near-toppling of Athens' naval supremacy. Phoenician involvement in the Samian affair is a more decisive violation of the Peace than the activities of the satraps, which were not necessarily always sanctioned by the Great King.

[659] Diod. 12.28.3. The Assyrians were using siege machines in the 8th century BC. Perhaps Diodorus means that Pericles was the first Greek.
[660] Thuc. 1.117.2-3, Diod. 12.28.2. Diodorus gives the number of additional Athenian ships as sixty, not forty.
[661] Bolmarcich 2009:52
[662] Thuc. 8.76.4. Plutarch (*Per*.28.7) has Pericles boast that it had taken Agamemnon 10 years to capture a barbarian city, but himself only 9 months to capture the most powerful city of Ionia.

An Athenian casualty list that probably belongs to the year 440 records the names of men killed fighting around Byzantium.[663] It has traditionally been dated c.447, despite its four-bar sigma, because it does not mention fighting around Samos and the many casualties from Samos would hardly have been recorded under the rubric "the other wars".[664] However, the casualties from Samos may have been recorded on a different stele. The third list of casualties is substantially more crowded than the previous two lists, suggesting that the inscriber anticipated fewer entries than he ended up writing, so the continuation of the list onto another (now lost) stele would be perfectly possible.

After the reduction of Samos, the island was forced to raze its walls, give hostages, relinquish its ships and pay an indemnity.[665] Plutarch curiously states that part of the fine was to be paid immediately and part of it "at a specified time"; presumably he means that the indemnity had to be paid off by a certain date, because in Thucydides the amount is to be paid over time and the Athenians will not have wanted to crush Samos financially.[666] Diodorus gives the figure of 200 talents; the authors of the *ATL* suggest as much as 1300 talents, or 50 talents per year.[667] Shipley thinks the amount per year may have been as much as 150 talents.[668] Certainly, a grand total of 200 talents seems impossibly small given that the total expenditure on the war with Samos is recorded as at least 1400 talents.[669] Isocrates and Cornelius Nepos preserve the sums of

[663] *IG* I^3 1162
[664] Meiggs & Lewis 1969:127-8
[665] Thucydides does not use the article with reference to its ships, leaving open the possibility that not all were requisitioned (Karavites 1985:48).
[666] Plut.*Per*.28; Thuc.1.117.3
[667] Meritt, McGregor & Wade-Gery 1950:307-8, 334-4
[668] Shipley 1983:92
[669] *IG* I^3 363.19. This higher figure was argued for by Fornara (1979:9-12). The higher figure would remove the neatness of the 50 talent per year calculation. Shipley follows Gomme (1956:33) in supposing that the entire indemnity may well have been paid off before the start of the war, which is why Thucydides does not mention it (1987:296).

1,000 and 1,200 talents respectively although these are sources from the early fourth and mid-first century B.C.[670] Where the money for the siege originally came from is an interesting question; Samons believes that for reasons of appearances Athens will have paid from the treasury of Athena, and the inscription recording expenses does not mention any other source such as the funds of the Hellenotamiae. If this is the case, it suggests that Athens was sufficiently partisan to feel unjustified in using allied money for the siege; "[w]hen the Athenians decided to dissolve the Samians' traditional form of government and install one modeled on their own system, they understandably might have decided not to employ the funds of the Hellenotamiai for this action".[671] This is if we believe that Athens felt the need to justify such expenditure: changing Samos' constitution was going to appear imperialistic no matter where the funding for it came from.

The Samian *horoi*

It is in the context of reparations for Athenian expenditure on the war and punishment of Samos that it makes most sense to place the Samian *horoi*. Punishment may have come in the form of that most hated of imperial institutions, the cleruchy. It is admittedly true that there is limited evidence for an Athenian cleruchy on Samos in 439. Craterus, explaining why the term Ἀττικός πάροικος (Athenian neighbour) became a synonym for an undesirable neighbour, observes that at an unspecified time "Athenians were sent off to Samos, made their homes there, and threw out the locals".[672] It seems more likely that Craterus was referring to a fifth century event than a fourth century

[670] Isoc. 15.111; Nep. *Timoth*. 1.1-2
[671] Samons 2000:47
[672] Craterus *FGrHist* 342 F 21. Cornelius Nepos speaks of an Athenian settlement in Samos in the fourth century (*Vit.Timoth*.1.2), and Aristotle explicitly mentions a Samian cleruchy (*Rhet*.2.6.24) as well as recording Craterus' proverb (*Rhet*.2.21.12) but gives no indication of date.

one, since all twenty-five other fragments of Craterus concern the fifth century.[673] Gallo argues that if this were the case the fragment would be recorded in Plutarch, but such arguments *e silentio* are not decisive and Plutarch's omissions and fabrications are many.[674] There is also a fragment of Heracleides Lembus quoting Aristotle's lost *Constitution of the Samians*: "Theogenes, a Samian, clever but profligate and wicked, being exiled from his country and living in Athens with Euripides...persuaded the Athenians to send 2000 [men] to Samos. Having arrived, they expelled everyone".[675] The whole story, which includes his "corruption" of Euripides' wife, may not be true, but if some truth lurks behind the anecdote then it could be that in the mid-fifth century two thousand cleruchs were sent to Samos.[676] Strabo tells a similar story of the sending of 2000 cleruchs, dated to the fourth century because it involves the father of the philosopher Epicurus; there is at least the possibility that the story belongs to the fifth century and refers to the same event.[677]

There is evidence for Athenian cleruchies as early as the turn of the fifth century, in Chalcis and possibly Salamis.[678] Though he does not mention Samos as an example, Plutarch attributes the Athenian habit of setting up of cleruchies specifically to Pericles.[679] He also gives Pericles the motive of using cleruchies effectively as a kind of garrison to prevent allied cities from revolting. A cleruchy with safeguarding and even spying powers is precisely the kind of reassurance that the Athenians will have

[673] Shipley 1987:115; Hornblower 1982:198; Jacoby ad loc.
[674] Gallo 2005:254-5
[675] Arist. fr.611.35 Rose (1886:378)
[676] This is true whether the Euripides in question is the playwright or the proposer of *IG* II² 145 (passed in 404/3), although the latter would have to have been active in public life for a long stretch between 439 and 404.
[677] Strab. 14.1.18. The cleruchy is mentioned in the context of Pericles' and Sophocles' siege of Samos in 439.
[678] Hdt. 5.77.2; *IG* I³ 1. The evidence for Salamis is not strong, since the word for "cleruchs" is restored from –ος and the Athenians can have sent Athenians to Salamis without establishing a cleruchy.
[679] Plut. *Per*.11.5

wanted. Since we know that Pericles was sent to put down the Samian revolt, it is likely that he established a cleruchy to prevent further disturbance. Cleruchies were a useful means of keeping an eye on the local population. They also acted as a lookout, and Samos' location made it a window into the Asiatic mainland. Not only this but cleruchies could damage the strength and wealth of the local ruling class from whom the land was confiscated: when in 506 the Athenians established a cleruchy on the Lelantine plain, the land they installed 4,000 of their own men on had belonged to the *hippobotai*.[680] Evidently cleruchies were also designed to curb the influence of wealthy landowners, who doubtless often also wielded political power.

It is worth noting that *horoi* need not be evidence for a full-on cleruchy, but merely for Athenian interference on such a level as to dedicate allied land to the Athenian imperial cult.[681] One possibility is that Athens confiscated land and rented it back to the Samians to use. Shipley tentatively suggests that those who set up the *horoi* were Athenian settlers, not cleruchs, earning themselves a bad reputation as neighbours and eventually driving the Samians to revolt.[682] These settlers, unlike cleruchs, would not have occupied land confiscated from ousted locals but either bought or rented land in Samian territory. It need not even have taken a revolt for Athens to want to take advantage of Samos' arable land and natural resources. It is, of course, also possible that Athens did not need the excuse of revolt to set up cleruchies, and imposed one on Samos in the early years of the League without any provocation.

Although these are all possibilities, it will be argued that the case for an Athenian cleruchy in Samos at this time is strong. Moreover, the basis of Barron's argument, the use of three-bar sigma, is unconvincing given recent developments

[680] Hdt. 5.77
[681] Sherwin-White points this out in relation to the *horoi* at Cos (1978:38).
[682] Shipley 1983:97

concerning the validity of three-bar sigma as a dating criterion. That "439 is not so very long after 446; but the script…should be earlier than 446" is unpersuasive given that we do not believe in a mysterious, sudden transition from three to four bar sigma in 446 B.C. [683] Other scholars who do associate the *horoi* with a cleruchy have nevertheless refrained from connecting them to the Samian revolt for the same reason, that the epigraphical *terminus ante quem* of 445 ruled the possibility out.[684] The belief that Athens confiscated land after the revolt goes back to Jacoby and even Keil in the nineteenth century, based solely on the evidence of Craterus.[685]

Crucial to Barron's argument is the belief that the *horoi* were carved by Samian, not Athenian, masons. One of the boundary-stones has serifs and late-looking letters. This suggests that it was inscribed later than the fifth century, and thus their memory in later years was not entirely detested. However, this could be an act of piety or a revival of old customs, or as Barron himself admits, might be an antiquarian forgery from the 19th century.[686] Samos remained loyal to Athens to the bitter end, so the re-inscribing of a *horos* could have been an expression of loyalty in the wake of revolution. The oligarchs may have destroyed the original horoi in the summer of 412 due to their association with Athenian rule.[687]

It should first be made clear that the *horoi* are largely written in the Attic dialect, but Barron interprets occasional Ionicisms and quirks of lettering as a sign that these

---

[683] Barron 1964b:39

[684] e.g. Shipley 1987:117 and Hornblower, who suggests that the confiscation of land was a trigger for the revolt, rather than the other way around (1992:183).

[685] Jacoby ad Craterus *FGrHist* 342 F 21; Keil 1895:215-6. They argued that the fragment of Craterus should be dated to the fifth century, and not the fourth, partly because it did not use the term "cleruchs" to describe the colonists; however, we need not expect a fourth century historian – or even Thucydides for that matter - to be technically precise in his definitions. Moreover, there is clearly an irony to the term πάροικος; it does not just mean the neutral "neighbour".

[686] Barron 1964b:37-8; Shipley 1983:97

[687] Smarczyk 1990:87

were Samian masons copying an unfamiliar Attic spelling.[688] To support this hypothesis, Barron suggests that the Samian proposal to set up *temene* to Athena included the directive to write in Attic dialect and script. However, this is only speculative, and if we assume that all masons were working from a template, there is often no telling whether what they wrote was familiar or unfamiliar to them. Even taking into account the Ionicisms, it is not safe to assume that the use of Ionic dialect pre-403 is the mark of an Ionic mason: it was not uncommon for Athens to use Ionic script earlier in proxeny decrees for foreigners and other decrees concerning relations with allies.[689] Tracy finds several examples of cutters writing some inscriptions in Attic script, some in Ionic.[690] Elsewhere there is evidence for Ionic cutters writing for Athenian patrons.[691] Nor does a non-Athenian dialect rule out that the *horoi* were put up under Athens' direction. As Figueira points out in relation to the Coinage Decree, the Athenians were "striving for compliance" and thus it made sense to inscribe in the dialect best understood by the relevant community.[692] Even for an inscription that did not contain as much information as the Coinage Decree, it may still have been preferable to adapt the script to fit the local surroundings. Scripts are not always a reliable indication of origin: a dedication of the Messenians and Naupactians is Doric in dialect but inscribed in the Ionic alphabet, presumably because the recently freed Messenians had no alphabet of their own.[693]

---

[688] Ionicisms include τεμένεος for τεμένους, but on the whole the *horoi* are written in Attic dialect. Barron notes the peculiarity of the delta and thinks this is a sign that the inscribers were not familiar enough with the Attic dialect to know what an Attic delta looks like. Yet the other instances of this unusual form of delta point towards Athens (Smarczyk 1990:76; Threatte 1980:34). The vase painter Douris signed his name with the same dotted delta, although to complicate matters he may have come from Samos (Preuner 1919:2).
[689] Low 2005:105-8
[690] e.g. the cutter of I^3 50 (2016:115-6), the cutter of II^3 1386 (2016:124), the cutter of II^2 17 (2016:158). All of these cutters used Ionic script before the official adoption of Ionic in 403/2.
[691] e.g. on the Athenian acropolis (Keesling 2005).
[692] Figueira 1998:451
[693] Luraghi 2010:82-3

Even if Samians did set up the horoi, this would only further invalidate Barron's adherence to the sigma rule, for there was no such development from three- to four-bar sigmas in fifth century Ionia. In fact, the four-bar sigma is found in Samos as early as the seventh century B.C. As Lilian Jeffery notes, four bar sigma is more common in Ionia generally, with three bar sigma occurring rarely and usually in earlier archaic inscriptions; since some *horoi* feature three bar sigma, this supports the hypothesis that they were set up under Athens' directive.[694] Four-bar sigma is to be found on the aforementioned Samian monument celebrating a victory at Memphis, likely from the 450s.[695] The fact that some *horoi* feature three bar sigma supports the hypothesis that they were set up under Athens' directive. As for why some contain three- and some four-bar sigma, either the consecration of *temene* happened at more than one point in time, or the four-bar were intended to replace the three-bar. The *horos* that has three-bar sigma yet Hellenistic features such as serifs could be an example of such a replacement stone; if it is not a forgery then it could be deliberately archaising.[696]

Polly Low thinks it unlikely that the allied states took charge of inscribing the decrees, since if local masons were used then we would expect to find more local dialects and not just Ionic.[697] Of whatever nationality one believes the masons were, and in whichever dialect they inscribed, what they wrote could still have been written under the direction of Athens. Consider the decree for Colophon (IG I^3 37), which has strong Ionic influence and was paid for by the Colophonians. In the same way, Samian *horoi* written by Ionians may well have been written at Athens' instigation, whether the choice to inscribe in the Ionic dialect was made by Athens or Samos. Other examples

[694] Jeffery 1961:325
[695] For a photograph see Peek 1939:291
[696] *IG* XII.6.1, 246
[697] Low 2005:106

of decrees to be set up in subject cities are numerous and include the decree for Phaselis (IG I^3 10), the Egesta decrees (IG I^3 11,12) and the regulations for Chalcis (IG I^3 40).

Samos is not the only Athenian ally on whose soil such *horoi* have been found: similar *horoi* have been found at Cos, Aegina and Chalcis. It seems too much of a coincidence that in all these places there was unrest in the 440s.[698] Petrological examination of the Coan *horos* has revealed that the stone probably did not come from Cos itself, raising the possibility that it was imported by the Athenians.[699] Barron similarly argued for the Coan inscription that the initiative to inscribe was local, yet his main argument – that angular rho betrays an early date - is invalidated by Pritchett's photograph of the stone, which clearly shows rounded rho.[700] Meanwhile for Aegina, Irene Polinskaya argues persuasively that the best context for these *horoi* is during the Peloponnesian War, after Athens had expelled the Aeginetans and populated the island with its own citizens.[701] The five boundary stones were originally dated separately on the basis of their different sigmas, despite all bearing identical texts. In response to the argument that the Aeginetan *horoi* do not bear the epithet Ἀθηνῶν μεδέουσα (protectress of Athens) as those found in other locations do, and thus should be treated differently, Polinskaya points out that the term would be redundant in a place inhabited by Athenians, as Aegina was after 431.[702] A date post-431 for all five stones is the most economical given the evidence: we have no evidence for the confiscation of land in Aegina after its defeat in 457, but several sources mention such confiscation during the

[698] Shipley 1987:115-6; Gallo 2005:251. Sherwin-White connects those at Cos with Alcibiades' involvement there in 412 (1978:35-9).
[699] Because most *horoi* have been found at Samos, it has generally been assumed that the *horos* found at Cos was transported there from Samos; this was then supported by the petrological findings (Georgiades & Pritchett 1965:423). Alternatively, the stone may have been imported before its use was decided on, or it may not have been imported at all; the findings are not certain.
[700] Barron 1964b43; Georgiades & Pritchett 1965:440 fig.15
[701] Polinskaya 2009 contra Barron 1983
[702] Polinskaya 2009:258

Peloponnesian War proper.[703] Lastly, the *horos* found in Chalcis contains no epithet for Athena, so we cannot rule out the possibility that the land is dedicated to a local Athena; however, the testimony of Aelian that the Athenians divided most of Chalcis' land into two thousand *kleroi* and dedicated a *temene* to Athena supports the case for a cleruchy.[704] It is most natural to find a single explanation for these *horoi* found in different allied locations, rather than supposing that the others indicate Athenian confiscation of land, while those at Samos indicate a spontaneous Samian display of solidarity.

Not all of the *temene* found were dedicated to Athena; some were dedicated to Ion, others to the eponymous heroes Ἀθήνηθεν. This surely indicates that these are the eponymous heroes of Athens rather than Samos; if it referred to the four sons of Ion who were also eponymous at Samos, there would be no need to point out that these originally hailed from Athens because this was well-known.[705] There is, moreover, no direct evidence that the Samian tribes were named after the Athenian heroes Geleon, Hoples, Aegicores and Argades in the fifth century or any time before the Hellenistic period.

The indirect evidence is a copy of a pair of late Hellenistic inscriptions from Samos' colony Perinthus that might record three of the Ionic tribes if its original editor mistranscribed them all.[706] It is a list of names grouped under different headings. The inscription no longer survives but Mordtmann edited the headings Τελεῦντες (l.28), Ωρεῖς (l.37) and Αἰγικοι (l.44) to Γελέοντες, Βωρεῖς and Αἰγικορεῖς. It makes some sense to restore known tribal names in the place of unknown ethnics, but at least two of

[703] Plut.*Per*.34.1; Diod. 12.44.2; Strab. 8.6.16
[704] Ael.*VH*.6.1
[705] Contra Barron 1964b:40 and Roussell 1976:212
[706] Mordtmann 1878:302-3

the other names (Macedonians, Acarnanians) are known ethnics so we may not be dealing with tribes at all. It is true that some tribes were named after places, and in Samos itself in Hellenistic times a *chiliastes* was named after Epidaurus.[707] Macedonia and Acarnania are very well-known place-names; Castalia is less so but "Castalians" turn up as a heading in a separate list from Samos.[708] In this extant inscription the Castalians admittedly must be a tribe rather than a town because it is some kind of citizen register. Three other columns are headed by "Mycalians", "Athenians" and "Astypalaeans (?), the larger [unit] of the Euboeans", the latter of which confirms that they must be tribes even though at first sight they look like ethnics. The evidence is inconclusive but the fact remains that not a single Ionic tribe survives in the inscription unrestored. Therefore Teleuntes, Oreis and Aegicoi are just as likely to be otherwise unattested Thracian ethnics as otherwise unattested Samian tribal names. In an inscription with three attested ethnics and not a single unrestored tribal name, the weight of the evidence is against Mordtmann's interpretation. Even if his interpretation were correct, this would only mean that Perinthus had the Ionic tribes around the 3rd to 1st century B.C.

For Samos itself the only literary evidence comes from a fragment of an author of dubious origin and date: Themistagoras the Ephesian writes that there were two tribes, Schesia and Astypalaia.[709] Inscriptional evidence from the late fourth century partly confirms this with a tribe called either Chesia or Chesion.[710] In the same inscription Oinopes appears as a subdivision (*chiliastys*) of a tribe rather than a tribe. None of this provides positive evidence that Samos' eponymous heroes were the sons

[707] Roussel 1976:215; *IG* XII,6 1:132
[708] *IG* XII,6 1:202
[709] Müller 1851:512; Roussel 1976:212
[710] *IG* XII,6 1:56

of Ion in the fifth century. Roussel notes that although it seems that some towns of the Ionian dodecapolis and their colonies had variations on the Ionian "tetraphylie", the huge diversity of the evidence forbids the conclusion that they all started out with only four tribes named Geleontes, Hopletheis, Aegicoreis and Argadeis.[711] We have perhaps taken Euripides too literally when he has Athena proclaim that Ion "will have four sons, from one stock, and they will give their names to the land and the tribes of men in the land".[712]

The only other evidence is from mid-fifth century Miletus, which as will be discussed certainly did have the old Ionic tribes, but this proves nothing conclusive about Samos.[713] Whatever the tribes of Samos were at the time, the natural way to interpret Ἀθήνηθεν (from Athens) is that these are Athens' eponymous heroes, rather than Samos'. Even if it means "our eponymous heroes from Athens", this would still mean that a conscious decision was made to draw attention to Samos' debt to its ally. At the very least it suggests that the impetus to erect the *horoi* came from Athens and that the dedicator wanted to emphasise Samos' Athenian origin.

In classical Athens *horoi* were generally associated with debt. Hence, Solon boasts that he lifted the *horoi* that had been fixed everywhere and as a result freed the earth that had once been in slavery.[714] Whether these *horoi* were literal or metaphorical, this is probably a reference to his cancelling debt secured on land, which had previously effectively enslaved peasants.[715] Ober provides an alternative theory that in archaic times *horoi* could have limited the movement of slaves and non-Eupatrids by marking

[711] Roussel 1976:213
[712] Eurip. *Ion*. 1575-8
[713] *I. Milet* 1.3 n.133.1-4
[714] Solon fr. 36 West l.3-7
[715] Aristot. *Ath. Pol.* 6.1; Plut. *Sol.* 15-16

out areas that they could not enter.[716] Yet he admits that this is only speculative, and Aristotle, who preserves the fragment, says that it is about the cancellation of debt and shaking-off of burdens (σεισάχθεια).[717] Elsewhere he explicitly says that getting rid of *horoi* liberated men from slavery.[718] The specifics of what kind of debt *horoi* marked out and what Solon achieved in getting rid of them are much discussed, but that *horoi* indicated debt or subservience at all is not a matter of debate.[719]

There is no disputing that by the fourth century, *horoi* had come to signify outstanding debt that might affect the value of a property. Demosthenes, wanting to demonstrate the wealth of his opponent Phaenippus, declares that he went around his entire estate and found not a single *horos*. "I instructed Phaenippus," he continues, "if he said there were any, to speak up and show them, lest some debt existing against the property be brought to light later on."[720] Demosthenes is speaking at some time in the mid-fourth century and by then *horoi* had developed the specific function of marking out land that had been seized as debt or as a kind of mortgage, to warn third parties against trying to buy or lend the property. Whether or not *horoi* already had such a function in the fifth century, they were nevertheless a way of marking out outstanding debts from the time of Solon. Even on Ober's interpretation, the *horos* is a way of ensuring that certain people do not enter a space that they are not entitled to enter.[721] Thus, I find it hard to believe, as Barron does, that the Samians erected them of their own accord out of love for Athens.

[716] Ober 2005:194
[717] Aristot. *Ath. Pol.* 6.1
[718] Aristot. *Ath. Pol.* 12.4
[719] e.g. de Ste Croix 2004:109-28
[720] Dem. 42.5
[721] Ober 2005:186, 194

It seems more than coincidence that all three types of *horos* found reveal Athenian control in some way. One dedicates land to Athens' patron deity, another dedicates land to the eponymous heroes specifically from Athens, and yet another dedicates land to the Athenian founder of Ionia, Ion.[722] That the Athenians might have wished to stress Ionian dependence on, and descent from, Athens after a period of upheaval makes perfect sense. In the tradition that Pausanias inherited, the Athenian Androclus (not Neleus) is specifically credited with conquering Samos.[723] Certainly, in the fifth century it was commonplace that the Ionians were originally descended from Athens, whether via Neleus, Androclus or Ion.[724] Thucydides and Herodotus both state it as fact a number of times.[725] The idea that Ionia owed its very existence to Athens was perhaps not purely a fifth-century construct, for it is hinted at in older sources including an aforementioned fragment of Solon.[726] Homer appears to equate the Ionians with the Athenians, though he says nothing of who came first.[727] According to Aristotle, the archaic poet and lawmaker calls Athens "Ionia's oldest land", which is an "appeal to citizens to see their city as unique in its prestige and united in their alleged ethnic identity" – and asserts that Athenians are the original Ionians.[728] Aristotle also passes down various traditions that Ion first founded Athens, organised its constitution and gave the Athenians the name "Ionians".[729] All these traditions reinforce the Athenian-ness of Ionia's eponymous founder. Herodotus with similar effect states that the

[722] *IG* I^3 1496, 1497, 1498, 1499
[723] Paus. 7.2.8
[724] Neleus: Hellanicus *FGrHist* 4 F 125, Hellanicus *FGrHist* 323A F 23 Suda s.v. Πανύασις, Aelian *VH* 8.5; Androclus: Strab. 14.1.3 = Pherecydes *FGrHist* 3 F 155; multiple sons of Codrus: Hdt. 1.146-7; Paus. 7.2.1, Plut. *De Gloria* 7; Ion: Vell. Pat. 1.4.3; Eurip. *Ion*. 74.
[725] Hdt. 1.147, 9.106.3; Thuc. 1.6.3, 1.12.4, 7.57.4
[726]Aristot. *Ath. Pol.* 5.2 = Solon fr.4
[727] Hom. *Il*. 13.685-9
[728] Rose 2012:330
[729] Aristot. *Ath. Pol.* 41.2; Aristot. *Ath. Pol.* Fr. 1

Athenians used to be called Ionians when Ion commanded their army.[730] Strabo says that in ancient times Attica was called Ionia and the Attic people were called Ionians; indeed, the Ionians were ”of Athenian descent” (ἐξ Ἀθηναίων τὸ γένος ὄντες).[731]

For our purposes it does not matter when or whence the myth originated. Nor does it matter whether the similarities between Athenians and Ionians can best be explained by a common origin, or even an Ionian origin.[732] What matters is that the Athenians evidently capitalised on the myth of Attic colonisation in order to reinforce their authority over the Ionian cities, especially ones that had recently rejected such authority. Welwei points out that neither Homer nor Hesiod mentions the sons of Codrus or Neleus ruling in Ionia, which leaves open the possibility that the claim was a fifth-century construct aimed at legitimating Athens' rule in Ionia.[733] It makes sense that the Athenians were particularly keen to advertise this claim after the formation of the Delian League and in the build-up to the Peloponnesian War, at a time when it was a useful means of justifying their tightening grip on the allies. Herodotus notes that when the Greeks assembled at Samos to discuss what to do with the Ionians, the Athenians did not like the Spartans' suggestion in part because they "disliked allowing the Peloponnesians to determine the fate of their own colonies (τῶν σφετερέων ἀποικιέων)".[734] By 478 – or a few decades later if Herodotus is retrojecting a contemporary attitude - Athens viewed the Ionian cities as its colonies. Around 412, when Athens was rapidly losing control of all the Ionian allies except for Samos, Ionia's

[730] Hdt. 8.44.2
[731] Strab. 8.1.2, 8.7.1, 9.1.5
[732] Connor 1993
[733] Welwei 1992:54
[734] Hdt. 9.106.3

Athenian origins and Athenian autochthony were once again proclaimed in Euripides' *Ion*.[735]

If the impetus to set up these boundary markers came from Athens, what was their message? Practically speaking, *horoi* mark the property of an absentee landlord. In the case of those dedicated to Athena, this meant that Athens' patron goddess had a claim to the allies' land in that she was their figurative landlady. In the case of the *horoi* marking out land belonging to Ion and the eponymous heroes, the message is less straightfoward. Some, like Smarczyk, have argued that their main purpose was to stress the unity of the Ionians through their common history.[736] This was certainly a part of it. Yet I think that Bremmer is right to push this interpretation further and note that the particular emphasis on Athens and Athena "makes it likely that Ion was meant to personify here the dependence of the Ionians on their Athenian ancestor".[737] Euripides' *Ion* sends a strong message that Athens and Ionia do not just have a common heritage: Athens *is* Ionia's heritage.[738] At the very opening of the play, Ion is proclaimed to be Asia's coloniser, its κτίστωρ.[739] The *horoi* in Samos and elsewhere were likely erected after these cities had caused Athens trouble and had land confiscated for cleruchies. The message of these *horoi*, then, was not only that Athens and Ionia had a shared past – though this was surely emphasised - but that Athens was the rightful coloniser of Ionia.

At Lemnos, which was close enough to Samos as to have held its hostages for safekeeping after the revolt, *horoi* from the fifth and fourth century have been found.[740]

[735] Eurip. *Ion*. 74, 267-8, 589-90, 1571-1605
[736] Smarczyk 1990:134
[737] Bremmer 1997:12
[738] Eurip. *Ion*. 1571-1605
[739] Eurip. *Ion*. 74
[740] Finley 1952:147-9

The *horoi* from the fifth century are unfortunately only known to us from drawings, but nevertheless they display fifth century lettering. The presence of Athenian names and demotics on some of the stones indicate an Athenian cleruchy on the island at some point in the fifth century. Fragments of an Athenian inscription dated to 387/6 also discuss the leasing of land to cleruchs on the island.[741] Thus at Lemnos, as at Aegina and Chalcis, the *horoi* found are likely a result of Athenian cleruchies.

In summary, it seems sensible to retain association of the Samian *horoi* with the aftermath of the Samian revolt. The hypothesis that Athens confiscated Samian land and dedicated a portion of it to the gods is in keeping with known Athenian practice in Mytilene, Chalcis and Aegina. Dedicating a portion of the land specifically to Athenian gods served to legitimise Athenian control of it. Athens was able to generate a profit from the confiscated land, and in the case of Samos this may have been a substitute for the burden of tribute, as happened at Mytilene; we will return to this later. Confiscation of land from the main offenders – the landed gentry - may well have been deemed an appropriate punishment, and one that would simultaneously curtail their power.[742] Perhaps a cleruchy was imposed as part of war reparations, which would explain why, whenever the indemnity was paid off, the island still did not pay tribute.[743] Whether the *horoi* belong to 439 or c.450, there is not enough evidence to show that a democracy prevailed at Samos in the period 469-54.

Indeed, Samos never makes it onto the tribute lists, because before 440 it was contributing ships rather than cash. Its absence from the lists is a reminder that absence does not equal defection or even lack of payment; there are many reasons why a state

[741] EM 6916, 6904, 6905, 12964
[742] Gallo 2005:251-2
[743] Nesselhauf 1933:138-9

might not appear on the lists in their present state.[744] Reference to payment from Samos is made in the decree appointing tribute collectors from 426 B.C.; from this it is inferred that Samos was still paying its indemnity fourteen years on.[745] The epigraphic evidence tells us that Samos was paying something – whether indemnity or regular tribute – until at least 414/3, and Thucydides lists Samos as a tribute-paying subject during the Sicilian Expedition.[746] It is even possible that the money "from the Samians" recorded in the payments from the treasury of Athena was revenue from a cleruchy on the island; otherwise it is a mystery what these sporadic payments between 426/5 and 410/9 are.[747] Since we have evidence for a cleruchy and none for regular tribute aside from Thucydides, it is more likely that Samos' contribution to the costs of the empire came in the form of that dreaded imperial colony. If Athens sent cleruchs as settlers to Samos, these will have replaced the ringleaders of the revolt who must have been killed or at least exiled – again, similarly to Mytilene, but on a far smaller scale.[748]

The sources agree that Pericles once again took hostages;[749] no mention is made of a garrison but it would be surprising if none were reinstated. Athens needed a guarantee of Samos' loyalty, no matter what its constitution. The treaty between Athens and Samos contains an oath to be sworn by the Samians, another way of securing their

[744] Neither Amphipolis nor Naupactus ever shows up on the lists, although they are known to have contributed resources to the war (Samons 2000:103).
[745] *IG* I^3 68.21-5. The same is inferred for Thera, who disappears from the *ATL* after 429/8 (*IG* I^3 282) and does not reappear until 418/7 (*IG* I^3 287).
[746] *IG* I^3 371; Thuc. 7.57.4. Thucydides implies that Samos is paying regular tribute by including it in a list of allies paying *phoros*.
[747] *IG* I^3 369-371, 375
[748] Smarczyk believes that there will have been too many oligarchs to expel or kill all of them, so confiscation of their land was a means of control (1990:82).
[749] Thuc. 1.117.3, Plut.*Per*.28.1. Diodorus (12.28.3) says that Pericles "punished those responsible" for the revolt, which is not unlikely.

loyalty.[750] Samos may also have lost some of its dependencies, although the evidence is flimsy.[751]

Samian autonomy

It was also likely in the aftermath of the revolt that Samos lost its autonomy. The scope of the word is debated but certainly it forfeited its walls and ships and the freedom to choose its own constitution. This is evident from Athens' imposition of a democracy, and from the later decree granting Samian autonomy, which specifies that Samos may choose its own constitution.[752] In the decree of 412, Samian courts are explicitly granted control over cases involving death, exile and confiscation of property, suggesting that this was also a privilege previously forfeited.[753] For the Athenians to reward Samos with autonomy in 412, it must have lost the privilege at some point previously. If Samos officially lost its autonomy in 439, this would also explain why Thucydides singles out only Lesbos and Chios as autonomous in the Mytileneans' speech during their revolt.[754] What this passage of Thucydides also suggests is that contributing ships rather than tribute formed a large part of what it meant for a state to be autonomous. After its revolt, Samos continued to contribute ships but crucially was forced to pay indemnity.

Symbolically, having to hand over their ships and instead pay an indemnity must have brought home to the Samians their loss of independence. In Thucydides' eyes at least, autonomy was strongly tied to the contribution of ships rather than money. We know from Aristotle that Samos, Lesbos and Chios were all originally ship-contributors. Yet note how – presumably with hindsight after the Samian rebellion -

[750] *IG* I^3 48.16ff.
[751] Samos may have lost Amorgos but it is difficult to tell, since the latter only appears on the tribute lists after 434/3 (*IG* I^3 278). See Gallo 2005:254 contra Shipley 1987:118
[752] *IG* I^3 127
[753] *IG* I^3 96.7-8
[754] Thuc. 3.10.5

Thucydides says that the Athenians stripped the allies of their power by making them pay tribute, with the exception of Lesbos and Chios who retained their own ships.[755] It is noteworthy that Thucydides never uses the word autonomous to describe Samos. When the Mytileneans complain of losing their autonomy, they say that their and Chios' ability to send their own contingents made them autonomous and free at least in name.[756] In Thucydides' narrative of the Sicilian Expedition, only the Chians are described as "autonomous, paying no tribute but furnishing ships".[757] The Samians are listed in a group that is described as ὑπήκοοι καὶ φόρου ὑποτελεῖς, "subjects and tributary". In this passage, furnishing ships instead of tribute appears almost synonymous with having autonomy. A similar claim is made of Chios and Methymna elsewhere.[758] If Thucydides is to be believed, Samos' autonomy may originally have been tied up with its privileged status as a ship contributor rather than a tribute payer. Elsewhere he claims that the allies' decision to pay tribute instead of furnishing ships left them incapable of revolt, again associating the contribution of ships with independence.[759]

de Ste Croix has argued that the distinction that Thucydides makes between tribute-paying and ship-contributing allies is a false one.[760] He points out that Thucydides is able to state that the Boeotians "regained their autonomy" (αὐτόνομοι πάλιν ἐγένοντο) in 447/6 even though they are not known ever to have paid tribute.[761] Thus their autonomy must have been based on something other than not paying tribute. It is clear that not paying tribute cannot have been the sole criterion determining

[755] Thuc. 1.19
[756] Thuc. 3.10.5
[757] Thuc. 7.57.4
[758] Thuc. 6.85.2
[759] Thuc. 1.99
[760] de Ste Croix 1954:249-54
[761] Thuc. 1.113.4

whether a town was autonomous, but at the same time the evidence of Thucydides suggests that in the allies' eyes there was a strong link between the two. Even from Thucydides it is evident that autonomy must have meant more than this, for elsewhere in his *History*, the terms of the Peace of Nicias include both the right of the allies to be autonomous and the right of the Athenians to claim tribute from them.[762] Xenophon similarly finds no contradiction in having Tissaphernes demand that the cities in Asia, remaining autonomous, should pay him the ancient tribute: τὰς δ' ἐν τῇ Ἀσίᾳ πόλεις αὐτονόμους οὔσας τὸν ἀρχαῖον δασμὸν αὐτῷ ἀποφέρειν.[763] Thus although the privilege of contributing ships rather than tribute seems to have symbolised independence for the allies, it is not all that autonomy meant.

Several times in Thucydides, autonomous appears to mean "free to govern itself". The Mytileneans suggest that being autonomous meant having an equal vote with the Athenians in decisions of the Delian League.[764] Cleon in his counterargument points out that the Mytileneans had always been autonomous and held in the highest honour (τιμώμενοι ἐς τὰ πρῶτα) by the Athenians.[765] By doing so, he implies that for the Athenians an autonomous ally was one they respected enough to refrain from making decisions on its behalf. Most tellingly, Pericles in his funeral oration states that if inactive men were to live autonomously by themselves (ἐπὶ σφῶν αὐτῶν αὐτόνομοι), they would ruin a state.[766] Here, autonomy has to do with creating one's own laws and norms. In all of these passages, autonomy means something slightly different yet the common thread that runs through them all is the freedom to make one's own decisions.

[762] Thuc. 5.18.5
[763] Xen. *Hell.* 3.4.25
[764] Thuc. 3.11.1-4
[765] Thuc. 3.39.2
[766] Thuc. 2.63.3

In one passage of Thucydides concerning Samos, autonomy has to do with ownership rather than decision-making. Thucydides explains that the *demos* is able to redistribute land confiscated from the Geomoroi, "the Athenians having now granted them autonomy on the basis that their loyalty was secure".[767] We will return to this passage in due course but note that here it is implied that with autonomy came full possession of the Samians' own land. For Aristotle the key issues seem to have been whether a town was allowed to keep its own government and rule its own dependencies, for this is how he describes Lesbos, Chios and Samos.[768] Thus, according to Aristotle autonomy is about both self-government and ownership.

A narrow definition of autonomy would cover only a state's legal and judiciary system, so that it was free to write its own laws and decide (the majority of) its own lawsuits. A broader form of autonomy would cover also political and military affairs and the "potential of establishing one's own norms".[769] There might have been additional guarantees of autonomy that were more specific to the Delian League, such as not being subject to cleruchies or tribute. For our purposes, the crux of the issue is whether autonomy meant that a town could choose its own constitution. Unfortunately no firm conclusion can be reached. It is evident that after Samos' revolt it lost the right to choose its own constitution, for the Athenians immediately imposed a democracy on the island. Once Samos regained its autonomy in 412, it may have had that right reinstated. Yet using the events of 412 to determine the definition of autonomy and vice versa is necessarily circular. Nor is it likely that there was a precise definition of autonomy to which the Athenians adhered when granting or rescinding it. As we have seen, Thucydides repeatedly equates autonomy with the freedom to provide ships

[767] Thuc. 8.21
[768] Aristot. *Ath. Pol*. 24.2
[769] Whitehead 1993:325

towards the war effort, and yet he himself describes tribute-paying allies as autonomous.

Public opinion in Samos

It is difficult to say how representative of the whole island's wishes the Samian revolt was. Herodotus several times draws attention to close ties between the Samians and the Spartans in the archaic period; their aristocracies appear to have had a particularly close connection.[770] Perhaps the Samian oligarchs were sympathetic to the Spartan cause for this historic reason; certainly, the oligarchs had more reason to be pro-Sparta than the supporters of democracy. Diodorus says that *stasis* arose because one group in Samos were satisfied with democracy and the other wanted aristocracy.[771] He states that the oligarchs prevailed easily and drove their opponents out of the city, but only he records these details. There is no sign in other sources of tensions among citizens themselves during the revolt – aside from those who accompanied the Milesians to Athens - but this does not mean that the whole citizenry was on board, if indeed any democrats were still present. It is hard to discern "whether a *demos* is acting freely or under compulsion, since a determined minority…may be able to coerce the docile majority into compliance with its wishes."[772] Passive acquiescence is not the same as support. This is the very problem the Athenians encounter in the aftermath of the Mytilenean revolt in 427. [773] Nevertheless, Legon concludes that the *demos* was pro-oligarchy and independence against democracy during the period of the siege. However, it is not true that there was no resistance to the rebellion. The scholiast to Aristophanes' *Wasps* identifies a man who pretended that he had been "the first to expose the Samian plot"

[770] Hdt. 1.70, 3.46, 3.55, 9.90
[771] Diod. 12.27.3
[772] Legon 1972:153
[773] Thuc. 3.47.2-3

as a certain Carystion, a genuine traitor to the Samian cause. It is worth quoting the scholiast in full because his words have sometimes been misinterpreted:[774]

Milesii cum Samiis bellum gesserunt, et quum inferiores essent, accersiverunt auxilium Atheniensium, qui quadraginta navibus cum imperatore Pericle Xanthippi filio missis Samo urbe potiti sunt, et statum popularem constituerunt, obsidibus acceptis et Lemni collocatis. Postea quum Samii defecissent ad regem barbarum, Persarum puto, rursum Athenienses duce eodem Pericle triremes bellicas plures instruxerunt et beneficio Carystionis cuiusdam, qui consilium ipsis Samiorum aperuit, victores evaserunt et ad deditionem murorumque destructionem Samum coegerunt.

The Milesians, when they were waging war with the Samians and were faring worse, sought the help of the Athenians, who sent 40 ships with Pericles son of Xanthippus as general to Samos and gained hold of the city, and established popular government, having taken hostages and deposited them on Lemnos. Later, when the Samians defected to a barbarian king, the king of the Persians I believe, the Athenians again with the same Pericles as general fitted out many war triremes and with the help of a certain Carystion, who exposed to them the Samian plan, they emerged the victors and forced the Samians to give up their walls and destroyed Samos.

In the scholiast's account this Carystion only appears after Samos has properly revolted and after Pericles has gone back for the second time, so he cannot be one of the Samians who went to Athens in the early stages of the disagreement about Priene. The oft-misinterpreted phrase is *consilium...aperuit*, which cannot mean that Carystion revealed a secret Samian plan to revolt, because by the time he is introduced to the narrative Samos is already in open revolt. According to the scholiast, Carystion helped

[774] Scholia in Ar. *Wasps* 283 (Dindorf 1820:364)

the Athenians to regain power once Samos had already revolted; he did not so much uncover a secret plot as help the Athenians by exposing a plan that was already underway. This is, of course, if Carystion is historical; the testimony of much later scholia cannot always be relied on. A sculpture group featuring Athena (rather than Samian Hera), Heracles and Zeus may have been set up by supporters of Athens at the end of the uprising; this is more tentative evidence that there were some dissenters on the island.[775] Indecisive evidence though this may be, it is at least a reminder that with so little to go on it is difficult to draw firm conclusions.

The Athenian treaty with Samos (IG I^3 48) aids our understanding of Athens' treatment of the island. Unfortunately, of the first 15 lines only the occasional word is preserved. It is disputed whether the bottom two fragments belong to the top two; since these fragments only contain a list of *strategoi* (generals), the dispute hardly affects our interpretation of the treaty's contents.[776] Probable mention of the Peloponnese or Peloponnesians in line 7 makes it likely that the Samians did seek aid from Sparta, as the Corinthians claim. That the Samians reached beyond Pissouthnes for Spartan help with such a big undertaking is not surprising. Moreover, Samos and Sparta had historic ties of friendship going back centuries, especially between the aristocrats who in Samos were the driving force behind the uprising. As previously discussed, Sparta had likely already voted to help Samos, but was blocked from doing so by its allies.[777] Mention of Lemnos must have to do with the hostages stored there by the Athenians and recovered by the Samians. What happened to them after being handed over to Pissouthnes is

[775] Strab. 14.1.4; Rhodes 2010:189
[776] Fornara 1979; Bridges 1980
[777] Cartledge 1982:262

unknown; presumably they were freed, to avoid an unnecessary strain on Persian-Athenian relations.[778]

The remainder of the stele is also fragmentary but the standard oath to be sworn by rebellious allies can with some safety be restored. The editors of the *ATL* restored fragment C to contain two oaths, by the Athenians and the Samians respectively; this would remarkably mean that the Athenians swore an oath of loyalty to the Samians after their revolt.[779] It would also be remarkable to find the Athenians' oath placed after the Samians', rather than before.[780] It is true that the Athenian decree concerning Chalcis includes an oath to be sworn by the Athenians, but this precedes the Chalcidians' oath and it is not an oath to love the Chalcidian *demos* (people) but rather a guarantee *not* to do certain things such as expel or kill Chalcidians without Athens' permission.[781] Moreover, only the *boule* (Council) and judges are required to swear the oath, whereas the restored Athenian oath in the decree for Samos is to be sworn by all the Athenians. Landucci Gattinoni identifies a concern for Samos' safety in the reference to Lemnos and Sparta, and thus believes that the Athenians must have sworn an oath to protect Samos against similar outside threats.[782] However, reference to outside threats may have been made more as a warning not to succumb to them than as a promise to look after the Samians against them. In the regulations for Erythrae we find just this: it is part of the subdued Erythraeans' oath not to receive any exiles or

[778] Eddy notes that the problem of the hostages might have been discussed in the embassy to the Great King in 437/6, referred to at Aristoph.*Ach.*66 (1973:252).
[779] *ATL* II, D 18
[780] Bolmarcich 2009:51 with n.25
[781] *IG* I^3 40.3-16
[782] Landucci Gattinoni 1999:123

Medisers.[783] Alternatively, since the first set of oaths is highly restored, it may have been that only the Samians had to swear allegiance.[784]

It is hard to imagine that the Athenians bothered to swear an oath of loyalty to an ally that had just rebelled, and since there is no similar instance of this occurring in an Athenian decree regarding an ally, it is best to assume that only the Samians swore allegiance. They swore allegiance first to Athens (l.16-21) and then to Samos and the Samian people (l.21-3?). If correctly restored, there is no mention of the allies in the oath; allegiance is sworn to Athens and Athens only. This is different to the regulations for Erythrae, traditionally dated to 454/3, which demand allegiance to "Athens and the allies".[785] From this it has been argued that as Athens became more openly imperialistic, it abandoned the need to even pay lip service to the allies when making decisions on their behalf. The Peace of Callias was often considered the turning point when Athens openly admitted that the purpose of the Delian League had changed. However, the line length of the decree for Samos is a matter of dispute. Bolmarcich argues that the line length should be 44 letters, rather than the accepted 35; this would allow for the oath to be less "short and truncated."[786] The lines containing the oath are fragmentary enough for there to be disagreement about who is swearing what, so they are certainly fragmentary enough to potentially contain more references to the allies than have been included in the restoration. Moreover, the allies are still mentioned in the previous oath not to revolt (l.19), so it is not true that they are overlooked altogether. The dating of the regulations for Erythrae will be questioned in its relevant chapter, but for now it suffices to note that there need not be a definitive year after which Athens pursued a

[783] *IG* I^3 14.25-7
[784] Fornara 1979:17-8
[785] *IG* I^3 14.22-4
[786] Bolmarcich 2009:50

policy of naked imperialism. Moreover, the kind of imperialism exhibited in the regulations for Samos might also be found long before and long after the decree was issued.

The oath could be evidence that a democracy was not restored after the revolt, for Quinn argues that it would be redundant if those who made the oath of allegiance to the democracy were a βουλή of loyal democrats.[787] Yet if they were swearing on behalf of the whole *demos*, or indeed if the *demos* itself were to take the oath, there certainly was meaning in an oath to remain loyal to the state from which they had recently rebelled. A parallel for having all the adult males of a rebellious ally swear loyalty can be found in the Chalcis decree.[788] This would then be a "standard precautionary measure against possible counter-revolution", a way of ensuring that the community was bound by oath to uphold and support the democracy.[789] This would have been necessary given how much resistance to democracy is recorded in the sources, from those who tried to bribe Pericles to those who succeeded in bringing in Pissouthnes. The authors of the *ATL* assume that democracy was restored, but their argument rests largely on the restoration [τοι δέμοι τοι] Σαμίον ([the people of] the Samians).[790] Since it is equally plausible that the more neutral word πόλει (city), or even the more oligarchic βολεῖ (council) fits the space indicating the Samian constitution, the argument is not decisive.[791]

[787] Quinn 1981:15; Ostwald 2009:60. Along these lines Ostwald argues that the βουλή was more likely to be oligarchic.
[788] *IG* I^3 40.32-3
[789] Fornara 1979:18
[790] Meritt, McGregor & Wade-Gery 1950:151-3
[791] Quinn 1981:116; Ostwald 2009:60. Welwei even argues that *demos* need not mean "democratic populace" but just "populace" (1986:188).

The Geomoroi and Samian democracy

What other evidence do we have of Samos' constitution after the revolt? Diodorus says that the democracy was restored, but not many historians have followed him.[792] It has even been suggested that only in (mistaken) hindsight did Thucydides interpret Athens' intervention as evidence for the establishment of a democracy.[793] Yet it seems foolish to reject the little reliable evidence that we have. Thucydides is not infallible but he has a keen interest in the development of Athenian imperialism, of which tampering with allies' constitutions is a feature. Meiggs takes the "unswerving loyalty of the Samian democrats even after the Syracusan disaster" as evidence that a democracy had been securely in place since 439: on this reasoning, Samos' unusual loyalty in the face of adversity was the result of years of democratic alignment with Athens.[794] Quinn, on the other hand, questions Diodorus' reliability as a historian, and takes Thucydides' silence as decisive.[795] The argument of Thucydides' silence works both ways: he "may expect us to understand that [the previous arrangements] were repeated as a matter of course, or that they were reversed because of their failure, equally as a matter of course".[796] Only two chapters previously, when the Athenians lost the war at Coronea to the oligarchic exiles who had taken over parts of Boeotia, Thucydides explicitly says that the Boeotians regained their autonomy.[797] One wonders what Thucydides' vagueness about how the Athenians left Samos is meant to imply. Perhaps he thought the outcome was obvious, or perhaps he was less interested in Samos' constitution than in the overall

[792] Diod. 12.28.4. Busolt takes Diodorus at face value: "Inbezug auf die staatliche Neuordnung in Samos ist nichts weiter bekannt, als dass die Athener natürlich die Regierung der aufständischen Oligarchen beseitigten und die Demokratie wiederherstellten" (1885:553 with n.2).
[793] Welwei 1986:188
[794] Meiggs 1972:171
[795] Quinn 1981:13
[796] Hornblower 1991:192
[797] Thuc. 1.113.4

lesson of Athenian power and imperialism before the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War.

Athenian interference in Boeotia is worth further consideration here. The Old Oligarch lists Boeotia as one of the places in which Athens supported an oligarchy to its disadvantage, though it is not clear when.[798] It is noteworthy that the Old Oligarch uses this and the case of Miletus as exceptions that prove the norm of Athenian promotion of democracy. Aristotle claims that after the battle of Oenophyta in 456, a (short-lived) democracy was installed at Thebes; presumably a victorious Athens was behind this change of government.[799] This would suggest not only that Athens interfered in favour of democracy well before the death of Pericles, but also that Thucydides is capable of not recording such interference.[800] Later on, in 424, Athenians got involved once again in trying to set up a democracy on the Athenian model in Boeotia; this Thucydides does note.[801] The situations in Boeotia and Samos contain notable similarities: in both places a democracy is set up in the midst of factional trouble, at the instigation of "certain men" from the area who want to bring in democracy. In the context of Athens' initial installation of a democracy and Athens' tendency to support

[798] [Xen] *Ath.Pol.* 3.10-11. It is not easy to pin a date down; to avoid contradiction with Aristotle, as early as some unrecorded time between 497 and 462 has been suggested (Larsen 1960:17 n.2). It is not impossible that Athens set up a democracy and at a later time supported an oligarchy (Simonton 2017b:203). Alternatively – but contradicting Aristotle - perhaps Athens supported an oligarchy after Oenophyta and democracy after Coronea (Welwei 1986:182).

[799] Aristot. *Pol*. 5.1302b

[800] The very fact of large numbers of oligarchic exiles at Orchomenus, Chaeronea and "other places of Boeotia" fighting the Athenians at Coronea suggests widespread democracy in Boeotia by 447 B.C. Thuc.1.108.2 merely states that Athens gained control of (ἐκράτησαν) Boeotia without mentioning a change of constitution. Ostwald explains away Athens' likely involvement in the change from oligarchy to democracy by saying that it "did not take place until the βέλτιστοι had proved themselves untrustworthy to Athens" (2009:64). Surely by the time of Athens' second intervention the Samian oligarchs had proved themselves just as untrustworthy.

[801] Thuc. 4.76

democracies, it is more likely that Thucydides took it for granted that democracy had been reimposed, than that an oligarchy was allowed to remain.

Edouard Will believes that if a democracy had been established at Samos, there would have been no need for the Athenians to take hostages as they did.[802] However, hostages were taken after the initial installation of democracy, so it may have been considered a necessary precaution to ensure loyalty and regular payment of the indemnity. Will also believes that the revolt was probably triggered by Pericles' establishment of a democracy rather than the squabble over Priene, and Samos' reaction put him off a second attempt. Beloch, similarly, finds it hard to believe that after the utter failure of the initial attempt, Athens would have bothered to try again; in his eyes, the Geomoroi remained in power politically until the social upheavals of 412.[803] Yet if Athens were by this point interventionist enough to impose a democracy in the first place, refraining the second time would appear weak and do no favours for its supporters. The democrats in allied cities were rarely in a majority, so would take care not to lose Athenian support; this is one reason why Athens often favoured them.[804] This is a generalisation, probably inspired by certain passages of Thucydides that make it seem like most people in the allied cities yearned for oligarchy and equated it with freedom.[805] In many cases it is simply not possible to know how many democratic sympathisers there were in any given allied city. However, it is true that in Samos' case, they appear to be in a minority: Thucydides calls them ἄνδρες ἰδιῶται ("private citizens" or perhaps even "individual men"), strongly implying that they were not

[802] Will 1969:313
[803] Beloch 1914:197
[804] Schüller 1981:281-2, 284
[805] One such example is 8.64, where Thucydides claims that giving the allies oligarchy merely meant that they wanted complete freedom and the freedom to make decisions without being held accountable (presumably to the *demos*).

many. If they had been in the majority, they would not have had to appeal covertly to Athens to change their government. Moreover, what had been a (so far as we know) stable oligarchy became unstable when Athens imposed a democracy, again showing that there was considerable resistance to democracy. Athens did not impose a democracy in response to internal *stasis* (civil unrest); it imposed a democracy on a rebellious ally that was a functioning oligarchy with a few private individuals who wanted democracy.

Of course, if an oligarchy was allowed to remain, oligarchs other than those responsible for the revolt could have headed it; it is unthinkable that power was handed back into the hands of the main offenders.[806] Even if some of the Geomoroi, associated with oligarchy due to their hereditary wealth and status, had spearheaded the revolt, it is perfectly likely that others could claim impartiality. Note that in his account of later events, Thucydides certainly associates the Geomoroi with the *dunatoi* but he does not entirely equate the two; they must have overlapped but not been identical.[807] But after reading Plutarch and Diodorus' accounts of the harsh penalties dealt out to the oligarchic ringleaders, it is difficult to imagine that this was followed by a return to the old arrangement as though nothing had happened, except that this time Athens was gambling on the loyalty of a different group of oligarchs.[808] Douris of Samos, quoted and disbelieved by Plutarch, claims that the Samian trierarchs were crucified in the marketplace of Miletus for ten days, then clubbed to death and cast out unburied. Diodorus simply says that Pericles punished the ringleaders. Even if Douris is

[806] Welwei 1986:188
[807] Thuc. 8.21; Gomme, Andrewes & Dover 1970:49
[808] Plut.*Per*.28; Diod. 12.28. Douris' story has been viewed with skepticism (Meiggs 1972:192) and attributed to events in Samos after its second revolt (Karavites 1985:53). Douris also says that the Samians and the Athenians branded the enemy's prisoners, which Plutarch seems more ready to believe (Plut.*Per*.26.3). The Loeb translation has Plutarch end the story with "Be that true or not..." but this appears nowhere in the Greek. It is probably an embellishment of λέγουσι ("rumour has it...") in the previous sentence.

exaggerating, both Plutarch and Diodorus take for granted that Athens wanted to make an example of the ringleaders and there is no reason to doubt this. The two historians agree that those responsible did not go unpunished. Whether they were crucified or not, the ringleaders were probably executed.

If Athens initially imposed a democracy in response to Samian aggression, it clearly felt that the oligarchy was part of the problem. There were tactical advantages to binding the democrats in power in an allied city to Athens' own democracy. There were also advantages to creating a democracy that depended on Athens, as demonstrated in later years when the Samian *demos* (people) relied on Athenian help to quell an oligarchic uprising.[809] Schüller notes the contradiction inherent in making an oligarchy pay reparations for a failed attempt at installing a democracy; it is not impossible, but nor is it likely.[810] Moreover, if we follow Mattingly's chronology for the lettered series of olive branch coins, it makes more sense that a democratic rather than an oligarchic party would issue such a coin type.

Legon thinks it likely that democracy was restored, since the promotion of democracy was one of Athens' initial motivations to intervene.[811] If the prospect of installing a democracy had been a major motivator even before the revolt, it would be strange to show such leniency at a point when Samos had actually revolted from the League. Why go to the trouble of overthrowing the aristocrats before they have even revolted, yet let them remain in power once they have actually done so? The siege of Samos was costly, and if there had been any chance that a democracy would inspire loyalty in the Samians, Athens would surely have installed one.[812] On the other hand,

[809] Thuc. 8.21
[810] Schüller 1981:285
[811] Legon 1972:154
[812] See Meiggs 1972 and Schüller 1981 contra Quinn 1981 and Will 1969.

Ostwald argues that having Samos run by "rich landowners" would make Athens more confident of the indemnity being paid off, and considers it no coincidence that if it was paid in 50 talent instalments, payment ended in the year before the uprising of 412.[813] However, as noted above, Fornara's re-examination of the inscriptional evidence makes this neat calculation unlikely; in reality, we have no way of knowing when Samos stopped paying its indemnity. If payments did stop in 414/3, this may indeed have been no coincidence for the opposite reason: the oligarchs, finally freed of their obligation, seized the opportunity to attempt an overhaul of the democracy. It is true that the co-operation of the wealthy oligarchs would be essential for paying off the indemnity, but this does not necessitate their being in power. Indeed if the Athenians were so convinced that the key to payment of tribute was having an oligarchy in power, we should not be surprised to find them supporting oligarchies all over the empire, and this is manifestly not the case. Leaving the oligarchs in power in 439 would not so much have made Athens confident of payment as made its anxious that they would revolt again, just as they had before.

Lupi argues that the Geomoroi first appeared in the fifth century when Athens needed a guarantee that Samos would pay off its indemnity. [814] He believes that Plutarch derived his account of the archaic Geomoroi from Thucydides and projected events from 412-403 onto sixth-century Samian history, as ancient authors were wont to do when evidence was lacking. The stories do have similarities but some of the correspondences that Lupi identifies are tenuous, such as the three Athenian ships of Thucydides corresponding to the 600 Megarian prisoners of Plutarch on the basis that a ship could hold roughly 200 men. Similarly, a "correspondence" between the

[813] Ostwald 2009:61; the point was originally made by Will (1969:314-7). Will's argument relies even more heavily on the assumption that the indemnity was paid off precisely in 414/3.
[814] Lupi 2005

Megarian prisoners in Plutarch and the Samian prisoners of war in Thucydides is hardly remarkable given that both stories are about war. It should not surprise us that an island might have two stories about war over a period of several centuries, both featuring prisoners. It is better to believe that the Geomoroi predated the Samian revolt, even if there is not enough evidence to trace them back to the founding of Samos in the eleventh or tenth century B.C. Whenever the Geomoroi were formed as a group, Lupi's theory does not help the question of who was in power because he believes that they could have been part of a democracy or an oligarchy and may not even have been a minority. They may well have acted as as a guarantee for the war indemnity, but there is no reason to believe that they came into existence purely out of the need for such a guarantee.

Landucci Gattinoni makes the ingenious argument that the Geomoroi were owners of land on the Samian *peraea* (coast opposite), not in Samos itself, and that they were the same men who were driven out of Samos and ended up harrassing the island from Anaea.[815] Her main argument is that the *dunatoi* (powerful people) and the Geomoroi were two different groups, and she notes that in Plutarch's account of the war with Megara the Geomoroi appoint nine commanders to subdue the Megarians; these must be a powerful group separate to the Geomoroi. She continues that Thucydides seems to designate two groups affected by the uprising of 412, the *dunatoi* and the Geomoroi, and that it is unlikely that they would have been wiped out twice if they were integral to the fabric of Samian society. Instead, perhaps they were rich landowners on the mainland whose power it was felt necessary occasionally to curtail. Yet Landucci Gattinoni does not explain why the Geomoroi could not have appointed fellow Geomoroi (or locals who were not *dunatoi*) as commanders, and neither Plutarch nor Thucydides tells us that the Geomoroi were wiped out entirely when attacked. It is

[815] Landucci Gattinoni 1999

reasonable to see them as a powerful minority in Samos who were targeted when revolution struck. Though it is true that Thucydides distinguishes the *dunatoi* from the Geomoroi, he does not bother to tell us who the latter are (either in that passage or in the rest of his work), a forgivable omission if he meant his reader to assume that the *dunatoi* and the Geomoroi broadly overlapped as groups. Landucci Gattinoni further argues that when Lysander reinstated the ἀρχαῖοι πολῖται (former citizens) in 404, these must have been the Geomoroi from the mainland.[816] Yet if this were the case, they would not be the "former citizens" but an entirely different group of citizens from a different place, who had never owned land in Samos. It is more natural to interpret these former citizens as the oligarchs (including Geomoroi) who were expelled in both 440 and 412.

Fifteen years after the revolt, Thucydides mentions Samian exiles at Anaea helping the Spartans and harrassing those on the island in 424.[817] As we have seen, these were acting on the orders of a Persian overseer and with the involvement of Amorges and possibly Pissouthnes. If these are not oligarchic exiles, it is difficult to explain who they are. Will raises the possibility that these had not been exiled since 439, but only since 428, which is the first time we hear of them in Thucydides' narrative.[818] These "people of Anaea" help to attack Lysicles' Athenian force in Caria; from what we know of earlier events, these must be Samian exiles. It is true that Thucydides does not explicitly mention an exodus of oligarchs to Anaea in 439, but he does imply as much when he says that some of the Samians who could not endure democracy had fled to

[816] Xen. *Hell.* 2.3.7
[817] Thuc. 4.75.1
[818] Thuc. 3.19. Samians at Anaea also appear in the narrative in 427 (Thuc 3.32). On the other hand, Cartledge seems to speculate that there were exiles at Anaea even before the revolt (1982:261)

the mainland.[819] Further evidence is provided by the *Vita Sophoclis*, a biography of Sophocles, which records that Sophocles was general alongside Nicias at the age of sixty-nine "in the war against the Anaeans, seven years before the Peloponnesian War".[820] This would be in either 438 or 437, just after the quelling of the Samian revolt. The scholiast's chronology admittedly seems confused; Sophocles will still have been under sixty at the time, and it is doubtful whether Nicias had gained prominence by that time.[821] The scholiast is either conflating two chronologically separate incidents involving Anaea, or conflating Athenian conflict with Anaea with the Samian war because the key players moved to Anaea; the latter is more probable, given that Anaea became a refuge for anti-Athenians. If indeed the anecdote should be dated to Sophocles' seventieth year, all this does is place the altercation in the early years of the Peloponnesian War proper. It is still highly likely that the Anaeans whom the Athenians fight are oligarchic exiles from Samos, since we hear of no other Anaeans whom the Athenians have reason to fight.[822] The co-ordination between these Anaeans and the Samian oligarchs would be an example of what Simonton terms "pan-elite coordination".[823]

A more pressing objection is that these need not be *all* the oligarchs who had once existed on Samos; it is too simplistic to posit the existence of one group of staunch oligarchs, and one of die-hard democrats.[824] Quinn believes that those at Anaea were a second group of oligarchs, there being two groups of oligarchs since the time of the revolt: those who fled and sought the help of Pissouthnes, and those who remained in

[819] Thuc. 1.115.4. The scholiast supplies mention of democracy, so perhaps simply the Samians "who would not remain [on the island]".
[820] *Vita Sophoclis* 9; Woodbury 1970:213
[821] Woodbury 1970:214-5
[822] For similar arguments see Fantasia 1986:135; Barron 1961:493-5
[823] Simonton 2017b:33
[824] Shipley 1987:122. Schüller's approach is simply to deny the possibility that the oligarchs at Anaea were only a small subset, but this is not very compelling (1981:285).

the city whom Thucydides describes as the δυνατώτατοι (most powerful).[825] The two groups, argues Quinn, did not disagree except insofar as those who left were "unable to stomach the Athenian settlement".[826] Ostwald similarly argues that the exiles "may well have looked upon the loss of Samian αὐτονομία [autonomy] as a sell-out to the Athenians which they did not wish to countenance".[827] Ostwald makes the important point that anti-Athenian does not equal antidemocratic, nor does antidemocratic equal oligarchical. Moreover, political ideology is not the only reason that a group might leave a place. The problem with this view is Thucydides' description of the exiles at Anaea; it seems strange that they would have been keeping those on the island in a state of alarm and welcoming refugees, if they were not actively opposed to them. Their presence at Anaea seems to have been a threat, not the result of a decision to agree to disagree. Thucydides explicitly says that these men were helping the Spartans by sending them pilots and agitating Samos, and it is not a leap of logic to think that by helping Sparta and harassing an Athenian base they were both anti-Athenian and actively opposed to the Samian political situation. They had not merely left to find a new life. They are comparable to the banished pro-Spartan Thasians who are easily able to effect the revolt of Thasos once the democracy there is abolished – the key difference being that at Samos we have no reason to believe that the democracy had been abolished, and so the exiles do not succeed.[828] Thucydides describes Anaea as the place ἔνθα οἱ φεύγοντες τῶν Σαμίων καταστάντες, "where the Samian fugitives had settled".[829] From his account of the Samian revolt it is natural to infer that the fugitives in question are the exact same oligarchs who fled to the mainland in 439. It is not a

[825] Quinn 1981:18
[826] Quinn 1981:18
[827] Ostwald 2009:65
[828] Thuc. 8.64
[829] Thuc. 4.75.1

logical fallacy but a careful examination of Thucydides' narrative that leads us to the conclusion that these Anaeans were the oligarchs from Samos.

The passage in question, 4.75, is a comparison of the situation at Mytilene to that at Samos; the Athenian generals were worried lest Mytilene become a second Samos, with exiles across shore at Antandrus harrying those in the city. The comparison would make most sense if the political situations at Mytilene and Samos were roughly similar; in other words, if Mytilene were at this time democratic, then it would follow that Samos also was. Unfortunately, the question of the constitution adopted by Mytilene after its revolt in 427 is just as vexed. The evidence of the decrees concerning Mytilene is flimsy because both are so heavily restored; mention of the Mytilenean *demos* in one decree, which tends to be used as evidence for a democracy, is entirely restored.[830] Since the *demos* was instrumental in Mytilene's downfall it is likely that the Athenians would have supported them, especially since they executed over 1000 of the leading oligarchs and then sent out Athenian cleruchs to take their place.[831] That Athens imposed democracies on all rebellious allies should not be assumed, but one wonders who was left to continue the oligarchy, and whether Athens would have expected its cleruchs to fit into it. Athens was evidently satisfied with Mytilene remaining autonomous and oligarchic before its revolt, but it can hardly have been afterwards. Thucydides may allude to the setting up of a democracy when he euphemistically describes Paches as "remaining with the rest to settle Mytilene and the rest of Lesbos as he thought best".[832] Seeing as this chapter comes directly after Paches' colonisation of Notium according to Athenian laws, perhaps we are to assume the same for Mytilene. The Mytilenean debate depicts an Athens preoccupied with the example that Mytilene

[830] IG^3 66, 67; Meritt, McGregor & Wade-Gery 1950:150
[831] Thuc. 3.50
[832] Thuc. 3.35.2

will set for the rest of the allies. Diodotus deliberately sets up a contrast between *demos* (the people) and *dunatoi* (the powerful), who are respectively friend and foe of Athens.[833] Cleon, though he wants to punish both, acknowledges that the revolt is the doing of the *oligoi* (the few).[834] In this atmosphere, it is hard to imagine Athens handing the power back to the *dunatoi*, especially seeing as they had all been killed and replaced by Athenians used to democracy.

If it is true that Mytilene adopted a democracy post-427, Thucydides' comparison between the two states as being troubled by their neighbours strengthens the case that Samos was, likewise, a democracy. Another comparable situation is that of Euboea after the crushing of its revolt in 446. Meiggs, noting the similarity in phrasing used of the settlements made with Chalcis and Samos, points out that neither island was in the position to refuse a democracy.[835] As with Mytilene, the problem is that we do not know whether Athens imposed a democracy on Euboea after its revolt; there is a chance that at least part of it was already democratic and Athens took steps to strengthen the democracy.[836]

Thucydides' statement that the Samians προσεχώρησαν ὁμολογίᾳ (surrendered on conditions) could, as Meiggs suggests, indicate a change in the surrendering

[833] Thuc. 3.47
[834] Thuc. 3.39.6
[835] Meiggs 1976:109 on Thuc. 1.117.3 and 1.114.3
[836] The regulations for Hestiaea, though very fragmentary, make reference to selection by lot (*IG* I^3 41.105). The regulations for Chalcis (*IG* I^3 40) do not explicitly call for the imposition of a democracy. Ostwald argues *e silentio* that this means that Athens did not alter Chalcis' government (2002:137-8); Hornblower finds this unlikely (1991:193). Ostwald uses the expulsion of the wealthy social class of the *hippobotai* (Plut.*Per*.23-4) as evidence for a democracy but many think that Plutarch has taken a sixth-century story of Herodotus' (5.77) and misdated it. The situation is further complicated by the possibility of redating the decree to a different Athenian campaign against Euboea in 424/3 (Mattingly 2002:377-9). Ostwald elsewhere suggests that Chalcis was already democratic, but only because some Euboean exiles had fought on the side of the Boeotian oligarchs at Coronea (2009:65). But there is no way of knowing whether these Euboean outlaws were Chalcidian, or even whether they were oligarchs outlawed by a democracy.

government. The conditions of the agreement may have been for Samos to accept a democracy. Admittedly the phrase can just mean a general settlement, as it seems to in Thucydides' account of Sitalces' takeover of Gortynia and Atalanta.[837] The closest that the word *homologia* comes to indicating a change of government in Thucydides is when the Spartans send messengers to Argos and the Argive oligarchs realise that they are in a position to persuade the majority to make an alliance, πείθειν τοὺς πολλοὺς ἐς τὴν ὁμολογίαν.[838] In the same sentence, we are told that these men are eager to overthrow the democracy. Although within the clause quoted above the word *homologia* only means "alliance [with Sparta]", what that alliance means in the context of the full sentence is a chance for a group of men to overthrow the democracy. Similarly, when the Athenians enter into talks about a *homologia* with Tissaphernes, we are aware that they were persuaded to get rid of their democracy if it meant alliance with him.[839] Later in book 8 the men who were most opposed to the democracy were enthusiastic for *homologia* with Sparta.[840] This example is different because Athens was by that point already an oligarchy, but yet again the prospect of coming to terms with oligarchic Sparta is clearly linked to the change of constitution to an oligarchy. Thus, it is clear that such *homologiai* with Athens or Sparta (or Persia) could entail a change of government. Returning to the parallel situation at Euboea, it is worth noting that Athens' response to its revolt in 446 was to expel the residents of Hestiaea and settle there themselves, a precedent for its confiscation of Samian land in similar circumstances less than a decade later.[841]

[837] Thuc. 2.100
[838] Thuc. 5.76
[839] Thuc. 8.56; 8.54
[840] Thuc. 8.90
[841] Thuc. 1.114.3. Thucydides does not describe the settlement as a cleruchy but he may not always make a technical distinction between types of colony (Ehrenberg 1952).

Another comparable situation would be that of oligarchic Erythrae, whose regulations after its revolt included the establishment of democratic institutions and, most likely, democracy.[842] The regulations for Erythrae speak against Ostwald's claim that there is little evidence for Athenian interference with a democratic bias before the death of Pericles.[843] Balcer, who studies the behaviour of several of the Ionian city-states in this period, identifies a pattern whereby the central urban nodes would remain loyal to Athens and the oligarchic, rural districts would side with Persia.[844] Thucydides provides several possible cases of oligarchs in exile in rural districts away from the urban centre, such as those at Embatus near Erythrae and Myonnesus near Teos who are friendly to the Spartan Alcidas.[845] While Athens related to merchant city-dwellers, the landed aristocracy was to be found in the countryside, supporting Persia. Occasionally the oligarchic faction would hold the centre for a while, as in the cases of Miletus and Erythrae, but there was still a political polarity between centre and periphery. If Samos were to conform to this pattern, the presence of oligarchic rebels at Anaea would make central Samos democratic. However, this argument is not decisive, and parts of Balcer's theory have been justly refuted as presumptive.[846]

[842] *IG* I^3 14. The word πλῆθος (masses) in line 22 to describe the Erythraeans is distinctly democratic.
[843] Ostwald 2009:61, noting that the first instance of "policy based on ideology" in Thucydides comes from Diodotus in the Mytilenean debate. However, his argument errs on the side of Great Man theory.
[844] Balcer 1974
[845] Thuc. 3.29, 3.32
[846] As Piérart points out in an afterword to the article, the picture has changed now that we know that Miletus (not just the Milesians from Leros and Teichioussa) paid tribute in 454/3 (1974:42). Moreover, Balcer assumes that oligarchic Antandrus and Anaea menaced a democratic Lesbos and Samos respectively, but Thucydides does not explicitly say in either case that the mainland was democratic (1974:33). Yet clearly in other cases Balcer's hypothesis rings true; for example, Colophon, Teos and Erythrae, which all had outposts that seemed to attract dissidents.

Thucydides' terminology

We know that in 412, Samos found itself once again in *stasis* (civil unrest), with the Samian *demos* rising up against the *dunatoi* so as not to be governed by an oligarchy.[847] This oligarchy was significantly associated with, but not totally identical to, the Geomoroi, the Samian "old money". The question is whether the oligarchy was already in power, as argued by the authors of the *ATL*,[848] or whether the revolt aimed to pre-empt the oligarchs' seizure of such power.[849] If the oligarchs were in power, we would have to postulate an unrecorded oligarchic coup between 439 and 412, perhaps after the Sicilian disaster when Athens had suffered a great loss.[850] Else we must concede that Pericles left Samos an oligarchy in 439. Note that Thucydides does not go so far as to say that the Athenians re-established democracy on Samos after the uprising of the *demos*, even though modern historians often take this for granted.[851] He only goes so far as to say that the Athenians aided the *demos* and subsequently restored their autonomy.[852] The issue of who formally controlled Samos in 412 rests largely on how we translate the term δυνατοί. The word can have many connotations and in this passage it is unclear whether it means "those in favour of oligarchy" or specifically "oligarchs who are in power". This is if the word is meant to conjure up an opposition between democracy and oligarchy in the first place; as Hornblower comments on the passage, "control of personnel was more important than political labels" and what was in ideology a democracy was in practice still the rule of "powerful men".[853] Legon makes

[847] Thuc. 8.21, 8.63
[848] Meritt, McGregor & Wade-Gery 1950:151. The authors of the *ATL* believe that a democracy was set up in 439, but that between then and 412 "an oligarchic revolution in Samos had been countenanced in Athens" that has left no trace in the evidence.
[849] Schüller 1981:286; Prandi 1978:60; Cuniberti 2000:140
[850] Kraay 1976:332-4; Cartledge 1982:263
[851] O'Neil 1995:49
[852] Thuc. 8.21
[853] Hornblower 1991:193

the persuasive point that the word can mean nothing more than "oligarchs", because the superlative is used of the oligarchically minded aristocrats in Samos during the siege of 440, even though they wielded no power at the time.[854]

The ways in which Thucydides uses the term *dunatoi* and its superlative are varied. Occasionally the term is used essentially as a synonym for "oligarchs": this happens during the Mytilenean debate when Diodotus interchanges the terms *oligoi* and *dunatoi* in opposition to the *demos.*[855] If you mete out the same punishment to everyone in the city, says Diodotus, this is to the advantage of the *dunatoi* because the *demos* will have no incentive to rebel against them. Sometimes *dunatoi* is used in contrast to *demos* to mean both wealthy and powerful: when towards the end of the siege the Mytilenean *demos* insist that the *dunatoi* share their provisions, there is a clear opposition between the few and the many, the haves and the have-nots.[856] Similarly, the Epidamnian *dunatoi* whom the *demos* boot out in 435 are evidently in power and probably wealthy too.[857] An even starker contrast is occasionally drawn between the *dunatoi* and slaves or subjects; the Amphilochian Argives, being the *dunatotatoi* of all Amphilochia, make the Ambraciots their slaves.[858] It is not clear whether Thucydides means that the Amphilochian Argives were the most powerful or the richest people in the land, and where there is ambiguity the word is probably meant to convey both senses; the two often go hand in hand. Whereas when the Athenian Euphemus claims that the Athenians restored the Leontines not to make them subjects but to make them *dunatotatous* ("the most powerful"), he means not wealthy but militarily strong and politically

[854] Legon 1972:155 on Thuc. 1.115.4. Before Legon, Meyer suggested that Thucydides did not mean that an oligarchy ruled in Samos before 412 (1939:564-5).
[855] Thuc. 3.47
[856] Thuc. 3.27
[857] Thuc. 1.24.5
[858] Thuc. 2.68

independent.[859] This is evident from the following sentence, in which he stresses the importance of Leontini's independence: ὅτι μάλιστα αὐτονομούμενοι ("when they are most independent").

Thucydides sometimes uses the word simply to mean aristocratic men of influence, but not necessarily political power; they might have power, but they are not an exclusive group in power. Indeed, later in Book 8 it even refers to wealthy or influential members of the democratic leadership whom Peisander persuades to attempt an oligarchic coup.[860] Thucydides even describes a group of Methymnaean exiles residing in Cyme as "not the least powerful" (οὐχ οἱ ἀδυνατώτατοι). It goes without saying that as exiles they can hardly have wielded political power in Methymna; rather, in being able to muster an army of 300 they must have had considerable sway in the region of Cyme.[861] Similarly, *dunatotatoi* is used of the aspiring oligarchs in Athens who want to get the government in their own hands; the word probably implies wealth here as Thucydides comments that they were the ones who had suffered most from the war, through taxation and loss of property.[862] One might compare the way that modern democracies can still allow for considerable power to be concentrated among a minority, meaning that in practice the majority does not rule.[863]

Thus, the word does not even always denote aspiring or actual oligarchs, but only wealthy men; Thucydides uses it to describe the wealthy men at Athens who grew angry with Pericles when they lost their expensive properties in the countryside.[864]

---

[859] Thuc. 6.84
[860] Thuc. 8.63.3
[861] Thuc. 8.100.3
[862] Thuc. 8.48.1
[863] Gilens & Page 2014
[864] Thuc. 2.65.2. There is perhaps also a similar usage of the word to describe democrats at 4.51, when the democratic Chians are ordered to provide πίστεις καὶ βεβαιότητα ἐκ τῶν δυνατῶν. The last three words could either mean "as far as possible" or "from the *dunatoi*"; if the latter, this means that the democratic leaders (the *dunatoi*) were made to provide hostages (Lintott

These are contrasted with the *demos* who only lost what little they had in the first place. It is used of the men in Leontini who called in the Syracusans and expelled the *demos* to prevent them from redistributing the land.[865] It seems most likely that Leontini was ruled by a democracy at the time, or else the *demos* would not have been in a position to attempt land reform in the first place.[866] Moreover, Thucydides states that many people had recently been enfranchised as citizens. These Sicilian *dunatoi* were therefore not those "in power", except insofar as they had previously been in power and as a result had such contacts in Syracuse as could assist them in regaining power. They were wealthy and well-connected, and in this sense powerful, but not "in power". Similarly, the Theban who engineered the invasion of Plataea, Eurymachus son of Leontiades, Thucydides describes as *dunatotatos* not so much because he has the most political power but because he is well-connected and influential enough to have the necessary connections in Plataea; the word here suggests the kind of network that only an elite can expect to have.[867]

The Sicilian example also sheds light on constitutional differences and their bearing on interstate relations: democratic Syracuse helped the *dunatoi* to get rid of a democracy and get into power. This should not surprise us, for states in this kind of situation were likely motivated by expediency rather than political ideals. In this case, Diodorus provides the clue as to the Syracusans' motivation: they subsequently made Leontini a Syracusan stronghold.[868]

1982:92 with n.19). However there seems to be no parallel in Thucydides of ἐκ + genitive meaning "from [a group of people]".
[865] Thuc. 5.4
[866] Robinson 2011:104
[867] Thuc. 2.2.3
[868] Diod. 12.54.7

Finally, two examples from outside Thucydides to see how other authors employ the word δυνατός. Relating a later episode of *stasis* at Corcyra, Diodorus uses the terms προέχοντες, πρωτεύοντες and δυνατώτατοι interchangeably to mean the leading men at Corcyra who favoured oligarchy and the Spartan cause.[869] In that passage, the *dunatotatoi* are powerful men who desire oligarchy. They are not in power, for they are on the verge of handing the city over to Sparta to get themselves into power, but nevertheless the words that Diodorus uses to describe them makes clear that as a group they wield influence. Elsewhere he tells us that when Lysander was in Ephesus, he called a meeting of the *dunatotatous* of the Ionian cities and told them that if things went his way, he would put each group in control of its city.[870] Evidently, the word cannot here mean "(solely) in power", or Lysander's promise would have no force. These men may well have still wielded political power and general influence, but crucially, they were not the ruling oligarchs in an oligarchy. Plutarch gives a clue as to what kind of power Diodorus was talking about, when he says that Lysander chose the men because they had the most confidence and daring.[871] Diodorus, like Thucydides, expected his reader to understand a range of connotations for describing a man as δυνατός, which unfortunately puts the modern reader at a disadvantage.

So, if the δυνατοί whom the people rose up against were not in power, we are free to translate ἵνα μὴ ὀλιγαρχῶνται to mean that their actions were entirely preventative; the *demos* rose up so as to avoid (the prospect of) being ruled by an oligarchy. This is after all the natural meaning of the phrase – not "so that they might no longer be ruled by an oligarchy", or "so that they might put down the oligarchy", but as a straightforward negative purpose clause, "lest they be ruled by an oligarchy".

[869] Diod. 13.48
[870] Diod. 13.70.4
[871] Plut.*Lys*.5.3

The Sicilian disaster may still have been the catalyst for this attempted oligarchic coup. A weakened Athens could guarantee less protection and was therefore less attractive to all the allies, oligarchs and democrats alike.

The only remaining problem for our interpretation of the passage is the word that Thucydides uses, ἐπανάστασις, which may imply a rising up against a group already in power – an insurrection or a rebellion.[872] This is true of Herodotus' use of the associated verb (twice) to describe Polycrates: he gained power by revolting (from whom is a different question).[873] Similarly (and ironically) Polycrates sends away to Egypt those whom he most suspects of planning ἐπανάστασις against him.[874] Yet elsewhere, and especially outside Herodotus, the power dynamic between the two sides involved in ἐπανάστασις is less clear-cut. The precise distinction between revolting from and rising up against another group is put into the mouth of Cleon in another passage of Thucydides, from the Mytilenean debate.[875] There, Cleon makes the point that the Mytileneans did not revolt from an oppressor but rose up against equals. Dionysius of Halicarnassus in his *Roman Antiquities* echoes Cleon in Fufetius' speech inciting war against Fidenae and Veii: there, Fufetius calls for war against the Fidenates and the Veientes, who have plotted "not only to revolt from you (ἀπόστασιν) but also to attack you (ἐπανάστασιν)".[876] The first verb clearly denotes defection or revolt, whereas the second, unless it is entirely redundant, must have a different meaning; it is usually translated as "attack". In both the Thucydidean passage and its imitation, the distinction between the two verbs is crucial. Elsewhere in Thucydides, the verb

[872] Shipley 1987:126; Ostwald 2009:54. Thucydides uses the word and its cognate three times, at 8.21, 63.3 and 73.2. The word is used in the problematic sense at Soph.*Ant.* 533, to mean rebellions against king Creon.
[873] Hdt. 3.39.1; 3.120.3
[874] Hdt. 3.44.2
[875] Thuc. 3.39.2
[876] Dion. Halic. 3.8

ἐπανίστημι is even used of the Samian aristocrats who conspire and attack the *demos*.[877] The word here denotes intestine party warfare; they "rose against" their fellow citizens but they did not "rise up against" a group in power.

