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Valuing the Welfare State: A cross-national analysis of attitudes about income inequality and redistribution in 91 countries with case analyses of Brazil, China, France, and the United States

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VALUING THE WELFARE STATE:
A CROSS-NATIONAL ANALYSIS OF ATTITUDES ABOUT INCOME INEQUALITY AND REDISTRIBUTION IN 91 COUNTRIES WITH CASE ANALYSES OF BRAZIL, CHINA, FRANCE, AND THE UNITED STATES

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ABSTRACT

Societies vary greatly in their equality and redistribution preferences. In this dissertation, I ask how and why this variation occurs with an analysis of differences in attitudes about income equality and social welfare benefits ("stratification beliefs") by examining the social, political, and economic determinants of these attitudes at both the country and individual level.

Most studies of public opinion about redistribution have focused either exclusively on the United States, or on comparisons among a small number of developed countries. For the present study, I have compiled a unique data set that includes more than 370,000 individuals from 91 countries, 68 of which are developing. I combine individual-level data from the International Social Survey Program and the World Values Survey with country-level data from more than a dozen sources.

In the dissertation, I expand on existing research on stratification beliefs to encompass the developing world and build theories appropriate for analyzing a much more socioeconomically diverse group of countries. In addition, I develop a new measurement that allows for the contextualization of attitudinal measures and thus may reduce the problems that arise in attempts to disentangle the relationship between public policy and public opinion. Scholars have contended that it is difficult, if not impossible, to discern whether attitudes have influenced, or been influenced by, social welfare policies that have existed for decades in some cases.

I examine how economic inequality and equality of opportunity are related to support for redistribution. Then, I explore how ethnic diversity affects attitudes about social welfare policies. Finally, to provide a more in-depth analysis of the theories and findings from the previous two chapters, I focus on four countries with widely distinct socioeconomic systems—Brazil, China, France, and the United States—at multiple time-points spanning two decades.

Selected findings from the dissertation include the salience of equality of opportunity, rather than existing levels of income equality, in predicting support for redistributive social policies, and the fact that contrary to widely cited theories, support for social welfare is actually higher in countries that are more diverse ethnically, which contradicts the claim that diversity is detrimental to social cohesion.

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to publish numerous momentous books on the sociology of religion, Bob somehow manages, at the same time, to return indispensable feedback on his many students' work in record time. Bob's untiring support of my pursuit of unusual ideas during my first few years at Princeton helped to cultivate my enduring sense of intellectual excitement.

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I. INTRODUCTION

Societies vary greatly in their equality and redistribution preferences. In this dissertation, I ask how and why this variation occurs with an analysis of differences in attitudes about income equality and welfare state benefits in 91 countries. I expand on existing research on stratification beliefs, which has focused almost exclusively on the Western world, to encompass the developing world and build theories appropriate for analyzing a much more socioeconomically diverse group of countries.

A. TERMINOLOGY

Although the terms "beliefs," "attitudes," and "values" have distinct meanings, and this dissertation is essentially about attitudes (see, for example, Rokeach 1968), I use the term "stratification beliefs" because there is a substantial literature in which that specific term is employed. I follow Kluegel and Smith (1981), who use the term "belief" to refer to the information about a phenomenon that an individual uses as a basis both for inferring other information and for action, which "encompasses more specific social-psychological concepts as values, perceptions, and attitudes" (1981:30). They define a "stratification belief" as a belief about some aspect of economic inequality and define the field as "the study of what people believe about who gets what and why" (1981:30).

In more specific cases in this dissertation, I instead use the terms "attitudes about," or "support for" redistribution, social spending, social welfare policies, or the welfare state. Because the term "welfare state" generally refers to a limited set of

developed countries, I use it only when the scholars I am citing have used that specific term. Elsewhere, I use the terms "social spending" and "redistribution" to encompass the wider range of redistributive policies—or the expenditure of tax revenue on public goods and services—that is represented by all countries. The study of a wider range of countries is important for a number of reasons, including the fact that social insurance legislation was pioneered by nondemocratic regimes. Indeed, the overwhelming number of social insurance programs were initially adopted by nondemocratic governments, especially in the developing world (Mares and Carnes 2009).

For the purposes of this dissertation, I use a very strict definition of "developed" countries, limiting that classification to high-income members of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), according to the World Bank's classification.[1] All other countries are classified as "developing."

When I refer to "equal opportunity" or "equality of opportunity," I refer to Roemer's (1998) concept of the distribution of resources within a society in a way that equalizes outcomes for the same amount of effort—the idea that children of the rich and the poor should be able to reap the same rewards from society if they put in the same amount of effort. One common way in which equal opportunity has been defined in the scholarly literature has been as intergenerational mobility, measured using the correlation between parents' and children's income. Thus, in discussing equal opportunity, I often

[1] http://data.worldbank.org/about/country-classifications/country-and-lending-groups#OECD_members

refer to "social mobility," which I use as the primary measure of equality of opportunity within a society.

Finally, consistent with the established practice in the literature, I use the terms "ethnic diversity" and "ethnic heterogeneity" interchangeably. When I use the term "diversity," I refer more generally to the racial, ethnic, linguistic, religious, and national (in the case of immigrant-receiving countries and multi-national states) composition of a society (most often, a country). However, there is another term, ethnic or ethnolinguistic "fractionalization," that is used in some contexts and has a more specific meaning, referring to the probability that two randomly selected people in a country will not belong to the same ethnic group (Alesina et al. 2003).

B. FUNDAMENTAL QUESTIONS

1. Is support for redistribution higher in countries where income inequality is higher, or in countries where it is lower (given that lower inequality results, at least partly, from redistributive social policies themselves)?
2. Is equality of opportunity—another byproduct of redistribution—associated with more or less support for social welfare policies?
3. Is ethnic diversity, which is generally assumed to detract from social cohesion, necessarily a detriment to support for the welfare state?
4. In the absence of sufficient time-series data, does constructing a measure that adjusts for the context in which attitudes are formed help reduce the problem of simultaneity in analyses of the relationship between public opinion and public policy?

C. CHAPTER SUMMARIES

In the next chapter (II), I provide an overview of the data and methods used for the analyses in this dissertation. In the two 91-country empirical chapters, I examine how equal opportunity (Chapter III) and diversity (Chapter IV) affect stratification beliefs. In the third empirical chapter (V), I examine selected findings from Chapters III and IV in greater depth by means of case analyses of four countries—Brazil, China, France, and the United States. In Chapter VI, I present conclusions from the dissertation as a whole.

The central finding of Chapter III is that there is a positive relationship between social mobility and support for redistribution. The structures and institutions that facilitate upward mobility—and potentially attenuate some of the detrimental effects of inequality and downward mobility—are generally the products of more comprehensive redistribution policies. Thus, these findings suggest that the tangibility of redistributive social policies may bolster support for social spending. I also explore the role of economic inequality and find some support for the Meltzer-Richard (1981) hypothesis that individuals who have the lowest income in the most unequal countries are the most supportive of redistribution.

In Chapter IV, I explore how ethnic diversity affects attitudes about the welfare state. Previous research has found a negative relationship between diversity and actual social spending and has assumed that this relationship results from lower support for redistribution among the publics of more diverse countries. Yet research on attitudes about redistribution and diversity has been limited. In this chapter, I study attitudes in 91 countries using two different cross-national public opinion data sets and three different methods of measuring diversity. The findings show that diversity is either positively

related or unrelated to support for redistribution, but no evidence is found to support the claim that diversity depresses support for social spending. Thus, this chapter suggests that ethnic heterogeneity may not be the impediment to support for social welfare policies that it is commonly assumed to be.

In Chapter V, to provide a more in-depth analysis of the theories and findings from the previous two chapters, I focused on four countries with very different socioeconomic systems—Brazil, China, France, and the United States—at multiple time-points spanning two decades. By disaggregating individuals in those countries who had experienced different types of social mobility, I find that downward mobility affects support for redistribution while upward mobility does not. In fact, the experience of downward mobility is most strongly related to greater support for redistribution in the U.S., the country where social advancement is the least likely. In my analysis of perceptions about equality of opportunity, I find that those who believe more strongly that family advantages and political connections are necessary to get ahead in their societies are consistently more supportive of redistribution; such supporters may see redistributive social policies as one way to attenuate inequality of opportunity.

Also in Chapter V, I find further evidence of a relationship between greater ethnic diversity and support for redistribution. Both greater tolerance of ethnic difference and greater appreciation for ethnic diversity are associated with greater support for social welfare policies. However, the effects of perceptions about discrimination on support for redistribution differ by country, suggesting that Americans may see greater government involvement in social policy as a means to address discrimination while the French and Chinese may view their governments as the primary perpetrators of discrimination.

II. DATA AND METHODS

A. DATA SETS

In this dissertation, I construct a unique data set that combines individual-level data from the 2009 International Social Survey Programme (ISSP 2012) and the World Values Survey (WVS 2009a) with country-level data from a range of sources, including:

- The World Bank's (2013) World Development Indicators [**WDI**];
- The United Nations Development Programme's (2010b, 2013) Human Development Reports [**UNDP**];
- Solt's (2009) Standardized Income Inequality Database [**SWIID**];
- Gwartney, Hall, and Lawson's (2011) Economic Freedom in the World data [**EFW**];
- Beck et al.'s (2001) Database of Political Institutions 2010 [**DPI**];
- The Polity IV data (Marshall and Jaggers 2009) on political regime characteristics [**Polity IV**];
- Desmet, Ortuño-Ortín, and Weber's (2009) Linguistic Heterogeneity Data [**LHD**];
- Alesina et al.'s (2003) Fractionalization Data [**EFD1**];
- Fearon's (2002) Cross-National Data Set on Ethnic Groups [**EFD2**];
- Gurr's (2009) Minorities at Risk Dataset [**MAR**];
- Cederman, Min, and Wimmer's (2009) Ethnic Power Relations data [**EPR**]; and,
- Vanhanen's (2010) Ethnic Heterogeneity and Ethnic Conflicts 2003-2010 data [**EHEC**].

The abbreviations in bold in brackets are used throughout the text to refer to these data sets. The resulting data sets encompass more than 370,000 individuals from 91 countries. Below, I describe the measures from each of the data sets that are included in the dissertation. The variable names used throughout the dissertation are also identified in bold when they are first presented in this chapter or later chapters so that the reader can find these references more quickly.

A.1 Details about individual-level data sets

The "Social Inequality IV" module of the ISSP was conducted in 2009 in 44 countries. At the time of writing, data for 38 of these countries were available (see Table 1 for a list of countries included in the ISSP).[2]

The WVS is a repeated cross-sectional survey of 98 nations. Nations included in the WVS were measured in one or more of the following time periods: 1989-1993, 1994-1999, 1999-2004, and 2005-2008.[3] In the global analyses in Chapters III and IV, I pool the most recent wave of WVS data from each nation (Inglehart and Baker 2000 used a

---

[2] Data from Canada, the Dominican Republic, Ireland, Italy, Mexico, the Netherlands, and Venezuela remained unavailable at the time of writing.

[3] There are two special cases relevant to differences between the coverage of the WVS and most other data sources used in this analysis. The first case is the United Kingdom; while other data sources cover all of the UK, the WVS only covers Great Britain. The other case is Serbia and Montenegro. The two nations split into two independent countries in 2006. While the last wave of the WVS covered Serbia alone, some measures from other data sets still cover both nations.

similar technique) to maximize the number of countries—especially developing countries—included in the study. The resulting data set includes 91 countries and spans a 12-year period, 1996-2008 (see Table 2 for countries and the years in which they were measured).[4] Accordingly, I control for the WVS year of measurement throughout the analyses. Details about sampling are available in the Technical Specifications of the WVS (WVS 2009b).

Sample weights, which compensate for small deviations with respect to dimensions such as the sex–age distribution or the rural–urban distribution of national populations in the resulting samples, were provided to the WVS and ISSP by participant countries and are applied throughout the analyses whenever appropriate (Medrano 2010).

Both the ISSP and the WVS have important strengths. While the WVS (2009a) is the only data set that contains any measures of attitudes about redistribution from a substantial number of developing and non-Western countries, the 2009 "Social Inequality IV" module of the ISSP (2012) includes a range of more nuanced questions about redistribution than does the WVS.

[4] Andorra, Hong Kong, Montenegro, Northern Ireland, Puerto Rico, and Taiwan are excluded because of the lack of data from those nations for many of the country-level predictor variables. East Germany is combined with West Germany in all analyses and they are referred to together as simply "Germany."

B. MEASURES

A complete list of all country-level variables used in the analyses is presented in Table 3 and a complete list of all individual-level variables used in the analyses is presented in Table 4.

B.1 Outcome variables

i. ISSP

The ISSP attitudes outcome variable is composed of the two ISSP items that best measure support for redistribution. Respondents to the 2009 ISSP were asked to what extent they agreed or disagreed with the following statements where [1] represented "strongly agree" and [5] represented "strongly disagree": "It is the responsibility of the government to reduce the differences in income between people with high incomes and those with low incomes"; "The government should provide a decent standard of living for the unemployed." For ease of interpretation, I reversed the coding of both items so that [1] represents "strongly disagree" and [5] represents "strongly agree." These measures are combined, and then the resulting index is standardized to a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one, which is the **ISSP** "**support for redistribution** score" for each individual (see Table 5 for a list of countries by mean score). The Cronbach's alpha of this index was 0.6. This measure is analyzed in all three empirical chapters—Chapters III, IV, and V.

ii. WVS

The **WVS** attitudes outcome variable, "**support for redistribution**," measures attitudes about social spending in the following way. "How would you place your views

on this scale? [1] means you agree completely with the statement: 'People should take more responsibility to provide for themselves'; [10] means you agree completely with the statement: 'The government should take more responsibility to ensure that everyone is provided for'; and if your views fall somewhere in between, you can choose any number in between." This question measures the extent to which respondents support the use of public resources to ensure minimum social and economic standards (see Table 6 for a list of countries by mean score).

iii. Context-adjusted attitudes

Critics of studies of public opinion and public policy (Immergut 1998; Thelen 1999; Myles 2006; Gelman 2008) contend that it is difficult, if not impossible, to discern whether attitudes have influenced, or been influenced by, welfare state institutions and policies that have existed for decades in some cases. As Kenworthy (2009) observes, cross-nationally comparable public opinion data became available long after different welfare state institutions had begun to influence the social, political, and economic circumstances of their countries. The question that remains is whether the attitudes are the product of the social-spending regime types or the regime types have been shaped by their societies' attitudes about them.

I argue that rather than attempting to disentangle attitudes from institutions that have existed for decades in many cases, one way to approach the study of attitudes about redistribution given the data presently available to us involves constructing a measure that contextualizes the attitudes. Thus, I construct a measure of individuals' views about redistribution that is conditional on the level of benefits that exist in their society, and call this second outcome variable, "context-adjusted attitudes" about redistribution.

All components of the context-adjusted measure are standardized to a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one. The measure is constructed by subtracting the level of redistribution for each respondent's country from each individual's attitudinal score. The attitudinal scores are the ISSP and WVS support for redistribution measures introduced above. The level of benefits (or "level of redistribution") is measured using EFW data (Gwartney, Hall, and Lawson 2011) on social spending, or transfers and subsidies as a percentage of the country's gross domestic product (GDP), which ranges from 1 to 28 percent. The standardized benefits score is subtracted from the standardized attitudinal scores. The resulting values represent a contextualized measure of each individual's support for redistribution. The formula for the **ISSP context-adjusted measure** is the following:

$$\mathbf{V_{ic1} = s(x_{ic1}+x_{ic2}) - s(x_{.c3})} \qquad \mathbf{(1)}$$

Where V_{ic1} is context-adjusted support for redistribution for individual i in country c, "s" means standardized, x_{ic1} and x_{ic2} are the two ISSP items measuring attitudes for individual i in country c, and $x_{.c3}$ is social spending as a percentage of GDP in country c.

To illustrate the meaning of this measure in practice, I compare support for redistribution and context-adjusted support for redistribution in France and China. Mean support for redistribution in the 2009 ISSP is 7.9 out of 10 for an individual in France and 8.2 out of 10 for an individual in China, scores which are separated by only 0.2 standard deviations of that measure, suggesting an almost identical level of support. Yet, in 2009, social spending was 24.9 percent of GDP in France (placing it in top decile for social spending compared to other countries in the sample) and only 6.8 percent of GDP in China (which is in the bottom decile for social spending compared to other countries in the sample). By context-adjusted support for redistribution, China's score is 2.7 standard

deviations higher than France's score—a much larger difference that captures the disparity in the meaning of French and Chinese attitudes given their vastly different national contexts.

The formula for the **WVS context-adjusted measure** is the following:

$$\mathbf{V_{ic2} = s(x_{ic4}) - s(x_{.c3})} \qquad \mathbf{(2)}$$

Where V_{ic2} is context-adjusted support for redistribution for individual i in country c, "s" means standardized, x_{ic4} is the WVS attitude item measuring support for redistribution for individual i in country c, and $x_{.c3}$ is the same social spending measure for country c used in the previous equation.

In previous research, the relationship between attitudes about social spending and policies has been examined assuming two different directions of causality. Arguing that social policy responsiveness to public opinion has been neglected in the study of welfare state differences, Brooks and Manza (2006, 2007) find that social-policy preferences exert a significant influence over welfare state spending in the OECD countries that they study and that cross-national differences in levels of policy preferences explain a portion of the widely noted differences in spending among Esping-Andersen's (1990) welfare state regime types. Weakliem, Andersen, and Heath (2005) have also presented a case for the effects of public opinion on redistributive policies. In contrast, a number of studies have considered the effects of welfare state policies on public opinion about them (Bobo 1991; Svallfors 1997; Andress and Heien 2001; Blekesaune and Quadagno 2003; Linos and West 2003; Blekesaune 2007; McCall and Kenworthy 2009; Breznau 2010).

However, both types of studies have been challenged to better address the issue of reciprocal causality between public opinion and public policy (Immergut 1998; Thelen 1999; Myles 2006), and what Gelman (2008) calls "the fundamental issue … [of] cross-

national comparison based on observational data" (2008:165). Among welfare state development theorists, both institutionalist and path dependency theories incorporate the idea of a reciprocal causality between public opinion and public policy. Institutionalists contend that the structure of political institutions shapes the development of the welfare state (Immergut 1992; Skocpol 1995). Path dependency theorists, such as Pierson (1993), explain welfare states as the product of early developments in the formation of social policy that placed nations on different paths that are difficult to reverse. According to the "new politics" of the welfare state, "the welfare state itself vastly alters the terrain on which the politics of social policy is fought out" (Pierson 1996:143).

In terms of cross-national research in the shorter term, a more fruitful approach toward understanding variation in social spending and support for such policies may be to bypass the debate described above, which I propose to do through the construction of the above-mentioned measure of public opinion that accounts for current policies and may reduce simultaneity. This alternative will allow a focus on other factors that may be associated with differentiation in attitudes about redistribution, such as ethnic diversity, income equality, and social mobility. In Chapters III and IV, I use the context-adjusted measure to test the robustness of models of attitudes alone through comparing models of both types of outcomes.

Figure 1 demonstrates the utility of the context-adjusted measure by showing the relationship between mean support for redistribution and context-adjusted support for redistribution among the countries in the ISSP. In addition to proposing a way to circumvent the debate reciprocal causality and reduce the simultaneity between public opinion and public policy, the context-adjusted measure may also contribute to improved

cross-national comparability by accounting for the varied national policy contexts that shape respondents' perceptions. If the context-adjusted measure were the same as the attitudes measure, there would be a one-to-one relationship between the variables, and all of the points would fall on the dotted line. However, few do. Countries that do fall near the dotted line have the level of spending that accords with their populations' support. Those above the line spend less than their citizens might prefer while those below the line spend more.

A test that shows how the context-adjusted measure may reduce simultaneity is presented in Section IV.D.2.

B.2 Predictor variables

i. ISSP

(a) Multiple chapters

Frequently used individual-level ISSP predictors include:

- Gender:
    - In cases where the effects of advantage are examined, **male** is used (1=male, 0=female);
    - In cases where the effects of disadvantage are examined, **female** is used (1=female, 0=male);
- **Age** (15-98) and **country mean-centered age**;
- Educational attainment:
    - High school completion (1=**high school** completed and above; 0=high school not completed);

  - University completion (1=**university** completed and above; 0=university not completed);

- Employment status (1=**unemployed**; 0=employed full- or part-time, self-employed, retired, student, housewife, or other);
- **Income** (generally mean- or median-centered country-specific deciles); and
- **Minority at risk** (MAR) status (1=MAR group member; 0=Not a MAR group member)

I use Gurr's (2009) classification of "minorities at risk" (MAR) to identify such individuals for the purposes of cross-national comparison.[5] Gurr defines MARs as "ethnopolitical groups, non-state communal groups that have 'political significance' in the contemporary world because of their status and political actions," and determines political significance by the following two criteria: "The group collectively suffers, or benefits from, systematic discriminatory treatment vis-à-vis other groups in a society; the group is the basis for political mobilization and collective action in defense or promotion of its self-defined interests."[6] I coded members of these groups by country in the ISSP and WVS by combining and cross-referencing data on ethnic self-identification, mother tongue, religion, political party membership, and region of residence. The resulting measure is a dummy variable that reflects whether the respondent is a member of a MAR group. The author can provide details of MAR coding by country and data set upon

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[5] For a complete list of "minorities at risk" by country, see http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/mar/data.asp

[6] http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/mar/definition.asp

request. There were many cases in which there was no way to identify members of MAR groups recognized by Gurr. Thus, this variable undercounts members of MAR groups. For an illustration of how the measure is constructed for specific countries, please see Chapter V, "Data and Methods" (Section V.C.1).

(b) Chapter III only

One common way in which equal opportunity has been defined in the scholarly literature has been as intergenerational mobility, measured using the correlation between parents' and children's income. In the ISSP, respondents were asked to rank themselves on a scale of 1 to 10 with 10 representing the group holding the best position in their society. Specifically, they were asked: "In our society there are groups which tend to be towards the top and groups which tend to be towards the bottom. Below is a scale that runs from top to bottom. Where would you put yourself now on this scale?" They were then asked to rank the family they grew up in on the same scale ("And if you think about the family that you grew up in, where did they fit in then?"). I measure **social mobility** by taking the difference between the individual's rank and the rank of the family ("social mobility"). The resulting scores range from a downward mobility score of -9 to an upward mobility score of 9. I include this individual-level measure of social mobility in the Chapter III models. At the country level, I calculate the mean social mobility score by country. Then, I take the variance of the country-level mean score to represent the amount of social mobility—both upward and downward—within each society. This variable is called "**variance of social mobility**," and is also included in Chapter III.

Moreover, because individuals' attitudes about the current state of social spending in their countries are likely to influence whether or not they support the government taking action to reduce income differences and provide for the unemployed, I use **two other attitudinal measures** as control variables. Responses to the following statements should represent the extent to which the respondent thinks the government should be allocating more or less resources to redistributive programs: "Differences in income in <country> are too large"; and "The government should spend less on benefits for the poor," where [1] represents "strongly agree" and [5] represents "strongly disagree." I reversed the coding of the first item to align ideologically with the second item.

(c) Chapter V only

In Chapter V, five new individual-level measures from the ISSP are introduced. For the reader's convenience, they are introduced in that chapter's Data and Methods section (V.C).

ii. WVS

(a) Multiple chapters

Frequently used individual-level WVS predictors include:

- Gender:
    - In cases where the effects of advantage are examined, **male** is used (1=male, 0=female);
    - In cases where the effects of disadvantage are examined, **female** is used (1=female, 0=male);

- **Age** (15-101) and country mean-centered age;
- Educational attainment:
    - High school completion (1=**high school** completed and above; 0=high school not completed);
    - University completion (1=**university** completed and above; 0=university not completed);
- Employment status (1=**unemployed**; 0=employed full- or part-time, self-employed, retired, student, housewife, or other)[7];
- **Income** (generally mean- or median-centered country-specific deciles)[8];
- **Minority at risk** (MAR) status (1=MAR group member; 0=Not a MAR group member), constructed as described in II.B.2i(a) above.

At the country level, in analyses of the most recent wave of 91 countries, I also control for WVS **year** of measurement (1996-2008), which is recoded so that [0] is 1996 and [12] is 2008.

(b) Chapter V only

In Chapter V, six new individual-level measures from the WVS are introduced. For the reader's convenience, they are introduced in that chapter's Data and Methods section (V.C).

[7] WVS employment status data are missing from New Zealand and Jordan.

[8] WVS income data are missing from Argentina, Hungary, Jordan, and Portugal.

iii. Macro-level data sources

(a) Multiple chapters

Two of the most well-established control variables in welfare state scholarship are measures of economic development, **per capita GDP** and **aged population** composition (Myles and Quadagno 2002). In many models in Chapter III and its Appendix, and in Chapter IV, I include both of these measures, which are drawn from the WDI data.[7] Per capita GDP (purchasing power parity, in constant 2005 dollars) ranges from $237 to $57,034, so I use a logarithmic transformation of this variable. Aged population (the percentage of the total population ages 65 and above) ranges from 2.1 percent to 19.9 percent.

A range of measures of political structures and orientations has been considered in the welfare state and stratification beliefs literatures. Yet, as Mares and Carnes (2009) point out, many of the political variables that are considered important determinants of the trajectory of social policy development—such as the strength of left-wing partisanship, the organizational density of business and labor, and the type of electoral system—are highly correlated with each other. Therefore, I include only one measure from this group—**years of left-leaning government**. Since high-quality data on comparative unionization rates remain sparse (Brooks and Manza 2006), it is not possible to consider that measure in this analysis. Left government is operationalized as the proportion of the preceding 35 years during which the largest government party was classified as left wing, and ranges from 0 to 1. These data are from the 2010 DPI (Beck et al. 2001).

(b) Chapter III and Chapter III Appendix

To examine the importance of income inequality to attitudes about redistribution in Chapter III and its Appendix, I use Solt's (2009) database, the Standardized Income Inequality Database (SWIID), which maximizes the comparability of income inequality statistics for the largest possible sample of countries and years. Solt standardized data from the United Nations University's World Income Inequality Database (WIDER 2008) and other sources, using data collected by the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) as the standard. **Post-tax and transfer, or "net," Gini coefficients** range from 23.5 to 67.8 and **pre-tax and transfer, or "gross," Gini coefficients** range from 27.1 to 68.5.[9]

[9] Where Gini coefficients were not available for the exact year in which the WVS was measured in a country, I substituted the closest available year. There was a difference of one year for the following cases: Ghana 2007, India 2006, Jordan 2007, Malaysia 2006, Mali 2007, Malta 1999, Rwanda 2007, Trinidad and Tobago 2006. There was a difference of more than one year for the following cases: Burkina Faso 2007—2003 data used; China 2007—2004 data used; Egypt 2008—2005 data used; Ethiopia 2007—2005 data used; Georgia 2008—2005 data used; Iceland 1999—2003 data used; Iran 2007—2005 data used; South Africa 2007—2005 data used; Switzerland 2007—2005 data used; Thailand 2007—2004 data used; Turkey 2007—2005 data used; Zambia 2007—2005 data used; Zimbabwe 2001—1995 data used. There are no data on Saudi Arabia in Solt's (2009) data set.

In the Chapter III Appendix, I also control for political institutions by including the **polity2** measure from the Polity IV data set to measure how democratic or autocratic a country's political regime is.[10] The scale ranges from -10, "strongly autocratic," to 10, "strongly democratic."[11]

Also in that section, I examine the effects of **education**, **life expectancy**, the **female labor force participation** rate, and the **unemployment rate** in order to measure some of the institutions that facilitate and/or result from equal opportunity. For life expectancy at birth and achievement in education, I use UNDP's (2010b) Human Development Indicators.[12] The life expectancy index was calculated by subtracting the minimum value from the actual value and dividing this by the maximum value minus the minimum value (the range is 0.278 to 0.957). The education index encompasses an index

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[10] Autocracies are defined as sharply restricting or suppressing competitive political participation. Democracy and autocracy scores are derived from codings of the competitiveness of political participation, the openness and competitiveness of executive recruitment, and constraints on the chief executive. For more information on measurement and coding, see Marshall, Gurr, and Jaggers (2010).

[11] For Iceland 1999, Luxembourg 1999, and Malta 1999, data are drawn from Gleditsch (2008), which provides estimates of the polity scores of states not in the original Polity data.

[12] Unlike other country-level indicators, which are drawn from the same year as the WVS was measured in each country, all UNDP data are from 2005.

of adult literacy and an index for combined primary, secondary, and tertiary gross enrollment with two-thirds weight given to literacy and one-third weight given to enrollment; education index scores range from 0.252 to 1.358 (for more details on the construction of both indices, see UNDP 2010a).

I use WDI data on the percent female of the total labor force, which ranges from 15 to 53 percent, and the unemployment rate, as measured as the percentage of the total labor force. Because of highly dispersed data (unemployment rates range from 1 to 77 percent), I use a logarithmic transformation of this variable.

(c) Chapter IV only

Measuring diversity. In recent studies analyzing the effects of ethnic heterogeneity, the most commonly used measure of heterogeneity has been the index of Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization (ELF), which measures the probability of two randomly selected individuals in society belonging to different racial, ethnic, or religious groups (Alesina et al. 2003; Fearon 2002). However, a number of objections have been raised about the validity of this measure. Banting and Kymlicka (2006) point out that the Alesina et al. ELF index is not a consistent measure of either the diversity of the ethnic origins of a population or its politically salient ethnic identities. Desmet, Ortuño-Ortín, and Weber (2009) criticize the Alesina et al. ELF index for failing to account for the dissimilarity between groups. As an example, they point out that the division between the Dutch and French spoken in Belgium is much wider than that between the Catalan and Spanish spoken in Andorra, but that Andorra is classified as more diverse by the Alesina et al. ELF measure. They contend that linguistic diversity can be viewed as a proxy for

the broader notion of ethnolinguistic or cultural diversity and that quantifying the degree of dissimilarity between languages is relatively easy.

However, more generally, Desmet, Ortuño-Ortín, and Weber (2009) delineate three categories of measures of diversity—ethnic fractionalization, linguistic diversity, and polarization. They present a general index of social effective antagonism that contains as special cases several widely cited indices of diversity and polarization. They define a country's level of social effective antagonism as "the sum of the effective antagonisms between all pairs of groups" (2009:1295):

$$A(\alpha,\tau)=\sum_{j=1}^{K}\sum_{k=1}^{K}s_k s_j^{1+\alpha}\tau_{jk} \qquad \textbf{(3)}$$

They refer to the index in equation (3) as an "*A*-index," which depends on the values of α—a positive number that represents how strongly the degree of identification depends on the size of the group, and may be equal to zero to capture the possibility of identification being independent of the size of the group—and the distance matrix τ. In equation (3), j and k are two out of K groups in the country, with population fractions s_j and s_k, respectively, and τ_{jk} is the distance between groups j and k (2009:1294–1295).

Desmet, Ortuño-Ortín, and Weber (2009) find that the crucial determinant of the statistical significance of the effects of diversity on social spending is whether distances between groups are taken into account. Thus, from the sources of measures of ethnic diversity available to me (Alesina et al. 2003 [EFD1]; Cederman, Min, and Wimmer 2009 [EPR]; Desmet, Ortuño-Ortín, and Weber 2009 [LHD]; Fearon 2002 [EFD2]; Vanhanen 2010 [EHEC]), I select measures that incorporate distances between groups whenever possible.