Thus, it seems perfectly possible to reconcile the word with a subtly different meaning such as rising up against, or attacking, an enemy, rather than specifically rebelling against one's oppressor. Such an attack may have been felt necessary if, despite the democratic regime, the Geomoroi and others of the propertied classes still dominated the political scene. This would explain why the commons resorted to such drastic measures as killing two hundred of the upper classes and banishing four hundred more.[878] What in name had been a democracy for over two decades, had not succeeded in curtailing the political power and wealth of the aristocrats and in 412 their power - and perhaps their overtures towards Sparta and attempts to take advantage of Athenian weakness after Sicily - drove the *demos* to act violently. What is more, the *demos* involved in the later coup only numbered three hundred, which should caution against always thinking of them as the "masses".[879]

Perhaps the Geomoroi's confiscated land went to the new democratic leaders who in 411 were to attempt an oligarchic coup.[880] Yet if we are to read the story less cynically, a redistribution of land that actually created a broader basis of wealth makes a lot of sense for a democratic state with a well-established aristocracy. A modern equivalent would be the introduction of a high inheritance tax or property tax. The situation at Samos very much resembles what Thucydides tells us happened in Leontini in 422: despite being a democracy the *demos* still felt it necessary to attempt to

[877] Thuc. 1.115.5
[878] Thuc. 8.21
[879] Thuc. 8.73.2
[880] Lintott 1982:117. Lintott interprets Thucydides' description of these leaders as δυνατώτατοι (8.63.3) to mean that they now possessed wealth and land as well as power.

redistribute the land to lessen the power of the *dunatoi*.[881] In the case of the Leontines, however, the *demos* failed and was driven out. The Geomoroi must have been a powerful group if the commons considered it necessary to ban them from intermarriage; had they been uninfluential – and had they not been in the habit of intermarrying in the first place - the ban would have been redundant. Lupi considers that they were as large a group as the Athenian census class of the 5000.[882] However, they need not have been particularly numerous to have concentrated much of the political power in their own hands. The Spartiate ruling class, as they grew in power and wealth, dwindled in numbers through intermarriage and the "relentless exclusion of those Spartiates who became too poor to pay their mess dues".[883]

439 and Beyond

So, the evidence supports the hypothesis that a democracy was reinstalled at Samos in 439 B.C., and remained until the *stasis* of 412. In the meantime, we know that the Samians contributed to the doomed Athenian effort to conquer Sicily.[884] In this passage, Thucydides classes the Samians as ὑποτελεῖς φόρου (subject to tribute), which may indicate that they were still paying their war indemnity, or even regular tribute; at the very least, they were making some monetary contribution, for Thucydides specifies that the only Ionians who were not paying tribute were the Chians. If the Samian hostages were originally taken as a guarantee of debt payment and they had paid off this debt by 414/3, there is the possibility that the hostages were returned to Samos just at the time when other allies were gaining the courage to revolt after the Sicilian expedition. Thus, Athens lost its guarantee of Samian loyalty – and Samos gained a group of people who

[881] Thuc. 5.4.2
[882] Lupi 2005:283
[883] Rose 2012:284; cf. Aristot. *Pol*. 2.1270a
[884] Thuc. 7.57.4

had reason to be very anti-Athens after being taken as hostages, if they were not already - in the lead-up to the attempted oligarchic takeover of 412.[885] Regardless of when the Samian indemnity was paid off, the Athenians' utter defeat in Sicily may have emboldened the Samian oligarchs to try to seize power.

There are hints of unrest in Samos in Thucydides' narrative during the period 439-412: in 424, the Samian exiles at Anaea "were giving naval assistance to the Peloponnesians by sending them pilots, had put the Samians in the city itself into a state of turmoil, and were giving shelter to people leaving the city".[886] These exiles at Anaea may have been responsible for a small coinage of tetradrachms from around 420, bearing a personal name – a Persian name, Batis - rather than Samos' ethnic.[887] This is particularly intriguing given that there is little evidence to demonstrate Persian activity in Samos around this time, as compared to some other Ionian cities. Barron thought that the coins must have been struck at Anaea because Samos was restricted by the coinage decree.[888] Though there is no clear evidence that Samos was affected by the ban, it nevertheless makes sense to associate the coins with Anaea since it is known to have harboured pro-Persians. These Anaeans may also have produced an issue of coins dated c.430 with no ethnic but the letter alpha (standing for Anaea).[889] However, this is only if the alpha is not rather meant to signify the beginning of a series or indeed Athens' name itself.

Even as late as 413/2, Anaea was still a base for those hostile to Athens, since the Chians specifically sent ships there to gain information and foment revolt in the

[885] Prandi 1978:60. Prandi assumes that with the end of the indemnity payments came the return of the hostages, although this is nowhere stated explicitly in the sources.
[886] Thuc. 4.75
[887] Kraay 1976:241; Barron 1966:92, Plate XIV
[888] Barron 1966:92
[889] Barron 1966:92-3

area.[890] Then in 411, one ship from Anaea provided assistance for the revolt of Abydus from Athens.[891] Presumably, the exiles provided the ship. However, although they had grown in power and military strength over the years, the exiles were clearly not strong enough to pose any serious threat to Samian democracy. Over time, they seem to have become more and more isolated from Samos, as their independent status as Anaeans strengthened and their link to the *dunatotatoi* of Samos weakened; it is noteworthy that as far as we know, they play no part in the events at Samos from 412 onwards.[892] They may have remained in contact with their friends on the mainland, and Lintott even suggests that the latter also possessed estates in Anaea and had been collaborating with them all along, but on this the sources are silent.[893]

Meanwhile, the power of the Samian upper classes must have been seriously reduced when the commons killed two hundred of them, exiled twice as many, took over their land and houses and stripped the Geomoroi of their political power, their possessions and their right to intermarry with the *demos*.[894] Certainly, whether or not they had remained in cahoots since their geographical separation, an obvious refuge for the four hundred exiled Geomoroi would have been Anaea. It makes sense to view this overhaul of power – aided by Athens - as a way of making sure that, with the indemnity now paid off, Samos would continue as a democracy.[895] We might also view it as a precautionary measure in the immediate aftermath of Miletus' revolt. Two things the episode tells us are that the Samian upper classes numbered at least six hundred, and

[890] Thuc. 8.19
[891] Thuc. 8.61.2
[892] Fantasia 1986:139
[893] Lintott 1982:117
[894] Thuc. 8.21
[895] A guarantee of Samian loyalty would be particularly necessary if, as Prandi suggests, all the hostages taken in 439 had now been returned (1978:61).

that despite all that had happened the power and wealth had remained concentrated in their hands.

According to Diodorus, this was not merely an internal affair but outright revolt from Athens; he lists Samos alongside Chios and Byzantium as revolting "to the Lacedaemonians".[896] Thucydides mentions no such revolt, and for some this is decisive.[897] Xenophon alludes to events in 412 when he says that the Samians, having slaughtered the aristocrats, were in possession of the city.[898] Although Quinn has argued that Xenophon is recording renewed *stasis* in 405, the imperfect κατεῖχον ("held") tells us that the citizens did not take possession of the city in 405 but were in possession of it at that point because of the earlier uprising.[899] Note also that Xenophon calls their victims the γνώριμοι, the wealthy or notable class – but not necessarily the ones in power. One may compare the way that Aristotle contrasts the so-called γνώριμοι with the *demos* when talking about the different classes that make up oligarchies and democracies.[900] He goes on to describe them as the leisure classes, those who are characterised by wealth, birth, virtue and education. These remain the γνώριμοι whether or not they are in power, just as the δυνατοί remain the elite regardless of whether the political power is concentrated in their hands. As for whether the passage of the *Hellenica* supports the hypothesis that the oligarchs were in power in 412, Xenophon frequently uses the verb κατέχω to mean 'keep hold of', rather than 'seize possession of'.[901] In this passage, Xenophon is not concerned with chronology, for he is making

[896] Diod. 13.34
[897] Quinn 1981:19-20. Quinn also points to Diodorus' unreliability in this part of his narrative: he mentions events twice, he gets the date of the revolt of Byzantium wrong, and aside from saying that Samos revolted he makes no mention of the democratic uprising.
[898] Xen. *Hell.* 2.2.6
[899] Quinn 1981:21; Shipley 1983:113
[900] Aristot. Pol. 4.1291b
[901] Cf. *Hell.*1.4.6; 3.3.10; 7.1.17

the broad statement that of all of Athens' allies, Samos was the *only* one not to revolt after Aegospotami.

The Athenian decree of 412/1 praising the Samian *demos* (IG I^3 96) sheds some light on the question, for it mentions some Samians "who have been trying to bring in the Peloponnesians" (l.4). Whether or not the whole island revolted, it is clear from this inscription that at least some Samians were tempted to follow Chios' lead, even if only those exiled at Anaea. It is frustrating that the part of the relevant sentence in the inscription is missing. Of the part we have, the present participle ἐπάγοντας (used of those trying to bring in the Peloponnesians) suggests that the action was incomplete, and the verb can be translated as "invite" as well as "bring in". The wording of this part of the sentence supports the view that this was not outright revolt but an invitation to the Spartans that did not succeed. It may have been that the Anaeans' reception of the rebelling Chians was what prompted some oligarchs at Samos to attempt bringing in Sparta. It seems no coincidence that at the same time as Anaea was aiding defection to Sparta, there is literary and epigraphical evidence that some in Samos were thinking along the same lines. As Shipley notes, "[i]t is scarcely conceivable that no one in the island thought their own...interests better served by attachment to Sparta than to Athens".[902] One such a person could be the Cleomedes mentioned in the inscription, whose land appears to have been confiscated.[903]

Ostwald suggests that the pro-Spartan group mentioned in the inscription could be the Samian oligarchs, who according to his reconstruction were in power at the time.[904] These may have been "trying to use the insignificant Athenian presence to regain their αὐτονομία under Peloponnesian control". This theory would have the merit

[902]Shipley 1987:125
[903] *IG* I^3 96.5. Cavaignac speculates that he was part of a *hetaireia* (1924:291).
[904] Ostwald 2009:67

of explaining the democratic uprising of 412: the democrats, determined to avoid involving the Spartans, took matters into their own hands and seized power from the ruling classes. This is essentially what Diodorus says, except in this case Samos will not have got as far as a full-scale rebellion because the democrats nipped their plans in the bud. Ostwald's theory is convincing, but it does not prove that the oligarchs were in power when they sought Spartan assistance. It is just as convincing that a group of oligarchs, not in power but with the connections and resources available to the aristocracy, attempted to hand Samos into Spartan hands, and the ruling democrats' reaction was to strip them of their powers so as to avoid a repeat scenario. The Chian sending of ten ships to Anaea to foment revolt may have caused particular concern for the preservation of Samian democracy.

It is likely that the rebels at Anaea were involved in this attempt at ridding Samos of Athenian rule. It is even possible that one reason the *demos* seized the oligarchs' property is because some of it was in Anaea, where their co-conspirators resided.[905] The Athenian grant of autonomy to Samos would then have been a pointed statement, rewarding the democrats with the very autonomy that the oligarchs had gone after by trying to bring in Sparta. It also makes sense that now that the Samian democracy was secure and trustworthy, Athens saw fit to restore Samian self-government. The Athenians had been worried enough about Samos' constitution to change it in the first instance; their granting of autonomy may have been in recognition that they were now satisfied of Samos' loyalty. As we have seen, what autonomy meant to Samos is debated but the scope of the word – whether it extends only to judicial matters, or also political, military and financial - does not provide any certainty as to

[905] Lintott 1982:111

what Samos' constitution actually was between 439 and 412.[906] It makes no difference which rights Samos was deprived of when it lost its autonomy, for whichever constitution Athens left Samos with in 439 was clearly up to Athens. The Athenians had shown their willingness to interfere in Samos' constitution by imposing a democracy after its initial rebellion. As a result, the possibility that Athens endorsed an Athenian-backed oligarchy cannot entirely be ruled out. However, the change in 412 could simply have been from Athenian-supervised democracy to voluntary democracy. This is not an insignificant change, given that it likely included the freedom for the Samians to judge their own serious court cases. It may also have meant the end of the cleruchy in Samos. Thucydides' wording suggests a link between the democrats' seizure of the Geomoroi's property and the granting of autonomy to them: καὶ αὐτοὶ τὴν γῆν αὐτῶν καὶ οἰκίας νειμάμενοι, Ἀθηναίων τε σφίσιν αὐτονομίαν μετὰ ταῦτα ὡς βεβαίοις ἤδη ψηφισαμένων ("[the people] distributed the land and property amongst themselves, the Athenians having now granted them autonomy on the basis that their loyalty was secure").[907] As previously noted, it seems that Samian autonomy meant total control over their own land.

That Samos actually did revolt from Athens in 412 is unlikely given that Thucydides records this section of his narrative (8.2-22) with such precision. Such an important fact would hardly be excluded from the narrative of Ionian unrest in the first twenty chapters of book 8.[908] He specifically mentions a Chian attempt to stir up revolt at Anaea, but nothing comes of it and no further mention is made of potential or actual rebellion. As Quinn points out, when Samos is mentioned, it is as a place of safe refuge

[906] Ostwald 1982; Whitehead 1993
[907] Thuc. 8.21
[908] Gehrke 1985:143 n.13

for the Athenians.[909] Furthermore, in describing the unrest at Samos Thucydides says that the commons rose with the help of the Athenians "who were there with three triremes";[910] a larger force than that would have come to the democrats' assistance in the case of a full-scale revolt. When Samos first revolted in 440, Athens sent forty ships; even with depleted resources in 412, the Athenians sent nineteen galleys to put down the Milesian revolt.[911] That Thucydides records the revolt of neighbouring Miletus and not of Samos is in itself telling: had both revolted at the same time, we would expect some comment. Thus, it seems unlikely that *de facto* revolt took place in 412; but this is not to say that there was nobody on the island tempted to bring in the Spartans.

Indeed, the combined literary and epigraphic evidence makes it likely that there were rumblings of rebellion at the time, and that Diodorus did not concern himself with distinguishing between this and full-on revolt. Three triremes are not as many as Athens would have sent out to quell an actual revolt, but the presence of Athenians in Samos when *stasis* (civil unrest) occurred suggests that they had cause for worry. Miletus' very recent revolt had been instigated by aristocrats, the προεστῶτες (foremost) of Milesian society. What was to say that the same would not happen at Samos? Certainly, Persian influence in the area was growing. Thucydides mentions the revolt of Miletus and the treaty concluded between Tissaphernes and Chalcideus in the same breath, drawing a link between the two events even if the Persian satrap was not directly responsible for Miletus' revolt.[912] By 412 the Persians were able to resume demanding tribute from the Ionian cities; Thucydides is vague about the precise details, but evidently the balance of power was shifting.[913] Samos may well have found itself at times saddled with both

[909] Quinn 1981:20 on Thuc. 8.16.2 and 19.4.
[910] Thuc. 8.21
[911] Thuc. 8.17.3
[912] Thuc. 8.17.3
[913] Thuc. 8.5.5

Persian tribute and an indemnity to Athens, and there must have been those on the island who considered their interests better served by Persia than Athens.

Athens had reason to trust in the newly invigorated democracy. In 411, the threat to democracy returned when, in conjunction with the oligarchic overthrow at Athens, three hundred of the Samian democrats banded together to form an oligarchy, intending to attack the rest ὡς ὄντες δῆμος.[914] Thucydides' wording is confusing, and could be translated among other things as "as though they were the *demos*" or "on the grounds that they were the *demos*". The point is clearly to contrast the oligarchs who had up until just then regarded themselves as the *demos,* with the *demos* that they then disown and assault. The complexity of the situation is brought out by Thucydides' avoidance of any label for the ex-democrats: they are simply called "conspirators". Only later in the passage is the word ὀλιγαρχία, oligarchy, explicitly used. Thucydides says that it was Pisander, author of the oligarchic revolution at Athens, who persuaded the Samian democrat-oligarchs to conspire against the *demos*.

Surprising though this move is, it may partly be explained by Athens' own move to oligarchy; some pro-Athenians in Samos may have considered it prudent to follow suit. Evidently the Samians thought it wise to follow the advice of the Athenian Pisander, whether out of sympathy for Athens, oligarchy, or another cause. Alternatively, they may simply have been acting out of pure self-interest; this is what Thucydides' rather ironic wording implies. Aided by the general Charminus and some other Athenians, the small group of aspiring oligarchs killed the ostracised Athenian Hyperbolus and decided to attack the masses. However, the loyal democrats got wind of their plans and cut them short, with the help of the Athenian generals Leon and

[914] Thuc 8.73.2. By ὄντες δῆμος Thucydides does not mean the entire popular party that had opposed the oligarchs, but most likely the "leading clique" (de Ste Croix 1954:25); this is made clear by the fact that there were enough loyal democrats left over to block their attempt.

Diomedon and other supporters of democracy serving in the fleet stationed at Samos.[915] They put to death thirty of the three hundred, banished three of the ringleaders, declared amnesty for the others "and lived together under a democracy from that time forward". It is noteworthy that the democracy was secure enough for the vast majority of the conspirators to be allowed to remain in the city. Although the Samians required Athenian help to overcome the threat of the oligarchs, Thucydides' narrative speaks against the assumption that "the lower class on Samos were relatively weak, or unconvinced of the value of popular government, and only the support of Athenian forces and the exile of substantial sections of the upper class (if not eventually all of them) enabled them to come to power".[916] The original core group who had been persuaded to change camp might have been unconvinced of the value of popular government, but their targets were convinced enough to seek Athenian aid to protect their democracy. Out of three hundred turncoats, in fact only a tenth were executed and only one percent exiled, and there is no evidence that any more were disposed of in the years following. These facts speaks to the strength of the democracy at the time.

Indeed this time it seems that the democrats were a true majority, for Thucydides calls them πλέονες, literally "more". Thucydides notes, perhaps with some irony, that a group of Samian democrats had been persuaded to try their hand at a broad oligarchy, "the very form of government which they had recently risen [against each other] to avoid".[917] Once again, Thucydides' wording is not inconsistent with the conclusion that the democrats had "risen up" only against aspiring, not power-wielding, oligarchs. In fact, Thucydides' wording invites such a conclusion: the awkward ἀλλήλοις, which some prefer to excise from the text or emend, clearly suggests that

[915] Thuc. 8.63, 8.73
[916] Contra O'Neil 1995:49-50
[917] Thuc. 8.63.3

rather than the democrats "revolting" against the oligarchs, the two parties *attacked* each other, ἐπαναστάντας...ἀλλήλοις. Translating the verb in such a way removes the awkwardness of supposing that these newly converted democrats had somehow revolted against themselves, a notion which some commentators have stretched the limits of translation to justify.[918]

In a way, both groups had shown their loyalty to Athens: one by following its lead, the other by resisting and protecting its cherished form of government. In response to Athens' political instability, the Samians and the Athenian soldiers stationed there swore "the most tremendous oaths" to support democracy, to prosecute the war with Sparta and to oppose the oligarchic Four Hundred at Athens.[919] The Samian democracy was to last for the next eight years, even after Aegospotami, until Athens' defeat. We find a Samian Cleomedes – perhaps the same Cleomedes as had his land confiscated in 412 – named on a monument commemorating Aegospotami.[920]

Towards the end of the war, Samos remained fiercely loyal to Athens, providing a base for the Athenian fleet and even setting up a statue of Alcibiades.[921] Alcibiades, Thrasyllus and Conon all used the island as a base for attacks against Sparta.[922] Samos' importance as a base is highlighted by the assembly of Athenian soldiers there, in which they reflected on their greater ability to exclude the Athenians at home from the sea than vice versa.[923] Plutarch also notes the strategic value of the island, commenting that the Athenians used Samos as a base whence to try to win back some Ionian allies who

[918] e.g. Tucker 1892 ad.loc.: "'Though they had risen in revolt against one another' is illogical, but one should not be tempted to emend...the two notions [revolting within a party and revolting against another party] are confused".
[919] Thuc. 8.75.2
[920] Paus. 10.9.10
[921] Thuc. 8.27.4-6; Paus. 6.3.15
[922] Xen.*Hell*.1.2.1; 1.4.8; 1.4.11; 1.4.23; 1.5.15; 1.5.17; 1.6.16; 1.6.25 2.1.12; 2.1.16
[923] Thuc. 8.76.4-5

had revolted and spy on the others.[924] Gomme suggests that some tribute records may be lost due to cities paying directly to generals in the field; this could easily have happened at Samos where the fleet was based permanently for a considerable period of time.[925] One can only speculate but Samos' absence from the tribute lists certainly does not rule out the possibility that Samos paid tribute (or another kind of cash contribution) post-440 and especially in the last years of the war.

As for their naval contribution, the Samians contributed ten triremes to the Athenian victory at Arginusae.[926] This is the first we hear of a Samian naval contribution to the war since forfeiting their ships after the revolt. When Lysander gained control of the Aegean, Samos was the only ally not to defect.[927] Such was the Samians' loyalty that Athens passed a decree of mutual citizenship with them, reinforcing its autonomy and its freedom to adopt whichever constitution it chooses.[928] The pact of isopolity gave the Samians the freedom to live permanently in Athens as citizens, and vice versa for Athenians relocating to Samos. Although it was a seriously weakened Athens that passed this decree, its significance as a gesture ought not to be underestimated.

To this period may belong an issue of tetradrachms and several other coins struck on the Attic, not the Samian, standard.[929] This was at a time when if anything, Athenian allies were systematically avoiding the Attic standard to make a political statement.[930] The coins are similar to the olive series but some are marked with an alpha or the monogram AP, presumably to signify alliance with Athens. The period of

[924] Plut. *Alc*. 25.3
[925] Gomme 1945:257-8
[926] Diod. 13.97
[927] Thuc. 8.63.3
[928] *IG* I^3 127
[929] Kraay 1976:242; Barron 1966:97-100, 200-2, Plate XVII
[930] Crawford 1983:225

prolonged Athenian presence on the island after 412 is the most obvious context for these coins, although any time post-439 is conceivable.[931] Also dated 412-405 is a bronze *chalkous* depicting the prow of a ship (the Samian *samaina*) on one side and an amphora within an olive wreath on the reverse.[932] Similar to this is a coin of curious weight with the prow of a ship on its obverse and an amphora and olive-branch on the reverse. The coins are dated 430-12 by Konuk and pre-439 by Barron, but only because he believes in a gap in minting after the Samian revolt and thinks that the coins were minted on the Samian standard.[933] Barron notes that their weight is closer to obols on the Attic standard, for they are rather light to be Samian trihemiobols, but "stylistic considerations forbid" because the olive leaves are represented in outline rather than fully raised. This does not exclude the possibility that they should be dated later, nor does it totally exclude the possibility that the coins were struck on the Attic standard.[934] If the coins belong to the period after the revolt, their imagery would be reminiscent of Athens as well as Samos. The *samaina* appears on coins struck at Samos and Zancle from the beginning of the fifth century into the Hellenistic period,[935] but naval strength and production of olives were common to Samos and Athens. Especially towards the end of the war, Athens' navy became strongly associated with Samos because it was stationed on the island. Perhaps the imagery on the coins was meant to evoke the glory of both communities.

Even when completely blockaded, Samos initially refused to come to terms with Lysander, surrendering only when invasion was inevitable. Lysander recalled all the

[931] Gardner argues that use of the old standard is a sign of disaffection, in which case use of the Attic standard could have started any time post-439 (1913:164).
[932] *SNG Turkey* 1.1 662; Barron 1955:99, 200-2, Plate XVII
[933] *SNG Turkey* 1.1 647; Barron 1966:71, 198, Plate XVI
[934] Gardner dates the coins c.439 but classes them as Attic-standard obols (1882:44, 52).
[935] Barron 1966:178, Plates VI-VII (494/3-490/89 B.C.), 1966:184, Plate IX (474-469 B.C.); *SNG Turkey* 1.1 667-8 (4th century B.C.)

exiled Samian oligarchs and put them back in power, driving out (at least some of) the democrats and setting up a decarchy.[936] Some of the democrats fled to nearby Ephesus and Notium on the mainland, as we know from two closely related Athenian decrees of 403/2.[937] It is generally believed that the decrees follow on from the decree granting citizenship, and as such address the exiled Samian *demos* rather than the newly powerful oligarchs.[938] The decrees are topped with a relief depicting Athena and Hera, patron goddesses of Athens and Samos respectively, shaking hands. Landucci Gattinoni argues instead that the decrees and the relief symbolise reconciliation between democratic Athens and the new oligarchic regime in Samos. He argues that the term Σαμίων τὸς ἔξω ὄντας (literally "those of the Samians outside") refers with "assoluto brachilogia" to the oligarchs in control, not the recently exiled democrats, and that these were Samian envoys to Athens.[939] These would be the same envoys with whom the Athenians suggest a joint embassy to Sparta.[940] For Landucci Gattinoni, the decrees recognise the legitimacy of the oligarchic government in the eyes of Athens after years of support of the *demos*. It is clear from the decree that the Athenians are trying to court Sparta, but it is also clear from the heading of the decree - Σαμίοις ὅσοι μετὰ τοῦ δήμο τοῦ Ἀθηναίων ἐγένοντο, "for the Samians who were on the side of the Athenian *demos* – that the main concern of the decrees is still the loyal Samian democrats, not the oligarchs. Speak of loyal Samians naturally brings to mind those who had not been so loyal. "The Samians who were outside" must be a pointed reference to the very recent democratic refugees from Samos, not a cryptic and roundabout reference to some

[936] Xen.*Hell*.2.3.6-7, Diod.14.3.4; Plut. *Lys*.14.1. In Xenophon those who are driven out are called the ἐλευθεροῖ; these must be the democrats who were living in the city, since it is unlikely that the entire population was exiled. He adds the detail that they were allowed to take only one cloak with them on departure.
[937] *IG* II² 1.48-9
[938] e.g. Cargill 1983:1-2; Shipley 1987:130-1; Whitehead 1993:322
[939] Landucci Gattinoni 1999:132
[940] *IG* II² 1.45-8

Samian envoys who happened to be outside Samos and in Athens at the time of the decree. Landucci Gattinoni's argument is based on the belief that the terms δῆμος ὁ Σαμίων ("the Samian people" - l.4), Σαμίοι ("the Samians" -l.7,11,13,14) and Σαμίων τὸς ἔξω ὄντας ("the Samians abroad" - l.9) must all refer to distinct groups. This need not be the case, since the Σαμίοι who are to send an embassy to Sparta could be the exiled Samian democrats wishing to bring about a return to their country. Nor does Landucci Gattinoni explain why Colophon and Notium would feel the need to receive a group of Samian oligarchic envoys to Athens, seeing as the two mainland towns are hardly en route. The Samians and Athenians must have been preparing a joint embassy to Sparta to discuss the return of Samian exiles in Athens, Ephesus and Notium to their homeland.

According to Plutarch, this was one of several oligarchies Lysander set up under Spartan control.[941] The newly reinstated Samian oligarchs were apparently so grateful as to honour Lysander as an immortal and dedicate a statue to him at Olympia.[942] The decarchy was probably short-lived, as a consequence of Lysander's fall from grace and the restoration of democracy at Athens in 404-3 or 403-2.[943] There may even have been a brief return to the moderate oligarchy of the years prior to the Samian revolt.[944] Athens' most loyal ally soon re-established a democracy upon the withdrawal of the Spartan navy in 394, only to be placed under Persian control once more with the peace of Antalcidas. Thus, Samos' politics continued to be characterised by factional fighting well into the fourth century. Pausanias accuses the Samians of always paying court to

[941] Plut.*Lys*.14.1-2
[942] Plut.*Lys*.18; Paus. 6.3.14; Douris *FGrHist* 76 F 26. The story was considered incredible, until the discovery of a fourth century inscription that revealed that the oligarchs had also renamed the Heraea the "Lysandrea" (Cartledge 1982:264).
[943] The decarchies had been overthrown by the ephors in his absence (Xen.*Hell*.3.4.2; Plut.*Lys*.21.1).
[944] Gehrke 1985:145

strength – first the Athenians, then Alcibiades, and finally Lysander – a cynical view, but not unfounded.[945] This said, Samos' unabating loyalty to Athens towards the end is exceptional in contrast with its other allies.

Samos' general progression in the fifth century, from tyranny to oligarchy to democracy (and back again), is clear enough. The finer details are obscured by gaps and ambiguities in the literary, epigraphic and numismatic record. Since Barron's dissertation and monograph were published in the 1960s, developments have been made in the field of epigraphy. Most notably, the validity of the three-bar sigma rule has been negated, making Barron's analysis of the *horoi* on Samos less secure. Now that it is possible to date them after 445 B.C., it makes sense to view the Samian *horoi* as evidence for an Athenian cleruchy in lieu of tribute payment, after Samos' loss of autonomy in 439. Moreover, new research on the ramifications of the Coinage Decree has made it possible – even likely – that the Samian series should be dated after the revolt of 440 B.C. As I have argued in this chapter, the belief that an oligarchy was allowed to remain on Samos after the revolt is based on a misreading of the crucial passages of Thucydides relating to the uprising of 412. Any history of Samos during this period may be only tentative, but re-examination of the evidence in light of recent developments leads to a rather different picture than previously assumed. The evidence suggests that Athens imposed a democracy on Samos that lasted right until the end of the war, likely with the help of a cleruchy that not only brought in revenue for the Athenians but also acted as a kind of garrison. Although there were periods of unrest and *stasis*, Samos did not actually revolt again, but remained Athens' most firm ally to the end.

[945] Paus. 6.3.15-6

Chapter 2: Colophon

The scant remains of the ancient city of Colophon give no indication of its former glory in the fifth century and beyond. Situated on three hills eight miles from the coast, Colophon boasted exceptionally fertile land and was famed for its wealth; Aelian blames the great luxury of the Colophonians for their downfall.[946] In archaic times it was also famous for its navy and cavalry, which gave rise to the expression "He put Colophon to it" meaning that a sure end had been put to something.[947] A fourth-century inscription referring to the "old city" suggests that the site of the city was different in the fifth century.[948] This would account for the absence of fifth century remains on the known acropolis and in the necropolis.[949] The overall lack of evidence for building work and habitation in the fifth century was used to argue that Colophon was in economic decline and depression.[950] However, this may be begging the question since the archaeological area excavated was so limited and possibly off the mark.[951] Likewise, there is no evidence for temple building in the archaic period but "that there is no record does not mean that there was no building".[952] Colophon's initial tribute obligation was substantial, which warns against finding a direct correlation between wealth and monumental building. This is something that Thucydides was all too aware of.[953] The city's later low tribute payments need not indicate poverty and may indicate an obligation to pay tribute to Persia as well as Athens.

---

[946] Ael. *VH* 1.19
[947] Strab. 14.1.28
[948] SEG 19.698
[949] Holland 1944:170-1
[950] Cook 1961
[951] Meiggs 1972:271
[952] Osborne 1999b:322
[953] Thuc. 1.10.1-3

Colophon's geographical position, set back from the coast, may help to explain its relationship with Athens in the fifth century. Unlike other coastal cities and islands such as Miletus and Samos, Colophon will have been less easy to access from the Mediterranean. Events at nearby Clazomenae prove this point: when the Clazomenians revolted they moved onto the mainland and took over Polichna, only to be reconquered and moved back by the Athenians.[954] Evidently it was easier for a naval power to govern an island than a coastal town, and a coastal town than a town tucked away inland. Hence it is unsurprising that Colophon vacillated between the Athenian and Persian empires during the Peloponnesian War.

Since very little survives about Colophon in literature and local evidence, we are reliant on Athenian epigraphy to piece together its history. Colophon's tribute record, combined with an Athenian decree concerning Colophonians, help to throw light the town's relationship with Athens before and during the Peloponnesian War. The main controversy surrounds the date of the regulations for Colophon, and whether it should be connected to Thucydides' brief account of *stasis* in Colophon in the 420s.[955]

Colophon's Early History

Herodotus includes Colophon in the Ionian *dodecapolis* as a part of the Lydian district.[956] Pausanias tells us that Colophon was one of the first Greek foundations in Ionia, being populated first by Cretans and subsequently Theban refugees after the Dorian invasion of Greece.[957] He adds that two sons of Codrus, Damasichthon and Promethus, then became king. Thus, although in Pausanias' account the sons of Codrus did not found Colophon, the Athenians could still trace its lineage back to two

[954] Thuc. 8.14.3; 8.23.6
[955] Thuc. 3.34
[956] Hdt. 1.142.3, 1.147.2
[957] Paus. 7.3

Athenian-born kings. The archaic Colophonian poet Mimnermus, preserved by Strabo, sings of leaving Pylos to settle in Colophon.[958] Mimnermus calls Pylos "the lofty city of Neleus"; Neleus was descended from the Athenian king Codrus. Strabo specifies that a Pylian – not an Athenian - named Andraemon founded Colophon. However, though he does not mention it, Andraemon is a son of Codrus and therefore also Athenian. In the same chapter Strabo claims that the Athenian Androclus began the Ionian colonisation.[959] What is striking is that all of these traditions trace Colophonian heritage back to an Athenian king or to Athens' foundation of Ionia. The traditions that more broadly attribute the foundation of Ionia to Athens (via Codrus or Neleus or their descendants) by implication make Athens responsible for Colophon's existence.[960] As with Miletus, Samos and Erythrae, the Athenians seem to have emphasised their role as the founders of Colophon as much as possible.

As early as the eighth century B.C. we hear of civil strife in Colophon that led to exiles being taken in at Smyrna.[961] At the beginning of the seventh century B.C., Gyges sacked and took over control of the city.[962] This had an impact on the city's prosperity, for Aristotle says that before the war against the Lydians, most of the population owned considerable property.[963] Gyges' successor Alyattes also felt the need to massacre the Colophonian cavalry and replace them with his own men, suggesting that until that point the cavalry were politically powerful enough to pose a threat to their master.[964] The archaic poet Xenophanes of Colophon talked about a thousand aristocratic men swanning into the city wearing purple robes, although this could clearly

[958] Strab. 14.1.4
[959] Strab. 14.1.3
[960] eg. Hdt. 1.147.2; Pherecydes *FGrHist* 3 F 155; Hellanicus *FGrHist* 323A F 23
[961] Hdt. 1.150
[962] Hdt. 1.15
[963] Aristot. *Pol*. 4.1290b
[964] Polyaen. 7.2.2

be an exaggeration.[965] The number has been taken to indicate the size of the Colophonian assembly.[966] However, the poem continues by saying that these men are "boastful, exulting in beautiful hair, dripping with expensive and fragrant oils". Evidently the description is meant to parody the men of Colophon and should not be taken too literally. He says that this happened once the "hateful" Lydian tyranny had been shaken off, which suggests that what followed tyranny was a broad oligarchy although one must be wary of fashioning historical fact out of poetry.[967] Aristotle, discussing what it means for a state to be a democracy, says that ancient Colophon does not count as a democracy just because the rich ruled as a landowning majority prior to the war with the Lydians.[968] In other words, democracy does not simply mean rule by the many and oligarchy rule by the few, or the elite Colophonians would have counted as democrats. The passage of Aristotle tells us that in the archaic period they made up at least half of the citizen body.

At the beginning of the sixth century, Colophon was still a part of the Lydian empire. The graffiti from Abu Simbel records the name of a Colophonian mercenary, Pabis.[969] When Croesus came to power, Colophon will have paid tribute to him, like the other cities of Asia Minor.[970] After the Persian overthrow of the Lydian kingdom around 547 B.C., Colophon passed into Persian hands. This probably saw it fall once again under a tyranny, for Herodotus gives the impression that there were Persian-backed tyrants all over Ionia before Mardonius set about deposing them.[971] This is if what

[965] Ath. 12.526a-b
[966] Whibley 1896:136
[967] Duplouy 2013 is a useful discussion of what history can be gained from the Xenophanes fragment.
[968] Aristot. *Pol*. 4.1290b . Unhelpfully, 'the war against the Lydians' could conceivably be Gyges' invasion in the 7th century, Alyattes' fight with the cavalry in the sixth century or Croesus' conquest of Ionia around 560 B.C.
[969] *ML* 7
[970] Hdt. 1.27.1
[971] Hdt. 4.137; 6.43

Herodotus says about the other Ionian cities applies to Colophon. Unlike much of Ionia, the town appears not to have participated in the Ionian Revolt in 499 B.C. This can be gleaned from its absence from Herodotus' lengthy and detailed narrative of the revolt.[972] If it did take part, it contributed no ships, for Herodotus lists these in full.[973] Colophon's apparent willingness to be subject to Darius may be because Colophon viewed Persia as its liberator from the Lydians. The war with Gyges destroyed Colophon's prosperity and it would not be surprising if the Lydian kingdom were held responsible for this.[974] A feeling of goodwill (or at least apathy) towards the Persian Empire would also explain Persia's influence and Athens' precarious control of the place during the Peloponnesian War. It is not clear whether Herodotus' proclamation that Mardonius set up democracies all over Ionia applies to Colophon.[975] Since it did not take part in the revolt, Colophon's claim to an early and short-lived democracy is even more doubtful than that of other Ionian towns.

The Colophonian coins attributed to the early fifth century may in fact be an indirect result of the Ionian Revolt, with the revolting cities' mints being disrupted by war and only Colophon's mint unaffected.[976] The coinage of Colophon, rather similarly to Miletus, tells us little about political goings-on at the time because its main motif barely changes over time. Every single Colophonian coin in the Muharrem Kayhan collection features the head of Apollo on the obverse, from the sixth century through to the second century.[977] This continuity makes it difficult to identify political change in

[972] Hdt. 5.28-55; 5.97-126; 6.1-33
[973] Hdt. 6.8
[974] Milne puts it down specifically to the "persistent policy of the Mermnad Kings of Lydia in favour of Ephesus" (1941:4). Certainly Croesus contributed to and perhaps rebuilt the temple of Artemis at Ephesus (Hdt 1.92; Tod I² 6) but whether he actively favoured Ephesus to the detriment of Colophon is unknown.
[975] Hdt. 6.43
[976] Milne 1941:45
[977] *SNG Turkey* 1.1 342-54 (6th century B.C.), 355-66 (450-10 B.C.), 367 (late 5th century B.C.), 368-71 (c.400-375 B.C.), 372 (c.375-60 B.C.), 373-82 (c.310-294 B.C.), 383-5 (c.330-

changes of iconography. Two coins in the Copenhagen collection, dated c.490-400 B.C., feature Artemis instead of Apollo.[978] These show Artemis laureate on the obverse and a lyre on the reverse. If the coins began to depict Athena rather than Apollo, we might suggest an Athenian link, but Artemis was no more Athens' than Colophon's and is commonly found on the coinage of her patron city Ephesus.[979] Thus, unfortunately the coins depicting Artemis do not provide any more of a clue as to Colophonian politics of the fifth century. This said, it is notable that all the fifth century coins of Colophon are all of the Persian standard.[980] These are all dated to the period 450-10 and 410-00. It is impossible to date them more precisely but the very fact that Colophon was still using the Persian standard is testament to its greater exposure to Persia than the cities directly accessible by the Athenian fleet. Colophon is the only Ionian city allied to Athens that certainly struck on the Persian standard during this period.[981]

The first tribute assessment for Colophon was three talents.[982] This amount was halved to one and a half by 446/5,[983] a fact that guided the dating of the Athenian regulations for Colophon to the previous year. Thucydides mentions no revolt in 447/6, but Colophon's four-year absence from the tribute lists starting in 450/49 led the authors of the ATL to postulate a revolt for those years, with the installation of a colony lowering its tribute when it reappears on the list in 446.[984] Because neighbouring Lebedus and Dios Hieron had their tribute lowered in 446/5 and post-447/6

10 B.C.), 386 (155-45 B.C.); 1.2 1306-9 (6th century B.C.), 1310 (c.500-450 B.C.), 1311 (c.450-10 B.C.), 1312 (c.400-375 B.C.), 1313-4 (c.370-60 B.C.), 1315 (c.360-30 B.C.), 1316-8 (c.320-294 B.C.). *SNG Turkey* 1.1 387 (c.75-50 B.C.) does not feature Apollo on its obverse but on its reverse.

[978] SNG Copenhagen 135, 138

[979] e.g. *SNG Turkey* 1.1 249-76, 1.278, 1.282-6, 1.2 1282-3. The bee that is commonly found on Ephesian coins was also associated with Artemis (*SNG Turkey* 1.2 1220-1281)

[980] *SNG Turkey* 1.1 355-67; Gardner 1913:166

[981] Erythrae seems to have struck on a similar standard but slightly lighter (Gardner 1913:168).

[982] *IG* I³ 259

[983] *IG* I³ 266

[984] Meritt, McGregor & Wade-Gery 1950:282-3; *IG* I³ 266 col. I.10

respectively, the authors argued that the colony affected these places too. The regulations for Colophon, which likely contain an oath of loyalty, presuppose a revolt.[985] The inscription contains three-barred sigma throughout, a fact which guided its dating to the early 440s and seemed to be supported by the evidence of the tribute lists.

Yet Colophon's tribute record is far from straightforward. For four years its name and tribute amount are restored either fully or almost fully.[986] For the year 441/0, Colophon's ethnic is restored from only a single, uncertain nu followed by a large lacuna.[987] The (restored) Colophonians are preceded by the Gryneians, which is true of the following list (IG I³ 272 col. I.13-4) but no other list. Colophon is absent from the tribute lists as they stand for the years 439/8-434/3. The gap between its entries in 451/0 and 446/5 means that we cannot know in which year its tribute was reduced; in fact even in the year 451/0 its tribute is not preserved. Its tribute appears to go back up in 433/2, though the amount for that year is restored and for the following year is insecure. There is no way of knowing for certain why it went back up to 3 talents and finally down all the way to 500 drachmas in 428/7. In a total of eight years its tribute amount is entirely restored, meaning that there can be very little certainty about fluctuations and the reasons behind them.[988]

The list for 447/6 is so fragmentary that it cannot be used as proof that Colophon did not pay. The names of Lebedus, Dios Hieron and Notium are all restored in their entirety, making it possible that Colophon should also be restored. In fact Colophon's most common position, preceding Notium, is available.[989] Calydnus is restored on the

[985] *IG* I³ 37
[986] *IG* I³ 267, 269, 271, 273
[987] *IG* I³ 271 col. II.11
[988] *IG* I³ 260, 262, 267, 269, 271, 272, 273, 279
[989] *IG* I³ 265 col. II.18

basis that the two appear together in the previous list, but that is the only such instance. It is true that there are close correspondences between the two lists, which is why previous editors have been so confident in restoring both lists.[990] Yet where neither ethnics nor amounts survive, one cannot restore with certainty. The entire section, and column II in general, is so incomplete that it is a challenge to restore with any certainty. Interestingly, Meritt and West originally restored Colophon into the lists for both 448/7 and 447/6, in the belief that it was the only ethnic that would fit one of the entries beginning with kappa.[991] This seems to have been a mistake based on a miscalculation of how many letters were available. Yet even with this restoration no longer available, there are plenty of lacunae – even some beginning with a kappa – into which Colophon could fit.[992]

Colophon's general tribute trajectory is rather unpredictable. It is halved from three talents to one and a half, then doubled once again by 432/1.[993] Finally in 428/7 it is reduced to only 500 drachmas and continues paying that amount until 416/5. This would suggest that its assessment was not raised in the reassessment of 425/4. The amount is missing, so there is the slight possibility that Colophon was assessed for more but defiantly continued to pay 500 drachmas. One can only speculate as to why Colophon's monetary contribution varied so much over the course of almost four decades. Two possibilities that will be explored are that Colophon was paying to both Athens and Persia, and that a colony was installed after its revolt. Certainly, it makes sense for the town to end up paying significantly less than it was originally assessed for, given that so many of its inhabitants left to form splinter groups in other areas. Its

[990] Meritt & West 1928; Meritt, McGregor & Wade-Gery 1939:175-8
[991] Meritt & West 1928:293
[992] e.g. *IG* I³ 265 col. II.26
[993] *IG* I³ 280

halving of tribute by 446/5 is in line with large scale reductions at that time, sometimes attributed to Athens' weak bargaining position after Coronea; Diodorus claims that "many cities" seized upon Athens' weakness and revolted although he only names Euboea and Hestiaea.[994] Yet its doubling of tribute at some point between 441/0 and 432/1 remains to be explained. It is interesting that the tribute of nearby Ephesus and Myus goes back up in the same time period. Ephesus' tribute goes down in 445/4 from 7½ talents to 6 talents, but is raised again between 439/8 and 433/2.[995] Myus' tribute also goes down from 1½ talents to 1 talent before 440/39 and rises back to its original amount by 432/1.[996] Erythrae's tribute goes down from 8 talents 3300 drachmas to 7 talents, then up even further to 10 talents 1100 drachmas between 440/39 and 433/2[997] However, Erythrae's tribute is more complex since it sometimes involves *syntely* with its dependents. For other nearby cities the same situation is possible but the evidence of the lists is lacking. Pygela, Isindus and Marathesion appear on the lists only sporadically and their tribute may have sometimes been paid in *syntely* with Ephesus.[998] Lebedus' tribute goes down in 446/5 but after 440/39 it drops off the lists completely.[999] Chios is not a normal contributor and barely appears on the lists.[1000] Teos' tribute is mainly restored and lacking in numerals after 440/39.[1001] It is possible that all or some of these cities were reassessed around the time that Athens was in the area putting down the Samian revolt. Their tribute may have been duly increased with the revolt of Euboea safely in the past and Athens' confidence on the rise. This explanation can only be

[994] Piérart 1987:294; Diod. 12.7
[995] *IG* I³ 267 col.V.17; *IG* I³ 279 col. I.65
[996] *IG* I³ 272 col.II.12; *IG* I³ 280 col. I.62
[997] *IG* I³ 272 col.II.16 (plausibly restored because of the amount and position above Polichna); *IG* I³ 279 col.I.48-9
[998] Meritt, McGregor & Wade-Gery 1950:22
[999] *IG* I³ 266 col.I.13; *IG* I³ 272 col.I.8
[1000] *IG* I³ 259 col.V.21; [*IG* I³ 264 col. I.24]; *IG* I³ 265 col.I.23
[1001] *IG* I³ 273 col.I.15; *IG* I³ 279 col.I.44; *IG* I³ 280 col.I.9 (none of which contain a numeral)

speculative, but has the advantage of using known local events to explain trends in tribute payment.

Colophon barely finds a mention in Thucydides' history, but when it does it is in the year 427. Narrating Alcidas' flight from Ephesus, Thucydides says that he went via Notium, the port of Colophon, "where the Colophonians had settled after the capture of the town above by Itamenes and the barbarians, called in on account of factional fighting.".[1002] The phrase, which is hard to translate fully, is κατὰ στάσιν ἰδίαν. The precise phrase used may mean factional fighting or fighting that was confined to Colophon, rather than spreading to Notium and other parts of the area. Some editors amend to ἰδίᾳ ("in private"), which would mean instead that one of the parties privately called in Itamenes. The difference between the two is only important for the question of whether Itamenes was breaking the "Peace of Callias" by responding to an official request, or helping some individuals privately.[1003] Itamenes' original capture of the city must have been around 430, for Thucydides says that it happened around the time of the second Peloponnesian invasion of Attica. This fits the record of the tribute lists, from which Colophon is absent in 431/0 and 430/29.[1004]

Thucydides' reverse narrative, relating first Alcidas' resettlement of the place and then the circumstances leading to the *stasis* that required settling, does not give the impression that the fate of Colophon was important to his history. He leaves several questions unanswered. Itamenes is not otherwise known and it is not clear whether he was acting under the orders of Pissouthnes or independently. Given Pissouthnes' blatant interference in the area a decade previously, the Ionian exiles' confidence that he would support a revolt, and his subsequent willingness to help the pro-Persian refugees settled

[1002] Thuc. 3.34
[1003] Badian 1987:25
[1004] *IG* I³ 281, 282

at Notium, it is likely that Itamenes was acting on his orders.[1005] Thucydides says that the town was taken by "Itamenes and the barbarians", which does not rule out that Itamenes had been ordered by Pissouthnes to raise a local army. In 430/29 the Athenians had sent six ships to Caria and Lycia.[1006] These ships were to collect tribute and protect trade, which was being interrupted by Spartan privateers. Again, one wonders whether Pissouthnes had a hand in the disruption and from how far up the command came. Lewis suggests that Artaxerxes was interested in "possibilities of stray profit" that arose from the likes of the situation in Colophon.[1007] As Lewis points out, when in the summer of 425 Artaxerxes sends Artaphernes to Sparta saying that he does not know what they want, he is still interested in making a deal with them, but he "will wish to know what he is buying".[1008] He cannot make a deal while the Spartan ambassadors cannot agree on their message. This is not the first we hear of attempted talks between Sparta and Persia; in 430, some Spartan ambassadors on their way to Persia are seized in Thrace, taken to Athens and all put to death immediately.[1009] Since Artaxerxes rarely features explicitly in Thucydides' history, it might be taken for granted unless otherwise specified that satraps and individuals like Itamenes were acting with the Great King's approval and sometimes even on his instruction. Diodorus claims that it was the policy of Persian commanders in war to refer every single detail to the King and wait for a reply because they were not independent agents.[1010] Diodorus uses this to explain Pharnabazus' stalling before the Egyptian revolt in 374/3 B.C., but implies that this policy of seeking permission had been in place for some time with the word ἐπίπαν. Perhaps the truth was somewhere in between, with satraps consulting the King where

[1005] Thuc. 1.115, 3.31, 3.34
[1006] Thuc. 2.69
[1007] Lewis 1977:61-2
[1008] Lewis 1977:62; Thuc. 4.50
[1009] Thuc. 2.67
[1010] Diod. 15.41.5

possible and using him as an excuse when they wanted to delay or change their mind. With so little information from Thucydides, one can only speculate about whether Itamenes was acting on command but a good case has been made for adherence to royal directive even where Thucydides does not make it explicit.[1011]

If Pissouthnes did order Itamenes to take Colophon, this is further proof that the satrap considered the coastal towns of Asia Minor his own and was determined to treat them as such. Badian may be right to say that Pissouthnes did not consider himself *de facto* at war with Athens, for otherwise the Ionian exiles who appealed to Alcidas directly after the siege of Mytilene would not think they needed to persuade Pissouthnes to support their cause. All they claim is that they think they will be able to get him to join in the war with them (ξυμπολεμεῖν).[1012] However, that Pissouthnes immediately sprang to mind suggests that the satrap had a claim over the Ionian cities and an interest in keeping Athens out of them. Badian argues that Alcidas' rejection of their proposal betrays that they had no basis for believing that Pissouthnes would be interested in getting involved.[1013] But this is not Thucydides' version of events. For Thucydides' Alcidas, the opportunity for aggression has passed and all he wants to do is get back to Sparta safely. Even if Thucydides is being unfair to Alcidas by portraying him as a defeatist coward, the problem with the Ionian exiles' plan is timing, not their choice of patron.

For our purposes the question is not whether Pissouthnes violated the "Peace of Callias", but whether he was still interfering in the cities of Asia Minor in a meaningful way during the Peloponnesian War proper. The answer to this must be yes. A related question is how keen the Athenians were to regain the town, which Pissouthnes had

[1011] Waters 2010
[1012] Badian 1987:23; Thuc. 3.31
[1013] Badian 1987:23

managed to assert complete control over. Badian thinks the brevity with which Thucydides deals with the whole episode "must mean that they [the Athenians] never did intervene at Colophon" after Paches left.[1014] Yet the alternative is that Thucydides was not particularly focused on Persian activity in Asia Minor. He tells the episode as a brief excursus from the main narrative of Paches putting in at Notium on his way to Lesbos to put down the Mytilenean revolt. As we have seen, his narrative leaves a lot to be desired. Paches' capture of Notium is presented as sheer opportunism: on his way from Patmus to Mytilene he touched at (ἔσχε) Notium, whose exiles called him in to repatriate them. This he did, and then carried on to Mytilene whose story is the true focus of chapters 2-50 of Book 3. If Paches' was not a chance visit, Thucydides is not concerned to mention it. Had Colophon been recaptured at some point later, one wonders whether he would have been concerned to mention it. Had Paches not put in at Colophon, the town might never have made it into Thucydides' history at all.

Whether or not he was acting under Pissouthnes' orders, Itamenes' capture of the town helps to explain Athens' sending of six ships to Caria and Lycia in the winter of 430/29.[1015] Thucydides says that the aims of the mission were to collect tribute and to prevent pirates from the Peloponnese from harassing trading vessels from Phaselis and Phoenicia. Phaselis was an Athenian ally and perhaps some places as far inland as Phoenicia were too, although Thucydides may refer to an unknown Phoenice in Lycia.[1016] Pissouthnes may have been behind these pirate raids, since the Spartans were not known for their naval strength, especially so far from home, and Pissouthnes had previously been active in damaging Athens' interests on the western coast of Asia

[1014] Badian 1987:23
[1015] Thuc. 2.69
[1016] Dickinson 1979

Minor.[1017] The Athenian mission to Caria and Lycia must also have been influenced by the loss of Colophon and a subsequent desire to assert control in the region. It was, however, unsuccessful: Melesander, the general in command, was killed in battle and many Athenian troops were lost. Thucydides' account gives the impression that Melesander was not simply collecting tribute or defending the coastline but trying to re-assert Athenian domination in mainland Ionia: he and his troops got out of their ships and went up-country (ἀναβάς) into Lycia and whatever they did was enough on the offensive that they provoked battle. Their motive could have been retaliation for the recent loss of Colophon. The loss of Colophon may also explain nearby Pygela's payment of *epiphora* in the year 430/29, although it must be noted that both entries for Pygela in that year are heavily restored and payment of *epiphora* may be more a practicality than a sign of unrest.[1018]

After settling at Notium, the exiled Colophonians had been suffering from *stasis*, with the pro-Persian faction gaining the upper hand and governing the city with the help of the "Medisers" who were now in charge of Colophon itself.[1019] During the *stasis* these men called in Pissouthnes and the pro-Athenian faction enlisted the help of Paches. Pissouthnes provided Arcadian and "barbarian" mercenaries, whom those in charge of Notium kept in a walled off area of the town. Paches was, through deception, able to bring Notium back into the Athenian sphere, and afterwards the place was colonised according to Athenian laws. Thus, it was that both Colophon and Notium revolted from Athens. It is notable that Paches did not try to recapture Colophon but focused on getting Notium back under Athens' sway; this may be partly explained by Notium's coastal location as compared to Colophon's location inland. Athens' naval

[1017] Hornblower 1991:354-5
[1018] *IG* I³ 281 col.I.45-6; Eddy 1973:254
[1019] Thuc. 3.34.2

strength was enough to maintain control on the coastal areas of Asia Minor but towns that required an additional expedition on foot were a different matter.

The political situation at Colophon and Notium is intensely complex and makes it impossible to visualise the conflict as being between "oligarchs" and "democrats" or even "pro-Persians" and "pro-Athenians". It does not help that Thucydides' terminology is often imprecise; he calls those who moved to Notium "Colophonians" but leaves us to work out how many they were and how many they left behind in Colophon. Nor does he explain the *stasis* that broke out at Colophon; the fact that the Athenians later made Notium democratic might suggest that there was a quarrel between oligarchs and democrats which drove the democrats out, but this is mere inference. Strangely, in his account of *stasis* between the newly settled Notians, Thucydides describes the pro-Persian Notians as entering into shared citizenship (ξυνεσελθόντες ἐπολίτευον) with the original Medisers from Colophon. These need not be all the pro-Persians from Colophon, but they must have been a significant number for Thucydides to call them τῶν ἐκ τῆς ἄνω πόλεως Κολοφωνίων οἱ μηδίσαντες ("the ones who medised out of the Colophonians from the upper city"). One wonders why it was preferable for these pro-Persians to move to Notium rather than staying put in a town that had already fallen under Persian influence. Unless we are to assume that by migrating they left the town desolate, there may have been a combination of pro- and anti-Persians left in the town after "the Medisers" left for Notium. What Thucydides' wording suggests is that those who remained were not Medisers, so perhaps even after the town's capture by Itamenes some pro-Athenians decided to remain. Thucydides does not tell us of the eventual fate of "the Medisers" who moved to Notium, so when Paches expelled them they may have returned to Colophon or gone elsewhere. Paches evidently did not attempt to regain Colophon, since his main mission was the far larger

task of reconquering Mytilene. However, there remains the possibility that at some point in the future Athens did take back control of Colophon, especially since the original troublemakers may not have been around or may have had less influence once they returned from Notium. Thucydides makes no record of this, but as we have seen his treatment of towns like Colophon, whose internal struggles had little impact on the main course of the war, is not comprehensive. Even if Athens had never formally regained the town, the departure or loss of influence of a large number of the pro-Persian faction might explain Colophon's appearance on the tribute quota lists some time after the town was lost to the Persians. What the episode confirms is that factional fighting did not always involve only two parties, and that the exodus of a particular group need not entail a complete exodus.

Harold Mattingly first suggested that the natural context in which to place the regulations for Colophon is this instance of *stasis* related by Thucydides, and not a hypothetical rebellion in the 440s.[1020] In the tribute list dated to 428/7, Colophon appears with its tribute reduced, allowing for the possibility that this reflects the installation of a colony or cleruchy post-revolt.[1021] This seems to have been an Athenian policy. In Thucydides, the imposition of a cleruchy on the Mytileneans goes hand in hand with the cessation of tribute and it is clear that one replaces the other.[1022] This can only be speculative because the only known colonists were sent to Notium rather than Colophon. Note, however, that what little Thucydides does say about Colophon implies that Athens first sent colonists out in the early 420s. What this means is that dating the inscription for Colophon to the 440s not only does not make use of but actually

[1020] Mattingly 1961:175
[1021] *IG* I³ 283 col. III.24
[1022] Thuc. 3.50.2

contradicts Thucydides' testimony. It places Athenian colonists in Colophon far earlier than there is any other evidence for them.

In support of Mattingly's dating, Stephen Tracy places the decree in the last three decades of the fifth century, although he questions the assumed relationship of the four fragments, suggesting that the fragments constituting lines 35-56 are older and from a different decree.[1023] The lettering is "quite different and surely by a different cutter". It looks like one of the rhos is tailed in fragments *b* and *c*, whereas they are not in the other two fragments.[1024] However, the rhos in fragments *b* and *c* are still round rather than angular and the other visible rhos do not have a tail. Fragment *a* has upsilon made from three strokes, upright nu, phi with a tall vertical line and psi with slightly curved bars and a vertical line that extends below the bottom of the V shape. In contrast fragments *b* and *c* have upsilon made from two strokes, slanted nu, phi with a shorter vertical line and a very straight psi with barely any vertical line below the V shape. They also have a broad lamda with horizontal lower stroke whereas the lamdas of fragments *a* and *d* are more angular and their lower stroke points up. The mu of fragments *b* and *c* is wider than that of fragment *a*.

If fragments *b* and *c* do belong to an earlier time, perhaps there was an earlier intervention at Colophon. This does not necessarily mean that Colophon revolted twice - for fragments *b* and *c* do not explicitly mention a revolt or an outside threat - but rather that Athens sent colonists and had the Colophonians swear an oath as a precautionary measure at some point before the town was completely lost to the Persians. One alternative is that fragments *b* and *c* belong to a different decree that was nevertheless

[1023] Tracy 2016:228

[1024] In line 54, the rho in παραβαίνοιμ[ι] appears to have a tail but elsewhere (e.g. ἀναγράψαν[τες in l.41) a tail is less discernible. The editor of *IG*² records tailed rho for fragment *b* of I³ 37 (Hiller von Gaertringen 1974:9-10) but the editor of *IG*³ does not (Lewis 1981:40).

passed around the same time as the other fragments, but whose cutter's style is less modern. Another is that a single decree was inscribed by two different hands. Since there is no other evidence, literary or epigraphic, for an earlier intervention at Colophon, and since the norm is for decrees to be inscribed by a singler cutter, I am inclined to believe that two decrees were passed regarding the same crisis. The assumption underlying many arguments for multiple revolts by the likes of Erythrae and Colophon is that Athens only passed one decree per revolt, but there is no reason to believe that the Athenians only gave themselves one shot when it came to dealing with allied cities. If a town was particularly problematic – as towns on the border of the Persian Empire were guaranteed to be – the Athenians must have taken extra care to maintain influence over it. Issuing multiple decrees concerning the same situation in a town is not unprecedented; one might compare the decrees concerning Chalcis or Methone, or the decrees honouring the Samians.[1025]

Fragment *a*, at least, is judged by Tracy to be in the "late fine plain style" despite its three-bar sigma. [1026] This supports the association of the decree (or at least this fragment) with known events after 430 B.C. It is fragment *a* that sets out the main provisions for Colophon, though due to the state of the stone most of these provisions evade us. As will be shown, what can be gleaned from the stone is better associated with what Thucydides tells us about Colophon at the beginning of the Peloponnesian War proper. That Thucydides does not go into more detail about the intervention should not surprise us; any argument *e silentio* is unconvincing when Thucydides' record of events in Asia Minor is so patchy.

[1025] *IG* I³ 40, 61, 127
[1026] Tracy 2014:114

Not all believe that the regulations for Colophon should be down-dated. Rhodes would keep them in 447/6 on the basis that they have a less "developed" (i.e. less imperialistic) oath formula than the settlements with Eretria, Chalcis and Hestiaea, which he chooses to keep in the 440s.[1027] However, as he himself concedes later in his article, departure from strict linear progression should not be worrying.[1028] This argument from the development of oath formulae is taken from Mattingly, who holds to the idea that the Athenian empire became gradually more imperialistic over time; he merely shifts this gradual development down to the 420s to coincide with the ascent of Cleon and his fellow demagogues.[1029] Perhaps a general trend in the language of Athenian imperialism can be detected, but to plot a timeline on which each inscription must be ordered from least to most imperialistic seems excessive and lacking in common sense.[1030] Just because the oath to be sworn by the Chalcidians does not include a pledge to love the Athenians, it does not mean that it was drawn up later than the oath to be sworn by the Colophonians.[1031] In fact, the oaths are fairly similar, both omitting mention of the allies and requiring a pledge not to revolt or help someone to revolt. The argument is even weaker considering how fragmentary the Colophonian oath is: barely a third of each line remains and the inscription cuts off mid-oath. Moreover, although mention of the allies would admittedly make for a rather long line length, it ought to be pointed out that the crucial part of the oath does not survive and so it is not definitively known to whom the Colophonians were pledging their allegiance (l.45-8).

A more serious objection to down-dating is that the regulations for Colophon concern Colophon rather than Notium; although it generally mentions "the

[1027] Rhodes 2008:504-5
[1028] Rhodes 2008:506
[1029] Mattingly 1963
[1030] See Low 2005
[1031] *IG* I³ 40.21-32

Colophonians" rather than "Colophon", in line 9 the place itself is referred to. Bradeen and McGregor argue that this shows that Athens controlled Colophon itself at the time of the decree's writing.[1032] Yet the mere mention of a place does not demonstrate control of it. Athenian decrees frequently refer to the enemy, be it Persia or Sparta, as well as factions who support their cause.[1033] A decree concerning Notium might well mention the threat of the pro-Persians in Colophon, which was perilously close. The threat of hostile neighbours will have loomed large, especially when there had been *stasis* among Athens' eastern allies. Mention of "the other" in decrees concerning the allies may also have had the advantage of strengthening the allied bond against a common enemy.

Woodhead points out rightly that "where it is possible to associate an important epigraphical document with an event recorded as important in the literary sources, it is more economical to do so and is liable to be more correct", yet still chooses to date the inscription to 447/6 B.C.[1034] He follows Bradeen and McGregor, arguing that an inscription that mentions Colophon over a dozen times must be about Colophon and not Notium.[1035] The words "Colophon" and "the Colophonians" only survive for certain in the extant inscription five times; the other occurrences are either heavily or wholly restored. As we will see, however many times Colophon is mentioned, it does not prove that the inscription solely concerns Colophon. In an inscription as fragmentary as this, the absence of a surviving mention of Notium is very different to the absence of any mention of Notium.

Since the upper town was not recaptured for a long time and the decree arranges for colonists to be sent out (l.20-3), one does wonder why the inscription in its current

[1032] Bradeen & McGregor 1974:97
[1033] e.g. *IG* I³ 14.27, *IG* I³ 48.7
[1034] Woodhead 1973:349
[1035] Woodhead 1973:351

state mentions Colophon and Colophonians several times and not Notium or Notians. Yet Notium was the port of Colophon and could easily have been considered to be a part of it. Aristotle considers Colophon and Notium to be one city divided by factional strife; granted, he uses it as an example of a place geographically unsuited to being a single city, but this shows that he considered the two places to some extent interchangeable.[1036] Later on, in the late fourth and early third century, a treaty of *sumpoliteia* (joint citizenship) existed between Colophon and Notium with the two places retaining a degree of independence from each other but minting together and ratifying each other's decisions.[1037] Thucydides himself uses the term Νότιον τὸ Κολοφωνίων ("Notium the [port] of Colophon"), which makes Notium sound very much a part of Colophon. So does Theopompus, who describes Notium in terms of its proximity to Colophon.[1038] Most importantly, those who fled Colophon for Notium may have continued to self-identify as Colophonians, especially since their town of origin was so close by. All of this removes any awkwardness in the regulations for Colophon – which are extremely fragmentary in their extant form – not mentioning Notium itself by name.

The relationship between Colophon and Notium during this period merits further comment. The two paid tribute separately from the first tribute list, so Notium must have been well established in its own right before Athens colonised it. Aristotle says that geographical factors made the place not suited to being a single city. Yet he also compares their relationship to that between democratic Athens and "more democratic" Piraeus, perhaps suggesting that the problem was more than geographical and Notium was the "more democratic" version of Colophon. Certainly, it became the

[1036] Arist. *Pol*. 1303b
[1037] Robert 1936:165-6
[1038] Harpocration s.v. Νότιον

refuge of exiled Colophonians, though these included pro- and anti-Persians alike. It was also controlled by Athens until the end of the war. The decree in honour of the Samians from the end of the war praises the people of Notium for welcoming in exiled Samians.[1039] This must have been when Lysander took over Samos and ousted some or most of its democrats.[1040] For Notium to be receiving exiled democrats and being praised for it by Athens, it is a reasonable assumption that the place was particularly sympathetic to the democratic cause. The Athenian fleet also used Notium as a base towards the end of the war. In 406, Lysander defeated an Athenian fleet there.[1041] Diodorus Siculus tells us that Notium is where Alcibiades left his ships before trying unsuccessfully to take Ephesus from Lysander.[1042] It seems that Notium was indeed the "more democratic" part of Colophon. However, note that Thucydides calls the Medisers τῶν ἐκ τῆς ἄνω πόλεως Κολοφωνίων οἱ μηδίσαντες. They are the ones who Medised "out of [all] the Colophonians who were in the upper city". Clearly after some anti-Persian Colophonians fled to Notium, there were still some who remained in Colophon who were *not* Medisers. Moreover, those who fled to Notium split in two again into pro- and anti-Persians, and the pro-Persians were joined by (some of) the pro-Persian party from Colophon.[1043] Thus, it is too simple to say that Colophon was pro-Persian and Notium was pro-Athenian. Evidently, there was a mixture in both places.

Note also that Colophon continued to pay tribute long after the place was taken over by Itamenes. Its tribute was merely reduced in 428/7, and after that it appears twice in the tribute lists paying the reduced amount. The second of these appearances is in 416/5, which suggests that Colophon was paying Athenian tribute (at least on and off)

[1039] *IG* II³ I
[1040] Xen.*Hell*.2.3.6-7
[1041] Xen.*Hell*.1.5.10-14
[1042] Diod. Sic. 13.71
[1043] Thuc. 3.34.2

for over a decade after Athens "lost" the town to the Persians. Thucydides' narrative in isolation gives the impression that Colophon was completely lost and seceded from the empire around 430, with no attempt to bring it back into the fold. When Thucydides says that Paches gave Notium to the Colophonians who had not medised, the implication is that Colophon itself was forfeited to the Colophonians who *had* medised.[1044] So it is extraordinary to find Colophon paying any tribute after this date, and it also raises the possibility that the town was paying tribute on two fronts. Meritt and West believe that since the amount paid by Colophon is only nominal, "[t]he quota was probably paid by those refugees who had settled in some quarter of Notium specially set apart for them, where they retained their name and separate existence".[1045] The sum may be small, but it is hardly natural to explain the Colophonians' presence on the list by supposing that of those who fled to Notium, a small group could not bear to lose their former identity and led an entirely separate existence to their fellow pro-Athenians. The most natural interpretation of the evidence is that either Colophon continued to pay, even if only a nominal sum, in order to hedge its bets, or a rebel group in Colophon continued to pay despite the town's pro-Persian stance. Another possibility is that Athens regained the town, and Thucydides neglected to record this later detail. This is hardly out of the question, since the historian summarises Colophon's entire history in one very short chapter midway through his narrative of the fall of Mytilene.

Descat suggests a different reason for Colophon's drastic reduction in tribute in the 420s.[1046] Descat argues that the Peace of Epilycus was not a mere renewal of the Peace of Callias, but a totally different treaty with different concessions. He dates the tribute list IG I³ 283 to 426/5 and uses Colophon's lowered tribute to argue that Athens

[1044] Thuc. 3.34.4
[1045] Meritt & West 1927:58
[1046] Descat 1991

had to cede control of most of Colophon in the new peace negotiations, when new geographical boundaries for both empires were agreed. Descat suggests that Caunus was also ceded to Persia in the negotiations. These negotiations will have taken place after Artaxerxes' death in 424 B.C. and early in the reign of Darius II. Yet here lies the weakness in Descat's argument: if the negotiations took place around 423-2 B.C., why did Athens lower Colophon's assessment so much earlier? Nor would one expect to find Caunus (plausibly restored) on the tribute quota list for 421/0 if Athens had given up its claim a couple of years previously.[1047] Nor need Colophon's lowered tribute prove any successful negotiations between Athens and the Great King. Athens may simply have assessed Colophon for less because the town was now largely pro-Persian.

If Colophon fell into the hands of Itamenes and subsequently Pissouthnes, it is likely that the latter seized the opportunity to extract tribute from the town for the Great King. This fits what Thucydides says about the status of the Ionian cities by 413/2; by this time they are being assessed by Persia.[1048] Herodotus states plainly that the Ionian tribute assessed by Artaphrenes remained roughly the same until his time of writing, i.e. the 430s.[1049] It may be that before Itamenes' taking of the town tribute was expected from Colophon even though it was not paid. Perhaps tribute was already being paid before Itamenes' arrival. Colophon might have tactically chosen to pay both Athens and Persia in order to hedge its bets on the outcome of the war. Alternatively, wealthy individuals from Colophon may have chosen to keep up payments to the King. As sugggested above, the fact that in 427 many of the pro-Persians in Colophon migrated at least temporarily to Notium might have weakened their influence in the town. All of

[1047] *IG* I³ 285 col.II.11. The first two letters are missing but no other recorded town ends -ύνιοι and Caunus appears directly above the Pasandes on other lists (*IG* I³ 260, 271)
[1048] Thuc. 8.5.5; 8.18.1
[1049] Hdt. 3.42.2

this is necessarily speculative, but the combined testimony of Thucydides and Herodotus hints at a much more significant obligation to Persia than is sometimes recognised.

Even if Colophon only resumed paying tribute to Persia by the 410s, it looks like there was a considerable period when it was answerable to both the Athenian and the Persian empires for funds. And in other ways, too, it seems to have been facing in both directions. Cook notes that three or four miles north of Colophon a bronze vessel was found inscribed with the words ἐπὶ Λεωφάντου Λαμπρου, ἆθλον ἐγ Λαμψάκου ("for Leophantus son of Lampros, a prize from Lampsacus").[1050] The inscription is thought to be classical and a Greek likely owned the cup. If Cook's interpretation is correct, this means that a Greek owned land in Persian-dominated territory. One cannot date the cup with any precision but even if Colophon was not in Persian hands at the time, the find demonstrates the overlap between Greek and Persian influence in the area. The narrative of Xenophon supports the idea that Greek and Persian grandees were living side by side in 409 B.C.[1051]

The regulations for Colophon, though fragmentary and very worn, contain some interesting features. They are made up of four fragments that all mention either Colophon or "the Colophonians". The fact the text is not *stoichedon* makes restoration particularly difficult. Mention is also made of the citizens of Dios Hieron and perhaps Lebedus, although in the latter case only the final iota is preserved (l.27). Little is known of Dios Hieron outside the tribute lists. Its exact location is not known for certain but modern-day Birgi in Turkey has been suggested. According to Ptolemy it is high

[1050] Cook 1961:16; Wilberg 1889:317
[1051] Xen. *Anab*. 7.8.8-19

up on the valley of the Cayster.[1052] It often appears beside Notium on the lists.[1053] At some point between 447/6 and 442/1 its tribute was reduced but it is difficult to say when, since its name is either absent or restored from 448/7 to 443/2. In 429/8 its name and amount are restored in a very fragmentary part of the list from the generic ending – αι; this can hardly be a certain restoration.[1054] In 428/7 it appears beside Colophon but unfortunately its tribute amount is missing. It does not seem that its tribute was lowered in conjunction with the revolt of Colophon – or at least, not for long - because in 421/0 (its final extant entry) it is still paying the same amount. Yet although the place is mentioned in the context of owing money (l.26), the section is far too fragmentary to be sure that what is being discussed is tribute, let alone specifically the reduction of tribute. It is entirely restored at the beginning of the tribute list for 443/2, based on the assumption of the authors of the *ATL* that its tribute was remitted for the third assessment period.[1055] However, the lists for the years 446/5-444/3 are fragmentary enough that it may be an accident of preservation. Only in 442/1 does Dios Hieron reappear for certain paying half its original tribute. This means its reduction in tribute may well have nothing to do with those of Colophon and Lebedus in the early 440s.

Mention of the cult of Athena Medeousa (l.15) fits what we know about the setting up of a colony after Paches had retaken Notium. Setting up a cult to Athena the protectress would be expected in a colony of Athens' or even, in Samos' case, a quasi-colony of Athens. The inscription talks about colonists at least once (l.42), and in all likelihood three times. In line 20 five men are to be chosen, presumably as colonists, and three lines below we probably have οἰκέτ]ορες, colonists, who are to work with the

[1052] Ptol. 5.2
[1053] *IG* I³ 259,260,263,272,285
[1054] *IG* I³ 282 col. IV.19
[1055] Meritt, McGregor & Wade-Gery 1950:282

demos. The editors of *Inscriptiones Graecae* restore line 20 οἱ δ' αἱρεθέντες πέ[ντε οἰκισταὶ. This is in accordance with Thucydides, who says that the Athenians sent out οἰκισταὶ of their own in order to set the place up according to their laws.[1056] These five men could play the same role as those in the regulations for Miletus and Chalcis, where five men over a certain age are instructed to take charge of the city.[1057] The inscription likely contains the standard instruction for the *stele* to be set up in the city at the Colophonians' expense (l.39-40). Although this was a financial burden for them, it also gave them the chance to make their own mark on the inscription and probably meant that they could choose the dialect it was written in. Next comes the oath of loyalty that the Colophonians are to swear (l.46-53). This includes a promise not to rebel from Athens but to love it and do whatever good it can for it. It likely also includes a promise not to put down the democracy, for δεμο[appears without an article (l.49). This is no surprise, since Thucydides states that the Athenians colonised Notium according to their own laws. There is no corresponding oath for the Athenians to swear, which is hardly surprising in the context of a revolt. The inscription cuts off in the middle of the oath and the last few lines seem to invite ruin on the taker of the oath and his family if he breaks the oath (l.53-6).

In the past, it had been thought that Athens must have established a democracy in Colophon in 447/6.[1058] This was on the basis of the restoration δεμο[κρατίαν οὐ καταλύσο Κολοφῶνι...], "[I will not put down the] demo[cracy at Colophon", in line 49. It seems likely that the first four letters bespeak a democracy because the most likely restoration is *demokratia* and the only other likely restoration, *demos*, is also suggestive of democracy. Yet it is a lot to infer from one partial word, when there exists no other

[1056] Thuc. 3.34.4
[1057] *IG* I³ 21.4-6; *IG* I³ 40.46-7
[1058] Meritt, McGregor & Wade-Gery 1950:153

evidence that Athens set up a democracy at Colophon. Now that re-examination of the inscription has made it unlikely that the regulations deal with a revolt of Colophon in the early 440s, the evidence points against any interference in Colophon's constitution. Instead, what seems to have happened is that Notium was made democratic, as Thucydides says. It has in the past been assumed that the Athenians set up a democracy at Colophon in a manner similar to Samos. Yet the picture that emerges is less simplistic: Athens had an ad hoc approach to setting up democracies and in Colophon's case does not ever seem to have felt the need. If the restoration of the oath is correct and the verb καταλύειν ("put down") is used, this is reminiscent of the law Solon introduced to protect democracy against κατάλυσις τοῦ δήμου, putting down democracy.[1059] Regardless of whether Aristotle is guilty of anachronism in attributing this to Solon, the safeguarding of Athenian democracy was certainly enshrined in law by the time of the Peloponnesian War. We know of more than one fifth-century trial for attempting to subvert the democracy, one being the affair of the profanation of the mysteries and the mutilation of the Herms in 415 B.C.[1060] The men responsible for setting up the oligarchy of the Four Hundred, for more obvious reasons, were charged with the same offence.[1061] The Athenians took precautions to ensure that their democracy would not come under threat, even if in 411 these precautions failed. Since they colonised Notium according to their own laws, it would be natural to find them protecting the Notians' newly established democracy in a similar way.

An Athenian decree of 427/6 honours a certain Apollonophanos of Colophon.[1062] Though not archon dated, it can be dated so precisely because it was

[1059] Arist. *Const. Ath.* 8.4
[1060] Thuc. 6.27; Andoc. 1.36; Diod. 13.2.3
[1061] Xen. *Hell*. 1.7.28; Plut. *Mor*. 833f-824a
[1062] *IG* I³ 65

evidently written during a period of unrest after Colophon had been lost to the Persians but Athens had begun to regain control of Notium. Apollophanos is praised for his help of the Athenian people and Athenian soldiers (l.10-11); perhaps he was instrumental in bringing Notium back under Athens' control. Dios Hieron is again mentioned, this time as a place in which to station a lookout so that it is safe for the Athenians (l.12-3). Mention of a lookout (φυλακε͂ς) reminds us of the value of these Athenian colonies and outposts in Asia Minor as a means of keeping track of what was going elsewhere. Athenian-controlled Notium was the perfect vantage point from which to observe Persian-controlled Colophon, less than ten miles away. Special mention of Dios Hieron in both the regulations for Colophon and the decree for Apollonophanes suggests that both decrees ought to be placed in the same historical context. What led to the separation of the decrees by two decades was likely the fact that one has three-bar and the other has four-bar sigmas. The most natural context would be the period of unrest that Thucydides records from 430-27 B.C. The decree honouring Apollonophanes clearly implies that at the time of writing, Dios Hieron was not safe, for it is a priority of the Athenians' to make it safe again. Perhaps Dios Hieron was also in revolt, in Persian hands or at least hostile to Athens at the time. The decree makes clear that Notium was not settled at the time, for not only had Apollonophanes been collaborating with the troops (l.11) but he is also to collaborate with the generals in the area (l.14-5). Note also that Apollonophanes is identified as a Colophonian twice (l.2, 9) even though he must have been residing in pro-Athenian Notium at the time. Thus, it was natural to refer to a fugitive from Colophon in Notium as being from Colophon.

Notium's surviving tribute record is intriguing. It appears in the *ATL* 17 times, though six of these entries are heavily restored. Its presence in the Thoudippus decree

is gleaned from a lone nu and a possible omicron.[1063] It is restored in 433/2 from a possible sigma although Paarmann disputes the length of the entry and the reading of the sigma.[1064] Curiously where it does appear securely it pays the same amount every time, with the exception of 428/7. In that year it pays a fraction of its usual amount. The authors of the *ATL* argue that a reduction in Lebedus' and Dios Hieron's tribute around 446 betrays the setting up of a colony in Colophon. Yet following this line of reasoning we would expect the same reduction for Notium, which was so close to Colophon as to be considered a part of it. Instead, Notium's tribute remains fixed at the same amount for that entire period. In 446/5 its amount is restored and all that is left of its supposed entry is ιξ͜; yet if it ought to be restored in this list, there is no reason to suppose that it would pay any less than what it pays in every entry pre-428/7. Its tribute is notably static and only decreases for one payment in 428/7, when Colophon's tribute also takes a sudden dip. Dios Hieron's payment, partially extant directly below, is unfortunately not preserved but it is conceivable that it was also reduced for that year, and that what is preserved in lines 26-8 of the regulations for Colophon pertains to this reduction for all three places. After all, Lebedus is almost entirely restored into the inscription and Notium has far more of a known connection to Colophon than Lebedus, especially where the foundation of a colony is concerned. The single iota from which Λεβέδιοι was gleaned in the regulations for Colophon could easily be the remnants of Κολοφόνιοι (or countless other words). If the tribute of all three towns was jointly reduced in 428/7 as the result of a colony, this would also explain why they appear in the list for that year alongside each other for the first time since the first two tribute lists and continue to appear alongside each other for the rest of the record.[1065]

[1063] *IG* I³ 71 col.II.102
[1064] Paarmann 2007b:56
[1065] It is to happen twice more, in 421/0 (*IG* I³ 285) and 416/5 (*IG* I³ 289).

Piérart follows Mattingly's dating and argues in addition that the 27th tribute list, dated to 428/7, should in fact be dated two years later, to 426/5.[1066] He agrees with the general consensus that IG I³ 283 represents a new period of taxation (Period VIII), but disagrees with the accepted date. Piérart points out that several sources say that (with notable exceptions) tribute was reassessed every four years at the Great Panathenaea, and following this, the reassessment naturally would fall in 426/5.[1067] Most scholars assume that 428/7 saw an extraordinary tribute reassessment due to lack of funds.[1068] Thucydides notes that the Athenians were in need of money for the siege of Lesbos, and says that money was gathered from different places.[1069] Yet this sounds like the collection of tribute rather than its reassessment, and it assumes that tribute was collected in advance of the Dionysia at which it was due.[1070] Even if it is true that Athens was short of cash, nothing ties the reassessment specifically to the year 428/7: Plutarch makes it sound more like a gradual process following the death of Pericles when he says that the demagogues "enlarged [the tribute] little by little.[1071] Piérart makes a second argument on the basis of Notium's payment, which in the Thoudippus decree of 425/4 is assessed at the same, remarkably low amount of 100 drachmas as in IG I³ 283. Notium's normal rate of payment is 2000 drachmas. Those who date the tribute list to 428/7 argue that such a low payment is a nominal sum paid while the Persians were in control of Colophon and the loyalists were taking refuge in Notium.[1072] However, it is striking (argues Piérart) that in two separate years Notium is assessed at not only such a reduced sum but also the exact same amount. Moreover, in IG I³ 283

[1066] *IG* I³ 283
[1067] [Xen] *Ath.Pol.* 3.5; *IG* I³ 61 l.5-9,29-31; *IG* I³ 71.26-33 (although the text is extremely fragmentary)
[1068] Meritt, McGregor & Wade-Gery 1950:69-70
[1069] Thuc. 3.19
[1070] Gomme 1956:202-3
[1071] Plut. *Arist*. 24.3
[1072] Meiggs 1972:532

Colophon itself also pays the reduced sum of 500 drachmas, down from 3 talents, which is strange if the city is in revolt; one would expect nothing to be paid rather than the same low amount that Colophon ends up paying in periods 10 and 11, post-revolt. Nor can it be the case that the revolt was put down so swiftly that the 27th list represents the new amount paid by Colophon after its revolt. It would have taken time for Athens to reassess Colophon's tribute after its revolt and Paches' intervention, meaning that the 500 drachmas paid in the 27th list cannot feasibly have been paid in 428/7. The payment in the 27th list must represent the new amount assessed in a subsequent year.