In the ethnic fractionalization category, I use the **ethnolinguistic fractionalization (ELF)** measure from the EPR data. Cederman, Girardin, and Wimmer (2006) argue that specific ethnic configurations are more conflict-prone than others; they construct an index of fractionalization that deviates from standard fractionalization measures by introducing state-centric rather than symmetric ethnic configurations and by postulating group-level, rather than individual-level micro-mechanisms of mobilization.[13]

I follow Desmet, Ortuño-Ortín, and Weber (2009) in selecting the Greenberg Index [LHD] as the best measure in the linguistic diversity category, and the Esteban and Ray Index [LHD] as the best measure in the polarization category. The **Greenberg Index (GI)** can be interpreted as the expected distance between two randomly selected individuals and is essentially a generalization of ELF, whereby distances between different groups are taken into account (Greenberg 1956; Desmet, Ortuño-Ortín, and Weber 2009). Desmet, Ortuño-Ortín, and Weber (2009) calculate GI using this formula:

$$A(0,T) = \sum_{j=1}^{K} \sum_{k=1}^{K} s_k s_j \tau_{jk} \qquad \textbf{(4)}$$

The *A*-index in equation (4) is a special case of equation (3) that assumes that $\alpha = 0$, which means that the degree of identification is independent of the size of the group. Thus, GI computes the population weighted total distances between all groups and can be interpreted as the expected distance between two randomly selected individuals where τ_{jk} is the linguistic distance between groups (Greenberg 1956; Desmet, Ortuño-Ortín, and

[13] For more information about how this ELF index was constructed, see Cederman, Girardin, and Wimmer (2006).

Weber 2009). Desmet, Ortuño-Ortín, and Weber (2009) point out that with nearly 7,000 known living languages and about 200 countries, multilingual societies are a common feature across the globe, and that another advantage of focusing on linguistic heterogeneity is that "quantifying the degree of dissimilarity between languages is relatively easy" (2009:1293).

The **Esteban and Ray Index (ER)** measures polarization. Esteban and Ray (1994) conceptualize polarization as a convergence of the extent of alienation between groups and strength of identification within groups, and believe that it is closely related to the generation of social tensions. Desmet, Ortuño-Ortín, and Weber (2009) calculate the index using this formula:

$$A(1,T) = \sum_{j=1}^{K} \sum_{k=1}^{K} s_k s_j^2 \tau_{jk} \qquad \textbf{(5)}$$

The *A*-index in equation (5) is another special case of equation (3), and assumes that $\alpha = 1$, which means that the degree of identification is proportional to the size of the group. ER assumes that individuals identify with other individuals in the same group, such as those who speak the same language. Identification with one's own group may affect alienation toward another group with alienation increasing with distance between groups (τ_{jk}).

Desmet, Ortuño-Ortín, and Weber (2009) illustrate the difference between diversity and polarization by comparing two countries, A and B:

> *If A consists of two equally sized groups, and B of three equally sized groups, then A is more polarized, but less diverse, than B. When distances between groups are taken into account, the difference between polarization and diversity becomes more subtle. In that case, increasing the number of equally sized groups need no longer imply increasing the*

> *level of diversity, since distances between groups also play a role. (2009:1293)*

So for example, when accounting for differences between groups, Switzerland is diverse but not polarized, Cyprus is both diverse and polarized. In another example, Nigeria has high ELF, GI, and ER scores while Iceland has low scores of all three measures.

Measures directly related to the study of diversity. Cederman, Girardin, and Wimmer (2006) contend that studies that problematize diversity must account for the political relevance of ethnic identities in national politics. They define ethnic groups as politically relevant if at least one significant political actor claims to represent the interests of that group in the national political arena, or if members of an ethnic category are systematically and intentionally discriminated against in the domain of public politics. I control for the share of the **excluded population** relative to the ethnopolitically relevant population, which ranges from 0 to .8.

To account for how diversity may influence support for redistribution differentially, depending on the size of a country's population, I also include **the log of total population** (277,500-1.3 billion) from the WDI as a control.

I control for how the effects of diversity on attitudes might differ in countries with large immigrant populations. I include a measure from the WDI of international **migrant stock** (percent of population), which is the number of people born in a country other than the one where they live, and includes refugees. Migrant stock ranges from .1 percent to 46 percent.

C. ANALYTIC STRATEGIES

Because the structure of the data sets used for these analyses in Chapters III and IV involves both aggregate (country-level) variables and micro- (individual-level) observations, the use of ordinary least squares (OLS) can lead to standard errors that are biased downward and is therefore a suboptimal approach for modeling such data (Moulton 1990). To account for the presence of unobserved, country-level dependence in the error terms, I estimate OLS regression models with robust, clustered standard errors (Chen et al. 2003; Wooldridge 2003). Robust standard errors adjust for the lack of independence of observations within countries.

In Chapter V, a cross-sectional study of four countries—Brazil, China, France, and the U.S.—over time using both the ISSP and WVS data, I use ordinary least squares (OLS) regression. For the reader's convenience, additional details about those data sets are presented in Section V.C.

III. INEQUALITY, EQUAL OPPORTUNITY, AND ATTITUDES ABOUT REDISTRIBUTIVE SOCIAL POLICY

A. INTRODUCTION

In this chapter, I address the question of how income inequality and equality of opportunity affect attitudes about redistributive social spending. Attitudes about redistribution have been associated with expectations of social mobility (McCall and Manza 2011; McCall 2013). Moreover, social spending programs are an important tool for facilitating equality of opportunity. Yet the relationship between actual conditions of social mobility and attitudes about redistribution has yet to be explored.

Previous research has primarily focused on economic self-interest and ideology as explanations for differences in stratification beliefs at the individual level while most studies of cross-national variation in stratification beliefs have focused on differentiation according to Esping-Andersen's (1990) welfare state typology. The majority of this research has focused either on the United States (Kluegel and Smith 1986; Shepelak and Alwin 1986; Hasenfeld and Rafferty 1989; Bobo 1991; McCall and Kenworthy 2009), or on comparisons among developed countries (Svallfors 1997; Bean and Papadakis 1998; Gelissen 2000; Andress and Heien 2001; Blekesaune and Quadagno 2003; Linos and West 2003; Brooks and Manza 2006; Breznau 2010). For the purposes of this chapter, in which I explore a new explanation for cross-national variation in stratification beliefs, I

examine over 50,000 individuals from 38 countries, many of which are developing. With a wider spectrum of variation in the structures and institutions of interest represented, the use of a broader sample of countries should enhance the robustness of findings about associations between country-level characteristics and the stratification beliefs of their populations. Although the overwhelming number of social insurance programs were initially adopted by nondemocratic governments, especially in the developing world (Mares and Carnes (2009), Esping-Andersen's typology was not intended for application beyond the developed, industrialized world. Thus, a study of stratification beliefs that incorporates the developing world calls for exploring alternative explanations for cross-national differences in these attitudes.

One economic model of attitudes about redistribution is the standard Meltzer-Richard hypothesis (Meltzer and Richard, 1981), which states that the lower the pre-tax income of an individual in relation to the average income, the higher is the preferred level of taxation and redistribution, and that this preference is reflected in the individual's voting behavior. Although this model assumes majority rule, Meltzer and Richard contend that welfare-maximizing dictators or monarchs would behave similarly to voting majorities in terms of these types of policy decision. A major limiting factor in prior studies of stratification beliefs and the Meltzer-Richard hypothesis has been inconsistencies in available data on income inequality. I use a recently released dataset from Solt (2009) that combines newly standardized measures of both pre- and post-tax and transfer income inequality (henceforward, "pre-tax" or "gross" inequality, and "post-tax" or "net" inequality) with more comprehensive geographic coverage.

However, I contend that the Meltzer-Richard hypothesis alone does not sufficiently explain variation in stratification beliefs. Rather, we can better understand how attitudes about redistribution vary by taking a broader view of inequality—by accounting for how structural and institutional factors affect how inequality is experienced by individuals in varied national contexts. If Meltzer and Richard (1981) are correct, support for redistribution should be greatest among those with the lowest income in the most unequal countries. On the other hand, the structures and institutions that facilitate equality of opportunity, thereby attenuating some of the potentially detrimental effects of inequality, are generally the products of more comprehensive redistribution policies. Thus, support for redistribution may be higher where such benefits of redistributive policies are most tangible.

B. BACKGROUND

Many studies of stratification beliefs have focused on differentiation according to the economic self-interest and ideology of individuals. Members of more privileged groups—such as those with higher income, men, and the employed—have consistently been shown to be less supportive of social spending (Blekesaune 2007; Bobo 1991; Hasenfeld and Rafferty 1989; Kluegel and Smith 1986; Linos and West 2003; Rytina, Form, and Pease 1970). Those who hold less egalitarian beliefs in countries with less egalitarian ideological orientations have also been shown to be less supportive of social spending (Andress & Heien 2001; Blekesaune and Quadagno 2003; Hasenfeld and Rafferty 1989; Kluegel and Smith 1986; Linos and West 2003; Mau 2004; Brooks and Manza 2006; Meier Jaeger 2006). In this chapter, I wish to consider some additional

factors. Specifically, I will explore how income inequality and equality of opportunity (as defined in Section I.A) are related to attitudes about social spending.

Weakliem, Andersen, and Heath (2005) find a relationship between public opinions about equality and the distribution of income within a country and suggest that to some degree the public gets the amount of inequality that it wants. Their estimates, based on individuals' assessments about the fairness of more productive workers receiving higher pay, show that a .25 increase in the proportion of public acceptance of pay differences in a given country is associated with an increase of 4.3 points in that country's Gini coefficient. For example, differences in public opinion on this question appear to account for about a quarter of the difference in inequality between the United States and Sweden. On the other hand, Finseraas (2009) demonstrates a positive association between the level of income inequality and the demand for redistribution. Analyzing individuals in 22 European countries, he demonstrates that these results are robust to the inclusion of a range of other country-level variables considered important for preferences for redistribution. Given that redistribution attenuates inequality, I expect to find support for Finseraas' supposition as summarized by the first hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: Support for redistribution should be higher where income inequality is higher.

Solt (2009) has compiled a standardized database of both pre- and post-tax inequality measures for most countries in the world. I maintain that post-tax Gini coefficients are the more salient predictor of attitudes and demonstrate this empirically in the Appendix to this chapter. As Kenworthy and Pontusson (2005) point out, "At the end of the day, what matters to people is not market income, but rather disposable income,

that is, income after taxes and transfers" (2005: 455). Relevant studies that have used measures of pre-tax inequality were examining actual redistribution as their outcome, rather than public opinion about redistribution. I argue that because post-tax Gini coefficients more accurately capture differences in real disposable income, they better reflect the ways in which individuals experience income inequality in everyday life and are more likely to influence attitudes about redistribution.

According to Roemer (1998), equal opportunity exists where the distribution of resources within a society facilitates equal outcomes for the same amount of effort. Regarding the relationship between equality of opportunity and attitudes about social spending, social spending programs are an important tool for facilitating equality of opportunity. Thus, I expect that:

Hypothesis 2: Support for redistribution is greater among individuals in countries in which structural and institutional factors maximize opportunities for advancement, particularly among those who have experienced the greatest social mobility themselves.

The extent to which social spending may affect equality of opportunity can be illustrated by the contrasting outcomes of two recent studies—one of 28 Latin American countries (de Barros et al. 2009) and one of Sweden (Björklund, Jäntti, and Roemer 2011). While circumstances may explain as much as 30 to 50 percent of inequality in Latin America, in the much more socioeconomically equal case of Sweden, only at most one-third, and in general less—as little as 5 percent—of inequality is attributable to circumstances. Where redistribution is greater, actual equality of opportunity is much greater. The structures and institutions that facilitate equality of opportunity are generally the products of redistribution, and public opinion may reflect this.

C. DATA AND METHODS

The data set used for the analyses in this chapter combines individual-level data from the ISSP with country-level data from the WDI, SWIID, EFW, and DPI. For more information about these data, see Chapter II.

C.1 Measures

Outcome measures. I examine two outcome variables—the ISSP support for redistribution score and the ISSP context-adjusted support for redistribution measure—a for each individual. For details about the construction of these variables, please see Section II.B.1.i.

Income inequality. The SWIID data maximize the comparability of income inequality statistics for the largest possible sample of countries and years. I use post-tax and -transfer Gini coefficients, which range from 23.5 to 67.8.[14] The justification for the selection of the post-tax and –transfer measure over the pre-tax and –transfer measure is in the Appendix to this chapter.

Equality of opportunity. At the country-level, I use the mean variance of social mobility measure to account for equality of opportunity. I also include the individual-level companion to this measure.

Individual-level control variables. As described in Chapter II, at the individual level, I control for a number of measures of self-interest—female, age, high school

[14] Where Gini coefficients were not available for the exact year in which the ISSP was measured (2009), I substituted the closest available year. This was 2007 for New Zealand and Ukraine and 2005 for China, Israel, South Africa, and Taiwan.

completion, unemployment, and country mean-centered income. I also control for what the respondent thinks about the current levels of income inequality, and about spending on the poor in the country.

Country-level control variables. Left-wing political institutions have been shown to be associated with more generous social spending programs (Huber and Stephens 2001; Taylor-Gooby 2005), and may be responsible for enhancing institutions that promote equal opportunity. Thus, I include the DPI years of left government measure.

C.2 Analytic strategy

I estimate OLS regression models with robust, clustered standard errors (Chen et al., 2003; Wooldridge, 2003), as described in Section II.C.

C.3 Sample

Because data for certain country-level predictors are unavailable for Taiwan, it is removed from the sample. After these observations are removed, the remaining sample has 51,129 observations. Listwise deletion of observations with missing data on one or more measures used in the analysis yields an analytic sample of 38,616 (76%). The vast majority of missing data arose due to nonresponse on the income item. Logistic regression analyses suggest that the missing are more likely to be unemployed (odds ratio=1.26), slightly less likely to be older (odds ratio=0.99), and slightly less likely to be upwardly mobile in terms of social class (odds ratio=0.94) but otherwise do not differ much from the analytic sample in terms of other measures used in the analysis.

Table 7 presents descriptive statistics of the analytic sample for all variables used in the analyses in this chapter.

D. RESULTS

Hypothesis 1 states that support for redistribution is higher where income inequality is higher. I show the results of testing that hypothesis in Table 8. Model 1 shows that the coefficient of income inequality has a positive, near-statistically significant effect on support for redistribution, which is statistically significant when the United States is excluded from the sample (Model 2). In Model 4, I show the same model predicting context-adjusted attitudes about redistribution. The coefficient of income inequality is again positive and is statistically significant, which offers some evidence that there is more support for redistribution in the most unequal countries, consistent with Hypothesis 1.

The estimates presented Table 8 also reveal the results of testing Hypothesis 2, which states that support for redistribution is greater where there is more equality of opportunity. The coefficient of the variance of social mobility is positive and statistically significant for both the attitudes-only model (Model 1) and the context-adjusted attitudes model (Model 4), which supports Hypothesis 2. The coefficients for the variance of social mobility are somewhat larger when the U.S. is excluded (Models 2 and 5).

Almost all of the individual-level coefficients show that support for social spending is greater among the less advantaged. In all models for attitudes alone (Models 1-3) and context-adjusted attitudes (Models 4-6), the coefficients for individual-level income and social mobility are negative and statistically significant suggesting that those whose incomes are relatively high and have themselves experienced the greatest social mobility are the least supportive of redistribution. The coefficients for high school

completion are also positive and significant in the attitudes-only models (Models 1-3), but non-significant in the context-adjusted attitudes models (Models 4-6). The coefficients for female, unemployed, and the beliefs that income differences in the respondent's country are too large and the government should spend more on the poor are all positive and significant in models of attitudes alone (Models 1-3). The coefficient of the belief that income differences in the respondent's country are too large is also positive and significant in the models of context-adjusted attitudes (Models 4-6). All other individual-level coefficients are non-significant. Since the outcome variables are also standardized, standardizing the coefficients for the predictor variables (Table 8, Models 3 and 6) reveals that an increase of one standard deviation (0.08) in the variance of social mobility results, on average, in an increase of 0.0072 (0.09*0.08) in support for redistribution, and an increase of 0.22 in context-adjusted support for redistribution. An increase of one standard deviation (9.9) in the net Gini coefficient results, on average, in an increase of 0.04 in support for redistribution and an increase of 0.59 in context-adjusted support for redistribution. Thus social mobility has a larger country-level predictor of attitudes about redistribution while income inequality is the most important country-level predictor of context-adjusted attitudes. However, given that there is some collinearity between post-tax and transfer income inequality and the amount of redistribution in a country, which is part of the outcome variable (the Pearson's correlation coefficient is -0.68, although the Variance Inflation Factor [VIF] for the income inequality measure in Model 6 is only 1.09), the size of the coefficients of income inequality must be interpreted with caution.

E. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

Dominant theories about stratification beliefs posit that support for redistribution is greater in countries with greater income inequality and among the most socioeconomically vulnerable individuals. However, while extant empirical studies offer more evidence of the latter, findings about the relationship between stratification beliefs and income inequality are inconsistent. I argued that we could begin to address these inconsistencies by broadening the analysis of attitudes about redistribution to encompass a larger number of countries to see if a more distinct pattern would emerge with a larger sample size. I included developing countries, which had not been included in previous studies, and incorporated newly available data that provided improvements in the cross-national comparability of measures of income inequality.

While data limitations meant that most scholars who have studied the relationship between redistribution, policy attitudes, and inequality had to rely on measures of pre-tax and transfer inequality, the analysis in this chapter employed new standardized data that provided a measure of post-tax and transfer income inequality (Solt 2009). I argued that post-tax inequality was more likely to reflect the ways in which individuals experience income inequality in everyday life, and would be the more influential factor in shaping attitudes about redistribution. I found some support for the Meltzer-Richard (1981) hypothesis that individuals would be the most supportive of redistribution in countries where income inequality was greatest. In particular, individuals with lower incomes were

more supportive of redistribution, as were individuals in countries with greater income inequality.[15]

However, the central finding of this study is that there is a relationship between social mobility and support for redistribution, and that social mobility is more relevant to explaining varied levels of support than is income inequality. At the country level, I found that support for redistribution is greater where social mobility is greater. Yet, at the individual level, I found that individuals who had personally experienced greater social mobility were less supportive. These findings may seem contradictory to some extent. Redistributive policies should facilitate social mobility by leveling the playing field, and support for redistribution should be greater among individuals who have benefited most from having greater access to opportunities for advancement. Although the findings herein support this assertion at the country level, those individuals who may have benefited the most from redistributive policies—those who have experienced the greatest mobility—are the least supportive. This suggests a question for future research: Does this disparity result from upwardly mobile individuals believing that their success is more a product of their own effort than a product of their countries' policies?

Nonetheless, an upwardly mobile individual in a more mobile society is more supportive of redistribution than an upwardly mobile individual in a less mobile society;

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[15] Predicted values for support for redistribution for individuals with income farthest above and below the mean in the most unequal countries (-0.11 and 0.22) are respectively higher than those with income farthest above and below the mean in the least unequal countries (-0.26 and 0.08) when all else is equal.

likewise, downwardly mobile individuals are more supportive of redistribution in more mobile versus less mobile societies.[16] Thus, in future research, another fruitful question to pursue could be how mobility affects support for redistribution when upwardly-mobile individuals are disaggregated from downwardly-mobile individuals in analyses.

There has been much debate about the direction of causality in the public opinion-public policy relationship. I attempt to address the issue of simultaneity between existing redistributive policies and respondents' attitudes about them in two ways. First, I construct a measure of individuals' views about redistribution given the level of benefits that exist in their society, thus contextualizing the attitudes. Comparing the results of models of contextualized attitudes with results of models of attitudes that are not contextualized allows for a test of robustness that in this case, where the results are fairly consistent, substantiates the findings.

Second, I control for individuals' attitudes about the current level of inequality and government spending on the poor in their countries, which is another approach to accounting for how the existing system of redistribution in a country may affect respondents' attitudes about social spending. I find that measures of inequality, social mobility, and individual socioeconomic status remain significant in the presence of these

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[16] Predicted values for support for redistribution for individuals who are most upwardly and downwardly mobile in countries with the greatest social mobility (0.08 and -0.26) are respectively higher than those of the most upwardly and downwardly mobile individuals in countries with the least social mobility (-0.27 and -0.01) when all else is equal.

controls, which suggests that support for redistribution is determined by factors other than respondents' feelings toward the current distributional system.

See the Appendix below for a test of robustness of the findings presented above using the World Values Survey (WVS) data, which includes a broader range of countries.

F. APPENDIX: RELATED FINDINGS FROM THE WORLD VALUES SURVEY

F.1 Introduction

In this Appendix, I demonstrate empirically that post-tax and transfer Gini coefficients are preferable to pre-tax and transfer Gini coefficients for the study of stratification beliefs. I also find additional support for the Meltzer-Richard (1981) hypothesis that individuals who are farthest below the median income in the most unequal countries are the most supportive of redistribution. However, another type of inequality—that of opportunity and individuals' differential access to it—is again found to be the most salient explanation for variation in attitudes about redistribution, particularly in developing countries. Individuals with the least access to opportunity in contexts in which equality of opportunity is lowest are the most supportive of redistribution. Consistent with the findings above, the differences in these effects between developed and developing countries suggest that where the welfare state is most successful, it is perceived as less necessary by the very populations who have benefited most from it.

F.2 Data and methods

In this chapter, I use individual-level data from the World Values Survey (WVS 2009a) and country-level data from the WDI, UNDP (2010b), SWIID, and the Polity IV.

i. Measures

Outcome measure. The outcome variable is the attitudinal item from the WVS of support for redistribution. Other individual-level measures used from the WVS include female, age (continuous), high school completion, unemployed, and country median-centered income. See Section II.C3.ii.a for more information about these variables.

Income inequality and equality of opportunity. Country-level variables include pre- and post-tax and -transfer Gini Coefficients from SWIID; the log of per capita GDP, the female labor force participation rate, and the log of the unemployment rate from the WDI; and the polity2 measure from the Polity IV data. The justification for the inclusion of the individual- and country-level explanatory variables is incorporated into the Summary of Results section below. Technical details about these measures can be found in Section II.B.2.iii.

ii. Analytic strategy

As above, I estimate OLS regression models with robust, clustered standard errors (Chen et al., 2003; Wooldridge, 2003).

iii. Sample

Because data for certain country-level predictors are unavailable for Bosnia and Herzegovina, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia, these countries are removed from the sample. In addition, because of the complete exclusion of measures necessary for the present analyses in the most recent wave of the WVS, Argentina, Denmark, Greece, Hungary, Jordan, Latvia, Malta, New Zealand, and Portugal are also removed from the sample. After these observations, which are Missing At Random (MAR) or Missing Completely At Random (MCAR) are removed, the remaining sample has 109,969 observations out of

the original total of l25,180. Listwise deletion of observations with missing data on one or more measures used in the analysis yields an analytic sample of 95,031 (86%). The majority of missing data arose due to nonresponse on the income item. Logistic regression analyses suggest that the missing are more likely to be female (odds ratio=1.13), but otherwise do not differ much from the analytic sample in terms of other measures used in the analysis.

Table 9 presents descriptive statistics of the analytic sample for all variables used in the analysis in this Appendix.

F.3 Summary of results

As described above, I contend that post-tax and transfer Gini coefficients are a more salient predictor than pre-tax and transfer Gini coefficients for attitudes about redistribution. I establish this empirically using the WVS and SWIID data. In Table 10, Model 1 shows that the coefficient of net inequality has a positive, statistically significant effect on support for government benefits while Model 2 shows that the effect of gross inequality is non-significant. Model 3 shows standardized coefficients when both net and gross inequality are modeled together. Net inequality has a positive, significant effect on support for income equality, as in Model 1, while the effect of gross inequality is non-significant again. The coefficient of net inequality is larger than that of gross inequality, consistent with the fact that the latter was non-significant in Model 2 while the former was significant in Model 1. Thus, in all other analyses in this dissertation, including the analysis of ISSP data above in this chapter, I focus on the effects of the level of net inequality.

The estimates presented in Table 11 explore the effects of inequality of income and opportunity at the individual level. I use individual-level country median-centered income data from the WVS.[17] In Table 11, Model 1 shows that, as above (Table 8, Models 1 through 6), income has a negative, statistically significant effect on support for redistribution. However, the effect of net inequality is non-significant while the effects in the ISSP models were positive and significant. To explore the contextual differences in the experience of varied income levels in different countries, I add an interaction measure of the effect between net inequality and median-centered income. The interaction term has a small, but significant positive effect. Thus, to some extent, the effects of income on support for redistribution do depend on the level of inequality.

Because of the larger number of countries included in the WVS, I was able to divide the countries into developed and developing (Table 11, Models 2 and 3). We see that median-centered income and the inequality-by-income interaction term are only statistically significant in the developing countries model (Model 3). Indeed, there is a large difference in net inequality between these two groups of countries. The mean net Gini coefficient is 40 among the developing countries, compared to only 30 among the developed countries, which suggests that the effects of income and the level of a country's income inequality on support for redistribution are most salient in poorer countries. However, it is actually individuals with the lowest income in the most equal countries that are the most supportive of redistribution.

[17] Income data are missing for Argentina, Hungary, Jordan, and Portugal.

Measuring equality of opportunity using the WVS was less straightforward than it was using the ISSP. Because there is no direct measure of social mobility in the WVS, and to the best of my knowledge, no global cross-nationally comparable country-level data on social mobility exists, I draw on other connections between opportunity and attitudes about redistribution that emerge from the literature. At the country level, I measure per capita GDP, quality of education, life expectancy, female labor force participation, unemployment, and democratic political institutions. The wealth of the country has an obvious impact on the severity of the experience of those at the bottom of the economic hierarchy, as well as countries' abilities to spend on redistribution. Solt (2009) illustrates this by showing that in the developing world, differences in gross income inequality explain 93.5 percent of the variance in net income inequality, but only explain 56.1 percent in the advanced countries. Thus, I control for the effects of economic development using WDI data on per capita GDP.

Education may be the institution most often associated with equality of opportunity (Harttgen and Klasen 2009). In addition, Mayer (2005) highlights how differences in life expectancy are a fundamental measure of the variation in mean life chances between countries. Thus, I include UNDP indexes of life expectancy at birth and achievement in education. To measure the availability of opportunities within the labor market, I include WDI measures of the female labor force participation and unemployment rates.

The Meltzer-Richard hypothesis suggests that voters control the balance between inequality and redistribution in their countries. Those in more democratic countries may feel less need to alter levels of inequality, which they presumably would have already

influenced by their voting behavior. Therefore, I control for how democratic or autocratic a country's political regime is by including the polity2 variable.[18]

To measure access to opportunities at the individual level, I use individual-level demographic data from the WVS. Specifically, I test the effects of female, age, high school completion, and unemployment.[19]

In general, equality of opportunity is more important in the developing countries (Model 3) than in the developed countries (Model 2). And, individuals with the least access to opportunities—women, the elderly, those with less education, and the unemployed—are more supportive of redistribution. Many of the opportunity predictors are non-significant in the developed countries model (Model 2). The female labor force participation rate presents an interesting exception; its effect is negative and significant in both models, but the coefficient is seven times larger in the developed countries model (Model 2). The other notable finding from the developed countries model is that the coefficient of unemployment at the individual level is much larger and significant—in those countries in which the unemployment rate is generally lower. Perhaps the effect of being unemployed is more salient in countries in which it is less common.

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[18] Autocracies are defined as sharply restricting or suppressing competitive political participation. Democracy and autocracy scores are derived from codings of the competitiveness of political participation, the openness and competitiveness of executive recruitment, and constraints on the chief executive. For more information on measurement and coding, see Marshall, Gurr, and Jaggers (2010).

[19] Employment status data are missing from New Zealand and Jordan.

The most striking finding is the differential effects of education at both the country- and individual-levels. The coefficient of the education index is large, positive, and significant in the developing countries model (Model 3). Although it is non-significant in the developed countries model (Model 2), the coefficient of the education index is negative, suggesting that above a certain level of development, greater equality of opportunity may decrease support for the welfare state. In Figure 2, I present the results of running the full regression model presented in Table 11 on two additional groups of countries—those with education index scores above and below the median (.88). Indeed, while mean support for government benefits among those without a high school education is higher than it is among those with a high school education in countries with an education index lower than the median, and this difference is statistically significant (using a t-test for equality of means), there is not a significant difference in these mean scores among those in countries with an education index above the median.

F.4 Discussion and Conclusions

Consistent with the findings from the analysis of ISSP data in Section III.D above, the central finding of this study is that access to opportunity at the individual level and structures and institutions that shape equality of opportunity at the country level are the most salient predictors of attitudes about redistribution, particularly in more unequal developing countries.

The positive effect of the education index using the WVS data offered further support for the hypothesis (ISSP Hypothesis 2) that support for redistribution is greater where its benefits are more evident, potentially engendering more appreciation of the

welfare state. However, the overall evidence is mixed. For example, the negative directionality of some of the opportunity measures—such as per capita GDP, life expectancy, and the female labor force participation rate—all suggest the possibility that, where greater social spending has bred greater equality of opportunity, the playing field may be perceived as more level. And perhaps—erroneously or not—the success of the welfare state may lead to it being viewed as less necessary among those who have benefited from it most.

For example, regarding the difference in the effect of the female labor force participation rate on support for redistribution in developed compared to developing countries, the larger negative effect on support for redistribution in developed countries may indicate that as it increases, the perceived need for a social safety net decreases. While studies by both Huber and Stephens (2000) and Brooks and Manza (2006) established a positive relationship between female labor force participation and social spending in industrialized capitalist countries, they were not analyzing its effects on attitudes about redistribution. My results suggest that in terms of attitudes, women's labor force participation is negatively related and has a more negative effect in the most developed countries. This finding supports Esping-Andersen's (1993) proposition that participation in the labor force has given women independence from the destinies of male partners. Increased control over their own life chances may lead women to feel less dependent on social safety nets, just as the employed express less support for redistribution than do the unemployed. Indeed, predicted values show that an employed (full-time or self-employed) woman in a developed country with high equality of opportunity is less supportive of redistribution than a woman who is not employed, and

much less supportive than an employed woman in a developing country where there is little equality of opportunity.[20]

[20] Predicted value for an employed woman in a developed country with high equality of opportunity: 4.9; predicted value for a woman who is not employed in a developed country with high equality of opportunity: 5.0; predicted value for an employed woman in a developing country with low equality of opportunity: 7.3.

IV. ETHNIC DIVERSITY AND SUPPORT FOR REDISTRIBUTIVE SOCIAL POLICIES

A. INTRODUCTION

In the previous chapter, I found that attitudes about redistribution are not sufficiently explained by the extent of income inequality within a country and the position of an individual within that economic structure, although there is little doubt that, in general, the poor are generally more supportive of redistribution. However, I found that another type of inequality—that of opportunity for advancement in life—is more important for explaining variation in attitudes about redistribution. The positive relationship between country-mean social mobility and support for redistribution at the individual level suggests that the tangibility of the products of more comprehensive redistributive social policies may, in turn, bolster support for redistributive social policies themselves. These products—the structures and institutions that facilitate upward mobility—attenuate some of the effects of income and class inequality.

One question that remains is how inequality between groups may affect support for redistribution. Scholars, politicians, and public figures from both the left and right wing of the political spectrum have raised concerns that increasing diversity will inevitably lead to demands for the retrenchment of welfare state benefits (Glazer 1998; Goodhart 2004; Pearce 2004). Such apprehensions are derived from research by scholars who claim that humans have a genetic disposition to favor beneficiaries who look like

themselves (Alesina and Glaeser 2004; Luttmer 2001; Salter 2004), and that ethnic heterogeneity poses obstacles to the development of social capital and pro-welfare political coalitions (Miguel and Gugarty 2005; Putnam 2007; Stephens 1979; Alesina and Glaeser 2004; Kitschelt 1995).