Against this it can be argued that with so little evidence, there is no way of knowing how long it took to put down Colophon's revolt. It is possible that Colophon paid at the end of 427 because its revolt had already been quelled, and its tribute had been reduced in line with the installation of a colony. Even if not, Colophon might have made its payment before it revolted or paid regardless. It is surprising to find Colophon on the lists at all after 427. Yet as argued in the case of Miletus, it is too simplistic to think that (members of) a town in revolt or *stasis* would never have paid tribute. Besides, there are no securely dated lists between Notium's payment in IG I³ 283 and its assessment in 425/4. This makes it less of a coincidence that Notium is shown being assessed at such a low amount in both; for all it means is that Notium's tribute was reduced in 428/7 and remained the same in 425/4. The greatest weakness in Piérart's theory is that Notium is almost entirely restored in the reassessment of 425/4. The only secure reading in the entry is of the final nu. The amount of tribute is insecure and followed by a *vacat*, and the first four letters of Νότιον are restored.[1073] It is restored between Cyrbissus and disputed reading preceding a lacuna;[1074] it does not appear

[1073] *IG* I³ 71 col. II.107
[1074] Only two letters survive. The authors of *ATL* read two sigmas, Paarmann reads an epsilon and a sigma (2007b:81)

below Cyrbissus anywhere alse. Besides, in all other entries but one, Notium is designated by its ethnic Νοτιεῖς, not its toponym.[1075] This means that Notium may not even feature on the list, and Colophon's amount does not survive, making comparison with other years difficult. It would be easier to prove or disprove Piérart's theory if we could compare the amounts paid in IG I³ 283 to those paid in IG I³ 284, for on his reasoning the latter must presumably be dated to 427/6 and no longer possibly belong to the following year. Yet only 20 names and not a single full amount survive. The only partially extant amount is that of Clazomenae, which does not appear on the lists again. In every other period, Clazomenae pays one talent and 3000 drachmas. Then suddenly in IG I³ 283 and 284 it pays 6 talents and 5 talents 2000 drachmas respectively. By 416/5 it is paying an enormous 15 talents. Piérart rightly points out that the authors of the *ATL* employ circular reasoning to claim that the tribute of Clazomenae helps to date IG I³ 283.[1076] Yet this does not make it any more logical to believe that Clazomenae paid 5 talents 2000 drachmas in 427/6 then 6 talents in 426/5, rather than vice versa. All we can say is that the 5 talents 2000 drachmas was probably a partial payment; there is too little context to say when precisely the payment was made or why it was partial. A comparison of the names, rather than the amounts, featured in IG I³ 283 and 284 reveals three towns that appear in the latter and not the former, but this hardly proves that the latter should precede the former.[1077] Thus, Piérart's argument is inconclusive but it does not affect the bigger picture regardless.

Clazomenae is comparable to Colophon in several respects. Aristotle lists them together as examples of cities whose territory is not suitable for the existence of only

[1075] Ethnic: *IG* I³ 259, 260, 261, 262, 263, 264, 266 (restored), 270, 272, 280, 283, 289. Toponym: *IG* I³ 285
[1076] Piérart 1984:173; Meritt, McGregor & Wade-Gery 1939:197
[1077] Καμιρεῖς (fully restored in *IG* I³ 289), Συαγγελεῖς, *h*αιραῖοι.

one city.[1078] In both cases the coastal part – more readily accessible to Athens - was more democratic than the inland part. Thucydides does not explicitly say that the oligarchs at Clazomenae were responsible for their revolt in 412, but their revolt is connected to that of the oligarchs at Chios.[1079] As soon as they revolted they began to fortify Polichna on the mainland; thus they retreated away from Athens' access and towards Persia. The tribute of Clazomenae rose sharply in 428/7 from one and a half to six talents.[1080] Cook suggests that this shows the enthusiasm of the Clazomenian *demos* for the Athenians, who were in the area besieging Mytilene.[1081] Clazomenae had in archaic times been prosperous, and in its territory was a fertile plain. One and a half talents is not a lot regardless of Clazomenae's prosperity in the fifth century. Its very low payment prior to 428/7 may indicate a reluctance to pay because the town was facing more towards Persia than Athens. Clazomenae was less than 70 kilometres away from Colophon by land. Evidence for towns like Clazomenae can help to build a better picture of Colophon, a town whose historical record is so poor. The situation at Clazomenae adds to a sense of competing influence between Athens and Persia in the area.

The redating of the regulations for Colophon from the mid-forties to 427 has implications not only for Colophon's relationship with Athens but also the bigger picture. It is generally accepted that Athens was in financial difficulty by 425/4, hence the harsh re-assessment of tribute that took place in that year.[1082] The rebellions of Miletus and Colophon provide a different context for this re-assessment, one that portrays an Athens struggling to maintain control over the Ionian allies as well as

[1078] Arist. *Pol*. 1303b
[1079] Thuc. 8.14
[1080] *IG* I³ 283 col. III.27
[1081] Cook 1961:14
[1082] *IG* I³ 71

struggling to raise cash. The absence and partial payment of some Ionian cities in the first and second assessment periods meant that scholarship focused on those years as the years which saw widespread defection in Ionia. Mytilene stood out as an exception in the 420s, in part because Thucydides treats it as such. However, with Colophon and other towns revolting in the early- to mid-420s, we find that Athens' problems were more than financial in those years.

Two more inscriptions about Colophon have been discovered. One is unfortunately so fragmentary that it is possible that it does not even concern Colophon; the only positive evidence are the three letters Κολ, the third of which is not a secure reading.[1083] It appears to concern oaths (l.6) and treaties (l.8) so if it does concern Colophon it may pertain to the revolt that Thucydides relates. Possible mention of something that is forbidden (l.2) heightens the impression that we are dealing with punitive measures. Mattingly dates the decree to 425 B.C., and Tracy puts it in the last three decades of the fifth century.[1084] Its three-bar sigmas no longer preclude a date in the 420s, but unfortunately its fragmentariness precludes any meaningful discussion of its contents. The other inscription is more informative and more secure, in all likelihood mentioning both Colophon (l.11) and Athens (l.7, 14).[1085] It appears to praise some men of Colophon for behaving well towards Athens. Being so fragmentary, it cannot be dated securely but it is dated post-445 B.C. by virtue of its four-bar sigma. Tracy dates it ten years to either side of 424/3 because he identifies the cutter as the same cutter of IG I³ 302, an inventory of the Pronaos.[1086] The editors of *Inscriptiones Graecae* suggest a *terminus ante quem* of 427 because of the pro-Persian takeover of Colophon at that

[1083] *IG* I³ 42
[1084] Mattingly 1963:267; Tracy 2014:114-5
[1085] *IG* I³ 43
[1086] 2016:115-6

time. It is possible, however, that the decree praises some particularly loyal Colophonians living in Colophon after that date. It is also possible that the Colophonians being praised are those living in Athenian-ruled Notium, for they may still be referred to as Colophonians rather than Notians. As argued above, the two places were associated with each other and the Colophonians who fled to Notium may still have identified as being from Colophon. A date after 427 should not entirely be ruled out, for Athens will have been in especial need of help from loyal Colophonians after the Persian takeover, and the concern for safety implied by ἀσφαλέστ[...] would suit a context of uncertain control (l.16). Moreover, concern for safety links this decree to the decree in honour of Apollonophanes, in which the honorand is to guard Dios Hieron so that it be safe for the Athenians.[1087] Perhaps the two decrees belong to the same historical context.

Fragments *a* and *b* of IG I³ 43 are opisthographic and inscribed on the other side is I³ 42. Tracy believes for this reason that the two inscriptions may be related (personal communication, July 9th, 2018). It is unfortunate that the latter is so fragmentary, for other than positing that the two belong to the same time, little more can be said. Only one or two words are preserved in each line. The inscription mentions keeping oaths (l.6), treaties (l.8) and probably Colophon or Colophonians, although only the first two letters are certain (l.13). Since the contents of I³ 43 show similarities with the regulations for Colophon, which in turn shows similarities to I³ 65, perhaps all four inscriptions should be associated with the *stasis* at Colophon and its aftermath in the early 420s. Certainly there is nothing standing in the way of this hypothesis now that the three-bar sigma rule has been invalidated, and Tracy has shown that in other ways the regulations for Colophon and I³ 42 have late, developed lettering that places them

[1087] *IG* I³ 65.12-3

in the last three decades of the fifth century. Meanwhile, there is nothing preventing us from associating IG I³ 37 with Thucydides narrative once it has been recognised that the Athenian regulations for Colophon are strictly speaking for Notium.

In 409, the Athenian Thrasyllus and his troops sailed to Notium then marched on Colophon. They succeeded in regaining Colophon as an ally before unsuccessfully attacking Ephesus.[1088] Thus, we can infer that from around 430 to 409, Colophon was in the hands of the Persians and an oligarchy. Thucydides is rough with his timings; he says only that Colophon was taken "around (μάλιστα) the Peloponnesian invasion of Attica happened for the second time", which makes the episode at least a couple of years prior to the date of the narrative in which the excursus is embedded.[1089] This leaves open the possibility that the beginning of the Peloponnesian War in 431 triggered the revolt of Colophon to the Persians. There is no indication in Xenophon's brief narrative that the Athenians tried to change Colophon's constitution to a democracy once they had regained control of the place. The arrival of the Persian cavalry meant that Thrasyllus' visit was short, and one wonders how lasting Colophon's allegiance was with such a heavy Persian presence in the area. Xenophon says that Stages the Persian "was in the area" at the time of Thrasyllus' visit, a reminder of this Persian presence while Colophon appears to have still been a part of the Athenian Empire.

The combined testimony of Thucydides and Xenophon would give the impression that Colophon had seceded for the entire period 430-409, for most of the Peloponnesian War, yet the tribute lists tell a different story. Colophon may well have ceased paying Athenian tribute after 413, when the Great King was certainly trying to divert funds away from Athens. Yet before then, Colophon likely found itself paying in

[1088] Xen. Hell. 1.2.4; Plut.*Lys*.13.3
[1089] Thuc. 3.34.1

both directions. In 407 Alcibiades had his ships cast anchor at Notium on the way to Ephesus, showing its strategic value as a coastal pit-stop.[1090] Indeed, on their way back from Ephesus in 409, the Athenians had buried their dead at Notium, which suggests that it was more than just a convenient place to stop off.[1091] Alcibiades left his steersman Antiochus in charge of the ships at Notium with specific instructions not to do battle until he got back.[1092] But the impetuous Antiochus could not wait and provoked Lysander into a sea battle. The Athenians lost the battle and 15 (or 22) ships with it.[1093] By the time Alcibiades returned it was too late.

This is the last we hear of either Colophon or Notium during the Peloponnesian war. Despite the Athenians regaining Colophon, it is the Notians whom they thank for taking in Samian exiles in 403/2.[1094] Evidently Notium maintained its independence from its inland counterpart, although in the third century it was to become known at least briefly as Colophon-by-the-Sea.[1095] At the end of the war, as with the other "Asian" cities both places will have fallen to Lysander and become decarchies or oligarchies.[1096] If decarchies, this will only have lasted until 402 at the latest due to Lysander's fall from grace and the harmosts' return of political power to the citizens in his absence.[1097] In the fourth century we find Colophon publishing decrees with the familiar Athenian-style prescript.[1098] What is striking is that we have no hard evidence for Colophon becoming democratic in the fifth century, let alone evidence for a

[1090] Diod. 13.71.1
[1091] Xen. *Hell*. 1.2.11
[1092] Diod. 13.71; Xen. *Hell*. 1.5.11
[1093] Diodorus gives the higher number and is perhaps exaggerating. There are other discrepancies between the two narratives: Diodorus claims that Antiochus initially went out with 10 ships, Xenophon, only two. Andrewes treats the discrepancies in full (1982:1-19)
[1094] *IG* II³ I
[1095] SEG 48.1404
[1096] Diod. 14.3.1; Xen.*Hell*.3.4.7; Plut.*Lys*.13.3
[1097] Plut.*Lys*.21.1; Xen.*Hell*.3.4.2. Parke rejects Plutarch's date of 404-3 in favour of 403-2 (1930:53).
[1098] Meritt 1935:377-9, 379-80, 382-3 (restored).

democracy implemented or backed by Athens. That the Athenians made Notium a democracy is no surprise given that it was an Athenian colony. For Colophon, all we know is that the Athenians lost the town to the Persians yet continued to receive tribute, suggesting that the town acknowledged both Athens and Persia as its master during the Peloponnesian War proper. As for its constitution, all we can say is that there is no positive evidence for a democracy.

Chapter 3: Miletus

Some basic facts about Miletus are undisputed: an early member of the Delian League, at some point it rebelled and was reincorporated into the Athenian Empire. If the Old Oligarch is to be believed, Athens briefly supported the oligarchs, to its detriment when they then revolted.[1099] Our local evidence comes in the form of inscriptions; at least one local history is known but lost to us.[1100] Judging by inscriptions from the fifth and fourth centuries with democratic prescripts, by the end of the century Miletus seems to have adopted democracy. That these things happened is not disputed; yet there is a wide divergence of views about when each took place. Moreover, the evidence of the tribute lists has led to the belief that not one but two revolts took place, in the 450s and the 440s, before the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War. Out of the inscriptional evidence, only the tribute lists are securely dated, and even these are subject to interpretation. The case for a revolt in the 450s was bolstered by the Athenian regulations for Miletus, dated to that decade on the basis of three-bar sigma.[1101] Fortunately, a handful of inscriptions from Miletus have survived which give some clue as to its constitution, although their dating is also uncertain. The lists of eponymous officials are of great help but even these pose their own problem of relative dating. In addition to Thucydides, Xenophon and the Old Oligarch, a chapter from Polyaenus' *Stratagems* adds a piece to the jigsaw puzzle of Miletus' history in the fifth century. It, too, is a challenge to date, coming as it does from a compilation of brief anecdotes not in chronological order.

The five Milesian inscriptions that best tell us about political workings in the city are as follows. The first is the "law against tyrants", an early-looking inscription

[1099] [Xen] *Ath.Pol.* 3.11
[1100] Clytus of Miletus' Περὶ Μιλήτου (Clytus *FGrHist* 490 F 1)
[1101] *IG* I³ 21

that names three men and banishes and puts a price on the head of their descendants. Two of the men named, Nympharetus and Stratonax, are presumably no longer alive because they themselves are not proscribed. For the sake of brevity and accuracy the inscription will be referred to by its German designation, the Blutinschrift. The nature of their crime is obscure: "blood-guilt" (ἐπ' αἵμ[ατι]) is a likely restoration but the inscription goes into no further detail. Instead, it outlines rewards for those who manage to kill the proscribed descendants of Nympharetus and Stratonax and penalties for those in charge who fail to put them to death. The second is the extensive list of eponymous *stephanephoroi and aisymnetai* that aids us in dating events. The role of the *stephanephoros*/*aisymnetes* is disputed but he was appointed annually as the head of the Molpoi and was attended by five *prosetairoi*, or companions. The third and fourth are decrees with prescripts that suggest that Miletus was democratic at the time of their being passed. One was published in *Supplementum Epigraphicum Graecum* in 1958 and includes Athenian tribal names and the formula ἔδοξεν τῆι βολῆι καὶ τῶι δήμωι, "it was resolved by the Council and the People".[1102] It can be dated by the name of the *stephanephoros* to 380/79 B.C. It is a completely preserved *lex sacra* regarding the priestess of Artemis. The other decree was published by Peter Herrmann in 1970 and names the *stephanephoros*, prytany, secretary, president and speaker. The name of the tribe, Leontis, is Athenian, and instruction is given to inscribe the decree on a stele if the *demos* says so: ἢν δόξει τῶι δήμωι.[1103] Its date is disputed but it is from the second half of the fifth century. These are the best preserved parts of the decree and very little can be said about its contents other than that it is a *lex sacra* concerning the sanctuary of Poseidon Heliconios. Finally, there are the statutes of the Molpoi. This is a far longer

[1102] Herrmann 1970:163-4; *SEG* 15.677
[1103] Herrmann 1970:165-6

decree, first issued in 450/49, detailing the rites (ὄργια) of the cult of Apollo Delphinios. The Molpoi (literally "singers") were members of a religious college who administered the cult of Apollo and were responsible for singing the paean at public sacrifices.[1104] The decree falls into three sections covering details of the festival called the Hebdomaea (6-18), the annual procession to Didyma (18-31), and the duties of the Onitadae (31-45). The lengthy and well-preserved inscription tells us a great deal about ritual and religion at Miletus, and hopefully a little about its politics. All of the aforementioned inscriptions were previously interpreted on the understanding that Miletus was in revolt in the 450s and was brought back into the fold and made a democracy, either as a direct result of revolt or at a later date.

The evidence needs to be reassessed in order to provide a clearer picture of the development of democracy in Miletus. It is assumed, even by those who warn against such assumptions, that Athens was behind the setting up of democracy at Miletus.[1105] Is there enough evidence to justify this view?

The Archaic Period to the Ionian Revolt

During the Archaic period, Miletus was wealthier and more prosperous than both Athens and Sparta; Herodotus calls it the "glory of Ionia".[1106] Herodotus could be talking about Miletus' wealth or its political stability; his claim is sandwiched between comparisons to wealthy Naxos and to factional strife in Miletus two generations previously. Gorman estimates that Miletus founded between 30 and 45 colonies.[1107] As other Ionian cities, in archaic times Miletus was ruled by hereditary tyrants; according to tradition, its founder was Neleus, and its ruling family were thus known as the

[1104] Their specific role, whether as singers or dancers or *orgiones*, is debated (Herda 2006).
[1105] Robinson 2011:188
[1106] Hdt. 5.28
[1107] Gorman 2001:64

Neleids.[1108] Hellanicus of Lesbos calls Neleus the founder of the entire Ionian dodecapolis; Herodotus and Strabo single out Miletus.[1109] Although Neleus was king of Pylos in Messenia, both Hellanicus and Herodotus include the detail that he was the son of the Athenian king Codrus; Strabo says that Neleus is from Pylos but goes on to claim that the Athenian king Codrus' son Androclus led the Ionian colonisation. As discussed regarding Samos, the tradition is somewhat divergent, but the common thread that runs through almost all the stories of Ionia's colonisation is its Athenian origins. Not all of our non-Athenian sources mention Athens' role in colonising Miletus. however. The late fifth-century poet Timotheus of Miletus, writing after the fall of the Athenian Empire, calls Miletus the twelve-walled (i.e. Ionian) town that is "first among the Achaeans", bypassing any Athenian involvement in founding the town.[1110] The Athenians doubtless capitalised on their Athenocentric version of the myth in their dealings with the Ionian allies in the fifth century.

Two fragments tell stories about early rivalry for kingship, but the relationship between the two fragments is uncertain and their informational value is only anecdotal.[1111] One concerns the expulsion of the children of the first known tyrant Amphitres and the supposed end of the Neleid dynasty; we will return to this later. The other concerns two men who fought for the kingship until the people decided that whoever brought the most benefit to the city would rule. More secure evidence for the tyranny in Miletus begins with Thrasybulus. Thrasybulus was tyrant in the late seventh century and he successfully fended off the attempts of Alyattes to take Miletus for

[1108] Hellanicus *FGrHist* 323a F 23
[1109] Hdt. 9.97; Strab. 14.1.3
[1110] Timotheus 791 Campbell (1993:110); cf. Hellanicus *FGrHist* 323A F 11 Commentary n.177
[1111] Nicolaus of Damascus *FGrHist* 90 F 53; Conon *Narratives* 44. The two stories could be combined but this would require emending the name of Conon's Phitres to Amphitres (Brown 2002:298).

eleven years; Herodotus reports that for three generations the Lydian dynasty was at war with Miletus until Thrasybulus and Alyattes eventually made peace.[1112] Herodotus tells an anecdote that demonstrates the potential for tension between a tyrant and his most powerful subjects: when a fellow tyrant asked Thrasybulus for advice on how to govern his city, he cut off the tallest ears of wheat in his fields and discarded them, thus signalling that he maintained control by disposing of his most influential citizens.[1113] The "cutting off" of certain citizens who made themselves too prominent will return as a theme in the fifth century history of Miletus, even after its tyranny had ended.

Then came Thoas and Damasenor, who were either tyrants themselves or members of a narrow oligarchy who acted in the manner of tyrants.[1114] Plutarch tells us that after they were deposed, two political clubs held the city, *Ploutis* and *Cheiromacha* ("Wealth" and "Labour" or "Hand-fighters"?). After the *dunatoi* had got control of the city and turned affairs over to their club, they would deliberate about important matters by putting out to sea and only returning once they had come to a decision. Because of this, they were called the ἀειναῦται, the "Perpetual Sailors". Plutarch does not make explicit who the *dunatoi* are, but they are more likely to be the wealthy than the hand-workers or hand-fighters. The various meanings of the term δυνατός are discussed in the introduction, its two main meanings being "the wealthy" and "those in power". The latter meaning can be ruled out here, for it would make no sense to say that those already in power gained political control of the city. So it seems likely that the *Ploutis* were put in power and prevailed against the *Cheiromacha*. If the *Cheiromacha* were manual labourers, they may have been the "working" class and *Ploutis* the leisure class. There is only so much to be gained from such an elusive anecdote without generalising or

[1112] Hdt. 1.15-22
[1113] Hdt. 5.92F-G
[1114] Plut. *Quaes. Gr.* 32.298c-d; Gorman & Gorman 2000

stereotyping, but it is our earliest evidence for factional (and perhaps class) struggles in Miletus and it suggests a very narrow oligarchy. Athenaeus also tells a story about violence between rich and poor in archaic Miletus, but it is so obviously a morality tale as to warrant little confidence. In the story, the Milesians, corrupted by luxury, fall into *stasis* with the *demos* first expelling and killing the rich, and then the rich taking their revenge by burning their enemies to death.[1115] Herodotus relates that the *stasis* at Miletus in archaic times was such that the Parians were called in to arbitrate, and the Parians handed over power to those who best cultivated their farms.[1116] These anecdotes can hardly be used as historical evidence, but they provide the backdrop for *stasis* and ideological conflict in the fifth century.

At the beginning of the fifth century, the tyrant in power was Histiaeus. Histiaeus was present on Darius' Scythian expedition and was among the tyrants whom the Great King held in high regard.[1117] Afterwards, when a council was convened to decide whether to free the Ionians on the Scythians' advice, Histiaeus allegedly advised his fellow tyrants to support Darius "because otherwise all the cities would rather have democracy than despotism".[1118] This advice was supposedly given before the turn of the fifth century. As we have seen elsewhere, Herodotus could be guilty of anachronism; this was long before any other evidence for discussion or implementation of democracy in Asia Minor. He also may be guilty of putting the sentiment into Histiaeus' mouth because it helped his characterisation of the tyrant as calculating and self-serving.[1119] Moreover, in Herodotus' account, Histiaeus was responding to the

[1115] Athenaeus 12.523f-524b
[1116] Hdt. 5.28-9
[1117] Hdt. 4.138
[1118] Hdt. 4.137
[1119] All manner of problems with Herodotus' account of the Ionian Revolt have been raised, not all of which will be discussed here. In general, the historicity of the debate between the tyrants has been questioned because it seems like a convenient set-piece of political theory. Lang, who is the harshest critic of Herodotus' characterisation of Histiaeus, actually argues that what

suggestion of the Athenian general Miltiades to set the Ionians free. Herodotus had a particular literary interest in contrasting tyranny with democracy, for in doing so he was able to compare the empires of Persia and Athens.[1120] Regardless of what Histiaeus actually said, he apparently changed his mind and together with his son-in-law and successor, the famed Aristagoras, he raised the Ionian revolt against Persia. Aristagoras started by (allegedly) renouncing his tyranny and giving Miletus equality of government.[1121] Herodotus seems to imply (with a carefully placed μέν λόγῳ) that this was only a pretence, and he was able to proclaim *isonomia* while maintaining his tyranny. He followed this by getting rid of tyrannies all over Ionia then making an alliance with Athens, after failing to persuade Sparta.

When Aristagoras approached the Athenians, he appealed to their historic ties, alleging that the Milesians were settlers from Athens.[1122] Herodotus corroborates this elsewhere with the story of Athenians settling at Miletus and marrying the girls whose fathers they had slain in order to settle there; he finds evidence for this in the custom of Milesian women not to sit and eat with their husbands or even call them by their names.[1123] A version of the story is told in Pausanias, and he includes the detail that Neleus colonised Miletus.[1124] Vitruvius and Velleius Paterculus both say that the Athenian Ion colonised Miletus, although they were writing in the Republican and Augustan periods.[1125] Herodotus elsewhere claims that the Ionians are descended from

---

Herodotus attributes to him here must be true because it "does not fit with his belief that the failure of both Histiaios and the revolt must have resulted from the selfishness of his motivations" and therefore is less likely to have been made up for narrative purposes (1968:25). However, in this passage Herodotus is still imputing selfish motives to Histiaeus and makes him look fickle for so quickly going back on the advice he gives to the other tyrants.

[1120] Forsdyke 2001:341-54
[1121] Hdt. 5.37
[1122] Hdt 5.97
[1123] Hdt. 1.146
[1124] Paus. 7.2.3-6
[1125] Vell. Pat. 1.4.3; Vit. 4.1.4

Athens and hence keep the feast Apaturia; he and others claim that a son of the Athenian Codrus founded either specifically Miletus or Ionia in general.[1126] As previously mentioned, even Solon appears to call Athens the oldest part of Ionia.[1127] How far back this tradition stretches is not clear because many of the early sources are fragmentary or of dubious origin.[1128] Yet it is clear that by the fifth century the Athenian foundation of Ionia was commonly accepted, at least by Athenians: Thucydides takes for granted that the Ionians' cultural heritage can be traced back to Athens; in his "catalogue of ships" for the Sicilian Expedition he states plainly that the Ionians were descended from the Athenians.[1129] Euripides calls Ion the founder of Asia.[1130] In Euripides' play, Ion is descended from Apollo and Erechtheus, and is thus crucially not Ionian but Athenian; the message is that Ionia is Athenian, and not vice versa.[1131] As has been argued in the chapter on Samos, the Athenians will have found it especially useful to draw on the "Athenian" origins of Ionia once they were in charge of the Delian League. Doing so not only created a common identity for Athens and its Ionian allies, but legitimated the former's control over the latter. Out of all the Ionian cities, Miletus seems to have had particularly strong and ancient ties to Athens through common tribal and calendar names and even similarities in their pottery styles.[1132] The possibility that Miletus considered itself an Attic colony, with Athens' encouragement, even before the formation of the Delian League will be important when considering their relationship during the fifth century.

[1126] Hdt. 1.147; Hdt. 7.94; Paus. 7.2.1-6; Hellanicus *FGrHist* 4 F 125; Suda s.v. Πανύασις
[1127] Aristot. *Const. Ath.* 5.2 = Solon fr.4
[1128] Kuciak 2013
[1129] Thuc. 1.6.3, 1.12.4, 7.57.4
[1130] Eurip. *Ion*. 74
[1131] Eurip. *Ion*. 1574-5
[1132] Gorman 2001:37-41; Connor 1993

In the early stages of the revolt, Aristagoras absconded to Thrace because he rightly predicted that it was impossible to beat Darius.[1133] In Thrace he founded a colony and died in conquest. Histiaeus eventually met his end at the hands of the governor of Sardis, Artaphrenes.[1134] The battle of Lade signalled the failure of the Ionian Revolt; the Persian sack of Miletus in 494 "was so total that there are no standing ruins prior to that date anywhere on the site".[1135] According to Herodotus, most of the Milesian men were killed and the women and children enslaved, with the surviving men being taken to Susa as captives.[1136] The same Artaphrenes (though Diodorus calls him Artaphernes) imposed tribute on all the Ionian cities "according to their ability to pay"; that he did so will be important later, when considering Miletus' tribute obligations.[1137]

Not surprisingly, the city lost its prominence and power, and it was not until the battle of Mycale in 479 that it seems to have been operating fully again.[1138] Whether Miletus was totally destroyed and depopulated is contested; since Milesians were present at Mycale, it cannot have stood desolate for long, perhaps being reinhabited by survivors from the city's sack and others from Milesian colonies such as Cyzicus and Olbia. Treaties of *isopoliteia* with these colonies may provide the clue as to whence the new inhabitants came.[1139] The inscribed list of eponymous officials includes names for the years 494-79, when the city was supposedly uninhabited, but this may be invented history, or the list could start earlier than we think with a gap for the period of desolation.[1140] If this is so, the Milesians who appear at Mycale may have gathered again from the cities they had fled to in 494. Herodotus gives the names of many of the leaders

[1133] Hdt. 5.124-6
[1134]Hdt. 6.30
[1135] Greaves 2002:82
[1136] Hdt. 6.19-20
[1137] Diod. 10.25
[1138] Greaves 2002:132
[1139] Gorman 2001:147-50; *I. Milet* 1.3 n.137; *I. Milet* 1.3 n.141
[1140] *I. Milet* 1.3 n.122. If it has no breaks, the list starts in 525/4 B.C.

of the uprising and none of them appear on the list for the period 494-79, which suggests that there was a gap owing to the office falling out of use for these years.[1141] On the other hand, the total depopulation of Miletus makes for a more exciting story. If the place was totally depopulated, it is slightly suspicious that when Milesians reappear at Mycale in 479, they appear to know the geography of the country so well that they are specially stationed at the hill passes.[1142] Either Herodotus is exaggerating, or some Milesians fled and scattered to nearby regions, remaining in the area until 479. Even if the town itself was destroyed, they could have occupied the surrounding *chora*. Certainly some Milesians escaped: Herodotus mentions some who founded a colony, Zancle, in Sicily with some Samians.[1143] A third option is that these are the men who had been spared death and taken to Susa, whom Mardonius now enlisted to fight; [1144] this is plausible if one considers that their knowledge of the local terrain would have been invaluable for the Persians at Mycale. Yet given the level of continuity that we find in the cults, calendar and tribal organisation of pre- and post-494 Miletus, the former is more likely.[1145] When Miletus regained its freedom in 479, this may have been viewed symbolically as a second foundation, especially since the city will hardly have thrived in the intervening years with so few inhabitants and so little infrastructure.

According to Herodotus, Mardonius made the Ionian cities, and thus presumably Miletus, democratic after the revolt had been subdued.[1146] In fact, he says that Mardonius deposed all the tyrants in order to do so, but in Miletus' case both Histiaeus and Aristagoras were dead anyway.[1147] As with Samos, it is best to take

[1141] Kawerau & Rehm 1914:243
[1142] Hdt 9.99
[1143] 6.22.2
[1144] Hdt. 6.20
[1145] Ehrhardt 2003:7-10
[1146] Hdt 6.43
[1147] Hdt. 6.26

Herodotus at face value and assume that Miletus enjoyed democracy at least briefly in 494; Mardonius may well have felt that he had little choice but to install a different governing body if he wanted the Greek cities to continue paying tribute to Persia and remain peaceful. The tyrants' unpopularity may also have been a factor, and the lack of a successor at Miletus provided the opportunity for a change of regime. It is notable that when it came to dividing up territory, the Persians themselves held onto the lowlands and "what was nearest to the city", giving the highlands to Carians.[1148] This would mean that Persia could keep an even closer eye on Miletus. Moreover, Darius settled some captive Milesians in Ampe on the Tigris, perhaps as hostages. We hear no more of these Milesian captives but it would not be surprising if they were used to exert influence over Miletus and keep it loyal. Herodotus even includes the detail that Darius did the Milesians "no further harm" by settling the captives rather than enslaving them, implying a debt of gratitude owed to him. This short Herodotean passage contains a wealth of information suggesting that, though we may not hear much of Persian influence from the sources, their very proximity to Miletus makes it likely that their influence was greater than we currently know.

At the battle of Mycale, the Milesians rebelled from Persia, deliberately misguiding Persian troops along the mountain paths and then killing them.[1149] Pausanias says that Xerxes also accused the Milesians of cowardice in a sea battle against the Athenians, stealing a bronze statue of Apollo from Branchidae in revenge.[1150] Their insubordination paid off, and the outcome of the battle marked the liberation of the Ionian Greeks from Persia. Miletus was possibly one of the original members of the Delian League, although its case is not as clear-cut as Samos'. There is no explicit

[1148] Hdt. 6.20
[1149] Hdt. 9.104
[1150] Paus. 8.46.3

testimony but it is made likely by the fact that the Milesians got their freedom from Persia at Mycale, and when Thucydides speaks of "the Ionians who had just been freed from the Great King" this likely includes Miletus.[1151] Balcer argues on the other hand that there was no time to liberate the Ionian mainland after Mycale, and points out that Persian interference in Ionia continued into the 450s.[1152] Briant adds that the harsh punishment inflicted on Didyma implies that Miletus remained under Achaemenid control: a fragment of Ctesias says that between the battle of Salamis and his death, Xerxes I "sent Megabyzus to plunder the temple at Didyma" after Mycale.[1153] Robertson believes that Miletus joined late and under compulsion because of its rivalry with Samos.[1154]

There are several problems with this reconstruction of events. A dispute over possession of land c.440 is not proof that Miletus and Samos had a sustained rivalry, and even if they did, Miletus must have made the decision whether or not to join the League based on what was best for it. As for the burning of the temple at Didyma, Persia hardly limited its punishment of cities to those it controlled. Moreover, the fragment of Ctesias is complicated by the fact that Photius actually says that Megabyzus plundered the temple at Delphi, not Didyma. Though it makes sense for Didyma to be plundered as revenge for Mycale, most editions nevertheless print Delphi.[1155] Herodotus says that Didyma was plundered after the Ionian Revolt in 494, and Ctesias says that Xerxes targeted Delphi before he invaded Attica, so it does not make much sense for either place to have been destroyed again; it may be that Ctesias' statement is not to be

[1151] Thuc. 1.95.1
[1152] Balcer 1997:374-5
[1153] Briant 2002:535, 555
[1154] Robertson 1980:72-3
[1155] Gilmore 1888:157-8; Ctesias *FGrHist* 688 F 13.31; Nichols 2008:94

believed at all.[1156] In answer to Balcer, Persian possessiveness and membership of the Delian League need not be mutually exclusive; Persia will have interfered whether or not Miletus was formally its own. Balcer's case was easier to argue when Miletus did not appear on the first extant tribute list; now that it does, the most economical explanation is that it joined the League some time before 454 despite - or rather, because of – continued Persian pressure. This would mean that it took part in the Egyptian expedition, and perhaps Milesians were among the 6,000 Greeks commandeered by Megabyzus to join his rebellion against Artaxerxes.[1157] If it was a member of the Delian League from early on, this does not mean that the Great King did not still lay claim to it as his territory.

Unlike Samos, Miletus appears to have paid tribute rather than contributed ships, at least from the beginning of the quota lists that we have. Miletus' record in the tribute lists is singularly complex, as will be discussed below. For a once prosperous state, Miletus' tribute was notably low – 10 talents reduced to 5 in 443 B.C. – adding to an impression of economic decline during the fifth century. The Milesians from Leros alone pay 3 talents in the first quota list, and Leros is a small island. This admittedly could be because of the influx of Milesians into the island, as may have happened at Boutheia when Erythae revolted.[1158] Miletus' sporadic and low payment during the early years could be due to an obligation still to pay to Sardis as well as Athens.[1159] It could also be because Miletus was contributing into a separate naval fund or directly to the Athenian navy stationed in Ionia.[1160] This will have meant that Athena's tithe did not always make it to Athens. Few cities in the region pay more:

[1156] Ctesias *FGrHist* F 13.28; Hdt. 6.19.3; Bigwood 1978:36-9
[1157] Ctesias *FGrHist* 688 F 14.38-40
[1158] Meiggs 1972:112-5
[1159] Cook 1962:122
[1160] Unz 1985:37; Samons 2000:103 n.96

Ephesus in the first list pays 7½ talents, Aerae pays 3 talents and Priene only pays 1 talent.[1161] Regardless, Miletus' 10 talents seems rather low for a city that had once been the glory of Ionia.

Certainly, one must not fall into the trap of assuming that what appears on the tribute lists is the extent of a city's contribution. Nor should it be assumed that an amount ascribed to a city was paid only by that city: one explanation for Leros' tribute obligation is that it was assessed in *syntely* with other Milesian demes.[1162] Whether formally obliged or not, Miletus may have been prevented from regular payment by Persian activity unrecorded in our Athenocentric sources. Alternatively, it could simply be an accident of preservation that Miletus appears erratically on the tribute lists, and its low tribute may reflect its relative poverty in the fifth century as compared to the sixth.[1163]

Miletus is one of the few Ionian cities to continue minting during the fifth century, suggesting a certain degree of wealth, even if it was to a much lesser extent than before the Persian destruction.[1164] It had been thought that Miletus had virtually no coinage of its own in the fifth century, but many coins that were originally dated pre-494 have now been down-dated to the fifth century.[1165] Unfortunately, few coins survive but the coins found have been generally been obols and no larger than diobols. Their iconography, a lion and an ornamental star, is traditional imagery and so tells us little about Milesian politics during the period of their circulation. The lion was the beast of

[1161] *IG* I³ 269 col.I.22, col.III.25, col.II.11
[1162] Jensen 2010:93-4
[1163] Ehrhardt points out that no comprehensive search for fifth century architecture has been carried out and gathers literary evidence for temple building in that period, but nevertheless it is clear that Miletus was not as prosperous then as it had been in archaic times (Ehrhardt 2003).
[1164]Gardner 1913:165; Dunham 1916:108; Deppert-Lippitz 1984:15; Figueira 1998:84, 178
[1165] Konuk 1998:37

Apollo, principal deity of Miletus.[1166] Moreover, the lion and star motif features on coins dated both to the beginning and end of the fifth century – and the motif persists from the sixth century until the Hellenistic era – thus providing no clue as to any upheaval or rebellion.[1167] The date range for most of the coins is broad enough that nobody has linked them to a specific historical context. A coin attributed to an uncertain mint of western Asia Minor, dated 480-400 B.C. features the head of Athena on the obverse and a starlike floral pattern and crescent on the obverse.[1168] The similarity of the obverse to the starlike floral pattern so common to Milesian coins is striking; in both the pattern contains five dots and four petals, although the petals in the Milesian types are notably fuller.[1169] The pattern does occasionally feature elsewhere, such as Ephesus, but not to the same degree.[1170] If my attribution is correct, at least one Milesian coin type of the fifth century shows a recognisable political affiliation by depicting the tutelary deity of its ally, Athens. This would be comparable to Samos' minting of coins featuring owls on them during their membership of the Delian League.

War with Samos and Beyond

In 440/39, war broke out between Samos and Miletus over control of Priene.[1171] Pericles intervened on behalf of Miletus allegedly to gratify Aspasia;[1172] though we need not believe this, it is notable that there was enough contact between the upper classes across Greece that a Milesian *hetaera* (mistress) ended up having influence at Athens. Thucydides reports that the Milesians, who were at a disadvantage, went to Athens for

[1166] Kraay 1976:258)
[1167] *SNG Turkey* 1.1 440-54 (600-550B.C.), 455-82 (c.500 B.C.), 483-7 (5th century B.C.), 488-9 (c.400-380 B.C.); 1.2 1352-6 (c.600-550 B.C.), 1357-1404 (c.500 B.C.), 1405-8 (5th century B.C.), 1409-12 (c.352-325 B.C.), 1411-2 (c.312-290 B.C.), 1413-4 (c.259-246 B.C.), 1415 (c.225-190 B.C.), 1416-9 (2nd century B.C.).
[1168] *SNG Turkey* 1.2 1583
[1169] *SNG Turkey* 1.2 1357-1408
[1170] e.g. *SNG Turkey* 1.2 1227-1231, 1235-7
[1171] Thuc. 1.115.1
[1172] Plut. *Per.* 23

help along with some Samians who wanted to revolutionise the government. From this – and from Athens' response, which was to set up a democracy at Samos - it has been assumed that Miletus must have been democratic by 440 B.C.[1173] A scholiast to Aristophanes records that Miletus borrowed the institution of ostracism from Athens, but provides no clue as to the date.[1174] The play in question was produced in 425/4, but the scholiast does not say whether Miletus had adopted ostracism by this time. Since the main purpose of ostracism was to avoid an individual accruing too much power, it was inherently democratic and opposed to the concentration of power in the hands of the few or just one man. As noted in the introduction, ostracism was alleged to have been instituted at Athens as a democratic means of preventing tyranny. Though heavily criticised, it was inherently democratic in the formal sense of the word in that it "involved the *demos* passing judgement collectively and on an exactly equal basis on its would-be leaders and advisers".[1175] That Miletus also adopted this very Athenian of institutions might suggest that it became a democracy on the Athenian model. Yet the question remains: at what point did Miletus become a democracy?

More specific evidence comes from other sources. A *lex sacra* from 379/8 with an Athenian-style preamble, including the phrase "it was resolved by the *boule* (Council) and the *demos* (People)", also suggests that Miletus gained a democracy at some point before 412, for its constitution is unlikely to have changed to the Athenian model after they became enemies or after the war ended.[1176] Diodorus narrates an oligarchic revolution in 405, saying that some men in Miletus who wanted an oligarchy "with the help of the Spartans put down the government of the people"; this means that

[1173] Meyer 1901:63; Oliver 1935:183
[1174] Schol. ad Aristoph. *Knights*. 855 (Fornara 1983b:43)
[1175] Cartledge 2016:71
[1176] *I. Milet* 6.3 n.1220; Sokolowski 1955:118-9 no.45 (380/79 on Rehm's dating). For Miletus revolting from Athens in 412 cf. Thuc 8.17

Miletus was democratic for a time up until 405.[1177] Herodotus' claim that Mardonius set up democracies all over Ionia does not help us find a starting point, for Miletus' very existence in 492 is disputed.

It must first be pointed out that the Milesians' recourse to Athenian arbitration along with Samian democrats does not prove that Miletus was a democracy. Jensen finds such *Realpolitik* unlikely and contends that Miletus would not have been interested in joining up with members of the opposite political persuasion in an enemy city.[1178] It is true that like favours like, but it is not true that Miletus would have no reason to engage in *Realpolitik*. At least according to Thucydides, the era was characterised by *Realpolitik*.[1179] If the city thought it had a strong claim to Priene, the Milesians will have had every reason to appeal to Athens, regardless of who accompanied them. Jensen postulates that Priene was Miletus' dependency at the time of the battle of Lade, because the 12 ships of Priene are stationed next to the 80 Milesian ships.[1180] However, all that Herodotus says is that the Milesians were next to the Prieneans, who were next to the Myesians, who were next to the Teans, and so on and so forth. Herodotus is describing a battle formation, not the relationship between mother-city and colony. Many of the other towns next to each other in the list (such as Lesbos and Samos) evidently had no such relationship with each other, so the argument is not strong. Jensen further argues that Miletus' claim was strong enough that Athens actually granted it control of Priene.[1181] If their claim was that strong and the payoff was so great, it will not have mattered how they achieved it. The evidence for this is that Priene last appears on the tribute lists in 443/2, but many of the later years are

[1177] Diod. 13.104.5
[1178] Jensen 2010:104
[1179] e.g. Thuc. 1.75-6, 3.37, 3.44, 3.82, 5.89-91
[1180] Jensen 2010:97; Hdt. 6.8
[1181] Jensen 2010:96

significantly more fragmentary.[1182] Even if neither of Jensen's hypotheses is correct, the Milesians might merely have wished to bring in a third party to settle the matter. The two groups approached Athens for very different reasons in any case: the Samian democrats, because they wished to subvert their constitution, and the Milesians, because they wanted Priene. Thucydides does not say (as Jensen believes) that Miletus must have wanted Athens to make Samos a democracy so that they would have "common ground".[1183] He is clear about Miletus' motivation: it was at war with Samos, and it was losing.[1184] The Milesians had nothing to lose by enlisting Athenian help. Given how messy and treacherous the politics of the region clearly was around this time, it is easy to believe that Miletus sided with a democratic faction opposed to Samos' ruling oligarchy to achieve its aim of winning against Samos. As the adage goes, the enemy of my enemy is my friend.

The evidence of the tribute lists led many scholars to postulate a revolt in 454/3, when Miletus did not appear but 'the Milesians from Leros' and 'the Milesians from Teichioussa' did.[1185] It seemed that the city had revolted and defaulted from payment, but some loyal Milesians had fled and made their contribution from neighbouring towns. The Milesians on the mainland then reappear in 452/1, suggesting this date for Athens' recapture of the city. This seemed to fit nicely with the regulations for Miletus, dated to 450/49 on the basis of three-bar sigma, albeit leaving a curiously long gap between the end of the revolt and the drawing up of regulations.[1186] Another gap in Miletus' tribute records led some scholars to hypothesise a second revolt between 446/5 and 443/2, when the city's tribute was also halved.

[1182] *IG* I³ 269
[1183] Jensen 2010:103
[1184] Thuc. 1.115.2
[1185] *IG* I³ 259 col. I.28
[1186] *IG* I³ 21

There are several difficulties with this reconstruction. The first is that it assumes that lowering a city's tribute was Athens' natural response to a rebellion. As Unz points out, "[h]istory is not replete with examples of imperial powers magnanimously reducing their tribute demands of a province damaged in an unsuccessful revolt".[1187] He provides an alternative for Miletus' lowered tribute: that it was directly funding the Athenian garrison stationed there as a consequence of the revolt. Although I will argue against the theory that there was a revolt (and therefore a garrison) in the 450s, Unz's hypothesis invites us to consider that the tithe that ended up inscribed into the tribute quota lists is not the whole story. It is not even 1/60th of the story. There are numerous factors that might prevent a city like Miletus' payments to the Delian League being accurately reflected in the tribute quota lists as they stand today.

Another problem is that one would have to suppose that the Athenian garrison remained in Miletus for the entire period from 452 to 449, an extraordinarily long time. The only alternative is that the garrison was first sent out in 450/49, two or three years after Miletus had seceded. Again, this would have been a slow policy on the part of Athens. The greatest obstacle is the discovery in 1970 of a fragment of the first tribute list with Miletus' name partially on it.[1188] The restoration is secure because the first four letters are well preserved and no other known ally's name began with Μιλέ. This refuted the theory that mainland Miletus had defaulted in that year. The reaction of (one of) the authors of the tribute lists was to posit that this, too, was not "the Milesians" but "the Neopolitans from Miletus from the White Promontory".[1189] However, this is to mould the facts to fit one's hypothesis, rather than the other way around. Gehrke followed suit, arguing in a footnote that because in later lists Miletus appears alongside Leros and

[1187] Unz 1985:37-8
[1188] *IG* I^3 259 III 19
[1189] Meritt 1972

Teichioussa, it cannot appear here separated from them.[1190] Yet the situation is clearly more complex in the first tribute quota list; in fact, it is not true that Leros and Teichoussa appear, but inexplicably it is the Milesians in those regions who are credited with the tribute:[1191]

Μιλέσιοι

[ἐ]χς Λέρο ⁝HHH

[Μι]λέσιοι

[ἐκ Τ]ειχιόσσε[ς

It is "the Milesians from Leros" and "the Milesians from Teichioussa" who appear, the former paying a 300 drachma quota and the latter paying an unknown amount. That is to say, Leros and Teichioussa do not appear as *poleis* in their own right – in fact, there is no other evidence that the two places were *poleis* in the fifth century.[1192] Nor is there enough evidence about their relationship with Miletus for any hypothesis to carry much weight.[1193] Leros may have been a colony or dependency of Miletus', for Herodotus tells an anecdote about Aristagoras being advised to fortify it as an emergency refuge.[1194] Thucydides describes Teichioussa as a part of Miletus.[1195] Excavators have plausibly identified it as the tiny islet of Sapli Ada ("Handle Island") to the southeast of Miletus.[1196]

Miletus' separation from the Milesians in Leros and Teichioussa in the first list may well be due to internal strife, but it could also merely have arisen from some

[1190] Gehrke 1980:19 n.10
[1191] *IG* I³ 259 col. VI.19-22
[1192] Paarmann 2007:78-9; Hansen & Nielsen 2004:114
[1193] Kallet 2004:489
[1194] Hdt. 5.125
[1195] Thuc. 8.26.3
[1196] Lohmann 2004:343

practicality to do with the way the *hellenotamiae*, the Athenian tribute collectors, went about collecting tribute. If the separate payment is due to internal strife, it is a reminder that *stasis* (civil unrest) can happen between three factions, not just two. Alternatively, it could reflect the independence of Leros and Teichioussa after the destruction of Miletus in 494; "the Milesians" could designate the refugees from Miletus after Lade. This is an argument that Jensen makes in his study of the pattern *apotaxis*, separate payment, and *syntely*, combined payment, in the tribute record of various towns and their dependencies. However, Jensen maintains that *apotaxis* in 454/3 was due to *stasis* in the Milesian polities.[1197] Yet perhaps this case of *apotaxis* reflects not *stasis* but the identity of the Milesian diaspora. These must have spread all across the Aegean when their city was destroyed, not just to Sicily as Herodotus mentions.[1198] It need not surprise us that they are not referred to thus again in the extant quota lists, for the Athenians' method of recording tribute naturally evolved. Such a specific description may have been considered superfluous, or local politics may have changed the way that the Milesians in Leros and Teichioussa self-identified. In other words, "the Milesians from Leros" and "Leros" may be two different ways of describing roughly the same group of people if by 427/6 the Milesians in Leros considered themselves Lerians.

Lapini made the ingenious argument that altogether the Milesians from Leros, Teichioussa and Neapolis would have been paying all or nearly all the tribute that Miletus itself usually paid in times of peace.[1199] Since the Milesians from Leros are recorded as paying 3 talents, assuming that the other two places paid the same this would not be far off the usual 10 talents. If the normal amount was being paid, but from abroad, this would indicate a mass exodus from Miletus rather than *stasis* or

[1197] Jensen 2010:95-9
[1198] Hdt. 6.22.2
[1199] Lapini 1997:106

disaffection. Lapini postulated that the transfer of the entire Milesian population to neighbouring towns was in response to the resurgence of Persian power. However this is assuming that all three places paid the same amount and since only the amount for the Milesians from Leros survives, it is a leap of logic to interpret 10 talents where we only have evidence for 3. Moreover, as we have seen, the new fragment does not record payment from the Milesians in Neapolis, but the Milesians in Miletus proper.

Before the fragment's discovery, Anton Powell employed the principle of Occam's razor to argue that the most economical explanation of Erythrae and Miletus' absence from the early lists, and Boutheia, Leros and Teichioussa's presence, was that the former two cities were in revolt.[1200] The principle is that "the existence of things should not be assumed beyond what is necessary". However, with the tribute lists incomplete and particularly varied in their first few years, the principle can be used to argue the reverse: the existence of revolts should not be assumed beyond what is necessary. The fact that a fragment was found with Miletus' name on it proves the validity of such an argument: one should not assume that absence from the lists means revolt. In the first years of the Athenian tribute lists it would be unsurprising to find that a system had not been fully drawn up yet, meaning that Boutheia was listed separately from Erythrae and its other dependencies, or (the Milesians from) Leros and Teichioussa separately from Miletus.

As for whether Meritt's reconstruction plausibly fits the extant evidence, it is unlikely that a tau followed Μιλέ[...] rather than a sigma, since there should be some trace of the tau left on the stone as it still stands. Nor were any traces found where they would be expected on the adjacent fragment of lines 12 to 18, though this has

[1200] Powell 1988:46-7

frustratingly since been lost.[1201] One of only two letters that would leave no trace on the adjacent fragment is the three-bar sigma.[1202] As Marcel Piérart observes, one would also expect there to be some trace of the ten conjectured letters on the line below, line 20, whose tribute figure is preserved.[1203] Piérart also argues ingeniously that the fragment recording lines 12 onward of column three, which has now been lost, originally recorded an amount next to Neapolis' name but in the process of transmission the amount was overlooked. C.O. Müller's copy records an odd numeral next to Neapolis' name, while Kyriakos Pittakys records nothing; then the authors of the *ATL*, dismissing what Müller wrote next to Aege's entry as unintelligible, gave Aege (an amended version of) the amount he listed next to Neapolis' name, leaving Neapolis without an entry.[1204] It is true, as Delorme counters, that Mendaean Neapolis already appears in column three of the list, paying its normal tribute amount for the period, 50 drachmas.[1205] Yet the name is common, and Hellespontine Neapolis is not accounted for elsewhere on the list although it tends to appear considerably later. If it is Mendaean Neapolis, it may have paid twice in the first year.[1206] The latter possibility is strengthened by the fact that in three other extant lists, Mendaean Neapolis appears

[1201] Gorman 2001:224
[1202] Paarmann 2014:133
[1203] Piérart 1974:164. Piérart also argues persuasively that the fragment recording lines 12 onward of column three, which has now been lost, recorded an amount next to Neapolis' name but because the authors of the *ATL* discarded the transcript reading next to Aege's entry as being unintelligible, they then gave Aege the amount listed next to Neapolis' name, leaving Neapolis without an entry.
[1204] The *aparche* of Aege in this period is usually 50 drachmas, while we would expect the amount of 33 drachmas 2 obols to belong to Neapolis since it was originally recorded in that line. Piérart's theory would also explain why Müller recorded a mystery ΔI beside Aege's entry: he was reading the right-hand side of the numeral 50.
[1205] Delorme 1995:220
[1206] Duplicate entries are not unheard of in the *ATL*. There are three towns called Neapolis in the tribute lists: Mendaean Neapolis (or Neapolis of Pallene), Neapolis in Thrace (modern Kavala) and Hellespontine Neapolis (Mattingly 1984:354-5). Neapolis is an obvious name for a newly founded city and could even have been the name of Pericles' Thracian colony in Plut.*Per*.19.1 (Meritt, McGregor & Wade-Gery 1939:525

beside Aege.[1207] Delorme's strongest counterargument is that the tribute accountants needed to know where each payment was coming from, so specifying "from the White Promontory" helped to distinguish the place from all the other Neapoleis. It is true that Thracian Neapolis is often additionally described as "in Thrace" or "by Antisara", but for the most part, one intuits which Neapolis is paying by the region that it is grouped with in the list, or the amount it pays.[1208] What is important for our purposes is that if Neapolis appeared on the lost fragment accompanied by a numeral, the reading of the authors of the *ATL* cannot stand.

Moreover, there is no evidence of the White Promontory in the classical period; the place name is only attested in Roman imperial sources, and it does not seem to have survived for very long.[1209] One can instead restore only "the Milesians in the promontory" to IG I³ 259, but calling the Halicarnassus peninsula a promontory is far from self-explanatory, and this merely makes the designation even more vague.[1210] It would also be strange for a group of temporary Milesian exiles to actually identify themselves as Neopolitans – "new city" being quite an extravagant name for a handful of exiles – rather than describing themselves as "the Milesians from *x*", as those in Leros and Teichioussa do.[1211] This is generally how communities paying from abroad

[1207] *IG* I³ 266, 268, 269

[1208] Examples of precise identification: *IG* I³ 71 ("by the Chersonese"), 262 ("from Pallene"), 277-80 and 282 ("by Antisara"), 281-2 ("of Mende"). Identification by grouping is not always possible as the Neapoleis in Thrace and Mende often appear so close together: in *IG* I³ 266, a Neapolis appears beside Mende and another beside Aege; we might assume that the one next to Mende is Mendaean Neapolis, but looking at the amount of tribute it has to be Thracian Neapolis.

[1209] The town is known from Pliny *Nat.Hist.*5.107 and Pomponius Mela (1.75).

[1210] Robertson 1987:397

[1211] An elaboration on a point made by Robertson (1987:397). Delorme points out that Neapolis is not directly comparable to Leros and Teichioussa since the latter two are Milesian territory, and the former is an uninhabited place that the Milesian refugees will have had to come up with a name for (1995:216). However, we still have absolutely no evidence for such a community and the only reason for positing one is the circular reasoning that Miletus was in revolt in 454/3 and so cannot appear on the list alone.

seem to be identified. If it was common practice to designate a group of temporary exiles as Neopolitans, we might find this elsewhere in the tribute lists yet we do not; the other Neapoleis all occur several times and so are well-established, "new" cities.[1212] It is possible that the Milesian Neapolis was intended to be a permanent outpost, but the fact that it never appears again suggests otherwise. Nor does such a long and convoluted designation for one community, spanning three lines, occur anywhere else on the extant lists. The most economical explanation is that both the mainland Milesians and their compatriots in Leros and Teichioussa paid tribute in the first year recorded by the *ATL*, but not at the same time; hence the tripartite division. The strange tribute-paying arrangement may well betray tensions between the communities, but the idea that Miletus was in revolt can be ruled out. The name given in line 20 of the first quota list would have to be otherwise unattested, but that is far from unheard of; many towns that appear early on in the lists are not found again, whether because they cease to pay or they are classed under a different rubric.[1213] Robertson suggests a name beginning with the common prefix *akro-*, such as Akrothoioi or Akroreitai.[1214] Akrothoioi is particularly tempting, since the town appears on the assessment of 422/1 and is mentioned by Thucydides as going over to Brasidas in 424.[1215] Paarmann believes that the reading *Aka-* is just as plausible as *Akr-*, in which case even more names are possible, including Acanthus.[1216] With Miletus paying tribute in 454/3, the case for a revolt begins to unravel.

[1212] Thracian Neapolis: *IG* I³ 259, 265, 266, 267, 269, 276, 277, 278, 279, 280, 282, 290; Mendaean Neapolis: *IG* I³ 259, 262 263, 264, 266, 267, 268, 269, 270, [271], 272, [273], 278, 279, 280, 281, 282; Hellespontine Neapolis: *IG* I³ 71, 270, [271], 272
[1213] e.g. Sambactus (*IG* I³ 259 col. II.27; 261 col. V.12), Erodioi (*IG* I³ 259 col. II.8; 263 col. IV. 18), Carian Polichne (*IG* I³ 262 col.II.33).
[1214] Robertson 1987:397
[1215] *IG* I³ 77; Thuc 4.109
[1216] Paarmann 2014:135

Upon further investigation, the date of the Athenian regulations for Miletus is no more secure. The first point to be made is that the decree is not archon-dated; rather, in the body of the decree reference is made to the archon Euthynus, implying that the regulations were passed at some point after Euthynus' archonship. If Euthynus were the archon that year, it would be unusual to refer twice to the year of his archonship as a dating reference later in the text. It makes more sense that a decree passed a few years after had to refer back to Euthynus' archonship, than that the need was felt to date the decree twice in the middle of the text. Even before archon dating was standardised, if a decree is archon dated this comes towards the beginning of the text, in the prescript.[1217] The tribute reassessment decree (the Thoudippus decree) is a good comparandum because there too we find two archon dates seemingly in the main body of the text.[1218] The double archon dating is explained by the fact that the document is actually two decrees, a rider and an assessment list rolled into one and they were passed at different times, under three different secretaries. In fact the two archon dates do appear in prescripts but they are the prescripts of the second decree and the assessment list; hence they are found in lines 56-9. They are dated by the same archon name, Stratocles, but the first decree does not appear to have room for an archon name even if it were fully preserved. The second decree actually dates the first decree by referring back to it as the tribute reassessment that happened in Stratocles' archonship (425/4), under the Council for which Pleistias was the first secretary. The likelihood is that all parts of the document were passed in Stratocles' archonship, for they appear to have been passed in quick succession, but the important point is that the archon dates are meant to date the first decree almost retrospectively. If the same logic is applied to the regulations for

[1217] *IG* I³ 53.4, 54.89. The exception is *IG* I³ 4 where the archon is named in lines 14-15 and (probably) 26-7 but the decree is very early (485/4) and does not have a prescript.
[1218] *IG* I³ 71

Miletus, the two archon dates there could be dating the whole decree to 426/5 or they could be referring back to Euthynus' archonship as a date in the past when something related had happened, as in the Thoudippus decree. Koch suggests that "in Euthynus' archonship" could refer to the year in which the revolt took place, with any laws passed or confiscations made in that year being rendered void by the regulations.[1219] However he also recognises that it could equally refer to a period after the revolt during which previous judgements were overturned, or when lists of claimants were drawn up to begin the process of reparation. 426/5 is thus a *terminus post quem*, not a definitive date.

Fornara, who on the old dating recognised that 450/49 was only a *terminus post quem*, wanted to date the inscription shortly after 443/2, when Miletus reappears on the tribute lists after a three year absence with its tribute halved to 5 talents.[1220] Yet this creates the additional difficulty of placing the decree in the Thirty Years' Peace, meaning that the many references to troops, warships and other aspects of warfare must all pertain to the Athenian garrison at Miletus rather than ongoing fighting in Greece. The second point to make is that Diodorus says that the archon for the year 450/49 was not Euthynus but Euthydemus.[1221] It seemed impossible to assign Diodorus' date to the decree because of its use of three bar sigma; thus it was conjectured that when Diodorus wrote Euthydemus for the year 450/49, what he really meant was Euthynus. It is true that the historian at first sight appears to make a similar mistake in writing Euthydemus for Eudemus as the archon of 431/0. The evidence that contradicts Diodorus' testimony is an inscription from the time of Augustus or Tiberius.[1222] The inscription, of which

[1219] Koch 1991:128-9
[1220] Fornara 1971:475
[1221] Diod. 12.3
[1222] *IG* XIV 1097, 1098, 1098a

three fragments have been found, is an archon-dated list of Athenian comic victors and the titles of their plays. The complete inscription may have decorated the imperial libraries in Rome.[1223] The incriminating part of the inscription reads thus:[1224]

[...ἐπὶ] Ἐπα[μεινονος...]

[…]Συμπ[…]

[...Ἐ]πὶ Εὐδ[…]

Epameinon was archon in 429/8 and the restoration of his name seems certain; the previous fragment also features the names of various archons from the fifth and early fourth century but not in chronological order.[1225] The problem is that no known archon's name began with Εὐδ. The archon for 433/2, Apseudes, has the right combination of letters in the middle of his name but a photograph of the fragment clearly shows the pi and the iota of ἐπὶ directly preceding the name. It seems inevitable that Diodorus must be mistaken. However, an even later source than Diodorus should not automatically be assumed to have got it right. Nor should it be assumed that epigraphical evidence is infallible or always superior; when a second *stephanephoros* list was found in Miletus, two out of the 15 names were spelled wrongly.[1226] The purpose of the text should also be taken into account: if the list was meant to adorn the walls of the imperial library, aesthetic considerations may have trumped accuracy. This is especially true given that, nearing half a millenium on, the names of fifth-century archons will hardly have been common knowledge to its audience. All three fragments of the inscription are extremely fragmentary and not in chronological order, meaning

[1223] Millis & Olson 2012:225
[1224] *IG* XIV 1098a.1-3
[1225] *IG* XIV 1097: The archons named are Antiochides (435/4), Timocles (441/0), Theodorus (438/7), Pythodorus (432/1), Theopompus (411/0), Diophantus (395/4), Nicoteles (391/0), Lysimachus (436/5), Morchides (440/39).
[1226] Blumel 1995:56-7

that we cannot know how accurate the inscriber was on the whole; it is possible that elsewhere he was careless with archon names or other details. In support of Diodorus, Athenaeus also gives the archon of 431/0 as Euthydemus.[1227]

Diodorus' track record is, however, not unblemished. The records of loans from the sacred treasuries make it virtually impossible that Diodorus was right in giving the archon of 426/5 as Euthydemus instead of Euthynus.[1228] The inscription is securely dated by a series of archons to 426/5-423/2 and its first entry is dated to the archonship of Euthynus. A fragment of Philochorus confirms the reading Euthynus.[1229] An ancient commentator writing the *prolegomenon* to Aristophanes' *Acharnians* gives Euthydemus as the archon, as does Athenaeus.[1230] In this case contemporary epigraphic evidence is far superior to a scholiast on Aristophanes and a second century A.D. grammarian, so Diodorus must be mistaken. There is also the possibility that the archon for 427/6 was Eucles rather than Diodorus' Eucleides, but the evidence for both names is patchy.[1231] Returning to the archon of 450/49, the discovery of the Strasbourg papyrus corroborated the name that Diodorus gives for that year, Euthydemus; if we want to retain Euthynus, we must now accept that both Diodorus and the unrelated author of the papyrus made the same mistake.[1232] Regardless of occasional irregularities in Diodorus' archon list, the methodology behind finding another date for the regulations for Miletus is not sound. Only if a date is completely untenable should an error in Diodorus' testimony be sought, and now that the three bar sigma rule has been discredited, nothing stands in the way of dating the inscription to 426/5.

[1227] Ath. 5.217a
[1228] Diod. 12.58; *IG* I³ 369
[1229] Philochorus fr.106, 128b; *Vita Thuc.* 8
[1230] Argum. I ad Arist. *Acharnians* (Dubner 1883:1); Ath. 5.218b
[1231] Eucles: Schol. ad Arist. *Wasps* 240, Aristot. *Met.* 1.6; Photius and the Suda s.v. Σαμίων ὁ δῆμος; Eucleides: Schol. ad Arist. *Knights* 237
[1232] P.Stras.inv. 84 l.5

The argument for down-dating has already been made by Harold Mattingly, citing also the grammar and vocabulary of the inscription. Mattingly points out that the rare verb κακοτεχνεῖν occurs elsewhere only in the aforementioned tribute decree of 426/5.[1233] In particular, Mattingly argues that mention of the *eisphora*, tax (l.56) dates the inscription after 428/7, when Thucydides says that a special *eisphora* was imposed on the allies to raise funds for the war.[1234] It has been countered that the word was in use earlier in the fifth century and could have a less specific meaning here, perhaps not even referring to an Athenian *eisphora* but a Milesian one.[1235] Admittedly, all extant literary attestations of the word are from the last quarter of the fifth century or later and two of these examples have the precise meaning that Thucydides uses, "property-tax levied for war".[1236] However, Mattingly's argument relies on redating two other inscriptions that feature the word, the regulations for Chalcis and the Callias decrees, both traditionally dated to the mid-440s and 430s B.C.[1237] Mattingly also points out the rarity of the name Euthynus, making it unlikely that the name emerged twice from the ballot box in the space of a quarter of a century.[1238] He connects the *epimeletai*, officers (l.40) with those mentioned in the tribute decree of 426/5, arguing that these officials were first elected in that year.[1239] These would then be the financial officers responsible for managing tribute in Athens. It is true that the verb used, αἱρεῖσθαι (to choose), suggests that the officials are being newly chosen, but this does not prove that they are the first of their kind to be appointed. The word *epimeletes* has a range of meanings, from the general "officer" or "official" to the specific "governor of a town", or even in

[1233] Mattingly 1971:32; *IG* I³ 68 l.43
[1234] Mattingly 1966b:208; Thuc. 3.19.1
[1235] Cataldi 1983a:203-4; Bradeen & McGregor 1973:66
[1236] LSJ s.v. εἰσφορά. c.f. Antiph. 2.2.12; Lys. 30.26; Xen. *Oec*. 7.40; Plat. *Laws* 955d; Aristot. *Pol*. 5.1313b
[1237] *IG* I³ 41.38; *IG* I³ 52.17 (both partially restored)
[1238] Mattingly 1981:115-6
[1239] *IG* I³ 68 l.8-39, 47

Lysias' time "supervisor of sacred olives".[1240] The word is found as far back as Theocritus, when in *Idyll* 10 the singer apostrophises a "greedy bailiff" (ὦπιμελητὰ φιλάργυρε).[1241]

These and some of Mattingly's other stylistic arguments are circular or at best inconclusive.[1242] Stronger is his argument that reference to defending the Milesians in Aristophanes' *Knights* makes sense in the context of a recent revolt.[1243] Some of the "late" grammatical features, such as elision and assimilation of *nu* before certain letters, may also be deliberate Ionicisms. [1244] Yet whether or not Mattingly's argument is convincing, there is a strong case for dating the inscription to the 420s based on good historical practice alone. For the sake of convenience, the regulations for Miletus will be referred to as "dated to 426/5" but it must be borne in mind that this is only a *terminus post quem*. In fact, a later date (even if only by a year) is more likely since it would be strange for the authors of a decree from the year 426/5 to find it necessary to mention that same date twice in the body of the text. Instead, the two mentions of Euthynus as archon appear to refer back to previous decisions made by the *boule*. A possible *terminus ante quem* for the decree will be discussed below.

Sculpturally, there is support for Mattingly's redating. The inscription features a relief with larger lettering at the top, which probably read [Μι]λεσ̣ί[οις χσυγ]γρ[αφαί] ("decree for the Milesians"). Barely any of the relief survives but it is clear from the remainder that there originally was one at the top of the stele. If it had a similar format to the decrees for Methone of 424/3 or the decrees honouring the Samians at the end of

[1240] LSJ s.v. ἐπιμελητής. c.f. Xen. *Hell*. 3.2.11 (governor); Lys. 7.29 (supervisor of sacred olives).
[1241] Theoc. 10.54
[1242] For instance, his comparison of the use of ἐξόμνυμι to the First-fruits decree (*IG* I³ 32), which he also wishes to down-date.
[1243] Arist. *Knights*. 361,930-3. The play was first produced in spring 424.
[1244] Henry 1978:102

the Peloponnesian War, it will have contained an image at the top with larger lettering directly beneath it and the rest of the inscription in small lettering underneath.[1245] Carol Lawton points out that it would be an anomaly if the inscription were dated to the 450s, for there is no securely dated sculptural evidence for Attic document reliefs before the 420s.[1246] Their emergence in the 420s can be explained by the revival of grave and votive reliefs in the late 430s and early 420s. If we redate the regulations for Miletus to 426/5, there will be no certain sculptural evidence for Attic document reliefs before the last quarter of the fifth century.

In 429/8 and 428/7, the Milesians do not appear on the tribute lists. They appear for certain in 432/1 and their name is restored in the list for 431/0. They make their reappearance in either 427/6 or 426/5, but only for a single year.[1247] After that, the tribute lists become patchier and Miletus only appears in 421/0 and 416/5, leaving several years in the 420s and early 410s unaccounted for.[1248] Thus, the evidence of the tribute lists is perfectly compatible with the possibility of a Milesian revolt at some point before 426/5. Yet Miletus' absence in many years is also a reminder of the imperfect state of the tribute lists and the consequent weakness of any argument *e silentio*. The fact that "Milesians" are attributed with payment rather than "Miletus" reduces certainty about which Milesians were paying, and from where. Without corroborating evidence, it is unreliable to speculate about revolts based solely on the tribute lists. It is impossible to know whether absence or a reduction in tribute is due to defection, rather than the accident of survival or any number of other circumstantial

[1245] *IG* I³ 48; *IG* II² 1
[1246] Lawton 1992:250-1
[1247] The tribute list *IG* I³ 284 could be dated to either year.
[1248] *IG* I³ 285, 289

reasons now lost to us. On this approach, it is safer to assume that Miletus revolted only once, not in the 450s or 440s but after the start of the Peloponnesian war.

The dating of the lists around 428-6 is fraught. Marcel Piérart has argued that the 27th tribute list, IG I³ 283, ought to be dated to 426/5, leaving the 28th tribute list with no option but to be assigned to 427/6.[1249] His argument is discussed in more detail in the chapter concerning Colophon. It suffices to say here that the lists for these years are so fragmentary as to permit no certainty. Yet even if we are convinced by Piérart's reshuffling, the evidence of the tribute lists would still fit the hypothesis of a revolt in or before 426/5. It would mean that Miletus paid an unknown amount of tribute in 427/6 but does not appear on what is left on the list for 426/5, possibly due to disaffection. In fact even if the list for 426/5 turned out to be IG I³ 284, all this would mean is that Miletus had been brought back into the fold by the end of that year or that a community of Milesians had paid in spite of political turmoil.

Meanwhile, Mattingly entirely reverses the order of tribute lists IG I³ 281-4, putting the 25th tribute quota list in the year 426/5. Again, this is not a problem for our argument, for Miletus does not appear on the list; its name is restored from the generic ending ιοι next to an unknown amount.[1250] Mattingly's reshuffling would mean that Miletus paid an unknown amount in 430/29 or 429/8 (I IG I³ 284) then does not appear for certain until after 426/5; this is compatible with a revolt. This is all based on the assumption that Miletus did in fact fully revolt and that a city in revolt never paid tribute. The latter assumption oversimplifies a process that we know very little about. It can at least be speculated that a town in revolt might have already paid its tribute for the year by the time it revolted, or that the payment came from a loyal community

[1249] Piérart 1984
[1250] *IG* I³ 281 col. I.14

representing the rebellious state.[1251] The former assumption will be challenged upon closer reading of the regulations for Miletus itself.

The decree's contents are tantalisingly fragmentary. Mention of past events in Euthynus' archonship and the absence of any full oath of loyalty to be sworn by Milesian citizens makes it likely that this is not the first set of regulations for the rebel city, but a follow-up document drawn up in the years after the revolt. Two words indicate an obligation to provide hoplites or weapons, ὅπλα παρέχεσθαι (l.11), but the question is whose obligation this is. The phrase is thought to refer to the Athenian garrison by Cataldi, who places the decree during the Thirty Years' Peace.[1252] Cataldi assumes that all references to fighting or rowing are to do with the Athenian garrison and surveillance of the area. Yet in a document setting out regulations for a subject city it would be simpler to interpret it as Miletus' obligation. If it is dated to 426/5, it can have its natural meaning of providing arms for the war, as in the Athenian decree concerning Salamis.[1253] It could even be a request for the hoplites we find in Thucydides serving under Athenian command in the summer of 425.[1254] Similarly, the mention of serving as a rower (l.11), triremes and troop-ships (l.10), and troop-ships going to Athens (l.15) can refer to the Milesian contribution to the war effort, rather than Athenian supervision of Miletus. The four obols (l.13) must be pay for the troops or rowers; Thucydides mentions pay ranging from three obols to a talent for soldiers and crew alike.[1255] Bradeen and McGregor maintain that the troop-ships are headed towards Miletus,[1256] but this hardly makes sense with the repeated use of Ἀθέναζε (to Athens)

[1251] This may not have then always been recorded with such precision as we sometimes find in the tribute lists when a group is paying from a different location (e.g. the Milesians from Leros and Teichioussa in *IG* I³ 259).
[1252] Cataldi 1983a:180-3
[1253] *IG* I³ 1.9
[1254] Thuc. 4.42.1; Mattingly 1996:132
[1255] Thuc. 5.47.6; 8.29; 8.45.2
[1256] Bradeen & McGregor 1973:40

in the same line and the lines following (l.15,16, 19). They argue that the text is so broken that we cannot know whether the military section continues beyond line 15, but (what remains of) line 15 in itself is proof enough that the troop-ships were headed to Athens: Ἀθέν]αζε τοῖς στρ[α]τιό[τεσι. There is some mention of swearing an oath (l.71-2):

[...]ορκό[ντον δ]ὲ *h*οι πέν[τε...]

[…]ὲόντο[ν πρὶ]ν ἂν ὀμόσε[ι...]

Perhaps the oath was similar to those sworn by the likes of Erythrae, Chalcis and Samos.[1257] These tend to include an oath not to revolt from Athens and the allies and an oath However the oath is evidently not set out in full, suggesting that this is not the first decree drawn up since the revolt.[1258] It does not (in its extant form) impose a democracy, but it does make provisions for a garrison (l.75) and for five Athenian archons over a certain age to collaborate with the local authorities in Miletus (l.4-7);[1259] there is also mention of drawing lots in line 34. This may suggest that progress was being made towards establishing a democracy.[1260] Athenian archons are not mentioned in any other inscription until the last years of the Peloponnesian war, although Thucydides does mention their presence on Samos in 440 after Athens' installation of a democracy.[1261]

[1257] *IG* I³ 14; *IG* I³ 40; *IG* I³ 48
[1258] Cataldi 1983a:209
[1259] The lines as they stand do not say whether the five men are to be Athenian or Milesian, but since they are later referred to as archons and a similar provision to choose five (Athenian) men appears in the Chalcis decree (*IG* I³ 40.46-7), the assumption is safe.
[1260] Cataldi 1983a:178-9
[1261] Thuc. 1.115.5; Rhodes 2014:43. This is assuming that the regulations for Chalcis (*IG* I³ 40) are also redated.

Lines 24-8 introduce "an ambassador, the allies, prohibitions, and legal penalties".[1262] Little more than this can be said for such fragmentary lines. The lone number thirty in line 24 could be the remnants of a minimum age requirement for the Council, as in the regulations for Erythrae.[1263] As discussed in the relevant chapter, the age requirement is suggestive of an Athenian-style democracy since the Athenians seem to have favoured this minimum age since the time of Draco.[1264] Yet nothing can be said with confidence when only part of one word remains in the line. Moreover, thirty appears to be the magic number in Attic inscriptions, denoting everything from the number of days to the number of triremes to the number of auditors of the tribute quota lists.[1265]

Lines 29-51 – with mention of *dikai* (trials) and the *dikasterion* (law court) - clearly deal with judicial procedures, confiscations and trials of Milesians to be referred to Athens, but the specifics are opaque and disputed.[1266] It is not at all clear that all trials were to be referred to Athens or that the Milesian courts were "stripped of any judicial prerogative", as Cataldi claims.[1267] He and Koch both assume that disputes between Milesians, as well as disputes between Milesians and Athenians, are transferred to Athens, but this is nowhere in the extant text.[1268] Both interpretations rely on the restoration δὲ δίκας ἔ̃ναι Μιλεσίοις κα[θάπερ Ἀθεναίοις], "court cases are to be conducted between Milesians just like those between the [Milesians and the] Athenians" (l.29). Cataldi's interpretation also rests heavily on the restored adverb

[1262] Bradeen & McGregor 1973:41
[1263] *IG* I³ 14.10-1
[1264] Aristot. *Ath. Pol*. 4.1-3
[1265] e.g. *IG* I³ 3.3; *IG* I³ 46.32-3; *IG* I³ 47 A.5-6; *IG* I³ 52.8; *IG* I³ 60.12; *IG* I³ 86.29; *IG* I³ 96.10; *IG* I³ 105.39; *IG* I³ 259 col.I.2; *IG* I³ 261 col.I.1; *IG* I³ 475.275-81
[1266] Oliver 1935:191-4; Bradeen & McGregor 1973:42; Low 2008:66
[1267] Cataldi 1981:37
[1268] Koch 1991:104

Ἀθε[ναζε], “to Athens”, in the context of penalties (ζεμίας) in line 76, but with only three letters remaining the word could refer to “the Athenians” or just “Athens” rather than specifically travel towards Athens. In any case, the rest of line 76 makes clear that the issue only has to do with penalties that are worth over a certain amount (μέζονο[ς ἄ]χσ[ι]ος).

Notwithstanding whether the restoration is correct, Cataldi’s interpretation relies on two assumptions: that all trials involving Athenians were transferred to Athens, and that καθάπερ Ἀθεναίοις means “just like those between Milesians and Athenians” rather than the more obvious “just like those between Athenians”. The latter would mean simply that some aspect of court proceedings at Miletus was going to imitate the Athenian process. This would not necessarily entail a full democracy on the Athenian model, but some level of interference in the Milesian judicial system. Since what is left of the inscription suggests that the Athenians had no qualms interfering in Milesian political affairs, this comes as no great surprise. However, it is worth reiterating that there is a high level of conjecture in any interpretation, since the stone cuts off after κα[...]. Consequently, the correct word might be καί or κάτα rather than καθάπερ. What is more, if the latter word is correct, a suitable parallel can be found only a few lines below. In line 41 we find the phrase καθάπερ πρὸ τοῦ (“just like before this [time]”). A further similarity between the two phrases is that line 41 starts with [...]αι, which is likely why Cataldi restored the end of the previous line (l.40) so that it reads [δίκας ἓν]αι.[1269] If a similar phrase were restored into line 29, this would mean that rather than interfering in and changing the way that Milesian trials were carried

[1269] Cataldi 1981:165

out, the Athenians were in fact protecting them against change. The sentence would run thus: "Legal proceedings are to happen at Miletus like they were before now [...]."

It would be unsurprising if the Athenians slightly reduced the power of the Milesian courts, but that they entirely stripped them of their power is not evident from the inscription as it stands. Note that in the Athenian decree concerning the festival of Hephaestus, a very similar scenario is envisaged.[1270] The religious officials have the authority to deal out fines of up to 50 drachmas but for fines above this amount, they have to bring the case to the *dikasterion* (court) of the Athenian archon. The wording is very similar to the regulations for Miletus: [ἐὰν] δέ τις ἄχσ[ιος ἦι μέζον]ος ζε[μ]ίας..., "if anyone deserves a higher fine..." (l.26-7). Perhaps at Miletus also, cases over a certain amount were for the time being to be referred to the Athenian archons in Miletus, rather than abroad. This would certainly have reduced the power of the Milesian courts but would have saved the journey to Athens.

The great distance between Miletus and Athens makes Cataldi's thesis unlikely. Koch restores the text so that fines above a certain amount are still handed out by the Athenian archons at Miletus, though he expresses confusion as to why they are not dealt with at Athens.[1271] Yet here it is worth considering geographical factors. It is one thing for the Athenians to monitor the judicial proceedings of Chalcis, which lies less than 50 miles north of Athens.[1272] It is another to ask the Milesians to travel hundreds of miles across the Aegean for a final verdict, especially for disputes between two Milesians. Moreover, what remains of the text elsewhere suggests that some cases were to be tried among the Milesians (l.29) whereas others were to be referred to Athens (l.32). Oliver suggests that these were mainly trials concerning *phoros*, since

[1270] *IG* I³ 82
[1271] Koch 1991:131-2
[1272] *IG* I³ 40.8-10

Elaphebolion (l.33) is the month of the City Dionysia, when tribute was paid.[1273] Bradeen and McGregor dispute this, arguing instead that the section has nothing to do with tribute but deals with the establishment and functioning of a special court to try Milesians in Athens.[1274] Balcer adds the possibility that this special court was to try Milesians for treason (i.e. rebellion), in order to discourage another revolt.[1275]

It is true that the regulations as we have them make no explicit mention of tribute, but nor do they provide for the setting up of special courts at Athens. They certainly do not specify that the courts are to try Milesians for treason. Balcer only infers this from the possibility that a tithe is to be paid to Athena from the convicted man's property (l.30), a fitting punishment for treason as found in the regulations for Chalcis.[1276] However, this is too much to interpret from the mere mention of an *epidekaton* (tithe) with very little context to aid interpretation. In the regulations for Miletus it is an unknown number of drachmas that is to be taken from the *epidekaton* and given to an unknown god or goddess, whereas in the regulations for Chalcis the entire *epidekaton* is to be given to Olympian Zeus.

Both Oliver and Bradeen and McGregor's interpretations are plausible but for our purposes the important thing is that in neither scenario would Athens be stripping local Milesian courts of all their power. If Oliver's restoration of line 46 is correct, in cases involving more than a hundred drachmas appeal to an Athenian court is admissible, but not compulsory.[1277] Since no mention of Athens survives, it may be that the clause concerning cases involving over a hundred drachmas has nothing to do with Athens. Note also the later mention of δίκαι ὄντον Ἀθένε[σι], "trials that are at Athens",

[1273] Oliver 1935:191-2
[1274] Bradeen & McGregor 1973:42-3
[1275] Balcer 1984a:385
[1276] ***IG*** **I³** 40.33-6
[1277] Oliver 1935:194-5

in the context of the return of confiscated land (l.63). It is generally assumed that here provisions are made for the return of property to Athenians who had owned land in Miletus but had it taken away during the civil strife.[1278]If this is the case, perhaps it is only cases such as these that are to be tried in Athens, which would be more convenient for the Athenian plaintiffs. There is therefore not enough evidence to suggest that the Milesian courts were stripped of their powers; probably some cases were invited to Athens for trial, but it will have benefited the Athenians to limit the number and make the process optional, given the logistical difficulties and expense incurred in referring cases such a long distance. As Koch points out, one hundred drachmas is by no means a fixed limit above which cases were transferred *ex officio* to Athens, but perhaps the high value of the case sometimes meant that transferral happened.[1279]

From the confiscations a certain portion of Athena's tithe (*epidekaton*) is to be paid elsewhere, most likely to Apollo as patron deity of Miletus. If Cataldi's restoration of lines 27-8 is correct, any man who wrongs the Athenians loses his civil rights and his property is confiscated; these sound like sanctions for crimes of a political nature and would make sense in the aftermath of a revolt.[1280] The specific definition of ἄτιμος is a matter of dispute but it may have left the culprit no option but to go into exile.[1281] Koch's restoration of line 26 is also indicative of a post-revolt atmosphere: μ]εδὲν μέτε ἐνδ[έχεσθαι ἀπόστασιν], "nor to invite revolt", though the crucial word (revolt) is admittedly restored.[1282] Similarly, the express prohibition of disobeying or destroying the stele (l.47-8) suggests that precisely that kind of subversive behaviour has happened in the recent past; authorities generally do not outlaw behaviour that has not happened.