Indeed, a number of studies have found that there is a negative relationship between ethnic diversity and redistributive spending, or the generosity of welfare states (Alesina and Glaeser 2004; Salter 2004; Desmet, Ortuño-Ortín, and Weber 2009). All of the assertions above explicitly or implicitly claim that diversity weakens the welfare state because it affects *attitudes* about redistribution. Yet the relationship between diversity and attitudes themselves has seldom been examined empirically.

Moreover, much of the empirical evidence that supports these theories comes from the United States (Banting and Kymlicka 2006). In this chapter, I address the question of whether ethnic diversity affects attitudes about social-spending policies by analyzing a broad set of countries, which represent a wider range of social-spending configurations and greater variation in the types and structures of ethnic diversity.

This analysis addresses the unanswered question of how diversity affects *attitudes* about social welfare policies, as well as examining an approach to contextualizing these attitudes. I also explore whether economic, political, and demographic factors better explain attitudes about redistribution than does diversity. I build on the burgeoning literature on the relationship between diversity and support for social spending, as well as the literatures on other determinants of stratification beliefs, welfare state development, and the social implications of diversity. In addition to presenting results from two

different global public-opinion data sets, I explore the effects of a wide range of approaches to measuring diversity.

B. BACKGROUND

My goal in this chapter is to integrate dominant theories about welfare state development with recent findings about the social role of ethnic diversity, to begin to explore how heterogeneity affects support for social spending in varied socioeconomic and political contexts. I also incorporate a larger sample of countries than has generally been examined and propose a method for addressing concerns about cross-national comparability such that policy attitudes can be contextualized within public-policy contexts.

Although some research on welfare states has focused on the relationship between ethnic diversity and social spending, little research has considered how diversity affects attitudes. Yet, attitudes are assumed to be a precursor to the development of, or change in, actual redistributive policy, at least in democracies. While studies of attitudes about redistribution or the size of the welfare state generally do not consider the role of diversity, I begin to examine how diversity affects attitudes about social spending by building on the major theories and findings from the bodies of literature that examine: 1) various social implications of diversity; 2) attitudes about redistribution or the welfare state (stratification beliefs); and 3) the development of varied welfare state regimes.

Although the large body of research on welfare state development has focused on developed democratic countries, the theories and findings from these studies raise many issues to consider in examining the relationship between ethnic diversity and attitudes about social welfare policies among a larger group of countries. Among the countries that

are most commonly studied in the welfare state literature, the variables that are considered important determinants of social-policy development are highly correlated with each other while other potentially important explanatory variables have been neglected (Mares and Carnes 2009). The examination of a larger group of countries in this chapter may challenge or confirm the generalizability of findings from studies of more limited groups of countries.

See the Terminology Section (I.A) for details about how the terms "welfare state," "social spending," "redistribution," "ethnic diversity," "ethnic heterogeneity," and "ethnic fractionalization" are used in this chapter.

B.1 Ethnic heterogeneity and social spending

In an early study of welfare states, Stephens (1979) found that ethnic diversity affects labor organization, a key determinant of social spending across the member states of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). Yet, as Banting and Kymlicka (2006) note, subsequent research in this area has not followed up on such leads about the role of diversity until fairly recently, when scholars have assumed that ethnic/racial heterogeneity erodes redistribution. The most common explanations for this assumption include the existence of a genetic disposition to favor co-ethnics (Luttmer 2001; Salter 2004), and the obstacles ethnic heterogeneity poses to the development of social capital and pro-welfare political coalitions (Miguel and Gugarty 2005; Putnam 2007; Stephens 1979; Alesina and Glaeser 2004; Kitschelt 1995). Salter (2004) illustrates this line of thought by claiming that existing ethological and sociobiological theories converge on the view that ethnic solidarity exists because individuals conceive of their ethnic groups as extended families. He argues that shared descent facilitates the

development of public altruism—the willingness to share resources to some extent with citizens at large. Yet, Salter claims, as ethnic heterogeneity increases society resembles less and less an extended family because of accumulating cultural and racial differences; as a result, public altruism declines across the society as a whole, although it survives *within* ethnic groups.

In what is perhaps the most prominent cross-national study of heterogeneity and social spending, Alesina and Glaeser (2004) conclude that ethnic, racial, and ethnolinguistic fractionalization (ELF) are all negatively correlated with social spending. However, these findings have been criticized on a number of fronts. Critics of Alesina and Glaeser observe that the measures of diversity used in their analyses are problematic, that key variables were excluded from their models, and that the authors relied too greatly on the United States as an exemplary case, rather than an exceptional one (Hvinden 2006; Banting and Kymlicka 2006; Taylor-Gooby 2005). While Luttmer (2001) demonstrated empirically that the relationship between attitudes about redistribution and diversity in the U.S. is indeed negative, Myles and St-Arnaud (2006) illustrate how the U.S. model may not be replicable for all countries. They observe that even extending these findings to Canada is problematic; while the black-white cleavage often acted as a fetter on social policy expansion in the U.S., the French-English divide may possibly have accelerated social policy development in Canada. Regarding excluded variables in Alesina and Glaeser's study, Taylor-Gooby (2005) finds that controlling for left-leaning politics (which is measured in his analysis using the proportion of cabinet seats held by left parties) dramatically decreases the impact of diversity on social spending in Alesina and Glaeser's models. On the topic of how to operationalize diversity, Desmet, Ortuño-Ortín,

and Weber (2009) demonstrate the importance of considering multiple approaches; they find that the crucial determinant of the statistical significance of the effects of diversity on social spending is whether linguistic distances are taken into account (ELF is not statistically significant in their models whereas measures incorporating distance are significant). Other scholars find that equality of groups may be more salient than cultural differences in predicting social spending or social capital (Baldwin and Huber 2010; Pearce 2007; Portes and Vickstrom 2011; Rothwell 2011).

B.2 Ethnic heterogeneity and public opinion

Although the relationship between *attitudes* about redistribution and diversity has not been studied comprehensively, scholars and public figures have claimed either explicitly or implicitly that diversity weakens support for redistribution. For example, writing about the case of the United Kingdom, Goodhart (2004) states that, "[i]f we want high tax and redistribution, especially with the extra welfare demands of an ageing population, then in a world of stranger citizens taxpayers need reassurance that their money is being spent on people for whose circumstances they would have some sympathy." He claims that sharing and solidarity can conflict with diversity. Likewise, Glazer (1998) expected retrenchment of social benefits in Europe because they were seen to go increasingly to immigrants and citizens of different religious and racial backgrounds, and would be seen as programs for 'others.'

Some related research has focused on immigrant populations, with some scholars suggesting that there is a negative relationship between support for social spending and higher immigration rates in the cross-national context (Soroka, Banting, and Johnston 2006; Van Oorschot 2007), and over time in Sweden, where support for the welfare state

declined over time as the share of immigrants increased (Dahlberg et al. 2012). These studies suggest the first hypothesis:

Hypothesis 1a: In countries where ethnic heterogeneity is greater, support for redistribution is lower.

Despite the dearth of research on the cross-national relationship between diversity and attitudes, a number of related theories and empirical findings suggest that diversity may not, in fact, be detrimental to social cohesion. The use of more rigorous methods (Fearon and Laitin 2003; Fish and Brooks 2004; Young 2002) has called into question many of the findings about the deleterious effects of diversity (Banting and Kymlicka 2006). Moreover, there is actually some evidence of a positive relationship between multicultural policies (MCPs), which would generally exist in more diverse countries, and support for redistribution (Crepaz 2006). For example, Crepaz (2006) observes that MCPs lower cultural distances between members of the dominant society and minorities, thereby fostering a better understanding between these two groups.

Crepaz's findings are consistent with the "contact hypothesis." Waglé (2012) describes the contact hypothesis as stating that increasing population diversity provides an opportunity to interact with other groups, which reduces intergroup tensions and hostilities and promotes positive feelings and trust (Allport 1954; Gaertner and Dovidio 2000). Waglé (2012) contends that this explanation for the effects of diversity on trust can be applied to the effect of heterogeneity on social policies. Indeed, there is some empirical support for this hypothesis, including Kymlicka and Banting's (2006) finding that there is no support for the claim that there is a systematic trade-off between policies of ethnocultural recognition and economic redistribution, and some of Waglé's (2012)

own findings—that ethno-racial heterogeneity does not affect welfare state policy provisions and that immigration has a positive effect on public social expenditure. Similarly, Bloemraad, Fox, and Kesler (2012) find a positive effect of foreign-born residents on redistribution by state in the United States. They hypothesize that although many immigrants cannot vote, they have co-ethnic citizens to advocate for them, and observe that there is some evidence that protests can increase welfare state spending, at least in the short run. And, in a cross-national study using 26 immigrant-related diversity measures, Hooghe et al. (2009) find no evidence that higher immigration correlates with reduced generalized trust. This growing body of evidence suggests a second hypothesis: *Hypothesis 1b: In countries where ethnic heterogeneity is greater, support for redistribution is higher.*

A range of economic and political factors that may be relevant to the study of diversity and attitudes about social spending emerges from the literature on welfare state development. The "logic of industrialism" theorists view the emergence of the welfare state as a response to industrialization—the product of large, impersonal economic forces more powerful than partisan politics (Wilensky 1975; Myles and Quadagno 2002). According to "power resources" theorists, the role of capitalism and democratic politics must be considered. In particular, factors such as left-party government participation, the prevalence of labor unions, and alliances between social classes and political parties are credited with shaping social-spending regimes (Korpi 1989; Esping-Andersen 1990; Huber and Stephens 2001).

Relatedly, Mau and Burkhardt (2009) find that the negative effects of ethnic diversity on support for welfare states among European OECD countries appear to be

mediated by migration and other factors related to political economy. Larsen (2008) finds that ethnic fractionalization is the weakest of his predictors of support for the state, concluding that institutions and individual-level economic circumstances are the most salient factors. Likewise, Waglé (2012) concludes that political economy and population composition have a mitigating effect on the relationships he finds between heterogeneity and social spending. From these findings, another hypothesis emerges:

Hypothesis 2: The economic, political, and demographic characteristics of societies and individuals' positions within these systems better explain support for redistribution than does ethnic diversity.

Figure 3 is a conceptual diagram that shows the relationship between diversity, economic/social/demographic context, and attitudes about redistribution.

C. DATA AND METHODS

This study uses individual-level data from the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) and the World Values Survey (WVS), and country-level data from the WDI, SWIID, EFW, LHD, EFD1, EFD2, EHEC, MAR and DPI. For more information about these data, see Chapter II.

C.1 Measures

Outcome measures. I examine four outcome variables—the ISSP support for redistribution score for each individual, the ISSP context-adjusted support for redistribution measure, the WVS support for redistribution score for each individual, and

the WVS context-adjusted support for redistribution measure. For details about the construction of these variables, please see Section II.B.1.

Individual-level control variables. Other individual-level variables from both the ISSP and WVS used as controls in the analyses include male, country mean-centered age, and country mean-centered income. In the WVS models, I also control for WVS year of measurement at the country level. See Section II.B.2 for more information about these items.

Measuring diversity. The central hypotheses of this chapter concern the relationship between ethnic heterogeneity and support for redistribution. To circumvent the various debates described above about how best to measure diversity, I show the results of testing models using three types of measures of diversity, one each from the same three categories selected by Desmet, Ortuño-Ortín, and Weber (2009) for comparison—ethnolinguistic fractionalization (ELF) from the EPR, and the Greenberg Index (GI) of linguistic distance and Esteban and Ray Index (ER) of polarization from the LHD.

I also account for whether an individual is a member of a marginalized minority group using Gurr's (2009) classification of "minorities at risk" (MAR) as described in Chapter II (1=MAR group member; 0=Not a MAR group member). We might expect that members of marginalized minority groups should favor redistribution more than their non-minority compatriots do given that their status as outsiders might enhance the appeal of a safety net. However, there were many countries in the ISSP (20) and WVS (25) for which no data for the construction of the MAR variable were available. Thus, I present relevant models with and without this variable.

Cederman, Girardin, and Wimmer (2006) contend that studies that problematize diversity must account for the political relevance of ethnic identities in national politics. When groups are excluded from power, Cederman, Girardin, and Wimmer (2006) expect the likelihood of civil war to increase with the size of the excluded groups, which can be extended to signify that greater exclusion fosters weaker social cohesion. Thus, I control for the share of the excluded population relative to the ethnopolitically relevant population. Details about these concepts can be found in Section II.B2.iii.c.

To control for how the effects of diversity on attitudes might differ in countries with large immigrant populations, I include the WDI measure of international migrant stock. In addition to account for how diversity may influence support for redistribution differentially, depending on the size of a country's population, I also include the log of total population from the WDI as a control. Baldwin and Huber (2010) suggest that there are two ways that population size might be related to social spending. If there are economies of scale, public goods provision may be largest in the most populous countries. However, if the most populous countries present the most challenges to governance, public goods provision may correlate negatively with population.

Country-level control variables. At the country level, I also control for the log of per capita GDP and aged population composition, both from the WDI. While these factors are expected to increase social spending, their expected effects on public opinion about it are not clear. More information about migrant stock, total population, GDP, and aged population is available in Sections II.B2.iii.a and II.B2.iii.c.

Authors such as Huber and Stephens (2001) and Taylor-Gooby (2005) have made a strong case for the influence of left-wing political parties in shaping welfare state

institutions. I include years of left-leaning government from the DPI to control for national ideology, in that left-wing political institutions have been shown to be associated with more generous social-spending programs (Huber and Stephens 2001; Taylor-Gooby 2005).

Figure 3, the conceptual diagram, is a depiction of the relationship among the concepts and variables described in this section.

C.2 Analytic strategy

Again, I estimate OLS regression models with robust, clustered standard errors (Chen et al., 2003; Wooldridge, 2003), as described in Section II.C. All Chapter IV regression coefficients are presented as standardized estimates.

C.3 Sample

Because data for certain country-level predictors are unavailable or because of the complete exclusion of measures necessary for the present analyses 11 countries are removed from the WVS sample[21] and four countries are removed from the ISSP sample.[22] After these observations are removed, the remaining WVS sample has 114,342 observations and the remaining ISSP sample has 47,733 observations. Listwise deletion of observations with missing data on one or more WVS measures used in the analysis yields an analytic sample of 100,542 (88%). The majority of missing data arose due to

[21] Argentina, Cyprus, Hungary, Iceland, Jordan, Luxembourg, Malta, Norway, Portugal, Serbia and Montenegro, Singapore

[22] Cyprus, Iceland, Norway, Taiwan

nonresponse on the income item. Logistic regression analyses suggest that those missing are younger (odds ratio=.99) and less likely to be male (odds ratio=.88), but otherwise do not differ much from the analytic sample in terms of other measures used in the analysis. Listwise deletion of observations with missing data on one or more ISSP measures used in the analysis yields an analytic sample of 37,423 (78%). Again, most of the missing data can be attributed to nonresponse on the income item. Logistic regression analyses suggest that those missing are younger (odds ratio=.99) and less likely to be male (odds ratio=.92), but otherwise do not differ much from the analytic sample in terms of other measures used in the analysis. Table 12 presents descriptive statistics of the analytic sample for all variables used in the analyses in this chapter.

In addition to the countries already removed from the samples, when the minorities at risk variable is included in the analysis, 19 additional WVS countries[23] and 17 additional ISSP countries[24] must be removed from the sample due to missing data. The remaining sample has a total of 80,067 observations for 61 countries in the WVS, and 21,574 observations for 17 countries in the ISSP.

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[23] Austria, Belgium, Burkina Faso, Croatia, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Indonesia, Ireland, Japan, Mali, Netherlands, Poland, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Slovenia, Sweden, Tanzania, and Uruguay are excluded from WVS MAR models.

[24] Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Chile, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, Israel, Japan, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia, South Korea, Sweden, and Switzerland are excluded from ISSP MAR models.

D. RESULTS

D.1 Examining the effects of ethnic diversity

The left panel of Figure 4 shows the bivariate relationship between ELF and social spending using the data set compiled for this analysis. Consistent with previous findings (Alesina and Glaeser 2004; Salter 2004; Desmet, Ortuño-Ortín, and Weber 2009), the relationship is negative. In contrast, the right panel of Figure 4 shows the bivariate relationship between ELF and mean support for social spending. The slope is slightly positive. I examine this relationship in greater detail below by testing the hypotheses described above, which calls for the inclusion of a range of control variables.

Hypothesis 1a states that support for redistribution is lower in more ethnically heterogeneous countries, while Hypothesis 1b argues that support for redistribution is higher is more heterogeneous societies. I show the results of testing these hypotheses with three different measures of diversity, using ISSP data in Table 13 and WVS data in Table 14.

In Models 1, 2, and 3 in both Tables 13 and 14, the outcome variable is attitudes about redistribution without context adjustment. In Models 4, 5, and 6 in both tables, the outcome variable is context-adjusted attitudes about redistribution. The coefficients for the Greenberg Index (GI), the Esteban and Ray (ER) Index, and the index of ELF are positive in all models (Models 1-6 in both tables). In addition, the coefficients for GI and ER are statistically significant (Models 1 and 2, respectively, in both tables) or near significant (Table 14, Model 1) in predicting attitudes. In the models in which the context-adjusted attitudes measure is the outcome variable, the coefficients for both GI and ER are statistically significant in the WVS models (Table 14, Models 4 and 5), but

are non-significant in the ISSP models. In sum, the effects of diversity in all 12 models are positive across two different outcome variables and two different data sets, and statistically significant in five out of 12 models, despite the inclusion of a full range of control variables.

The results of testing Hypothesis 2—that economic, political, and demographic characteristics of societies and individuals' positions within these systems better explain support for redistribution than does ethnic diversity—are also shown in Tables 13 and 14. Among the country-level variables, only per capita GDP is statistically significant. Its coefficient is negative in all models, and significant in all attitudes-only models (Models 1-3 in both tables) and in WVS context-adjusted attitudes models (Models 4-6, Table 14). In addition, across models and data sets, per capita GDP has the largest effect of any of the statistically significant measures. The effects of migrant stock, excluded population, population size, and years of left-leaning government are never statistically significant in any of the models for either outcome variable or either data set.

At the individual level, the coefficients for male and mean-centered income are negative and statistically significant in all models while the coefficients for age are positive and significant in the WVS attitudes-only models (Models 1-3, Table 14) and non-significant in all other models. In addition, Table 15 shows the difference in coefficients in models with and without country-level economic, political, and demographic control variables; the coefficients are generally larger and more significant in the models without control variables (column 1), with three exceptions: the ISSP attitudes-only model in which GI is the measure of diversity, and both WVS models in which the ER index is the measure of diversity. In all three cases, there is either no

change or a slight increase in the diversity coefficients. Thus, I find some support for Hypothesis 2.

To address the issue of whether or not the positive effects of the diversity coefficients might be related to the greater number of members of minority groups, who are generally more supportive of redistribution, in more diverse countries, I show the results of controlling for individual-level minority status in Table 16. The coefficients for all diversity measures remain positive in all cases and the coefficients for minority status are not statistically significant. In general, the findings of Table 16 are almost identical to those of Tables 13 and 14, suggesting that the findings from the larger sample are robust to including the MAR variable.

Overall, the results are remarkably consistent. All measures of diversity have positive effects on support for redistribution and context-adjusted support for redistribution in both data sets, and a number of these effects are statistically significant with or without the inclusion of economic, political, and demographic control variables and the measurement of individual-level minority status.

D.2 The contribution of a context-adjusted outcome measure

In Table 17, as a test of robustness of the context-adjusted measure of support for redistribution, I replicate the context-adjustment models from Tables 13 and 14 and compare them to models of support for redistribution with social spending—the other component of the context-adjusted outcome measure—as a predictor variable instead. In Models 1–3 of ISSP data and Models 7–9 of WVS data, the coefficients for the measures of diversity are larger and more statistically significant than the coefficients for the diversity measures in the context-adjusted models (Models 4–6 of the ISSP data and

Models 10–12 of the WVS data), which are also positive but smaller and non-significant in some cases. This comparison illustrates how the context-adjusted measure yields more conservative results, which suggests that it may reduce simultaneity. In other words, this measure may help us model support for redistribution in a way in a way that reduces the inflation of coefficients

E. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

The findings of this chapter challenge the assumption that diversity weakens support for social welfare spending. Using two different public opinion data sets encompassing 91 countries and three different approaches to measuring diversity, I examined support for social spending (an index of attitudes about redistribution), as well as support for social spending given the actual level of social spending in a respondent's country. Across both outcome variables, all three measures of diversity, and both data sets, there is either a positive relationship or no relationship between diversity and support for redistribution, but diversity never has a negative effect on support.

In general, controlling for economic, political, and demographic characteristics at the country level decreases the size and statistical significance of the effects of diversity in most models. In particular, consistent with previous research, economic factors—per capita GDP at the country level and country-mean-centered income at the individual level—emerge as particularly salient predictors of support for redistribution, with greater wealth at both levels of analysis being associated with lower support in every case. However, the diversity coefficients remain positive in all cases and significant in six out of the nine models in which the effects of diversity were significant without these country-level control variables.

One explanation for the positive effect of diversity on support for social spending could be that members of minority groups are generally more supportive of redistribution and that there are more members of such groups in more diverse countries. The models discussed above already included country-level measures to control for the extent to which diversity is a product of recent immigration—which has been shown to be an important determinant of public opinion (Mau and Burkhardt 2009; Hooghe et al. 2009; Dahlberg et al. 2012), and the extent to which minorities are excluded from political power—which the research of Cederman, Wimmer, and collaborators has shown to be more relevant for phenomena closely related to social cohesion than measures of fractionalization that do not account for political exclusion. Neither the net migration measure nor the measure of the politically excluded population was statistically significant in any of the models presented herein.

Scholars, politicians, and other public figures have implicitly or explicitly indicated that increasing diversity weakens identification among citizens and thus social solidarity, which has or will lead to lower social spending and the retrenchment of welfare-state benefits. For example, Kymlicka and Banting (2006) describe how opposition to immigration and multiculturalism now comes not only from the political right, but also from the political left, which perceives these forces as a threat to the welfare state—raising the so-called "progressive's dilemma," which would require social democrats to choose between sustaining their traditional agenda of economic redistribution and embracing immigration and multiculturalism (Pearce 2004). Pearce (2004) and Kymlicka and Banting (2006) suggest that integration policies may solve the dilemma. The evidence presented herein suggests that, in general, if public support for

redistribution is lower than in previous years—which is dubious—diversity is not the culprit. This finding is consistent with related research on the relationship of social spending with immigration (Bloemraad, Fox, and Kesler 2012) and with multicultural policies (Crepaz 2006).

In this chapter, I find that economic factors, which shape the context in which diversity may affect everyday life, are more salient determinants of support for redistribution than is diversity itself. These findings would explain why ethno-racial fractionalization does appear to negatively affect support for social spending in certain contexts, such as the United States, where welfare state institutions have developed in a context of high inter-ethnic antagonism and spatial segregation, but not in other countries in which policy legacies are quite different. Two areas for future research are suggested by the findings herein: 1) a study of how spatial integration of diverse groups is related to attitudes, and 2) an examination of changes in support over time when time series data become available for a wider range of countries and periods of time.

The finding that ethnic diversity is positively related or unrelated to support for social spending challenges the assumed reasons for why there may be a negative relationship between diversity and the generosity of social welfare policies. While ethnically heterogeneous countries may have less generous social-spending policies, the findings herein suggest that the most frequently cited explanation for this—that taxpayers only want their money spent on people that look like them—is incorrect. Diversity does not depress support for redistribution. In fact, it may bolster support. Perhaps societies in countries in which the population is more diverse ethnically become more tolerant, consistent with the contact hypothesis. This idea is also consistent with Crepaz's (2006)

related theory that multi-cultural policies (MCP) decrease the cultural distance between members of the dominant society and minorities and, as a result, lead to a better understanding between these two groups, as well as his finding that MCPs actually have positive effects on attitudes about redistribution. Notably, his study was also one of the few that includes a substantial number of developing countries.

This study also introduced novel measures that may be relevant to the empirical analysis of a range of cross-national research topics. One goal of the study was to address concerns about the simultaneity of public policy and public opinion, as well as cross-national comparability in public opinion studies. To account for the vast differences in the circumstances that are likely to shape respondent evaluations, I constructed a measure of attitudes about redistribution that incorporates the amount of redistribution in the country in which the respondent is living. While this does not answer the question of whether policies are shaped by public opinion or vice versa, it does allow for a more meaningful cross-national comparison of attitudes without having to exclude some of the most relevant factors because of simultaneity concerns. Another aspect of the research design that may be of interest to cross-national researchers is the coding of the minority at risk variable based on Gurr's (2009) typology. While the comparison of minority ethnic groups across borders will always pose a challenge—and this measure is far from perfect—it does suggest one approach.

E.1 Limitations

The under-counting of members of MAR groups at the individual level is one limitation of this study, although I was able to control for relevant factors at the country level. If future data collection includes measures of ethnicity for a larger number of

countries and groups within them, I would be able to repeat these analyses using a more comprehensive, cross-nationally comparable measure of minority status.

At the least, this study has shown that heterogeneity may not be the impediment to social welfare policies that it is commonly assumed to be. Policy-makers need not be constrained by the concern that their populations are too diverse to sustain support for a universal safety net. However, the extent of the role of inequality in shaping social cohesion and of inequality among different ethnic groups remains an important concern. Preliminary evidence from a study of democratic countries suggests that equality of groups matters more than cultural differences in predicting social spending (Baldwin and Huber 2010); however, because these data are limited to democracies, they were not suitable for the present analysis. There are additional studies that suggest it is not diversity per se but unequal diversity that makes a difference in the development of civic engagement and trust (Kesler and Bloemraad 2010; Portes and Vickstrom 2011), the key components of social capital, which may play important intermediary roles in the relationship between diversity and support for redistribution. Yet, at present, the way that civic engagement is measured is not consistent across countries in the WVS and is not measured at all in the 2009 ISSP module. Moreover, the meaning of the most commonly used measure of trust (which is included in the WVS data, but not in the 2009 ISSP module) has recently been called into question, with Delhey, Newton, and Welzel (2011) showing that it varies substantially across cultures and countries. Even the more specific WVS trust items identified by the authors, such as questions about trust in people of different religions and nationalities, do not specify whether these "others" are within a respondent's country or outside of it.

High-quality measures about the role of trust in the relationship between ethnic diversity and attitudes about redistribution should be developed more thoroughly in studies of individual countries before this knowledge can be applied in a cross-national analysis. Rothwell's (2011) study of urban areas in the United States and Soroka, Banting, and Johnston's (2002) study of Canada take important steps in this direction.

V. CASE ANALYSES OF BRAZIL, CHINA, FRANCE, AND THE UNITED STATES

A. INTRODUCTION

In this chapter, I further investigate outstanding questions from Chapters III and IV above by examining data from four countries—Brazil, China, France, and the United States—over time. There are a number of advantages to conducting these case analyses. Limiting the data set to four countries allows me to include some key explanatory variables for which there were too much missing data in the aggregate data sets. Moreover, while data for many of the countries in the 91-country study were only available for one point in time, I chose for closer examination four countries for which data were available from multiple time-points spanning two decades. Three to four waves of data were collected from each of the selected countries between 1990 and 2007. While allowing access to a wider range of relevant variables and to data from multiple time-points, these four distinct regimes continue to represent the increased range of socioeconomic variation, compared to what has previously been studied, for which I advocated above.

In Chapter III, I found that the evidence of a relationship between income inequality and attitudes about related social welfare policies was limited, at best. By determining how the relationship between income inequality and support for

redistribution varies over time within countries, I may be able to clarify the nature of that relationship, or provide additional evidence that there is no relationship whatsoever.

In addition, I also demonstrated in Chapter III that the availability of opportunities for social mobility explained more of the variation in support for social welfare policies than did income inequality. However, a new question emerged from these findings about why greater social mobility increased support for redistribution at the country level while decreasing it at the individual level. At the end of Chapter III, I suggested that perceptions about individual versus institutional responsibility for achieving upward mobility may explain this apparent disconnect. The data from the case analyses include a broader range of measures of perceptions about social mobility that were unavailable for the larger number of countries in the aggregate data set. In addition, by examining the relationships between perceptions about opportunities and support for redistribution over time, I may be able to better elucidate how country-level circumstances—such as changes in social policies and economic development—are associated with the effects of social mobility on support for redistribution at the individual level.

The findings from Chapter IV cast doubt on the assumption that ethnic diversity weakens the social cohesion that is necessary for support for social welfare policies to flourish. To further analyze whether the relationship between diversity and support for redistribution is positive rather than negative—or even entirely inconsequential—I explore below how perceptions about and the experience of ethnic diversity are related to support for redistribution within countries over time. Once again, the data for the case analyses allow for the inclusion of measures that were unavailable for many countries in the aggregate data set. Moreover, the analysis over time enables me to explore the

implications of changes in attitudes toward diversity for support for redistribution, as well as the implications for stratification beliefs of membership in different minority groups as the relations between those groups, their states, and their societies changed.

Previous comparative case analyses of stratification beliefs have primarily focused on how beliefs differ across Esping-Andersen's (1990) welfare-state regime types,[25] which are limited to developed, Western countries. Thus, case analyses of stratification beliefs among countries such as Brazil and China have been almost entirely neglected. Brazil, China, France, and the United States vary widely in terms of levels of economic development and income inequality, predominant forms of social stratification, and generosity of social welfare policies. This variation is illustrated in Figure 5. Levels of human development, based on scores from the United Nations Development Programme's 2006 Human Development Index (UNDP 2010b), are plotted on the y-axes of both figures. The U.S. and France (in the upper quadrants on both plots) represent developed countries while Brazil and China are classified among developing countries. The x-axis of the figure on the left-hand side shows variation in welfare-state effectiveness using Dixon's (2000) social security design scores; the left-hand quadrants of that figure, containing the U.S. and China, represent countries with weaker social welfare policies while the countries with more robust social welfare policies, France and Brazil, are in the right-hand quadrants. In the figure on the right-hand side, level of development is plotted against trends in inequality, measured on the x-axis using percent

[25] For a summary of Esping-Andersen's regime types, see the Appendix to this chapter (V.F.1).

change in Gini coefficients from 1990 to 2006 (WIDER 2008); Brazil and France, in the left-hand quadrants of the figure, represent states with declining levels of inequality while inequality has increased in China and the U.S., which are in the right-hand quadrants.

Regarding variation over time in country-level circumstances, stratification beliefs among individuals in the U.S., a developed country with very limited social welfare policies that has experienced marked and rapid increases in inequality, can be directly contrasted with beliefs in France, a developed country with a very generous welfare state and declining levels of inequality. As China continues to retrench social welfare policies and capitalist market practices become increasingly widespread, this case will illustrate individual-level predictors of stratification beliefs in a developing country in which, like the U.S., socioeconomic inequality has increased rapidly. Finally, Brazil's case will shed light on predictors of stratification beliefs in a country that is developing rapidly like China, experiencing decreases in socioeconomic inequality like France (albeit from a much higher level), and continuing to expand social welfare benefits.

B. BACKGROUND

In this section, I elaborate further about the motivations for examining the research questions selected from Chapters III and IV using case analyses. Detailed background information about Esping-Andersen (1990) welfare-state regime types, as well as economic development, income inequality, social stratification, and social welfare policies in Brazil, China, France, and the United States is presented in the Appendix below. I also present key economic and development indicators for each of these countries in Tables 18 and 19.