[1278] Koch 1991:130; Cataldi 1983a:218; Schuller 1974:73
[1279] Koch 1991:118-9
[1280] Cataldi 1983a:183
[1281] Koch 1991:101-2
[1282] Koch 1991:102

If the prohibition is directed at the Milesians, it also suggests that the Athenian interference at Miletus was anticipated to be unwelcome and fought against. Lines 51-3 and 57-61 likely arrange for the return of property and money confiscated from Athenian loyalists who had been exiled during the civil strife.[1283] The property is to be re-confiscated ([δ]ε̣μευσα[σθαι]) and probably given back to its original owners. The prohibition against creating ἐπιγραφὰς ("inscriptions" - l.55) in the future is probably meant to stop the anti-Athenian party from imposing any more taxes or levies. The aorists in line 57 and elsewhere are probably references to circumstances of the revolt now lost to us; κ̣ατεδικάσαντο ἀλλέλον *h*οι οἴκοι οἰ[κοῦντες], "those still resident in the city have passed sentence upon each other", is another indication that the city has just recovered from civil strife, since disputes need to be resolved between those who stayed in Miletus.[1284] "Those who held the city" (l.58), again in the past tense, must refer to those who had taken control of the city during the unrest. The "decrees of the Athenians" might have to do with securing the legal status of the returned Milesian exiles.[1285] Lines 61 onwards then deal with those who do not obey instructions to return property; the mention of φανον (l.63) suggests that both physical property and money was recovered. Little is known of Arnasus (l.81), but it presumably belonged to Miletus and is now under Athenian control; the reference to a garrison or guard two lines below may be to guarding against rebels in exile, perhaps at Arnasus. These lines, though fragmentary, tell of political instability and the Athenians' attempt to restore order.

At the end of the document there was probably the customary direction for the *stele* to be set up in Athens and the allied city; this is made even more likely by the

[1283] Cataldi 1983a:201-4; Koch 1991:123
[1284] Bradeen & McGregor 1973:52
[1285] Koch 1991:124

discovery of what seems to be a fragment of the Milesian copy.[1286] The Athenian-style prescript naming the prytany, chairman and probably the archon (l.1-3), and likely mention of συγγραφεῖς, "commissioners", (l.4) and serving as a rower (l.5) all suggest that this was the local equivalent of the regulations for Miletus. Unfortunately it is too fragmentary to make comparison possible. The name of the prytany does not survive in IG I³ 21 but the lacuna does not leave enough room for Acamantis, meaning that the two sets of regulations must have been passed during different prytanies.[1287] Because συγγραφεῖς rarely appear outside Athens, and even then only in the Hellenistic era, it is likely that this is an Athenian decree for Miletus rather than a Milesian decree.[1288] In Athenian inscriptions of the fifth century, the verb συγγράφειν (to draw up a contract) and its cognates appear regularly and συγγραφεῖς occurs with the specific meaning of "commissioners" in the final book of Thucydides.[1289] More specifically, the expression τάδε οἱ χσυγγραφεῖς χσυνέγραφσαν is elsewhere only found in Athenian decrees recovered from Athens and Eleusis.[1290] Outside Athens, the only comparable example in the fifth century can be found in the Erythraean decree concerning democracy.[1291] There, it is said that the officials will be responsible for both introducing court cases and conducting them: ἐσάγεν δὲ τ[ὰ]ς δίκας καὶ συγγρά[φεν] πρυτάνεας. The meaning of συγγράφειν here is different, meaning "conduct [a trial]" rather than "draw up [a treaty or decree]". Given how rarely the word occurs outside Athens in the fifth century, it is more likely that Athens produced the decree.

[1286] *I. Milet* 6.3 n.1020
[1287] The two Athenian tribal names that fit the lacuna are Cecropis and Antiochis.
[1288] Herrmann, Gunther & Ehrhardt 2006:1; c.f. *I. Priene* 38.123, SEG 44.1218
[1289] *IG* I³ 25; *IG* I³ 35; *IG* I³ 46; *IG* I³ 79; *IG* I³ 238; Thuc. 8.67.1
[1290] *IG* I³ 21.3 (partially restored); *IG* I³ 78a = *I. Eleusis* 28a
[1291] *I. Erythrai* 1.2.28-9

The archon's name – if that is the right restoration - begins with *eta*, making Euthynus a possibility (l.3).[1292] However, if we restore an archon name, there is no room for the name of the secretary and the accompanying verb. Matthaiou convincingly argues that since the archon name does not become the norm until 421/0, and it would be surprising to find no mention of the secretary, the lacuna at the end of line 3 ought to be filled by the secretary's name. By this reasoning, Matthaiou is able to date the decree within a five year period, 426/5 to 421/0, when archon dating became the norm in Athens.[1293] This helps us to date the regulations for Miletus more precisely, since the Athenian and Milesian documents must have been created within a short time of each other; thus we can say with some confidence that the regulations for Miletus were in place by 421/0 at the latest. Unfortunately, if we accept that the fragment found in Miletus is Athenian rather than Milesian, it cannot from its prescript tell us anything about Miletus' constitution at the time.

It is important to note that the tribute decree and tribute reassessment ("Thoudippus'") decrees of 426/5 and 425/4 have both been used to restore the regulations for Miletus.[1294] There are similarities between all three inscriptions, with at least two out of the three each mentioning officials (*epimeletai*) in the context of a court (*dikasterion*) and additionally the deposit for a lawsuit (*ta prytaneia*).[1295] Oliver uses the tribute reassessment decree to restore lines 28-40, identifying the two archons of line 35 with the archon and polemarch of the reassessment decree (l.13). Oliver also restores magistrates (*eisagogeis*) into the text (l.37) on the basis of their appearance in the Thoudippus decrees. He thinks that lines 28-40 concern the payment of tribute and

[1292] Matthaiou 2008:85
[1293] Matthaiou 2008:86
[1294] *IG* I³ 68, 71
[1295] *IG* I³ 21.31-40, *IG* I³ 68.47-55, *IG* I³ 71.49

trials that arose from non-payment.[1296] He takes the *epimeletai* ("officers" or "supervisors") of the regulations for Miletus (l.40) to be the same *epimeletai* who are to receive charges of tribute non-payment in the reassessment decree (l.42-8). In both decrees these officials are mentioned in close connection to a court, so Oliver argues that they have the same judicial function, bringing cases to court against those who get in the way of tribute payment. The weakness of this argument, as we have seen, is that the word *epimeletes* occurs earlier than in these inscriptions and has a range of meanings.

Bradeen and McGregor follow Oliver in using the tribute reassessment decree to restore some lines of the regulations for Miletus (e.g. l.31-4), but they do not agree that the section concerning trials has only to do with cases concerning tribute.[1297] They reject Oliver's restoration of *eisagogeis* because it makes the line too long. Bradeen and McGregor argue that *epimeletes* is a general term and there is no way of knowing when the office was established, or whether they had the same function as those mentioned in the other decrees. They are probably correct, since the name of the office is so ambiguous ("manager", or literally "one who has charge of something"). Whether or not one agrees with the restorations made in each edition, and whatever one suspects the function of the *epimeletai* to be, it is striking that the editors all chose to restore the regulations for Miletus using two texts securely dated to the mid-420s.[1298] This is true also of Cataldi's edition, though his restorations are so extensive as to be only educated guesses.[1299]

[1296] Oliver 1935:193-4
[1297] Bradeen & McGregor 1973:42-8
[1298] The Cleinias decree (*IG* I³ 34) is also used, but since its date is disputed, any argument involving it is perilously circular.
[1299] E.g. his restoration ἔ[μμεναϛ δίκαϛ (l.44) based on ἔμμενα in *IG* I³ 68.48 (Cataldi 1983a:191-2).

Mattingly's method of dating decrees based on individual words was open to the criticism that too much weight was given to words that can have a generic meaning, such as *epimeletes*. Yet the case is stronger when more and more specific words are common to two inscriptions. The rare verb κακοτεχνεῖν, "conspire wickedly", occurs in fifth-century Attic inscriptions only in the regulations for Miletus and Cleonymus' decree.[1300] Isolated cases of words being common to two texts can easily be put down to coincidence, but it is more difficult to argue against the occurrence of several technical terms in both the regulations for Miletus and the tribute decrees of the mid-420s.

Minor points of vocabulary cannot definitively prove that Miletus was a democracy or an oligarchy. Meiggs points out that σωφροσύνη, "moderation" (l.80) is a particularly oligarchic quality, but the association may be unintentional and it is hardly believable that the Athenians would not demand good sense from a democratic Miletus.[1301] Moreover, ἐὰν δὲ σοφρονο[...] ("if they show moderation") may refer to negotiations with rebels rather than the entire Milesian citizenry. The word and its cognates are difficult to translate because they can have so many meanings; in Thucydides the noun σωφροσύνη even means a moderate oligarchy.[1302] It is also highly unusual for the word to appear in a fifth-century inscription. Thus, it could mean "if they remain an oligarchy..." but the total lack of context prevents us from knowing what this means for Miletus' constitution. Bradeen and McGregor and Cataldi take the use of the word πόλις in lines 54 and 66 as evidence that Miletus was not yet a democracy, but such a neutral word

[1300] *IG* I³ 21.48; *IG* I³ 68.43
[1301] Meiggs 1972:115
[1302] Thuc. 8.64.5

can hardly be evidence either way.[1303] It is used in several Athenian decrees to refer to the city of Athens, which was of course democratic.[1304] Similarly, Cataldi argues that the verb ἐψηφίσθαι (l.79) does not mean, "it has already been voted by the *boule*", suggesting an established democracy, but is an invitation to the *demos* to vote on the proposals.[1305] Yet councils existed in oligarchies and democracies alike. Moreover, since only the infinitive ending -ίσθαι is preserved on the stone, the verb is hardly certain anyway.

A more convincing argument of Cataldi's is that the *prytaneis* (presiding officials) mentioned (l.65) are not on the Athenian, and thus democratic, model, but rather a feature of the Milesian oligarchy. Gehrke had argued that the *prytaneis* were an Athenian-style presiding committee for a democratic council, but just because *prytaneis* are found in Athenian democracy, this does not prove that they were part of the democratic machinery elsewhere.[1306] In Athens the word meant "ruler" or "lord" before it meant "democratically elected presiding official"; it appears with this meaning in odes of Pindar and perhaps Bacchylides.[1307] Outside Athens, *prytaneis* are found in Erythrae in the mid-fourth century, when the town was certainly an oligarchy.[1308] Aristotle tells us that in archaic times at Miletus a tyranny arose from a prytany, "for the *prytanis* had control of many important matters".[1309] Clearly the office existed at Miletus well before democracy, and as a stepping-stone to tyranny could have thoroughly un-democratic associations. Our earliest epigraphic evidence for the office at Miletus is a sixth century inscription that names at least two *prytaneis*.[1310] It is

[1303] Bradeen & McGregor 1973:67; Cataldi 1983a:178
[1304] *IG* I³ 29.3-4; *IG* I³ 52.15; *IG* I³ 62.19; *IG* I³ 92.8; *IG* I³ 95.7; *IG* I³ 98.11
[1305] Cataldi 1983a:211
[1306] Gehrke 1980:22-3
[1307] Pindar *Pythian* 2.58; *Pythian* 6.24; Bacchylides 19.43 (restored)
[1308] *SEG* 31:969
[1309] Arist.*Pol*.5.1305a
[1310] *I. Milet* 1.3 n.129

possible that the *prytanis* was the original eponymous official, and his eponymity was transferred to the *aisymnetes* to make the office more politically neutral and disassociate it from tyranny.[1311] If Delorme's restoration is correct, the regulations for Miletus seem to privilege the *prytaneis* over the rest of the *demos* by having them swear the oath before anyone else (l.71-2).[1312] Alexander Herda thinks that the *prytaneis* are made up of the five *prosetairoi* ("colleagues" or "assistants") and the *aisymnetes*, and that these six combined constitute the government of oligarchic Miletus; however, there is nothing in the text of this or any other inscription to confirm this.[1313] All this is only speculation, but one thing that is clear from the comparative evidence is that *prytaneis* existed in many cities independently of Athenian influence. We find eponymous *prytaneis* all over Ionia in the archaic and classical periods and beyond, and these have nothing discernible to do with the Athenian office. To take one example, the anthologist Stobaeus records a *prytanis* alongside *basileis* (kings) at Mytilene in the time of Pittacus the archaic sage.[1314]

With no evidence to the contrary, one can assume that the *prytaneis* of the inscription are part of oligarchic Milesian society and not the same as the Athenian officials who were democratically appointed by sortition. The old theory that line 6 contained mention of *prosetairoi* and their *aisymnetes* has been proven untenable by the discovery of the faint traces of a rho where there would have had to be a tau; these would have added to the evidence for an oligarchy.[1315] As it stands, the inscription

[1311] Sherk 1992:230
[1312] Delorme 1995:261
[1313] Herda infers from the fact that the *aisymnetai* are allowed to take funds out from the treasury of Hestia, that they have a political function. He then translates ἐμ μολπῶι as "in the Molpon", suggesting that this was the Milesian equivalent of the Prytaneion, and thus that the *aisymnetes* is the lead *prytanis* (2005:249-50.). However, all of this is highly speculative and it is natural to translate κατόπερ ἐμ μολπῶι as "as happens in (the house of) the Molpoi", rather than inventing a word for an unattested building (Chaniotis 2010).
[1314] Gschnitzer 1973:733-6; Stob. Flor. 44.22.1
[1315] Bradeen and McGregor 1973:39

provides no definitive proof of an oligarchy at Miletus, but nor does it a democracy, unless we take the *prytaneis* to be the kind found at Athens. Unlikely though it is that the regulations for Miletus imposed a democracy, they may still have been dealing with an already democratic Miletus. However, this is unlikely given the total lack of mention of a *boule* (council) selected by lot or any other such democratic institution. It must also be noted that there is no knowing how long the arrangements were supposed to last. Given that the five men elected to take charge are not allowed to delegate the role to someone else (l.4-6), these may be temporary measures specially designed for – and only meant to last as long as - the period of crisis.[1316] This would mean that Athenian control over the city was not absolute, but was meant to step in where local control had failed. If the regulations for Miletus do not impose a democracy, it is conceivable that the city opted for democracy of its own accord.

Noel Robertson first pointed out that the inscription as we have it not only does not impose a democracy, but also barely presupposes a revolt.[1317] Clearly, unrest in Miletus prompts the regulations, but these may be internal problems rather than open revolt and the regulations may be more pre-emptive than punitive. We might speculate that one faction was pro-Persian, given the known Persian involvement in Milesian politics at the beginning and end of the century, though certainty is impossible given the silence of our sources.[1318] For Robertson, the splinter groups at Leros and Teichioussa that appear on the *ATL* in 454/3 and 427/6 or 426/5 show internal disagreement; if Miletus were in revolt, we would expect to find no payment, but instead we find payment coming from three separate Milesian territories. Robertson

[1316] Low 2013:39 n.44
[1317] Robertson 1987:388. Dunham first suggested that the decree could be in reaction to internal dissent, but believed that Miletus did revolt and a democracy was imposed (1916:134).
[1318] Balcer takes for granted that in 454 the pro-Persian faction gained control and caused a revolt with the help of Persian gold (1974:374; 431).

contends that a rival group had got into power at Miletus and paid even though the city was in *stasis*.[1319] It is particularly striking that in 454/3 the Milesians likely paid at a completely different time to their counterparts in Leros and Teichioussa, since they are found far apart from each other on the lists. Although neither Leros nor Teichioussa is mentioned in the regulations for Miletus, the aforementioned enigma Arnasus (l.81) could be another local region affected by the unrest.

Robertson was writing at a time before the sigma doctrine had been challenged, and as a result he dated the regulations for Miletus to the 450s and the actual revolt to the 440s.[1320] It seems a curious coincidence that the new date for the decree is either the same year as, or the year before, evidence for further internal unrest at Miletus. In either 427/6 or 426/5, Miletus, Leros and Teichioussa each paid separately, when in other years they were either all included under the rubric "Milesians", or paid together despite being listed separately. We can tell, for example, that all three paid together in 421/0 because all three names are listed with only one amount (10 talents) beside them.[1321] In the list for 427/6 or 426/5, the quota amounts for Miletus and Teichioussa do not survive, but part of Leros' amount survives: two obols (representing 20 drachmas). The tithe to Athena that the group pays is only ever 1000 drachmas or 500 drachmas, neither of which sum would necessitate the numerals for two obols. Since the total amount must be different to the five and ten talents attested elsewhere for the three towns' payment, and since the amount that survives is beside Teichioussa rather than Leros' name, it is logical to conclude that all three paid separate amounts. The tribute reassessment decree shows the degree to which they were normally intertwined: all

[1319] Robertson 1987:390
[1320] His interest was in down-dating Miletus' revolt to the 440s, which required arguing that the regulations for Miletus (dated to 454/3) are not evidence of a revolt.
[1321] *IG* I³ 285 fr. 3 l.88-90

three places are listed together, with Miletus and Leros even occupying the same line.[1322] This, combined with the fact that Leros and Teichioussa seldom make it onto the tribute quota lists themselves, suggests that generally the payment of all three places was usually subsumed under the rubric "Milesians". Yet in 427/6 or 426/5, perhaps the same year as the regulations for Miletus, all three are paying separately.

It is often noted that a Milesian revolt could not have lasted long before Athenian intervention. Perhaps in the past we have been too hasty to ascribe irregularities in the list to revolts. Abnormal payments might indicate rather that a city was experiencing internal problems. In Miletus' case, neither the tribute lists nor IG I³ 21 is hard proof of outright revolt from the Athenian Empire. The combined evidence is also proof that whatever dissension there was at Miletus did not last long; by 452/1 and 421/0 respectively, payment looks like it was back to normal.[1323] As with the situation on Samos, it is only realistic to expect that tensions between different political groups continually simmered throughout this period, and it is necessary to try to distinguish such tensions from actual revolt. The fragmentary state of the regulations for Miletus and the absence of features such as an obligatory oath of loyalty leave both options open.

It had also been posited, on the evidence of the *ATL* alone, that Miletus revolted a second time in the 440s.[1324] Miletus is absent from the tribute lists between 446/5 and 444/3, and reappears with its tribute halved to 5 talents. Yet the reduction in tribute could be merely due to reassessment or some other change of circumstance, and three years is a long time for Athens to stand by and tolerate a revolt. If we believe in a Peace of Callias, Miletus' absence may be due to uncertainty in the period after the peace was

[1322] *IG* I³ 71.121-2
[1323] *IG* I³ 261, 285
[1324] Meiggs 1943:27

made. However, the "Peace" should not be used to date the regulations for Miletus, even if it is tempting to use both to draw a picture of increased Athenian imperialism in the 450s and early 440s.[1325] The evidence of the tribute lists alone is not enough to prove that a city was in revolt, and since there is no supporting evidence in favour of the hypothesis, we can rule out a revolt in the 440s. Gehrke and Robertson both argue for a single revolt, in the 450s and 440s respectively, but this is on the basis of assigning the old date to IG I³ 21.[1326] Instead the evidence points to unrest during the Archidamian War. If Miletus did not properly revolt, this would also explain why Athens seems to have backed (or, at least, not ousted) the oligarchs: they were not a particular threat. The real threat was the unpredictability caused by factionalism in the city.

One ramification of the new date is that it detracts from the picture of widespread Ionian defection in the early years of the Athenian quota lists. Instead, what we find is increasing evidence for disaffection and factionalism in Miletus, Mytilene and other towns at a time when Athens was already under financial pressure. 426/5 is only a *terminus post quem* but assuming that the decree was passed within a few years of Euthynus' archonship, the trouble in Miletus will have been roughly contemporaneous with the Thoudippus decree of 425/4. Whether or not it was effective, this extraordinary reassessment sought to tighten control over tribute payment and suggests that Athens was experiencing difficulty raising enough cash from tribute. This may be, as Kallet suggests, because tribute was an unstable source of revenue for maintaining an empire.[1327] Thus, as well as having trouble getting allies to pay tribute, Athens had the additional worry of losing Miletus and other Ionian towns altogether.

[1325] Balcer prefers to place the revolt in 454 rather than 446 because this "allows us to consider...that in 449 B.C...the Athenians actively and acutely transformed the Confederacy into an Empire" (1984:28).
[1326] Robertson 1987:393; Gehrke
[1327] Kallet 1993:169; 190-2

The Dating of the *Stephanephoros* Lists

We are fortunate enough to have a handful of inscriptions from Miletus itself that help somewhat to demystify the city's political institutions in the fifth century. We are aided in dating them by the earliest *stephanephoros* lists, which name the eponymous official from (perhaps) 525/4 all the way to 314/3.[1328] Unfortunately, even this list is subject to dating controversy, since all we have is a list of names and no definitive proof of when it began. Issues like whether Miletus was actually depopulated after Mycale will affect how far back the lists go, since total depopulation would mean that there was nobody around to be appointed *stephanephoros*. Luckily this does not affect our time period (c.450 onwards), for dates are calibrated by working backwards from Alexander the Great's stephanephorate and not forwards from the beginning of the list. However, the date of Alexander's stephanephorate itself is not known for certain. We are only talking about a difference of a few years, but in some cases such a difference is significant: by the time of the Ionian war, cities' fortunes were changing rapidly and political situations were shifting constantly. The oligarchy of the Four Hundred at Athens lasted only four months; in Samos, it took a matter of months for the defenders of democracy to form an oligarchy.[1329]

The *stephanephoros* lists are spread across seven published inscriptions.[1330] Each list begins with the heading οἵδε μολπῶν ἠσύμνησαν and every entry contains the name of the *stephanephoros* or *aisymnetes* followed by his patronymic. We do not know whether the list stops during the period of supposed depopulation, and we do not know why some columns contain two names rather than one. Rehm took these double entries as entries for separate years, because in doing so one can date the

[1328] *I. Milet* 1.3 n.122
[1329] Aristot. *Const. Ath.* 33.1; Thuc. 8.73.2
[1330] *I. Milet* 1.3 n.122-8

stephanephorates mentioned in the statutes of the Molpoi to 479 (Charopinus) and 450 (Philtes).[1331] These being two years of great change in Miletus, Rehm found it no coincidence that changes to the statutes of the Molpoi would be made in those years. However, with the new dating for Miletus' revolt, 450 is no longer an especially attractive year in which to date events. Regardless, it is tempting but methodologically suspect to use dates of known change as a kind of magnet towards which to draw less secure or less well understood events: there is no reason why all the cultic decisions of the Molpoi can only have been made in years when Miletus was in political turmoil. This is not to deny the political importance of the Molpoi, who even up to the Hellenistic period controlled the granting of citizenship.[1332]

Cavaignac made a case for taking the two double entries to be years in which turmoil led to the replacement of the *stephanephoros*.[1333] He also argued that Alexander the Great's stephanephorate, by which we date the rest of the list, fell not in October 334/3 but April 333/2. The result of these two changes would be that the dates that concern this study, in the mid to late fifth century, would be three years later than those adopted in *Inschriften von Milet*. Cavaignac makes some persuasive points, but he too places too much emphasis on years of great change: he relies on the thesis that it cannot be a coincidence that two names are given for the years 403/2 and 392/1. He places an anecdote of Polyaenus about Tissaphernes attacking Miletus to restore its exiles in 403, arguing that this will have caused the disruption found in the list.[1334] Similarly, he suggests that the double *stephanephorate* in 392/1 is due to the fallout from the Battle of Cnidus. However, Polyaenus' anecdote cannot be fixed to a particular year. We have

[1331] Kawerau & Rehm 1914:243
[1332] Herda 2005:248; *I. Milet* n.1.3 143.32; 146.41; 150.65
[1333] Rehm & Herrmann 1997:166; Cavaignac 1924:311-4
[1334] Polyaen. 7.18.2

no other information about Tissaphernes attacking the city, with which he was especially friendly, and there is simply not enough evidence to situate the attack precisely in 403. Cavaignac argues that Tissaphernes was restoring the moderate conservatives to power, but the only known exiles at the time were the democrats ousted in 405/4. Neither Diodorus nor Plutarch mentions a group of conservatives who shared the same fate as the democrats.[1335] As for the Battle of Cnidus, this took place two years prior to the second double entry. Thus, rather than those being two years in which disruption is known to have occurred in Miletus, they are merely two years in which disruption was possible or, at best, likely (and no more likely than, say, the years 404/3 and 393/2). The weakness of Cavaignac's argument is that 403/2 and 392/1 are not two years of exceptional unrest, but rather two out of many years of unrest in a period of heavy conflict and change around Ionia.

Both Cavaignac and Rehm make their arguments by pegging certain stephanephorates onto well-known dates, meaning that there is little to choose between the two arguments. Rehm mentions that the lines that contain two names are written in slightly smaller lettering than the other lines; what this means is that the second name cannot have been written as an afterthought.[1336] The stonecutter must have decided to write two names before writing either name. This does not rule out the possibility that the two names represent the same stephanephorate; all it means is that the stonecutter was not charged with inscribing the name(s) onto the stone until the year was out. From a merely practical point of view, it seems nonsensical that a stonecutter would deliberately inscribe two names side by side in a document whose format was clearly one name per line, unless something extraordinary had happened in that year such as

[1335] Diod. 13.104.5; Plut.*Lys*.8
[1336] Kawerau & Rehm 1914:243

the replacement of a *stephanephoros.* Thus, although some of Cavaignac's methodology is questionable, his conclusion is to be preferred.

Cavaignac's redating of Alexander's stephanephorate is persuasive, and we will consider the possibility that the dates of the *stephanephoros* lists should be pushed back a year. We know that Alexander captured Miletus in the summer of 334/3;[1337] the question is whether he appointed himself *stephanephoros* straight away, or waited until the year was out. The question also arises when the beginning of the year was, in autumn or in spring. It was Bilabel who first made the case for the latter, arguing that Alexander did not assume the stephanephorate straight away. It is more natural to assume that he took office during the month Taureon as his successors did, and this would have fallen in 333/2, six months or so after he took Miletus.[1338] There would be no rush for Alexander to take office so long as Sotas, the *stephanephoros* before Alexander, was favourable to his cause. Rehm merely takes for granted that as soon as Alexander arrived, he replaced the *stephanephoros* in office. If this had happened in autumn when the changeover was usually in spring, we would expect to find something to indicate this in the lists, such as the name of the person he ousted from office (unless, of course, this was Sotas).

Bilabel uses the statutes of the Molpoi and a sixth century sacrificial calendar to argue that even in classical times, the Milesian year began in the spring.[1339] The statutes of the Molpoi make very little clear about the Milesian calendar, because although they state that at the Hebdomaea the *aisymnetes* gives his name to the year, this could happen at either the beginning or the end of the year, and moreover the month

[1337] Diod. 17.22. Diodorus dates the section to Ctesicles' archonship in 334/3 (Diod. 17.17)
[1338] Bilabel 1920:74-5
[1339] Bilabel 1920:73-4; *I. Milet* 1.3 n.31, 133

is not specified.[1340] The matter is complicated by the fact that a key passage of the statutes naming the month Taureon (l.23-5) appears to be an addition by a later hand. Bilabel's interpretation of the archaic sacrificial calendar relies on a restoration of the name of the month Artemision, to prove that the Hebdomaea was celebrated in that month. He also adduces evidence from the Milesian colony Cyzicus to show that the beginning of the year was Taureon there, too. Unfortunately the evidence is very late, some of it in the second century A.D.[1341]

Fortunately, the recent discovery of a fifth-century graffito from the Milesian colony Olbia settles the question, for it contains a list of consecutive months starting with Taureon.[1342] So, unless Alexander replaced Sotas as soon as he arrived in the summer of 334/3, he will have assumed the stephanephorate in Taureon 333/2. The only drawback of Bilabel's chronology is that it pushes Antigonus' liberation of Miletus back a year to 312/1, whereas in Diodorus' account it is in 313/2, in the archonship of Theophrastus.[1343] However, Diodorus' chronology is notoriously chaotic for book 19.[1344] Overall, Bilabel's (and consequently Cavaignac's) argument is not incontrovertible, but it is more convincing than Rehm's.

Rehm and Bilabel's dates for Alexander's stephanephorate are both problematic. While Bilabel's contradicts Diodorus, Rehm mistakenly places the beginning of the year in the autumn. Rehm himself raises the intriguing possibility that Alexander took over from Sotas halfway through the year, and rejects it on the grounds that it pushes all the dates pre-334/3 back by a year, disrupting the pleasing

[1340] Rehm argues for the beginning of the year (1914:235), Bilabel for the end (1920:74).
[1341] Bilabel 1920:76-8; *I. Mysia & Troas* 1464
[1342] *SEG* 30:977
[1343] Diod. 19.57. Rehm uses Diodorus to date Antigonus' liberation to 313/2 (1914:241).
[1344] Diodorus' chronology in book 19 is haphazard and may be out by a year or so here because there is a missing winter in his narrative of the third Diadoch war (Wheatley 1998:263).

synchronicity of the battle of Mycale and the regulations for Miletus with changes to the statutes of the Molpoi.[1345] As we have seen, this is a flawed argument. Thus, one final possibility is that Sotas' stephanephorate should also be dated to 334/3, making all the stephanephorates before 334/3 one year later. Since the two names are written separately, one would also have to assume that in this case, the decision was made to record *stephanephoroi* from the same year on separate lines. This is by no means certain, but remains a possibility. It would also maintain synchronicity with Diodorus while keeping the beginning of the month in Taureon, thus providing a solution to both Bilabel and Rehm's problems.

This means that for our time period, we are working with an error margin of three years, if the years featuring two names should be counted separately, and either Sotas' or both Sotas and Alexander's stephanephorate are dated a year later than usual. Cavaignac's dating aside, there are many issues with assigning a precise date to each of 213 names when only one of these, Alexander son of Philip, is well attested. We have already raised the possibility of a gap between 494 and 479, and there is no way of knowing how many other gaps, or double years, the list might include. Fortunately, an error margin of three years makes little difference to the general picture of Milesian history in the fifth century. Since there can be no certainty, both Rehm and Cavaignac's dates will be borne in mind where a few years do make a difference.

Local Evidence

A fifth-century *lex sacra* (sacred law) published by Peter Herrmann, which refers to a tribe named Leontis, suggests expansion of the tribal system to make it more like Athens', Leontis being the name of an Athenian tribe.[1346] Carved on white marble, it

[1345] Rehm 1914:241
[1346] *I. Milet* 6.3 n. 1218; Herrmann 1970

also has an Athenian-style prescript, unfortunately not fully preserved but including the name of the secretary as well as the prytany and president (l.1-5):

[..10..] . [..12..]

[..9.. E]ὐδήμο, Λεῳντ[ὶς ἐ]

[πρυτά]νευεν, Τήλαγ[ρ]ος ἐγρα[μ]

[μάτευ]εν, Τήμεν[ος] ἐ[πεστ]άτε[.]

[..5..]ς εἶπεν· […]ΘΙΕ[…]

This is in addition to the *lex sacra* mentioned above, with Athenian-style prescript, which attests to the existence of another tribe of Athenian name, Cecropis, which was in prytany; the names of the president and the proposer of the motion are also given.[1347] Unlike the other *lex sacra*, this excludes the name of a secretary. The prescript is almost perfectly preserved (l.1-5):

ἐπὶ Παρ[θ]ενοπαίο, μηνὸς Ἀρτε

μισιῶνος, Κεκροπὶς ἐπρυτά

νευεν, Φιλίννης Ἡροδότο

ἐπεστάτει, ἔδοξεν τῆι βολῆι

καὶ τῶι δήμωι, Ἡράκλειτος εἶπεν

In archaic times Miletus originally had six tribes, four of which were the old Ionian (and Athenian) tribes: Geleontes, Aegicoreis, Argadeis and Hoplethes.[1348] In addition, specific to Miletus were the tribes Boreis and Oinopes. It seems that in 447/6, there were still six Ionian tribes, because the only three tribes mentioned under Philtes'

[1347] *I. Milet* 6.3 n.1220

[1348] Hdt 5.66; Haussoullier 1897:46-7. There is some debate about whether Miletus started out with four, five or six tribes, but the matter does not concern us here.

stephanephorate in the statutes of the Molpoi are all of the old designation. These are Oinopes, Hoplethes and Boreis. Unless this is sheer coincidence, it means that the expansion of the tribal system at Miletus must have happened in the second half of the fifth century, when Athens was gaining influence over Miletus.

At some point after 447/6, the six Milesian tribes were either expanded to ten, in perfect imitation of Athens, or doubled to twelve. Either is possible, since for the Classical period we know of only five Cleisthenic tribes and two more, Theseis and Asopis.[1349] The five known Cleisthenic tribes are Oineis, Pandionis, Acamantis, Cecropis and Leontis. The discovery of two inscriptions, attesting to the 'second [tribe] of Hoplethes' and the 'first [tribe] of Argadeis' (now sadly lost), poses the possibility that each tribe was split into two, resulting in twelve tribes.[1350] Of course, the problem with this is that it leaves no room for the ten Cleisthenic tribes and Theseis and Asopis. The former of the two inscriptions Dunst originally dated to the turn of the fourth century, but Piérart dates them to the middle of the fifth century based on letter-forms.[1351] Precise dating is difficult given the brevity of the extant inscription and its unhelpful context; the statue on which it resides dates back to the end of the sixth century. The Ionic dialect provides no further clue, since this can be found from the oldest Milesian inscriptions to those from the fourth century.[1352] However, Piérart draws attention to its similarity to the Blutinschrift and also to a mid-fifth century inscription from Samos; the only difference is that its omega and rho have a slightly wider curve.[1353] Any progress on the date of the latter inscription is virtually impossible now that it is lost. Regardless, it seems most likely that the six old Ionic tribes were first split in two

[1349] Lewis 1997:53-4; Roussel 1976:211
[1350] *I. Milet* 6.3 n.1380; 1381
[1351] Dunst 1961:272; Piérart 1969:382 n.72
[1352] Bondesson 1936:205
[1353] Fornara 1983b:78 no.77; *ML* 34

and then entirely replaced by twelve new tribes, ten of which borrowed their names from Athens, plus Theseis and Asopis.[1354] This would mean that the two brief inscriptions that suggest a division of the original six tribes are to be dated to the mid-fifth century, and this system was replaced at some point by a system modeled on Athens'. It would make sense if this change coincided with the installation of democracy in Miletus, since the offices of secretary, prytany and president and the format of the decree also look closely modeled on Athens'.

Herrmann's decree displaying Cleisthenic institutions can be dated more precisely because it preserves the name of the eponymous official for the year (or his father), Eudemus. Three officials, however, could fit the bill from the *stephanephoros* lists: those whose names are recorded for the years 437/6, 413/2 and 404/3 (Rehm's dating) or 434/3, 410/9 and 402/1 (Cavaignac's dating). Herrmann considers the most likely date to be the earliest, given the unlikelihood that Miletus would have adopted Athenian-style institutions after it had seceded from the Delian League and undergone an oligarchic revolution.[1355] However, it is not impossible, especially since we know that Miletus was to become democratic again by 379/8. Bear in mind that the later dates need not be the very first year that democracy was established; they are merely *termini ante quos*. Herrmann also sees a similarity between the decree and the Blutinschrift;[1356] others similarly date the decree to the mid-fifth century on the basis of its resemblance to another *lex sacra*.[1357] Any such argument is indecisive since with so few inscriptions for the period, it is impossible to trace their development accurately. As we will see, the Blutinschrift is anything but securely dated, and the *lex sacra* is of such uncertain

[1354] Ehrhardt 1983:98
[1355] Herrmann 1970:170
[1356] Herrmann 1970:171
[1357] *I. Milet* 6.3 n.1219

provenance that some have dated it to the turn of the fourth century.[1358] For our purposes, the early date would be the most difficult to explain, on the assumption that the regulations for Miletus date to 426/5 when the city was still oligarchic. If Miletus were democratic by the mid-430s, we would expect to find some indication in the regulations for Miletus. The middle date is also unlikely, since this would rely on Eudemus being the name of the official's father, and neither of the other officials named is called by his patronymic.[1359] Also, this would be very shortly after Miletus' defection from the League in 412.[1360] The latest date has generally been dismissed as unlikely because of the oligarchic coup recorded at the end of 405/4.[1361] However, if one thing is clear from this period it is that the fortunes of a political group can change fast, and it is certainly possible that the *demos*, the people, regained power within a few years.

The coup is dated unusually precisely because Diodorus specifies that it happened during the Dionysia; unfortunately, we do not know for sure when in the year the Milesian Dionysia would have been celebrated. Thucydides tells us that the Ionians who represented themselves as descended from Athens celebrated the Dionysia in Anthesterion, which was towards the end of the year.[1362] Whether or not Thucydides' testimony applies to the Milesian Dionysia, it was likely at the end of the year, since Diodorus begins his chapter, "At the end of this year [405/4]..."[1363]

It is here that the discrepancy between Rehm and Cavaignac's chronologies matters the most. If one adopts the latest date for the Eudemus decree, 404 provides

[1358] Sokolowski 1955:116
[1359] Gorman 2001:218 n.6
[1360] On Cavaignac's dating – on Rehm's there is still the possibility that the *lex sacra* was written just before Miletus seceded.
[1361] Diod.Sic.13.104.5-6; Plut.*Lys*.8.1-3; Polyaen.1.45.1
[1362] Thuc 2.15
[1363] Diod. 13.104.1. He is referring to events in Rome, but when he pans across to Miletus he uses the expression "at the same time" (13.104.5).

both a *terminus ante quem* for the coup and a *terminus post quem* for the decree. It is possible that the decree was passed before the coup, accounting for slight inaccuracy on the part of Diodorus or the *stephanephoros* lists. With the Milesian calendar differing from the Attic,[1364] and with the various possible dates provided by different interpretations of the *stephanephoros* lists, one can only speculate as to the precise order of events in the years 405-3 B.C. The decree is unlikely to have been passed after the coup, for the latter happened shortly before the whole of Ionia was abandoned to the Persians at the end of the Peloponnesian War. However, Herrmann considers the possibility that the decree has something to do with the turbulence following the oligarchic overthrow.[1365] The other *lex sacra* from 379/8 B.C., with its democratic prescript, tells us that democracy was restored at some point after the coup. Moreover, if we are tempted by Cavaignac's redating of Alexander's stephanephorate, this would push Eudemus' stephanephorate back to 403/2. If we are tempted by Cavaignac's entire argument, Eudemus' stephanephorate would occur as late as 402/1. This presents the intriguing possibility that in the aftermath of the oligarchic overthrow and at the very end of the Peloponnesian war, Miletus chose to reinstate democracy of its own accord.

J.D. Smart has gone even further, arguing that Diodorus' overthrow of 405/4 is the one referred to by the Old Oligarch.[1366] For Smart, the regulations for Miletus should be dated to 406/5, with a restored prescript saying that Callias was archon. Smart believes that Athens briefly managed to regain control of Miletus in that year, an event that passed without comment by ancient historians. In the following year, the oligarchs will have risen up and cut down the *demos*, thus proving the Old Oligarch's point that

[1364] Most of the names of the months are different, and even where they are the same, they are in a different order. The year begins at a different time, with the autumnal equinox (Samuel 1972:115)
[1365] Herrmann 1970:171
[1366] Smart 1977:250

Athens always regretted favouring oligarchies. There are several problems with this interpretation, not least that if the Athenians "decided to continue co-operation with the leading families" and allowed an oligarchy to remain in 406/5, there will have been no democracy for the oligarchs to overthrow in the following year.[1367] Both Diodorus and Plutarch make clear that the oligarchs were overthrowing a democracy, not just suppressing the *demos* and its leaders.[1368] In the same way as at Samos, a distinction must be drawn between overthrowing a constitution and merely quelling an uprising. In this instance both sources unequivocally state that the democracy was replaced by an oligarchy, so it is not possible to interpret the passages as meaning that the oligarchs were shutting down a potential threat to the *status quo*. If one instead argues that the regulations for Miletus imposed a democracy (for which there is no evidence), then the Old Oligarch's claim that Athens supported the oligarchs loses its meaning. Then there is the problem of dating the Oligarch several decades after its accepted date, which will be discussed below. However, the latest possible date for the Eudemus inscription should certainly not be ruled out solely on account of the events of 405/4, especially since the inscription's date may be as late as 402/1. That Miletus remained democratic immediately after the war ended is not impossible, though unlikely if Lysander succeeded in establishing decarchies in most cities and oligarchies in the others.[1369]

Another fascinating but frustrating inscription is the Milesian Blutinschrift, also called the "law against tyrants", discovered in the North Market of Miletus in 1905.[1370] The inscription was moved to Berlin but is now lost; it was inscribed on the base of a stele that was presumably also inscribed, that has never been found. The first thing to

[1367] Smart 1977:250
[1368] Diodorus says they were ὀλιγαρχίας ὀρεγόμενοι (13.104.5); Plutarch says that Lysander helped them συγκαταλύσειν τε τὸν δῆμον (Lys. 8.1).
[1369] Diod. 14.3.4; Xen.*Hell*.3.4.7; Plut.*Lys*.13.3
[1370] *I. Milet* 1.6 n.187

point out is that the law does not banish "tyrants" so much as some prominent citizens, (the sons of) Nympharetus and Stratonax and Alcimus and Cresphontes, and their descendants. It has been pointed out several times that since tyranny is one-man rule, Nympharetus and Stratonax can hardly have both aspired to tyranny.[1371] Yet the Samian Polycrates' arrangement with his brothers Syloson and Pantagnotus is still considered a tyranny.[1372] So is the three-way tyranny of Ortyges, Irus and Echarus in Erythrae; Hippias of Erythrae (or at least Athenaeus) feels no contradiction in using the plural τύραννοι to describe them.[1373] It is less the number of people involved than a lack of information about Stratonax and Nympharetus that makes it unwise to call them tyrants. It is not even entirely clear what they are being charged with. Their crime may be murder, but it could also be sacrilege or treason; the phrase ἐπ' αἵματι φυγὴν (l.2-3) may mean that they are to be tried "as though for blood-guilt", and besides, it is heavily restored. What is clear is the effort being made to ensure that their descendants be executed, which suggests that they are still a threat and still nearby. The decree's *terminus post quem* is generally taken to be 479/8, because of the widely held belief that the city was not rebuilt before then. Scholars have variously argued that the inscription banishes democrats, oligarchs, and tyrants.

Glotz linked the inscription to a fragment of Nicolaus of Damascus concerning the tyrant Epimenes' expulsion of the children of Amphitres in the sixth century, a similar instance of an aristocratic family being driven out of the city.[1374] Using the evidence of scholia, myths and other inscriptions, Glotz identified some of the names in the description as being those of the Neleid family and concluded that there had been

[1371] e.g. Lapini 1997:91
[1372] Hdt. 3.37.2
[1373] Hippias *FGrHist* 421 F 1
[1374] Glotz 1906; Nicolaus of Damascus *FGrHist* 90 F 53

two expulsions of the Neleids, one in the sixth and one in the fifth century.[1375] He also suggested that the original stele contained details of the expulsion of the children of Amphitres and thus dated to the sixth century; however, this would mean that the stele survived the sack of Miletus by the Persians and that iron clamps were already being used in sixth-century inscriptions.[1376] This is unless the stone was reinscribed after the sack of Miletus. Yet given that the inscription as it stands contains none of the information included in Nicolaus of Damascus' story, it is pure conjecture to suppose that it did (and that it is a replica of an older stone).

Though we do not have the full list of the proscribed, it is also unlikely that the names of the entire Neleid family would have fit onto the monument. The prosopographical argument is not strong as it assumes that certain aristocratic names were reserved for the sole use of the Neleid family; besides, some of the names in the inscription do not have a possible Neleid connection. The name Cresphontes occurs in Apollonia, a Milesian colony, in the fourth century but there is no way of knowing whether the name had political significance or was carried in some families to the exclusion of others.[1377] Barron uses the names of a *prosetairos* (assistant) in 450 and the *aisymnetes* in 445 to argue that the Neleids were in power in this period, but even if both names are Neleid, this does not have to mean total Neleid control of politics.[1378] If ancient Athenian and modern US politics are anything to go by, political dynasties can and do exist under democracy.

There is the possibility that Nicolaus of Damascus got his information from the fifth-century inscription and elaborated on it to reconstruct the past; this would have

[1375] Glotz 1906:524. Alcimus is the name of one of the twelve sons of Neleus (schol. B. on *Iliad* 11.692) and Cresphontes has ties to Messenia, home of the Neleids.
[1376] Rehm & Herrmann 1997:103
[1377] IMT Kyz Kapu Dağ 1722; Robert 1938:199-200
[1378] Barron 1962:3-4

been especially tempting if few sixth-century inscriptions were left after the Persian sack. Caution must be exercised when using Nicolaus as a source; he also claims that Epimenes as *aisymnetes* could kill whomever he pleased, yet most accept that he was writing "about legendary, not historical times".[1379] Certainly, we cannot use the fragment of Nicolaus alone to date the inscription. That the reward for killing and punishment for failing to execute the proscribed are fairly small (100 and 50 staters respectively) points to a date in the fifth century, when Miletus was far less prosperous.[1380] Yet even this hypothesis takes for granted the contentious claim that Miletus suffered a huge economic decline in the fifth century.

Barron argues that the decree was prompted by a democratic revolution in which the democrats banished the oligarchic faction; though only four names survive, he points out that there will have been space for many more names on the main part of the stele.[1381] However, that our inscription banishes members of the Neleid family is far from certain; it is only likely that they are prominent members of the oligarchy. Though the rest of the inscription is lost, it is unlikely to have included many more names because "it would be a careless stonecutter who laid out his inscription so badly that it had to overflow for twelve lines onto the base of the stele."[1382] Thus, the law probably has nothing to do with Miletus' revolt from Athens, since the group being banished for treason is small and the rewards for killing the proscribed are to be taken from the property of one man, Nympharetus. It may have been passed in the aftermath of the bloody oligarchic uprising mentioned by the Old Oligarch; however, with so little to go on, it is impossible to say with certainty.

[1379] Romer 1982:30
[1380] Glotz 1906:524-5
[1381] Barron 1962
[1382] Gorman 2002:232

Who was the Old Oligarch?

In a chapter on Athens' folly in supporting oligarchies, the Old Oligarch claims: ὁποσάκις δ᾽ ἐπεχείρησαν αἱρεῖσθαι τοὺς βελτίστους, οὐ συνήνεγκεν αὐτοῖς, ἀλλ᾽ ἐντὸς ὀλίγου χρόνου ὁ δῆμος ἐδούλευσεν ὁ ἐν Βοιωτοῖς: τοῦτο δὲ ὅτε Μιλησίων εἵλοντο τοὺς βελτίστους, ἐντὸς ὀλίγου χρόνου ἀποστάντες τὸν δῆμον κατέκοψαν: τοῦτο δὲ ὅτε εἵλοντο Λακεδαιμονίους ἀντὶ Μεσσηνίων, ἐντὸς ὀλίγου χρόνου Λακεδαιμόνιοι καταστρεψάμενοι Μεσσηνίους ἐπολέμουν Ἀθηναίοις.[1383] "Whenever [the Athenians] endeavoured to support the upper class, things did not turn out well for them, but within a short time the people were enslaved in Boeotia. This also happened when they took the side of the Milesian oligarchs; within a short time, they had revolted and cut down the people. This also happened when they chose the side of the Spartans instead of the Messenians; within a short time, the Spartans had subdued the Messenians and were waging war on the Athenians".

The Old Oligarch's testimony is crucial yet cannot be fixed to a decade, let alone a year; since the Messenian revolt happened in 464 B.C., the uprising at Miletus could have been as early as that.[1384] What precisely the Old Oligarch means when he says that Athens supported the oligarchs only for them to cut down the *demos* has been variously interpreted. Gehrke suggested that "supporting the oligarchs" need be nothing more than accepting the Milesian oligarchy into the Delian League in the first place, and that the oligarchs' rebellion was their refusal to support the Egyptian campaign, which may have been accompanied by a slaugher of the democrats around 457.[1385] Leduc interpreted τὸν δῆμον κατέκοψαν, "[the oligarchs] cut down the people", to mean

[1383] [Xen] *Const. Ath*. 3.11
[1384]Thuc. 1.101
[1385] Gehrke 1980:28-9

merely that the oligarchs subjugated the democrats rather than massacring them.[1386] Both of these are very liberal interpretations of what the Old Oligarch says, and Leduc fails to make sense of the violent choice of verb, κατέκοψαν - literally "hacked down" or "butchered" - or explain her translation. Nor is there any positive evidence that Miletus refused to join the Egyptian campaign. Gehrke's thesis is based entirely on the supposed absence of Miletus from the first quota list.

Gigante suggests that the Old Oligarch interprets the Milesian *demos*' problems with Samos in 440 as an Athenian intervention in favour of the oligarchy. Despite believing that Miletus was an oligarchy at the time, he believes that if at any point the Milesian democracy had been reversed, this will have been enough for the Old Oligarch to claim that Athens sided with the Milesian upper class.[1387] He makes his case by arguing that all three examples are historically inaccurate due to the Old Oligarch's deliberate misrepresentation of facts and subordination of the truth to his own political agenda. Gigante's hypothesis suffers because it fails to explain why events at Samos would have been considered a victory for the Milesian upper classes when Miletus was supposedly already a democracy. Yet as will be argued, it is by no means certain that Miletus was a democracy by 440. If Miletus at the time was an oligarchy, then Athens' response to Miletus' appeal against Samos may well have been seen as preferring the upper classes, if only in the sense that Athens took sides with an oligarchy. The only problem with this interpretation is that the dispute between Miletus and Samos was not a "class war" and not even an ideological war if both states were oligarchies. More persuasive contexts can be found for the incident, although Gigante's explanation cannot be ruled out.

[1386] Leduc 1976:225
[1387] Gigante 1953:165-70

When the regulations for Miletus were dated to the 450s, the general consensus was that the Old Oligarch was referring to these years or later, after 446, when Miletus again disappears from the tribute lists.[1388] Some argued for two Athenian interventions: the one the Old Oligarch refers to, that resulted in the regulations for Miletus which did not impose a democracy but showed respect for the existing Milesian institutions and left the Milesian oligarchs to themselves; and a later intervention that brought in democracy.[1389] However, to postulate two revolts is to overcomplicate the situation and is only necessary if we date the regulations for Miletus and the testimony of the Old Oligarch to the 450s.

The early dates of the events alluded to in chapter 3.11 could place the pamphlet in the 440s, but similarly the Old Oligarch's mention of Athens suffering the ravaging of its land makes most sense after 431, when the Peloponnesian raids on Attica began.[1390] In fact, only one of the events in 3.11 is fixed, making it possible that all three events happened at completely different times and spanned a number of decades. Athens' support of Boeotian oligarchs remains a mystery. The "enslavement" of Boeotia is generally dated between 457 and 446, during Athens' known control of the place. [1391] Aristotle says that after the battle of Oenophyta in 456, the Theban democracy was destroyed.[1392] It is usually assumed that Athens set up democracies in the *poleis* of Boeotia directly after Oenophyta and that these went wrong quite quickly of their own accord.[1393] If this is what the Old Oligarch means, how exactly Athens would have been responsible for the failure of Boeotian democracy by preferring the

[1388] Barron 1962:6
[1389] Lintott 1982:100
[1390] Thuc. 2.19
[1391] Bowersock 1967:35
[1392] Arist. *Pol.* 1302b29
[1393] Simonton 2017b:203

upper classes remains a mystery. Gigante suggests that the Old Oligarch falls victim to a syllogism: when Athens backs democracies it succeeds, and in the case of Boeotia it ultimately failed, therefore it must have backed the oligarchs.[1394] This might do if the anonymous author's overarching point were that Athens always succeeds when it supports democracies, but it is not. His point is that Athens always regrets taking the side of the upper classes, and it is hard to believe that he simply made up the example of Boeotia. Nor is it convincing that he forgot to mention Coronea because it was a sore topic for Athens.[1395] He seems to be particularly attuned to the events that Athens would rather forget.

O'Neil makes the ingenious argument that after Oenophyta the Athenians made friends with the Theban aristocrats by establishing only a "first democracy" of which the aristocrats still formed the governing class.[1396] Yet the Athenians establishing a democracy of whatever sort can hardly be called preferring the upper class. To avoid contradiction with Aristotle, as early as some unrecorded time between 497 and 462 has been suggested for the Athenian support of the upper classes against an already existing democracy in Thebes and other cities.[1397] Alternatively, it has been argued that democracy only made its appearance in Boeotia after Coronea and prior to that Athens had supported oligarchies.[1398] However, this contradicts Aristotle, one of the few sources we have. A similar argument is that Athens supported democracies after Oenophyta but had to make peace with the Theban oligarchs after its defeat at Coronea; yet, this also contradicts Aristotle.[1399] It is true that "after Oenophyta" could mean a

[1394] Gigante 1953:164
[1395] Leduc 1976:224
[1396] O'Neil 1995:50
[1397] Larsen 1960:17 n.2
[1398] Welwei 1986:181-2
[1399] Kalinka 1913:307

long time after Oenophyta, but that is not the most natural interpretation. If Aristotle really meant "after Coronea", writing "after Oenophyta" would be a very oblique way to express this indeed.

Note that in Aristotle's account it is through bad management, not Athenian involvement, that the democracy falls apart. Thus, what Aristotle says simply does not fit in enough with the Old Oligarch's account for them to be talking about the same event. Yet it is still likely that the incident should be dated before or shortly after the battle of Coronea, when Athens lost control of Boeotia altogether. Perhaps the clue lies in the fact that Aristotle confines his example to Thebes. Most historians tend to conflate the two, assuming that what both authors mean is either the whole of Boeotia or specifically Thebes. Yet one is making a claim about Thebes, the other about the whole of Boeotia. The Theban democracy could have failed shortly after 457 while others lived on until Coronea. In this case, Aristotle does not help to date what the Old Oligarch is talking about so we must look elsewhere. The passage that most resembles the Old Oligarch's description is Thucydides on the aftermath of Coronea: the Athenians relinquished all of Boeotia and made peace on the condition that their prisoners would be released; the exiles returned and they all lived again under their own laws.[1400] Such a truce could have been interpreted as Athens backing the oligarchs, even if this was a result of, rather than the cause of, things going badly for them at Coronea. It also could have been seen as the cause of the "enslavement" of Boeotia in that Athenian-backed democracy was replaced by oligarchy. That a truce with the Thebans is presented as the enslavement of all Boeotia is characteristically exaggerative of the Old Oligarch.

[1400] Thuc. 1.113.4

If this is even roughly the time period to which the Old Oligarch refers, there could be up to half a century between the incidents in Boeotia and Miletus. This is entirely plausible, though in the past critics have tried to bring the events closer together as though the author were incapable of remembering events any older than the recent past. If the three examples given by the Old Oligarch are unusually far apart, it is perhaps because he is proving a point that Athens rarely actively supported oligarchic regimes. Any fifth-century action of Athens' is relevant to the anonymous author's argument, and it is not as though Athens' support of and subsequent dismissal from Sparta at the time of the helot revolt would have been forgotten in a hurry.

If indeed reference is made to the mutilation of the herms and the imposition of a harbour-tax, the pamphlet may have been published as late as 414, in which case the uprising could be linked to the regulations for Miletus of 426/5.[1401] Lapini argues for a date of 414 on different grounds: he compares the tone of the pamphlet to that of Aristophanes' *Birds* and concludes that it must have been published by one of the (prospective) oligarchic conspirators of 411.[1402] It would even be possible to date the pamphlet between 426 and 424 to avoid the four arguments that supposedly tell against a date post-424, although none is particularly strong. The first, that the author says that nobody is allowed to make comedies about the *demos* yet Aristophanes depicted Demos onstage in the *Knights* in 425/4, does not allow for the possibility that the law (if indeed it amounted to a law) was passed *after* Aristophanes' comedy.[1403] The second, that the author says that land forces cannot make journeys of several days yet Brasidas managed it across Thessaly in 424, is a minor inconsistency that the Old Oligarch would hardly

[1401] [Xen] *Ath.Pol.* 3.5, 1.14; Mattingly 1997:355
[1402] Lapini 1987
[1403] [Xen] *Ath.Pol.* 2.18; Sealey 1973:258

be concerned by.[1404] This is especially true since the writer is primarily concerned with the fate and actions of Athens, not its allies. The third, that after the Spartan capture of Amphipolis the Old Oligarch would not have been able to claim that he got his timber from the empire, is a petty point given how liberal with the truth he is elsewhere.[1405] The fourth is that the pamphlet must have been written before Cleon's command at Pylos or the author would not have claimed that the *demos* has no share in generalships.[1406] Yet Cleon was hardly an ordinary member of the *demos*, and we should not expect the Old Oligarch to fill his work with caveats; he is ranting.

Tuci points out that it is problematic to resort to arguments *e silentio* when the nature of the work is not impartial or accurate but highly subjective.[1407] Even the fact that the Old Oligarch passes over an event as important as the Samian revolt is not a persuasive argument *e silentio*, for the author is a rhetorician, not a historian. Countless allusions to events of the fifth century have been identified; perhaps the spectre of the Mytilenean debate lurks behind the author's proclamation that "whatever agreements the *demos* makes can be denied by blaming the speaker or the one who put it to the vote...if the decision seems bad, they find countless excuses not to do what they don't want to do".[1408]The accusation takes on a special significance in light of the Mytilenean debate or the Athenian promise to Plataea, but these are hardly the only such decisions that the Old Oligarch can have had in mind. The problem is that apart from in 3.11, the Old Oligarch deals in generalisations and as such these equally could or could not be veiled references to concrete events of the war. After the Sicilian Expedition

[1404] [Xen] *Ath.Pol.* 2.5. Even Thucydides points out that this was exceptional and would not have been achieved without the help of some Thessalians (4.78.2-3).
[1405] Canfora 1985:7
[1406] [Xen] *Ath.Pol.* 1.3
[1407] Tuci 2011:31-2
[1408] [Xen] *Ath.Pol.* 2.17

Thucydides notes that the Athenians lost no time in blaming the orators who had encouraged the voyage and even the soothsayers who had divined its success;[1409] surely the anonymous author could be alluding to this, or any of the other poor decisions that the *demos* disclaimed.

If neither arguments *e silentio* nor arguments based on what the author actually says can narrow the time frame, we must content ourselves with the *terminus post quem* of the only (relatively) securely dated event, the Messenian revolt of the 460s B.C. Since the pamphlet gives the general impression of being written at (or after) the empire's height and the author mentions the ravaging of Athenian land, its true date may well be post-431.[1410] As for the *terminus ante quem*, the fourth century cannot be ruled out since many of the themes identified in the work were current in the fourth century as well as the fifth, and the work may be a later imitation. Even mention of tribute cannot fix a *terminus ante quem*, for the author is exaggerative and imprecise enough to have used the term φόρος loosely.[1411]However, the Old Oligarch is unusually precise here in saying that assessments occur every four years, making a date 425-13 more likely.[1412] The word does not just have the specialist meaning of "Athenian tribute" but also more generally it simply means "payment".[1413] Over the years, several scholars have argued for termini that would allow for a date after 426/5.[1414] In short, it is impossible to date the Old Oligarch's pamphlet but a date post-426/5 is perfectly plausible in order to interpret 3.11 as a reference to Milesian *stasis*, civil unrest, in that year.

[1409] Thuc. 8.1.1
[1410] [1410] [Xen] *Ath.Pol.* 2.16
[1411] Lapini 1987:27-8
[1412] Tuci 2011:59-61
[1413] c.f. Hdt. 3.13.3; Xen. *Symp*. 4.32; Plut. *Anth*. 24.5; Plat. *Alc.* 1.123a; Plb. 18.44.7
[1414] e.g. Gomme 1940:224-5; Mattingly 1961:179; Connor 1971:207-9; de Ste Croix 1972:307-10; Cataldi 1984:172-4; Fontana 1968; Lapini 1987; Thorley 1996; Tuci 2011

If we find it surprising that Athens would have supported a group of oligarchs who so quickly turned against it, Delorme puts forward a tempting hypothesis: the Old Oligarch may have oversimplified the political situation to prove his general point that Athens regretted supporting oligarchies.[1415] In other words, it may not have been the same set of oligarchs whom Athens supported, who then revolted; there could be pro-Athenian as well as anti-Athenian oligarchs. It is also worth bearing in mind that although the Old Oligarch claims that the oligarchs revolted "within a short time" of Athens' support of them, this too may be for the shock factor. Note that he similarly remembers a "short time" between the third Messenian war and the outbreak of hostilities between Sparta and Athens, yet there are seven years between the helot revolt and the battle of Tanagra, and many more until outright hostilities between Sparta and Athens. He also claims that the Spartans had subjugated the helots within a short time, but Thucydides says that it took almost a decade for the helots to come to terms.[1416] It is clear that we cannot trust the Old Oligarch when it comes to detail; the events that he describes seem rooted in historical fact but seriously distorted.

Allowing for some exaggeration on the Old Oligarch's part, the reality may be that Athens did not interfere with Miletus' constitution for decades and came to regret it when *stasis* broke out around 426/5. This can only be a tentative hypothesis, but it reminds us not to assume that "the oligarchs" or "the democrats" in any city were one homogeneous group. Indeed, Koerner suggests that the Blutinschrift shows a power struggle between two groups of oligarchs in the city rather than between democrats and oligarchs, with the *epimenioi* being threatened with fines because they were associates or friends of the banished oligarchs.[1417] However, it is more natural to suppose that the

[1415] Delorme 1995:277
[1416] Thuc. 1.103.1
[1417] Koerner 1987:478

epimenioi had some financial role in the city that meant that they were to pay rewards out of the public purse, and the individual fines for those who did not comply were merely meant to discourage complacency.

An even more natural context for the Old Oligarch's remarks is the Milesian oligarchic uprising of 405/4; however, this would require dating the pamphlet later than is usually considered. The latest date backed by several scholars is 410-406, on the basis that the Old Oligarch's comments on unjust disfranchisement and attacking Athenian democracy echo Thucydides' narrative of the oligarchic coup of 411.[1418] Smart argued briefly for a date of 405 and Canfora even suggested 408-4.[1419] Fontana further argues that the author of the pamphlet is in fact Xenophon, who had previously been discounted because he was only born in the 430s and probably did not hold the views expressed.[1420] Xenophon did write a Constitution of the Lacedaemonians, and if the Athenian version were meant as a continuation of this it would explain the mystery δέ ("but") of the opening sentence.[1421] However, its tone is notably different; it is far less polemical and more Herodotean in its interest in explaining Spartan rituals and practices and how they vary from Greek ones.[1422] We do not have to go as far as to argue that Xenophon wrote the treatise. If it is merely a rhetorical exercise, it could have been written at almost any time by anyone. It could even be a fourth-century rhetorical or symposiastic exercise, an anti-ἔπαινος whose genre is signalled by the repetition of two words in its very first sentence and again at the beginning of the third chapter: οὐκ ἐπαινῶ, "I do not applaud".[1423] Roscalla points out that Isocrates, writing in the same

[1418] Fontana 1968:55-84; Sordi 2002
[1419] Smart 1977:250; Canfora 1985:5-8
[1420] Fontana 1968:80-5
[1421] Some editors excised the δέ because it seems so incongruous in the opening chapter of an isolated text; however, Kalinka gives numerous examples of works that open in this way and not all of them are intertextual references (1913:84-7).
[1422] c.f. Xen. *Const. Lac.* 1.1-3; 1.10; 2.1; 2.12-14; 4.7; 5.2; 6.1-2; 7.1-2; 11.1; 15.1
[1423] Roscalla 1995; [Xen] *Ath.Pol.* 1.1; 3.1

genre around 380 B.C., uses the present tense when he says that some people criticise the Athenians for the massacres at Melos and Scione.[1424] Clearly the actions of the Athenians at the height of their empire were still being discussed as current affairs in the early fourth century. Alternatively, the pamphlet could be a very early reception of Thucydides. Hornblower identifies up to three "levels" of the text: the surface level of sincere praise of Athenian democracy, the implicit level of insincere praise of democracy, and the further disguised level that a fourth-century democracy would appreciate with the benefit of hindsight.[1425]

It has been counterargued that the author's understanding of political theory is not developed enough for him to have been writing in the fourth century.[1426] However, if the piece is a parody, it would be no surprise to find it lacking in nuance, and even if it is not, we cannot hold the author to the standard of Plato. The problem is that ancient authors' sincerity is always open to interpretation, especially so when the author in question is anonymous. There is no way of proving whether or not the author held the views that the Old Oligarch espouses, but it remains a possibility that he referred to events as late as 405/4. Since both the Old Oligarch and Diodorus give the detail that the oligarchs not only revolted but also butchered the *demos*, the case for this late date is the strongest.[1427] Against the argument that the Milesians did not revolt from Athens in 405/4 but only experienced *stasis*, as has been argued elsewhere it is in the Old Oligarch's rhetorical interests to exaggerate and conflate incidents. Any upheaval in an allied city could be portrayed as a revolt, and given the extent of the Old Oligarch's exaggeration elsewhere in his treatise, such a historical inaccuracy is not unlikely.

[1424] Roscalla 1995:115-6; Isoc. *Paneg*.100
[1425]Hornblower 2000:363-84
[1426] Faraguna 2011
[1427] Diod. 13.104

The Blutinschrift and the statutes of the Molpoi

The role of the *epimenioi*, monthly officers, in Milesian public life is relevant to the date of the Blutinschrift, which makes mention of them. Their name could suggest that they performed monthly sacrifices, as the chronicler Hesychius records.[1428] Hesychius equates them to *hieropoioi* (sacred officials), and certainly they seem originally to have had a religious function. The question is whether at some point they took on a political role, and if so, whether the name suggests a democratic monthly office. *Epimenioi* are also found in the Milesian colonies as well as Colophon, Erythrae and Samos.[1429] In some Hellenistic cases they are part of the framework of a democracy, but some of our evidence for the office predates the fifth century, which would suggest that they were not originally democratic. At Erythrae in the mid-fourth century, the *epimenioi* make decisions as part of an oligarchy, not a democracy.[1430] Ehrhardt thinks the *epimenioi* were a council committee similar to the Athenian prytany, because in Odessus and Istrus it seems that they comprised a council from whom a single *epimenios* would be picked to act as chairman of assemblies.[1431] This would not mean that Miletus was necessarily a democracy, but rather that the *epimenioi* were the oligarchic equivalent to the Athenian democratic prytany. Yet comparative evidence from the colonies does not shed light on the development of the office in the mother city, and the colonies may have progressed in a different way or at a different pace. Since the *epimenioi* are responsible for paying out rewards to those who kill the proscribed, they do appear to have more than a purely religious function; they control public funds and have police duties.

[1428] Hsch s.v. ἐπιμήνιοι
[1429] *SEG* 19:699 (Colophon); *I. Erythrai* 76, *SEG* 31:969 (Erythrae); *IG* XII.6 1:168 (Samos); *SEG* 24:1103, *SEG* 33:581 (Istrus); *IGBulg* I² 36, *IGBulg* I² 38 (Odessus)
[1430] *SEG* 31:969
[1431] Ehrhardt 1983:211

From the text of the Blutinschrift alone, Dunham claims that the chief *epimenios* presides over an assembly in which it is his duty to bring forward motions. This is too much to infer from the text, which makes no mention of an assembly or the *epimenios*' role in it.[1432] Gehrke believes that they are evidence of a democracy in Miletus, and that their reappointment every month attests to the existence of twelve tribes from which the officials were picked.[1433] His argument is based on two assumptions: that Miletus revolted in the 450s, and that the Blutinschrift came after Miletus' revolt. Thus, he concludes, there is no way that Athens would have tolerated an oligarchy post-revolt, and the drawing up of the Blutinschrift must be one of the early actions of the new democracy. Yet even if the *epimenioi* were appointed monthly, this does not necessarily make them democratic. Moreover, our new date for the regulations for Miletus makes Gehrke's conclusions unconvincing, and it is by no means certain that the Blutinschrift postdates the Milesian revolt, whether one accepts an early or a late date for the regulations.

We cannot even be sure that the Blutinschrift postdates the Ionian revolt. Most scholars, including Gehrke, date the inscription roughly between 470 and 440, accepting 479/8 as a *terminus post quem*[1434]. There is, however, the alternative of taking the date to be a *terminus ante quem*, as Slawisch convincingly argues. [1435] She associates the Nympharetus of the decree with a Nympharetus recorded as *stephanephoros* in 500/49.[1436] Slawisch merely states without further proof that the recurrence of the name is no coincidence, but what are the chances that it is? Investigation into the frequency of the name reveals that it does not occur again in the

[1432] Dunham 1915:135
[1433] Gehrke 1980:25
[1434] Gorman 2002:234; Meiggs & Lewis 1969:107; Hermann 1970:170
[1435] Slawisch 2012
[1436] On Cavaignac's dating (1924:311-4); otherwise, 503/2.

stephanephoros list, nor does it occur in any other inscription from Ionia. Thus, it seems plausible that the inscription ought to be dated to the first year of the Ionian revolt, when a member of the Persian-friendly upper class may well have found himself ousted by the rebel Aristagoras and all those who supported him. The only objection, that the agora was rebuilt after the battle of Mycale so the inscription must be dated after 479, is not decisive since it had already been noted that it was discovered at a lower level than the agora and would have been difficult to read if its find spot was its original location.[1437] As for the Persian destruction of the city in 494, it may not have been as total as Herodotus claims.[1438] Accordingly, we can date the inscription to the early fifth century, before Athenian involvement or the advent of democracy.

It is tempting to associate the Blutinschrift with similar, later decrees banishing tyrants which were all passed under democracies.[1439] It is especially tempting to think that it might have been passed in a similar vein to the Athenian regulations for Erythrae, which explicitly outlaw multiple tyrants.[1440] Yet the Milesian decree as it stands does not explicitly banish tyrants, and almost any constitution would be interested in banishing a dangerously powerful family, as Herodotus' story about the Milesian tyrant Thrasybulus aptly illustrates.[1441] For those who do believe in the total devastation of Miletus and its resurgence post-Mycale, Noel Robertson's chronology can be followed. Robertson uses the inscription to argue that an oligarchy was restored when the city was refounded in 479 B.C.[1442] The oligarchy wanted to stamp out Persian influence, and since Nympharetus had served under the tyrant Aristagoras, he and his children became

[1437] Kleiner 1968:50
[1438] Ehrhardt 2003 argues that Herodotus' account of the fall of Miletus is a literary fiction designed to create a parallel with Sybaris in the west.
[1439] Teegarden 2014
[1440] *IG* I^3 14.33
[1441] Hdt. 5.92F-G
[1442] Robertson 1987:380-4

a target. It is conceivable that there was a lapse of some time between Nympharetus' assuming office as *stephanephoros* and his eventual expulsion, although a lapse of two decades is ambitious. Regardless of whether we adopt Slawisch or Robertson's date, it unfortunately nullifies what the inscription can tell us about Milesian-Athenian relations in the mid-fifth century.

The statutes of the Molpoi, though inscribed in late Hellenistic times, can be securely dated to 447/6 by their reference to Philtes as eponymous *aisymnetes*;[1443] this was the old name for the *stephanephoros.*[1444] Indeed, some of the statutes must go back to at least 476/5 because reference is made to the *stephanephoros* Charopinus of that year (l.41).[1445] The statutes give some insight into the political workings of Miletus, though the roles of the officials mentioned are somewhat opaque. It is not clear whether the *aisymnetes* and the *prosetairoi* were elected, or how much political power they actually wielded. As argued above, they were probably not *prytaneis.* Herda believes that the *aisymnetes* and *prosetairoi* constituted the oligarchic government of ancient Miletus.[1446] Some argue that over time the positions lost their power and became honorific; de Sanctis goes further and argues that the Molpoi had no political power from the beginning and were not even aristocratic.[1447] He claims that the fact that they were eponymous proves their political impotence because you do not fear usurpation of power by a priesthood. This is begging the question, though, since the question in the first place is whether the Molpoi indeed were just priests.

[1443] Or 450/49 on Rehm's dating.
[1444] *I. Milet* 1.3 n.133
[1445] Or on Rehm's dating, 479/8. Slawisch (2009) argues that Charopinus could be the *stephanephoros* of the same name in 352/1 (351/0 on Cavaignac's dating), but its argument has more significance for Miletus' cultic than its political history.
[1446] Herda 2005:249-50
[1447] de Sanctis 1930

We assume that the Molpoi could only have power in an oligarchy, but even in an oligarchy it is odd to find a board of priests, rather than a council, wielding the political power. The fact that their tribal names are given in the inscription does not necessarily tell us that they held political office, and "need not indicate anything more than the basic principle of inclusion in the body politic of the Milesian state".[1448] If they did not have any power, the statutes cannot tell us much about politics in Miletus in the middle of the century.

On the other hand, the Molpoi were associated with Apollo Delphinios, the political divinity "par eccelenza" in Miletus. It is hard not to view the Molpoi as politically involved and powerful when their statutes were displayed in the Delphinion side by side with interstate treaties, decrees granting citizenship (over which they had control) and other decrees relating to the *polis*, the town.[1449] Three of these decrees make reference to the powers of the Molpoi. A decree of isopolity with Heraclea specifically mentions the powers of the Molpoi in a civic and legal context:[1450]

[…] ἐὰν δέ τινες παρὰ τήνδε συνθήκην μετέχωσι τῆς πολιτείας, εἶναι αὐτοὺς ὑπε[υ]θύνους ἐμ Μιλήτωι μὲν τῆι τῆς ξενίας δίκη καὶ τῆι ἐν μολποῖς ἐνστάσει, ἐν Ἡρακλείαι δὲ τῆι τῆς ξενίας δίκηι […]

"If anyone holds citizenship contrary to this treaty, they are to be held accountable both in Miletus in a trial for foreigners and the prosecution of the Molpoi, and in Heraclea in a trial for foreigners..."

Whoever in Miletus gets citizenship contrary to the treaty is liable both to indictment and to intervention by the Molpoi. Nor is the Molpoi's power over

[1448] Gorman 2001:97
[1449] e.g. *I. Milet* I.3 n.141, 143a, 146a; Faraguna 2001:326
[1450] *I. Milet* I.3 n.150.65-7

citizenship merely formal or ceremonial; Faraguna has shown that the word ἔνστασις implies that they had the power to oppose applications.[1451] The imbalanced μὲν...δὲ clause draws attention to the fact that the Milesians have an extra governing body to answer to on their side of the deal, whereas the Heracleans have only the δίκη ξενίας, the trial for foreigners. That the Molpoi are specifically included in this way suggests that their involvement is more than token. In two other decrees anyone who becomes a citizen contrary to the decree is again liable to have their citizenship objected to by the Molpoi or questioned in court.[1452] It can, of course, be argued that their power to oppose was much like the Queen's power to oppose bills of parliament, yet surely the burden of proof ought to lie with the sceptic in cases where there is no reason to doubt the evidence. Unless there is good reason not to take a source at face value, it should be interpreted in the most economical and logical way. In this case it seems that the Molpoi had considerable political power and made decisions concerning citizenship. In addition to this, there is the aforementioned story of Nicolaus of Damascus about Epimenes the tyrant *aisymnetes* who carried out his reign of terror via the institution.[1453] However, the story is a myth possibly borrowed from Athenian folklore, and likely an etymology of the word *epimenios*, so it is doubtful evidence that the *aisymnetes* had political power.[1454]

A separate question is whether he was associated with narrow rule, and comparative evidence suggests that he was. Two early to mid fifth-century inscriptions concerning Abdera and its mother-city Teos ban the setting up of an *aisymnetes*, in one

[1451] Faraguna 2001:327
[1452] *I. Milet* I.3 n.143a.31-3, n.146a
[1453] Nicolaus of Damascus *FrGrHist* 90 F53
[1454] de Sanctis 1930:678

case even if the majority consents to doing so.[1455] The *aisymnetes* in these inscriptions appears to be some kind of elected magistrate or judge. When the first inscription was discovered, one very fragmentary section was interpreted as prohibiting disobedience to the *aisymnetes* in power, but Wilhelm Bannier showed that it was trying to prevent an *aisymnetes* from getting into power in the first place.[1456] This was confirmed by the discovery of the second inscription, which explicitly includes an oath not to set up an *aisymnetes*. Since this decree also sets a quorum for prosecution, arrests and execution, it shows a move away from individual power and towards the power of the people to make important decisions. In other words, the decree appears to promote democracy, by taking such powers away from the *aisymnetes* and handing them to the citizens of Teos and Abdera. Negative treatment of the *aisymnetes* combined with "hints of a more stable, community-oriented, majority-driven government" suggests that Teos and Abdera in the process of building democracy.[1457] The likely context of both decrees, with their concern for limiting power, is one of political instability; one decree mentions revolt in a fragmentary context, and the other contains an oath not to plan revolt, actually revolt, or kindle civil war.[1458] In this context, the office of *aisymnetes* is certainly not associated with democracy, and probably negatively associated with oligarchy and even tyranny.

Faraguna notes that the setting up of an *aisymnetes* to arbitrate could be objectionable to the Teians because it gets in the way of true democracy, rather than because it might be a slippery slope to tyranny.[1459] Yet as he admits this is a technicality,

[1455] *SEG* 31:985; *ML* 30. The former cuts off after οὔτε σὺμ πολλοῖσι[ν] but it is safe to assume that this means "not with the [approval of] the majority".
[1456] Bannier 1925:285-6
[1457] Robinson 2007:112
[1458] *ML* 30 b.5;*SEG* 31:985.10-13
[1459] Faraguna 2001:330

and for our purposes the important thing is that the *aisymnetes* is considered anti-democratic. Faraguna's main thesis is that the *aisymnetes* wielded political power and acted as a kind of mediator. In support of this he points to three Hellenistic decrees from Calchedon using the verb προαισιμναώ in a juridical context to mean something close to "mediate".[1460] Faraguna argues that in these inscriptions the function of the *aisymnetes* is analogous to that of the Athenian *prytanis.* All three inscriptions likely contain the phrase [ὃς δέ] κα εἴπῃ ἢ προαισιμνάσηι ἢ ἐν [β]ουλᾶι ἢ ἐν δάμωι, "whoever speaks or is chairmain of the *aisymnetai* either in the Council or among the people [i.e. in the assembly]", evidently in the context of a functioning democracy. Yet the etymology of the verb suggests that the archaic *aisymnetai* originally had the power to arbitrate. Faraguna also adduces evidence from Selymbria, the Chersonese and elsewhere, but the inscriptions are mostly Hellenistic and many are either too fragmentary to provide context or do not specify the actual role of the *aisymnetes*.[1461] Although much of his evidence is late, he builds up a convincing picture of the *aisymnetes* as an official who wielded real power especially in times of crisis or *stasis.*

Not all Faraguna's examples are late: one inscription found in Elis and dated c.500 B.C. twice features the plural *aisimnatai*.[1462] Unfortunately, the extant inscription is split across five fragments, two of which do not contain a single decipherable word. Yet enough can be gleaned from the first fragment to be confident that it concerns the reconciliation of some exiled Selinuntians with their homeland. The verb *dameuein*, which is restored in fragment b, precedes the word *aisimnatas* and may mean that the *aisymnetai* were responsible for confiscating property on behalf of the city. The inscription supports Faraguna's thesis that the *aisymnetes* often crops up where there

[1460] *I. Kalchedon* 10-12; Faraguna 2001:328
[1461] e.g. *SGDI* 3068 (Selymbria); *SIG*³ 709 (Chersonese); *SIG*³ 642 (Megara)
[1462] *I. Olympia* 5 n.22

has been conflict and legal arbitration is needed. That the *aisymnetes* is so frequently invoked in a legal context and at times of (potential or real) crisis suggests that he had an active and public role in the *polis* (the town) and was not a mere figurehead. The crucial points to take away are that the role was politically important originally, and that it was connected to narrow rule but over time developed into something more neutral, quite literally, in the sense that the *aisymnetes* became a kind of mediator.

As for the literary evidence, in Homer the nine *aisymnetai* are "masters of the lists" or perhaps "umpires", in charge of getting everything in order for the games.[1463] In Theocritus the *aisymnetes* is the overseer or bailiff of an estate.[1464] The later literary sources are more complex to interpret, for by this time the *aisymnetes* seems to have been mythologised. Aristotle calls the office an elective tyranny, which can be held for life, for a fixed period of time or just "until certain things are accomplished" and gives the example of Pittacus of Mytilene.[1465] Pittacus was elected as *aisymnetes* but, Aristotle points out, Alcaeus describes him plainly as a tyrant who was set up by the people. To complicate matters, he was set up by the people in order to reconcile two different factions and prevent *stasis*. In this way, he was paradoxically meant to prevent tyranny arising from *stasis* despite being a "tyrant" himself. It is possible that Aristotle only describes the office thus because of the absolute authority entrusted to it rather than because he actually believed it to be a tyranny.[1466] Romer has ingeniously argued that Aristotle's conception of the office as "elective" is an attempt to reconcile the fact that Pittacus was a tyrant with his ending of *stasis* in Mytilene.[1467] Yet for our purposes it does not matter whether the office was elective or not, but whether it was equated with

[1463] *Od*. 8.258-60
[1464] *Id*. 25.48
[1465] Arist. *Pol*. 3.1285a
[1466] Whibley 1896:60
[1467] Romer 1982

tyranny. Moreover, as Romer himself concedes, Aristotle had spent time in Mytilene and probably had access to the (now lost) *Constitution of the Mytileneans*, so his testimony ought not to be dismissed completely.

Dionysius of Halicarnassus, citing Theophrastus, compares the office of *aisymnetes* to the Roman dictatorship.[1468] A commentator on Aristotle names an actual tyrant, Periander of Corinth, as someone who held the office.[1469] This suggests that as with the *prytanis*, the extraordinary power of the *aisymnetes* could be abused and give way to tyranny. Two fragments of Aristotle give a similar impression of the office at Cyme: in one Aristotle is quoted as claiming that in Cyme the *aisymnetai* of old were tyrants, and in the other he compares the *aisymnetai* there to archons.[1470] Diogenes Laertius, writing admittedly in the early third century A.D., quotes a fictitious letter from Thrasybulus to Periander telling him that if he wants to strengthen his *aisymnetia* he should kill his pre-eminent subjects, "for to an *aisymnetes* even a friend is suspect". [1471] This is a variation on Herodotus' abovementioned anecdote about Thrasybulus cutting back the tallest blades of corn.[1472] Diogenes Laertius is more likely to be telling us how a third century A.D. historian thought of the role than how it actually functioned in archaic and classical society. This criticism could be, and has been, levelled at all of the literary evidence concerning the *aisymnetes*, much of which is late and derived from scholia.[1473] Yet the inscriptional evidence is enough to show that the office was associated with narrow rule at least in Teos in the fifth century.

[1468] Dion. Hal. 5.73
[1469] Theodorus Metochites in Bekker 1837:313.
[1470] Rose F524 (1886:326-7)
[1471] D.L. 1.100
[1472] Hdt. 5.92
[1473] Romer 1982:28-31

Thus, the cumulative evidence from elsewhere in the Greek world suggests a more important role for the *aisymnetes* than Gehrke admits. What does this mean for its development at Miletus? The function of the *aisymnetes* in Miletus must have changed, for it lasted as an annual magistracy (synonymous with the stephanephorate) into the Common Era, long after tyranny had died out. This is true also of the *prosetairoi*, the assistants: both positions were maintained throughout the Classical and Hellenistic eras, under both democracy and oligarchy. This means that the existence of *aisymnetai* is not irreconcilable with democratic rule, even if it was not generally associated with it. The comparative evidence bears out the same conclusion. All of the positive evidence that we have points to the office of *aisymnetes* being linked to narrow rule, and yet it did not die out with the advent of democracy. The Teian inscriptions suggest a deep distrust of the office of *aisymnetes* around the beginning of the fifth century and one wonders whether this might have been true also in Miletus. Nicolaus of Damascus certainly presents the role as a stepping-stone to tyranny. In the same way that it is possible that the eponymity of the *prytanis* was transferred to the *aisymnetes* to avoid connotations of tyranny, so it could be that the *aisymnetes* became the *stephanephoros* to avoid similar connotations. This can only be speculative, but if so, the fact that the Molpoi decree refers to an eponymous *aisymnetes* rather than a *stephanephoros* places it in an oligarchy. However, for this to be true, we must imagine that the change in designation from *aisymnetes* to *stephanephoros* happened after the drawing up of the statutes of the Molpoi and that a democratic decree would not think to use the old term.