B.1 Income inequality

Evidence from Chapters III and IV, consistent with previous research, suggests that the most disadvantaged individuals are the most supportive of redistribution. However, because the evidence about the effects of income inequality at the country level has not been consistent in the existing literature, nor between the analyses of the ISSP and WVS data in Chapter III's 91-country study, whether support for redistribution is greater among individuals in more economically unequal countries, or among those in countries that have already implemented more equalizing social policies remains unclear. Comparing how the relationship between inequality and support for redistribution changes over time within countries may clarify the nature of this relationship, or provide additional evidence that there is no relationship between income inequality and attitudes about redistribution. Thus, I ask whether individuals who are farthest below the median income in the more economically unequal countries—and at the most unequal periods of those countries' recent histories—are more supportive of redistribution (Research Question 3.1).

B.2 Equal opportunity and social mobility

Evidence from Chapter III suggests that there is greater support for redistribution in the countries with the greatest social mobility. However, individuals who have experienced the greatest mobility (where mobility encompasses both upward and downward mobility, as described in Section II.B.2i(b) above) are less supportive.

In this chapter, I examine whether or not there are differences between upwardly and downwardly mobile individuals given greater or lesser access to opportunities for social mobility. In addition, since attitudes about redistribution have been associated with

expectations about social mobility (McCall and Manza 2011; McCall 2013), I also examine the extent to which perceptions about equality of opportunity—which facilitates social mobility—influence attitudes about redistribution. I ask how support for redistribution is related to both the experience of and perceptions about social mobility under four distinct structures of opportunity (Research Question 3.2). Those who perceive greater equality of opportunity in their countries could be either less supportive of redistribution because they view it as superfluous (as suggested by the WVS analysis in the Chapter III Appendix), or more supportive because they view it as a product of redistribution (as suggested by the ISSP analysis in Chapter III).

Moreover, by examining the relationships between perceptions about opportunities and support for redistribution over time, I may be able to better determine if there is a relationship between changes in country-level social and economic circumstances and how social mobility affects support for redistribution at the individual level.

B.3 Ethnic diversity and tolerance

The findings from Chapter IV cast doubt on the assumption that diversity erodes the social cohesion that is necessary for support for social welfare policies to flourish. If social cohesion is essential to the health of the welfare state, then differences in individuals' backgrounds and lifestyles should be well tolerated in countries with more generous redistributive policies. In this chapter, I explore how ethnic diversity is related to support for redistribution within countries over time. I ask how diversity affects individuals' attitudes about redistribution given their own status as immigrants or members of minority groups under different sociopolitical systems (Research Question

3.3a). I also examine how this relationship changes over time as minority groups' relations to their states and societies vary.

In the previous chapter, the effects of minority status itself on support for redistribution were not statistically significant. Having a measure of minority status that can be used for cross-national comparisons (the MAR variable) offers an important tool for analyzing trends and patterns among marginalized groups worldwide. However, the vast differences in the minority experience between and within countries makes this measure particularly susceptible to artificially masking its implications in larger-scale quantitative analyses of certain topics, perhaps including the study of determinants of stratification beliefs. By examining four case analyses over time, I am able to disaggregate minority groups within and across countries, compare and contrast the effects of being members of these groups at different moments in each country's recent history, and distinguish between national minorities and immigrants. Brazil and the United States were historically immigrant-receiving countries while China and France were not. Being Muslim in France is quite different from being Muslim in China. The experience of those of African descent in Brazil is quite different than it is in the U.S. (Telles 2004). See the Appendix to this chapter (V.F.2) for more detailed descriptions of the relevant minority and migration issues in Brazil, China, France, and the U.S.

At the end of Chapter IV, I suggested that support for redistribution may be greater in more ethnically diverse countries because diversity itself fosters tolerance. However, measures of tolerance were not available for a large enough number of countries to be included in the 91-country analysis. The examination of a more limited set

of countries in this chapter allows me to begin analyzing how tolerance may affect the relationship between diversity and support for redistribution.

Moreno-Riaño (2003) describes tolerance as the political, if not moral, principle mediating between the competing moral claims of individuals and communities. For the purposes of this analysis, I accept that proposition and the definition of tolerance delineated by Corneo and Jeanne (2009), along with Berggren and Nilsson (2013) expansion of it. Corneo and Jeanne's definition states:

> *A person is tolerant if she attaches symbolic value not only to her own characteristics but also to those that she does not have—but others have. Conversely, an intolerant person has an unbalanced value system that makes her at the same time complacent and irrespectful of traits and lifestyles that are not her own. (2009:692)*

Berggren and Nilsson conceptualize tolerance more broadly, classifying "anyone who respects diversity as tolerant, both those that genuinely approve of the characteristic that is respected and those who respect it in the sense that they put up with it in spite of finding it objectionable" (2013:178).

In Berggren and Nilsson's (2013) analysis of the macro-economic implications of tolerance, they control for ethnic and religious fractionalization, postulating two competing ideas about heterogeneity: 1) That it may bring about an increase in tolerance due to a greater probability of people meeting and getting to know others who are different, or 2) That it could bring about a decrease in tolerance if differing groups tend to come into conflict with each other. Consistent with my findings in Chapter IV that ethnic heterogeneity may bolster support for redistribution, Berggren and Nilsson's results suggest that ethnic heterogeneity increases tolerance. Thus, in this chapter, I ask whether

individuals who are more tolerant of diversity are also more supportive of redistribution (Research Question 3.3b).

C. DATA AND METHODS

In this chapter, I use the individual-level data from the 2009 International Social Survey Programme and the World Values Survey (WVS), which are described in Chapter II above. Since Brazil is not included in the ISSP's Social Equality Module, I present ISSP data from China, France, and the United States and turn to the WVS to compare all four countries over time.

The WVS has conducted three to four waves of its study in each of the countries selected for the case analyses (Brazil: 1991, 1997, 2006; China: 1990, 1995, 2001, 2007; France: 1990, 1999, 2006; U.S.: 1990, 1995, 1999, 2006).[26] France was not measured in the 1994-1999 wave of the WVS while Brazil was not measured in the 1999-2004 wave. Moreover, the sampling frame for the 1995 wave of the study in China was notably different from the sampling frames of the other three waves of the WVS in that country.[27]

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[26] What I refer to as the "first wave" is called "Wave 2" in the WVS because of a study carried out in the 1980s in a limited number of developed countries included in the European Values Survey.

[27] Stevenson and Wolfers (2008) offer the best description of the WVS China data that I have encountered thus far—much better than what I have been able to obtain from the WVS Association itself.

> *For the 1989–93 wave the survey notes state that the researchers 'undersampled the illiterate portion of the public and oversampled the urban areas and the more educated strata.' Moreover, the survey notes*

To maximize comparability, I focus on three waves from each country—the earliest wave (1990-1991), the most recently available wave (2006-2007), and a second wave combining data from both the 1994-1999 and 1999-2004 waves of the WVS. In the resulting data, the 1997 data from Brazil is combined with the 2001 data from China, as well as the 1999 data from France and the U.S., Thus, I avoid using the problematic 1995 China data. Table 20 shows a summary of which of the countries in the case analyses were included in each wave of the WVS, and which are used in this study (the hybrid wave is called the "{Modified Wave}").

C.1 Measures

As in Chapter II, the names of the variables introduced in this chapter—those not used elsewhere in the analyses or those that require additional explication for the purposes of this chapter—are also identified in bold when they are first presented so that the reader can find these references more quickly.

> *explicitly state that 'the oversampled groups tend to have orientations relatively similar to those found in industrial societies' and that 'the data probably underestimate the size of cross-national differences.' In the 1994–99 wave, a random sample of central China, which contains about two-thirds of the population, was done. Sampling weights are not provided for any of the waves. These two surveys are quite different from each other: in the first wave only 1 percent of the sample were from a town with fewer than 50,000 people, whereas in the second wave 63 percent were. In the first wave 60 percent of respondents were men; the proportion falls to 53 percent in the second wave. In the 1999–2004 wave, the sampling frame was drawn from a previous nationally representative survey and was conducted throughout the entire country, with the exception of six remote provinces with 5.1 percent of the total population. The sample was also limited to persons ages 18 to 65. Despite some limitations, we believe that the last wave is approximately representative and include observations from this last wave in our analysis. (Stevenson and Wolfers 2008:79–80)*

Outcome measures. The ISSP outcome variable is the same standardized index of support for redistribution used in the previous chapters. The WVS outcome variable is also the same 1-10 scale of the respondent's belief in government responsibility for those in need, also described above. The mean scores of these variables by country and wave are shown in Figure 6 (ISSP) and Figure 7 (WVS).

Income inequality predictors. To examine Research Question 3.1 about the Meltzer-Richard Hypothesis (MRH), I use median-centered income, as described in Chapter II. Individuals farthest below the median income in the most economically unequal countries—and at the most unequal periods of those countries' recent histories—should be the most supportive of redistribution. The MRH implies that the magnitude of the coefficients for median-centered income should be greatest in the most unequal countries and in countries' most unequal years.

Equal opportunity and social mobility. Research Question 3.2 asks how support for redistribution is related to the experience and perception of opportunities for advancement. First, I examine the experience of mobility using a measure from the ISSP of the extent to which the respondent's social class has changed during his adult lifetime. Specifically, given the preliminary evidence presented at the end of Chapter III, I expect those who have experienced downward mobility to be most supportive of redistribution, given that they may have had good reason to rely on—or lament the lack of—social welfare institutions. The **downward mobility** measure is a dummy variable constructed from the mobility predictor used in Chapter III. I recoded it such that [1] indicates that the respondent had experienced a decrease in social class compared to the family he grew

up in, and [0] indicates that the respondent had experienced an increase or no change in social class.

There is no direct measure of social mobility in the WVS. However, there are a couple of items that measure perceptions about opportunities for mobility. Specifically, there is a measure of how much **freedom of choice and control** over life the respondent feels (a173), where [1] represents "None at all" and [10] represents "A great deal."[28] Believing that one has freedom of choice and control in life is conceptually quite similar to believing that there are opportunities for advancement. Likewise, those who believe that **hard work** generally leads to success (e040) perceive opportunities in society to be reasonably accessible. Thus, I also include this measure, coded such that [1] means "Hard work doesn't generally bring success—it's more a matter of luck and connections," and [10] means "In the long run, hard work usually brings success." This item was not measured in China in 2001, or in France or the U.S. in 1999.

The ISSP has a very similar item to measure respondents' perceptions of the importance of **hard work** for getting ahead in life (Q1e or V10). For ease of interpretability, I reverse the coding of the Likert scale such that [1] is "Not important at all" and [5] is "Essential." In addition, to further measure perceptions of opportunities for

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[28] The exact wording from the WVS is the following: "Some people feel they have completely free choice and control over their lives, while other people feel that what they do has no real effect on what happens to them. Please use this scale where 1 means 'none at all' and 10 means 'a great deal' to indicate how much freedom of choice and control you feel you have over the way your life turns out."

advancement, I combine a number of ISSP measures that ask the respondent how important connections are for opportunities to get ahead in life (Q1 or V6-V17). Again, I reverse the coding of the Likert scale such that [1] is "Not important at all" and [5] is "Essential." Specifically, I create an index called "**connections are important**," in which I combine the items measuring the respondent's perceptions of the importance of coming from a wealthy family (Q1a or V6), having well-educated parents (Q1b or V7), knowing the right people (Q1f or V11), and having political connections (Q1g or V12) for getting ahead in the country.

Those who perceive greater equality of opportunity—that they have freedom of choice and control over their lives, that advancement can be achieved through hard work, and that getting ahead in life is possible in their societies without connections—may be either less supportive of redistribution because they view it as superfluous, or more supportive because they consider the level playing field to be a product of redistribution.

Ethnic diversity and tolerance. To address Research Question 3.3a, about how diversity affects individuals' attitudes about redistribution through their own status as immigrants or members of minority groups under varied social circumstances, I again use MAR dummy variable from the Minorities at Risk Dataset (Gurr 2009), as described in Chapter II. Because membership in only some of the MAR groups delineated by Gurr was measured in the ISSP and the WVS, this variable almost always undercounts minority group membership.

The MAR data cite Amazonian Indians and Afro-Brazilians as **minorities at risk**. In the Brazil WVS data, I am able to code both Afro-Brazilians and Amazonian Indians using the ethnicity (x051 for all three waves) and identity variables (g015 for 1997 only).

Hui Muslims, Tibetans, and Turkmens are identified in the MAR data for China. In the WVS, I combine data on ethnicity (Hui, Tibetan, and Uighur were included as categories of x051 in the 1990 wave only) with data on Muslim religious denomination (f025) for all waves. In the ISSP, these groups are not included in the ethnicity variable (ETHNIC) for China. Thus, Tibetans are missing entirely, but I use the religion variable (RELIGGRP) to code all Muslims in China as MAR, since it would be unusual for a Chinese Muslim not to be Hui or Turkmen.[29] I do the same for Muslims in France, which prohibits by law the measurement of ethnicity in surveys. There was insufficient data from France in either data set to identify members of any of the other French MAR groups—Basques, Corsicans, and Roma. Thus, these groups are missing from the MAR variable. For the U.S., the MAR data identify African-Americans, Hispanics, Native Americans, and Native Hawaiians. I am able to code all of these groups except Native Hawaiians in the ISSP using the ethnicity variable (ETHNIC) and in the 2006 wave of the WVS. However, there is no data on ethnicity or identity in the 1990 U.S. wave of the WVS. In the 1995 and 1999 waves, the WVS provides sufficient data to code African-Americans (x051 in the 1995, 1999, and 2006 waves, plus g015 in the 1995 and 1999 waves) and Hispanics (g015), but not Native Americans.

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[29] For example, cross-referencing Muslim religious denomination (f025=49) with the geographic region of residence variable (x048) in the WVS shows that only 1 out of 49 Muslims in the 2007 China wave did not live in Xinjiang, the Uighur (Turkmen) Autonomous Region, or Ningxia, the Hui Autonomous Region. Geographic coding is not available for China in the ISSP.

There are many reasons why the immigrant experience is unique from that of domestic minority groups. To measure immigrant status, the only available measures in either data set are two WVS items that record whether the respondent's mother (g026) or father (g027) is an immigrant. I create an "**immigrant parent(s)**" dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the respondent has at least one immigrant parent. This measure is only available for Brazil and the U.S. Thus, where it is available, models are shown with and without the immigrant parent measure to maximize comparability with the other two countries in the analysis.

If tolerance is an outcome of diversity, and diversity enhances support for redistribution, then a measure of tolerance of ethnic diversity should also be associated with greater support. Research Question 3.3b asks whether individuals who are more tolerant of diversity are more supportive of redistribution. I follow Berggren and Nilsson (2013) in using the WVS question about acceptance of diverse types of neighbors as the first way I measure tolerance. Respondents were asked to choose groups in answer to the question, "On this list of various groups of people, could you please mention any that you would not like to have as neighbors?" In my recoding, [1] means that the respondent did *not* select "people of a different race" (a124_02), and [0] means the respondent did; the same coding is used for measuring whether the "immigrants/foreign nationals" (a124_09) group was selected. Because these two items are highly correlated,[30] I combine them into an index called "**tolerant of different ethnicities and nationalities**," or simply

[30] For example, in France, the Pearson's correlation coefficient between these two variables is 0.8.

"**tolerant**." However, the main findings presented below do not differ substantially if the two items are included in the models separately.

In addition, although it was not included in all country-waves, the WVS also includes an item that asks directly about a respondent's disposition toward **ethnic diversity** (g032). On a scale of 1-10, the respondent is asked: "Turning to the question of ethnic diversity, with which of the following views do you agree? Please use this scale to indicate your position," where [1] is 'ethnic diversity erodes a country's unity,' and [10] is 'ethnic diversity enriches my life.' As shown in Table 21, this question was not included in any of the waves of data from France. Additional data are missing from Waves 2-4 of the U.S. data. However, I include it whenever it is available, and show models with and without it when there is substantial missingness.