If *aisymnetai* could still be a feature of a democracy, this limits what the Molpoi decree can tell us about democracy at Miletus. The presence of tribal names in the statutes of the Molpoi does not mean that Miletus was democratic at the time; it only

tells us that all citizens were organised into tribes. In fact, if we are to assume that the expansion of the tribal system coincided with the imposition of democracy at Miletus, the statutes of the Molpoi tell against the existence of a democracy, with only the six old Ionic tribes mentioned in the inscription.[1474] Even though the Molpoi were an elite group, their longevity suggests that their existence was not incompatible with democracy, especially if their function developed over time in line with political change. Herda thinks that because in the Molpoi decree they, rather than the Milesian *demos,* control the *orgia*, in the 440s Miletus "was still ruled by the oligarchy of the Molpoi".[1475] The problem with this is that it takes for granted that the Molpoi retained considerable political power in the classical period and that it would be impossible for them to be in control of rites under a democracy. These being the rites of a religious festival, it remains possible that the Molpoi retained only their religious, not their political, significance. There is nothing in the statutes of the Molpoi that explicitly attributes political power to the Molpoi.

Yet despite all this, there is nothing about the statutes that actually suggests the context of a democracy. The inscription provides no positive evidence for a democracy, which is striking given how well-preserved it is. There is no mention, so far as we know, of a democratically elected body. The only institutions to which it refers are those that, as we have seen, could have existed under either a democracy or an oligarchy. The only possible explanation for this is that the Molpoi decree is deliberately anachronistic,[1476] but there is no reason to suppose this. The statutes begin with the prescript ἔδοξε μολποῖσιν. This may look democratic, but it merely introduces a decision of the cult association, not a democratically elected body. The formula might consciously imitate

[1474] Robertson 1987:359. The tribes are Oinopeis, Hoplethes and Boreis.
[1475] Herda 2011:63
[1476] Gehrke 1980:22-3

Athens but this does not mean that Miletus itself was democratic, only that Athenian practices influenced the allies'; it must also be borne in mind that the statutes were only written up much later, at a time when such formulae were common.[1477]

When the regulations for Miletus were dated to 450/49, there was the vexed question of whether the statutes of the Molpoi might predate the regulations and thus provide no proof either way of whether Athens established a democracy in the city. With the regulations for Miletus dated to 426/5, it is unsurprising that the statutes show no sign of a democracy so early. The later date also removes the question of whether the regulations ought to be dated before or after the supposed Peace of Callias, for the change happened long after 449. If we follow Cavaignac's interpretation of the *stephanephoros* list, the statutes of the Molpoi do not belong to 450/49 either, but to 447/6. Cavaignac argues that the list is, in this case, out by three years due to the misdating of Alexander's stephanephorate and the dating of two double entries as separate years, rather than the same year in which one man replaced another.[1478] Cavaignac's dating has no huge impact on our general sense of the timescale of Milesian politics; but it is worth noting that if the regulations for Miletus are to be moved from 450/49, there is no pressing reason to associate the statutes of the Molpoi with this year either. It had been thought that with the quelling of the Milesian revolt came a reform of the city's cultic organisation, but it is now clear that the two are (as far as we can tell) unconnected. It is unfortunate that the statutes cannot tell us more about political institutions at Miletus; while it is likely that the Molpoi had a degree of

[1477] Herda 2006:406. An honorific inscription from Didyma from the 2nd century B.C. similarly contains the prescript "it was resolved by the *koinon* of those dedicating the sanctuary..." (*I.Didyma* 486). Here again the decision is enacted not by a democratic council but by a cult-group.
[1478] Cavaignac 1924:311-4

political involvement, the connection between the religious institutions and political constitution at Miletus remains obscure.

Since the regulations for Miletus do not either explicitly impose or implicitly bespeak the imposition of a democracy, the question of when – and at whose instigation - this happened remains. Our best evidence for the installation of democracy at Miletus is the *lex sacra* with Eudemus as *stephanephoros*. As discussed above, the likeliest date for the law is 404/3-402/1, depending on how we date the *stephanephoros* lists. This at least gives us a *terminus ante quem* for the installation of democracy, and a *terminus post quem* is provided by the regulations for Miletus.

By 425, Miletus is back under Athenian control and present on an expedition against Corinth.[1479] The following summer, two thousand Milesian hoplites accompany the Athenians under Nicias, Nicostratus and Autocles on a successful mission to take the island of Cythera.[1480] With the regulations for Miletus dated to 426/5, it makes sense to find Milesian troops reappearing on Athenian expeditions shortly afterwards. Miletus is the only allied city that Thucydides takes care to name; the rest are simply referred to as "some others". The particular attention paid to Miletus makes sense if Miletus had experienced an Athenian intervention and was only recently reincorporated into the fold. The Athens-bound troop-ships referred to in the regulations for Miletus may even be the ones that accompanied Nicias and his colleagues to Cythera. This is the last we hear of Miletus in Thucydides' narrative before the disastrous Sicilian expedition wreaks havoc for Athens' control over its allies. Some have argued that the stability of Athens' relationship with Miletus in this period must be due to their both being governed by democracies,[1481] but there is no reason why good relations cannot have

[1479] Thuc. 4.42
[1480] Thuc. 4.53-4
[1481] Gorman 2001:236

existed between a democratic Athens and a friendly, stable oligarchy at Miletus. This was, however, all to change after Sicily.

A curious tale of Miletus' involvement in Persian politics survives from Ctesias' *Persica* via the chronicler Photius. Photius says that directly after Darius II's succession in 424 B.C., his brother Aristes and Megabyzus' son Artyphius revolted. The Greeks who were fighting with Artyphius were won over to the King's sides with presents, "and only three Milesians were left behind with him [Artyphius]".[1482] Evidently Milesians were being hired by Persian rulers as mercenaries, and in this case were easily bribed from one (Persian) side to another. The anecdote does not tell us about Miletus' constitution or relationship with Athens at the time. However, it reminds us of the contact between Miletus and the Persian empire, especially in the confusion after Artaxerxes' death. It is also an example of Persian armies hiring Greek mercenaries, which must have happened more often than survives in the sources.

Revolt and the Persian Revival

Miletus is named among the Ionian allies who contributed ships to the Sicilian expedition.[1483] Miletus also appears paying tribute in the very fragmentary tribute list of 415/4 B.C.[1484] In fact, Miletus is the only tribute-paying city listed by Thucydides that shows up on the stone.[1485] Without Thucydides' catalogue of ships, we would be unaware that ten additional cities paid tribute in that (or the following) year; this is another caution against inferring too much from absence on the lists.[1486] In 412, no doubt taking advantage of Athens' weakness after the disaster, Miletus revolted from the

[1482] Ctesias *FGrHist* 688 F 15.52
[1483] Thuc. 7.57.3
[1484] *IG* I³ 290 col.I-II.9
[1485] Thuc. 7.57.4
[1486] These ten are Eretria, Chalcis, Styros, Carystus, Ceos, Andros, Tenos, Samos, Tenedos and Aenos.

Delian League.[1487] The importance to the Athenians of the Milesian betrayal is illustrated by Aristophanes' reference to it in his *Lysistrata* the following year.[1488] Alcibiades, who was friendly with some of the foremost Milesians, fomented the revolt along with the Spartan Chalcideus. Thucydides makes no mention of Miletus' constitution at the time; Alcibiades' friends in high places may have been oligarchs, but they may also simply have been men of influence or aspiring oligarchs in a democratic society. By this point, oligarchs and democrats alike may have tired of Athenian rule. Even if a democracy had existed for some time, aristocratic families may still have dominated Miletus; the continued prominence of certain families in democracies is nothing new.

The Athenians wasted no time in blockading and attacking Miletus from Lade, killing Chalcideus but not managing much else.[1489] Eight hundred of the Milesians, aided by both the Spartans and Tissaphernes' foreign mercenaries, managed to hold out. There is a hint of Tissaphernes' involvement before this point: a few chapters previously Thucydides tells us that the first alliance between the Great King and the Spartans was concluded "immediately after the revolt of the Milesians", suggesting that these were not isolated events.[1490] Thucydides comments that the Athenians were particularly keen to regain Miletus so that other towns would follow suit; this is a point reiterated by Alcibiades to inspire the people of Teichioussa to act.[1491] Certainly the Chians, who had already revolted by this point, were interested enough in hearing about "the business at Miletus" that Thucydides made special mention of it in a passage on their mission to cause widespread revolt in the area.[1492] In the end they failed to get to

[1487] Thuc. 8.17.2
[1488] Aristoph. *Lys*. 108-9
[1489] Thuc. 8.24-5
[1490] Thuc. 8.17.3
[1491] Thuc. 8.25.5; 26.3
[1492] Thuc. 8.19.1

Miletus because word had got around that the rebel Amorges was in the area. Such is the complexity of the situation at the time that while Athens and Persia both have their eye on Miletus, even a pro-Athenian Persian appears on the scene.

The Athenians returned at the end of the summer with a far greater force and besieged the city; still they did not manage to take it, coming up against the combined forces of Miletus, Sparta and Syracuse.[1493] The Athenian commander Phrynicus decided against engaging the Spartan navy and sailed back to Samos. After the Athenians had left, the Spartans appointed Philip as governor of Miletus.[1494] They also used Miletus as a base from which to attack Carian Iasus and capture Amorges; the incident shows the strategic importance of Miletus as a gateway to the rest of Asia Minor. The Athenians returned a second time to besiege Miletus, but the city remained in Sparta's hands and the following winter was the scene of the second treaty between Sparta and Tissaphernes.[1495] Thucydides comments that the Milesians were particularly eager for war, perhaps implying that other of the Ionians were not.

Miletus is the base of Spartan naval operations during the period from 412 presumably to the end of the war, even after Lysander moves the main base to Ephesus.[1496] An owl tetradrachm that looks Athenian, yet features the bearded face of a Persian satrap on its obverse, has been found in modern-day Karaman, roughly 400 miles east of Miletus. It could belong in the context of Tissaphernes' payment of the Spartan fleet at Miletus since we know that the fleet was paid an Attic drachma per day.[1497] More tempting is to associate the coin with Tissaphernes' friendship with Alcibiades in 411. Though it has been argued that it would be a "psychological blunder"

[1493] Thuc. 8.26-8
[1494] Thuc. 8.28
[1495] Thuc. 8.30; 8.36-7
[1496] Thuc. 8.28-109 *passim*; Xen. *Hell.* 1.5.1, 1.6.2, 1.6.7
[1497] Robinson 1948:53-5; Thuc. 8.29

for Alcibiades to allow Tissaphernes to issue coins on which his own head replaced the head of Athens' patron goddess, it could have been considered a compliment and Athens was by this point desperate for funds.[1498] Thus, as at Samos we would find coinage that pays deference to Athens, in this case initiated by Tissaphernes. However, both the identity of the satrap and the date of the coin are disputed so this must remain only a tantalising possibility.[1499]

Having thrown off the Athenian yoke, the Milesians found themselves reluctantly paying court to Tissaphernes, who went as far as to build a fort in Milesian territory.[1500] Though they made a stand by expelling the garrison installed in it, the episode serves to highlight that the Milesians had merely swapped the Athenian yoke for the Persian. If they had revolted from Athens in the hope of freedom, they must have been sorely disappointed. In the words of the Spartan Lichas, who appears not to have minced his words, the Milesians were obliged to be slaves to Tissaphernes and court his favour until the war ended. It is possible that this had been enshrined in law when the third treaty between Persia and Sparta had been drawn up, and that as of the treaty the internal government of Miletus had been handed over to Tissaphernes.[1501] Lichas could even have been paraphrasing the text of the treaty, as some scholars argue.[1502] Lichas' words imply that Milesian subjection to Persia would last only as long as the war, but what Thucydides puts into the mouth of his speakers should not be interpreted in the same way as the written text of a treaty. If anything, Lichas was sugar-coating the truth, for nothing suggests that Tissaphernes intended to give up the cities of Asia Minor after the war.

[1498] Robinson 1948:54
[1499] Figueira 1998:534
[1500] Thuc. 8.84
[1501] Parke 1930:47-8
[1502] Amir 1975:51

We know that the Persian satraps were laying claim to tribute from the Ionian cities by 412, and this could be part of Sparta and Persia's recent ploy to direct funds away from Athens, or it could have been Persian practice for quite some time.[1503] All Thucydides says is that Tissaphernes was not able to get his tribute because of the Athenians – he does not tell us for how long this had been a problem. Clearly the Persians laid claim to the Ionian cities, for Thucydides twice describes them as being "in his [Tissaphernes'] *arche* [kingdom]". Assuming Miletus was one of the cities required to pay, the additional burden of tribute to the Great King will hardly have created an atmosphere of liberation post-revolt. Thucydides mentions Tissaphernes' problems collecting tribute in the context of events of 413/2, just before the first treaty between Sparta and Persia. It is possible that Darius began exacting tribute from the Ionian cities before that time, whether in connection with Athens' weakening grip or simply because he had always considered the coastal cities of Ionia to be his possession. Thus, by 412 the Ionian cities may have been indebted to Persia for a few years or for a matter of decades. At the time of Herodotus' writing, the Ionian cities were still paying tribute, suggesting that the practice was long established.[1504] It has been argued that the *phoros* (tribute) to which Herodotus refers had by his day morphed into Athenian tribute.[1505] Yet this is not what Herodotus says; he explicitly says that Artaphrenes compelled the Ionians to pay the tribute that had been fixed by him ἐκ τούτου τοῦ χρόνου αἰεὶ ἔτι καὶ ἐς ἐμὲ, "from that time still right up until my time". Note how forcefully Herodotus stresses that Persian tribute was claimed continually (αἰεὶ), was still in force (ἔτι) and was in force even up to his own day (καὶ ἐς ἐμὲ). Herodotus is completely unambiguous in his language: the same tribute that Artaphernes imposed in

[1503] Thuc. 8.5.5; 8.6.1; 8.18.1
[1504] Hdt 6.42.2
[1505] How & Wells 1912:78-9

493 had continued right through to Herodotus' own time. Whether these cities actually paid the tribute is a separate question. It remains a possibility that the Ionian cities paid tribute to the Persian king from Artaphernes' time to Tissaphernes', though likely in an irregular fashion. Given Herodotus' painstaking precision, the most convincing argument comes from Oswyn Murray, who shows that the most natural rendering of the Greek is that Persia still fixed the *phoros* in his day, but may have met with little success in trying to exact it.[1506] Indeed, what Herodotus says presents two possibilities. Either the satraps before Tissaphernes had not bothered to demand tribute but by 413 the Great King had regained an interest in the area, or all of his predecessors had bothered but Tissaphernes was the first to run into arrears.

In 409, a force of Milesians came to the aid of the Pygelans who were being besieged by Athens.[1507] The consequences were disastrous, with all but a handful of the Milesians killed by the Athenian hoplites and peltasts. In 408, Lysander makes his first appearance at Miletus, on his way to Cyrus at Sardis.[1508] In 406 we find the Milesians being (rather unreliably) funded by Cyrus and commanded by the Spartan Callicratidas; we also find Callicratidas making a speech to the assembly that implies that they are under Persian rule and takes advantage of their hatred of the "barbarians". The speech is effective and the Milesians decide to give him money out of the public purse and in the form of private donations. [1509] Note that when Callicratidas arrives at Miletus he gathers an assembly of the Milesians, which indicates (although does not prove) that decisions were being made by a democracy. The navarch Aeantides of Miletus is one of several honoured with a statue for assisting Lysander at Aegospotami in 405.[1510]

[1506] Murray 1966:146
[1507] Xen. *Hell*. 1.2.2-3
[1508] Xen. *Hell*. 1.5; Diod. 13.70
[1509] Xen. *Hell*. 1.6.7-12
[1510] Paus. 10.9.9

During this whole period of alienation from Athens and alliance with Sparta and Persia, strange though it may seem, Miletus remained a democracy. This is in spite of the hints of dissent in the sources, such as Lysander's calling an assembly of influential men from around Ionia and encouraging them to form *hetairiae* (political clubs) and promising to put them in control of their cities.[1511] Moreover, Plutarch explicitly says that Lysander had promised his Milesian friends that he would help them overthrow the government; this promise was probably made in 407, before his term of office ended and Callicratidas took over.[1512] Even if Miletus' internal government had been surrendered to Persia in 412/11, this may not have entailed a change of constitution. It is unlikely – though by no means impossible - that Miletus first adopted democracy and Athenian-style institutions of its own accord after 412, once it had broken with Athens. It is most probable that democracy had been installed some time previously, whether by force or perhaps at the Milesians' bidding. Cavaignac puts the period 412-406 in his timeline as being ruled by moderate conservatives, democracy having become irrelevant after Miletus' revolt from the League in 412.[1513] Yet as we shall see, it is clear from both Diodorus and Plutarch that the oligarchs overthrew a democracy in 405/4.

In 405/4, certain men who were "striving for an oligarchy" called in the Spartans and violently suppressed the *demos*, the people, and its leaders.[1514] They slew forty of their opponents and an additional three hundred of the wealthiest citizens; Plutarch puts the number at eight hundred and holds the deceptive Lysander responsible for the idea.[1515] A thousand democrats fled to Pharnabazus, who received them kindly and settled them in Lydia. It should not be taken for granted that those exiled in an oligarchic

[1511] Diod. 13.70.4
[1512] Plut.*Lys*.8.1
[1513] Cavaignac 1924:312
[1514] Diod. 13.104.5; Plut.*Lys*.5.3
[1515] Plut. *Lys*. 19; *Apoph*.54. Polyaenus also puts the blame for the coup on Lysander (1.45.1).

coup are democrats rather than a rival group of oligarchs. Yet in this case, both Diodorus and Plutarch state explicitly that democrats were the target of the coup of 405/4. According to Diodorus, the "noblest" or perhaps "cleverest" thousand of those who favoured the *demos* fled to Pharnabazus.[1516] Plutarch says that Lysander tricked the "most democratically inclined" - τούς δημοτικωτάτους - into staying in the city, and it was these men who were slain.[1517] Between the two authors it is clear that both those who died and those who escaped were active supporters of the democracy. In this case, it is safe to assume that the opponents of the revolting oligarchs were indeed democrats. Given that at this time Miletus was not, as far as we know, under Athenian control, it is noteworthy that democracy persisted for so many years after its influence ended. If democracy returned before 402/1, as argued here, it is likely that the thousand democrats returned from Blauda.

Herrmann thinks that these democrats are the same exiles we find in Polyaenus' story about Tissaphernes, and this is an attractive solution.[1518] The first published English translation of the work, from the 18th century, renders the Greek, "Tissaphernes planned to attack Miletus, and seize all the deserters, who had taken refuge there".[1519] However, the original Greek clearly states that Tissaphernes wanted to attack Miletus in order to *restore* the exiles who had been displaced from there: Τισαφερνης ἐμβαλεῖν ἐς Μίλητον καὶ τούς φυγάδας καταγαγεῖν. It is possible that Diodorus confused Tissaphernes for Pharnabazus when he stated that the Milesian democrats fled to Pharnabazus in 405/4; this is a mistake that he is known to have made elsewhere.[1520]

[1516] Diod. 13.104.6; the adjective used is χαριέστατοι.
[1517] Plut.*Lys*.8.3
[1518] Herrmann 1970:170; Polyaenus 7.18.2
[1519] Shepherd 1793:279
[1520] Diod. 13.36.5, 37.4-5, 38.4-5, 40.6, 41.4, 42.4. Tissaphernes does not appear once in book 13 despite being alive and active in 415-404 B.C.

Tissaphernes was at that time, after all, satrap of Lydia, even if by the turn of the century Cyrus the Younger had taken over his official role.[1521] Even if this is not the case, it is plausible that Polyaenus is referring to the democratic exiles, for we know of no other Milesian exiles with whom Tissaphernes had dealings other than those that he himself exiled a few years down the line. It is additionally plausible that Tissaphernes would want to restore men ousted by Lysander, who had been all too ready to slander him to flatter Cyrus.[1522] It is impossible to date Polyaenus' anecdote precisely, so Tissaphernes may have restored the exiled Milesians any time between 405 and his death. The Athenian-looking *lex sacra* allows us to narrow the plausible time frame further to 405-2 B.C., on the assumption that Tissaphernes' restoration of democrats preceded or influenced the city's return to democracy. The event may have even taken place before the end of the war, for as we have seen Tissaphernes was already acting as though he controlled Miletus, whether or not this had been made explicit in the third Spartan treaty.

When the Peloponnesian war ended in 404, Miletus was officially handed back to Persia; this cannot have been a welcome result for the Milesians, who had enjoyed almost a century of freedom from Persian rule and had been so reluctant to submit to Tissaphernes. Nor did their enslavement end with the end of the war: we still find a Milesian bodyguard attending Tissaphernes at the scene of his death in 395.[1523] After the Peloponnesian War, Miletus played a key role in the political rivalry between Cyrus, satrap of Lydia and Tissaphernes, satrap of Caria. When the other Ionians revolted from Tissaphernes in 401, only Miletus did not join Cyrus, less through loyalty to Tissaphernes than fear. At least some of the Milesians had been planning to revolt with

[1521] Xen.*Anab*.1.1.8
[1522] Plut.*Lys*.4
[1523] Polyaen. 7.16.1

the rest of Ionia but when Tissaphernes got wind of this, he put some of them to death and exiled others.[1524] Cyrus responded by settling the exiled Milesians and besieging the city by land and sea. Cyrus' continued loyalty to these exiled Milesians was a cause of concern for all those who remained in Miletus and supported Tissaphernes.[1525] Cyrus' siege failed, and Miletus continued under Tissaphernes' governance, with Persian control of Asia Minor consolidated by the King's Peace of 386 B.C. To this period also belongs an inscription showing satrapal arbitration between Miletus and Myus.[1526] In light of this, it is interesting that our sacred law from 379/8 shows the workings of a democratic *boule* (Council) and *demos* (people); though much of Miletus' history remains obscure, it is clear that its relationship with democracy was not contingent on its relationship with Athens. Indeed, there is good evidence that even during periods of control by Sparta and the Great King, democracy prevailed at Miletus. It even seems likely that Tissaphernes helped to restore democracy by reinstating the exiled democrats.

So much of Miletus' fifth century history is insecurely dated, but the redating of the regulations for Miletus to 426/5 has some important implications. It changes our understanding of relations between Athens and Miletus in the period leading up to the Peloponnesian war, for there is no longer compelling evidence that Miletus revolted during that time. Instead, Miletus can be added along with Mytilene to the list of Ionian towns that were causing Athens grief in the lead-up to the Peace of Nicias. Thucydides mentions that in the winter of 426/5 the Athenians reinstated an ancient Ionian festival at Delos; it is tempting to see this as an appeal to historic ties at a time when the loyalty

[1524] Xen. *Anab*. 1.1.6-7; 1.9.9-10
[1525] Xen. *Anab.* 1.9.9-12
[1526] Tod 113. The satrap, Strouthas, was in power from 391-88 B.C.

of the Ionian cities could not be taken for granted.[1527] Rather than placing the decree concerning Miletus in the context of the early quota lists, we ought to associate it with such measures as the Thoudippus decree which aimed to increase compliance and tighten control on tribute payment.[1528] Closer examination of the regulations prevents us from being certain that Miletus actually revolted; disruption is evident but this may have been internal. New evidence from the tribute lists invalidates the theory that Miletus was in revolt in the 450s and reminds us that absence on the extant tribute lists does not always mean a city did not pay at all. With the 450s and 440s no longer a period of Milesian disaffection, the Blutinschrift and the evidence of the Old Oligarch become even more difficult to date. A tentative suggestion is that the Old Oligarch was making a more general point that Athens had tolerated an oligarchy at Miletus for most of its membership in the Delian League, only for factional fighting to break out in 426/5. Meanwhile the Blutinschrift probably belongs to the early fifth century, before Miletus had even joined the Delian League. Fascinating though the inscription is in its own right, this means that it is of limited use for the period of Athenian control.

Although we cannot pin down a precise date for the installation of democracy in Miletus, we can be sure that it had been first established before 405/4 and probably by 412, when Miletus seceded from the Delian League. The *lex sacra* with Athenian-style prescript is best dated to 402/1, despite (or perhaps because of) its close proximity to the oligarchic coup of 405/4. The oligarchic coup also provides the likeliest context for the Old Oligarch's complaint about Athens favouring the Milesian oligarchs only for them to rebel, if we can bear to date the treatise so late. This can amount to no more than a hypothesis, since so little is known of the Old Oligarch's identity. All of this

[1527] Thuc. 3.104
[1528] *IG* I^3 71

would mean that there were two periods of democracy at Miletus in the fifth century: the 420s or 410s down to 405/4, and again in the last years of the century. Democracy was evidently not just an Athenian imposition, for it was possibly instituted by the Milesians, lasted after Miletus severed ties with Athens, and was re-established by the early fourth century. A re-examination of the evidence reveals the possibility that democracy was not a punishment or burden inflicted by Athens, but a choice that lasted for some time after Athens' influence had ended. Even if it was not a choice the first time around, the Milesians seem to have appreciated democracy enough to reinstate it of their own accord towards the end of the war. It is perhaps our preconception that Athens imposed democracy wherever possible that has led us to assume as much for Miletus, though none of the evidence compels it.

Chapter 4: Erythrae

Erythrae was a small town on the coast of Asia Minor, opposite Chios. A lot of our early evidence for the town is either anecdotal or rooted in myth. Pausanias tells us that Erythrus founded the town and it was subsequently colonised by Cretans.[1529] Diodorus adds the detail that Erythrus was given the kingship by his father, the Cretan king Rhadamanthus.[1530] Not only Cretans inhabited the place but also Lycians, Carians, Pamphylians and later Ionians. Harpocration, glossing a speech of Demosthenes, quotes the fifth-century historian Hellanicus as saying that Erythrae was founded by Neleus, son of Codrus, the semi-mythical king of Athens.[1531] Strabo preserves an alternative tradition that has Cnopus, bastard son of Codrus, lead the Ionian colonisation of Erythrae.[1532] Pausanias cites a further tradition that Codrus' other son Cleopus was responsible for settling all the various Ionian peoples in Erythrae.[1533] All of these are later Athenian traditions that emphasise the Athenians' role as founders of Ionia and trace its history back to an Athenian king.[1534] This will be important when considering the relationship between Athens and its Ionian ally in the Delian League.

The first known king of Erythrae after its founder is Cnopus, presumed to be a different Cnopus to the son of Codrus. The local historian Hippias of Erythrae says that three men, Ortyges, Irus and Echarus, overthrew Cnopus then took over the government.[1535] Cnopus' rule is described as a hereditary monarchy (βασιλεία) rather than a tyranny, perhaps deliberately to contrast with Ortyges, Irus and Echarus'

[1529] Paus. 7.3.7
[1530] Diod. 5.79
[1531] Harpocration s.v. Ἐρυθραῖοι = Hellanicus *FGrHist* 323A F 11; Dem. 8.24
[1532] Strab. 14.1.3
[1533] Paus. 7.3.7
[1534] Welwei 1992:54
[1535] Hippias *FGrHist* 421 F 1 = Athenaeus 6.74-5

illegitimately acquired tyranny. Amongst other things, the three forced their fellow citizens to carry them in litters and attend the funerals of their *hetaireia*, and distinguished themselves by wearing special diadems and gold jewellery. Hippias says that these men had wanted to install an oligarchy but what he describes sounds very much like a tyranny and he describes the trio as οἱ...περὶ τὸν Ὀρτύγην τύραννοι ("the tyrants...associated with Ortyges"). As we have seen, there seems to have been no contradiction in ascribing multiple tyrants to a single city. In Hippias' account, it takes Cnopus' brother Hippotes to truly "liberate" Erythrae from tyranny. It is often assumed that this happened in the seventh century because that is when other tyrannies are known to have fallen, although Simonton points out that the most natural interpretation of the evidence is to assume that Cnopus is the same Cnopus who founded Erythrae in the eleventh century.[1536] This is, of course, if truth lies behind the tradition handed down to us by a Hellenistic historian whose work is preserved in only one fragment.

Whenever the transition from tyranny to oligarchy happened, we know that political power was concentrated in the hands of one family, the Basilidae. Their name implies that they were descended originally from royalty. Aristotle speaks of the oligarchy of the Basilidae "in ancient times" which was brought down because the *demos* became resentful at being governed by a few.[1537] On the basis of this, it has been claimed that Erythrae first became a democracy in the sixth century.[1538] Aristotle's anecdote is not sufficient proof that this was a full-scale democratic revolution – the overthrow of an oligarchy is not the same as the establishment of democracy - but it must have spread the power somewhat. Gehrke suggests that the fall of the Basilidae

[1536] Simonton 2018:505-10
[1537] Arist. *Pol.* 5.1305b
[1538] O'Neil 1995:47-8

saw a transition to a *Hoplitenpoliteia*, a hoplite citizenry.[1539] That Erythrae showed signs of spreading power and wealth at this time will prove important for our understanding of its relationship with democracy in the fifth century.

The fifth century evidence

Very little is known about Erythrae in the fifth century. Thucydides does not mention the town at all until his account of the Ionian War. The Erythrae that Herodotus speaks of is by and large the Erythrae in Boeotia.[1540] The work of the local historian Hippias of Erythrae, *History of My Homeland*, is largely lost to us aside from what survives in Athenaeus.[1541] Some of our evidence is entertaining anecdotally but useless historically: Pliny the Elder tells us that the river Aleos, which ran through Erythrae, "promotes the growth of hair on the body".[1542] Available to us are a handful of inscriptions, the evidence of the *ATL* and very little by way of literature. However, one inscription in particular tells us a lot about Erythrae's relationship with Athens and its constitution at one point in the fifth century.[1543] The inscription had originally been dated to the first half of the fifth century due to its three-bar sigma. A related, extant set of fragments gives some further insight into dealings between Athens and Erythrae.[1544] It is the purpose of this chapter to review what little evidence we have to build up a picture of Erythrae's political experience.

In terms of the extra-literary evidence, Erythrae had a productive mint in the second quarter of the fifth century but there is little evidence for the second half of the century which leads to the conclusion that it was closed then.[1545] Judging by its tribute

[1539] Gehrke 1985:66
[1540] Hdt. 9.15, 19, 22, 25
[1541] Hippias *FGrHist* 421 F 1 = Athenaeus 6.259
[1542] Pliny. *NH*. 31.10
[1543] *IG* I³ 14
[1544] *IG* I³ 15
[1545] Kraay 1976:244; Balcer 1989:12

contributions, Erythrae was very wealthy despite its size; the maximum amount that it pays is 12 talents. Of 205 cities recorded in the *ATL*, only 12 pay more than 7 talents and over 170 pay 5 talents or less.[1546] Although the amount that a city pays should not be considered the extent of its contribution, if Erythrae was able to pay even 7 talents, it must have been wealthy. This comes as a surprise to the modern-day visitor: there is so little left of its ancient remains that finding them is no mean feat. The state of Erythrae today, coupled with the state of the evidence concerning it and the uncertain location of its dependencies, can give the misleading impression that it was isolated and unimportant in ancient times. Yet one thing that strikes the modern-day visitor is the visibility of Chios to the naked eye. Erythrae was in the heart of coastal Asia Minor, sandwiched between two powerful Athenian allies, Chios and Samos. Its geographical location will be important when considering Athens' treatment of the town.

Erythrae had five dependent *poleis,* with which it often paid in *synteleia* (joint contribution). These are Boutheia and the Polichnitai, Sidousioi, Elaiousioi and Pteleousioi. The location of these five towns has been disputed because so little is known about them and Elaioussa could be anywhere that produced olives.[1547] Polichna's name suggests that it was a small, fortified town, but this gives no clue as to its location. However, there is some agreement that at least some of these places lie inland of Erythrae. Some have identified Elaiousa as Strabo's Elaioussa, a tiny island slightly south of Lesbos, near Pitane.[1548] This location was even further east than Erythrae and even more exposed to Persian influence. Thucydides describes Sidousa and Pteleon as fortifications "in Erythraean territory", so they cannot have been far

[1546] Nixon & Price 1990:142-3
[1547] Hansen & Nielsen 2004:1064 (Boutheia), 1070 (Elaioussa), 1091 (Polichne), 1093 (Pteleon), 1098-9 (Sidousa)
[1548] Strab. 13.1.67

away.[1549] Since they were used as a base from which to attack Chios, it would make sense that like Erythrae they were on the west coast opposite Chios or somewhere accessible on the east coast of the Mimas peninsula. The editors of the *ATL* point out that any part of the west coast near hostile Erythrae would have been a "death trap", so they locate Sidousa on the northeastern edge of the peninsula.[1550] This would also place it further east than Erythrae. Stephanus of Byzantium describes a "Sidous" as being a village near Clazomenae, further inland than Erythrae; if this is the same place, Sidousa must have been east of Erythrae.[1551] For this reason, both the editors of the *ATL* and Meiggs identify Sidousa as modern-day Sahib Island to the northeast of Erythrae, directly facing Phocaea and the western coast of Asia Minor.[1552] Polichna they place on the same coast of the Mimas peninsula, further southeast. The Barrington Atlas puts Polichna in the same place. There seems to be no consensus for Boutheia, which could be north or south of Erythrae, but either way it would be further west. The editors of the *ATL* suggest Meli, at the northernmost tip of the bay of Erythrae, and the editors of *IK Erythrai* suggest Çeşme, at the southern end of the strait between Chios and Erythrae.[1553] The likely location of Pteleon is similarly northwest of Erythrae. Whether or not Erythrae's dependencies were further inland than Erythrae itself, all of the towns on the peninsula and the coast will have been caught "between two worlds", on the border of the Persian empire yet paying tribute to Athens. As has been argued elsewhere, Erythrae and its neighbours may well have found themselves paying both the Athenians and the Great King at points in the fifth century.

[1549] Thuc. 8.24.2
[1550] Meritt, McGregor & Wade-Gery 1939:486
[1551] Stephanus of Byzantium s.v. Σιδοῦς
[1552] Meritt, McGregor & Wade-Gery 1939:486; Meiggs 1972 Map 1(1)
[1553] Meritt, McGregor & Wade-Gery 1939:487; Engelmann & Merkelbach 1972:35. Meli does not seem to exist any more; there is a small town that has been subsumed into the larger region of Küçükbahçe Mahallesi.

It is worth considering Erythrae's relationship with Persia before the First Peloponnesian War. Erythrae was originally a part of the Lydian Empire under Croesus, and then surrendered to Cyrus with the rest of Ionia around 547 B.C.[1554] It is unclear whether it joined Darius' Scythian expedition or who ruled Erythrae at that point in the late sixth century, for Herodotus does not mention a tyrant of Erythrae among those who debated the fate of Ionia.[1555] On the other hand, Herodotus speaks often of "the Ionian tyrants" and claims that Aristagoras deposed them all, so we may assume that unknown tyrants ruled Erythrae during the sixth century.[1556] What is certain is that it joined in the revolt from the Persian Empire in 499. The town's size is indicated by the fact that it contributed only eight ships to the battle of Lade in 494 B.C; the Milesians brought 80 and Samos brought 60.[1557]

After the Ionian revolt, if Herodotus is to be believed, Erythrae will have been made democratic like the other cities in Ionia.[1558] It is not known when Erythrae first joined the Delian League. It may have joined the Hellenic League straight after the battle of Mycale like Samos, Lesbos and Chios, or it may have been a later addition.[1559] Robertson argues that its historic rivalry with Chios prevented it from joining the League initially, but this is to assume that neighbourly rivalry would trump practical considerations such as the protection that the League offered.[1560] Erythrae first appears on the tribute quota lists in 450/49, paying in *synteleia* with the Polichnaioi, Sidousioi, Pteleousioi and Boutheians.[1561] It appears in the two following years, paying on behalf of the Elaiousioi as well and then paying just for itself, but for none of these three years

[1554] Hdt. 1.26-8, 1.169
[1555] Hdt. 4.138
[1556] Hdt. 5.37.2, 5.38.2, 6.13.2, 6.9-10, 6.43.3
[1557] Hdt. 6.8
[1558] Hdt. 6.43
[1559] Hdt. 9.106.4
[1560] Robertson 1980:480
[1561] *IG* I³ 263 col.II.13-17

does the amount paid survive.[1562] Because of its absence from the first four tribute quota lists, it is assumed that Erythrae was in revolt for the period 454/3-451/0. Yet nearby Teos and Lebedus do not appear until 451/0; nor does Acanthus.[1563] Iasus does not appear until 450/49.[1564] In any case, the example of Miletus ought to make one wary of jumping to conclusions when a town is missing from a list.

The Athenian regulations for Erythrae, IG I³ 14

The regulations for Erythrae have traditionally been placed in the context of this hypothetical revolt and dated to the year 454/3. The inscription has a complex history. It survives only in two copies, made by Kyriakos Pittakys and Louis Fauvel.[1565] Fauvel made the earlier copy in the late 18th century from a stone on the Acropolis, but both stone and copy disappeared and for a time all that was left was the transcription printed in *CIG*. Pittakys' copy, from the 19th century, has only come to light recently. Both copies are somewhat garbled and lacunose, so the stone was evidently already in bad condition by the time Fauvel got to it. Pittakys was a student of Fauvel's and was in possession of two of Fauvel's notebooks. His copy of the inscription seems to be a copy of Fauvel rather than of the original stone; however, his version is useful in its own right because it may copy a different facsimile of Fauvel's to the one preserved in *CIG*.[1566] It is certain that Fauvel made more than one copy. The main question for our purposes is what – if anything – the lettering of the copies can tell us about the date of the regulations for Erythrae.

Since we are dependent on Fauvel and Pittakys' transcriptions, dating by letter-form is even more precarious than usual. We cannot know for sure what was written on

[1562] *IG* I³ 264 col.III.27-30a; *IG* I³ 265 col.I.58
[1563] *IG* I³ 262 col.II.12, col.III.34, col.II.32
[1564] *IG* I³ 263 col.V.21
[1565] Malouchou 2014:78-9
[1566] Malouchou 2014:80-1

the stone. The letter-forms that both copies exhibit are early: three-bar sigma, tailed and angular rho, angular beta and dotted theta. The sigmas in the original inscription are more likely to have been three-barred and the rhos tailed because Fauvel adds a note saying as much at the end of his facsimile.[1567] As we have seen, the sigma style should not dictate the date but the overall lettering points to an earlier date. For the rest of the letters, there is no evidence to suggest that Fauvel and Pittakys were particularly careful to represent their style faithfully. The nu is slightly slanted but its bars are all the same length. Pittakys' copy contains the occasional late letter-form but this appears to be the result of carelessness rather than faithful copying. Both copyists represent the letter rho in a variety of ways including rounded and with no tail at all, which may be why Osborne and Rhodes record the rho as pointed but not tailed.[1568] If the rho was tailed, this might suggest a *terminus ante quem* of 440 B.C., for tailed rho appears to fall out of use around then. However, letter-forms can only be used as a rough guideline and not a rule.

Meritt argues that the rho was not tailed because Fauvel only seemed to include a tail when he was confident what the word was, suggesting that it was his own embellishment.[1569] Meritt points out that in another inscription Fauvel mistakes a tailed rho for a three-bar sigma, which could mean that he was not familiar with the letter-form and failed to recognise it when it actually did occur.[1570] Meiggs and Cataldi argue against this that in two other instances Fauvel appears to mistake rho for kappa, making it likely that there were tailed rhos.[1571] They believe that the fragments cannot be associated with the facsimile for this reason. However, their two examples are of words

[1567] Malouchou 2014:75 Fig. 2
[1568] Osborne & Rhodes 2017:112
[1569] Meritt 1946:247
[1570] Meritt 1946:248 n.52 on CIG I Add. 527b (Boeckh 1828:915)
[1571] Meiggs 1972:421-2; Cataldi 1981:27; Cataldi 1983:92

that are uncertain in the first place. In line 7, *h*ιερέα (sacrifices) is read for what in Fauvel's copy looks like HBYKEA. Similarly, in line 18 IEKON is thought to be *h*]ιερο̣ῦν but the word is closely preceded and immediately followed by a lacuna in a sentence whose sense is almost completely lost. Meritt's argument is subject to the same criticism; he provides numerous examples of letters for which rho was mistaken, yet rarely are the words secure. Cataldi trusts too much in Fauvel's accuracy as a copyist and concludes that all four types of rho that Fauvel writes must have featured in the original inscription. That Fauvel represents the rhos as tailed does not tell us much; however, the fact that he goes to the lengths of noting that the rho was tailed is more difficult to get around for those who want to argue that IG I³ 14 had rhos without a tail. All that can be said is that it is a possibility that Fauvel was mistaken, given his apparent lack of interest in letter forms and his confusion of tailed rhos for other letters elsewhere. The tailed rho would point to an earlier date, although letter-forms should not take precedent over the actual content of the decree.

The contents of the lost decree as gleaned from the facsimiles are at times unintelligible but fascinating. The restorations and amendments provided in most editions can give a false sense of security, because what would usually signify an uncertain reading on the stone actually means that Fauvel recorded a different letter. It is very rarely that a word survives in its entirety without either restoration or emendation. None of the names in the prescript survive, only the lone word ἐπεστατε ("was chairman"). The line length means that there is no room for the secretary's name before the chairman's; however, their order could be reversed, as is the case in IG I³ 27. Meiggs suggested that the secretary's name could appear only in superscript along with *theoi* (gods) at the top of the stele; this is something we first find in an inscription

concerning Mytilene dated to 427/6.[1572] Moroo uses this fact to push the date down, but the fact that such a detail first materialises for us in 427/6 may tell us more about how few fifth century inscriptions remain than anything else.[1573] As Moroo herself points out, superscripts containing *theoi* feature in one of the Parthenon accounts dated to 442/1.[1574] The name of the secretary is also missing from the regulations for Chalcis as we have them, and it has long been accepted that prescripts varied a great deal before becoming more standardised in the 420s.[1575]

Next probably comes the requirement that the Erythraeans bring an offering of grain worth at least three minas to the Great Panathenaea and that it be shared out amongst the Erythraeans present (l.2-4). These lines certainly mention the Panathenaea, three minas and the Erythraeans, but every other significant word is either restored or edited. Lines 5-8 are very difficult to make sense of; there is mention of sacrificers (l.5) and possibly victims (l.8), which must also relate to the Erythraeans' obligations at the Panathenaea. On the traditional dating of the decree, these provisions were seen as the first of their kind, paving the way for the eventual requirement that all allies bring a cow and panoply to the Panathenaea.[1576] Thus, an ad hoc arrangement would have eventually been tightened up into a rule that applied to the entire Delian League. However, it may just as well be that the requirements set out in the regulations for Erythrae were not the first of their kind and all they tell us is that the decree was probably passed shortly before a Great Panathenaea. Note that as the text stands, it is not clear what exactly the Erythraeans are to bring to the festival. Grain (σῖτος) is put forward in most editions but Fauvel's copy records Σ·TO· and Pittakys' preserves

[1572] Meiggs 1943:34; *IG* I³ 66
[1573] Moroo 2014:103
[1574] *IG* I³ 457
[1575] *IG* I³ 40; c.f. Henry 2001:98 on 'the 421 rule'
[1576] *IG* I³ 34.41-2; *IG* I³ 46.15-6; *IG* I³ 71.57 (heavily restored)

Σ··ΤΟ··. If the restoration is correct, this is still different to the requirement to bring a cow and panoply to the Panathenaea. There is nothing to suggest that this was a new requirement, other than the sheer fact that it is mentioned in the decree. Meanwhile, Cleinias' decree makes it obvious that the requirement had already been established by the time of its writing by the way that the subject is brought up: καὶ ἐ]άν τις περὶ τὲν ἀπᾳ[γογὲ]ν τε͂ς βοὸς ἒ [τε͂ς πανhοπλία]ς ἀδικεῖ... ("And regarding the bringing of the cow and panoply, if anyone does wrong...").[1577] The regulations for Erythrae give no indication that the requirement to bring an offering to the Panathenaea is either brand new or well established. It is a circular argument to say that they must be early because they contain the first such requirements when it is not certain that they are the first of their kind.

Lines 10-17 are more secure and set out that there is to be a Council made up of 120 men, with a minimum age requirement of 30 for councillors and a ban on serving twice in four years. There is also the opportunity for prosecution of an official, δίωξις (l.11-12). It had been thought that the ban on serving twice in four years was only to be enforced in particular cases where officials had been successfully prosecuted.[1578] In other words, it was thought that the clauses in lines 11 and 12 were connected by a comma rather than separated by a full stop. However, it seems likely that the ban on serving twice in four years stands on its own rather than being dependent on the *dioxis* of an official, given that there are parallels in Athens and in fourth-century Erythrae.[1579] Moreover, *dioxis* seems to be an examination process rather than a criminal verdict itself.[1580] This means that being subject to *dioxis* should not carry a penalty, but only

[1577] *IG* I³ 34.41-2
[1578] Highby 1936:10
[1579] Koch 1991:77-8
[1580] Koch 1991:77-8; Antiph. 6.7

being found of wrongdoing via the process of *dioxis*. Rather than acting as a punishment for individuals who had abused their office, the blanket ban on serving more than once every four years will have been meant to curb the accumulation of power by individuals in office. It will also have maximised the number of Erythraeans who held the office, which suggests an ideological interest in the sharing of power and responsibility by as many people as possible.

The Erythraean council is smaller than at Athens, perhaps due to Erythrae's smaller size. The Athenian council was made up of 500 men.[1581] While Athenians could only serve on the council a maximum of twice, Erythraeans can serve multiple times as long as there is at least a four-year interval in between. The garrison commander and some other officials are to choose by lot and set up the Council but in the future the garrison commander is to do it with the Council no less than 30 days before the current councillors leave office (l.14-15). The councillors are to swear oaths, presumably to carry out their job with integrity (l.16-17). The next few lines have something to do with a sacrifice (l.18-20) and then the councillors' oath is set out (l.21-9).

Sortition as a democratic process

The fact that the Council is to be chosen by lot sounds like the setting up (or tightening up) of a democratic system, which deliberately tries to curb the amassing of power by a particular family or individual. In Greek political thought, sortition was generally associated with democracy and election with oligarchy. There are some exceptions in the epigraphic and literary sources, which will be discussed. Solon may have introduced the sortition of certain magistrates, although the issue is contentious.[1582] There is very little evidence to suggest that this was done for religious purposes, which, if true, might

[1581] Aristot. *Ath. Pol*. 24.3; Aeschin. 3.2
[1582] Aristot. *Ath. Pol.* 8.1; de Ste Croix 2004:89-92

suggest that sortition was not purely a democratic practice. It has been argued that the early Greeks used sortition as a way of letting the gods decide on the outcome of important elections. In fact, Wade-Gery adduces only one piece of archaic evidence: a passage in Homer's *Iliad* in which the lot is used as a way of choosing between the nine warriors willing to battle Hector.[1583] Nowhere in the passage is it suggested that sortition is divinely inspired, much less that Nestor based his decision to cast lots on the belief that it was. There is so little positive evidence for the religious nature of sortition that it begs the question to say that at some point in the fourth century sortition lost its religious authority and became a "weapon of democracy".[1584] Instead, it seems always to have been a weapon, or we might say a mechanism, of democracy.

There is some evidence that sortition was not only employed in democracies. Aristotle provides a practical reason why it might be employed in an oligarchy: to avoid canvassing.[1585] It is worth looking at what Aristotle actually says in this passage of the *Politics*. He is making the point that constitutional change can come about as a result of things other than civil strife. He gives the example of Heraea, which not only changed the way that it voted to get rid of the problem of canvassing, but even changed its constitution as a result. If this is a reference to the aftermath of the battle of Leuctra, then Heraea will have changed from an oligarchy to a democracy.[1586] In which case this particular example of Aristotle's only serves to demonstrate the strong link between sortition and democracy. The author of the Pseudo-Aristotelian *Rhetoric to Alexander* makes a similar point that the lot is the method least likely to cause civil strife (it is ἀστασίαστον).[1587] He also says that in an oligarchy the majority of magistracies ought

[1583]Wade-Gery 1958:112-4; Homer *Iliad* 7.170-90
[1584] de Ste Croix 2004:96 contra Wade-Gery 1958:112-4
[1585] Arist. *Pol.* 5.1303a
[1586] Lintott 2018:357
[1587] [Aristot.] *Rhetoric to Alexander* 2.14 (Fuhrmann 1966:13)

to be appointed by lot.[1588] However, moments earlier the author says a similar thing about democracies; the key difference between the two passages is that the most important magistracies must be chosen by lot in a democracy whereas in an oligarchy they are to be elected by secret ballot.[1589] Thus, although the author advocates sortition for oligarchies, only in a democracy are the really important magistracies entrusted to chance. Moreover, he is saying what should happen in a hypothetical oligarchy, not what is actually happening in an existing oligarchy.

Generally, earlier and more reliable sources than Diogenes connect sortition with democracy. Solon instituted election by lot after a preliminary election, which was considered to be a step towards democracy but not as democratic as in Aristotle's own day when the preliminary election was also by lot.[1590] Herodotus' Persian adviser Otanes says that determining offices by lot is the preserve of ἰσονομία (equality before the law), although as we have noted in the introduction, there is some dispute as to whether the word means democracy or merely equality before the law.[1591] Certainly, in this passage of Herodotus, the lot is not associated with oligarchy. The author of the *Dissoi Logoi*, a non-Athenian text usually dated to the Peloponnesian War, claims that sortition is not democratic because it allows those who are against the *demos* to destroy it.[1592] Yet he is deliberately trying to undermine the common opinion and is starting from the assumption that most people believe sortition is democratic; he begins by saying, "they say that [the lot] is a good thing and very democratic (δαμοτικός)." Isocrates makes a similar point when arguing against radical democracy: he claims that those who are elected to a post are by self-selection more attached to the existing

[1588] [Aristot.] *Rhetoric to Alexander* 2.18 (Fuhrmann 1966:16)
[1589] [Aristot.] *Rhetoric to Alexander* 2.14-15 (Fuhrmann 1966:13-4)
[1590] Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 8.1
[1591] Hdt. 3.80.6
[1592] Anon. *Dissoi Logoi* 7.5-6; Simonton 2016:31 n.133

constitution, whereas random selection will frequently put aspiring oligarchs in office.[1593] For both authors, it is not that selection by lot is inherently undemocratic, but rather that it allows those who are undemocratic to ruin it. Isocrates, like the anonymous author, is likely deliberately subverting the argument that sortition from a large group minimises the accidental selection of people who are not impartial or unrepresentative of the citizen body. The chances that an oligarchic conspirator would be selected, let alone into a role that gave him the power to jeopardise the prevailing government, were in reality very slim. Moreover, both authors are arguing against the dominant ideology that sortition is democratic.

At Athens, selection by lot was fundamental to its democracy. As we have seen, *isonomia* was a key principle of democracy, as was the notion that social goods should be divided equally between citizens.[1594] Therefore, dividing the good of political office equally was democratic. Analysing Solon's constitution, Aristotle says that its elective magistracies were considered aristocratic whereas its law courts, which were made up of jurors chosen by lot, were considered democratic.[1595] Similarly, he identifies as oligarchical the fact that at Sparta all the offices are elective and none are appointed by lot.[1596] Plutarch credits Aristides with opening up administration of Athens to all citizens, even the archonship.[1597] Previously, the archons had been chosen by popular election, which might sound democratic but the main criteria for their election were birth and wealth.[1598] The next stage was for candidates to be selected by lot from a pre-

[1593] Isoc. 7.23
[1594] Mulgan 1984:545-6
[1595] Aristot. *Ath. Pol.* 2.1273b
[1596] Aristot. Pol. 4.1294b
[1597] Plut. *Arist*. 22.1
[1598] Aristot. *Ath. Pol.* 3.6, 22.5; Mulgan 1984:542

elected panel. Eventually, almost every position was elected by lot, except for the generalship and some financial roles because of their need for specialist experience.[1599]

Choosing officials by lot prevented wealthier citizens from simply buying their way into important positions. Offices that were staffed by lot and re-elected annually "were no platform for the conversion of wealth to political power, and no basis for anyone aspiring to political dominance or domination to be able to do so."[1600] Sortition also reduced the likelihood of powerful groups forming; in 410/09 the Athenians even introduced sortition for the seating order of the Council, so that organised groups could not overly influence proceedings.[1601] This is precisely the opposite of the conservative Thucydides son of Melesias' tactic of having the καλοὶ κἀγαθοί (nobles) sit together in a bloc so as to increase their influence.[1602] Further, comparison of official positions selected by vote and by lot has shown that sortition minimised the geographical bias of elections.[1603] Whereas living closer to the city increased the likelihood of being elected *strategos* (general), this is not the case for offices selected by lot such as that of the *tamias* (treasurer). As well as being a social leveller in terms of wealth, the use of the lot appears to have mitigated the effects of distance on actively taking part in democracy. In line with this strong association between sortition and democracy, the fact that the Erythraean Council is to be elected by lot is suggestive of a democracy.

Lines 10 to 46

The minimum age requirement of 30 (l.10-11) suggests that what is being set up is an Athenian-style democracy. The readings here are fairly secure, with only the word for years, ἔτη, being conjectured in place of the original reading ΒΕΓΑ (l.11). This is not a

[1599] Aeschin. 3.13; [Xen] *Ath. Pol.* 1.3; Plut. *Per*. 16.3; Plut. *Phoc*. 8.1
[1600] Lane 2014:119
[1601] Nippel 2016:39; c.f. Philochorus *FGrHist* 328 F 140
[1602] Plut. *Per*. 11.2
[1603] Taylor 2007

particular problem because the following word γεγονό[τ]α confirms that we are dealing with an age restriction.[1604] According to Xenophon and Aristotle, an Athenian citizen had to be thirty years old to serve on the Council.[1605] As Aristotle goes on to elaborate, this meant in turn that thirty was the minimum age for serving as a military general, archon, treasurer and a variety of other public positions. Aristotle claims that the age restriction goes back to the time of Draco. This is corroborated by the fact that even when Athens briefly became an oligarchy under the Thirty, the oligarchic Council retained the same minimum age on the basis that this would be κατὰ τὰ πάτρια, "according to the ancestral [laws]".[1606] Aristotle elsewhere states that thirty is the minimum age for sitting on a jury.[1607] While thirty is the normal age requirement for holding office in Athens and crops up several times as an age threshold in Attic inscriptions, it does not appear in inscriptions from elsewhere.[1608] This leads to the conclusion - as far as the sources allow - that it was peculiar to Athens.

In the oath, the councillor swears to act as best and most justly as he can for the *plethos* (mass) of the Erythraeans and Athenians (22-3). This is important because the word could suggest that a democracy has been set up at Erythrae as at Athens. Certainly, the phrasing of the oath assimilates the Athenians and the Erythraean people by calling them both a *plethos*. In this way it puts the Athenians and the Erythraeans on the same side. As will be discussed below, this turns out to be the "right" side, with Persians and pro-Persians standing on the wrong side in opposition to them. It is interesting that the

[1604] Fauvel and Pittakys preserve lamdas instead of gammas but this is something they do elsewhere in their transcriptions (e.g. l. 25 ΕΛΟ for ΕΓΟ). The two letters are easily confused. Generally, in both Fauvel and Pittakys' copies lamdas are represented as an L rather than Λ and the latter is used only a handful of times. Gamma never appears in either transcription. This strongly suggests that when they transcribe Λ they are reading something other than lamda, and probably gamma.
[1605] Xen. *Mem*. 1.2.35; Aristot. *Ath. Pol*. 4.3, 30.2
[1606] Aristot. *Ath. Pol*. 31.1
[1607] Aristot. *Ath. Pol*. 63.3
[1608] *IG* I³ 3.9-10; *IG* II² 1237.33-4; *SEG* 40.20 l.31 (restored)

term *plethos* is used rather than *demos*, for the former has connotations of "the masses" and may have been meant to evoke the victory of the many over the so-called "tyrants" who were trying to take over the city. Each Erythraean councillor is also probably to swear not to defect from the *plethos* of the Athenians or the allies, or to be persuaded by someone who defects, or to take back any of the exiles or those who have fled to the Medes, without the permission of the Council and the *demos* of the Athenians (l.23-7). Note, however, that in lines 28-9 the word *demos* does not survive in the original transcription; instead it is conjectured from NMO (l.28) and ΣΑΕΜΟ (l.29). Later on, mention of the *demos* of the Athenians is more secure because [δ]ε̃μον τὸν Ἀθεναίον ("the Athenian people") is restored from ENONTONAΘENAION (l.38). Finally, he is not to exile those who are still in the town without the permission of the Council and the *demos* of the Athenians (28-9). There is no oath of the Athenians, although in a text as corrupt as this one cannot rule out that there originally was one. That the Athenian people are called the *demos* is to be expected and unfortunately tells us nothing about Erythrae's own constitution. Nevertheless, an opposition is set up between the Athenian and Erythraean *demos* on one hand and the pro-Persian tyrants on the other.

Note again that *boule* and *demos* in all four instances across lines 27-9 are heavily restored; in fact, *boule* is restored entirely from a lacuna (l.27) and the *demos* from KA... (l.28-9). So, although it is likely that the Athenians are involving themselves in decision-making, it is debatable whether the council and the assembly are actually being invoked. It used to be thought that in these lines the Athenians were stripping the Erythraean courts of all decision-making powers by having its councillors swear not to do anything without Athens' express permission. However, if the restored text is more or less correct, the only things that the Erythraean Council cannot do without Athens' permission are reverse decisions that have already been made about who gets to occupy

the city.[1609] The councillors swear on the one hand not to take the exiles in, and on the other, not to exile anyone who is still in the city; the point of the latter is probably to make sure that people do not start exiling their personal enemies or try to organise a coup. One way to guarantee security is essentially to forbid the citizen body from changing. Robertson cites this as one of the ways in which Athens "protected her democratic friends and weakened her oligarchic enemies in the subordinate states".[1610] The idea that Athens always wanted to hurt oligarchs and aid democrats is too simplistic, but in Erythrae's case the Athenians were clearly trying to strengthen their newly instituted constitution against those who were trying to sabotage it. In these lines, Athens was protecting against the possibility of the Erythraean council revoking Athens' decisions and thus exposing the city to outside threats. Given the evident Persian threat from the rest of the decree, it is reasonable to assume that the Athenians were protecting the new arrangement at Erythrae from pro-Persian (and perhaps Persian) interference.

From line 29 onwards the text becomes more and more garbled. There follows a warning that if anyone kills someone else, he should be put to death (29-30). It likely says "if an Erythraean kills another Erythraean", but both ethnics are almost entirely restored and the second in both manuscripts actually reads Ἐρτοι…ον. Likely the murderer is to be exiled from "the entire alliance of the Athenians" (l.31) and his possessions are to become public property (l.32). The point of this, since it only bans citizens from slaying other citizens, is probably to deter against *stasis*, civil war. Since some of the laws are passed over so briefly in this section, Athens is not enacting new laws but referring to existing laws that are relevant to a city that has recently suffered

[1609] Robertson 1924:32-3
[1610] Robertson 1924:32

upheaval. Thus, these lines do not provide any proof that Athens tried to change the law on homicide trials or limit the Erythraean council's power to deal with them.

It has been pointed out that in line 31 the Delian League is referred to as "the alliance of the Athenians" rather than "Athens and its allies", but "the alliance of the Athenians" may be meant to have that meaning in that it is an alliance headed by Athens.[1611] It does not necessarily follow that Athens was claiming the right to ban people from the alliance without having to consult the rest of the allies first. In any case, both protasis and apodosis of the conditional are incomplete. Hill restores lines 32-4 so that they read "if anyone takes the city of the Erythraeans and betrays it to the tyrants, he is to die along with his children".[1612] Unfortunately the original transcriptions do not make much sense at this point; where Hill supplies τέμ πόλιν (the city), the copies both read TEMNAM[…]. The rest of Hill's sentence is restored, so it is not possible to say that the lines presuppose that an Erythraean had already betrayed the *polis* of the Erythraeans and been condemned.[1613] All that is clear is that there is some kind of conditional involving tyrants. In the final section there is mention of tyrants (l.33), a punishment extending to the accused's children (l.34), further mention of his children (l.35), the allies (l.41), possibly archers (l.42) and people chosen (?) from each tribe (l.45). In the last recorded line (46) there may be further mention of a garrison, likely an Athenian once since Ἀθεναι- is also preserved.

This last section is interesting because in some ways it resembles the Milesian "law against tyrants". Not only is there mention of tyrants – again suggesting that multiple tyrants were not seen to be a contradiction in terms – but also the extension of the punishment onto the children of those who have committed a crime. Variations on

[1611] de Sanctis 1937:309
[1612] Hill 1897:27
[1613] Contra Koch 1991:81-2

the phrase καὶ αὐτὸς καὶ ἔκγονοι ("both himself and his descendants") are not uncommon in either honorary or punitive decrees involving ritual pollution, but it tends to occur in inscriptions from the Hellenistic period.[1614] Grammatically, one would assume that the protasis to "let him be put to death, both himself and his children" is not "if any [Erythraean?] kills another Erythraean" (l.29-30) but the unfortunately vague, "if anyone contrives (?) to [...] the tyrants" (l.31-2). The most obvious restoration here would be "if anyone contrives to take back the tyrants". Thus, the sense of the sentence in its entirety would be: If anyone contrives to restore the tyrants in Erythrae, let him be put to death, both him and his sons. This is not identical to the Milesian Blutinschrift, for there it is the children of the "tyrants" to whom the punishment is extended. If our interpretation of these lines is correct, it is not the tyrants' children but the children of anyone who tries to help the tyrants who are targeted. Cataldi restores the lines so that the Athenians display an unusual generosity to the children of these hypothetical traitors by saying that they can be saved from death if they become friends of the Erythraean *demos* and Athens.[1615] Not only this, but if the traitors' children change their ways, they will inherit half of their executed parents' property, the other half going to the Erythraean state. This restoration goes back to Highby, who saw in the provision "humanity" towards the children of the accused.[1616] In Cataldi's eyes, the concession was not so much about humanity but a necessary concession to the aristocrats who still held power in the city. The pivotal word for this interpretation is ἥμυσυ (half), which Cataldi inexplicably spells with an upsilon instead of an iota and restores from ΘNKY... in the facsimile (l.37). There is therefore no evidence that the

[1614] e.g. *I. Erythrai* 1.6.12-3, 1.8.10-11, 1.14.5, *I.Milet* 1.2 n.10.11, 1.3 n.152a.4, 1.3 n.154.24 (honorary); *I. Milet* 1.3 n.149.60-1, 1.3 n.150.114-5, *IG* XII, 2 526.23, *IG* XII,2 645.50-2, *IG* XII Suppl. 83.3-4 (punitive)
[1615] Cataldi 1981:19, 24, 37
[1616] Highby 1936:29

children of the traitors are given the option to change their ways or that they are to receive half their inheritance if they do so.

If the regulations for Erythrae are like the Milesian Blutinschrift then it will be anyone who manages to kill a "tyrant" or traitor who receives a monetary reward. Yet since the crucial word is merely a conjecture and the rest of the sentence incomprehensible, it is unlikely that the regulations deal out the traitors' property in halves at all. The lines deal with money in some way (l.36) but whether this is the money of those put to death or a reward for killing them is unfortunately lost. Even the word that tells us that impunity was granted to anyone who killed one of the tyrants – νεποινεί ("with impunity") – is restored only from the final iota. Again, if the decree is like the Milesian Blutinschrift then impunity will have been granted to whoever killed one of the "tyrants", but this remains a guess. According to Andocides, Athens dealt with threats to democracy in just such a way.[1617] The Demophantus decree, passed in the aftermath of the oligarchic coup of 411, calls for the murder of anyone who tries to suppress Athenian democracy. Like the regulations for Erythrae, the Demophantus decree says that anyone who kills such a threat to democracy will do so with impunity (νηποινεί). If the Athenians were particularly concerned about the influence of the Erythraean "tyrants" then the grant of impunity may have been extended to the entire alliance, so that the "tyrants" were in danger wherever they fled.[1618] It should be noted, however, that there is great controversy surrounding the authenticity of the Demophantus decree, which is only known to us from a speech of Andocides.[1619]

Unfortunately, these provisions belong in the most fragmentary part of the transcription and so certainty is impossible, but at both Miletus and Erythrae there

[1617] Andoc. 1.95-6
[1618] Koch 1991:82-3
[1619] See Carawan 2017

seems to have been a genuine concern about the return of tyranny. Jensen says that the decree refers to "banished tyrants" but this is not quite right: reference is probably made to people who have fled or been banished to Persia (l.27) and tyrants (l.33) but how these are connected is not made clear.[1620] The restorations in this section are a lot more significant than most editions intimate; τοῦν ἐς Μέδος φευγόντων ("those who fled to the Mede") is deduced from ...ΜΕΔΟΣΟΕΝΑΟ...Ν (l.26). In fact there is no safe reference to fugitives, for in the previous line φύγαδον ("fugitives") is taken from Ο...ΝΟΝ (l.26) and even the imperative φευγέτο (l.31) comes from ΟΕΥΛΕΤΟ; the link between the two is evident but by no means incontrovertible. Fauvel seems often to have transcribed phi as omicron but the restorations are still far from secure. Nevertheless, it is clear that these lines concern Persia and talk of "those who remain" presupposes that some have left the town. The oath not to banish anyone still in Erythrae further suggests unrest, in that there were those still in the town who feared exile under the new regime. Whether this was due to personal vendettas or because they had acted disloyally is unclear. What is clear is that reconciling the population was of paramount concern to the Athenians.

If the tyrants are the ones who fled to the Mede, this makes the decree resemble the Blutinschrift all the more. One wonders who exactly these multiple tyrants were. Perhaps they were a group of people who aspired to put one tyrant in control, or perhaps the Greeks equated a very narrow oligarchy with tyranny. Narrow oligarchy and tyranny were often equated, either for propagandistic purposes or because of a genuine fear that one could lead to the other: "for classical Greek democrats, the tyrant can be defined as *anyone* who would seek to overthrow the *demos*".[1621] In Athenian popular

[1620] Jensen 2012:482
[1621] Ober 2005:215

consciousness, rejecting democracy was the same as supporting tyranny; hence an Aristophanic character is able to joke that anyone who displays un-"democratic" behaviour is labelled a tyrant.[1622] Oligarchy became "a rhetorical devise to describe and demonise anyone who opposed the prevailing political view in Athens" and making oligarchs the natural enemies of democracy was a way of discrediting them.[1623]

This is not to say that there was not sometimes a genuine fear of the amassing of power by certain individuals that turned the oligarch into a potential tyrant. Thucydides says that the profanation of the mysteries in 415 was deemed a threat because it was thought to be part of a conspiracy towards oligarchy or tyranny. In fact, the Greek says that they feared an oligarchic *and* tyrannical conspiracy, showing just how closely the two were aligned in the Athenians' thinking: πάντα αὐτοῖς ἐδόκει ἐπὶ ξυνωμοσίᾳ ὀλιγαρχικῇ καὶ τυραννικῇ πεπρᾶχθαι.[1624] Alcibiades' son complains that most of his contemporaries suspected him of aiming at tyranny simply because he was powerful; he neglects to mention that they likely did so because Alcibiades had been the one to propose that the Athenians replace their democracy with an oligarchy.[1625] Xenophon describes the Thirty at Athens as behaving like tyrants, τυραννεῖν.[1626] A law passed shortly after the restoration of full democracy in 410 requires that all Athenians take an oath to slay not just anyone who tries to put down the democracy but anyone who tries to become or helps to instal a tyrant; this implies that any minority rule is essentially a tyranny.[1627] The heliasts' oath quoted by Demosthenes is even more explicit in equating the two. The second promise they make after promising to give a

[1622] Aristoph. *Wasps* 488-502
[1623] Mitchell 2006:185
[1624] Thuc. 6.60.1
[1625] Thuc. 8.47.2, 8.48.1
[1626] Xen. *Hell.* 2.4.1
[1627] Andoc. 1.97

lawful verdict is, "I will not vote for a tyrant or oligarchy."[1628] This is followed by a promise not to aid anyone in subverting democracy. Both Demosthenes and Isocrates in the fourth century describe oligarchy as slavery, which suggests that at least some Athenians considered oligarchy to be a kind of tyranny because it was not free or equal.[1629]

A similar attitude is found in inscriptions such as the alliance between Athens, Arcadia, Achaea, Elis and Phlius of 362/1 and Eucrates' decree of 337/6.[1630] If restored correctly, the alliance forbids either oligarchy or tyranny from being set up in the place of democracy (l.24-6). The latter is a perfectly preserved Athenian decree that forbids the establishment of a tyranny or the overthrow of democracy and features a relief depicting Demos (the people) being crowned by Demokratia (democracy). Although the latter does not explicitly ban the setting up of an oligarchy, from the fact that it bans anyone from sitting in the Council if the democracy is overthrown it is evident that any form of narrow rule was feared. It is likely that an Eretrian tyrant-killing law from the fourth century also explicitly forbids both oligarchy and tyranny.[1631]

During their dispute with Plataea in 427 B.C., the Theban envoys to Sparta justify their "Medising" during the second Persian invasion of Greece. They describe their narrow oligarchy at the time as "almost a tyranny", ἐγγυτάτω δὲ τυράννου.[1632] The implication is that if an oligarchy is too oligarchic, it inevitably slides into tyranny. Their situation around 480 B.C. is on the face of it remarkably similar to what is likely to have happened at Erythrae some time later: a close oligarchy (the Thebans call it a δυναστεία ὀλίγων ἀνδρῶν) gains control of affairs and invites in the Persians against

[1628] Dem. 24.149
[1629] Isoc. 7.61, 8.125; Dem. 15.20, 24.75-6
[1630] *RO* 41 = *IG* II² 112; *IG* II³,1 320
[1631] *SEG* 51.1105 B.20-1
[1632] Thuc. 3.62.2

the will of the people. It was, admittedly, in the Thebans' interest at this stage to claim to a Greek audience that only a small minority had wanted to betray Thebes to Persia. Herodotus presents the Thebans as almost consistently anti-Athens and pro-Persia, and singles them out as the only Greek force to fight enthusiastically on behalf of the Persians at Plataea.[1633] Yet Plutarch alleges that Herodotus is biased against Thebes and neglects to mention that five hundred Thebans took part in defending Tempe against the Persians in 480; Herodotus himself records the support of four hundred Thebans against Persia at Thermopylae in the same year.[1634] He also speaks of "those of the Thebans who Medised" (οἱ γὰρ μηδίζοντες τῶν Θηβαίων) at the battle of Plataea, implying that there was a significant body of Thebans who did not go over to the Persians.[1635] Diodorus, following the fourth-century historian Ephorus, reports that the Thebans "were divided against each other concerning alliance with the Persians" at Thermopylae. [1636] What this suggests is that by this point most Thebans had made the decision to Medise but a small group from the "opposition party" fought against Persia.[1637] Even if the Thebans are guilty of downplaying Theban support for Persia when Xerxes invaded Greece, it looks like – at least initially - there was a struggle between pro-Persian and anti-Persian factions in the town.[1638]

Thus, it is conceivable that at Erythrae a cabal called in the Persians and tried to establish an "almost-tyranny", as allegedly happened at Thebes. The response in this decree was then to propagandistically label these pro-Persian few "tyrants".

[1633] Hdt. 6.87, 7.131-2, 9.67
[1634] Plut. *Mor*. 864e; Hdt. 7.205. Herodotus alleges that the Thebans sent this contingent "intending something different" (ἀλλοφρονέοντες), i.e. intending to Medise. However, this is an obvious motive to infer given that the Thebans eventually did Medise. It may be that the Thebans only decided to Medise after 480.
[1635] Hdt. 9.67
[1636] Diod. 11.4.7
[1637] Demand 1982:20-1
[1638] See Hammond 1988:544-5

Alternatively, perhaps "tyrant" was simply a derogatory term for anyone who was pro-Persia and/or anti-democracy. This seems the most likely explanation, for by calling pro-Persian oligarchs "tyrants" the Athenians were able to emphasise, even exaggerate, the threat they posed to the Erythraean *polis*. What is certain is that the so-called tyrants were thought to be enough of an obstacle to civic harmony that they were driven out of the town and legislated against *in absentia*. If the tyrants are banished from the entire Athenian alliance, this may primarily be an attempt to curb Persian influence in other parts of Asia Minor to which Athens laid claim. Such a precaution is understandable given that Chios was so close to Erythrae as to be visible from it.

The Erythrae decree seems to show a genuine concern not just for civil discord but also for the Persian threat. The presence of a garrison may have been meant to guard against pro-Persians as well as generally ensure stability. If it is true that the decree explicitly bans foreigners from serving on the Council, this too could be an anti-Persian precaution, but unfortunately the text is heavily restored.[1639] The oath to be taken by Erythraean councillors when they are sworn in is also telling (l.21-29). It is not clear what happens to the councillor if he breaks his oath, but Koch may be right that he is to be exiled from the whole Athenian alliance just like those who kill fellow Erythraeans (l.31).[1640] Whatever the consequences, it is clear from the oath that Erythraean loyalty to the Athenians cannot be guaranteed at this point in time. An oath not to take back those who have fled or been banished to the Medes does not sound hypothetical; such a specific action would not be prohibited if it were not a serious possibility or had not happened already. The decree makes it sound as though there had been recent factional fighting between pro-Athenians and pro-Persians, resulting in the (voluntary?) exile of

[1639] Cataldi restores καὶ μὴ ξένον εναι βολε[ύεν] from ΚΑΙΕΝΟΣΕΟΟΝΕΝΑΙΒΟΛΕ[...] (1981:19).
[1640] Koch 1991:78

the latter to the area controlled by the Persians. Mention of "the Medes" has been a factor in the decree's early dating, but it need not situate it in the 460s or 450s. Simonton points out that the oligarchs of Erythrae appear to have sought Persian support at least three times during the Classical period.[1641] As we have seen, it is hardly as though the Persians ceased to be a presence in Asia Minor after the supposed Peace of Callias. Pericles feared the Persian navy (or at least its spectre) enough to personally take 60 ships to meet it off Samos in 439.[1642] It is also possible for "the Medes" to have been considered a potential threat long after they were an actual threat to the Delian League, and mention of the Medes helps to bind Athens and its ally together against a mutual enemy. In the decree, Athens is able to present itself as Erythrae's saviour, and Persia implicitly as the enemy of Athens, Erythrae, and democracy. It does so by assimilating itself with Erythrae (via the Erythraean oath and such phrases as Ἐρυθραίον τοῖ πλέθει καὶ Ἀθεναίον, "the mass of the Erythraeans and the Athenians") and identifying pro-Persians and Persians as their enemy. After civil unrest in Erythrae, it was important for the Athenians to assert that Athens and Erythrae were friends united by a common cause and a common enemy.

The date of the regulations for Erythrae

The dating of the decree has rather far-reaching consequences. Firstly, it is the first known instance of Athens stipulating use of the lot in selecting members of the council. Naturally, Athens would only impose such a system if it had already adopted the same system itself. Thus, many scholars regard 453/2 to be the *terminus ante quem* for the use of the lot to elect the council of five hundred at Athens.[1643] Secondly, the regulations for Erythrae on their traditional dating and interpretation are thought to be the earliest

[1641] Simonton 2018:510-20 on *IG* I³ 14, *RO* 17 and *I. Erythrai* 1.21
[1642] Thuc. 1.116.3
[1643] Larsen 1955:9

example of Athens dealing with a recalcitrant ally. Dated in the 450s, they tell us about the early development of Athenian imperialism during a period of time for which we are woefully underinformed: the Pentecontaetia. If there was unrest among the Ionian allies in the 450s, Thucydides does not mention it. Thirdly, the regulations are the clearest example in Athenian epigraphy of Athens interfering with the political system of an ally. There are hints of interference in other decrees, but these tend to be inferences such as that the use of the word δῆμος (people) indicates that Athens installed a democracy. Only here is the city's new political framework laid out in such detail, even if much of it is lost.

Leo Highby dated the decree the earliest, to the mid-460s.[1644] This is when Highby believed that Erythrae first joined the Delian League, so the decree would mark their entry. The decree would also mark the changing of its constitution from tyranny to democracy at the same time as it joined the League. Highby argues that the provisions "really presuppose a very friendly relationship between Athens and Erythrae" rather than a hostile, post-revolt atmosphere.[1645] He believes that the *episkopoi*, overseers, were not permanent and Athens largely left Erythrae to govern itself without encroaching on its autonomy. He notes that the council is bound first and foremost to its own people, not to Athens, and that Erythrae is not made to swear obedience to Athens as Chalcis is in (possibly) 447/6.[1646] In the regulations for Chalcis, the most serious crimes are to be referred to the Athenian court, whereas the Erythraeans are left to judge cases of murder and treason themselves.[1647] Not only this but they "are given definite assurance, are guaranteed, that the judicial sentences which they deliver shall

[1644] Highby 1936:31-5
[1645] Highby 1936:16
[1646] *IG* I³ 40.21-30
[1647] *IG* I³ 40.71-6

have validity".[1648] The repeated mention of the allies "makes it clear that we have to do not only with the ordering of affairs between Erythrae and Athens, but rather between Erythrae and the other members of the League including Athens, which represents the others officially as the executive arm of the confederacy."[1649] Meanwhile, the Chalcis decree does not mention the allies at all, not even in the oath to be sworn by the Chalcidians. Thus, it is true that there seems to be a difference in tone between the two decrees. Because he perceived the regulations for Erythrae to be lenient, Highby argued for an early date, when some cities were still joining the Delian League and before Athens had begun to transform it into an empire.

We run into several difficulties when comparing the tone of Athenian decrees concerning their allies. Few of the decrees are dated with certainty. Harold Mattingly redated the Chalcis decree to 424/3 on the basis of a fragment of Philochorus that refers to an Athenian campaign against Euboea in the year when Isarchus was archon.[1650] Mattingly's redating is, however, problematic because he attaches the inscription to an event recorded in a fragment of a third-century historian rather than an event recorded in some detail by a fifth-century historian.[1651] Regardless of when one dates the Chalcis decree, dating relatively based upon the tone of a decree assumes that Athens became steadily more imperialistic as the Empire developed. The "tone" of a decree is usually judged by its choice of wording and the way it treats the subject of the decree. Usually, for decrees concerning the allies the tone is judged by whether the Athenians are treating them like allies or like subjects, and whether the actions they propose infringe on their autonomy. A classic example of the way that the tone of decrees has been

[1648] Highby 1936:27
[1649] Highby 1936:22
[1650] Mattingly 1996:53-7; Philochorus *FGrHist* 328 F 130
[1651] Thuc. 1.113-4

judged is by whether they talk about "the cities which the Athenians control".[1652] Another is whether they acknowledge the alliance by demanding loyalty to "the Athenians and their allies", rather than just "the Athenians", as the regulations for Erythrae do (l.22-4) but the decree for Chalcis does not.[1653] The fact that the regulations for Erythrae at least pay lip service to the allies has given some historians the impression that they are lenient. The problem with this interpretation is that it assumes that there was a particular time at which the Athenians consciously (or, at least, consistently) stopped bothering to mention the rest of the Delian League in official documents. As will be argued below, this is to underestimate the natural variation in language that such documents will have had, being as they were proposed and drawn up by different people.

It is true that the regulations do not appear particularly punitive, insofar as they mention the allies of the Delian League. This alone should not guide our dating of the decree. Koch makes the point that when the proposer of a decree petitions the *boule* (council), the immediate situation will have a direct effect on the tone of the resultant decree, and factors such as the presence of a herald from the allied town in question will make a difference.[1654] Likewise, so will the particular character of the proposer, the transcribing choices made by the secretary, and the mood of the *boule*. Nowadays when a document is drafted in government, the process of drafting and revising might take months or even years. Little is known of how decrees were drawn up in fifth-century Athens but a months-long process involving guidelines and considerations of the finer points of law can be ruled out. There were at least three people involved in the production of any given decree: the proposer (whose name precedes εἶπε), the secretary

[1652] e.g. *IG* I³ 98.17; *IG* I³ 156.14-5; *IG* I³ 174.15-6
[1653] *IG* I³ 40.21-32
[1654] Koch 1991:62

(γραμματεύς) and the under-secretary (ὑπογραμματεύς). There seems to have been some standard language but as Kenneth Dover observes, "documentary language never became strong enough to exclude intrusions from literature and vernacular".[1655] Dover goes so far as to suggest that one can identify the individual style of a proposer in certain decrees. This means that while there was such thing as official language, the wording and tone of decrees was not formalised in the way that it is in modern official documents. Moreover, the proposer alone – and not a group of drafters, let alone the entire citizen body - will have largely been responsible for a decree's tone. The circumstances in which the decree was drawn up ought also to be considered. Thucydides and Xenophon certainly present the Athenians as quick to change their minds, although both authors bring their own biases to their histories.[1656] Elsewhere, Xenophon has a Theban embassy to Athens claim that they cannot be held accountable for having voted harsh measures for Athens, for it was only one individual who proposed them on their behalf in the allied council.[1657] Sophistic though this may be in disclaiming any responsibility for the person whom they had elected to represent their opinion, it is a reminder that individual proposers did influence collective decisions. This remains true even if there was a tendency to exaggerate their influence when such decisions went wrong. The character of the proposer, the emotions of his listeners and numerous other circumstantial factors will have affected the tone and language of Athenian decrees.

Highby argues that the inscription marks Erythrae's entry into the Delian League and its simultaneous transformation into an Athenian-style democracy. The latter must be the case, he argues, because otherwise the text of the decree would not

[1655] Dover 1981:5
[1656] Thuc. 3.36-49; Xen. *Hell.* 1.7.35
[1657] Xen. *Hell.* 3.5.8

include an oath to protect the *boule* (council).[1658] He is right that the decree does not explicitly acknowledge that a revolt has taken place, but nor does it acknowledge that a brand-new alliance is being formed. Meiggs points out that if Athens were entering into an alliance with Erythrae for the first time, one would expect a phrase along the lines of χσυμμαχίαν εἶναι Ἐρυθραίοις καὶ Ἀθηναίοις καὶ χσυμμάχοις, "there is to be an alliance between the Erythraeans and the Athenians and their allies".[1659] Allowances must be made for the incomplete state of the decree. Yet the decrees for Rhegium and Leontini are also fragmentary and still make clear that a new alliance is being formed, with the phrase (partially restored in both) χσύμμαχοι ἐσόμεθα, "we will be allies", and other phrases that make clear that the alliance is a new one.[1660] In the regulations for Erythrae as they stand, there is barely mention of an alliance and what mention there is takes for granted that it already exists. Moreover, it is not clear that the inscription necessarily introduces the democratic election of a *boule* for the first time. As Koch points out, an oath to protect the *boule* would have been deemed necessary if a pre-existing democracy had recently been overthrown; the re-institution of a *boule* would then look very similar to the institution of a *boule* in an inscription as fragmentary as this one.[1661] Perhaps the democracy was not even being re-instituted but merely reinforced in the face of the Persian threat. Thus, the oath could suggest that a pre-existing (or still existing) democracy was under threat rather than newly instituted. We will return to the issue of the *boule*, for it is central to the question of which constitution the regulations for Erythrae presuppose and impose.

[1658] Highby 1936:101
[1659] Meiggs 1943:23
[1660] *IG* I³ 53.13, 14; *IG* I³ 54.16-18, 21-22, 25
[1661] Koch 1991:63

Highby adds that several Ionian towns had not been brought into the alliance by the mid-460s, deducing from the anecdote about Themistocles fleeing to Ephesus c.465 that it cannot have been a member of the Delian League at that time.[1662] However, this is to assume that a town that received an Athenian fugitive cannot have been a member of the Delian League. This is if the town officially "received" him in the first place; in Thucydides' account he arrives as a stowaway on a merchant ship, and wastes no time in making his way inland to Persia. Highby may be right that not all of the Ionian towns joined the Delian League straight away, but it does not follow that Erythrae waited until the 460s to join or that the decree, as we have it, fits such a context. Highby at times overstates the case, for example by denying that the oath not to revolt presupposes a revolt having taken place. For almost all other known examples of this oath – the regulations for Colophon, Eretria, Chalcis and Samos – there is an identifiable revolt or episode of *stasis* to which one can attach the decree.[1663] In some cases, there is more than one such episode, resulting in disagreement over the date of the decree, but that the decree follows unrest is not disputed.[1664] One cannot have absolute confidence when all of the decrees are fragmentary, but what survives gives the impression that each of these allies had been affected by unrest.

It is questionable whether the decree can be described as lenient, let alone "friendly", even if it does make an effort to unite the Erythraeans with the Athenians against a common enemy. Bringing an offering to the Panathenaea may have been considered a privilege, but the Athenians' requirements are exacting; note that they stipulate the minimum value of the offering (l.3-4). Although the precise amount, three minas, is somewhat dubiously restored, the word ἄχσι[ον] ("worth") makes clear that a

[1662] Highby 1936:43-50; Thuc. 1.137.2-3; Plut.*Them*.27
[1663] *IG* I³ 37, 39, 40, 48
[1664] Mattingly 1963

specific amount was demanded. In addition, some argue that the regulations for Erythrae set out a fine of 1000 drachmas for not fulfilling the obligation of the offering in lines 18-19, although these lines are barely comprehensible.[1665] The crucial verb (κατακαίειν - to burn a sacrifice) and the amount of the supposed fine are almost entirely restored. Yet even if no fine is threatened, it is questionable whether the obligation to bring an offering to the Panathenaea would have been well received. Perhaps it was not, given that Cleinias' decree, if restored correctly, stipulates that failure to bring a cow and panoply to the Panathenaea results in a fine.[1666] Certainly, it sets out some kind of punishment for those who do not bring a cow and panoply, though the specifics are lost to us. In light of these it is difficult to accept that bringing offerings to the Great Panathenaea was purely a privilege rather than an obligation. Turning back to the regulations for Erythrae, if it is true that a fine of 1000 drachmas is threatened for non-compliance, this is noteworthy for an additional reason. 1000 drachmas is the customary amount that officials are fined in Athens, which would strengthen the impression that the Erythraean constitution is to take its cue from the Athenian.[1667]

The Erythraeans are hardly reassured that their judicial sentences will be valid, but extra care is taken to instruct the Erythraeans to banish serious offenders from the entire alliance (l.31). The sentence is incomplete and it is usually assumed that the sentence continues on from lines 29-30 so that anyone who kills another Erythraean but escapes before being convicted is banished.[1668] Neither Fauvel nor Pittakys' copy makes any sense at the end of line 30 and beginning of line 31, so to an extent one can only guess. The word φευγέτο ("let him be banished"), printed in Osborne & Rhodes as

[1665] Cataldi 1981:30-1
[1666] *IG* I³ 34.41-3
[1667] Koch 1991:71; cf. *IG* I³ 55.8-9, *IG* I³ 63.4-5, 18-19 (heavily restored), *IG* I³ 71.30-1, *IG* I³ 84.9-10. Koch also cites *IG* I³ 21.37-8 but this is completely restored.
[1668] Osborne & Rhodes 2017:118

though this is the actual reading, is actually derived from ΟΕΥΛΕΤΟ in both facsimiles.[1669] One can see how the word was identified, but the process is very different to - and much more open to error than - taking readings from a stone that is still extant and readable. Despite the ambiguity surrounding some individual words, the safety of the Athenian alliance against threats both internal and external is evidently a concern. What Highby interprets as a guarantee of Erythrae's autonomy can just as easily be interpreted as reinforcing or even introducing laws and oaths to prevent unrest from happening again.

It is often assumed that here the Erythraeans are allowed to deal with capital cases themselves without referring them to Athens, whereas the regulations for Chalcis include an oath not to put anyone to death without Athens' authority.[1670] The underlying assumption is that an "early" decree would have allowed the ally in question more freedoms than one produced by an Empire in full swing. Note, however, that in the decree for Chalcis it is the Athenians who are not allowed to put anyone to death without getting the approval of the Athenian *demos*. The regulations for Chalcis contain a long oath to be sworn by the Athenian Council and jurors protecting the Chalcidians' rights against exile, *atimia* (loss of civil rights), death and confiscation of property. The oath grants any Chalcidian facing these penalties the right to a fair trial in Athens, presumably to minimise the chances of an unfair trial in Chalcis. Whereas the decision to make certain decisions by the Chalcidian courts appealable at Athens is open to the criticism that Athens was infringing on Chalcis' autonomy, this move seems aimed at reassuring the Chalcidians that Athenian officials in Chalcis are answerable to their

[1669] Their readings are substantially different to the version offered in most editions. They both read: ΕΑΝ...ΟΣΘΕΙΜ..ΝΔ.../..ΝΕΟΣΘΕΓΟΕΥΛΕΤΟΝΑΤΑΣΚΑΙΤΕΟ... where Osborne & Rhodes print ἐάν Δ[...6...] / [.]γνοσθεῖ, φευγέτο *h*ἅπασαν τέν... (2017:116).

[1670] *IG* I³ 40.8-10; Highby 1936:27 Cataldi 1981:35-6; Koch 1991:79-80

counterparts at home.[1671] The regulations for Erythrae, as they stand, contain no such reassurances. Thus, although in some ways the regulations for Erythrae appear more lenient than those for Chalcis, in other ways they are harsher.

A harsher interpretation is advocated by Segre, who inserts a line into the text that refers cases worth over a certain amount to Athens, as was probably the case for Miletus. However, he admits that the restoration is pure conjecture.[1672] One should not rule out the possibility on the basis that the regulations for Erythrae are early and therefore lenient, but equally, Segre's restoration is a guess. It is difficult to make such comparisons with other decrees when the text is incomplete. Even if the Erythraeans are allowed to preside over their own capital trials, the overarching law itself – that those who are found guilty receive the death penalty and those who are exiled are to be exiled from the entire League – is still decided by Athens. If we think about how much further away Erythrae was from Athens than Chalcis, the decision not to have Erythrae refer every individual case to Athens was probably a practical one. Polly Low and Moses Finley have stressed the practical aspects of some of Athens' decisions, such as the way that it left a lot of legislation in the hands of the subject cities.[1673] This was likely because it meant that Athens could exert some control without actually having to take over and maintain control of these cities' legal systems from afar. Similarly, the Megarian decree can be explained by Athens' reliance on imported food and raw materials and its resultant need to control the sea.[1674] Of course, this is not to say that the Athenians only ever thought in practical terms and not in terms of how to make their power known, but if they had an ad hoc approach to their allies, the individual qualities

[1671] *IG* I³ 40.70-6
[1672] Segre 1938:199; *IG* I³ 21.29-32
[1673] Low 2013; Finley 2008
[1674] Finley 2008:31-2

of a town will have been taken into account. What comes across as leniency or friendliness may in fact be the consideration that Athens had no alternative but to let the democracy at Erythrae rule itself, unless it wanted to invest the time and money necessary for transporting cases all the way across the Aegean and back. Even if this was desirable, the Athenians may have realised early on that it was unworkable. Although lines 21 onwards are too fragmentary for any meaningful analysis of Erythrae's judicial autonomy, they make clear that the Athenians had specific concerns that they wanted to decide upon themselves by the very fact of including them in the decree. Whether or not they took the additional step of stipulating that some cases be referred to Athens is unknown.

In answer to Highby's question, "Why was it thought necessary to include these provisions about judicial sentences in the decree at all?" we might answer that Athens wanted to change and control the way that Erythrae was run, even if there was a limit to what it could do from afar.[1675] It is often commented that the Athenians appear to have left the Erythraeans to their own devices as far as law and order are concerned.[1676] Yet for all its supposed leniency, the decree is still an assertion of authority and control. It still imposes a new constitution on Erythrae and presumes that this is Athens' right regaring its allies. That the Athenians felt the need to discuss Erythrae's judicial system in the first place tells against the idea that the town was allowed complete judicial autonomy. ἐὰν [γν]οσθεῖ ("if he is judged guilty" - l.30) is sometimes used as evidence that Athens respected the Erythraeans' verdicts, as though the conditional shows that they had no say in these matters.[1677] Yet writing such clauses into a decree suggests the exact opposite. The fact that the Athenians are here dictating what happens in the case

[1675] Highby 1936:27
[1676] e.g. Forsdyke 2005:209
[1677] Koch 1991:80

of a successful prosecution tells against the idea that a hands-off approach was taken to the Erythraean judicial system. They might not be making the judgements themselves, but they are having a say in how judgements are reached. A hands-off approach would either put into writing that the Erythraeans had control over their own legal system, or would not address the topic at all. It is noteworthy that a man who is condemned is to be outlawed not just from Erythrae but also from the entire alliance. Highby interpreted it as an assurance of Athens' support by enforcing Erythrae's sentences of banishment.[1678] Alternatively, it is a double limitation on the allies' freedom to take the decision away not only from Erythrae but from everywhere else under Athens' control too. The Athenians decree overrules what would otherwise be a local decision about how to handle political fugitives. Nor is it clear that the Athenians were enforcing decisions made by Erythrae, rather than reinforcing decisions that they themselves had made. In fact, since earlier in the inscription Erythrae is forbidden from exiling anyone without the permission of Athens (l.28-9), this strongly suggests that the decision was Athens' to make and not Erythrae's. In other words, it is the Athenians' choice whom to exile, and the Athenians' choice how far the exile extends.

This is not to say that the Athenians were being arbitrarily intrusive or were engaging in mere political muscle-flexing. The entire section, which stipulates that the Erythraeans not exile anyone or take any exile back without the consent of the Athenian *boule* and *demos* (l.25-9), can be construed in a variety of ways. It comes across first and foremost as an assertion of power, taking power away from the Erythraeans and the Athenian officials in Erythrae and putting it in the hands of Athenian central government. In this sense it has often been interpreted as an infringement on Erythrae's

[1678] Highby 1936:102

autonomy and an act of imperialism.[1679] Yet there are other reasons why the Athenians might want to transfer such decisions to Athens itself. As Sarah Forsdyke points out, one such reason is that it formalises and prolongs the process: "by requiring that all decisions of exile in Erythrae be approved by the Athenians as a whole, as embodied politically in the council and the assembly, the Athenians indicated that such decisions would not be hasty and arbitrary, but would be made through a regular procedure by which the most authoritative bodies of the state were consulted".[1680] This would have been particularly crucial at a time when those still in Erythrae in the aftermath of *stasis* will have feared reprisals by those whom the Athenians had helped to put into power, and vengeful behaviour on both sides. As mentioned above, the oath not to exile anyone who had stayed in Erythrae suggests that not everyone who stayed in the town had always pinned their colours to the Athenian mast. Evidently the Athenians believed that Erythraean unity was in both the Erythraeans' and their own interest. The Athenians' and the Erythraeans' interests align, insofar as peace in Erythrae is beneficial for both parties. Nevertheless, it is evident that the power is in the hands of the Athenians.

We cannot know whether or not the *episkopoi* (overseers) were permanent, and it is likely that they were not given that they are only responsible for the initial setting up of the *boule*, with separate instructions given for electing the *boule* in the future (τὸ δὲ λοιπὸν – l.15). This gives the impression that the *episkopoi* were only meant to be in charge while Erythrae was being stabilised. Yet the very mention of a garrison and garrison-commander (l.14-15, 46?), and the need for *episkopoi* to create stability in the first place, suggest that there had been unrest. de Ste Croix argued that since the garrison commander's main job was to supervise the selection of the Council, his political

[1679] Meiggs 1972:113
[1680] Forsdyke 2005:208-9

function "amounted to no more than ensuring that there was *no* jiggery-pokery".[1681] Yet this is his only explicitly stated role in the decree as we have it. The main function of a garrison commander, not spelled out precisely because it was his main job, was to secure and maintain Athenian control of a place.

An even greater indication of unrest is the section that deals with a group that has fled the town (l.27). As mentioned above, the section of the decree that deals with trials for murder and treason is the most indecipherable and lacunose part of the text. Hence, it is not possible to say with certainty that no trials are referred to Athens. The regulations for Miletus and Chalcis show that the Athenians certainly were not shy of requiring that at least some disputes be resolved on their home territory.[1682] The Athenian decision to allow the Samians to decide their own capital trials again presupposes that the privilege had previously been taken away.[1683] By the last quarter of the fifth century, Antiphon is able to claim that all cases involving the death penalty in allied cities had to have the consent of the Athenian people.[1684] The Old Oligarch makes the similar point that the Athenians force their allies to sail to Athens for judicial proceedings so that they can "control allied cities while staying at home without having to go on voyages", although his characteristically generalising manner makes it impossible to elucidate the specifics.[1685] As has been argued elsewhere, geographical factors will have made it a burden for all cases to be referred to Athens, but there was gain to be had from referring important cases and especially those involving Athenian citizens. That this was the case for Erythrae should not be ruled out solely on the basis of its "early" date.

[1681] de Ste Croix 1954:40
[1682] *IG* I³ 21.63; *IG* I³ 40.71-6
[1683] *IG* I³ 96.6-8
[1684] Antiph. 5.47
[1685] [Xen] *Ath. Pol.* 1.16

That the evidence is insufficient for Cataldi's thesis is equally true of fragment *a* of I³ 15, which he uses to argue that disputes involving penalties over a certain sum were referred to the Erythraean court rather than the *phrourarchos* (garrison commander) or an Athenian court.[1686] This is inferred from ἐναντίον τ[ὸ̃ φ]ρ[ουράρχο... δικά]ζεται τοῖ Ἐρυ[θ]ρ[αίοι (l.26-7), "in front of the garrison commander...judgement is to be passed on the Erythraean", both of which phrases are heavily restored and lacking in context. A fragment for which a maximum of three words per line survives cannot be used to understand the finer points of the Erythraean judicial system. Whether or not any Erythraean trials were referred to Athens, by issuing at least one decree involving Athenian *episkopoi* and an Athenian *phrourarchos* in Erythrae's court process Athens showed an active interest in imposing its own legal authority on another city.

Highby's date for the Erythrae decree is guided by his belief that certain features make it seem like the Athens in action is not yet the fully imperialistic Athens that we find in the 430s and onwards.[1687] By this, Highby falls into what Finley terms the "harshness-of-Cleon trap", assuming that the developments in Athens' imperialism were strictly linear over time.[1688] Ultimately, the question of whether certain requirements made by Athens were a privilege or an infringement of autonomy is a matter of subjective interpretation, especially since we have so little indication of how the allies responded to them. However, even if we do subscribe to the view that the regulations are "friendly", we need not believe that Athens only ever behaved more and more imperialistically rather than judging each situation individually and acting accordingly. In the case of Erythrae it seems that the Athenians were making practical

[1686] Cataldi 1983:95
[1687] Highby 1936:102
[1688] Finley 2008:19

decisions that would bind the Erythraean community together and ultimately benefit them by providing a stable ally. Moreover, it is a mistake to think that mentioning the allies proves that Athens is still taking its allies into consideration, in the same way that it is a mistake to believe that any state that advertises itself as a democratic republic is a democratic republic. From Thucydides we get the idea that the Athenians felt no need to pay lip service to their allies or cloak their imperialism in fine words. Yet as Polly Low argues, just because some political figures in Thucydides are happy to discuss their imperialism, it does not follow that those drafting their decrees should be similarly straight-talking or that an absence of such language entails a friendlier disposition towards their allies.[1689] Moreover, there need not be an absolute link between the wording of decrees and the behaviour that it represents. We might add that questions of genre and audience are relevant; what Cleon says to his fellow Athenians is not necessarily what the Athenian assembly would have written and set up in the allied cities. In other words, it should not be presumed that the relationship between Athens' vocabulary and its behaviour towards its allies is straightforward.

De Sanctis, in his review of Highby, makes the suggestion that the decree does not follow a rebellion but a successful, Athenian-backed democratic revolution.[1690] He points out that although it is commonly believed that tyranny was eradicated after Mycale, this may not have been historically accurate. Thus, the tyrants mentioned in the decree might be those deposed by the revolutionary democracy. This would not be the only time we hear of Athens backing the democrats in a civil war; events at Samos in 412 spring to mind.[1691] De Sanctis' theory is tempting for those who view the decree as lenient, for it reconciles this supposed lenience with the fact that it clearly follows

[1689] Low 2005:93-5
[1690] de Sanctis 1937:300
[1691] Thuc. 8.21

some incident of unrest. It is true that the regulations are less concerned with punishing Erythrae than stabilising its political situation and safeguarding its democracy. Yet the notion that the decree is somehow friendlier than comparable inscriptions concerning Athens' allies has been questioned above. As we will see, there is additionally reason to believe that the Athenian-style democracy at Erythrae was preceded either by an oligarchy or by a more moderate democracy. Moreover, de Sanctis fails to explain why, if the democracy at Erythrae had been preceded by a tyranny, the regulations for Erythrae would feel the need to banish more than one tyrant. Since we know of no attemped tyranny and the ideological assimilation of oligarchs with tyrants by democrats was commonplace, it seems more likely that the "tyrants" referred to in the inscription are not actually tyrants but pro-Persian oligarchs. As argued above, oligarchy and tyranny were frequently associated with each other either out of an actual fear of individual power, or because both were non-democracy. We might modify de Sanctis' thesis and suggest that the regulations follow an attempted tyrannical or oligarchic overthrow rather than a full-scale revolt. This would be a comparable situation to the one described by the regulations for Miletus; neither text presupposes revolt but both indicate serious internal unrest. de Sanctis suggests a date around 462 in order to link the decree to Ephialtes' reforms at Athens.[1692] He does consider a later date since it was in 440 that our most securely dated imposition of democracy took place. Yet he rejects it on the same assumption as Highby: that the decree is lenient, therefore early in Athens' trajectory of imperialism. This is not a satisfactory way to date the decree.

The vast majority of scholars have dated the decree to the late 450s or early 440s. Kolbe, like Highby, dates the decree post-450 to disassociate the sending out of

[1692] de Sanctis 1937:301

Athenian colonists from Cimon's policy of conservatism; many scholars have followed his reasoning even if they have not explicitly contrasted the decree's "expansionism" with Cimon's alleged conservatism.[1693] Evidence for Cimon's conservatism is usually taken from Plutarch, who alleges that Cimon was milder than Pausanias in his dealings with the allies and pursued a policy of friendship with Sparta; indeed, he was φιλολάκων (a "Spartophile").[1694] Cimon also led the doomed expedition to help Sparta subjugate its helots.[1695] Whatever Cimon's personal feelings towards the Spartans, it is to fall prey to Great Man Theory to date an inscription based on the feeling that Cimon would not have done such a thing. It also ignores the fact that in decision-making under the Athenian democracy, a vote of the assembly was required to pass any decree. Since (and doubtless before) the time of Plutarch, there has been a tendency to ascribe major political upheavals and specific actions with far-reaching effects to individual politicians.[1696] Besides, there is plenty of evidence to suggest that Athenian expansionism began before the heyday of Pericles or Cleon. Colonists were sent out shortly after 476 to Scyros.[1697] Cimon commanded the expedition, which is often considered to be the first real act of Athenian imperialism after the formation of the Delian League. The expedition involved the capture of Persian territory and attacks on Carystus and Naxos, the latter of which had tried to secede from the alliance. Although Cimon doubtless had a different policy to those who came after him, this does not mean that every decision made during his political career was in line with his policy. Moreover, Thucydides' account of the Pentecontaetia tells against the idea that Athens

[1693] Kolbe 1938:258
[1694] Plut. *Cim*. 6.2-3, 16
[1695] Thuc. 1.101.1; Plut. *Cim*. 16.8
[1696] e.g. Plut. *Per*. 33.5, *Sol*. 17, *Cim*. 10.7-11.2
[1697] Thuc. 1.98.2

– and specifically Cimon – pursued an exclusive policy of conservatism in the early years of the Delian League.

Most scholars date the regulations to the 450s in order to associate them with Erythrae's absence from the tribute quota lists before 450/49. The revolts of Erythrae and Miletus have naturally been closely linked. Meiggs hypothesises a similar situation to Miletus', in which the actual revolt happened around 454 but Athens' main intervention happened in 450.[1698] However, as we have seen this reconstruction of events at Miletus is unconvincing and it should not be used to date the evidence for Erythrae. Elsewhere, Meiggs restores the archon Lysicrates from the lamda in line 2, which would date the decree to the year 453/2.[1699] Restoring an archon date would leave no room for the name of the secretary. Although the regulations for Chalcis provide a precedent for omitting the secretary's name, archon names are rare before 421.[1700] In fact, the Chalcis decree omits both the secretary and the archon's name. Even if an archon was named in the regulations for Erythrae, that it was Lysicrates is a mere guess.

Segre and Cataldi agree with Highby that the regulations are lenient, but put this down to Athens' imperialism being in its early stages rather than Erythrae only just having joined the League in a time of peace.[1701] Thus, they date the regulations to the 450s and use this date to explain the respect that Athens shows for Erythrae's equality and autonomy within the League compared to "later" decrees such as those for Chalcis and Miletus. For similar reasons, the supposed Peace of Callias has been a major factor in dating the decree prior to 449 B.C.[1702] The reasoning is that once Athens made peace with Persia, it entered a new phase of imperialism to which the decree does not belong.

[1698] Meiggs 1972:115-6
[1699] Meiggs 1943:34
[1700] *IG* I³ 40.1-2
[1701] Segre 1938:200; Cataldi 1981:35-6
[1702] e.g. Kolbe 1938:267-8

As has been argued, the perceived leniency of the regulations is questionable. More importantly, even if the regulations do concede more to Erythrae than decrees for other cities, this does not necessitate an early date. As Cataldi himself recognises, giving Erythrae the final say in major trials is understandable if Athens felt that it was leaving a group in charge who were and always had been loyal. If we are to assume that Athens made any effort to tailor its decisions to the ally in question, the fact that the Erythraeans are seemingly allowed to deal with capital trials themselves (l.29-32), while the Chalcidians are not, says more about the individual circumstances of each city than the date of their revolt.

Noting that the Erythrae decree was left isolated once the regulations for Miletus had been moved to the 420s, Akiko Moroo down-dated the decree to 435/4 B.C.[1703] This would be just before the Great Panathenaea of 434. Moroo argues that of the inscriptions concerning recalcitrant allies, the regulations for Samos was the first extant decree in 439, followed by those for Erythrae, Colophon, Miletus and Chalcis. This rearrangement means that only the earliest decrees, the regulations for Samos and Erythrae, refer to the allies as "the allies of the Athenians" and all subsequent decrees use the term "the cities that the Athenians rule" or neglect to mention the allies at all.[1704] Again, the problem with this argument is that it assumes that a linear progression from "non-imperialistic" to "imperialistic" can be traced, and further, that once Athens began to call the allies "the cities that the Athenians control", there was no going back. It also assumes a strong correlation between Athens' language and its behaviour, and in this case assumes that if Athens merely makes mention of the allies, its imperialism cannot be in full swing. Alternatively, if the change of language was not subconscious, it

[1703] Moroo 2014:105-12
[1704] *IG* I³ 48.19-20; *IG* I³ 14.22-24; *IG* I³ 37.45-8

assumes that the Athenians were unfailingly consistent and deliberate in the language that they used to formulate decrees. Another difficulty is that for Erythrae we possess epigraphic but no literary evidence, and for Thasos the reverse. Thasos is a known example of an early Athenian intervention, yet the only available evidence is Thucydides' account totalling two chapters.[1705] This skews what little evidence we have for the early years of the League. If we were able to compare the "regulations for Thasos" with those for Erythrae and other allies, we might be in a stronger position to identify trends in the way Athens treated its allies. As it stands, the pool of evidence is too small to make any meaningful generalisations.

In any case, a further argument against Moroo is that the regulations for Erythrae in their extant form only mention the allies a maximum of twice. In one instance, the restored word συμμαχίς (l.30) refers technically to the alliance itself rather than Athens' allies and unlike in other decrees, it is not part of an oath of loyalty. The allies are included twice in the oaths to behave well and not to revolt (l.22-4) but once it comes to further restrictions on the Erythraeans' behaviour, they swear not to act without the authority of the council of the Athenians and the Athenians only (l.27-9). Later in the text, the partial word σύμμαχο- appears in a completely indecipherable context and as a result does not appear in Rhodes and Osborne's edition (l.41). Editors have not been able to make sense of the facsimile readings that precede the noun and its definite article, so in the *IG* edition the rest of the line is left blank. It seems incredible that these few words, one of which is in the part of the decree that is the most garbled, would guide its tone and therefore its date in such a way. A similar problem exists for two of the other decrees under discussion: not enough is left of either the Colophon or Miletus decrees to be able to definitively state that the allies are left out of the picture.

[1705] Thuc. 1.100-1

In Miletus' case, the allies in fact are mentioned in the the same breath as the Athenians but the overall context is unclear:]χσυ]μμάχον *h*ό τι ἂμ μὲ Ἀθε[ναίοις...], "of the allies whoever does not [?] to the Athenians...".[1706] Even the decree for Samos, though it evidently does include the allies in the oath to be sworn by the Samians, is too fragmentary to say much about its tone. Thus, even if one could date by reference to the allies, the poor state of preservation of every single decree in question prevents us from doing so. The most compelling argument is still against Moroo's methodology. Despite her radical date, she conforms even more to the "harshness-of-Cleon" principle than the decree's early commentators.

The most radical redating of the decree is J.D. Smart's.[1707] Smart dates the regulations for Erythrae to just before the Great Panathenaea of 406 when Erythrae was recovered after Arginusae. He believes that the regulations for Miletus belong to the same year, and that Erythrae and Miletus are among the allies that Athens managed to recover in this year. However, there is no evidence that Athens did recover these places, and unlike at Miletus there is no evidence for any unrest whatsoever at Erythrae around 406 B.C. Smart resolves the problem of the early lettering by supposing that after the oligarchic coup and the rule of the Thirty, Athens might have shown some nostalgia for the past. Thus, political considerations may have been behind the archaising script. Similarly, the use of the term *plethos* (masses) instead of *demos* (people) could be meant to distance the decree from any pejorative associations that democracy had by that time amongst the likes of the Old Oligarch. It should be noted that although *plethos* is used twice, the word *demos* is likely used at least five times (l.7, 20, 28, 29, 38). Smart shows the importance of taking factors other than lettering into consideration, but there is not

[1706] *IG* I³ 21.27
[1707] Smart 1977:250-1

a great deal of evidence that 406 is the right historical context for the decree. It is not inconceivable that the Athenians used an archaising script to convey nostalgia for the past, although it seems unlikely. One can see why the Themistocles decree might deliberately archaise, because there is a clear motivation for making a document that glorifies Athens' past appear older than it is (or indeed forging it completely).[1708] Yet for a run-of-the-mill decree concerning a recalcitrant ally, the motivation to make the document hark back to the past is less obvious, not to mention confusing if the Athenians placed any value on being able to date their own decrees. The main problem with Smart's argument is that it could be used to down-date virtually any Athenian decree. Nostalgia for the past was not a post-war phenomenon. Similarly, if the Athenians did consciously use the word *plethos* to distance themselves from the pejorative associations of *demos*, they might have done so at any point in the fifth century and not just in its last years. Criticism of democracy is as old as democracy itself. Whether or not they are valid, neither of Smart's arguments pins the inscription to the end of the Peloponnesian War.

Supporting evidence

Two extant inscriptions may help to date the lost decree. An Athenian inscription concerning Erythrae, consisting of four fragments, can help because it still exists and resides in the British Museum and the Epigraphical Museum in Athens.[1709] IG I³ 16, in two fragments, is also supposed to be related, although in its extremely poor state it does not mention Erythrae. The thickness of both inscriptions is the same and the lettering is similar. Fragment *a* of IG I³ 15 mentions an *episkopos* ("overseer" - l.19), *prytaneis* (officials - l.30) and a garrison (l.24), tying it to the regulations for Erythrae.

[1708] *ML* 23
[1709] *IG* I³ 15

Fragment *b* mentions money (l.7, 10, 12), Athens (l.9) and inscribing (l.13) but with no context these isolated words are of limited use. Fragment *d* is part of an oath but from what is left of it, it is not exactly the same oath as that preserved in the regulations for Erythrae. It does, however, contain some of the hallmarks of the standard oath to be sworn by recalcitrant allies: not to revolt from the Athenians, and to obey them. The editors of *IG* I³ restore a promise not to obey anyone else and to obey only the will of the Athenian people, but all that remains on the stone is […]ει τε̃[ι] Ἀθ[ε]ναίον πείσ[...]. No other extant oath promises to follow the γνόμει (the "opinion" or even "will") of the Athenians, so this precise term can only be a guess, but evidently the Erythraeans are to swear to obey the Athenians in some way. So little of the oath survives that we can hardly compare its tone to that of other oaths, or even to that of the oath preserved in the facsimile.[1710] Early editors wanted to see in the oath proof that Athens was reremodelling the Erythraean government upon democratic principles, but this is a lot to infer from three partial lines of an oath.[1711] What is more, it is unclear who is being made to swear the oath. This is the kind of oath that all adult males are to swear in similar decrees such as the regulations for Chalcis, not necessarily (as some editors surmise) a newly selected democratic "senate".[1712]

The inscription IG I³ 16 mentions a garrison commander (l.8) as do the regulations for Erythrae. Other than this one word, the rest of the inscription is very difficult to make out. There is possible mention of a Council (l.7) although a key letter is uncertain. Mention of the number thirty followed by an epsilon (l.13) looks like a link to the section of the regulations for Erythrae that stipulate that members of the Council are to be over thirty years old. It is important to note that only fragment *a* of I³

[1710] Contra Cataldi 1983:96
[1711] Hicks 1874:9
[1712] *IG* I³ 40.21-32

15 mentions Erythrae by name. Mention of Erythrae in fragment *d* is restored from ʾE[…]ρᾶ[.]ι in its penultimate line (l.44). It is very plausible that I³ 15 concerns an Erythraean revolt or its aftermath, but the parallels between this inscription and I³ 16 and are hardly conclusive. One would expect any Athenian decree concerning a recalcitrant ally to mention a garrison or a garrison commander, as the regulations for Miletus do.[1713] Though the regulations for Samos in their current state make no allusion to a garrison, we know from Thucydides that one was set up.[1714] The establishment of garrisons in allied cities was a common Athenian measure even when the city had not revolted. During the course of the war Athens set up garrisons in Chaeronea, Nisaea and Minoa, Plataea, Naupactus, Salamis, Pylos, Cythera, Delium, unspecified towns in Thrace, Torone, Epidaurus, Lecythus, Mecyberna, Labdalum, Oropus and Oenoe, as well as having a permanent garrison stationed in Athens.[1715] The setting up of a small garrison even features in the narrative of Athens' disastrous retreat from Syracuse.[1716] These are only the places that Thucydides saw fit to include in his history but the list is doubtless much longer if we consider the incidental inscriptional evidence for Erythrae and Miletus. Elsewhere he puts the total number of men serving on garrison duty (abroad and at Athens) at sixteen thousand men.[1717] One tactic, used at Methana, Pylos and territory opposite Cythera, was to install a garrison on territory from which to carry out raids on Spartan-controlled territory.[1718] In the treaty between Athens and Halieis, it is likely that a garrison was established for this precise reason.[1719] All this is to say

[1713] *IG* I³ 21.75, 85
[1714] Thuc. 1.115.3
[1715] Thuc. 1.103.4, 1.113.1, 1.114.1, 2.6.3, 2.90.3, 3.51.4, 4.5.2, 4.41.3, 4.54.4, 4.96.9, 4.100.5, 4.108.6, 4.110.1, 4.113.2, 4.114.1, 4.118.4, 5.3.6, 5.39.1, 5.75.6, 5.80.3, 6.98.2, 8.60.1, 8.98.2
[1716] Thuc. 7.60.2
[1717] Thuc. 2.13.6
[1718] Thuc. 4.45.2, 4.3.2-3, 7.26.2-3
[1719] *IG* I³ 75.12, 17 (both restored)

that IG I³ 16 should mention a garrison does not tie it exclusively to the regulations for Erythrae.

The contents of the fragments of IG I³ 15 and 16 do not tell us much that is new but they can give us a clue as to the date of the regulations for Erythrae. Both fragments of I³ 16 feature three-bar sigma, dotted theta and pennant-shaped – although not tailed – rho. Meritt identified all the fragments that mentioned Erythrae as part of the same decree.[1720] One problem with this is that, as we have seen, Fauvel wrote explicitly that IG I³ 14 had tailed rho. It has been pointed out that I³ 14 and 15 both contain an oath not to revolt from Athens and it is unlikely that one decree would contain the same oath repeated. Meiggs noted that they could be a Bouleutic oath followed by an oath to be sworn by the *demos*, in which case the two oaths could belong to the same decree.[1721] He dismissed the possibility on the grounds that the last clause of the latter had a "more imperial flavour" than that in the regulations for Erythrae. This is the clause in which the Erythraeans allegedly swear not to obey anyone else but only to obey the γνώμη (will) of the Athenians. Elsewhere we have questioned the validity of the assumption that something "more imperial" should be dated later. Moreover, the last clause to which Meiggs refers is almost entirely restored.[1722] From what remains on the stone it is only clear that the Erythraeans are to swear some kind of obedience to Athens. This is essentially what we find in IG I³ 14 (l.24-5) so it can hardly be said that the former is more imperial.

It is not even agreed that all of the fragments within IG I³ 15 belong together. Fragment *c* preserves too few letters to allow comparison with the other fragments. It

[1720] Meritt 1946:246
[1721] Meiggs 1943:25
[1722] *IG* I³ 15.41-2: οὔτ' αὐ[τὸς ἐγὸ οὔτ' ἄλλοι πείσομαι, τεῖ δὲ γνό]-
[μ]ει τε[ι] Ἀθ[ε]ναίον πείσ[ομαι]

has been questioned whether fragment *b* of I³ 15 belongs with the other three fragments associated with the decree, since its letter size and forms are slightly different.[1723] Stephen Tracy finds several differences in lettering between fragment *b* and fragments *a* and *d* and concludes that it is unlikely that they belong together (personal communication, November 30th, 2018). Tracy notes that generally the letters of fragment *b* are more carefully and consistently cut than in fragments *a* and *d*. The crossbar of fragment *b*'s alpha is consistently very low and the slanting strokes are roughly symmetrical, whereas there is more variation in all three of the strokes in fragments *a* and *d*. Mu is asymmetrical and shorter on its right side, whereas in *a* and *d* it is symmetrical. Its chi is shorter than the other letters whereas in *a* and *d* it is the same height. All three horizontals of its epsilon are evenly spaced, whereas in fragments *a* and *d* the bottom and central horizontals are often closer together. It also contains a two-dot interpunct, whereas fragments *a* and *d* do not. Fragment *a* is safe to associate with Erythrae because it is the only fragment to mention Erythrae by name and it does so four times; fragment *d* probably mentions Erythrae in its penultimate line, although only three letters of the relevant word remain and the entire right-hand side of the stele (and much of the left) is restored. Fragments *b* and *d* have a connection to the lost inscription because Pittakys discovered them both around the Erechtheum, where Fauvel had found his inscription half a century previously. Yet given that it has different lettering and lacks mention of Erythrae, it is best not to associate fragment *b* with the other three fragments of IG I³ 15. Fortunately, it is one of the less informative fragments anyway since it is so badly preserved and the letters that it does preserve lack any context.

[1723] Moroo 2014:98-9

Starting with Highby, several scholars have suggested that fragment *d* of IG I³ 15 belongs at the end of IG I³ 14 and found ways to incorporate the two.[1724] Meritt argues that lines 17-19 of the regulations for Erythrae stipulate that the *demos* is also to swear what the Council swears, and this oath comes at the end of IG I³ 14.[1725] He offers a new restoration of those lines to fit this theory. Cataldi inserts an entire line between 19 and 20 that sets out the *demos*' responsibilities for sacrificing and swearing an oath.[1726] There are two problems with associating the fragment with the facsimile. The first is that Meritt's interpretation of lines 18-20 pivots on the restored word ὀμνύει, "swears", which is somehow gleaned from EONNΣOEN in the facsimile. If line 20 does not contain that word, there is no proof that the *demos* is to swear an oath. Secondly, it seems strange that the oath of the *boule* would immediately follow the stipulations but the oath of the *demos* would be delayed to the very end of the decree. In the regulations for Chalcis, the Athenian oath comes first (l.4-15), followed by that of the Chalcidians shortly after (l.21-32).[1727] The second oath is to be sworn by all men of military age; there is no distinction between *boule* and *demos.* The regulations for Colophon contain a single oath whose swearer is uncertain but is likely to be "the Colophonian(s)" due to the space available in the relevant line.[1728] The treaty with Halieis also contains only one oath, again with an unknown swearer but probably "the Halieians".[1729] In other treaties such as that with Leontini, the swearers are similarly identified by an ethnic: first "the Athenian" swears, then "the Leontinian".[1730] The regulations for Samos probably contain a single oath to be sworn by the *demos* but they

[1724] Highby 1936:4-6
[1725] Meritt 1946:248-9
[1726] Cataldi 1981:19, 33
[1727] *IG* I³ 40
[1728] *IG* I³ 37.43
[1729] *IG* I³ 75.21-7
[1730] *IG* I³ 54.20-5. The ethnic [Λεοντίνο]ς is restored but made almost certain by the line length and the fact that an ethnic is used for the Athenian oath in lines 20-1.

are too fragmentary for comparison and the precise identity of the swearer does not survive.[1731] In no other extant inscription do the *demos* and *boule* swear separate oaths at all, much less swear the same oath in different parts of the text. If the *boule* and the *demos* were to swear exactly the same oath, setting out that oath twice would be superfluous. In what little evidence we have, the swearers are identified either very generally with an ethnic ("the Leontinians"), or more specifically but still as one group ("Chalcidians of military age").

The relationship between IG I³ 15 and 16 is also uncertain. The latter is in a very worn state, making positive identification even more challenging. Fragment *a* is the longer of the two fragments, with fragment *b* barely containing three letters across three lines. Its nu looks more archaic than in IG I³ 14 because it is slanted and its third bar is shorter than the first; this is the same as we find in fragments *a* and *d* of I³ 15. In fragment *b*, on the other hand, the nu is upright. Tracy does not rule out that fragment *a* of I³ 16 belongs with fragments *a* and *d* of IG I³ 15, but believes that its lettering is not identical with that of fragment *b* (personal communication, 30th November 2018). He notes that another similarity between fragment *a* of I³ 16 and fragments *a* and *d* of I³ 15 is that its chi is shorter than the other letters. He dates fragment *b* of I³ 16 to 430 B.C. or later because the middle stroke of its epsilon is sometimes shorter than the top and bottom stroke, and this is not known to occur before 430.[1732] None of the fragment's three words mentions Erythrae or indeed anything that can tie it to the rest of IG I³ 14, 15 and 16. It seems, then, that fragment *b* should be disassociated from fragment *a*, and cannot tell us anything about the date of any of the inscriptions relating to Erythrae.

[1731] *IG* I³ 48.17-25
[1732] Tracy 2018:221 with n.21

The most telling argument against IG I³ 14, 15 and 16 all being parts of the same inscription is that this would make for a very long inscription indeed, for none of the fragments seem to belong to the 45 lines of the facsimile. There is a total of seven texts associated with the regulations for Erythrae, altogether coming to over 100 lines. The regulations for Chalcis are only 80 lines long and are made up of two distinct decrees.[1733] The regulations for Miletus are around 85 lines long but the inclusion of an archon date midway through suggests that the same stone contains not one but two decrees.[1734] This could, admittedly, also be true for Erythrae but it is difficult to tell with no surviving archon dates. Alternatively, if the fragments and the facsimile were not all from completely different parts of the decree, we would expect to find some overlap between the copy and the fragments. Although they share some of the same words, none of the fragments of I³ 15 and 16 can be identified as an actual part of I³ 14. Even the oath in fragment *d* of I³ 15, though it shares notable similarities with the oath in the facsimile, is clearly not the same. The only largely unrestored expressions common to the two are οὐκ ἀποστέσομαι ("I will not revolt") and [χσυνμάχο]ν τοῖν Ἀθεν[αίο]ν οὔτ' αὐ[τὸς] ("the allies of the Athenians nor I myself" - with square brackets denoting what survives in fragment *d*).[1735] The first two lines of fragment *d* are completely restored, but even ignoring these lines, what is left of the third and fourth lines does not feature at all in the equivalent line of the facsimile (l.22).[1736] Nor do the last two lines, which likely instruct the Erythraeans to inscribe the decree on a stele and set it up on their acropolis. The direction to inscribe the decree on a stone stele and set it up on the acropolis must

[1733] *IG* I³ 40
[1734] *IG* I³ 21.61
[1735] *IG* I³ 14.23-4; *IG* I³ 15.40-1
[1736] In *IG* I² 12/13a the scant letters of the first two lines are not in brackets, giving the impression that they are on the stone, but this is rectified in *IG* I³ 15.37-8. It is not clear where the letters in the second edition are from or why the editors gave the impression that 14 letters were visible on the stone. The photograph in the *ATL* shows that the fragment begins with line 3 (Meritt, McGregor & Wade-Gery 1949:22, Plate III).

mean that fragment *d* was the end of the inscription, yet the oath in the facsimile is halfway through the text. This means that if we put fragment *d* at the end of the facsimile, we must believe that the Athenians wrote out more or less the same Erythraean oath twice in the same document. Given the cost of inscribing, Athenian decrees are not known for their long-windedness and this seems unlikely.

Regardless of which fragments belong where, there is not enough evidence to suggest that any of the fragments belonged to I³ 14 and therefore contains the same lettering. Yet this does not render them useless. Even if the inscriptions belong to separate decrees, their overlapping content means that these were likely passed within a short time of each other when Erythrae was of concern to Athens and was in need of a garrison and *episkopoi*, overseers. The extant inscriptions look later than the copies of IG I³ 14. This leaves open the possibility that the copyists misrepresented the lettering of the latter. Perhaps Fauvel inadvertently encouraged an early date for the regulations by copying tailed rho where none existed. This is all necessarily speculative, but a date post-445 should certainly not be ruled out solely on the basis of lettering. Although they have been used as such in the past, letter-forms are not an objective dating criterion.

It is impossible to date the decree with any precision with the evidence available to us at present. The early letter-forms make it unlikely that the decree belongs to the third quarter of the fifth century. That said, no great weight should be placed on letter-forms when the stone was last seen in the nineteenth century. Several aspects of Fauvel and Pittakys' copies suggest that no great care was taken to represent the original letter styles or even the letters themselves accurately. Neither Fauvel nor Pittakys seems to have been concerned to illustrate the *stoichedon* style, so it is still debated whether the

inscription was *stoichedon* with 47 letters per line.[1737] Even if it was, since so few of the extant lines contain 47 letters, there is the additional difficulty of not knowing whether the missing letters belong on the left- or right-hand side. Fauvel's copy may be deceptive in that all the initial letters line up vertically, giving the impression that they are *stoichedon* and their position in the line is certain. Yet in reality, he does not always accurately determine the size of the gaps he records and sometimes does not indicate a gap at all, rendering any restorations of the missing phrases very tentative. Nor does either copyist seem to have recorded a single phi, instead transcribing phis as omicrons. Pittakys' drawing of fragment *d* of IG I³ 15 contains a mixture of three- and four-bar sigmas (despite the inscription only containing the former) and at least one error per line.[1738] His first version of fragment *b* is more accurate, although he still wilfully misreads lines 13-14 (9-10 in his copy) in order to restore mention of a temple of Athena Polias; in fact all these lines contain for certain are [γ]ράφσαι ("write") and πρὶ[ν ("before").[1739] His second version of the same inscription is far more accurate but still misreads words in order to make the sense of the inscription involve a temple of Athena.[1740] His unreliability as a copyist was noted by Peek, who provides examples of dittography and misreading of key letters.[1741] Fauvel has a better reputation as a copyist but it is clear that he struggled to read the stone in its worn state, especially at the beginning and end of the inscription. All of these factors warn against analysing the copies as faithful representations of the original lettering. It is entirely possible that the

[1737] Pro:Highby 1936:2-4, Meritt 1946:248, Engelmann & Merkelbach 1972:39, Malouchou 2014:81; Anti: Meiggs 1943:24
[1738] Pittakys 1852:674 no.1119
[1739] Pittakys 1856:1421 no.2873
[1740]Pittakys 1859:1834 no.3514. παρει τα is misread as [κα]τακειτα[ι] to fit the fact that in the next line a temple of Athena is restored from Ἀθεναι- (l.8-9).
[1741] Peek 1958:5-6

inscription belongs in the second half of the fifth century but the state of the evidence forbids precision.

If Athens issued more than one decree concerning Erythrae, the possibility arises that the town revolted from the Delian League twice. Sealey argues that Erythrae revolted again in the 440s on the basis of its absence from tribute quota lists 9 and 10 and its reappearance in list 11 with its *synteleia* broken up.[1742] Balcer puts forward a similar theory, dating the facsimile to 453/2 and IG I³ 15 to 447/6.[1743] The second inscription is thus dated on the basis of the three-bar sigma and Erythrae's absence from the tribute quota lists between 447/6 and 444/3. Balcer believes that the second inscription tightened control even further to prevent against a third rebellion. Cataldi argues against Balcer and Sealey that the secure mention of *episkopoi* and a *phrourarchos* in I³ 15 means that the inscription belongs to the same intervention as I³ 14, rather than a later intervention.[1744] This argument has little force since the permanence of the *episkopoi* and *phrourarchos* is a much-debated topic, and even if they were temporary, a second intervention could have reinstated them to restore order. Yet there are other reasons to suppose that Athens only intervened once. Balcer and Sealey's theory is very similar to the one used to explain the evidence for Miletus, and it is open to the same criticism. Firstly, none of the inscriptional evidence should be dated pre-445 based solely on the appearance of three-bar sigma. Secondly, it is not certain that the facsimile is older than the extant inscriptions concerning Erythrae. It is impossible to tell when we cannot even be certain of its letter-forms (which are themselves an imperfect means of dating). Thirdly, Erythrae's absence from the lists in the mid-440s needs to be viewed in the broader context of the overall mark Erythrae

[1742] Sealey 1970:16-7
[1743] Balcer 1977:253
[1744] Cataldi 1983:92-3

has left on the extant tribute lists. Erythrae's known payment is so sporadic and heavily restored that on the basis of absence, one might well also postulate revolts in 443/2-439/8, 438/7-4/3 and 427/6-417/6. Erythrae's record on the tribute quota lists is too poor to form the basis of arguments about its relationship with Athens and the Delian League. The pattern of *synteleia* and *apotaxis* in Erythrae's payments remains something of a mystery but Jensen shows that *apotaxis* was not a way of weakening or punishing allies; in fact, *apotaxis* tends to lead to a lowering of tribute.[1745]

A lack of evidence forbids us from supposing that Erythrae revolted twice from the Delian League in the middle of the century. Applying the principle of Occam's razor, the most economical way to explain the evidence is to postulate a single revolt that possibly triggered more than one Athenian decree on the subject. As noted elsewhere, that the Athenians should give a troublesome ally like Erythrae enough thought to merit more than one decision by the *boule* should not surprise us. Parallels for this would be the three decrees concerning Chalcis or the decrees for Methone, of which there were four in fairly quick succession.[1746] None of the Chalcis decrees is securely dated but from the names of the proposers it is evident that three separate meetings were held which resulted in three distinct decrees concerning Athenian relations with Chalcis. The situation with Chalcis is particularly close to that of Erythrae because the decrees are in response to an attempted revolt and as we have seen above, the contents of the decrees for Erythrae and Chalcis are similar enough to afford useful comparison.

The regulations for Erythrae show that Athens perceived a real threat to the loyalty of the town, and its geographical location indicates why. The Athenians seem

[1745] Jensen 2012:489-90
[1746] *IG* I³ 40; *IG* I³ 61

to have been concerned enough to change Erythrae's constitution, leave garrisons and guards in the town and force its inhabitants to swear an oath not to bring in pro-Persians or expel or kill the Erythraeans who had remained in the town. Whereas the regulations for Miletus show no hard evidence of a change of constitution or even of a revolt, the situation at Erythrae appears quite different even from the limited evidence available. Athens' concern for the Erythraeans' loyalty and safety is understandable given how close the town was to those still in the Persian Empire such as Smyrna, which was less than 50 miles directly east. Aditionally, it seems that the pressures were not only external; as we will see from the local evidence, Erythrae's internal politics went through great change in the course of the fifth century.

Local evidence

Three inscriptions from Erythrae are important for our understanding of how its political structure developed and what Athens' role was in its development. Unfortunately, the dearth of inscriptions from Erythrae means that not much is known about the development of lettering in the fifth century; this, combined with a dearth of literary evidence, means that two of the three inscriptions are not even fixed to the fifth century and the third is only associated with the fifth century by external evidence.

The first decree dated to the fifth or early fourth century concerns re-election to public office.[1747] The formula at the end (l.18) does not survive in full but there is no room for the *demos* to have been included in it; the line likely reads, "It was decided by the *boule*". Since the decision was made by only a *boule* and no *demos*, it looks like it might have been produced under an oligarchy. However, occasionally in democratic Athens the *demos* is not included in the prescript or elsewhere in the decree because it

[1747] *I. Erythrai* 1.1

was either implicit or explicit that they had accepted the bouleutic proposal.[1748] Secondly, its content is democratic in that it forbids any scribe (*grammateus*) from Chalcideus' time from serving again as a scribe for any other office (l.1-5). It also prohibits men from being elected secretary for the treasurer more than once or being elected to be secretary for two offices at the same time (l.5-9). Anyone who does serve as secretary or appoint someone to serve contrary to what has been decreed is to be accursed and deprived of his civil rights (*atimos*) and pay a fine of 100 staters (l.9-13). Someone who had served in Chalcideus' time may have tried to serve twice in a short space of time, prompting the decree. Alternatively, the Erythraeans brought in the regulation out of a general fear that consecutive office-holding would lead to an abuse of power.

It might seem strange that there is such concern for the abuse of power by a scribe rather than an actual magistrate, but the scribe was probably in office for longer than those he served, who presumably rotated every prytany, meaning that he would end up better informed than them by virtue of his continuity of office. Nevertheless, the fact that even less powerful positions such as that of the *grammateus* were safeguarded in this way suggests that the Erythraeans were particularly interested in "democratising" their public offices. This is especially true given the logistical nightmare that this decree would have posed; the editors of *IK Erythrai* note that the disadvantage of limiting even the secretary's time in office is that absolutely nobody will have known what was going on from one prytany to the next.[1749] This was a sacrifice that the Erythraeans were evidently willing to make in the name of fairer process. The provision is remarkably similar to one to which Lysias refers in his speech against Nicomachus. According to

[1748] e.g. *IG* I³ 24, *IG* I³ 32, *IG* I³ 58, *IG* I³ 65, *IG* I³ 98.30 (plausibly restored), *IG* II² 32 (restored, but there is no space for inclusion of the *demos*), *IG* II² 77, *IG* II² 145 (restored)
[1749] Engelmann & Merkelbach 1972:18-19

Lysias, the same secretary cannot act as under-secretary (ὑπογραμματεῦσαι) to the same magistrate twice.[1750] This meant that the secretary changed at least every year, since this was the upper limit for holding a magistracy. Since Lysias' speech is dated to the turn of the fourth century, it cannot be known whether the Erythraeans' decision was influenced by the arrangement at Athens. What is clear is that Erythrae was ready to adopt an even more radical policy than Athens, for at least Athenian secretaries had a year to get to grips with their role before being rotated.

The belief that public offices should be rotated so as to prevent the abuse of power is a major democratic principle. At Athens, for example, the chairman of the assembly was elected by lot daily in order to stop a seasoned chairman from manipulating the assembly.[1751] Starting in the fifth century, any Athenian could serve as a councillor but only twice in his lifetime and never in two consecutive years.[1752] This was in part because he had to be audited by the incoming council. Men were not allowed to serve twice as the president of the *prytaneis* at all.[1753] As far back as when Draco established his laws in the last quarter of the seventh century, the same person was not permitted to hold an office a second time until the whole number of eligible citizens had been gone through.[1754] Limiting how long and how often a person could spend in the same role in this way helped to prevent corruption and self-aggrandisement. It must be noted, however, that fixed-term tenure in and of itself is not an exclusively democratic principle, and stretches as far back as seventh-century Crete.[1755] It also features in Solonian Athens, which was still aristocratic and only in the

[1750] Lys. 30.29
[1751] Nippel 2016:36
[1752] Aristot. *Ath. Pol.* 62.3
[1753] Aristot. *Ath. Pol.* 44.1
[1754] Aristot. *Ath. Pol*. 4.3
[1755] *ML* 2

early stages of democratisation.[1756] In the law on the constitution of Dreros, when a man has been *kosmos* he is not to hold the office for another ten years. A similar law from seventh- or sixth-century Gortyn prohibits anyone from *kosmein* more than once in three years.[1757] An interval of ten years is required for serving again as a *gnomon* (examiner) and five years for serving as a *xenios* (magistrate for foreigners). The law by itself is not enough evidence to suppose that Gortyn was a democracy so early. Further, Cretan democracy developed in the fourth century at the earliest, so the aim of the law was probably to prevent tyranny or the concentration of power in a particular family.[1758] The laws may have been passed in an oligarchic society but it was one that was paving the way for democracy by creating a strong sense of community and communal organisation.[1759] Hence the prescript of the Dreran law, strikingly similar to that of democratic Athens: ἄδ' ἔαδε τήν πόλιν ("this pleased the city"). The laws can also be understood as a move by the elite to limit individual influence, rather than a move by the *demos* to diminish the power of the elite.[1760] The impetus to stop greedy men from amassing personal power is not exclusive to democracy, although it is easy to see how it became a part of democratic ideology.

There is an additional reason why rotation of office was desirable in a democracy, which is particularly evident in the Erythraean decree. It was a principle of democracy that as many citizens as possible should have the chance to hold office, and having a quick turnover of secretaries is just as much about sharing out the responsibility as it is about ensuring that one person did not abuse it. The Athenian system of capping the number of times someone could serve as a councillor at two

[1756] Aristot. *Ath. Pol. 8.1;* de Ste Croix 2004:97-9
[1757] *IC* IV 14
[1758] See Willetts 1955:166-91 for the development of democracy in Crete.
[1759] Raaflaub & Wallace 2007:23-4
[1760] Simonton 2017b:19

meant that in practice every fourth or fifth citizen held office, allowing for an "extraordinary dispersion of political experience within the citizenry which is all the higher, the smaller the number is of those who actually did serve twice".[1761] In a speech of Theseus' from Euripides' *Suppliants*, democratic Athens is defined by the fact that its *demos* "rules in succession, each in turn every year" (ἀνάσσει διαδοχαῖσιν ἐν μέρει ἐνιαυσίαισιν).[1762] Theseus' point is that everyone in the city gets to "be lord" (ἀνάσσειν) in turn, unlike in a tyranny ruled by only one man. He goes on to say that the advantage of this is that wealthy candidates for office do not take preference, but the poor man shares equally with the rich. It is implied that there is inherent value in having as many people gain access to office as possible. Aristotle makes his case more explicitly. He says that where possible, it is more democratic for a larger number of people to share in offices because it shares the responsibility out more (it is κοινότερον, literally more shared").[1763] Whether this was for ideological or practical reasons, or a mixture of both, it is assumed that the sharing out of offices is both a good and a democratic thing.

Another democratic feature of the decree from Erythrae is the naming of the proposer Apellias in the prescript, which is paralleled only in democratic prescripts. It is likely that the decree was passed under a democracy, but the matter of when remains unresolved. What is noteworthy is that if the decree had been passed under a fully-fledged democracy, one would expect to find the democratic decree formula ἔδοξεν τῆι βουλῆι καὶ τῶι δήμωι ("it was resolved by the council and the people" or simply ἔδοξεν τῶι δήμωι ("it was resolved by the people"). These are the standard formulas found in later, democratic Erythraean inscriptions and of course Athenian decrees.[1764] The fact

[1761] Nippel 2016:37
[1762] Eurip. *Supp*. 406
[1763] Arist. *Pol*. 2.1273b
[1764] e.g. *I. Erythrai* 1.6, 21, 24, 29, 114; *I. Erythrai* 2.503

that this does not appear, and yet the proposer is still named, leaves open the possibility that this inscription predates the Athenian regulations and shows Erythrae beginning to democratise of its own accord.

A law that similarly tries to curb the power of individuals forbids anyone from jointly serving as a magistrate of the Peproioi more than once in ten years.[1765] If he does do so, he is to be fined five staters (l.5-8). This inscription too is dated no more precisely than to the late fifth or early fourth century. There are a few clues as to its political context. We find that prosecution of these magistrates is open to anyone who wishes (δίωξιν δ'ἔ̃ναι τῶι βολομένωι – l.8-10). The right of "whoever wishes" to prosecute on behalf of an injured party is described by Aristotle as one of the three most democratic features (τὰ δημοτικώτατα) of Solon's constitution.[1766] That the adjective here has connotations of democracy, rather than meaning "most demotic", has been disputed but this ignores how frequently the word was associated with democracy in texts of the fourth century B.C and even in Aristotle's *Politics*.[1767] Aristotle uses the word ten times in his *Athenian Constitution* and every time the word either means "democratic" or has heavy connotations of popular rule.[1768] In a chapter following the one under discussion, Aristotle calls Cleisthenes' reforms much more democratic (δημοτικωτέρα πολύ) than Solon's.[1769] Here, one can make no mistake about the meaning of the word. Aristotle's point is that, democratic though Solon's constitution was, Cleisthenes' was even more

[1765] *I. Erythrai* 1.17
[1766] Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 9.1
[1767] Cartledge (2016:53-4) disputes that the word means "democratic" here but by Aristotle's time the word had certainly gained association with the institution of democracy. Compare Aeschin. 3.168 (contrasting the oligarch with the man of a δημοτικός nature); Andoc. 2.26 (Andocides appealing to the restored democracy to return from exile on the basis of his family history of being δημοτικός and anti-tyranny). In the *Politics*, Aristotle contrasts the δημοτικός Council with the ὀλιγαρχικός one (Aristot. *Pol*. 4.1299b) and commends Solon for his blending of constitutions with Athens' oligarchic Areopagus, aristocratic elections and δημοτικός law-courts (Aristot. *Pol*. 2.1273b).
[1768] Aristot. *Ath. Pol.* 6, 9, 10, 13, 14, 16, 18, 22, 27, 41
[1769] Aristot. *Ath. Pol*. 22.1

so because the tyranny had obliterated Solon's laws while Cleisthenes' reforms had successfully been aimed at the people (στοχαζόμενον τοῦ πλήθους). Even if Aristotle's use of the word is rather anachronistically applied to Solon, it is evident that by the fourth century at least, allowing any citizen the right to prosecute was considered to be democratic. Elsewhere, Aristotle describes the right of anyone who wishes (κἄν τις βούληταί) to call officials to account (εὐθύνα) as a mark of Athenian democracy.[1770] Originally in Athens, only the Areopagus could demand an accounting of officials' conduct in this way.[1771] With Ephialtes' reforms, the privilege was extended to all citizens so that anyone who was concerned about the activities of an official after he had finished his time in office could complain to an auditor.[1772] What had been in the hands of an aristocratic body became a public right, meaning that "all magistrates were answerable for their conduct in office not to a small group drawn from the upper classes, but to those to whom they owed their election to office and those who were ultimately most affected by their political acts, the people as a whole".[1773] This is an even closer parallel to the Erythraean law, which is concerned specifically with the right of every citizen to prosecute magistrates who try to break the law. The extension of the privilege of prosecuting them, combined with the clear interest in limiting individual power, makes a democracy the most fitting context for the Erythraean decree. The accountability of those in power to the rest of the citizenry was (and remains) an important democratic principle. It put equality into action, for it gave "even the humblest citizen the sense that he had the power to air even the smallest grievance against official misconduct...ensuring a kind of popular control in political affairs that

[1770] Aristot. *Ath. Pol*. 48.4-5
[1771] Aristot. *Ath. Pol*. 8.4
[1772] Aristot. *Ath. Pol*. 25.2
[1773] Ostwald 2000:12

the world has not seen since".[1774] Although the Erythraean law does not go as far as the Athenian procedure of rendering accounts, it too stresses the equality of its citizens by giving to "anyone who wishes" the power to hold officials to account. This is a power that most ordinary citizens in modern democracies do not have.[1775]

It is notable that both this inscription and the regulations for Erythrae show a concern to try and prevent the concentration of political power. In the Erythraean inscription, this comes across in the way that it limits repeat office-holding and encourages prosecution of those who contravene the law by anyone who wishes to do so. Aristotle says that in a democracy the assembly should be sovereign over everything, and officials over nothing or next to nothing.[1776] This stops the abuse of power by individuals in office. Even after Erythrae had become an Athenian-backed democracy, it seems there was a real fear of the democracy being undermined or even overthrown. This fear must have been compounded by a heavy Persian influence in the area, as evidenced by the regulations for Erythrae. As Christian Koch notes, by calling the oligarchs "tyrants" the regulations effectively criminalise the support or establishment of an oligarchy as a way of trying to counter Persian influence in and around Erythrae.[1777] We can go further and say that the fact that they are banished from the entire alliance (l.31) shows that the Athenians viewed the "tyrants" as a threat not just to Erythrae, but also to the whole of the Athenian empire. Moreover, it shows the Athenians' fear that banishment only from Erythrae was not enough, for it left open the opportunity for the culprits to exert their influence from elsewhere in Asia Minor. Koch

[1774] Ostwald 2000:12
[1775] Ostwald notes that in the United States, the only power that the people have is not to vote for someone again; the power to censure Senators or impeach the President rests only with Congress (Ostwald 2000:12-13).
[1776] Arist. *Pol.* 6.1317b
[1777] Koch 1991:82

notes further that this rule might not only apply to future convictions, but also extend retroactively to others who have already been banished, forcing them to go on the run for a second time.[1778] The aorist [γν]οσθεῖ, "condemned", (l. 30, 31) hints at events already completed. If some were banished retroactively, this only serves to emphasise how great the problem was perceived to be. Once again, the value of the decree for our purposes is almost nullified by the lack of a secure date.

Another law was found in 1900 by the Aleus River and dated to the first half of the fifth century.[1779] It is written in the *stoichedon* style and inscribed on three of its faces. Wilhelm had originally dated the decree to the late fifth or early fourth century but later, noting that its characters were "extraordinarily similar" to those of the Athenian decree for Phaselis, decided on a fifth-century date.[1780] It should be borne in mind that the relative dearth of Erythraean inscriptions makes it difficult to date them based on letter-forms, hence the range of a century for dating this law. The Phaselis decree is itself insecurely dated and is from Athens, not Erythrae. Generally, the Erythraean law is written in Ionic dialect, as would be expected. We find ἤν for ἔαν (a.9, a.31, c.2-3, c.22), βολή for βουλή (a.20) and ὅτις and ὅτεο for ὅστις (b.16, b.25). It features two different Ionic forms of ἐλάττων: ἐλάΤονος with sampi (a.16-7) and ἐλάσσονας (a.23-4).

The first column is the longest because it occupies the main face of the *stele*. As we have it, the inscription starts midway through a paragraph that seems to deal with the prosecution of officials (l.1-13). Since the first part of the paragraph is lost, it is not clear whether the officials to be prosecuted are specific ex-magistrates from a previous regime, or whether these rules are merely hypothetical and being set out in anticipation

[1778] Koch 1991:81
[1779] *I. Erythrai* 1.2
[1780] Wilhelm 1911:237

of future misconduct. What is striking is that once again, we find that the opportunity to prosecute is explicitly open to "anyone who wishes" (δίωξιν δ' εἶναι τῶι βολομένωι – l.5-6). A similar sentiment is found in Athenian inscriptions and in other aspects of Athenian political life. Opening up a process to anyone who wants to take part shows that everyone's input is equally valued. Hence the aforementioned invitation from the Athenian herald to introduce meetings of the assembly, "Who wishes to address the assembly (τίς ἀγορεύειν βούλεται)?"[1781] Although our source for this is the orator Aeschines speaking in 330 B.C., he ascribes the tradition to Solon. His lament elsewhere that it used to be that men over 50 were invited to speak first also suggests that the practice at least goes back to the fifth century. There is some controversy surrounding Aeschines' claim but it centres on whether there was ever priority for men over fifty years of age, rather than whether the herald opened debate in the assembly in such a manner. [1782] The herald uses exactly the same phrase in three Aristophanic comedies to open up discussion in the assembly.[1783] The Old Oligarch perhaps echoes the herald's invitation when he bemoans the right of anyone who wishes to speak his mind in democratic Athens: λέγειν ἐξεῖναι τῷ βουλομένῳ τῶν πολιτῶν.[1784] In a similar way, specifying that prosecution is open to anyone is a way of encouraging active participation from the citizen body and emphasising the principle of equality before the law.

The invitation to prosecute finds even closer parallels in Attic epigraphy. While the details remain obscure, it is clear that the Erythraean inscription opens up

[1781] Aeschin. 1.22-3, 1.27
[1782] It has been argued that the practice is a fourth-century invention in order to idealise the past. Although Aeschines might be exaggerating, it is unlikely that he could get away in a courtroom with inventing the tradition wholesale (Kapparis 1998). For some notable examples of "invented tradition", see Hobsbawm & Ranger 2012
[1783] Aristoph. *Ach*. 45; Aristoph. *Thes*. 379; Arist. *Eccl*. 130
[1784] [Xen] *Ath. Pol*. 1.2

prosecution of someone or some group to anyone who wishes (τῶι βολομένωι) in much the same way as Athenian inscriptions and assemblies emphasised the right of anyone who wished to get involved in the democratic process. It is comparable to Athenian decrees that explicitly open certain decisions up to whoever wishes, ὁ βολομένος, including the decree for Erythrae itself.[1785] Unfortunately the decree for Erythrae provides no context for the two words, so it is not known what it is that "anyone who wishes" can do. In the case of the Athenian decrees, it is not that a certain group is being given a privilege it had previously been denied, but rather the entire citizen population is invited to exercise a right that already exists. The effect of this is to encourage democratic participation and holding those in power to account. In Cleinias' decree, anyone who wishes can prosecute any Athenian who acts unfairly regarding tribute; the details are obscure because only the left side of the stone can be read, but the basics are certain.[1786] In a decree concerning the lease of the precinct of Neleus and Basile, it is stated that the decree must be written up on a stone stele and put in a public place "so that anyone who wishes can know", ὅπος ἂν ἦι εἰδέναι το[ι] βολομένοι.[1787] Here, the right of "anyone who wishes" is not to prosecute officials but to read and understand a decree of the council. The phrase σκοπε(ῖ)ν τῷ βουλομένῳ ("for anyone who wishes to read") crops up in several fifth-century inscriptions.[1788] The late fifth-century decree of Teisamenos stipulated that while laws were being revised they should be posted on wooden boards "for anyone who wishes to read them".[1789] As will be explored below, that anyone should be able to access and read (or, perhaps in many cases, have read to him) a decision made by the council and people is an important democratic principle.

[1785] *IG* I³ 14.8; 34.31-4; *IG* I³ 64.5-8
[1786] *IG* I³ 34.31-4
[1787] *IG* I³ 84.26-7
[1788] *IG* I³ 60.31 (restored); *IG* I³ 133.11; *IG* I³ 1453G.16
[1789] Andoc. 1.83-4

Returning to the inscription from Erythrae, the manner in which it expresses the right of anyone to prosecute suggests that Erythrae was or was in the process of becoming a democracy.

The decree goes on to demand the formation of juries of nine men from each tribe with a property qualification of 30 staters (l.13-18). A property requirement initially gives the impression that we are dealing with an oligarchy. As discussed in the introduction, property requirements were closely linked to oligarchy because by definition they meant that some were excluded from participating in political life. Later political theorists such as Plato, Aristotle and the author of the *Rhetoric to Alexander* all name the property qualification as a defining feature of oligarchy.[1790] Pausanias (admittedly writing much later about Rome in the second century B.C.) takes as a given that a government based on a property qualification is not a democracy.[1791] Xenophon's Socrates thinks that where ratable property (τίμημα) is the qualification for office, you have a plutocracy, but where the officials are chosen from the whole citizen body, you have a democracy.[1792] Aristotle brands the former a timocracy, which is preferable to - and therefore distinct from - a democracy.[1793] When the Athenian oligarchy of 411 was initially set up, the Five Thousand were chosen on the basis of wealth.[1794] The phrase that Aristotle uses in this case, δυνατώτατοι...χρήμασιν καὶ σώμασιν (literally "the strongest in wealth and body"), may be a technical term denoting a property requirement because it echoes Thucydides' phrasing and is found elsewhere in literature

[1790] Plat. *Rep*. 8.550c, 8.551b; Aristot. *Pol*. 4.1292a39; Aristot. *Rhet*. 1.8.4; [Aristot.] *Rhetoric to Alexander* 3.18 (Fuhrmann 1966:96)
[1791] Paus. 7.16
[1792] Xen. *Mem*. 4.6.12
[1793] Aristot. *Nic. Eth*. 8.10.1-3
[1794] Thuc. 8.65.3; Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 25.3

and inscriptions.[1795] O'Neil uses the property qualification to argue that the democracy being set up was only meant to be intermediate rather than permanent.[1796]

Yet as the editors of *IK Erythrai* note, 30 staters is such a low threshold that only the very poorest would be barred from serving.[1797] To put the amount into perspective, the previous inscription from Erythrae set out a fine of over three times that amount for disobeying the decree.[1798] Even in the present inscription, there is a fine of 10 staters for misbehaviour (l.3-5). If the Erythraeans were confident that a man could pay a one-off fine of 10 staters, they could be confident that most men's entire worth amounted to over 30 staters. Such a low threshold, though ruling out a radical democracy like Athens', does not rule out that Erythrae considered itself a democracy. Even the Athenian democracy only got rid of its property requirement in stages. In Solon's day the thetes were still banned from serving in any office and only the highest class could serve as treasurers and in other important offices; in fact Aristotle claims that Solon appointed all the offices from the noble and wealthy.[1799] Only after Ephialtes' death were men of the zeugite class made eligible to hold the archonship – still to the exclusion of the thetes.[1800] It is disputed whether Ephialtes' reforms made the thetes eligible to be admitted to the Council; even though it seems likely, there is no positive evidence for it.[1801] Thus, it was only the final democracy of fifth-century Athens that removed the wealth barrier altogether. Solon's ban on office-holding by the poorest Athenians does not ever appear to have been repealed officially: Aristotle simply says that thetes get round the ban by denying their status when asked. Aristotle's testimony

[1795] *IG* IX,1 694.9-10; Xen. *Hipparch*. 1.9; Whibley 1896:128 n.6
[1796] O'Neil 1995:48
[1797] Engelmann & Merkelbach 1972:25
[1798] *I. Erythrai* 1.1.9-13
[1799] Aristot. *Ath. Pol*. 7.3-4, 47.1; Arist. *Pol.* 2.1274a
[1800] Aristot. *Ath. Pol.* 26.2
[1801] Raaflaub 2007:106 contra Rhodes 1972:2-3

implies that the ban was not strictly enforced and could be overlooked at will, but that nevertheless it was not simply a "dead letter".[1802] The fact that even in Aristotle's day candidates for office were vetted by being asked their rank, suggests that it still counted against someone to admit to being rated as a thete. One can also imagine a situation in which a citizen's low status was used as a pretext to bar him from office.

The Ten Treasurers were only ever chosen from the top property class, the "five-hundred-bushel" class, from Solon right down to Aristotle's time.[1803] The third-century orator Dinarchus claims that to be an orator or a general, one had to have legitimate children and own land within the boundaries of Attica.[1804] Thus, the property qualification had a place – even if only nominally - in the developed Athenian democracy. Aristotle implies that the rationale behind this was that without an income a citizen did not have the requisite leisure time to devote himself to public affairs.[1805] Elsewhere he says that property requirements were used because manual labour was conceptually too close to slavery.[1806] Ostwald, on the other hand, provides an entirely different explanation: the purpose of Solon's property classifications was not to exclude certain groups from office but to "determine the degree of service the state could expect of each group of citizens, since there was no pay for public service".[1807] The positions and occupations open to each class were therefore not a right but a public obligation. However the Athenians and other Greeks rationalised it, evidently they saw no contradiction in having a property requirement in a democracy. According to Aristotle,

[1802] Lane 2014:107 with n.11 contra Rhodes 1981:146
[1803] Aristot. *Ath. Pol.* 8.1, 47.1
[1804] Din. *Dem.* 71
[1805] Aristot. *Pol.* 4.1291b, 4.1292b
[1806] Aristot. *Pol.* 3.1277a
[1807] Ostwald 1996:56-7; Ostwald 2000:2-3

a democracy will allow membership of the assembly either on no property qualification or on a small one.[1808] The latter is precisely the case in this inscription from Erythrae.

In its second line the decree likely mentions selection by lot ([κ]ύαμ[…].), as in the Athenian regulations for Erythrae. The significance of this will be discussed below. If someone (probably an official, following on from the end of the section concerning officials) violates the law, prosecution is open to anyone who wants (l.3-6). If the prosecutor withdraws the charges, he too is liable to prosecution and a fine (l.9-13). As mentioned above, the extension of the right to prosecute to the whole population is associated with democratic reform. It also suggests that a serious offence has been committed such as an attack on democracy. The editors of *IK Erythrai* draw comparison with the law against tyranny and oligarchy produced in democratic Ilium in the early third century B.C.[1809] The law offers a monetary reward and other privileges to the man who kills either a tyrant, the leader of an oligarchy, or anyone who tries to destroy the democracy. The law is very similar because it lists a group of people who are not only permitted but also given the incentives of money and enfranchisement to kill any threat to democracy. These people, who evidently were not previously permitted to kill enemies of state with impunity, are foreigners (l.28-31), slaves (l.31-34), and another group that unfortunately does not survive on the stone but is rewarded with citizenship and thirty minas (l.38-9).

The full court is to be composed of at least 61 judges (l.22-5); these judges are to swear the same oaths as the *bouleutai*, although it is not clear whether they are to be picked from the Council itself, as Low takes for granted.[1810] In fact, since there are instructions on how many and from which tribes to choose, and since the men who are

[1808] Aristot. *Pol.* 4.1294b
[1809] Engelmann & Merkelbach 1972:28; SEG 44.981
[1810] Low 2013:40

to judge (*dikazein*) are considered separately from the *bouleutai*, it makes more sense that the two groups were separate from one another. It would be unusual for the jury and the council to be made up of the same group. At Athens, jurors were selected from a far larger pool than the Boule; perhaps it was the same at Erythrae. From the fact that the jury is just over half the size of the Council it does not follow that the jury *was* half the Council and it would have been unusual for this to be the case. It may be forcing the scant evidence to think that the numbers 120 and 61 must be so closely related. They may have been related in some way, but it is doubtful that the number 61 was chosen so that a quorum was achieved amongst the jurors whom we must believe doubled up as the council. Nor is it of particular significance that an odd number is chosen, for this is merely the minimum and therefore would not have ruled out the outcome of an even split of opinion.[1811]

From Pausanias it is clear that there were at least three tribes; to get a total of over 60 there must have been at least seven tribes contributing nine men each.[1812] There cannot have been only three, as is often assumed on the basis of Pausanias and inscriptions that tend to list officials in multiples of three.[1813] Pausanias does not say that Erythrae had three tribes, but only that its third tribe took its name from the district Calchis. In any case, it would be unusual for an Ionian town to have only three tribes; they tend to have four or more, with tribes named after the sons of Ion recurring frequently.[1814] Balcer believes that there were nine tribes, but this is only because he thinks that one dikast is to be taken from each tribe.[1815] It is true that δικάζεν δὲ ἀπὸ

[1811] Koch notes the rarity of stipulating the number of judges and posits that an odd number is never required in fifth century decrees (1991:122).
[1812] Paus. 7.5.12
[1813] Larsen 1955:196 n.28; *I. Erythrai* 1.24; *I. Erythrai* 1.29; *I. Erythrai* 1.32; *I. Erythrai* 1.33
[1814] Roussel 1976:212-3; Hdt. 5.66; Eurip. *Ion*. 1575-81
[1815] Balcer 1984a:382

τῶμ φυλέων ἄνδρας ἐννέα ἀπ' ἑκάστης is rather ambiguous, but it has to be interpreted as "nine men from each tribe" rather than "a total of nine men, one from each tribe" if we are to make any sense of the quorum of at least 61 judges. It cannot be that there are 27 men, nine from each tribe.[1816] Koch questions whether the *dikasterion*, the court (l.22-3) is identical in form to the nine men from each tribe who *dikazein*, judge (l.14-5), but the wording of the document suggests that it this is the case.[1817] In the same sentence, it is stipulated that nine men from each tribe are to be selected to judge, and that there are to be no fewer than 61 judges; the natural interpretation is that we are dealing with the same group of people rather than a smaller advisory committee and a larger *dikasterion*. The document first sets out how these judges are to be selected, and then details a minimum number of judges to make up the same court. To explain the inconsistency between the number of tribes and the quorum, Cataldi suggests that the Athenian regulations for Erythrae increased the number of tribes from three to ten.[1818] In his view, the Erythraean tribal system was at some point prior to this inscription modelled on the Athenian system. The alternative is that Erythrae increased its number of tribes without Athens' help, as may have been the case at Miletus. The evidence points to there being a minimum of seven tribes, so either Erythrae had always had seven or more tribes or the original set was added to as at Miletus.

Cataldi has a tendency to be overly generous with his restorations, but he may be right that the Athenian regulations for Erythrae prove that there were ten tribes at Erythrae.[1819] He believes that the Athenians expanded the number of tribes, but there remains the possibility that the regulations merely refer to ten tribes that were already

[1816] Contra Koch 1991:83
[1817] Koch 1991:83
[1818] Cataldi 1981:31
[1819] Cataldi 1981:20, 31

in place. In the last few lines of Fauvel's copy we find the number ten at least once. In the first instance, it is thought to be preceded by the word τοξότας but this is restored from ΟΧΣΑΚΑΣ (l.42). If we are not dealing with ten archers in this line, we might be dealing with ten tribes. In the second instance only [...]KA survives, but crucially before the words ἐ̣κ τ̣ε̃ς φυλε̃ς *h*εκάστες and just after mention of a *boule* (l.45). Cataldi restores the whole phrase to be δέκα ἄν[δ]ρας ἕνα ἐκ τες φυλε̃ς *h*εκάστες. Although this involves reading at least five letters differently from how they are represented in Fauvel's copy, the restoration makes sense of a line that clearly stipulates that a certain number of men be chosen from each tribe, possibly for a *boule*. The problem with Cataldi's restoration is that if one man were chosen from each tribe for the *boule*, the *boule* would only be made up of ten people. What these lines might instead stipulate is that ten men from each tribe serve as *prytaneis* at any one time, as at Athens 50 men served out of a total of 500. Thus, the Athenians would be taking the ten tribes at Erythrae and modelling them even more closely on their own democratic model by making ten from each tribe serve on the *boule* rather than nine. These men would have been selected by lot, as was the case at Athens. However, if the *prytaneis* were not modelled on the Athenian setup, they unfortunately provide no indication of a democracy at Erythrae because *prytaneis* are found in democracies and oligarchies alike. The word πρύτανις has a variety of meanings, including "lord" and "prince" as well as (at Athens) "democratically elected president". Pausanias speaks of *prytaneis* ruling in oligarchic Corinth after the end of the hereditary tyranny of the Bacchidae.[1820] Pindar, who only uses the word in the singular, describes his *laudandus* as *prytanis* in the sense of "ruler" or "lord".[1821]

[1820] Paus. 2.4.4
[1821] Pind. *P*. 2.58, *P*. 6.24

Whatever the precise function of the *prytaneis* in Erythrae at this time, if ten men are to be chosen in some capacity, one from each tribe, this means that there were ten tribes; how long this had been the case and how many were chosen from each tribe for the *boule* remain a mystery. It is conceivable that only nine were chosen from each tribe for the *boule*, which would mark no change from the Erythraean decree. There is, however, the mystery δέκα[...] at the beginning of line 22 which is amended to δ[ι]κα[ιότα]τα because of its position in the councillors' oath. If this really is reference to ten of something, it may be the ten tribes. None of these examples is definitive proof but perhaps in one or more instance the ten tribes are alluded to. The regulations for Erythrae hint at there being ten tribes at least from the time the decree was drawn up, if not before.

The rest of the first column sets out some practical details. The judges are to judge "according to the laws and the decrees", κατὰ νόμος καὶ ψηφίσματα (l.21-2). It is noteworthy that a distinction is made between laws on the one hand and decrees on the other. This only happened at Athens around the turn of the fourth century, with laws largely having general application and decrees being more specific and sometimes only temporary.[1822] Andocides' speech *On the Mysteries*, given in 400/399 B.C., provides the earliest example of decrees being separated from laws based on whether they only applied to an individual rather than all Athenians.[1823] Aristotle says that laws should be expressed in general terms while decrees should handle particulars.[1824] Fifth-century Athenian decrees tend to stipulate that something be done "according to the law[s]" or "according to the decree[s]" but not both; when both are mentioned there seems to be

[1822] Hansen 1987:161-77
[1823] Andoc. 1.87
[1824] Aristot. *Nic. Eth*. 1135a

no distinction between them.[1825] Unfortunately from the Erythraean inscription it is impossible to ascertain how they distinguished laws from decrees, and whether it was roughly the same as at Athens. Yet that the Erythraeans wanted their judges to make their decisions in accordance with two different types of edict suggests a certain sophistication for their communal decision-making procedure.

The judges are to make their judgement according to a law that has been set up nearby (l.25-7), which demonstrates the importance of inscribing and displaying laws. These instructions rely on the writing down and publication of decrees so that they can be referred to It will be argued below that the need for laws to be recorded and displayed publicly was a key feature of ancient democracy. The *prytaneis* will introduce the case and write it down (l.27-9). They are also to indict debtors and if they do not, the penalty falls on them (l.29-31). There is more mention of adjudicating but the inscription becomes very fragmentary and then cuts off at this point (l.34). Mention of *prytaneis* unfortunately does not help to demystify Erythrae's constitution unless they were *prytaneis* on the Athenian model, which is possible but not definite.

The second column instructs for the decree to be written in stone and set up in the circle of Zeus Agoraios at a specific time (l.1-14). Such efforts to make sure that a decree is both recorded and visible in a public space are usually associated with, though not limited to, democracy. This means that the law can be consulted and used to hold citizens accountable to it. One can compare this desire for transparency and broad participation in public affairs to that of the Athenians as they instituted and developed their democracy: "literacy and above all the publication of corporately generated texts and documents for "anyone who wishes" to read were of the essence of Athenian

[1825] e.g. *IG* I³ 68.40; *IG* I³ 84.18, 25; *IG* I³ 258.17

democratic ideology".[1826] It is significant that Solon wrote his laws on durable wooden boards and set them up publicly and prominently in the Royal Stoa.[1827] This made the statement that law-making was no longer a secret process understood by few and carried out by even fewer. To prove the durability of these wooden boards, Plutarch claims that slight remnants (λείψανα) of them are still preserved in his own day, although he does not go so far as to say that they are still legible. A related tenet of Athenian democracy was officials' accountability to the *demos*, which the publication of information helped to ensure.[1828] In theory at least, anyone could now read a decree and understand both his own rights and the obligations of those in charge. The direction to engrave the decree on a stone *stele* and place it somewhere visible and public in the *polis* is found in numerous Athenian decrees of the fifth century.[1829] This includes the aforementioned decree concerning the sacred precinct of Neleus and Basile, which places particular emphasis on the need for the stele to be in a public place so that "anyone who wishes" can read and understand it. In Euripides' *Suppliants*, Theseus proclaims that when the laws are written down, "both weak and rich have equal justice" (τὴν δίκην ἴσην).[1830] He compares this to a tyranny in which only one man is sovereign over the law and there is no equality.

The proposed location of the inscription is noteworthy. In Hellenistic Athens Zeus Agoraios was the guardian of popular assemblies and his altar originally stood on the Pnyx, where the assembly met. His association with popular rule and democracy goes back at least as far as the fifth century. Even in Homer, the agora was a place of

[1826] Cartledge 2016:21
[1827] Plut. *Sol*. 25.1; Aristot. *Ath. Pol.*
[1828] Hdt. 3.80.6
[1829] e.g. *IG* I³ 7.4-6 (partially restored); *IG* I³ 10.23-6; *IG* I³ 62.9-11; *IG* I³ 65.5-7 (partially restored); *IG* I³ 66.20-2; *IG* I³ 76.23-30; *IG* I³ 84.26-8; *IG* I³ 104.5-8
[1830] Eurip. *Supp*. 433-4

assembly or trial.[1831] Zeus Agoraios was not just "Zeus of the marketplace" but "Zeus who presides over assemblies and trials", since assemblies took place in the agora. Herodotus seems to have been aware of the association, for there is a deliberate irony in his anecdote about a man who made himself tyrant of Selinus only to be slain by its people at the altar of Zeus Agoraios.[1832] It is Zeus Agoraios who presides over Orestes' acquittal at the end of Aeschylus' *Eumenides*.[1833] It is simultaneously to Zeus Agoraios and to the Athenian people that Euripides' Heraclids appeal.[1834] By doing so, they are appealing to the democratic institutions of Athens (or more accurately, Attica, since the play is set in Marathon). The association adds a particular symbolism to the public place in which it is stated that the decree should be erected, the circle of Zeus Agoraios. This is not the only indication that the Erythraeans put careful thought into where and how they set up their decrees. The importance of displaying laws in a public space is highlighted by the provision for the judges to judge "according to the law which lies nearby" (l.25-7); such a provision presupposes that laws were set up visibly and in close proximity so that they could refer to each other in this way.

James Sickinger contends that such "formulae of disclosure" do not always have a democratic ideology behind them.[1835] He argues that many of our examples contain instructions for the decree to be written on wooden tablets rather than permanent stone *stelai*, and that often the formula of disclosure is meant to explain the motivation behind the enactment of the decree in the first place rather than specifically its publication as a written text. Although he is right in cases where there the formula does not make an explicit connection between the act of writing down the decree and the motivation of

[1831] Stone 1988:207-8; cf. Hom. *Od*. 3.127, Hom. *Il*. 18.497
[1832] Hdt. 5.46
[1833] Aesch. *Eumen*. 973
[1834] Eurip. *Herac*. 61-72
[1835] Sickinger 2009

making sure that it is publicised, there are still plenty of examples of inscriptions that do make this connection. Some of these have been discussed above. Sickinger himself acknowledges that the decree about the precinct of Neleus and Basile gives no other reason for the writing down and publication of the stele on stone other than "to inform [and] to make its contents...known and accessible to any interested party".[1836] For some of the other examples, it can be countered that although wood is not as durable as stone, it lasts long enough for information written on it to be accessible for a matter of years. That the wood eventually perishes does not negate the function of the tablet as a means of disseminating information. It simply means that the information was only relevant for a certain period of time. It is only in the age of digitisation that it is easy and inexpensive to make a permanent record. Note also that in the case of the inscription from Erythrae, it is made explicit that the inscription should be written in stone (l.3-4). The decree does not contain a "disclosure formula" as such but nevertheless, the decision to write it on stone and set it up somewhere associated with popular rule suggests a democratic interest in transparency and the availability of information.

The second column of the inscription continues by allowing "those who were not brought up according to the tradition (κατὰ νόμον)", sons of freedmen and foreigners, who are presumably not normally allowed to prosecute, to do so (l.14-24). It is presumed that these three groups are not normally allowed to prosecute because there would be little purpose in pointing out a right that was already available to them. Moreover, they are all groups of people who often did not have full citizen rights in classical Greece. Again, this is a possible sign that Erythrae either was or in the process of becoming a democracy. By extending the right to prosecute to certain groups of people who had previously been excluded, the Erythraeans are broadening citizen

[1836] Sickinger 2009:94

participation and taking steps towards equality. In a way, this is even more radical than saying that anyone can prosecute, for it singles out three distinct groups of people who are to be included in the privilege. Aristotle, discussing the Spartan constitution, says that it is the mark of an oligarchy that few people have the power to impose sentences of death and exile "and many other such matters".[1837] It follows that the opposite, allowing decisions to be made – or officials to be prosecuted - by the many rather than the few, is the mark of a democracy.

The decision to open prosecution to a wider group has an additional implication. Giving more people the chance to prosecute officials may also suggest that there had recently been political turmoil in Erythrae, the response to which was to increase the accountability of those in charge. Allowing a wider group of people to prosecute officials made it easier to call them to account and made it harder for officials to serve their own interests or the interests of a small group without any repercussions. The most likely context for the Erythraeans increasing the accountability of officials is during a period of civil strife.

The end of the second column, though fragmentary, is of particular interest. Something is said about men whose fathers held office or were chosen by lot, but only the first part of the sentence survives (l.25-34). Wilhelm associated τιμὰς ἴσχεν (l.28-30) with the aristocratic office of the τίμουχος, a type of magistrate.[1838] Strabo says that the Massilians, who live under an aristocracy (ἀριστοκρατικῶς), have a council of 600 of these officials.[1839] If this association is correct, all it tells us is that Erythrae had previously been an oligarchy, for it does not say that the office is still in existence but refers back to current citizens' fathers who had held office in the past (παλαιότερον).

[1837] Arist. *Pol*. 4.1294b
[1838] Wilhelm 1909:137
[1839] Strab. 4.1.5

What is interesting is that the sentence possibly combines mention of two different systems: one associated with oligarchy (the magistracy of the τίμουχος) and one heavily associated with democracy (sortition by κύαμος, the bean). The same probably happens in the first two lines of the first column, which are badly preserved but probably mention sortition and definitely mention something to do with magistracies (τίμας[...]). The mixture of the two in the recent past gives the impression that Erythrae has only recently transitioned from an oligarchy into a democracy. If the uncertain reading ἤ before παλαιότερον is correct, this strengthens the thesis that Erythrae has recently become a democracy, for one could then translate, "whoever's father either in the past held office or [recently] was selected by lot...". In Athenian literature of the fifth century and beyond, the bean is synonymous with the lot.[1840] This is true also for the Attic inscriptional evidence. The decree for Hestiaea makes some prescription to do with selection by lot but it is in too poor a state to be certain that Hestiaea is or is being made a democracy.[1841]The Callias decrees, on the other hand, are far better preserved and use the verb ἀποκυαμεύω to stipulate that the treasurers are to be chosen by lot.[1842] There are a handful of other such decrees, passed in democratic Athens, that use various words derived from κύαμος to mean "(democratically) select by lot".[1843] A speech of Andocides preserves a decree passed after the restoration of democracy in Athens.[1844] The decree is dated as the first sitting of the Council of Five Hundred, chosen by lot (οἱ λαχόντες τῷ κυάμῳ). The fact that the Council had been chosen by lot was evidently considered to be an important feature of the newly restored democracy. The evidence for fifth-century Ionia is unsurprisingly scarcer and there seems to be no extant

[1840] Hdt. 6.109.2; Thuc. 8.66.1; Xen. *Mem*. 1.2.9; Arist. *Ath. Pol*. 24.3, 32.1; Plut. *Per*. 27.2; Lucian *Vit. Auct*. 6
[1841] *IG* I³ 41.105
[1842] *IG* I³ 52.13-4
[1843] *IG* I³ 258.13-4; *IG* II² 1172.13-4
[1844] Andoc. 1.96

inscription featuring the word. As has been argued above, selection by lot was certainly associated with democracy even if it was not its sole preserve.

Even if Wilhelm's interpretation is not correct, these lines certainly suggest a recent political upheaval and a change in attitude to people who had held office in the recent past. The editors of *IK Erythrai* suggest that these ex-magistrates had previously been stripped of the right to stand for office during a democratic revolution, and that this penalty had extended to their descendants as they often do during episodes of *stasis* and major political change.[1845] Now that the democracy needs to be protected, the editors propose, an appeal is made to these descendants to do so in return for their full citizenship rights back. This is only one possible interpretation, but it seems likely that these people who had at some point lost their rights are having them restored. This seems more likely than that their loss of rights is being reinforced; there seems little point mentioning them if their circumstances have not changed. An alternative is that if the democracy has now been in existence for some time, it is not that it needs to be protected but it is stable enough for the Erythraeans to feel that they can relax their policy on these ex-magistrates and their children.

The extant part of the third column also begins midway through a sentence. It says that the sons of illegitimates are to be "supervised" (perhaps a euphemism for "punished") and enslaved (l.2-9) and sets out fines for citizens (literally "he who is the son of a genuine [citizen]") who do not show up at court even though called by the *prytaneis* (l.9-18). It seems that illegitimates are defined as those whose fathers do not have full citizenship (literally "born from a bastard" – ἀπὸ νόθο), which suggests that citizenship is patrilineal and does not require both parents to be citizens. Aristotle describes a comparable law about bastards at Athens, which prescribes that when a man

[1845] Engelmann & Merkelbach 1972:29-30

is to be registered on the rolls of his deme at age 18, if a court decides that he is not free or legitimate, the state sells him.[1846] Aristotle is talking about the "present constitution", so even in the early fourth century citizenship was thus limited. Such laws do not tell against a democracy because it was a given for citizenship to be limited. Pericles' citizenship law, which confined citizenship to those whose parents were both citizens, was passed under a democracy.[1847] It was democratic in the truest sense of the word, which is to say that it empowered the social and political unit of the deme, where citizenship was granted and tested.[1848]

Fifth-century democratic Athens proves that the Greeks saw no contradiction in a democracy that excluded both slaves and women from its roster, nor did they conceive of democracy as being a universal value. On the contrary, ancient chattel slavery and democracy went hand in hand, "inasmuch as a democrat's ideological commitment to freedom was premised on his freedom from legal servitude, and to equality on his being considered equal only to his (male) citizen peers, not his society's more numerous unfree members, who were...un-persons".[1849] The concept of citizenship was predicated on there being a larger portion of the population who lost out on it. The deme citizen-list might have reflected a cross-section of society but it was still a cross-section of (male, freeborn) full citizens. Membership in the religious, political and military community was based on membership in a tribe. The tribal procedure of voting to accept a man as a citizen when he reaches eighteen and writing his name on the citizen-list is only necessary if there are some people who will fail the test and therefore be denied access to politics at a local and a national level.[1850] Scrutiny (*dokimasia*) of

[1846] Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 42.1
[1847] Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 26.3
[1848] Cartledge 2016:89-90
[1849] Cartledge 2016:296
[1850] Aristot. *Ath. Pol.* 42.1-2

incoming councillors required them to prove not just that they were legitimate citizens but that they were third-generation Athenian citizens.[1851] Long after the birth of democracy, the Athenian *demos* "was still defined as a closed group whose membership was hereditary and rigidly transmitted by descent"; it was not simply "the Athenian population".[1852] If the Athenians prided themselves on their autochthony and purity of descent, Pericles' citizenship law only served to "purify" their descent further. In Athens as elsewhere, the *demos* (people) was a *genos* (race). The myth of autocthony was a "charter for asserting a communal identity distinguishing Athenians from refugees" (and other non-citizens).[1853]

Even in modern democracies, citizenship is almost always defined by those whom it excludes. The notion of citizenship "seems to articulate a universal potential, and also to close it down, defining a community that is smaller than humanity and directing its members to serve each other and themselves preferentially over others".[1854] As noted in the introduction, the very fact of living in a country is not considered grounds for citizenship rights in a similar way to how the rights of metics were restricted in ancient Athens. Indeed, the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, which restricted not just naturalisation but immigration itself, had its place in American democracy as late as the twentieth century.[246] In many countries citizenship is a prerequisite for owning property, and in most countries immigrants must apply for and obtain citizenship no matter how long they have been resident in the country. Only then are they granted the right to vote, access welfare provisions, and other rights reserved for citizens. The ideology behind restricting citizenship in the modern day can perhaps be summed up

[1851] Aristot. *Ath. Pol.* 55.3
[1852] Asmonti 2015:67
[1853] Rose 2012:328
[1854] Lane 2014:185

by the controversial claim of Theresa May during Britain's departure from the European Union that "if you believe you are a citizen of the world, you're a citizen of nowhere". [1855] Regardless of the philosophical arguments for and against such a worldview, it is one that seeks to strengthen a community by limiting membership of it. The idea that limiting citizenship is compatible with – even enhances – democracy is still current.

In the inscription, the finer points of this section on citizenship are unfortunately obscure because of the state of the *stele*, but what is noteworthy is that the criteria for citizenship are being revised at all. This might suggest that Erythrae had only recently become a democracy and that part of the process was redefining citizenship so as to work out exactly who the *demos* was. After a change of constitution – especially one in which a large number of people had just been enfranchised - it would only be natural to set out whose rights were what. In a similar way to Pericles' citizenship law defining who got to take part in Athenian democracy in its early stages, this inscription seems particularly concerned with sorting the legitimate from the illegitimate.

It is likely, however, that sons of illegitimates are only to be enslaved if they commit an offense now lost to us. The word restored for lines 1-2 of fragment *c* is [ἐπι]οπ[τεύ]εν ("watch" or "punish"). This restoration seems likely enough given that the same verb features a few lines below in relation to legitimate citizens. Since bastards and then legitimate sons are dealt with in turn, it makes sense that the same law is being dealt with but the consequences for disobeying it are different for the two different groups. if this is the case, it is not simply that as a blanket rule all illegitimate sons are to be enslaved. If they do not appear before the *prytaneis*, they are to be enslaved; if

[1855] https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-37788717

fully enfranchised citizens do not appear before the *prytaneis*, they face a fine of half a stater.

Wilhelm suggests that under the oligarchy the sons of freedmen and foreigners, the sons of those of dubious origin, and bastard sons, had all been allowed privileges of which they are now stripped.[1856] The only problem with this view is that according to what is left of the law, all of these groups except for bastards are in fact being given rights rather than having them taken away. Indeed, the rather euphemistic "those not brought up according to the traditions" (μὴ κατὰ νόμον τραφὲς) might actually refer to bastard sons. If this is the case then they, too, are given the right to prosecute even though they are also liable to be enslaved if they break the law. If these are not bastard sons they must not be considered full citizens for another reason, such as that they never underwent ephebic training. [1857] Whatever the precise reason for their disenfranchisement, Wilhelm may be right that under the oligarchy, citizenship had been rather less precisely defined. There is more need to define citizens' rights in a state that professes equality for all than one in which it is obvious where the power lies. It may have been felt necessary to define the new democracy in terms of those whom it excluded from citizenship, in order to make the citizen body more cohesive at the local (*deme* or tribe) level. As we have seen, this presents no more of a contradiction than excluding from democracy slaves, women, metics and even occasionally those of the lowest property class.

The extension of the right to prosecute to those not brought up "according to the tradition", sons of freedmen and foreigners gives the overall impression that Erythrae is democratic and taking steps to define its democracy by broadening participation in

[1856] Wilhelm 1909:139
[1857] Engelmann & Merkelbach 1972:29

public affairs but at the same time excluding some groups (notably, sons of illegitimates) from citizenship and placing harsher penalties on them than on full citizens. It also gives the impression that a crisis of some sort has precipitated the need for these measures, which seem especially concerned that all citizens appear in front of the *prytaneis* when ordered. The editors of *IK Erythrai* envisage a wartime scenario in which all men must be available to be called upon for guard duty against attack by either the Persians or a group of displaced aristocrats.[1858] A crisis precipitated by *stasis* or war would help to explain why the inscription seems so concerned with holding magistrates to account and keeping citizens and non-citizens in line. If this is the case, the question is whether this decree and the regulations for Erythrae are both a reaction to the same threat, and if not, which came first.

The date of the democratic decree from Erythrae

In recent years there has been a general consensus that the decree is democratic but no consensus on dating it; some believe it precedes the Athenian regulations for Erythrae, while others believe it embodies and is intended to protect the newly formed democracy.[1859] Accordingly, it has been dated either pre-454 or 455-2 based on the conventional date for the Athenian regulations. As we have seen, the Athenian regulations for Erythrae were dated to our just after 454 B.C. based on the evidence of the tribute quota lists. The Erythraean decree certainly should not be dated after the regulations simply because it bespeaks a democracy. Jeffery dates the inscription "*c*.465?" without an explanation; this dating is presumably guided by Highby's date for the Athenian regulations for Erythrae.[1860] Jeffery's dating is perhaps also based on the fact that the inscription features sampi, which only occurs elsewhere in Ionia in the

[1858] Engelmann & Merkelbach 1972:31-2
[1859] Arnaoutoglou 1998:62-3; Simonton 2018:510-1
[1860] Jeffery 1961:344 no.52

sixth and early fifth centuries, at Ephesus and Teos.[1861] It has not yet been found after 450 B.C.[1862] The editors of *IK Erythrai* choose a date before the intervention.[1863] They do so on the basis that lines 23-5 set a minimum of 61 jurors serving in the *dikasterion*, although they do not explain why the size of the *boule* must have been influenced by the size of the *dikasterion* rather than vice versa. It has been argued that the regulations for Erythrae must impose a democracy rather than adapt a pre-existing one, because of the way that the appointment of councillors is only temporary and to be changed in the future (l.12-15).[1864] However, the fact that some of the provisions are only temporary merely shows that the Athenians did not expect to change the Erythraean constitution overnight. Moreover, as previously discussed, the use of the definite article when referring to the *boule* (l.13, 14) suggests that a *boule* already existed and was being adapted rather than created. Koch assumes that the criteria for *dioxis* in the Erythraean decree are modelled on, though deviate slightly from, the Athenian process of *dioxis*.[1865] This leads him to argue that the Athenians had already intervened at Erythrae. Yet since the criteria are different, perhaps the process is not modelled on Athens at all. In fact, it is unlikely to be, because as previously discussed the term *dioxis* has a non-technical meaning in Athenian literature and is rare in Attic inscriptions, whereas it turns up in Erythraean and Tean inscriptions of the fifth century.[1866]

The question of the decree's date is an important one. If it predates the regulations for Erythrae, there is the chance that Erythrae became democratic before the Athenians interfered in their constitution. This would mean that rather than turning

[1861] Jeffery 1961:325; cf. SEG 19.686 = *ML* 30, SEG 34.1079
[1862] Meiggs & Lewis 1969:62-3
[1863] Engelmann & Merkelbach 1972:20, 24
[1864] Kolbe 1938:251
[1865] Koch 1991:77
[1866] Liddel 2010:119-20

an oligarchy into a democracy overnight, the Athenians sped up a process of democratisation that had already begun in Erythrae. That the Erythraean decree is older than the Athenian regulations should not be ruled out, and indeed the use of sampi supports this hypothesis. Although the regulations for Erythrae show that Athens had a keen interest in the town's political setup, it does not prove that Athens set up a democracy from scratch. The possibility that Erythrae became a democracy of its own accord, as other towns in the Greek world seem to have done in the sixth and fifth centuries, is fascinating. If the Erythraean decree comes after the regulations, as is generally believed, the Athenian model was evidently not followed to the letter. It would mean that even after the Athenian intervention, Erythrae still employed small juries with limited membership based on a property qualification.[1867] This is not irreconcilable with democracy but it is not democracy on the Athenian model.

The fact that the jury is to be comprised of at least 61 people may not be a coincidence if the Athenians had already established a council of 120; this would ensure that more than half of the elected council had to serve on the jury. It is equally possible that the Athenians did not come up with the number 120 out of thin air but tailored their changes to fit what already existed. In other words, finding a jury size of 61 in Erythrae, the Athenians decided to double this number to create a permanent council of 120. It may alternatively be that there is supposed to be no relation between the jury size and the council size, for it would be strange for the council to serve double duty as jurors. At the height of the Athenian empire, Aristotle says that Athens employed 6000 jurymen, although it is hardly likely that they all served at the same time.[1868] In Aristotle's own day the Athenian jury was made up of anywhere between 40 and 1500 men depending

[1867] Rhodes & Lewis 1997:369
[1868] Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 24.3

on the case; the fourth-century writer states that most courts consist of 500 members.[1869] Cases involving very small sums were decided by 40, while claims under 1000 drachmas came before a court of 201 and cases over that amount came before a court of 401. Andocides compares a case in which there were allegedly 6000 jurors to one which had only 200; whether or not he is exaggerating it is clear that the size of the jury could fluctuate enormously.[1870] All the while, the Council had exactly 500 members. The two were evidently not the same group not only because the jury seems frequently to have been larger, but also because someone who was rejected by the Council could appeal to the jury.[1871] Where connections can be drawn between inscriptions there is perhaps a tendency to overemphasise features that might be pure coincidence, and the fact that the Erythraean jury is just over half the size of the Council may be one such coincidence.

In his discussion of the Athenian regulations for Erythrae, Peter Liddel notes that the use of the word δίωξις does not tend to be used to mean "prosecution" in Athenian decrees, but crops up with this meaning in other decrees of Erythrae (including the one in question) and neighbouring Teos.[1872] The early fifth-century Teian curse against rebels contains amongst other things an oath not to prosecute (διώκω) anyone without a quorum, probably of 200 people.[1873] If the term δίωξις has a specific legal meaning in Asia Minor that it does not have in Athens, this suggests that Athens was aware of local legislation and made an effort to tailor its decrees to the subject city. It also suggests that the Athenians made a conscious effort to build on systems that were already in place in allied cities rather than trying to impose a one-size-fits-all democracy

[1869] Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 53.2-3, 68
[1870] Andoc. 1.17
[1871] Lys. 26.6
[1872] Liddel 2010:119 on *IG* I³ 14.11
[1873] *SEG* 31.985.13

on Athens' model. A similar lexical oddity is the use of the word κύαμος to denote sortition of magistrates.[1874] That specific meaning of the word is not often found outside Athens, so it could be that by using the same technicality in the regulations for Erythrae, the Athenians were using a term already familiar to the Erythraeans. Yet the alternative is that the Athenians are using a peculiarly Athenian term despite its unfamiliarity to an Erythraean audience.

Interestingly, the 61 jurors are to swear "the same oaths as the *bouleutai* according to the laws and the decrees". Are these the same oaths as those to be sworn by the newly installed councillors of the regulations for Erythrae?[1875] Perhaps, but again the evidence could work either way. The Athenians could have instituted the oath to be sworn by the councillors, or they could merely have changed an existing oath. Prescribing a council of 120 on the basis of a pre-existing jury of 61 might be another example of such tailoring. Hansen and Nielsen note that lines 13-14 of the regulations for Erythrae suggest that Erythrae already had a *boule* when Athens intervened.[1876] If the restoration τ]ὲν μὲν ν[ῦν] βολὲν is correct, it would then seem that an already existing *boule* is being referred to. The existence of a *boule* does not tell us that Erythrae was already democratic, but it does tell us that the Athenians were making changes to a *boule* rather than starting from scratch. If Athens wanted such major changes to succeed, it would make sense to take into account the pre-existing arrangements in the allied city in question. Moreover, if Athens merely consolidated a democracy that was already taking shape in Erythrae, we need not see the changes set out in the decree as monumental or particularly radical. Rather than imposing democracy, perhaps Athens was making the rather safer decision to speed up a process that was already in motion.

[1874] Liddel 2010:119
[1875] Francesconi 1967:360
[1876] Hansen & Nielsen 2004:1075

Another clue that Erythrae may have been a democracy before the Athenians arrived comes from the fact that in the inscription from Erythrae, there is still a property qualification for those who want to serve as jurors (l.16-18). Small though it may be, it means that not everyone has access to political office. This is of course different to Athens, where Ephialtes had reformed the courts so that citizen males over 30 were chosen by lot to form the jury.[1877] The regulations for Erythrae as they stand contain no such property qualification, nor would we expect to find one if Athens was helping to set up a radical democracy along the lines of Athens' own.

In light of the inscriptional evidence from Erythrae, it is not impossible that the Erythraean decree predates the regulations for Erythrae, and that Athens tightened up a democracy that was already in its first stages. According to Herodotus, the cities of Ionia had already tasted democracy after the Ionian revolt, even if only briefly.[1878] Whether or not we believe this particular claim of Herodotus', the Ionians had rebelled from Persia for their freedom and to obtain *isonomia*. The word *isonomia* is in fact only used by Herodotus in relation to Persia and Ionia at the turn of the sixth century.[1879] As we have discussed in the Introduction, the precise definition of *isonomia* is somewhat nebulous but this is something of a moot point because Herodotus in fact goes so far as to use the word δημοκρατία. It may not have taken Athenian encouragement for many of the Ionian cities to begin to move towards democracy, albeit not democracy on the Athenian model. Francesconi points out that an alternation between narrow oligarchy or tyranny and democracy must have formed the political experience of many of the Ionian cities, including Erythrae, in the early fifth century.[1880] This is certainly what the

[1877] Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 24.3, 63.1
[1878] Hdt. 6.43
[1879] Hdt. 3.80, 3.83, 3.142, 5.37
[1880] Francesconi 1967:365

combined evidence of Herodotus and inscriptions concerning Erythrae lead us to conclude. That the Erythraean decree has features of both democracy and oligarchy should not surprise us, nor should it lead us to date the decree after Athens' intervention.

Erythrae in the Athenian tribute quota lists

Since Erythrae's tribute record has influenced so much of the writing of its history, it is worth re-examining. There are two places called Erythrae on the tribute lists, the other being the town in Boeotia. This can be confusing, for example in 450/49 when Boeotian Erythrae is listed above Byzantium and Miletus, two towns in Asia Minor more associated with the eastern Erythrae.[1881] In 450/49 Erythrae first appears, paying in *synteleia* with its dependencies. It is convincingly restored in the following year (448/7) paying for the Polichnitai, with the other dependencies paying for themselves.[1882] The restoration is made secure by what is left of the ethnic and its position in the list. The first and last two letters of the ethnic survive, with a lacuna of six letters in the middle: Ἐ[ρυθραῖ]οι. Below are the largely intact names of Polichna, Sidousa, Elaioussa and Pteleon, which frequently appear alongside Erythrae whether in syntely or not. In 447/6 they pay on their own, with the other groups paying for themselves again.[1883] For none of these three years does the amount paid by Erythrae survive. Erythrae next appears in 444/3, paying 7 talents; in that year the Polichnitai and the Elaiousioi have Ἐρυθ and [Ἐρυ]θραί respectively written beside their names.[1884] This could be simply to identify them as dependencies of Erythrae, since they are separated from Erythrae on the list and the others that they are usually grouped with do not appear at all. Thus, although they pay separately, care is taken to identify them as

[1881] *IG* I³ 263 col.V.13
[1882] *IG* I³ 264 col.III.28-30a
[1883] *IG* I³ 265 col.I.58-64
[1884] *IG* I³ 268 col.I.27-8, col..II.27

belonging to Erythrae. Their separation from Erythrae on the list suggests that they paid at a different time and separately. For the next two years Erythrae and its amount are completely restored.[1885] For the year 440/39, Erythrae's name is restored from a single iota, but the restoration is plausible since the amount (7 talents) is to be expected and its entry appears above that of the Polichnitai, Pteleousioi and Elaiousioi (and Boutheia and the Sidousioi, also plausibly restored).[1886] In the following year Erythrae appears but the amount it paid as a tithe to Athena does not.[1887] For the year 438/7 Erythrae and three of its dependencies are completely restored on the basis of the appearance of the Polichnitai and Sidousioi; this particular list is in such a bad state that it is very shaky evidence for all but a handful of towns that do appear for certain.[1888] The editors of the *ATL* restore the towns on the basis that "the members of the Erythraean group normally appear not only together, but often at the end of the Ionic panel".[1889] Yet they do not always appear in the same order, and they do not all always appear. As we have seen, the variation in the ways that each town appears on the lists is huge.

After a gap of four years, Erythrae reappears paying the tithe to Athena for a – restored - total of 10 talents 1100 drachmas on behalf of its dependencies in 433/2.[1890] In 432/1 it pays the same amount again, presumably for the group although no mention is made of no mention is made of *synteleia*.[1891] If it is paying on behalf of the other towns, it was evidently not considered essential to make this clear. This means that where the dependencies are not named, we cannot be entirely sure that Erythrae was not paying on their behalf. Almost as though to compensate for this, in 430/29 the point

[1885] *IG* I³ 269 col.I.20; *IG* I³ 270 col.I.22
[1886] *IG* I³ 272 col.II.16-21
[1887] *IG* I³ 273 col.I.32
[1888] *IG* I³ 274 col.III.6-11
[1889] Meritt, McGregor & Wade-Gery 1939:186
[1890] *IG* I³ 279 col.I.48-9
[1891] *IG* I³ 280 col.I.40

is rather laboured: each of the dependencies is listed separately with the qualification Ἐρυθραίον.[1892] Erythrae's name is restored above these, although it should be noted that all that remains on the stone is –ῖοι and no amount for any of the towns listed. That section of the stone is extremely poorly preserved and their entries are preceded and followed by several lacunas. It is conceivable that Erythrae is not the entry above the group of five dependencies, and that they were categorised as "of Erythrae" precisely because Erythrae itself was missing. Care was taken to categorise them thus to show that even though they were not paying in *synteleia* with Erythrae, they still belonged to Erythrae. The bottom line is that Erythrae does not feature on the list as it stands.

Even stranger is the fact that at the end of the same column for the year 430/29, Erythrae appears with its five dependencies (almost completely restored) below it, under the heading "these cities paid to [...] from their tribute".[1893] The authors of the *ATL* restore "the army" into the lacuna. If their restoration is correct, this means that Erythrae paid its tribute directly to the Athenian army rather than having its tribute collected in the usual manner. Ron Unz suggests that this unusual entry is due to the exceptional piety of a particular commander in the field who still felt it necessary to dedicate a sixtieth of Erythrae's contribution to Athena.[1894] Other cities appear under similar rubrics that are generally interpreted to mean that the cities contributed directly to local forces.[1895] The uncommon nature of these payments opens up the possibility that a less pious general might not have bothered to send Athena's tithe to Athens. This means that there were payments made in the field, of which the tribute quota lists record no trace.

[1892] *IG* I³ 281 col.I.19-24
[1893] *IG* I³ 281 col.I.61-6
[1894] Unz 1985:31-2
[1895] *IG* I³ 281 col.II.37-41; *IG* I³ 282 col.I.15-6; Meritt, McGregor & Wade-Gery 1939:449

It seems that the restoration of Erythrae from -θραῖοι is secure, for no other known tribute-payer's ethnic has the same ending. Although the initial theta is difficult to make out, the rest of the letters are clearly visible. The restoration of Sidousioi from –σι- is less so. The two letters are barely visible on the stone because they are on the very bottom of the fragment and only the top of each letter is discernible. As a result, Paarmann chooses to restore Erythrae's name but not that of Sidoussa.[1896] Even if they are the correct letters, Sidoussa is far from the only possible restoration. Several towns and their ethnics have those two letters as their fifth and sixth letters, including Miletus, Myus, Hamaxitus, Berytis, Lepsimandus, Scapsa, Coresia, Ialysus, or even the once-attested Prassilus.[1897] The rest of the towns' names are completely restored. Whether or not the usual group is listed beneath Erythrae's name, it is fairly certain that Erythrae's name appears in the list here. In fact there is no positive evidence that Erythrae is listed in a group; rather, what remains on the stone looks like Erythrae listed separately from the rest of its syntely. The extraordinary way in which it pays separately from its dependencies, perhaps directly to the army, makes one wonder whether there was unrest in this year.

In the following year, there is no extant entry for Erythrae. Boutheia is restored from an uncertain omicron and a final sigma in a very lacunose part of the list, so it cannot confidently be claimed that Boutheia appears without Erythrae.[1898] The entire list for 429/8 is something of a mystery.

In the list for the year 428/7, Erythrae's entire name and tribute amount survives: inferring from the *aparchai* lists, it pays 12 talents separately from Boutheia,

[1896] Paarmann 2007b:65
[1897] *IG* I³ 285 col.III.10
[1898] *IG* I³ 282 col.IV.38

which pays 1000 drachmas, and Polichna, which pays half a talent.[1899] Presumably, Erythrae's higher figure accounts for the Sidousioi, Polichnitai and Pteleousioi, though we cannot know for sure. Erythraeans in the genitive plural appear in the uncertainly dated list of 427/6 or 426/5, but it seems to be the Boutheians and Elaiousioi who are paying and being described as Ἐρυθραίον; in any case, no amount survives.[1900] In the list that has been traditionally dated to 416/5 but whose date is contested, Erythrae appears right at the end with no amount and no dependencies, and finally it is plausibly restored in the list for 415/4 but no amount survives.[1901]

It is difficult to say much about Erythrae's tribute because it is often tied up with the tribute of five other towns, and it is often missing. Amount and ethnic are only recorded in full in two instances. In 444/3 it for certain pays the quota for 7 talents separately from the other five towns, and in 428/7 it pays the quota for 12 talents, perhaps also on behalf of the Sidousioi, Polichnitai and Pteleousioi.[1902] Usually the temptation is to link variations in tribute to changes in Athens' relationship with the contributor in question, but Erythrae's tribute is also affected by its relationship with its own dependencies, and perhaps the tribute it was paying to Persia. The evidence for its dependencies is similarly patchy: the amount that Boutheia pays on its own only survives in full three times. In 453/2 it pays 3 talents, in 447/6 it pays 600 drachmas, and in 428/7 it pays 1000 drachmas.[1903] The rest of the time either its tribute or its ethnic is restored, or often both are entirely. Even more striking is the fact that its name Boutheia (rather than the ethnic "Boutheians") never appears securely on the lists, yet the editors of the *ATL* restore its name from –ια in the list for 442/1. The only other

[1899] *IG* I³ 283 col.III.28-30
[1900] *IG* I³ 284 l.3
[1901] *IG* I³ 289 col.I.45; *IG* I³ 290 col.I.29; Kallet 2004:480-7
[1902] *IG* I³ 268 col.II.27; *IG* I³ 283 col.III.29
[1903] *IG* I³ 260 col.X.5; *IG* I³ 265 col.I.62; *IG* I³ 283 col.III.29

times we find the name Boutheia on the lists, it is completely restored, with its tribute either completely or partially restored. This is the case for the lists dated to 443/2, 440/39, 439/8 and 438/7.[1904] In the list for 442/1, Erythrae and Elaioussa are completely restored. Thus, we cannot be sure that the name Boutheia, rather than the ethnic "Boutheians", ever appeared on the tribute quota lists.

A particular issue is that for some years, the initial numeral is lost. This is the case for Erythrae's tribute in 433/2 and 432/1. The editors of the *ATL* restore a chi as the initial numeral so that the total amount paid is 10 talents 1100 drachmas. Yet Hampl restores a delta so that the amount paid is only 1500 or 1700 drachmas, and uses this to support his theory that Athens installed a cleruchy in Erythrae between 440 and 433.[1905] The difference between the two possible restorations is enormous. The restoration of the editors of the *ATL* is more in line with Erythrae's other payments around that time, but that does not invalidate Hampl's proposal. The Athenians may well have considered it a good idea to install a cleruchy in Erythrae both as a check on its inhabitants and to keep an eye on the surrounding area in Asia Minor. Yet this suggestion is pure speculation when we cannot be certain that Erythrae's tribute was reduced, let alone that the reduction was the direct result of the installation of a cleruchy.

Sean Jensen argues that when there is a big increase in tribute, it may because there is a change from *apotaxis* to *synteleia,* as happens in 433/2 when Erythrae likely pays the quota for 10 talents 1100 drachmas.[1906] Jensen calculates that this is over a talent more than Athens previously received from the towns individually. We can be relatively certain that Erythrae paid that amount because only the initial numerals for each line are missing. However, we cannot be certain that the increase in tribute

[1904] *IG* I³ 269, 270, 272, 273, 274
[1905] Hampl 1939:37
[1906] Jensen 2012:489

accompanied the change from *apotaxis* to *synteleia*, because prior to 433/2 the last time any of the Erythraean towns appears on the lists is in 438/7 and even then, four of the towns are completely restored. Jensen goes back a year to 439/8 to compare the total tribute, but the amounts for every single town (and many of the towns themselves) are completely restored.[1907] Similarly, Jensen notes a reduction from 9 talents to 7 talents 5700 drachmas when *apotaxis* occurs in 444/3; yet Erythrae's amount of tribute is restored for every year prior to 444/3, including 447/6 when it supposedly pays 8 talents 4000 drachmas and 2000 drachmas on behalf of Polichne.[1908] 447/6 is a particularly difficult year to analyse because Erythrae appears to pay only on behalf of Polichne and the other four towns pay for themselves. Moreover, the editors of the *ATL* record part of a numeral next to οὗτοι ἀπεῖγον, between the entries for Erythrae and Polichne, which does not obviously belong to either town.[1909] It may be a transcription error, for it is directly above and beside two etas, but equally it might be Erythrae's tribute since the fragment does not include a numeral next to Erythrae's name. The editors' drawing of the fragment shows the numeral sitting slightly higher than the words οὗτοι ἀπεῖγον, although this may simply be an idiosyncrasy of their drawing. The numeral must be extremely faint, for it does not show up in their photograph of the fragment or on squeezes. Nor does it show up in two previous drawings of the fragment done by Meritt and West, who revise the reading of the line taken from Lolling's copy in *Inscriptiones Graecae* and write, "there is no trace of numerals on the stone".[1910] What traces of it that the editors record do not even make certain that it is an eta. The fact that this list is almost identical to the previous list in 448/7 does not help us, for no amount survives

[1907] *IG* I³ 273 col.I.32-col.II.6
[1908] *IG* I³ 265 col.I.58-64
[1909] Meritt, McGregor & Wade-Gery 1939:26, Plate VIII
[1910] Meritt & West 1925:267, Plate II; Meritt & West 1926:69-70, Plate VII; Kirchhoff 1877:71

on that list either.[1911] Thus, we must exercise extreme caution when making deductions about Erythrae's tribute. Not only is there an additional factor to account for fluctuations in tribute (*synteleia* and *apotaxis*), but also these fluctuations are difficult to track with so few secure amounts recorded on the stone.

Jensen has studied these changes and concludes that *apotaxis* happened in response to appeals for adjustment to the tribute process, but that Erythrae never completely lost control of its dependent towns.[1912] Since we have evidence for towns appealing to Athens to have their tribute lowered and these processes tended to change the overall amount of tribute owed, it is likely that *syntely* and *apotaxis* happened at the instigation of Athens rather than the communities themselves.[1913] For our purposes it does not make much difference whether they were *poleis* in their own right or subdivisions of the *polis* of Erythrae. Jensen argues convincingly that since Athens rearranged the towns into *synteleia* after years of their paying separately, it cannot be the case that Athens only ever employed *apotaxis* to weaken states with a divide-and-conquer mentality. Jensen believes that the total amount paid by Erythrae in *synteleia* is more than it pays on its own after *apotaxis*, though it is difficult to tell when the amount paid seldom survives.[1914] If *apotaxis* sometimes reduced the overall amount of tribute, it is clear that there were other factors guiding Athens' decision to separate the payment of neighbouring towns. Perhaps some towns themselves applied for *apotaxis* if they felt that they had to pay on behalf of dependencies that were not pulling their weight financially. Athens may have preferred the six towns to pay together if it eased tribute collection, or if it was felt that the dependencies were less vulnerable to Persia

[1911] *IG* I³ 264 col.III.28-30a
[1912] Jensen 2012:493-4
[1913] Antiphon *On the Tribute of Lindus* and *On the Tribute of Samothrace*; *IG* I³ 61
[1914] Jensen 2012:489-92

that way. The fact that Athens chose to reintroduce *synteleia* for the six Erythraean towns, not once but twice, "should cast doubt on the supposition that some ever-tightening knot of hegemony dominated the League".[1915] When it comes to the way that the Delian League was transformed into an empire, we tend to look for imperialism as a motive behind Athens' changes in policy. However, in the case of *synteleia* and *apotaxis* Jensen persuasively shows that Athens made decisions based on individual cases rather than implementing a blanket policy of aggressive imperialism. The tribute record for Erythrae and its five related towns is complex and clearly not the result of a single decision by Athens. Evidently there were different benefits and setbacks to both *synteleia* and *apotaxis* for Athens and its allies.

It is intriguing that in 453/2, when Erythrae does not appear, Boutheia is listed on its own paying the quota for 3 talents.[1916] Boutheia's tribute quota amount is restored more often than not, but in 447/6 one can infer that it pays only 600 drachmas and in 428/7 it pays 1000 drachmas.[1917] Scholars explained Boutheia's high tribute by postulating that around 454, Erythrae revolted and the Erythraeans loyal to Athens fled to Boutheia and paid from there.[1918] Robertson suggests that Erythrae had not even joined the Delian League by 454 "and was opposing the League foothold at Butheia", hence its absence from the list.[1919] However, the list from that year is so lacunose and we know so little about the process of *synteleia* and *apotaxis* that Boutheia's payment hardly proves that Erythrae was in revolt. It has already been argued in the case of Miletus that towns will have made the decision to join or not to join the Delian League based on more than mere neighbourhood rivalry. Besides, Robertson himself considers

[1915] Jensen 2012:484
[1916] *IG* I³ 260 col.X.5
[1917] *IG* I³ 265 col.I.62; *IG* I³ 283 col.III.29
[1918] Gehrke 1985:67
[1919] Robertson 1980:91 n.55

the possibility that Erythrae's absence is accidental. Boutheia appears on the first quota list but the amount it pays is unknown, so it is impossible to tell whether three talents is a sudden leap or whether it had been assessed thus since joining the League.[1920] Boutheia may have been paying on behalf of the other dependencies, since their names do not appear on the first two quota lists. It is evident that despite their size, these dependencies were capable of paying a considerable sum, for in 428/7 we find Boutheia paying 1000 drachmas and Polichna paying 1½ talents.[1921] It would be different if there were some literary evidence to back up the theory of revolt, but the only other evidence available to us is the insecurely dated Erythrae decree. Therefore, Robertson's argument based on the tribute quota lists is unconvincing.

In the combined evidence of the tribute quota lists and another Athenian inscription, there is possible evidence for a colony at Erythrae. An Athenian fragment of an inscription, dated c.450 based on letter forms, reads thus: τε̃ς ἀποι[κίας] τε̃ς ἐς Ἐρ-[...].[1922] The editors of the Athenian Tribute Lists postulate that a colony was placed in Erythrae in the 440s, when Erythrae and neighbouring Haerae's tribute amounts are lowered.[1923] The other possible restoration is Eretria, but the regulations for Chalcis and Eretria do not in their extant form mention a colony and the only known colony in Euboea is that in Hestiaea.[1924] The problem with this is that for all entries before the 440s, Erythrae's tribute is restored, so it is not certain that its tribute was reduced by the time we find it paying 7 talents in 444/3. Haerae's tribute is cut by two-thirds between 447/6 and 446/5, but Erythrae's situation is much less clear.[1925] It would make

[1920] *IG* I³ 259 col.V.19
[1921] *IG* I³ 283 col.III.29-30
[1922] *IG* I³ 513
[1923] Meritt, Wade-Gery & McGregor 283-4
[1924] *IG* I³ 39,40; Thuc. 1.114.3
[1925] *IG* I³ 265 col.II.52; *IG* I³ 266 col.I.12

sense that a colony was established in Erythrae, since the town lay in an area subject to Persian influence. When this colony was established is not clear. From what little evidence we have, Erythrae's tribute does not seem to go down so much as up. The lowering of tribute in the 440s is only hypothetical given that the first amount that survives on the stone is for the list of 444/3. The only certain changes are actually increases in tribute, which may be explained by *synteleia*. If Hampl is right that Erythrae's tribute dropped dramatically after 440, perhaps a colony was installed in the decade between 443 and 433; however, his argument relies solely on a restoration of the relevant quota lists.[1926]

The Decelean War and beyond

In 412, Erythrae revolted from Athens in concert with Chios and became allied to Sparta.[1927] While Erythrae was in revolt, the Athenian generals Leon and Diomedon managed to use Sidousa and Pteleon as bases from which to attack Chios, which had also revolted.[1928] Yet Thucydides is able to describe Sidousa and Pteleon as "in Erythraean territory", suggesting that both places were still dependencies of Erythrae. It is testament to the complexity of the political situation on the coast opposite Chios that while Erythrae had gone over to Sparta (perhaps due to Persian influence), neighbouring Sidousa and Pteleon remained loyal to Athens. During the period 412-394 Erythrae was likely a Spartan-backed decarchy.[1929] It remained allied to Sparta and oligarchic until its "liberation" by the Athenian Conon in 394. After Coronea, Erythrae was induced by Pharnabazus and Conon to secede to Athens; it expelled its Spartan garrisons and the newly reinstated democracy honoured Conon as *proxenos*.[1930] The

[1926] Hampl 1939:37
[1927] Thuc. 8.6.3-5, 8.14.2
[1928] Thuc. 8.24.2
[1929] Diod. 14.3.4; Xen. *Hell.* 3.4.7; Plut.*Lys.*13.3
[1930]Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.1; Diod. 14.84.3-4; *I. Erythrai* 1.6 = RO 8

decree honouring Conon contains a democratic decree formula. Another inscription from around the same time, concerning the building of a temple for Athena Pandemos, begins ἀγαθῆι τύχηι τοῦ δήμου.[1931] It contains a democratic decree formula (l.6-7) and stresses the involvement of the public at every stage, for example by specifying that work is to be carried out according to the decree of the *demos* (l.9), inviting citizens to take action (l.12) and probably referring to documents in the public archives (l.18-9).

An Athenian decree of c.387 B.C. was excavated in Erythrae and published in 1976. It testifies to further *stasis,* likely between oligarchs and democrats.[1932] It prohibits exiles who had been driven out from being allowed to return to Erythrae without the permission of the Erythraean *demos*, ending with the tantalising half-sentence: "as for not giving up Erythrae to the *barbaroi*, respond to the Erythraeans that it has been decided by the Athenian *demos*..." It also forbids reconciliation with "those on the Acropolis" without the permission of the Athenian *demos*; these were likely members of an oligarchic group. It is generally thought that the decree marks Athens' re-establishment of a democratic constitution after another disagreement between two factions.[1933] If Athens' previous support of democracy and the use of the word *demos* to describe the Erythraeans are anything to go by, this will be the case. The familiar language of *barbaroi* (foreigners) versus *demos* (the people) makes it almost certain that Erythrae was again divided between a pro-Athenian *demos* and oligarchic *barbaroi*. Before Alexander's conquest, oligarchs controlled the city for over half a century (386-332) B.C. It was only in the late 330s that the *demos* regained power and subsequently asserted their victory by restoring the statue of Philites the tyrannicide

[1931] *SEG* 36.1039
[1932] SEG 26.1282
[1933] Aikyo 1988:22; Sato 2006:27

that had been tampered with by members of the oligarchy.[1934] It seems, then, that the rift between the *demos* and its rivals continued in the fourth century.

With the regulations for Erythrae in the state that they are in and no literary evidence to tie them to, it is impossible to say when Erythrae revolted from the Delian League. Now that nothing ties the regulations to the 450s, Erythrae might have revolted during the Thirty-Year Peace or even after the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War. It has been suggested in this chapter that Erythrae revolted in or just before 430/29, which is why its record and its relationship to its dependencies on the tribute quota list for that year is so complex. I have presented a case for the hypothesis that Erythrae was already a democracy by the time the Athenians arrived to restore order and drew up their regulations for the town. The presence of sampi in the text of the inscription from Erythrae points to an earlier date, although of course letter-forms are not conclusive evidence in themselves. What is striking is the way in which local evidence from Erythrae attests to civil unrest and displays the kind of interest in people power and shared responsibility that Athens did in the fifth century. The contents of the decrees from Erythrae, combined with their likely date, suggest that the Erythraeans were already in the process of democratising before Athens' intervention.

[1934] *I. Erythrai* 503; Teegarden 2014:142-72

Conclusion

Diodorus records an epigram inscribed on a monument celebrating the Athenian triumph over Persia at Cyprus in 449, which begins: "From the day when the sea divided Europe from Asia...", ἐξ οὗ γ᾽ Εὐρώπην Ἀσίας δίχα πόντος ἔνειμε.[1935] The first line of the Greek epigram in the Xanthus trilingual inscription is almost identical.[1936] The former epigram was meant to mark the final separation of east from west as a result of Athens' victory; the latter reclaims the line for a Lycian dynast at the end of the fifth century. Evidently the idea that a single event had separated Europe and Asia once and for all was current on both sides of the Aegean. Yet when the line was being drawn down the middle, for the Asiatic Greeks, the separation was not so clear-cut. Even the fact that this single verse was inscribed on both Greek and Persian monuments is an example of the interconnectedness between the two empires. The four towns of this study, located where they were, physically linked these two worlds. During the fifth century they became the site of the struggle between east and west.

As we have seen, various Persian rulers and satraps still claimed the towns of Asia Minor for their own by the late fifth century and there is little evidence that they had renounced their claim in the decades before. The evidence points towards the conclusion that the Asiatic Greeks were being assessed for tribute by both empires; how much they actually paid to Persia, if anything, can only be speculated. In general, the evidence that survives for Colophon, Samos, Erythrae and Miletus bears out the theory that the Peace of Callias was at best ineffectual and at worst a fourth-century fiction. Pissouthnes and Itamenes are two known Persian actors with an eye for vulnerable Athenian allies and they may not have been acting alone. The sources indicate that

[1935] Diod. 11.62.3
[1936] Bryce 1986:97; *ML* 93

despite Athens' efforts all four towns to a greater or lesser extent were exposed to the Persian threat, and this should not come as a surprise given their geographical location.

This dissertation has sought to show that Athens dealt with its allies on an ad hoc basis, sometimes seeing fit to establish a democracy after unrest but at other times leaving towns to organise their own political framework. In the case of Samos, we have a clear case of Athens imposing a democracy after the island's trouble with Miletus and, it is argued, once again after it had actually revolted and been subdued. From Thucydides' narrative it is clear that the Athenians had no qualms about changing the constitution of an allied state to try and ensure its loyalty. Yet the rest of the evidence points against the conclusion that this was a matter of course. Miletus shows signs of having been democratised, but nothing dictates that its eventual democracy was imposed by the Athenians. Early inscriptional evidence records an attempt to curb the amassing of power by a single family, and other local evidence suggests that Miletus had become a democracy by 402 B.C. at the latest. If it did revolt in or before 426/5, there is nothing in the surviving inscriptions to tie this democracy to Athens' response to the revolt. The regulations for Miletus show the Athenians tightening up control over Miletus, but not necessarily imposing a democracy. Miletus' patchy record in the tribute quota lists may point to difficulties paying tribute on both fronts rather than outright revolt from Athens. The same can be said of many towns on the tribute lists for whom a revolt has been posited on the basis of their absence from the tribute quota lists. Meanwhile in Erythrae's case, it seems that Athens sped up a process of democratisation that was already underway. This might have been in response to outright revolt, or simply a preventative measure taken because of heavy Persian influence in the area. Whatever the reality, the regulations for Erythrae contrast Athenian democracy with Medising tyranny and betray Athens' fear that the latter will

take hold in Erythrae. Finally, Colophon certainly was taken by the Persians but at a later stage than is usually believed, and seemingly without any attempt on the part of the Athenians to bring it back into the fold or install a democracy.

The second main thesis of this dissertation has been that most of these Athenian interventions happened later than orthodoxy dictates. Due to the belief that the three-bar sigma fell out of use around the middle of the fifth century, the revolts of Colophon, Miletus and Erythrae were all placed mid-century. Often, the histories of allied towns have been constructed almost solely from the evidence of the tribute quota lists at the expense of other evidence. For Colophon this was despite the fact that Thucydides records Persian interference in the 420s. The quota lists are an invaluable source of information, but they cannot definitively tell us the status of a town in any given year. Used alongside cogent evidence, they can support the hypothesis that a town was or was not in revolt. It is important to bear in mind the intended functions of the quota lists: to establish accountability in the transfer of money between the Hellenotamiae and the Logistae, and to record the tithe devoted to Athena. For Miletus and Erythrae, revolts in the 450s or earlier were posited on the basis of gaps in the tribute quota lists even though the tribute record for both towns is extremely patchy. Unfortunately, the regulations for Erythrae, recorded only in facsimiles, cannot be dated with any precision. The lettering preserved by Fauvel and Pittakys is early, and in the absence of any other evidence, all that can be said is that nothing secures the inscription to the Pentecontaetia rather than the Peloponnesian War proper. For Miletus, on the other hand, the evidence is more clear-cut. The city appears to have suffered unrest in 426/5 B.C which led to an Athenian intervention. The regulations for Miletus are fortunately archon-dated, and now that there is no need to situate them before 445, they can be assigned their proper date. Even the history of Samos was not immune to the effects of

the three-bar sigma theory, for John Barron dated the Samian *horoi* (boundary markers) on the basis of the occurrence of three-bar sigma in most of them.[1937] This informed his theory that they must have been set up by the Samian people out of loyalty to Athens before their revolt in 440. It is contended that the *horoi* were in fact set up by the Athenians in the aftermath of the revolt, to signify that Samos was now effectively an Athenian cleruchy. Now that Harold Mattingly has been vindicated in his scepticism about the validity of the three-bar sigma rule, we can begin to rearrange the jigsaw puzzle and reassess how Athens' relationship with its allies developed over the course of the Pentecontaetia and the Peloponnesian War.[1938]

As we examine the evidence for Samos, Miletus, Colophon and Erythrae, a more nuanced picture of Athens' treatment of its eastern allies emerges. It is tempting to view Athens' harsh and uncompromising treatment of Samos, to which Thucydides devotes a substantial part of his narrative, as a paradigm for other allies for whom less information survives. Yet the evidence warns against this. For one thing, there is little evidence to suggest that establishing a democracy after unrest was a routine procedure.[1939] Despite the numerous instances of Athens supporting the democrats in allied cities, and a few known instances of Athens setting up democracies, for some allied cities Athens not only permitted but supported oligarchies. The Old Oligarch provides three examples of Athenian support for "the few".[1940] One of these is Athens' support of the Milesian "best men", which is likely a reference to the fact that Athens left Miletus alone as an oligarchy for some time. As I have argued, Miletus never fully revolted but was torn in two by factional strife in 426/5. It only became a democracy at

[1937] Barron 1961
[1938] Mattingly 1996
[1939] Brock 2009
[1940] [Xen] *Ath. Pol.* 3.11

some point after that, possibly at Athens' behest but there is no solid positive evidence for Athenian intervention. Similarly, Erythrae became a democracy after suffering from factional strife, but it is not clear that the two events were linked. In other words, there is too little evidence to conclude that Athens imposed democracy on an oligarchic Erythrae after a revolt. Instead, from a combination of the local evidence and the regulations for Erythrae it looks as though the Athenians strengthened an already existing democracy. The looming Persian threat is evident in the regulations for Erythrae, with the Athenians tightening up the Erythraean democracy perhaps in an attempt to guarantee Erythrae's loyalty.

What is striking in the case of both Erythrae and Miletus is that democracy was not necessarily imposed by Athens. Local evidence from both places suggests that political power was being transferred to the people as early as the turn of the fifth century. The Milesian Blutinschrift, whose likely date is just before the Ionian revolt, shows a concerted effort to limit the power of a particular family. Three local inscriptions from Erythrae provide evidence for the democratisation of the town's political machinery, although the question of precisely when is vexed. For Colophon there is no real evidence of democracy at all in the fifth century. Even after it revolted, what is left of the "regulations for Colophon" suggests that the regulations were really for Notium. There is no other evidence to suggest that Athens imposed a democracy on Colophon itself. Moreover, Colophon (or a group of self-identifying Colophonians) continued paying to Athens long after the main town had been lost to the Persians. The situation in Colophon and the surrounding towns is especially complex, which comes as no surprise given that local evidence points towards Persians and Greeks living side by side in an area under the influence of both empires. The most straightforward interpretation of Colophon's record in the tribute quota lists is that it continued to pay

tribute to both empires even after the town was taken by Itamenes. In the past it was assumed that the Athenians made Colophon a democracy based on the precedent of Samos combined with an inscription with the restored word δεμο[κρατία], "democracy". It is proposed that the inscription actually deals with Notium, a known colony to which some democratic Colophonians had fled after the pro-Persian faction had gained control of their town around 430.

Another aim of this dissertation has been to try to resist an Athenocentric approach to the rise of democracy in Greece. Herodotus' claim that Mardonius set up democracies all over Ionia remains controversial. In this study it has been taken at face value, in the absence of evidence to contradict it or alternative accounts. Yet regardless of the fate of Ionia after the Ionian Revolt, studies such as Robinson's have provided ample evidence for the democratisation of Greece in the early fifth and even late sixth centuries.[1941] Chios has evidence of democratic mechanisms as early as the first half of the sixth century. Towns such as Elis, Argos and Teos and likely many towns in Sicily all developed their own democracies independently of Athens in the early fifth century. All of this is to say that democracy should not be seen as an Athenian phenomenon or necessarily influenced by Athens, although Athenian democracy may have been qualitatively different from the democracies in these towns. Comparison between Athenian democracy and early democracies in other towns is made complicated by a dearth of evidence outside Athens. Because Athenian democracy is by far the best-attested and most famous, there is a temptation to assume that it must have been the model for all other democracies that formed at a similar time. Yet there is enough evidence to state confidently that democracy was gaining enough popularity elsewhere in Greece in the first decades of the fifth century for Herodotus' claim that a Persian

[1941] Robinson 2011

satrap went around installing democracies not to be totally incredible. Moreover, regardless of the truth of that specific claim, there is enough evidence of democracies emerging elsewhere in Greece to support the idea that some of Athens' allies became democratic of their own accord.

Each case study has sought to construct the town's history using as much local evidence as possible, with as few preconceptions about Athenian imperialism as possible. The result has been a more nuanced story of Athens' relationship with its eastern allies. By endeavouring to date inscriptions according to their most likely historical context rather than their lettering, this study has also brought forward many of Athens' interventions to the Peloponnesian War proper. These had previously been dated to the Pentecontaetia. This is a continuation of the important work that Mattingly and Papazarkadas started by "reshuffling the chronological cards".[1942] However, it has been careful not to down-date inscriptions with three-bar sigma just because we now can. Unlike Mattingly's study, it has tried to move away from preconceptions of Athenian and specifically "Periclean" imperialism. The evidence of the Athenian Tribute Lists, vital for our understanding of the workings of the Athenian empire, have formed an important part of the story. I have used the quota lists to corroborate other evidence rather than as definitive proof of allied revolts. The lists are not straightforward evidence, with many questions surrounding the way they have been assembled and restored. Meritt, McGregor and Wade-Gery's edition of the lists is indispensable to any study of the Athenian empire, but it is one interpretation of an incomplete and enigmatic body of evidence.

Taking away the assumption that Athens felt an ideological or imperialistic compulsion to impose democracy on other members of the Delian League, this study

[1942] Mattingly 1996; Papazarkadas 2009

proposes that some allied cities came to democracy of their own accord and on their own terms. Towns like Erythrae and Miletus appear not to have had democratic constitutions imposed on them from the outside, but had already developed some democratic mechanisms by the time Athens got involved. For Colophon, there is simply not enough evidence to say how it became democratic but there is no positive evidence that Athens was the driving force behind the process. Rather than having a consistent and coherent policy, the Athenians dealt with their allies on an ad hoc basis, supporting whichever faction was most likely to guarantee loyalty and stability at the time. The term "democracy" is used in a broad sense, in line with the limited evidence available for most towns. Where there is evidence for giving power to the people and implementing measures to stop it from being concentrated in the hands of the few, this has been interpreted as democracy. The focus has been not on how democratic these towns were (a question which cannot be satisfactorily answered), but how people power began to develop in eastern Greece during a time of conflict and competing influences. Many of the conclusions reached have been by necessity tentative due to the state of the evidence. It is hoped that they will provide the starting point for future discussions in an area for which new evidence is rare, but new interpretations of the evidence are much needed.

Appendix A: The Regulations for Samos (*OR* 139)

NB. Fornara separates fragments *a* and *b* from *c* and *d*.[1943]

frg. *b*.

— — — ọ — — — — — — — — — — — — — — —
— — — απ̣ι — — — — — — — — — — — — — —
— — — Σαμίος δὲ ο]ικε^ν[*or* τὲν πόλιν τὲν *h*εαυτõν?
— — — Λε͂μνο[ν — — — *or* — — — ἐν] Λεμνο[ι— — —
— — —.ι καθάπ̣[ερ — — —
— — — οι καταȿ — — —
— — — ?καὶ τõν λοι]ποῦ νέσ[ον* — — —
— — — δὲ ἐν τε͂[ι — — —
— — —]ȿοι δὲ κα[θελε͂ν — — —
— — —τὸ͂ λοιπὸ͂] χρόνο ὑπαρχεν? — — —
— — — παραδõ͂ναι δ’α]ὐτὸς Ἀθεν[αὶ]-
[οισι τὰς ναῦς ἐς τὸν ἐσιόντα ἐνια]υτόν : *h*οσα δ’Ἀ]
[θεναῖοι χρέματα ἐΣαμοι ἀνέλοσα]ν ἀποδ[οναι Σ]-
[αμίος ἐς τὸν εἰρεμένον χρόνον· ἄνδρα]ς [δὲ ?*h*ομέ]-
[ρος (e.g. *h*ἕκατον) δõ͂ναι αὐτὸς Ἀθεναίοις—]

lacuna

frg. *c*.

[— — — 8 — — κατὰ τάδε Σαμίος ὀμόσαι· δράσο καὶ ἐ]-
[ρὸ͂ καὶ βολεύσο *h*ό τι ἂν δύνομ]αι ἀγαθόν, [καὶ οὐ]-
[κ ἀποστέσομαι ἀπὸ τὸ͂ δέμο τὸ͂ Ἀ]θεναίον οὔτε λ[ό]-
[γοι οὔτ’ ἔργοι ?οὐδενί οὐδὲ τõν] χσυμμάχον τõν Ἀ-
[θεναίον, βοεθέσο δὲ καὶ ἀμυνὸ͂τ]οῖ δέμοι τοῖ Ἀθ-
[εναίον. τάδ’ ὀμόσαι Ἀθεναίος· δρ]άσο καὶ ἐρὸ͂ καὶ]-
[βολεύσο ἀγαθόν τοῖ πλέθει τοῖ] Σαμίον *h*ό τι ἂν
[δύνομαι αδόλος ποιόντον Σα]μίον κατὰ *h*ὰ χ]-
[συνέθεντο τοῖς στρατεγοῖς τοῖς] Ἀθεναίον. [..]
[— — — — — — — 29 — — — — — — — —]κράτε[….]

frg. *d*.

[στ]ρατεγο[ὶ Ἀθεναίον *h*οίδε ὄμοσαν·..] | […Ἐρε]-
χθείδος : Δεμ[— — 5 — — Αἰγείδος : ? Ἄγνον Φορμίον Πα]-
νδιονίδος : Χ[αρισανδρίδες Λεοντίδος : Περικλ]-
ε͂ς : Γλαύκον Ἀ[καμαντίδος : — — — — — 17 — — — — —]

frg. *a*.

[..]ίδος : Χ̣ȿ[— — — — — 16 — — — — — — ?*h*ο]ίδ[ε ταχσίαρχ]-
[οι — — — — 16 — — — — ?Ἀντικλ]ες : Τλεμ̣π̣[όλεμος]
[— — — — — — — 24 — — — — — — — — —]: βολὲ ἔ̣ρχε ΙΟ[..]
[— — — — — — 18 — — — — — — — προ͂τ]ος ἐγραμμάτευε Ῥα-
[μνόσιος. *vacat*] *vacat*
vacat

* Previous editors followed Pittakys in restoring Πελο]ποννεσ[—.

[1943] Fornara 1979

Appendix B: The Regulations for Colophon (IG I³ 37)

NB. Tracy separates fragments *b* and *c* from fragments *a* and *d*.[1]

frg. *d*.

[ἔδοξεν τεῖ βολεῖ καὶ τοῖ δέμοι· …c.9.… ἐπρυτά]-
[νευε, ..c.8…]ος [ἐγραμμάτευε, ..c.7.. ἐπεστάτε, .c.2.]
[….] εἶ̣πε· Κ̣[ο]λ[ο]φο[ν — — — — — — — — — — — — — —]
[..c.7..]σ̣ —
[….]ες Ἀ̣θενᾳ —
[…]EONT[..] αὐτο —
[.2-3.]αι δὲ ταῦτᾳ π — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — —
[..] ἐ[χ]ς ἄλλες [π]όλ̣ε[ος — — — — — — — — — — — — — —]
[. Κ]ολ̣φοῦνα ο[ἰ] π̣ο — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — —
[.2-3.] κ̣ατ —

lacuna

frg. *a*.

[…….15.……]ᾳ̣ι Τ̣ριοπίο ε — — — — — — — — — — — — —
[…8…. ψέφ]ισμα γένεται, ὁς — — — — — — — — — — — — —
[..5.. ἐν τούτ]οι τοῖ χρόνοι δὲ Λ — — — — — — — — — — —
[…9..… Κο]<λ>οφονίον καὶ τ̣ο̣[ν — — — — — — — — — τε̣]-
[ς Ἀθενᾶς τε̃ς] Ἀθενο̃ν μεδεόσ[ες — — — — — — — — — — —]
[….10….]α δ’ ἐκένο τοῖ ἐ — — — — — — — — — — — — —
[…10.….] Κολοφονίον π — — — — — — — — — — — — — — —
[….11…..] δ̣ὲ γένεται ἐπ — — — — — — — — — — — — — —
[..5.. Ἀθεν]αῖοι ἐὰμ μέ τις αὐ̣[το — — — — — — — — — —]
[…8….]· οἱ δ’ αἱρεθέντες πέ[ντε οἰκισταὶ οἱ ἐς Κο]-
[λοφο̃να τ]ά τ’ ἐψεφισμένα φρᾳ̣[ζόντον τε̃σι πόλεσι κα]-
[ὶ ἐπιμελ]εθέντον, ὅπος ἂν — — — — — — — — — — — — — —
[οἱ οἰκέτ]ορες μετὰ το̃ δέ[μο το̃ — — — — — — — — — — —]
[…7…] ἱερο̃ν το̃ν παρ’ α[υτοῖς· το̃ν δὲ αἱρεθέντον λα]-
[μβανέτο] ἕκαστος τε̃ς ἐμ[έρας ἑκάστες ἐς ἐφόδια δρ]-
[αχμέν· τὸ] δὲ ἀργύριον ὀφε[λόντον Κολοφόνιοι καὶ Λ]-
[εβέδιο]ι καὶ Διοσιρῖται κ — — — — — — — — — — — — —
[..6… Κ]ολοφονίον μ — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — —
[… γέν]ε̣ται ὅ̣ [τ]ι ἂν δί[καιον — — — — — — — — — —]
[..6…]μ[.]ε[.] ἑκαστο̣ — — — — — — — — — — — — — — —
[..6…] ὅταν δὲ γέ[νεται? — — — — — — — — — — — — —]
[… τὰ ὀ]νόματα? — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — —
[…. το]ῖς δὲ Κ[ολοφονίοις? — — — — — — — — — — —]
[…8….]οι —

lacuna

frg. *b*.

[..6…]ο̣ιν —
[Κολοφ]σ̃νι αρο —
[….]νασ̣λε —
[τὸ] δὲ ψέφισμ[α τόδε καὶ τὸν ὅρκον ἀναγραψάτο ὁ γραμ]-
[μα]τεὺς ὁ τε̃ς β[ολε̃ς ἐστέλει λιθίνει ἐμ πόλει τέλεσ]-
[ι τ]οῖς Κολοφο[νίον· Κολοφσ̃νι δὲ ταῦτα καὶ τὸν ὅρκ]-
[ον] ἀναγράψαν[τες ἐστέλει λιθίνει οἱ ἐς Κολοφσ̃να]

οἰκισταὶ κατα[θέντον ἐν τόποι ὅτοι τάττει Κολοφ]-
ονίον ὁ νόμος· [Κολοφονίος δ’ ὀμόσαι· δράσο καὶ ἐ]-
ρο͂ καὶ βολεύσο [ὅ τι ἂν δύνομαι καλὸν καὶ ἀγαθὸν πε]-
ρὶ τὸν δε͂μον τ[ὸν Ἀθεναίον καὶ περὶ τὲν ἀποικί]-
[α]ν καὶ οὐκ ἀποσ̣τ[έσομαι το͂ δέμο το͂ Ἀθεναίον οὔτε]

frg. *c*.

[λ]όγοι οὔτ’ ἔργ[οι οὔτ’ αὐτὸς ἐγὸ οὔτ’ ἄλλοι πείσομαι]
[κ]αὶ φιλέσο τὸ[ν δε͂μον τὸν Ἀθεναίον καὶ οὐκ αὐτομο]-
[λ]έσο καὶ δεμο[κρατίαν οὐ καταλύσο Κολοφο͂νι οὔτ’ α]-
ὐτὸς ἐγὸ οὔτ’ ἄ[λλοι πείσομαι οὔτ’ ἐς ἄλλεν ἀφιστά]-
μενος πόλιν ο[ὔτ’ αὐτόθι στασιάζον, κατὰ δὲ τὸν ὅρκ]-
ον ἀλεθε͂ [τ]αῦτ[α ἐμπεδόσο ἀδόλος καὶ ἀβλαβο͂ς νὲ τὸν]
[Δ]ία καὶ τὸν Ἀπό[λλο καὶ τὲν Δέμετρα, καὶ εἰ μὲν ταῦτ]-
[α] παραβ<α>ίνοιμ[ι ἐξόλες εἴεν καὶ αὐτὸς ἐγὸ καὶ τὸ γ]-
[έ]νος τὸ ἐμὸν [ἐς τὸν ἅπαντα χρόνον, εὐορκο͂ντι δὲ εἴε]
μοι πο[λ]λὰ καὶ [ἀγαθά — — — — — — — — — — —]
[*vacat*?]

Appendix C: The Regulations for Miletus and the Blutinschrift

IG I³ 21

[Μι]λεσ̣ί[οις χσυγ]γρ[αφαί]·
[ἔδοχσεν] τεῖ βολεῖ κα[ὶ τοῖ δέμοι· ….ὶς ἐπρ]υτάν[ευε, …… ἐγραμμάτ]-
[ευε, ….]ορ ἐπεστάτε, [Εὔθυνος ἔ̃ρχε· τάδε *h*οι χ]συνγγρα[φε̃ς χσυνέγραφσαν· τε]-
[λε̃ν τὰ ν]ομιζόμενα το[ῖς θεοῖς, *h*αιρε̃σθαι δ]ὲ πέντε ἄν[δρας τὸν δε̃μον ἐχς *h*απ]-
[άντον α]ὐτίκα μάλα ὑ̣[πὲρ πεντέκοντα ἔτε] γεγονότ[ας, ἐχσομοσίαν δὲ μὲ ἓ̃να]-
[ι αὐτοῖς μ]εδὲ ἀνθ<α>ί[ρεσιν, τούτος δὲ ἄρ]χεν καὶ συν[……19..……]
[…7..…]οις προσερ[…..13..……]ι μετὰ το ᾳ̣ι[…….20…..……]
[….8….]ενεσι καὶ τ̣ο[….10..……]γος τὸς Μιλ[εσίον ……16...……]
[…..7.. Μιλ]εσίον τὸ[ς …7…]ρ̣γος δεκατο[……22..……]
[…...11…..] τριερ[……] τ̣ὸν στρατιο[τ]ίδ[ον …….19...……]
[……22..……] ὅπλα παρέχεσθαι κ̣[……..21……]
[……..22……]ε· ὑπερετε̃ν [δ]ὲ τού[τοις …….18...……]
[……..20…… τέ]τταρας ὀβο[λὸ]ς π[……23..……]
[……..21……]ον *h*εκ<ά>στο [τσ̃] σόμ[ατος ……20...……]
[……...16….. Ἀθέν]αζε τοῖς στρ[α]τιό[τεσι ……21...……]
[……...17…… Ἀθέ]ναζε *h*ό τι δ’ ᾷ̣[ν] τὸ […….26…..……]
[……...19…… *h*]οπόσα ἂν λάβο[σι …….26...……]
[……..20……]οντος κ[.]ο̣τ[……..29……]
[……16..…… Ἀθέν]αζε *h*ο[…]μ[……30...……]
[……..21……] Ἀ̣θέ[ν]εσ[ι …….30.……]
[…….21.……]#[7][..]αυτ[…….31.……]
[…….13……]ο̣ι[…. *h*.]ι δὲ σ[……34...……]
[…….13……]ιαν[…..]υ[……...34……]
[…..10.….] τ̣ριάκον[τα ……..39……]
[….6.. πρ]εσβευτὲς ἓ̃ ε[……40..……]
[….6.. μ]εδὲν μέτε ἐνδε[……38...…… τ]-
[σ̃ν χσυ]μμάχον *h*ό τι ἂμ μὲ Ἀθε[ναίοις ……29...…… ἄτ]-
[ιμο]ς ἔστο καὶ τὰ χρέματα α[ὐτσ̃ δεμόσια ἔστο τε̃ς τε θεσ̃ τὸ ἐπιδέκατον· τὰ]-
[ς] δὲ δίκας ἓ̃ναι Μιλεσίοις κα[……35…..……]
δραχμὰς ἀπὸ τσ̃ν ἐπιδεκάτο[ν ……32…...…… τὰ]
δὲ πρυτανει̃α τιθέντον πρὸς [τὸς ἄρχοντας ……23...…… *h*α]-
[ι δ]ὲ δίκαι Ἀθένεσι ὄντον ἐν τ[……30..…… Ἀνθεσ]-
[τε]ριοῖνι καὶ Ἐλαφεβολιοῖνι· *h*[οι δὲ ……32…...……]
[..]νέμαντες καὶ κλερόσαντε[ς ……34..……]
[…]όντον δύο τσ̃ν ἀρχόντον κ[αὶ ……22..…… καὶ *h*ο μισθὸς δ]-
[ιδό]σθο τοῖς δικαστε̃σιν ἐκ τ̣ο̣[ν πρυτανείον ……24..……]
[…] π̣αρεχόντον τὸ δικαστ[έριον ……22..…… ἐν τοῖς μεσὶ]
[τοῖς] προερεμένο̣[ι]ς ἓ̃ εὐθυν[όσθον ……30...……]
[… π]ρὸς τὸς ἄρχοντας τὸς Ἀθ[εναίον ……29..……]
[…..] Ἀθέναζε τοῖς ἐπιμελε̣τ[ε̃σι …….31.……]
[…..]αι καθάπερ πρὸ τσ̃ καὶ ἐμ[……34...……]
[……]ς ἐπιμελόσθον *h*οι πέν[τε ……32…...……]
[….. δι]καστέριον καθίζει κ[……..34……]
[……] πορευομένοις ἓ̃ναι ε[……..34……]
[….][.. *h*]οι ἄρχοντες *h*οι Ἀθενα[ίον ……30…...……]
[..] τελε̃[σθα]ι· τὰς δὲ *h*υπὲρ *h*εκατὸ[ν δραχμὰς ……25..……]

[. ἐ]ν στέλει [κα]ὶ τοῖς φσεφίσμασ[ι ……32..……]
[..] μὲ διαφθεί[ρεν] μεδὲ κακοτεχν[εῖν …11..……· ἐὰν δέ τις τούτον τι παρ]-
ᾳβαίνει, γραφαὶ [ὄ]ντον κατ᾽ αὐτο῀ π[ρὸς τὸς ……26…..……]
50 ται· ἐσαγόντον μ[ὲν αὐ]τὸν ἢ ἐς *h*ένα [……..22……· τιμάτο δὲ τὸ]
δικαστέριον *h*ό τι ἂγ χ[ρῆ]ι παθεῖν ἢ ἀ[ποτεῖσαι ……21..…… τὰ]
[φ]σεφίσματα τὰ Ἀθεναίο[ν δ]εμευσα[…….31.……]
[.]χοσι λαβόντες· ἀποδόντ[ον δὲ *h*]ένͅ[ινα ……..25…… χρυ]-
σίο *h*ε πόλις ἀποδότο τὲν τιμ[……36…..……]
55 καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν ἐπιγραφὰς μὲ πο[ιεῖν ……31…..……]-
ς περὶ τῶν χρεμάτον τε῀ς ἐσφορᾶ[ς ……..30…… κ]-
ᾳτεδικάσαντο ἀλλέλον *h*οι οἴκοι οἰ[κοῦντες ……25…..……]
[τ]ὲμ πόλιν *h*ε῍χον ἢ ἄλλει τινὶ ζεμία[ι ……29..……]
[ἀν]απόμπιμα ε῎ναι τοῖ ὀφλόντι παρὰ τ[……..29……]
60 [. ἀπ]οδοῦναι ἢ χρέματα ἢ ἀργύριον ἀπὸ [……29.……]
[…5..] ἐπ᾽ Εὐθύνο ἄρχοντος· *h*ὸς δ᾽ ἂμ μὲ [……29.……]
[….c.8….]ναι *h*οι πέντε *h*οι ἄρχοντες καὶ ἐχσεν[…….c.28……]
[….8….]ϰ ν φανον δίκαι ὄντον Ἀθένε[σι ……26..……]
[…..10.….] ν ἐναντία τοῖς Ἀθεναίον σ[……27..……]
65 [……12.……] *h*οι πρυτάνες *h*οι Μιλεσ[ίον ……24..……]
[…….15.…… *h*]εκάτεροι τὲμ πόλιν [……27..……]
[…7.…]ο[……..11…..] Μ̣ιλεσίον τον *h*[…….27.……]
[….5..]εσχο[……12.…… *h*]οι μὲν Ἀθε[ναῖοι ……22..……]
[…6.. ἐ]χσορϰ[…8.….]ε[…5.] [..]πει [……27...……]
70 [….7… *h*]οι δὲ ἄ[λλοι Μι]λέσ̣ι[οι ……34…..……]
[…..9….]ορκό[ντον δ]ὲ *h*οι πέν̣[τε ……32...……]
[….9.….] ἐόντο[ν πρὶ]ν ἂν ὀμόσε[ι ……...31……]
[…..10.….]ς ὄντο[ν Μι]λέτο *h*ος ἂν σ[χ]ε̣ῖι *h*ε[……25…..……]
[…..10.….] ἐπιμελ[ό]σθον *h*όπος ἂν ἄριστ[α ……..24……]
75 [.4.. τῶν Μιλ]εσίον ἢ [το῀]ν φρουρῶν κύριοι ὄ[ντον ……21…..……]
[…..10.….] μέζονο[ς ἄ]χσ[ι]ος ἒ῀ι ζεμίας Ἀθε[ν…….23……]
[..6… ἐπι]βαλόντε[ς *h*]οπόσες ἂν δοκεῖ ἄχσ[ιος ……21……]
[…8…. ἐσφ]έρεσ<θ>[αι ἐ]ς τὸν δε῍μον *h*υπὸ το[……24……]
[..5.. ἐφσεφ]ίσθαι αὐ[το]῀ς ἔτι εἴτε ἄλλο τι δ[…….23……]
80 [….10….]οντες Μ[ιλέ]σιοι· ἐὰν δὲ σοφρονσ῀[…….23……]
[….10….]ν δέοντ[αι· π]ερὶ δὲ Ἀρνασσ῀*h*ε βο[λὲ ……22……]
[….11…..]ατ[..6…]τον *h*όπος ἂν ἄρχοντ[αι ……21...……]
[….9…. *h*]ε βολ[ὲ τε῀ς φ]υλακε῀ς· τῶν δὲ φσεφ[ισ……22…..……]
[…8….ος] ἂν ἐπιτ[ελε῍ται *h*ε βολὲ αὐτοκράτ[ορ ἔστο ……17...……]
85 […6… ἀποσ]τελάντο[ν τὸ] φρορίδε καὶ τὸς ἀ[……24...……]
[……10….]σι τον ἐπ᾽ [Εὐθ]ύνο ἄρχοντος [— — — — — *rasura* — — — — —]
[— — — — — — — — — — — — — *rasura* — — — — — — — — — — —]
vacat

***OR* 123 (*I. Milet* 1.6 n.187)**

[— — — 15 — — —]σ[— —5— —τ]ο[.Ν]υμφαρήτο καὶ Ἄλκι[μον]
[καὶ Κ]ρεσφόντην [τὸ]<ς>* Στρατώνακτος φεύγεν τὴν ἐπ᾽ αἴμ[ατ|ι]
[φυγὴν] καὶ αὐτὸς [κα]ὶ ἐκγόνος, καὶ ὅς ἄν τινα τούτωγ κ̣α̣τ̣[α]-
[κτείν̣ε]ι, ἑκατὸν [στ]ατῆρας αὐτῶι γενέσθαι ἀπὸ τῶν
[χρημά]̣των τῶν Ν̣υμ[φαρή]το· τὸς δ̣᾽ ̣ἐπιμηνίος ἐπ᾽ ὧν ἂν ἔλθωσ|ιν
[οἱ κατα]κτείναν̣τες ἀποδοῦναι τὸ ἀργύριον· ἢν δὲ μή, αὐτὸ|[ς]
[ὀφε]ίλεν. ἢν δὲ ἡ πόλι[ς ἐ]γκρ̣α̣τ<η>ς γένηται, καταᾳ̣κτεῖναι
[αὐ]τὸς τὸς ἐπιμηνίος [ἐ]π᾽ ὧν ἂν λαφθέωσιν· ἢν δὲ μὴ κατα-
[κτ]ε̣ίνοσιν, ὀφείλεν ἔ[κ]α̣στον πε̣ντήκοντα στατῆρας·
τὸν δ᾽ ἐπιμήνιον, ἢν μὴ προθῆι, ἑκ̣α̣τὸν στατῆρας ὀφείλε[ν].
καὶ τὴν ἐσιο̃σαν ἐπιμηνίην ἀιὶ ποιε̃ν κατὰ τὸ ψήφισμα·
ἢν δὲ μή, τὴν αὐτὴν θωιιὴν ὀφείλεν. *vacat*
vacat

* The stone has [τὸ]ν.

Appendix D: The Regulations for Erythrae and Inscriptions from Erythrae

OR 121 (IG I³ 14)

[ἔδοχσεν τεῖ βολεῖ καὶ τοῖ δέμοι· — — — — — ἐπρυτάνευε — — — — —]
[….] ἐπεστάτε· Λ[…] Γ [—ἐγραμμάτευε· — — — — εἶπε· Ἐρ]-
[υθραί]ος ἀπάγεν σ[ῖ]το[ν ἐ]ς Παναθέναια τὰ μεγάλα ἄ[χσιον μὲ ὀλέ]-
[ζον]ος ἢ τριῶν μνῶν καὶ νέμε[ν] Ἐρυθραίον [τ]ο[ῖ]ς παροῦσι|[….]
[..τὸ{ι}ς *h*ιεροπο[ι]ὸς ΑΠΗΔΙΝΟΝΜΙΘΑΝΟΙ·ἐὰν δὲ ἀπαγ …[….]
[…]ν ἄχσια[.] ἢ ΤΙΠΟΣΜΝΕΟΚΑΙΑΤΑΣΕ..ΕΝΗΑΠΡΙΣΘΑΙΒΙ [— — c.4 —]
[…]ΣΗΒΛΚΕΑΤΜΟΝΗΟ . ΟΥΧΙΟΨΟΝΟΣΣΤΙΝΑΧΑΝΡΛΧ [— — c.9 —]
[…]ΡΕΟΝΟΣ . ΟΑΣ[….]λον τοῖ βολομένοι· Ἐρυθραίον…[….]
[.κ]υάμον βολὲν ΟΝΑΚ εἴκοσι καὶ *h*εκατὸν ἄνδρας· τὸν δὲ κ[υάμ]-
[ε]υθέντα ΘΕ . ΘΕ . ΘΝ . ἐν τεῖ [β]ολεῖ καὶ ΕΝΟΣΕΟΟΝ εἶναι βολε[ύε]-
[ν μ]ὲ ὅλεζον ἢ τριάκοντα ἔτε γεγονότα· δίοχσιν δ’ εἶναι [τοῦ…]
ΟΣΕΙΕΧΟΕΝΟΣ. βολεύεν δὲ μὲ ἐντὸς τεττάρον ἐ{ι}τῶν [δίς. ἀπό]-
κυαμεῦσα[ι δ]ὲ καὶ καταστεῖσαι τὲν μὲν νῦν βολὲν τὸς τ’[ἐπισκ]-
όπος καὶ [τὸν] φρ[ό]ραρχον, τὸ δὲ λοιπὸν τὲν βολὲν καὶ τὸν [φρόρ]-
αρχον, μὲ ὅλεζον ἢ τριάκοντα ἐμέρας πρ[ὶ]ν ἐχσιέναι [τὲν βολ]-
έν· ὀμνύναι [δὲ? Δ]ία κα[ὶ] Ἀπόλλο καὶ Δέμε[τρα] ἐπαρομένο[ς ἐχσό]-
λειαν ἐφ[ιορκῶντι τε κ]αὶ παι[σ]ὶν ΕΧΣΟ[.]Ο[..]ΝΔΕΠΟΝΟΝΟ — — — — —
[..]ΚΑΙΑ[.]ΙΕΚΟΝ[—2-3—]ΕΙΣΟΝΝΟΕΓΟΝ δὲ βολὲν ΝΒΟL[.]ΤΟΝΕΑΤΑ[1-2—]
[.]ΟΝ|ΑΚΑΙΝΕΓΚΟΝ δὲ μέ ἔναι ζεμιῶσαι [..]ΛΕ[.]ΣΑΝΑΤ[— — — c.7 — — —]
ΟΑΝΕΟΔΕΜΟΕΟΝΝΣΟΕΝΟΝ δεῖμον κατακαίειν μὲ ὅλεζον·[— — — c.6 — — —]
ὀμν[ύ]να[ι δ]ὲ [τά]δε [τὲν] βολέν· βολεύσο *h*ος ἂν [δύ]νομαι ἄριστ[α .]
[.]ΔΕΚΑ[..]ΤΑ Ἐρυθραίον τοῖ πλέθει καὶ Ἀθεναίον καὶ τῶν [χσυ]-
νμά[χ]ον [κ]αὶ οὐκ [ἀποσ]τέσομαι Ἀθεναίον τοˉπ[λ]έθος οὐδὲ [τῶν]
χσυνμάχον τῶν Ἀθεναίον οὔτ’ αὐτὸς ἐγὸ οὔτ’ ἄλλοι πε[ί]σομ[αι]
ἀφισ[τα]μενο[ι] οὔτ’ αὐτὸς ἐγὸ οὔτ’ ἄλλον [.]ΕΙ[— — — — c.10 — — — — οὐδὲ]
τῶν φ[υγά]δον [κατ]αδέχσομαι οὐδ[ὲ] *h*ένα ΟΥΤΟΠΟΙΚΑΙΝΑ[— — 5 — —]
ΙΠΕΙΣ[.]Θ[.]Α[—1-2 — τῶν ἐς] Μέδος φευγό[ντο]ν ἄνέυ τε[ῖ]ς βολε[ῖς τ[ῆς Ἀθε]-
ναίον καὶ τοˉδέμο· [ο]ὐδὲ τῶν μενόντον ἐχσελοˉ[ἄ]νευ τε[ῖς βο[λῆς]
τε[ῖς Ἀθεναίον καὶ τ[σ]ῖ δέμο· ἐὰν δέ τις ἀποκτένει [— — — — 10 — — — — —]
ΕΟΣ *h*έτερον ἜRΤΟΙ[— 4 — —]ΟΝ, τεθ[ν]άτο ἐὰν [γν]οσθεῖ·ἐ[ὰ]ν Δ[— — 6 — —]
[.] γνοσθεῖ, φευγέτο *h*άπασαν τὲν Ἀθεναίον χσυνμαχίδ[α, καὶ τ]-
ὰ χρέματα δεμόσ[ια ἔσ]το Ἐρυθραίον· ἐὰν δέ τις [.]ΒΟ[— — — 8 — — — —]
ΟΣ[..] τὸς τυράννος ΤΕΜΝΑΝ[—1-2 —]ΟΣ ἜρυθραΙΝ καὶ [αὐτ]ὸς [— — c.6 — —]
ΧΑΠΙ τεθνάτο [κ]α[ὶ] παῖδες *h*οι ἐχς ἐκένο ΕΓ . ΝΕΟ[— — — — 10 — — — —]
ΕΙΟΘΕΜΙLΕΘ[.]ΕΧΟΣ[— — c.5 — —]παῖδες [*h*]οι ἐχς [ἐ]κέν[ο — — c.10 — —]
Ἐρυθραίο[.] καὶ […]ν Ἀθεναίον ΑΠΟΣΑΝΟΝ, τὰ δὲ χρέματα [αὐ]τὸ Τ?
traces of ten further lines, including
[— — 6 — —]ΝΑΜΕΝΕΙ[.]ΤΟΜ[.]ΟΡ[.]ΟΝ τοχσότας ΔΕΚΑΤΑ[.]ΟΙ[..]ΟΟΣΕΝ
[….]βολε[….]ΚΑΝΑ[—1-2 —]ΟΑΣΙΕΡΑ ἐκ τεῖς φυλεῖς *h*ἑκαστεῖς Χ[— 3-4 — —]

IG I³ 15

frg. *c*.
— — ΧΙ — —
— — ΔΙ — —
— — ΟΛ — —

— — ΟṆ — —

lacuna

frg. b.

[— — ..6…]ανε — — — — —
[— — ..5..]ι ἐπι — — — — —
[— — …] δραχμὰς — — — —
[— — …]παρει τα — — — —
[— — ..]ι Ἀθεναι — — — —
[— — . χ]ρεμάτον — — — — —
[— — ..]τον χιλι — — — — —
[— — χρ]έματα ⁝ ε — — — — —
[— — γ]ράφσαι — — — — — —
[— — .]ς ⁝ πρὶ[ν — — — — —]
[— — .]ι — — — — — — — —

lacuna

frg. *a.*

[— — ..5..]αχιλ — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — —
[— — ..5..]ον τριοῦ — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — —
[— — ..5..]ικον τοῦ τε#[7]#[7] — — — — — — — — — — —
[— — …. ἐ]πισκόπος αὐτῳ — — — — — — — — — — — —
[— — ..5..]αιος καὶ τἆλλα — — — — — — — — — — — —
[— — …. φ]ρόραρχον καθάπ[ερ — — — — — — — — — —]
[— — …. δ]ὲ μὲ ἔναι Ἐρυθρᾳ[ίοις — — — — — — — —]
[— — ..5..]ν μεδὲ τοχσοτα — — — — — — — — — — — —
[— — …το]ῖς φροροῖς τρ — — — — — — — — — — — —
[— — ..5..]οι καὶ Ἐρυθρα[ι — — — — — — — — — — —]
[— — ..5..]ε ἐναντίον τ[ὅ φ]ρ[οράρχο — — — — — — —]
[— — . δικά]ζεται τοῖ Ἐρυ[θ]ρ[αίοι — — — — — — — —]
[— — .. *h*ο Ἐ]ρυθραῖος τοῖ [Ἀθεναίοι — — — — — — —]
[— — . δικά]ζεν καταβαλ̣λ̣[έτο — — — — — — — — — — —]
[— — ..5..] τοῦ δὲ πρυτα[νείον — — — — — — — — — —]
[— — …. δι]κάζεν δὲ *h*ε — — — — — — — — — — — — —
[— — ..6…]ενον χ — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — —
[— — …. κα]θάπερ — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — —
[— — ..6…] ἔναι — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — —
[— — …7…] — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — —

lacuna

frg. *d.*

[— — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — τὸν δὲ *h*όρκο]-
[ν ὀμνύναι κατὰ *h*ιερῶν καιομένον Δία καὶ Ἀπόλλο καὶ Δέμετ]-
[ρα ἐ]ναντί[ον τεῖς βολεῖς Ἐρυθρᾶσι καὶ τὅ φροράρχο, ἐφιορκῶσ]-
[ι] ἐ̣παρομέ[νος ἐχ]σόλε[ιαν καὶ παισί· ὀμνύναι δὲ τὸν δεῖμον τά]-
δε· οὐκ ἀπο[στέ]σομα[ι] Ἀ[θεναίον τὅ πλέθος οὐδὲ τῶν χσυνμάχο]-
ν τῶν Ἀθεν[αίο]ν οὔτ᾽ αὐ[τὸς ἐγὸ οὔτ᾽ ἄλλοι πείσομαι, τεῖ δὲ γνό]-
[μ]ει τέ[ι] Ἀθ[ε]ναίον πείσ[ομαι· ἀναγράφσαι δὲ ταῦτα καὶ τὸν *h*ό]-
[ρ]κον ἐ[ν] λι[θ]ίνει στέλει [καὶ τὸν *h*όρκον τὸν τεῖς βολεῖς ἐμ πόλ]-
ει, Ἐ[ρυθ]ρᾶ[σ]ι δὲ ἐν τεῖ ἀκρ[οπόλει τὸν φρόραρχον ἀναγράφσα]-
ι ταὐ[τά] *vacat*

OR 122 (*IK Erythrai* 2)

frg. *a*.

[—] μηδ[ὲ]
κύαμ[ον — 6 —] μηδὲ
τιμάς· ἢν [δ’] ἁμαρτάνη-
ι, ὀφελέτω δέκα στατ-
ῆρας· δίωξιν δ’ ἔ̃ναι τ-
ῶι βολομένωι, καὶ τῶ-
ι καταλαβόντι τᾰ̃μι-
συ, τὸ δ’ ἥμισυ τῆς πόλ-
εως. ἢν δ’ ἐκχωρῆι ὁ δι-
ώξας, ὀφελέτω ὅπερ ο-
ἷ νικῶντι γίνεται, κ-
αὶ τούτο δίωξιν ἔ̃να-
ι κατὰ ταὐτά. δικάζε-
ν δὲ ἀπὸ τῶμ φυλέων ἄ-
νδρας ἐννέα ἀπ’ ἐκάσ-
της οἷσίν ἐστιν μὴ ἐ-
λάΤονος ἄξια ἢ τριή-
κοντα στατήρων, ὀμό-
σαντας τὸν αὐτὸν ὅρ-
κον τῆι βολῆι δικᾶν
κατὰ νόμος καὶ ψηφί-
σματα· πληροῦ δὲ τ[ὸ δ]-
ικαστήριον μὴ ἐ̣λ̣ά̣[σ]-
σονας ἢ ἐξήκο[ντ]α̣ κ̣α̣-
ὶ ἕνα· δικάζεν [δὲ π]λη-
σίον τιθέντα̣ κ̣ατὰ τ-
ὸ̣ν νόμον. ἐσάγεν δὲ τ-
[ὰ]ς δίκας καὶ συγγρ[ά]-
[φεν] πρυτάνεας, καὶ [γ]-
[ράφε]σθαι τὸν ὀφ[έλο]-
[ντα· ἢ]̣ν δὲ μή, αὐτ[ὸς ὀφ]-
[έλεν· ἐ]γδικάζ̣[εσθαι]
[—5—]ᾐ̣ν[— —9— —]

frg. *b*.

[…. ἀν]-
[αγράψα]-
[ι δὲ τόδ]-
[ε τὸ] ψήφ-
̣ισμα ἐ[ς]-
̣τήληι [λ]-
̣ιθίνηι
καὶ ἐς [τ]-
ὸγ κύκλ-
ον στῆσ-
αι τοῦ Ζη-
νὸς τὠγ-

ορα[ίο τ-
ὴν δευτ-
έρην πρ-
υτανη[ί]-
ην. δίωξ-
ιν δ’ ἔνα-
ι ὅτις α-
ὐτὸς ζώ-
ει μὴ κα-
τὰ νόμο-
ν τραφ-
ὲς ἢ ἐξ-
ελευθ-
έρο παῖ-
ς ἢ ξένο.
ὅτεο δὲ
̣πατὴ[ρ] ̣ἢ
παλαιό-
τερον ̣τ-
ιμὰς ἴσ-
χεν ἢ κύ-
αμον ἐδ-
[έ]ξατο [.]
[..]̣περ[.]
[…]λ[..]

frg. *c*.
[. ἐπι]οπ-
[τεύ]εν. ἢ-
ν δ’ ἀπὸ ν-
όθο ἦι, ἐ-
πιοπτε-
υέτω κα-
ὶ ὑποζυ-
γὴν ἔνα-
ι. τῶν δ’ ἀ-
ληθῶν ὃ-
ς ἂμ μὴ ἔ-
λθηι ἐπ-
[α]γγελά-
ντων τῶ-
μ πρυτά-
νεων, ὀφ-
ελέτω
ἡμιστ-
άτηρον
(ἔστω δὲ
τῶμ πρυ-
τάνεων),
ἤν τι μὴ

τῶν ἀνα-
γκαίων
ἀπέρ[γη]-
ι. *vacat*
vacat

***IK Erythrai* 1**

Ἀπελλίας εἶπεν· ὅσοι ἤδη ἐγρα-
μμάτευσαν ἀπὸ Χαλκίδευ ἔκαθ-
εν, τούτων μὴ ἐξεῖναι γραμματ-
εῦσαι ἔτι μηδενὶ μηδεμιῆι ἀρ-
χῆι, μηδὲ τὸ λοιπὸν γραμματεύ-
εν ἐξεῖναι μηδενὶ πλέον ἢ ἅπα-
ξ τῆι αὐτῆι ἀρχῆι, μηδὲ ταμίηι
πλέον ἢ ἑνί μηδὲ δύο τιμαῖς τὸ-
ν αὐτόν· ὃς δ’ ἂγ γραμματεύσηι
ἢ ἀνέληται ἢ εἴπηι ἢ ἐπιψηφίσ-
ηι, κατάρητόν τε αὐτὸν εἶναι κ-
αὶ ἄτιμον καὶ ὀφείλεν αὐτὸν ἑ-
κατὸν στατῆρας· ἐκπρηξάσθων
δὲ οἱ ἐξετασταὶ ἢ αὐτοὶ ὀφειλ-
όντων· ἄρχεν δὲ τούτοις μῆνα Ἀ-
ρτεμισιῶνα ἐπ’ ἱροποιοῦ Πόσεο-
ος·
ἔδοξεν τῆι βουλ[ῆι· ὃς ἄν ποιή]-
σηται γραμμα[τέα παρὰ τὴν στ]-
ήλην, ὀφε[ιλέτω — στατῆρας]

***IK Erythrai* 17**

μὴ συνελεο-
ρεῖν τὸν αὐτὸ-
ν μηδὲ γράφ-
εν δέκ’ ἐτέω-
ν· ἢν δὲ μή, ὀ-
φελέτω στ-
ατῆρας πέν-
τε· δίωξιν δ’
εἶναι τῶι βο-
λομένωι· καὶ
ἢγ καταλάβ-
ηι, εἶναι τῶμ-
υσυ τοῦ διώξ-
αντος, τὸ δ’ ἥ-
μυσυ Πεπρω-
ίων· ταῦτα ἐ-
ψηφίσθη ἐπὶ
Πόσιος ἐλε-
ορέοντος

Bibliography

Adcock, F.E. (1963) *Thucydides and his History*. Cambridge.

—(1940) "The Breakdown of the Thirty Years' Peace", *CAH* 5:165-92. Cambridge.

Ager, S. (1996) *Interstate Arbitrations in the Greek World, 337-90 B.C.* Berkley, Los Angeles, London.

Aikyo, K. (1988) "Clazomene, Eritre ed Atene prima della Pace di Antalcida (386 a. C.)", *Acme* 41:17-34

Amir, M. (1975) "The Athenian Empire in Asia Minor", *SCI* 2:38-72

Andrewes, A. (1961) "Thucydides and the Persians", *Historia* 10:1-18

—(1966) "The Government of Classical Sparta" in E. Badian, ed., *Ancient Society and Institutions: Studies Presented to Victor Ehrenberg on his 75th Birthday,* 1-20. Oxford.

—(1982) "Notion and Kyzikos: The Sources Compared", *JHS* 102:15-25

Arnaoutoglou, I. (1998) *Ancient Greek Laws: A Sourcebook*. London, New York.

Arrington, N.T. (2012) "The Form(s) and Date(s) of a Classical War Monument: Re-evaluating IG I^3 1163 and the case for Delion", *ZPE* 181: 61-75

Asmonti, L. (2015) "Gentrifying the "Demos": Aristocratic Principles and Democratic Culture in Ancient Athens", *Studi Classici e Orientali* 61:55-75

Badian, E., ed., (1966) *Ancient Society and Institutions: Studies Presented to Victor Ehrenberg on his 75th Birthday*. Oxford.

—(1987) "The Peace of Callias", *JHS* 107:1-39

—(1993) *From Plataea to Potidaea*. Baltimore.

Balcer, J.M. (1974) "Separatism and Anti-Separatism in the Athenian Empire (478-433 B.C.)", *Historia* 1974:21-39

—(1976) "Imperial Magistrates in the Athenian Empire", *Historia* 25:257-87

—(1977) "The Athenian Episkopos and the Achaemenid 'King's Eye'", *AJP* 98:252-63

— (1978) *The Athenian Regulations for Chalkis. Studies in Imperial Law*. Wiesbaden.

(1979) "Imperialism and Stasis in Fifth Century B.C. Ionia" in G.W. Bowersock, W. Burkhart & M. Putnam, eds., *Arktouros*, 261-8. Berlin.

(1984a) *Sparda by the Bitter Sea. Imperial Interaction in Western Anatolia*. California.

—(1984b) "Miletos and the Structures of Alliances" in W. Schüller, ed., *Studien zum attischen Seebund,* 11-30. Konstanz.

—(1985) "Fifth-century Ionia: A Frontier Redefined", *REA* 87:31-42

— (1997) "The Liberation of Ionia: 478 B.C", *Historia* 46:374-7

Bannier, W. (1925) "Zu Griechischen Inschriften. II", *RhM* 74:280-92

Barron, J.P. (1961) *The History of Samos to 439 B.C.* PhD Thesis. Oxford.

—(1962) "Milesian Politics and Athenian Propaganda", *JHS* 82: 1-6

—(1964a) "The Sixth-Century Tyranny at Samos", *CQ* 14:210-9

—(1964b) "Religious Propaganda of the Delian League", *JHS* 84:35-48

—(1966) *The Silver Coins of Samos*. London.

—(1983) “The Fifth-Century *Horoi* of Aigina”, *JHS* 103:1-12

—(1988) “Persian Occupied Thrace (Skudra)”, *Historia* 37:1-21

—(1989) “Ionia and Sparda under the Achaemenid Empire, the 6th and 5th centuries B.C. Tribute Taxation and Assessment” in P. Briant & C. Herrenschmidt, eds., *Le Tribut dans l'Empire perse : actes de la table ronde de Paris, 12-13 Décembre 1986*. Paris.

Bearzot, C. (2017) “Pissutne, Satrapo Della Lidia”, *Rationes Rerum* 9:37-57

Bearzot, C., Landucci, F., & Prandi, L., eds. (2011) *L'Athenaion Politeia Rivisitata:il Punto su Pseudo-Senofonte*. Milan.

Beck, H., ed., (2013) *A companion to ancient Greek government*. Chichester.

Behr, C.A. (1981) *P. Aelius Aristides: The Complete Works. Vol. II.* Leiden.

Bekker, I. (1837) *Aristotelis Opera. Vol. V.* Oxford.

— (1870) *Aristotelis Opera. Edidit Academia Regia Borussica. Vol. X.* Berlin.

Beloch, J. (1914) *Griechische Geschichte 2.1*. Strasbourg.

—(1927) *Griechische Geschichte 4.2*. Strasbourg.

Bigwood, J.M. (1978) “Ctesias as Historian of the Persian Wars”, *Phoenix* 32:19-41

Bilabel, F. (1920) *Die Ionische Kolonisation, Untersuchungen über die gründungen der Ionier, deren staatliche und kultliche Organization und Beziehungen zu den Mutterstädten*. Leipzig.

Birgalias, N. (2009) “Organisation and Competencies of magistrates of the Athenian State Down to the End of the Classical Period” in M. Lagogianni-Georgakarakos & K. Buraselis, eds., *Athenian Democracy Speaking Through Its Inscriptions*, 25-33. Athens.

Bleicken, J. (1979) “Zur Entstehung der Verfassungstypologie im 5. Jahrhundert v. Chr. (Monarchie, Aristokratie, Demokratie)”, *Historia* 28:148-72

Blumel, W. (1995) “Inschriften aus Karien I”, *EpigrAnat* 25

Boeckh, A. (1828) *Corpus Inscriptionum Graecarum*. *Vol. I.* Berlin.

Bolmarcich, S. (2007) “Oaths in Greek International Relations”, in A.H. Sommerstein and J. Fletcher, eds., *Horkos: The Oath in Greek Society*, 26-38. Exeter.

—(2009) “The Athenian Regulations for Samos (*IG* I3 48) Again”, *Chiron* 39:45-64

Bradeen, D.W. (1960) “The Popularity of the Athenian Empire”, *Historia* 9:257-69

—(2014) “Beyond the Three-barred Sigma: IG I3 11” in J. Bodel & N. Dimitrova, *Ancient Documents and their Contexts*, 54-66. Leiden.

Bremmer, J. (1997) “Myth as Propaganda: Athens and Sparta”, *ZPE* 117:9-17

Bridges, A.P. (1980) “The Athenian Treaty with Samos, *ML* 56”, *JHS* 100:185-8

Bondesson, B. (1936) *De Sonis et Formis Titulorum Milesiorum Didymæorumque*. Lund.

Bowersock, G.W. (1967) “Pseudo-Xenophon”, *HSCP* 71:33-55

Bradeen, D.W. & McGregor, M.F. (1973) *Studies in Fifth-Century Attic Epigraphy*. Norman.

Briant, P. (2002) *From Cyrus to Alexander: a History of the Persian Empire*. Winona Lake.

Bridges, A.P. (1980) “The Athenian Treaty with Samos, *ML* 56”, *JHS* 100:185-8

Brock, R. (2009) “Did the Athenian Empire Promote Democracy?” in J. Ma, N. Papazarkadas & R. Parker, eds., *Interpreting the Athenian Empire*, 149-66. London.

Brown, M.K. (2002) *The Narratives of Konon*. München.

Bryce, T.R. (1986) *The Lycians in Literary and Epigraphic Sources*. Copenhagen.

Busolt, G. (1885) *Griechische Geschichte bis zur Schlacht bei Chaeronea*. Vol. III, Pt. I. Gotha.

Campbell, D.A. (1982) *Greek Lyric. Vol. 1.* Cambridge, MA.

—(1993) *Greek Lyric. Vol. V.* Cambridge, MA.

Canfora, L. (1985) “Necessità e Responsabilità in Tucidide”, *Quaderni di Storia* 11:5-10

Carawan, E. (2017) “Decrees in Andocides’ on the Mysteries and ‘Latent Fragments’ from Craterus”, *CQ* 67:400-421

Cargill, J. (1983) “IG II² I and the Athenian Kleruchy on Samos”, *GRBS* 24:321-32

Cartledge, P. (1982) “Sparta and Samos: A Special Relationship?”, *CQ* 32:243-65

—(2007) “Democracy, Origins of: Contribution to a Debate” in K.A. Raaflaub, J. Ober & R.W. Wallace, eds., *Origins of Democracy in Ancient Greece*, 83-104. Berkeley, Los Angeles, London.

—(2016) *Democracy: A Life*. New York.

Carty, A. (2015) *Polycrates, Tyrant of Samos: New Light on Archaic Greece*. Stuttgart.

Cary, M. (1945) “The Peace of Callias”, *CQ* 39:89-71

Cataldi, S. (1981) “Le Disposizioni Ateniesi per Eritre e le Prime Manifestazioni dell’Imperialismo Ateniese” *Miscellanea di studi storici* 1:17-50.

— (1983a) “La Secessione dei ‘Beltistoi’ milesi e le Suggraphai ateniensi per mileto”, in S. Cataldi, ed., *Studi sui rapporti interstatali nel mondo antico*, 161-233. Pisa.

—(1983b) “Controversie fra Eritrei ed Ateniesi ad Eritre dopo la repressione della rivolta medizzante” in S.Cataldi, ed., *Symbolai e relazioni tra le citta greche nel V secolo a.c.*, 87-98. Pisa.

— (1984) *La Democrazia Ateniese e Gli Alleati*. Padova.

Cavaignac, E. (1924) “Les dékarchies de Lysandre”, *REH* 90:285-316

Cawkwell, G. (1997a) *Thucydides and the Peloponnesian War*. London.

—(1997b) “The Peace between Athens and Persia”, *Phoenix* 51:115-30

Chambers, M., Galluci, R., Spanos, M. (1990) “Athens’ Alliance with Egesta in the Year of Antiphon”, *ZPE* 83: 38-60

Chaniotis, A. (2010) “The Molpoi Inscription: Ritual Prescription or Riddle?”, *Kernos* 23:375-9

Childs, W.A.P. (1979) “The Authorship of the Inscribed Pillar of Xanthos”, *Anatolian Studies* 29:97-102

— (1981) “Lycian Relations with Persians and Greeks in the Fifth and Fourth Centuries Re-Examined”, *Anatolian Studies* 31:55-80

Cogan, M. (1981) “Mytilene, Plataea, and Corcyra Ideology and Policy in Thucydides, Book Three”, *Phoenix* 35:1-21

Connor, W.R. (1971) *The New Politicians of Fifth-century Athens.* Princeton

— (1993) “The Ionian Era of Athenian Civic Identity”, *PaPhS* 137:194-206

Constantakopoulou, C. (2007) *The Dance of the Islands: Insularity, Networks, the Athenian Empire, and the Aegean World*. Oxford.

Cook, J.M. (1961) “The Problem of Classical Ionia”, *PCPS 187:9-18*

— (1963) *The Greeks in Ionia and the East*. New York.

(1975) “Greek Settlement in the Eastern Aegean and Asia Minor”, *CAH* 2²:773-804. Cambridge.

Crawford, M. (1983) “Numismatics” in M. Crawford, ed., *Sources for Ancient History*, 185-234. Cambridge, New York.

Crielaard, J-P. (2009) “The Ionians in the Archaic period. Shifting identities in a changing world” in T. Derks & N. Roymans, eds., *Ethnic Constructs in Antiquity: The Role of Power and Tradition*. Amsterdam.

Cuniberti, G. (2000) *Iperbolo Ateniese Infami*. Naples.

Dahl, R.A. (1989) *Democracy and Its Critics*. New Haven.

Davies, J.K. (1992) “Greece after the Persian Wars”, *CAH* 5²:15-33. Cambridge.

—(2013) “Corridors, Cleruchies, Commodities, and Coins: The Pre-history of the Athenian Empire” in A. Slawisch, ed., *Handels- und Finanzgebaren in der Ägäis im 5. Jh. v. Chr.: Trade and Finance in the 5th c. BC Aegean World*, 43-66. Istanbul.

Dawson, S.E. (1996) “The Egesta Decree IG "IG" I³ 11”, *ZPE* 112:248-52

de Romilly, J. (1963) *Thucydides and Athenian Imperialism*. New York.

de Sanctis, G. (1930) “I Molpi di Mileto” in E. Albertario, P. Ciapessoni & P. De Francisci, eds., *Studi in Onore di Pietro Bonfante*, 669-80. Milan.

—(1937) “Recensione di L. Highby, *The Erythrae Decree*”, *Riv. di Fil.* 65:299-309

de Ste Croix, G.E.M. (1954) “The Character of the Athenian Empire”, *Historia* 3:1-41

— (1972) *The Origins of the Peloponnesian War*. New York.

— (2004) *Athenian Democratic Origins and Other Essays*. Oxford.

Deane, P. (1972) *Thucydides’ Dates*. Ontario.

Delorme, J. (1995) “Athènes et Milet au milieu du Ve s. av. J-C”, *Journal de Savants* 2:209–281

Demand, N. (1996) *A History of Ancient Greece*. New York.

—(1982) *Thebes in the Fifth Century: Heracles Resurgent*. London, Boston.

Deppert-Lippitz, B. (1984) *Die Münzprägung Milets vom vierten bis ersten Jahrhundert v. Chr.* Aarau, Frankfurt am Main, Salzburg.

Descat, R. (1991) “Colophon et la Paix d’Epilycos” in H. Malay, ed., *Erol Atalay Memorial*, 33-40. Izmir.

Dickinson, A.W. (1979) “A Note on Φοινίκη in Thucydides”, *CQ* 29:213-4

Dindorf, W. (1820) *Commentarii in Aristophanis Comoedias. Vol. V*. Leipzig.

Dössel, A. (2003) *Die Beilegung innerstaatlicher Konflikte in den griechischen Poleis vom 5.-3. Jahrhundert v. Chr.* Frankfurt am Main.

Dover, K.J. (1981) “The Language of Classical Attic Inscriptions”, *Transactions of the Philological Society* 79:1-14

Dubner, F. (1883) *Scholia Graeca in Aristophanem*. Paris.

Dunham, A.G. (1916) *The History of Miletus down to the Anabasis of Alexander*. London.

Dunst, G. (1961) "Zu den altmilesischen Phylen", *Forschungen und Fortschritte* 35

— (1972) "Archaische Inschriften und Dokumente der Pentekontaetie aus Samos", *AthMitt* 87:99-163

Duplouy, A. (2013) "LES MILLE DE COLOPHON: «Totalité symbolique» d'une cité d'Ionie (VI e –II e s. av. J.-C.)", *Historia* 62:146-66

Earp, A.J. (1954) "Athens and Miletus ca 450 B.C.", *Phoenix* 8: 142-7

Eckstein, A. (2013) "What is an Empire and How Do You Know When You Have One? Rome and the Greek States after 188 BC", *Antichthon* 47:173-90

Eddy, S.K. (1968) "Four Hundred Sixty Talents Once More", *CP* 63:184-95

—(1973) "The Cold War Between Athens and Persia, ca 448-412 B.C.", *CP* 68:241-53

Ehrenberg, V. (1950) "Origins of Democracy", *Historia* 1:515-48

—(1952) "Thucydides on Athenian Colonization", *CP* 3:143-9

—(1973) *From Solon to Socrates*. London

Ehrhardt, N. (1983) *Milet und Seine Kolonien*. Frankfurt am Main, Bern, New York.

—(2003) "Milet nach den Perserkriegen: Ein Neubeginn?" in E. Schwertheim & E. Winter, eds., *Stadt und Stadtentwicklung in Kleinasien*, 1-19. Bonn.

Eddy, S.K. (1973) "The Cold War Between Athens and Persia ca.448-412 B.C.", *CP* 68:241-58

Engelmann, H. & Merkelbach, R. (1972) *Die Inschriften von Erythrai und Klazomenai*. Bonn.

Erxleben, E. (1969) "Das Münzgesetz der Delisch-Attischen Seebundes", *AfP* 19:91-139, 212

—(1975) "Die Kleruchien auf Euböa und Lesbos und die Methoden der attischen Herrschaft im 5. Jh.", *Klio* 57:83-101

Evans, J.A.S. (1976) "The Settlement of Artaphrenes", *CP* 71:344-8

Fantasia, U. (1986) "Samo e Anaia" in M.G.Angeli Bertinelli & L. Piccirilli, eds., *Serta Historica Antiqua (Pubblicazioni dell'Istituto di Storia Antica e Scienze Ausiliarie dell'Università degli Studi di Genova, XV)*, 113-43. Rome.

—(1970) "Das Münsgesetz der Delisch-Attischen Seebundes II", *AfP* 20:66-132

—(1971) "Das Münsgesetz der Delisch-Attischen Seebundes III", *AfP* 21:145-62

Faraguna, M. (2001) "La figura dell'aisymnetes tra realtà storica e teoria politica", in R. W. Wallace & M. Gagarin, eds., *Symposion 2001*, 321-38.

— (2011) "Lessico e argomenti politici nello scritto del <Vecchio Oligarca>" in C. Bearzot, F.Landucci, & L. Prandi, eds., *L'Athenaion politeia rivisitata: il punto su Pseudo-Senofonte*, 73-98. Milan.

Farrar, C. (2007) "Power to the People" in K.A. Raaflaub, J. Ober, R. Wallace, P. Cartledge, & Farrar, C, eds., *Origins of Democracy in Ancient Greece*, 170-96. Berkeley, Los Angeles, London.

Ferngren, G. (1966) *A History of Samos to the Persian War*. MA Thesis. Vancouver.

Figueira, T. (1998) *The Power of Money: Coinage and Politics in the Athenian Empire*. Philadelphia.

Finley, M.I. (1942) *Thucydides*. Boston.

— (1952) *Studies in Land and Credit in Ancient Athens, 500-200 B.C.: The horos-inscriptions*. New Brunswick.

—(1962) "Athenian Demagogues", *Past & Present* 21:3-24

— (1985) *Democracy Ancient and Modern*. New Brunswick.

—(2008) "The Fifth-Century Athenian Empire: A Balance-Sheet" in P. Low, ed., *The Athenian Empire*. Edinburgh.

Fleck, R. K. & Hanssen, F. (2013) *How Tyranny Paved the Way to Democracy: The Democratic Transition in Ancient Greece, The Journal of Law & Economics* 56:389-416.

Flower, M.A. (2009) "Athenian Religion and the Peloponnesian War" in O. Palagia, ed., *Art in Athens During the Peloponnesian War*, 1-23. Cambridge.

Fontana, M. J. (1968) *L'Athenaion politeia del V secolo A.C.* Palermo.

Fornara, C.W. (1971) "The Date of the "Regulations for Miletus".", *AJP* 92:473-5

—(1977) "IG I², 39.52-57 and the "Popularity" of the Athenian Empire", *CSCA* 10:39-55

—(1979) "On the Chronology of the Samian war", *JHS* 99:7-18

—(1983a) *The Nature of History in Ancient Greece and Rome*. Berkeley, Los Angeles, London.

—(1983b) *Translated Documents of Greece and Rome, v.1: Archaic Times to the End of the Peloponnesian War*. Cambridge, New York.

—(2010) "The Aftermath of the Mytilenian Revolt", *Historia* 59:129-142

Fornara, CW. & Samons, L.J. (1991) *Athens from Cleisthenes to Pericles*. Berkeley.

Forsdyke, S. (2001) "Athenian Democratic Ideology and Herodotus' *Histories*", *AJP* 122:329-58

—(2005a) *Exile, Ostracism, and Democracy: The Politics of Expulsion in Ancient Greece*. Princeton.

—(2005b) "Revelry and Riot in Archaic Megara: Democratic Disorder or Ritual Reversal?", *JHS* 125:73-92

Forsdyke, S., Foster, E. & Balot, R., eds. (2017) *The Oxford Handbook of Thucydides*. Oxford.

Foster, E., and Lateiner, D., eds. (2012) *Thucydides and Herodotus*. Oxford.

Francesconi, F. (1967) "Per la storia di Eritre nel V sec. A.C.", *Studi Classici e Orientali* 16:359-65

Fuhrmann, M. (1966) *Anaximenis Ars Rhetorica Quae Vulgo Fertur Aristotelis ad Alexandrum*. Leipzig.

Gallo, L. (2005) "Samo e Atene" in L. Breglia, & M. Lupi, eds., *Da Elea A Samo: Filosofi e Politici di Fronte all'Imperio Ateniense*, 247-58. Naples.

Galpin, T. "The Democratic Roots of Athenian Imperialism in the Fifth Century B.C.", *CJ* 79:100-9

Gardner, P. (1882) *Samos and Samian Coins*. London.

—(1913) "Coinage of the Athenian Empire", *JHS* 33:147-88

Garnsey, P.D.A. & Whitaker, C.R. (1978) *Imperialism in the Ancient World: The Cambridge University Research Seminar in Ancient History*. Cambridge.

Gauthier, P. (1966) "Les Clerouques de Lesbos et la Colonisation Athenienne au Ve Siecle", *REG* 79:64-88

Gehrke, H.-J. (1980) "Zur Geschichte Milets in der Mitte des 5 Jahrhunderts v.Chr. ", *Historia* 29:17-31

—(1985) *Stasis : Untersuchungen zu den inneren Kriegen in den griechischen Staaten des 5. und 4. Jahrhunderts v. Chr.* Munchen.

Georges, P.B. (2000) "Persian Ionia under Darius: The Revolt Reconsidered", *Historia* 49:1-39

Georgiades, A. & Pritchett, W.K. (1965) "The Koan Fragment of the Monetary Decree", *BCH* 89:400-40

Georgoudi, S. (2001) "La procession chantante des Molpes de Milet" in P. Brulé & C. Vendries, eds., *Chanter Les Dieux: Musique et Religion dans l'Antiquité Grecque et Romaine:Actes du Colloque des 16, 17 et 18 Décembre 1999,* 153-70. Rennes.

Gigante, M. (1951) "A Pseudo-Senofonte Ἀθ. πολ. 3. 11," *Parol. del Pass*. 6

—(1953) *La Costituzione degli Ateniesi : Studi Sullo Pseudo-Senofonte*. Naples.

Gigante, M. & Maddoli, G, eds., (1997) *L'Athenaion politeia dello Pseudo-Senofonte*. Naples.

Gilens, M., & Page, B. (2014). "Testing Theories of American Politics: Elites, Interest Groups, and Average Citizens", *Perspectives on Politics* 12:564-581

Gilmore, J. (1888) *The Fragments of the Persika of Ktesias*. London.

Glotz, G. (1906) "Une Inscription de Milet", *Comptes rendus des séances de l'Académie des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres* 8:511-29

Gomme, A.W. (1936) "Euboea and Samos in the Delian Confederacy", *CR* 50:6-9

—(1940) "The Old Oligarch" in *Athenian studies presented to William Scott Ferguson,* 211-46. Cambridge.

—(1944) "Athenian Notes", *AJP* 65:321-39

—(1945) *A Historical Commentary on Thucydides, Vol. I.* Oxford.

— (1956) *A Historical Commentary on Thucydides, Vol. II and III.* Oxford.

Gomme, A.W., Andrewes, A. & Dover, K.J. (1970) *A Historical Commentary on Thucydides. Vol. V*. Oxford.

Gorman, R. J. & Gorman, V.B. (2000) "'The Tyrants around Thoas and Damasenor' (Plut. Q. G. 32.298c-d)", *CQ* 50:526-30

Gorman, V.B. (2001) *Miletos, the Ornament of Ionia*. Ann Arbor.

Graham, A.J. (1983) *Colony and Mother City in Ancient Greece*. Chicago.

—(1992) "Abdera and Teos", *JHS* 112:44-73

Greaves, A.M. (2002) *Miletos: Archaeology and History*. London and New York.

Green, P. (1984) *Lesbos and the Cities of Asia Minor*. Austin.

—(2006) *Greek History 480-431 B.C., The Alternative Version: Diodorus, Siculus; Translated, with Introduction and Commentary*. Austin.

Gschnitzer, F. (1973) *RE* Suppl. 13.730-816, s.v. *Prytanis*.

Hammond, N.G.L. (1967) "The Origins and the Nature of the Athenian Alliance of 478/7 B.C.", *JHS* 87:41-61

—(1988) "The Expedition of Xerxes", *CAH* 4²:518-91. Cambridge.

Hansen, O. (1985) "Hestia Boulaia at Erythrai", *L'Antiquité Classique* 54:274-6

—(1986) "On the Archaic Constitution of Erythrae", *L'Antiquité Classique* 55:323

Hansen, M.H. (1983) "Political Activity and the Organization of Attica in the Fourth Century B.C.", *GRBS* 24:227-38

— (1987) *The Athenian Assembly*. Oxford.

Hansen, M.H. & Nielsen, T.H. (2004) *An Inventory of Archaic and Classical Poleis*. Oxford.

Harari, Y.N. (2015) "Imperial Visions", in Y.N. Harari, ed., *Sapiens: A Brief History of Humankind*, 188-208. New York.

Haussoullier, B. (1897) "Demes et tribus, patries et phratries de Milet", *Rev. Phil.* 21:38-49

Hedrick, C.W. (1999) "Democracy and the Athenian Epigraphical Habit", *Hesperia* 68:387-439

Henry, A.S. (1978) "The Dating of Fifth-Century Attic Inscriptions", *CSCA* 11:75-108

—(1979) "Archon-Dating in Fifth Century Attic Decrees: The 421 Rule", *Chiron* 9:23-30

— (1992) "Through a Laser Beam Darkly: Space-Age Technology and the Egesta Decree", *ZPE* 91:137-46

— (1995) "Pour encourager les autres: Athens and Egesta encore", *CQ* 45:237-40

— (1998) "The Sigma Enigma", *ZPE* 120: 45-8

— (2001) "The Sigma Stigma", *ZPE* 137: 93-104

Herda, A. (2005) "Apollon Delphinios, das Prytaneion und die Agora von Milet",

AA 2005:243–294

—(2006) *Der Apollon-Delphinios-Kult in Milet und die Neujahrsprozession nach Didyma : ein neuer Kommentar der sog. Molpoi-Satzung*. Mainz am Rhein.

(2011) "How to Run a State Cult: The organization of the cult of Apollo Delphinios in Miletos" in M. Haysom & J. Wallensten, ed., *Current Approaches to Religion in Ancient Greece*, 57-93. Stockholm.

Herrmann, P. (1965) "Neue Urkunden zur Geschichte von Milet im 2. Jahrhundert v.Chr." *MDAI(I)* 15:71-117

—(1970) "Zu den Beziehungen zwischen Athen und Milet im 5. Jahrhundert", *Klio* 52:163-73

— (1981) "Teos und Abdera im 5. Jahrhundert v. Chr. Ein neues Fragment der Teiorum Dirae", *Chiron* 11:1-30

Herrmann, P., Gunther, W. & Ehrhardt, N. (2006) *Inschriften von Milet, Teil 3. Inschriften n. 1020-1580*. Berlin, New York.

Herzfeld, E. (1937) *Archaeologische Mitteilungen aus Iran. Band VIII*. Berlin.

Hicks, E.L. (1874) *The Collection of Ancient Greek Inscriptions in the British Museum*. *Part I: Attika*. Oxford.

Highby,L.I. (1936) *The Erythrae Decree*. Klio Beiheft 36, Leipzig.

Hignett, C. (1952) *A History of the Athenian Constitution to the End of the Fifth Century B.C.* Oxford.

Hill, G. (1962) *Sources for Greek History between the Persian and Peloponnesian Wars*. Oxford.

Hiller von Gaertringen, F. (1924) *Inscriptiones Atticae Euclidis anno anteriores*. Berlin.

Hobsbawm, E. & Ranger, T., eds. (2012) *The Invention of Tradition*. Cambridge.

Holland, L.B. (1944) "Colophon", *Hesperia* 13:91-171

Hopper, R.J. (1943) "Interstate Juridical Agreements in the Athenian Empire", *JHS* 63: 35-51

Hornblower, S. (1982) *Mausolus*. Oxford.

— (1991) *A Commentary on Thucydides: Volume I: Books 1-3*. Oxford.

—(1992) "The Religious Dimension to the Peloponnesian War, or, What Thucydides Does Not Tell Us", *HSCP* 94:169-97

— (1994) "Asia Minor", *CAH* 6²209-33. Cambridge.

—(2000) "The Old Oligarch and Thucydides: a fourth-century date for the Old Oligarch?" in P. Flensted-Jensen, T. H. Nielsen and L. Rubinstein, eds., *Polis and Politics: Studies in Ancient Greek History Presented to M. H. Hansen*, 363-84. Copenhagen.

—(2008) *A Commentary on Thucydides Volume III: Books V.25-VIII*. Oxford.

How, W. & Wells, J. (1912) *A Commentary on Herodotus with Introduction and Appendices. Volume I (Books I-IV)*. Oxford.

Huizinga, J. (1945) *Wenn die Waffen Schweigen*. Basel.

Huxley, G.L. (1966) *The Early Ionians*. London.

Hyland, J.O. (2004) "Waiting for Tissaphernes: Athens and Persia in Thucydides VIII", *Syllecta Classica* 15:71-101

— (2018) "The Revolt of Kaunos and the Assassination of Zopyros", *GRBS* 58:19-41

Irwin, E. "Herodotus and Samos: Personal or Political?", *CW* 102:395-416

Jacoby, F. (1955) *Die Fragmente der Griechischen Historiker*. Leiden

Jeffery, L. H. (1961) *The Local Scripts of Archaic Greece*. Oxford.

Jensen, S.R. (2010) *Rethinking Athenian Imperialism: Sub-hegemony in the Delian League*. PhD Thesis. New Brunswick.

— (2012) "Tribute and *Suntely* at Erythrai", *CW* 105:479-96

Johnson Bagby, L. M. (2011) "Thucydides and the Importance of Ideology in Conflict" in D. Tabachnick & T. Koivukoski, eds., *On Oligarchy*. Toronto.

Kagan, D. (1969) *The Outbreak of the Peloponnesian War*. Ithaca.

— (1974) *The Archidamian War*. New York.

— (1981) *The Peace of Nicias and the Sicilian Expedition*. New York.

— (1987) *The Fall of the Athenian Empire*. New York.

— (2003) *The Peloponnesian War*. New York.

—(2009) *Thucydides: The Reinvention of History*. New York.

— (2012) *A New History of the Peloponnesian War*. New York.

—(2013) "The Hoplite Debate" in D. Kagan & G.F. Viggiano, eds., *Men of Bronze: Hoplite Warfare in Ancient Greece*, 1-56. Princeton.

Kahrstedt, U. (1934) *Staatsgebiet und Staatsangehorige in Athen*. Stuttgart-Berlin.

Kalinka, E. (1901) *Tituli Asiae Minoris I. Tituli Lyciae lingua Lycia conscripti*. Vienna.

— (1913) *Die pseudoxenophontische Athenaion politeia: Einleitung, Übersetzung, Erklärung*. Leipzig, Berlin.

Kallet, L. (1993) *Money, Expense and Naval Power in Thucydides' History 1-5.24*. Berkeley.

—(2001) *Money and the Corrosion of Power in Thucydides*. Berkeley.

—(2004) "Epigraphic Geography: The Tribute Quota Fragments Assigned to 421/0-415/4 BC", *Hesperia* 73:465-96

—(2017) "The Pentecontaetia" in S. Forsdyke, E. Foster & R. Balot, eds., *The Oxford Handbook of Thucydides*, 63-80. Oxford.

Kapparis, K. (1998) "The Law on the Age of the Speakers in the Athenian Assembly", *Rheinisches Museum für Philologie* 141:255-9

Karavites, P. (1895) "Enduring Problems of the Samian Revolt", *Rheinisches Museum für Philologie* 128:40-56

Kassel, R. & Austin, C. (1983) *Poetae Comici Graeci*. Berlin, New York.

Kawerau, G. & Rehm, A. (1914) *Das Delphinion in Milet*. Berlin.

Keen, A. (1998) "Persian policy in the Aegean, 412–386 B.C." *JAC* 13: 93–110.

Keesling, C. (2005) "Patrons of Athenian Votive Monuments of the Archaic and Classical Periods: Three Studies", *Hesperia* 74:395-426

Keil, B. (1895) "Der Perieget Heliodoros von Athen", *Hermes* 30:199-240

Kienast, H.J. (1978) *Die Stadtmauer von Samos*. Bonn.

Kirchhoff, A. (1877) *Inscriptiones atticae anno Euclidis vetustiores. Supplementa*. Berlin.

Kleiner, G. (1968) *Die Ruinen von Milet*. Berlin.

Koch, C. (1991) *Volksbeschlüsse in Seebundangelegenheiten : das Verfahrensrecht Athens im ersten attischen Seebund*. Frankfurt am Main.

Koerner, R. (1987) "Beamtenvergehen und deren Bestrafung nach frühen griechischen Inschriften", *Klio* 69:450-98

Kolbe, W. (1938) "Die Anfänge der attischen Arché", *Hermes* 73:249-68

Konuk, K. (1998) *The Coinage of the Hekatomnids of Caria*. PhD Thesis. Oxford.

— (2002) *Sylloge Nummorum Graecorum. Turkey. 1: The Muharrem Kayhan Collection*. Istanbul

— (2015) *Sylloge Nummorum Graecorum. Turkey. 1: The Muharrem Kayhan Collection. Vol. II*. Istanbul

— (2003) *From Kroisos to Karia: Early Anatolian Coins from the Muharrem Kayhan Collection*. Istanbul

Kraay, C.M. (1967) "Review: The Silver Coins of Samos by J.P. Barron", *JHS* 87:196-7

—(1976) *Archaic and Classical Greek Coins*. London.

Kuciak, J. (2013) "The Tradition of the Ionian Colonisation of Asia Minor: Remarks on the Sources", *Electrum* 20:9-22

Landucci Gatinoni, F. (1999) "L'aristocrazia di Samo tra opposizione e potere nella seconda meta del V secolo a.C." in M. Sordi, ed., *Fazioni e congiure nel mondo antico,* 115-33. Milan.

Lane, M. (2014) *The Birth of Politics: Eight Greek and Roman Political Ideas and Why They Matter*. Princeton.

Lang, M. (1968) "Herodotus and the Ionian Revolt", *Historia* 17:24-36

Lapini, W. (1987) "Il Vecchio Oligarca e gli "Uccelli" di Aristofane: considerazioni cronologiche sulla "Respublica Atheniensium" pseudosenofontea", *Sandalion* 10:23-48

(1997) "Atene e Mileto nell'Athenaion Politeia" in M. Gigante & G. Maddoli, eds., *L'Athenaion politeia dello Pseudo-Senofonte,* 81-106. Naples.

Larsen, J.A.O. (1939) "Sparta and the Ionian Revolt: A Study of Spartan Foreign Policy and the Genesis of the Peloponnesian League", *CP* 34:24-35

—(1955) *Representative Government in Greek and Roman History*. Los Angeles.

—(1960) "Orchomenus and the Formation of the Boeotian Confederacy in 447 B.C.", *CP* 55:9-18

Lawton, C. (1992) "Sculptural and Epigraphical Restorations to Attic Documents", *Hesperia* 61:239-51

—(1995) *Attic Document Reliefs: Art and Politics in Ancient Athens*. Oxford.

Leduc, C. (1976) *La constitution d'Athènes attribuée à Xénophon*. Paris.

Legon, R. (1966) *Demos and Stasis. Studies in the Factional Politics of Classical Greece*. PhD Thesis. Ann Arbor.

—(1968) "Megara and Mytilene", *Phoenix* 22:200-25

—(1972) "Samos in the Delian League", *Historia* 21:145-58

Lepper, F.A. (1962) "Some Rubrics in the Athenian Quota-Lists", *JHS* 82:25-55

Lewis, D.M. (1954) "Notes on Attic Inscriptions", *BSA* 49:17-50

— (1977) *Sparta and Persia*. Leiden.

—(1981) *Inscriptiones Atticae Euclidis anno anteriores. Editio Tertia, Fasc. I*. Berlin.

—(1992) "The Thirty Years' Peace", *CAH* 5²:121-46. Cambridge.

— (1994) "The Athenian Tribute-Quota Lists, 453-450", *BSA* 85:285-301

—(1997) *Selected Papers in Greek and Near Eastern History*. Cambridge.

—(2008) *The Athenian Empire*. Edinburgh.

Lewis, S. (2009) *Greek Tyranny*. Liverpool.

Liddel, P. (2010) "Epigraphy, Legislation and Power", *BICS* 53:99-128

Lintott, A. W. (1982) *Violence, Civil Strife and Revolution in the Classical City 750-330 B.C.* Oxford.

— (2018) *Aristotle's Political Philosophy in its Historical Context: a New Translation and Commentary on Politics Books 5 and 6*. London.

Littman, R.J. (1974) *The Greek Experiment*. London.

Llewellyn-Jones, L. & Robson, J. (2010) *Ctesias' History of Persia. Tales from the Orient.* London, New York.

Lohmann, H. (2004) "Milet und die Milesia. Eine antike Großstadt und ihr Umland im Wandel der Zeiten," in F. Kolb, ed., *Chora und Polis,* 325-60. München.

Low, P. (2005) "Looking for the Language of Athenian Imperialism", *JHS* 125: 93-111

— (2013) "Law, Authority and Legitimacy in the Athenian Empire" in J. Duindam, J. Harries, C. Humfress & N. Hurvitz, eds., *Law and Empire: Ideas, Practices, Actors,* 25-44. Leiden.

Lupi, M. (2005) "Il Duplice Massacro" in L. Breglia & M. Lupi, eds., *Da Elea A Samo: Filosofi e Politici di Fronte all'Imperio Ateniense,* 259-86. Naples.

Luraghi, N. (2001) "Samo arcaica: storie di pirati e di tiranni", in C. Bearzot, R. Vattuone & D. Ambaglio, eds., *Atti del congresso "Storiografia locale e storiografia universale. Forme di acquisizione del sapere storico nella cultura antica", Bologna 16-18 dicembre 1999,* 119-138. Como.

— (2010) "The Local Scripts from Nature to Culture", *CA* 29:68-91

Ma, J., Papazarkadas, N. & Parker, R. (2009) *Interpreting the Athenian Empire*. London.

Magnetto, A. (2008) *L'arbitrato di Rodi fra Samo e Priene*. Pisa.

Malouchou, G. (2014) "A second facsimile of the Erythrai decree (IG I^3 14)" in A.P. Matthaiou & R.K. Pitt, eds., *Athenaion Episkopos: Studies in Honour of Harold B. Mattingly,* 73-96. Athens.

Marek, C. (2016) *In the Land of a Thousand Gods: A History of Asia Minor in the Ancient World*. Princeton.

Markle, M. (1990) "Participation of Farmers in Athenian Juries and Assemblies", *Ancient Society* 21:149-65

Matthaiou, A.P. (2004) "Peri tes *IG* I^3 11" in A.P. Matthaiou, ed., *Attikai Epigraphai,* 99-121. Athens.

— (2008) "Inschriften von Milet VI 3, 1020. A Note", *ZPE* 165:84-6

— (2009b) *The Athenian Empire on Stone Revisited.* Oxford.

— (2011) *Ta en tei stelei gegrammena: Six Greek Historical Inscriptions of the Fifth Century BC.* Athens.

Matthaiou, A.P. & Pitt, R.K., ed., (2014) *Athenaion Episkopos: Studies in honour of Harold B. Mattingly*. Athens.

Mattingly, H. (1961) "The Athenian Coinage Decree, *Historia* 10:148-88

— (1963) "The Growth of Athenian Imperialism", *Historia* 12:257-73

— (1966a) "Athenian Imperialism and the Foundation of Brea", *CQ* 16:189-90

—(1966b) “Periclean Imperialism” in E. Badian, ed., *Ancient Society and Institutions: studies presented to Victor Ehrenberg on his 75th birthday*, 193-223. Oxford.

—(1967) “The Language of Athenian Imperialism”, *Epigraphica* 56:33-56

—(1971) “Formal dating criteria for fifth century Attic inscriptions” in *Acta of the Fifth International Congress of Greek and Latin Epigraphy 1967*, 27-33. Oxford.

—(1978) “The tribute quota lists from 430 to 425 B.C”, *CQ* 28:83-8

—(1981) “The Athenian Decree for Miletos ("IG" I2,22 + = "ATL" II,D 11): A Postscript”, *Historia* 30:113-7

— (1981b) “Coins and Amphoras - Chios, Samos and Thasos in the Fifth Century B.C.”, *JHS* 101:78-86

— (1982) “The Athena Nike Temple Reconsidered”, *AJA* 86: 381-5

— (1984) “Review Article”, *AJP* 105: 340-357

— (1990) “Some Fifth-Century Attic Epigraphic Hands”, *ZPE* 83:110-22

— (1996) *The Athenian Empire Restored: Epigraphic and Historical Studies*. Ann Arbor.

—(1997) “The Date and Purpose of the Pseudo-Xenophon Constitution of the Athens”, *CQ* 47:352-7

— (1999) “What Are the Right Dating Criteria for Fifth-Century Attic Texts?” *ZPE* 126: 117-122

—(2002) “The Athenian Decree for Chalcis (IG I^3 40)”, *CQ* 52:377-9

—(2007) “Two Fifth-century Attic Epigraphic Texts Revisited”, *ZPE* 162:107-10

McGregor, M.F. (1987) *The Athenians and their Empire*. Vancouver.

Meiggs, R. (1943) “The Growth of Athenian Imperialism”, *JHS* 63:21-34

— (1972) *The Athenian Empire*. Oxford.

—(1976) “Review: Fifth-Century Attic Epigraphy by Donald William Bradeen; Malcolm Francis McGregor”, *CR* 26:108-9

Meiggs, R. & Lewis, D. (1969) *A Selection of Greek Historical Inscriptions*. Oxford.

Meijering, G.R. (2012) *Empire and polis revisited. Miletus, Athens and the Achaemenids, 499-387 BCE*. Master’s Thesis, Utrecht University.

Melchert, H.C. (1993) “A New Interpretation of Lines C 3-9 of the Xanthos Stele” in J. Borchhardt & G. Dobesch, *Akten des II. Internationalen Lykien-Symposion,* 31-4. Vienna.

Meritt, B.D. (1935) “Inscriptions of Colophon”, *AJP* 56:358-97

—(1937) *Documents on Athenian Tribute*. Cambridge, Mass.

— (1945) “Attic Inscriptions of the Fifth Century: Athens and Erythrai”, *Hesperia* 14:82-4

—(1946) “Greek Inscriptions”, *Hesperia* 15: 169-253

— (1972) “The Tribute Quota List of 454/3 BC.”, *Hesperia* 41: 403-17

— (1984) "The Samian Revolt from Athens in 440-439 B.C.", *PAPS* 128:123-33

Meritt, B.D., McGregor, M.F. & Wade-Gery, H.T. (1939) *The Athenian Tribute Lists*. Vol. I. Princeton.

—(1949) *The Athenian Tribute Lists*. Vol. II. Princeton.

— (1950) *The Athenian Tribute Lists*. Vol. III. Princeton.

Meritt, B.D. & Wade-Gery, H.T. (1957) "Athenian Resources in 449 and 431 BC.", *Hesperia* 26:163-97

—(1962) "The Dating of Documents to the Mid-Fifth Century – I", *JHS* 82:67-74

—(1963) "The Dating of Documents to the Mid-Fifth Century – II", *JHS* 83:100-117

Meritt, B.D. & West, A.B. (1925) "The Reconstruction of IG I^2 ,193, 194, and 201", *TAPA* 56:252-67

— (1927) "A Revision of Athenian Tribute Lists", *HSCP* 38:21-73

—(1928) "Correspondences in I. G., I^2 196 and 198", *AJA* 32:281-97

Meyer, E. (1901) *Geschichte des Altertums*. Vol. IV. Stuttgart.

Michels, R. (2001) *Political Parties: A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern Democracy*. Ontario.

Millar, F. (2002) *The Roman Republic in Political Thought.* Hanover.

Miller, M. (1997) *Athens and Persia in the Fifth Century B.C.: A Study in Cultural Receptivity*. Cambridge.

Millis, B. & Olson, D. (2012) *Inscriptional records for the dramatic festivals in Athens: IG II2 2318-2325 and related texts*. Leiden.

Milne, J.G. (1941) *Kolophon and its Coinage: A Study*. New York.

Mitchell, B. (1975) "Herodotus and Samos", *JHS* 95:75-91

Mitchell, L. (2006) "Tyrannical oligarchs at Athens" in S. Lewis, ed., *Ancient Tyranny,* 178-87. Edinburgh.

Mitchell, L. and Rubinstein, L., ed., (2009) *Greek History and Epigraphy: Essays in Honour of P.J. Rhodes*. Swansea.

Mordtmann, J-H. (1878) "Melanges d' Épigraphie", *Rev. Arch.* 36:292-304

Mount, F. (2012) *The New Few: Or A Very British Oligarchy*. London, New York.

Mulgan, R. (1984) "Lot as a Democratic Device", *The Review of Politics* 46:539-60

Müller, C.G. (1821) *Theodori Metochitae: Miscellanea philosophica et historica*. Leipzig.

— (1851) *Fragmenta Historicorum Graecorum IV.* Paris

Munksgaard, E. (1945) *Sylloge Nummorum Graecorum. Denmark. Vol. XXI*. Copenhagen.

— (1946) *Sylloge Nummorum Graecorum. Denmark. Vol. XXII-XXIV.* Copenhagen.

Murray, O. (1966) "Ὁ ἈΡΧΑΙΟΣ ΔΑΣΜΟΣ", *Historia* 15:142-56

— (1988) "The Ionian Revolt", *CAH* 4^2:461-90. Cambridge.

Nakategawa, Y. (1988) "Isegoria in Herodotus", *Historia* 37:257-75

Nesselhauf, H. (1933) *Untersuchungen zur Geschichte der delisch-attischen Symmachie*. Leipzig.

Nichols, A. (2008) *The Complete Fragments of Ctesias of Cnidus: Translation and Commentary with an Introduction.* PhD Thesis. University of Florida.

Nippel, W. (2016) *Ancient and Modern Democracy. Two Concepts of Liberty?* Cambridge.

Nixon, L. & Price, S. (1990) "The Size and Resources of Greek Cities," in O. Murray and S. Price, eds., *The Greek City from Homer to Alexander*, 37–70. Oxford.

Nudell, P. (2016) "The War Between Miletus And Samos", *CQ* 66:772-4

O'Neil, J.L. (1974) *Greek Democratic Constitutions Outside Athens*. PhD Thesis. Cambridge University.

—(1995) *The Origins and Development of Ancient Greek Democracy*. Lanham.

Ober, J. (1996) *The Athenian Revolution: Essays on Ancient Greek Democracy and Political Theory.* Princeton.

— (2005) *Athenian Legacies: Essays on the Politics of Going On Together*. Princeton.

— (2007) ""I Besieged That Man": Democracy's Revolutionary Start" in K.A. Raaflaub, J. Ober & R.W. Wallace, eds., *Origins of Democracy in Ancient Greece*, 83-104. Berkeley, Los Angeles, London.

Ober, J. & Hedrick, C. (1996) *Demokratia : A Conversation on Democracies, Ancient and Modern*. Princeton.

Okin, L.A. (1985) "Sources for the History of Archaic Megara" in T. J. Figueira & G. Nagy, eds., *Theognis of Megara*, 9-21. Baltimore.

Oliver, J.H. (1935) "The Athenian decree concerning Miletus in 450/49 B.C.", *TAPA* 66:177-98

Olmstead, A.T. (1948) *History of the Persian Empire*. Chicago.

Osborne, R.G. (1996) *Greece in the Making 1200-479 B.C.*. New York.

—(1999a) "Inscribing Performance" in R.G. Osborne & S.D. Goldhill, eds., *Performance Culture and Athenian Democracy*, 341-58. Cambridge.

—(1999b) "Archaeology and the Athenian Empire", *TAPA* 129:319-32

— (2000) *The Athenian Empire*. London.

Osborne, R. & Rhodes, P.J. (2017) *Greek Historical Inscriptions 478-404 BC*. Oxford.

Ostwald, M. (1982) *Autonomia: Its Genesis and Early History*. Oxford.

— (1986) *From Popular Sovereignty to the Sovereignty of Law*. Berkeley, Los Angeles, London.

—(1996) "Shares and Rights: "Citizenship" Greek Style and American Style" in J. Ober & C. Hedrick, eds., *Demokratia: A Conversation on Democracies, Ancient and Modern*, 49-61. Princeton.

(2000) "Popular Sovereignty and the Problem of Equality", *Scripta Classica Israelica* 19:1-13

— (2002) "Athens and Chalkis: A Study in Imperial Control", *JHS* 122:134-43

— (2009) *Language and History in Ancient Greek Culture*. Philadelphia.

Owens, E.J. (1991) *The City in the Greek and Roman World*. London, New York.

Paarmann, B. (2007a) *Aparchai and Phoroi: A New Commented Edition of the Athenian Tribute Quota Lists and Assessment Decrees. Part I:Text*. PhD Thesis. Switzerland.

—(2007b) *Aparchai and Phoroi: A New Commented Edition of the Athenian Tribute Quota Lists and Assessment Decrees. Part IIa: Catalogue*. PhD Thesis. Switzerland.

——(2007c) *Aparchai and Phoroi: A New Commented Edition of the Athenian Tribute Quota Lists and Assessment Decrees*. *Part IIb: Epigraphical Commentary*. PhD Thesis. Switzerland.

— (2014) "The revolt of Miletos in 454/3 B.C. and the Milesians in IG I³ 259.III.29" in A. P. Matthaiou and R. K. Pitt, eds., *Athenaion Episkopos. Studies in Honour of Harold B. Mattingly*, 121-40. Athens.

Papazarkadas, N. (2009) "Epigraphy and the Athenian Empire: Reshuffling the Chronological Cards" in J. Ma, N. Papazarkadas & R. Parker, eds., *Interpreting the Athenian Empire*. London.

Parke, H.W. (1930) "The Development of the Second Spartan Empire (405-371 B. C.)", *JHS* 50:37-79

Peek, W. (1939) "Ein Seegefecht aus den Perserkriegen", *Klio* 32:289-306

—(1958) *Attische Grabinschriften II. Unedierte Grabinschriften aus Athen und Attika*. Berlin.

Pelling, C. (2011) "Herodotus and Samos", *BICS* 54:1-18

Piérart, M. (1969) 'LES 'ΕΠΙΜΗΝΙΟΙ DE MILET: Contribution épigraphique à l'histoire politique de Milet au V e siècle', *L'Antiquité Classique* 38:365-88

— (1974) "Milet dans la premiere liste de tributs", *ZPE* 15:163-7

— (1979) "La Constitution de Milet à la lumière des institutions de ses colonies" in D.M. Pippidi, ed., *Actes de VIIe congrès international d'épigraphie grecque et latine*, 439-40. Paris.

—(1983) "Athènes et Milet. I: Tribus et dèmes milésiens", *Mus.Helv.* 40:1-18

—(1984) "Deux notes sur la politique d' Athènes en mer Égéé", *BCH* 108:161-76

—(1985) "Athènes et Milet. II: L'Organisation du territoire", *Mus.Helv.* 42:276-99

—(1987) "Athènes et son empire: la crise de 447-445." In J. Servais, T. Hackens & B. Servais-Soyez, eds., *Stemmata. Melanges de philologie, d'histoire et archèologie grecque offerts à Jules Labarbe.* 291-303. Liège.

Pittakys, K. (1852) "Aphorōsa tas entos tēs Hellados aneuriskomenas archaiotētas", *Ephēmeris Archaiologikē* 31:665-88

— (1856) "Aphorōsa tas entos tēs Hellados aneuriskomenas archaiotētas", *Ephēmeris Archaiologikē* 42:1331-1458

— (1859) "Aphorōsa tas entos tēs Hellados aneuriskomenas archaiotētas", *Ephēmeris Archaiologikē* 51:1811-62

Plommer, H. (1967) "Review: Samian Silver Coins: The Silver Coins of Samos by John Penrose Barron", *CR* 17:212-4

Polinskaya, I. (2009) "Fifth-Century Horoi on Aigina: A Re-Evaluation", *Hesperia* 78:231-67

Powell, A. (1988) *Athens and Sparta: Constructing Greek Political and Social History from 478 BC*. London.

Prandi, L. (1978) "Il Trattato fra Atene e Samo del 439/8 (IG I 50) e il Problema della Democrazia Nell'Isola Dopo L'intervento Ateniese", *Aevum* 52:58-61

Pritchett, J.B. (1978) *Ancient Near Eastern Texts Relating to the Old Testament*. Princeton.

Pritchett, W.K. (1965) “The Koan fragment of the Monetary Decree”, *BCH* 89: 423-440.

— (1971) *The Greek State at War*. Berkeley.

Quinn, T.J. (1969) “Political Groups at Chios: 412 B.C.”, *Historia* 18:22-30

—(1971) “Political Groups in Lesbos during the Peloponnesian War”, *Historia* 20:405-17

— (1981) *Athens and Samos, Lesbos and Chios*. Manchester.

Raaflaub, K.A. (1994) “Democracy, Power, and Imperialism in Fifth-Century Athens” in J.P. Euben & J.R. Wallach, eds., *Athenian Political Thought and the Reconstruction of American Democracy*, 103-149. New York.

—(1987) “Herodotus, Political Thought and the Meaning of History”, *Arethusa* 20:221-48

—(2004) *The Discovery of Freedom in Ancient Greece*. Chicago.

— (2006) “Thucydides on Democracy and Oligarchy” in A. Rengakos & A. Tsakmakis, eds., *Brill’s Companion to Thucydides*. Leiden, Boston.

—(2007) “The Breakthrough of *Demokratia* in Mid-Fifth-Century Athens” in K.A. Raaflaub, J. Ober, R. Wallace, P. Cartledge, & Farrar, C, eds., *Origins of Democracy in Ancient Greece,* 105-54. Berkeley, Los Angeles, London.

— (2009) “Learning from the Enemy: Athenian and Persian ‘Instruments of Empire’’’, in J. Ma, N. Papazarakadas and R. Parker, eds., *Interpreting the Athenian Empire*, 89-124. London.

Raaflaub, K.A. & Wallace, R.W. (2007) “Origins of Democracy in Ancient Greece” in K.A. Raaflaub, J. Ober, R. Wallace, P. Cartledge, & Farrar, C, eds., *Origins of Democracy in Ancient Greece,* 22-48. Berkeley, Los Angeles, London.

Reger, F., Ryan, F.X. & Winters, T.F. (2010) *Studies in Greek Epigraphy and History in Honor of Stephen V. Tracy*. Bordeaux.

Rehm, A. & Herrmann, P (1997) *Inschriften von Milet, Teil 1. Inschriften n.187-406*. Berlin, New York.

Rhodes, P.J. (1972) *The Athenian Boule*. Oxford.

— (1981) *A Commentary on the Aristotelian Athenaion Politeia*. Oxford, New York..

— (1985) *The Athenian Empire*. Oxford.

— (1992a) “The Delian League to 449 B.C.”, *CAH* 5²:34-61. Cambridge.

—(1992b) “The Athenian Revolution”, *CAH* 5²:2-95. Cambridge.

—(2003) *Ancient Democracy and Modern Ideology*. Bristol.

—(2006) “Milesian *Stephanephoroi*: applying Cavaignac correctly”, *ZPE* 147:116

—(2007) “Oaths in Political Life” in A.H. Sommerstein & J. Fletcher, eds., *Horkos: The Oath in Greek Society*, 11-25. Exeter.

— (2008) “After the three-bar sigma controversy: the history of Athenian imperialism reassessed”, *CQ* 58: 500-06

—(2010) *A History of the Classical Greek World, 478-323 BC*. Chichester.

—(2014) “What Remains of Periclean Imperialism?” in A. P. Matthaiou and R. K. Pitt, eds., *Athenaion Episkopos. Studies in Honour of Harold B. Mattingly*, 39-49. Athens.

Rhodes, P.J. & Lewis, D.M. (1997) *The Decrees of the Greek State*. Oxford.

Rhodes, P.J. & Osborne, R. (2003) *Greek Historical Inscriptions 404-323 BC.* Oxford.

Robert, J. & Robert, L. (1967) "Bulletin Epigraphique", *Revue des Études Grecques* 80:453-573

Robert, L. (1936) "Études d'épigraphie grecque", *RPh* 62:113-70

— (1938) *Etudes Epigraphiques et Philologiques*. Paris.

Roberts, J.T. (1982) *Accountability in Athenian Government*. Wisconsin.

Robertson, H.G. (1933) "Democracy and Oligarchy under the Athenian Empire", *CP* 28:50-3

Robertson, N. (1976) "False Documents at Athens: Fifth-Century History and Fourth-Century Publicists", *Historical Reflections* 3:3-25

— (1980) "The True Nature of the 'Delian League'," *AJAH* 5:64–133

—(1987) "Government and Society at Miletus", *525-442 B.C, Phoenix* 41:356-98

Robinson, E.S.G. (1946) "Rhegion, Zankle-Messana, and the Samians", *JHS* 66:13-20

— (1948) "Greek Coins Acquired by the British Museum 1938-48. I", *The Numismatic Chronicle and Journal of the Royal Numismatic Society* 8:43-65

Robinson, E.W. (1997) *The First Democracies: Early Popular Government Outside Athens*. Stuttgart.

— (2007) "The Sophists and Democracy Beyond Athens", *Rhetorica* 25:109-22

—(2011) *Democracy Beyond Athens: Popular Government in the Greek Classical Age*. Cambridge.

Roebuck, C. (1955) "The Early Ionian League", *CP* 50:26-40

Roisman, J. (1985) "Maiandrios of Samos", *Historia* 34:257-77

Romer, F.E. (1982) "The Aisymneteia: a Problem in Aristotle's Historic Method", *AJPh* 103:25-46

Roscalla, F. (1995) "Περὶ δὲ τῆς ᾽ Αθηναίων πολιτείας..." *Quaderni Urbinati di Cultura Classica* 50:105-30

Rose, P.W. (2012) *Class in Archaic Greece*. Cambridge, New York.

Rose, V. (1886) *Aristotelis qui ferebantur librorum fragmenta*. Leipzig.

Roussel, D. (1976) *Tribu et Cité*. Paris.

Russet, B. & Antholis, W. (1992) "Do Democracies Fight Each Other? Evidence from the Peloponnesian War", *JPR* 29:415-34

Sakellariou, M. (1990) *Between Memory and Oblivion: The Transmission of Early Greek Historical Traditions*. Athens.

Samons, L, ed., (1998) *Athenian Democracy and Imperialism*. Boston.

— (2000) *Empire of the Owl: Athenian Imperial Finance*. Stuttgart.

—(2004) *What's Wrong with Democracy? From Athenian Practice to American Worship*. Berkeley.

—ed., (2007) *The Cambridge Companion to the Age of Pericles*. Cambridge and New York.

Samuel, A.E. (1972) *Greek and Roman Chronology: Calendars and Years in Classical Antiquity*. München.

Sato, N. (2006) “Athens, Persia, Clazomenae, Erythrae: An Analysis of International Relationships in Asia Minor at the Beginning of the Fourth Century BCE”, *BICS* 49:23-37

Schaefer, H. (1936) “Die attische Symmachie im zweiten Jahrzehnt ihres Bestehens”, *Hermes* 71:129-50

—(1948) “Besonderheit und Begriff der attischen Demokratie im 5. Jahrhundert” in E. Salin, ed., *Synopsis,* 479-503. Heidelberg.

Schede, M. (1919) “Aus dem Heraion von Samos”, *MDAI* 44:1-46

Schüller, W. (1974) *Die Herrschaft der Athener im Ersten Attischen Seebund*. Berlin, New York.

Schürr, D. (1998) “Kaunos in lykischen Inschriften”, *Kadmos* 37:143-62

—(1979) “Zur Entstehung der griechischen Demokratie außerhalb Athens” in H. Sund & M. Timmerman, eds., *Auf den Weg Gebracht: Idee und Wirklichkeit der Grundung der Universität Konstanz,* 433-47. Konstanz.

—(1981) “Die Einfiihrung der Demokratie auf Samos im 5. Jahrhundert v. Chr.”, *Klio* 63:281-8

—(1984) “Wirkungen des ersten attischen Seebunds auf die Herausbildung der athenischen Demokratie” in J.M. Balcer, ed., *Studien zum attischen Seebund,* 87-101. Konstanz.

Scott, L. (2005) *Historical Commentary on Herodotus*. Boston.

Sealey, R. (1973) “The Origins of "Demokratia”. *CSCA* 6:253-95

Segre, M. (1938) “L. Ingemann Highby, The Erythrae decree (Book Review)”, *Athenaeum* 16:198-200

Sen, A. (1982) *Choice, Welfare and Measurement*. Oxford.

Shepherd, F. (1796) *Polyænus's Stratagems of war; translated from the original Greek.* London.

Sherk, R.K. (1992) “The Eponymous Officials of Greek Cities IV: The Register: Part III: Thrace, Black Sea Area, Asia Minor (Continued)”, *ZPE* 93:223-72

Sherwin-White, S.M. (1978) *Ancient Cos.* Gottingen.

Shipley, G. (1983) *A History of Samos from the Revolt of 440 BC to the Peace of Apameia*. PhD Thesis. Oxford.

—(1987) *A History of Samos 800-188 B.C.E.* Oxford.

Sickinger, J. (2009) “Nothing to Do with Democracy: ‘Formulae of Disclosure’ and the Athenian Epigraphic Habit” in L. Mitchell & L. Rubinstein, eds., *Greek History and Epigraphy: Essays in honour of P.J. Rhodes,* 87-102. Swansea.

Simonton, M. (2017a) “Stability and Violence in Classical Greek Democracies and Oligarchies”, *CA* 36:52-103

—(2017b) *Classical Greek Oligarchy: A Political History*. Princeton.

—(2018) “The Local History of Hippias of Erythrai: Politics, Place, Memory, and Monumentality”, *Hesperia* 87:497-543

Slawisch, A. (2009) “Epigraphy versus Archaeology: Conflicting Evidence for Cult Continuity in Ionia During the Fifth Century B.C.” in C. Gates, J. Morin & T. Zimmermann, eds., *Sacred Landscapes in Anatolia and Neighboring Regions*, 29-34. Oxford.

— (2012) “Aus unruhigen Zeiten: Die >Ächtungsinschrift< aus Milet, ein Erlass aus dem frühesten 5. Jahrhundert v. Chr.”, *IM* 61:435-32

Smarczyk, B. (1990) *Untersuchungen zur Religionspolitik und politischen Propaganda Athens im Delisch-Attischen Seebund*. München.

Smart, J.D. (1972) “Athens and Egesta”, *JHS* 92:128-46

—(1977) “Review: The Athenian Empire by Russell Meiggs”, *Phoenix* 31: 245-57

Sokolowski, F. (1955) *Lois sacrées de l'Asie Mineure*. Paris.

Sordi, M. (2002) “L’Athenaion Politeia e Senofonte”, *Aevum* 76:17-24

Stadter, P. (1989) *A Commentary on Plutarch's Pericles*. Chapel Hill.

— (1992) “Herodotus and the Athenian “Arche””, *Annali della Scuola Normale Superiore di Pisa. Classe di Lettere e Filosofia* 22:781-809

Stockton, D. (1990) *The Classical Athenian Democracy*. Oxford.

Stone, I.F. (1988) *The Trial of Socrates*. Boston.

Strauss, B. (2013) “The Classical Greek Polis and Its Government” in H. Beck, ed., *A Companion to Ancient Greek Government*, 22-37. Chichester.

Tabachnik, D. & Koivukoski, T., eds., (2011) *On Oligarchy: Ancient Lessons for Global Politics*. Toronto.

Taylor, C. (2007) “From the Whole Citizen Body? The Sociology of Election and Lot in the Athenian Democracy”, *Hesperia* 76:323-45

Teegarden, D.A. (2013) *Death to Tyrants! Ancient Greek Democracy and the Struggle Against Tyranny*. Princeton.

Thonemann, P. (2007) “Review: Inscriptions from Miletus”, *CR* 57:544-6

—(2009) “Lycia, Athens and Amorges” in J. Ma, N. Papazarkadas & R. Parker, eds., *Interpreting the Athenian Empire*, 167-94. London.

Thorley, J. (1996) *Athenian Democracy*. London, New York.

Threatte, L. (1980) *The Grammar of Attic Inscriptions Vol. 1: Phonology*. Berlin, New York.

Tober, D.J. (2013) *The Autobiographical Community: Local Historiography in Classical and Hellenistic Greece*. PhD Thesis. Princeton.

Tod, M.N. (1946) *A Selection of Greek Historical Inscriptions*. Oxford.

Tracy, S.V. (2000) “Dating Athenian Inscriptions: A New Approach”, *PAPS* 144:67-76

—(2014) “Down Dating Some Athenian Decrees with Three-bar Sigma: A Palaeographic Approach”, *ZPE* 190: 105-15

— (2016) *Athenian Lettering of the Fifth Century B.C.: The Rise of the Professional Letter Cutter*. Berlin.

Tridimas, G. (2012) “Constitutional Choice in Ancient Athens: The Rationality of Selection to Office by Lot”, *Constitutional Political Economy* 23:1-21

Tuchelt, K. (1989) “Didyma. Bericht über die Ausgrabungen 1985 und 1986 an der heiligen Strasse von Milet nach Didyma.” *AA* 104:143-217

—(1991) *Branchidai-Didyma: Geschichte, Ausgrabung und Untersuchungen seit dem Jahre 1962*. Part 1, *Ein Kultbezirk an der Heiligen Strasse von Milet nach Didyma.* Mainz.

Tuci, P. (2011) “La datazione dell’*Athenaion Politeia* pseudosenofontea: problemi metodologici e proposte interpretative” in C. Bearzot, F.Landucci, & L. Prandi, eds., *L'Athenaion politeia rivisitata: il punto su Pseudo-Senofonte,* 29-72. Milan.

Tucker, T.G. (1982) *The Eighth Book of Thucydides.* London, New York.

Unz, R.K. (1985) “The Surplus of the Athenian *Phoros*”, *GRBS* 26:21-42

Vickers, M. (1996) “Fifth Century Chronology and the Coinage Decree”, *JHS* 116:171-4

Vlastos, G. (1953) “Isonomia”, *AJP* 74:337-66

Wade-Gery, H. (1933) “Classical Epigrams and Epitaphs: A Study of the Kimonian Age”, *JHS* 53:71-104

—(1958) *Essays in Greek History*. Oxford.

Walbank, M.B. (1978) *Athenian Proxenies of the Fifth Century BC*. Toronto.

Wallinga, H.T. (1989) “Persian Tribute and Delian Tribute” in P. Briant & C. Herrenschmidt, eds., *Le tribut dans l' Empire Perse,* 173-82. Paris.

Walker, E.M. (1940) “Democracy in the Empire”, *CAH* 5:471-2. Cambridge.

Wallace, R.W. (2007) “Revolutions and a New Order in Solonian Athens and Archaic Greece” in K.A. Raaflaub, J. Ober, R. Wallace, P. Cartledge, & Farrar, C, eds., *Origins of Democracy in Ancient Greece,* 49-82. Berkeley, Los Angeles, London.

Waters, M. (2010) “Applied Royal Directive: Pissouthnes and Samos” in B.Jacobs & R. Rollinger, eds., *The Achaemenid Court,* 817-28. Wiesbaden.

Wecowski, M. (2013) “In the Shadow of Pericles: Athens’ Samian Victory and the Organisation of the Pentekontaetia in Thucydides” in A. Tsakmakis & M. Tamiolaki, eds., *Thucydides Between History and Literature*,154-166. Berlin.

Trümpy, C. (1997) *Untersuchungen zu den altgriechischen Monatsnamen und Monatsfolgen*. Heidelberg.

Van Wees, H. (2004) *Greek Warfare: Myths and Realities*. London.

Van Effentere, H. & Ruzé, F., eds. (1994) *Nomima:Recueil d'Inscriptions Politiques et Juridiques de l'Archaïsme Grec.* Rome.

Wells, J. (1907) “The Persian Friends of Herodotus,” *JHS* 27:37-47

Welwei, K-W. (1986) “Demos und Plethos in athenischen Volksbeschlussen um 450 v.Chr.”, *Historia* 35:177-91

—(1992) *Athen: Vom neolithischen Siedlungsplatz zur archaischen Grosspolis.* Darmstadt.

West, A.B. & Meritt, B.D. (1926) “The Reconstruction of I. G. I^2, 191”, *AJP* 47:171-6

Westlake, H.D. (1977) “Athens and Amorges”, *Phoenix* 31:319-29

— (1979) “Ionians in the Ionian War”, *CQ* 29:9-44

—(1985) “Tissaphernes in Thucydides”, *CQ* 35:43-54

Wheatley, P. (1998) “The Chronology of the Third Diadoch War, 315-311 B.C.”, *Phoenix* 52:257-81

Whibley, L. (1896) *Greek Oligarchies: Their Character and Organisation*. Cambridge.

White, M. (1954) “The Duration of the Samian Tyranny”, *JHS* 74:36-43

Whitehead, D. (1993) “Samian Autonomy” in R.M. Rosen & J. Farrell, eds., *Nomodeiktes. Greek Studies in Honor of Martin Ostwald*, 321-30. Ann Arbor.

Wick, T.E. (1975) ‘A Note on the Date of the Athenian-Egestan Alliance’, *JHS* 95: 186-90

Wiesehofer, J. (2006) “...Keeping the two sides equal: Thucydides, the Persians and the Peloponnesian War” in A. Rengakos & A. Tsakmakis, eds., *Brill’s Companion to Thucydides*, 657-67. Leiden, Boston.

Wilberg, K. (1889) *Mitteilungen des Deutschen Archäologischen Instituts. Athenische Abteilung. Vierzehnter Band.* Berlin.

Wilhelm, A. (1909) “Inschriften aus Erythrai und Chios”, *Jahreshefte des Österreichischen Archäologischen Institutes in Wien* 12:126-41

— (1911) “Die lokrische Mädcheninschrift”, *Jahreshefte des Österreichischen Archäologischen Institutes in Wien* 14:163-256

Will, E. (1969) “Notes sur les regimes politiques de Samos au Ve siecle”, *REA* 71:305-19

Willetts, R.F. (1955) *Aristocratic Society in Ancient Crete*. London.

Woodbury, L. (1970) “Sophocles Among the Generals”, *Phoenix* 24:213-5

Woodhead, A.G. (1973) “Reflections on the Use of the Literary and Epigraphical Evidence for the History of the Athenian Empire” in *Akten des VI. Internationalen Kongresses für Griechische und Lateinische Epigraphik*, 345-54. Munich.

Zelnick-Abramovitz, R. (2004) “Settlers and Dispossessed in the Athenian Empire”, *Mnemosyne* 57:325-45