Since the ISSP's Social Equality Module does not include any questions directly measuring tolerance of ethnic diversity, I instead turn to items that may reflect respondents' perceptions of the level of tolerance in their societies. I select a number of measures from the series of questions that ask the respondent to rate the importance of each factor for facilitating opportunities to get ahead in life (Q1 or V6-V17). For ease of interpretability, I reverse the coding of the Likert scale such that [1] is "Not important at all" important for getting ahead in life and [10] is "Essential." Specifically, I create an index called "**discrimination prevalent**," in which I combine the items measuring the respondent's perception of the importance of race (Q1i or V14), religion (Q1j or V15), and gender (Q1k or V16) for getting ahead in the country.

Control variables. Demographic control variables include male, continuous age and the old age dummy,[31] high school completion, university completion, and union membership, all of which are described above in Chapter II.

See Table 21 below for a list of variables used in the Chapter V analysis by concept, data set, and year. Descriptive statistics are presented in Tables 22 (ISSP) and 23 (WVS). In addition, selected country-level mean scores from the ISSP and WVS, along with macro-level statistics from other data sources,[32] are presented at the bottom of relevant regression tables for illustrative purposes.

C.2 Analytic strategy

I use ordinary least squares (OLS) regression for all models in this chapter to analyze how income inequality, social mobility, and ethnic diversity are related to support for redistribution, which is the continuous outcome variable.

C.3 Sample

I apply listwise deletion to handle missing data throughout the analysis. The final ISSP sample size by country is 2583 (85%) for China, 2100 (75%) for France, and 1202 (76%) for the U.S. The variables with the most missing data are the income variable (7% missing) and the prevalence of discrimination index (10% missing). Logistic regression

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[31] I use the continuous age variable for the 1991 Brazil model, which did not include any respondents above age 55.

[32] Some country-level statistics presented in this chapter are drawn from the WDI, SWIID, LHD, EFD1, and the EPR data, which are all described in Chapter II.

analyses suggest that the missing are less likely to be male in the U.S. (odds ratio=0.6), more likely to be age 60 or older in France and the U.S. (odds ratios = 2.2 and 1.9, respectively), less likely to have completed high school in France and the U.S. (both odds ratios = 0.5), but more likely to have completed high school in China (odds ratio=1.4). Those who are missing do not differ from the analytic sample in terms of the other measures used in the analysis.

The final WVS sample size by wave is 4968 (88%) for the 1990–1991 wave, 4301 (87%) for the 1997–2001 wave, and 4831 (84%) for the 2006–2007 wave. By country, the final WVS sample size is 4157 (94%) for Brazil, 3144 (78%) for China, 2929 (81%) for France, and 3870 (90%) for the U.S. Aside from the special cases of certain variables with high missingness, as described in Section V.C.1 above, the majority of missing data can be traced to non-response on the income item across all countries and waves. Logistic regression analyses suggest that there are no statistically significant differences from the analytic sample among those missing from the WVS Brazil sample. However, the missing are less likely to be male in China, France, and the U.S. (odds ratios =.8, .7, and .6, respectively) and more likely to be older in the U.S. (odds ratio=1.6). Otherwise, those who are missing do not differ much from the analytic sample in terms of other measures used in the analysis.

When a variable has substantial (more than 30%) missingness in any particular study, country, or wave (those that are marked with "†" in Table 21), I calculate the models for that country-wave with and without that variable.

Because the last wave (2006-2007) of the WVS is closest in time to the ISSP 2009, I will give special attention to discussing results from these models in comparisons between the two data sets.

D. RESULTS

D.1 Income inequality

In Tables 24 and 25, I show the results of examining Research Question 3.1, which asks whether individuals who are farthest below the median income in the most economically unequal countries at the most unequal periods of those countries' recent histories are the most supportive of redistribution.

In Table 24, we see that the coefficient of median-centered income in the ISSP data is negative and statistically significant in France and the United States, but non-significant in China. Those with the highest incomes in the wealthiest countries, the U.S. and France, appear to be the least supportive of redistribution, with the level of opposition being greater where per capita GDP is greater.

The finding about the effect of median-centered income is consistent in both data sets during the most recent period (2005-2010). In the WVS data, the coefficients for median-centered income are also largest and only statistically significant in the developed countries—France and the United States (Table 25, Models 9 and 12). This evidence suggests that the level of development or wealth of a country may be a more salient determinant of attitudes about inequality and redistribution than the level of inequality

itself. Thus, unsurprisingly, the wealthiest individuals in the wealthiest countries appear to be the least supportive of redistribution.

Evidence to support the Meltzer-Richard hypothesis (MRH) is more mixed. Regarding changes over time, Table 25 shows that in the WVS data, consistent with the MRH, the coefficients for median-centered income decrease in magnitude in Brazil as inequality decreases (Models 1-3) and increase in the U.S. as inequality increases (Models 10-12), suggesting that when inequality is highest, support for redistribution is greater among those with incomes farthest below the median. However, evidence from China and France contradicts the MRH. The coefficients for median-centered income decrease in magnitude in China as inequality *increases* (Models 4-6) and increase in France as inequality *decreases* (Models 7-9). Thus, evidence about the MRH remains inconclusive.

These findings are consistent when demographic control variables—gender, age, level of education, and union membership—are added to the models in Table 23. Models 1-3 show the ISSP results by country. Model 4 shows the ISSP results for the U.S. without the union membership variable, which has substantial missingness (33%). Models 5-8 show the results for the last wave of the WVS by country. Because of the high number of missing observations in the ISSP data, I exclude the union membership variable from subsequent models.

D.2 Equal opportunity and social mobility

Tables 27, 28, and 29 show the analysis of Research Question 3.2, which asks how the experience and/or perception of social mobility affects support for redistribution. Specifically, regarding personal experience—are individuals who have experienced

downward social mobility, defined as evaluating one's position in the country's social hierarchy as lower than that of one's family, more supportive of redistribution? Using the ISSP data (Table 27), I find some support for this idea. The coefficient of downward mobility is positive and near-significant in the case of the U.S. (Models 5-6), but non-significant in the models for China (Models 1-2) and France (Models 3-4). Notably, the U.S. is the country in which the largest proportion of respondents—more than one-third—have experienced downward mobility.

Evidence from Chapter III suggests that there is greater support for redistribution in the countries with the greatest social mobility, but that individuals who have experienced the greatest mobility (both upward and downward) are less supportive. Regarding whether there are differences between upwardly and downwardly mobile individuals, if I replace the measure of downward mobility with a measure of upward mobility—defined as evaluating one's position in the country's social hierarchy as *higher* than that of one's family—in the models from Table 27 (not shown), I find that none of the effects are statistically significant. Thus, there are at least some differences between the upwardly and downwardly mobile in terms of support for redistribution. While experiencing upward mobility does not appear to affect support for redistribution, downward mobility may have effects.

In addition, I examine the extent to which perceptions about equality of opportunity—which facilitates social mobility—influence attitudes about redistribution. Those who perceive greater equality of opportunity could be either less supportive of redistribution because they view it as superfluous, or more supportive because they view it as a product of redistribution. I find support for both propositions. The ISSP results

reveal that the coefficient of the measure of the importance of connections is positive and significant across all three countries (Table 27, Models 2, 4, and 6). Thus, the more strongly an individual believes that family or political connections are essential to having opportunities to get ahead in life, the more supportive that individual is of redistribution, which suggests that they may see redistributive social policies as having the power to attenuate some of the advantages of being born into wealthy and well-connected families.

On the other hand, the coefficient of the belief that hard work leads to getting ahead in life is negative and significant for France and the U.S. (Table 27, Models 4 and 6), but positive and significant for China (Table 27, Model 2), which suggests that such optimistic respondents see less need for redistribution. I find the same difference in the directionality of this effect using the most recent wave of the WVS data. The coefficient of believing that hard work leads to getting ahead in life is negative and significant for the developed countries—France and the U.S. (Table 28, Models 3 and 4)—but positive and significant for the developing countries—Brazil and China (Table 28, Models 1 and 2). Moreover, an examination of the WVS data over time for these countries reveals that these coefficients were negative and significant for both Brazil and China in the 1990-1991 wave of the WVS,[33] which may suggest that the improved standard of living in both

[33] I only use data from the 1990-1991 and 2006-2007 waves of WVS data because the "hard work" question was not measured in 1997-2001. In addition, when I present WVS opportunity models over time, I have to exclude the education variables because they were not measured in China, France, or the U.S. in the 1990-1991 wave. To maximize the comparability of the two waves of Brazil data (Table 29, Models 1-2), because the cut-off

of those countries has increased the faith of their citizens in the effectiveness of hard work.

D.3 Ethnic diversity and tolerance

Finally, in Tables 30, 31, 32, and 33, I explore how the experience of and attitudes about ethnic diversity are related to support for redistribution. First, in Research Question 3.3a, I asked how diversity affects individuals' attitudes about redistribution given their own status as minority- or majority-group members, as well as their immigrant status.

In Tables 30 (ISSP data) and 31 (WVS data), I show the effects of adding the MAR variable. In practice, this coding captures Muslims in China and France; Blacks, Latinos, and Native Americans in the U.S.; and Afro-Brazilians and Amazonian Indians in Brazil. The coefficient of MAR is positive and statistically significant in all U.S. models (Table 30., Model 3, and Table 31, Models 5-6). When the U.S. MAR variable is divided into groups, we see that the largest effect is among Blacks (Table 30, Model 4). The coefficients for MAR are non-significant for China and France in the ISSP data (Table 30, Models 1-2).

In the 2006-2007 WVS data (Table 31), the coefficient of MAR is also statistically significant for China—with a large negative effect (Model 3). This negative effect is not surprising given the often-adversarial relationship between Chinese Muslims and the government, as described above. In particular, almost all of the Muslims in the 2007 WVS data (45 out of 47) live in the marginalized ostensibly autonomous regions of

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age was 55 in the 1991 sample, I limit the 2006 sample to those ages 55 and younger and use a continuous measure of age instead of the age dummy variable.

Xinjiang or Ningxia (region-specific coding was not included in the 2009 China ISSP data). However, the MAR coefficient was non-significant in the ISSP China model (Table 30, Model 1). I explored a range of characteristics of the Chinese Muslims in each data set to see what might account for these divergent results. The most notable difference was that while Muslims in the China ISSP data had a mean income that was lower than that of non-Muslims, Muslims in the 2007 China WVS data had a mean income substantially *higher* than that of their non-Muslim compatriots.

The only measure in either data set that can be used to address the question about immigrant status for the countries in the case analyses consists of items about the immigrant or non-immigrant status of the respondent's mother or father. Data are not available on the respondent's own status. Moreover, these data are only available for Brazil and the U.S. Thus, in Table 31, I show the models for Brazil (Models 1-2) and the U.S. (Models 5-6) with and without the "immigrant parent(s)" variable. The coefficients are positive but non-significant in both cases.

Table 33 shows the effects of the diversity and tolerance measures over time. Since minorities were not coded in the 1990 wave of the U.S. data, in this table only, I use the 1995 wave in order to show change over time in the coefficients for the MAR variable. The coefficients for China got much larger (more negative) from 1990 to 2007 while the coefficient for the U.S. became more positive. In both cases, the effects of being a minority group member intensified. While relations between the Chinese government and its Muslim population undoubtedly worsened during this period (see Steele and Kuo 2007), in the U.S., racial inequalities generally became more extreme as social spending that disproportionately benefited minorities was retrenched. Thus,

Chinese Muslims may have lost faith in their government while American minorities may have viewed retrenchment as detrimental to their racial groups.

The other question I address in this chapter, Research Question 3.3b, is whether attitudes about diversity affect support for redistribution. The findings from Chapter IV challenged the assumption that diversity weakens the social cohesion that is necessary for support for social welfare policies to flourish. If social cohesion is essential to the health of the welfare state, then differences in individuals' backgrounds and lifestyles should be well tolerated in countries with more generous redistributive policies. In the WVS, I approach this issue by means of questions that are directly related to tolerance: 1) Whether the respondent objects to having neighbors of a different race or neighbors who are immigrants or foreign workers ("tolerance"), and 2) Whether the respondent believes that ethnic diversity enriches her life ("support for diversity"). In the ISSP, I am only able to approach the question about tolerance tangentially—using a measure of the extent to which a respondent believes that race, religion, and gender determine opportunities in life ("discrimination"). None of these measures has an equivalent in the other data set.

The results of including the ISSP discrimination measure are shown in Table 30. In the U.S. models (Models 3-4), the coefficient is positive and statistically significant. This finding suggests that believing that race, religion, or gender is an important determinant of opportunities in life is associated with greater support for redistribution. At least to some extent, Americans who are concerned about discrimination may see greater government involvement in social policy as a solution. However, in China and France (Models 1-2), where the discrimination coefficients are negative and significant, this belief is associated with less support for redistribution. Again, in China,

discrimination based on language, religion, and ethnicity remains very much institutionalized at the level of the federal government. Thus, it is logical that those who view discrimination as a larger problem would not want the government to become even more involved in social policy. In France, the government has propagated policies that are arguably discriminatory. Although French policies have generally encouraged minority groups to assimilate, in the past decade, a particularly controversial issue arose. The French government passed a law to ban visible signs of religious affiliation in public places, which has been viewed as an attempt to discriminate against the country's sizable Muslim population.

The 2006-2007 WVS tolerance models are presented in Table 32, while models over time are presented in Table 33. The only statistically significant coefficient is the support for diversity coefficient for the U.S. in 2006 (Table 32, Model 4 and Table 33, Model 9). Because of the high missingness of the support for diversity variable in all earlier waves of the U.S. WVS data (for example, 83% of responses are missing in the 1995 wave), I show the 1995 model with (Model 7) and without (Model 8) this variable. If anything can be concluded from comparing the coefficients for support for diversity in the 1995 and 2006 waves, we would see that support for diversity has become more important over time in predicting support for redistribution in a society that is increasingly diverse.

E. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

In this chapter, I examined in greater depth the findings from the 91-country studies of the previous chapters by means of case analyses of Brazil, China, France, and

the United States. For the most part, the results were consistent with the 91-country findings. However, the analysis of these four countries over time highlighted some nuances in the relationships between the key explanatory concepts—income inequality, equal opportunity, and ethnic diversity—and attitudes about social welfare policies. These findings can be used to further refine the theories emerging from Chapters III and IV in order to improve later larger-scale analyses.

On the topic of income inequality, I asked whether individuals who are farthest below the median income in the most economically unequal countries are the most supportive of redistribution. I found those with the highest incomes in the wealthiest countries were the least supportive of redistribution. Thus, consistent with the 91-country studies, I find no evidence that differences in income inequality affect cross-national differences in support for redistribution.

However, there is some evidence for a relationship between income inequality and support for redistribution within countries over time. The coefficients for median-centered income decrease in magnitude in Brazil as inequality decreases and increase in the U.S. as inequality increases, suggesting that when inequality is highest within a country, income becomes more salient of a predictor of support for redistribution—that it matters most when inequality is greatest. However, contradictory evidence from China and France challenges the robustness of this finding. Future research may answer this question more definitively. Lupu and Pontusson (2011) have developed a new method of analyzing the effects of inequality. They measure the dispersion of income with the upper and lower halves of the income distribution; in other words, they show whether the middle class is closer in income to the poor or to the rich. They find that redistribution

increases as dispersion of earnings in the upper half of the distribution increases relative to the dispersion of earnings in the lower half of the distribution—as the middle class move closer to the poor. At the time of writing, this method of measuring dispersion had not yet been examined at the individual level. Finding a way to adapt it for individual-level analysis could yield fresh insights into the relationship between inequality and support for redistribution.

I then questioned how another type of inequality—that of opportunities for socioeconomic advancement—was related to support for redistribution. I expected those who had experienced downward mobility to be most supportive of redistribution, given that they were likely to have had more direct experience with social welfare institutions. The coefficient of downward mobility was largest in the U.S., where the largest proportion of the sample—more than one-third—had experienced downward mobility. Indeed, while more than half of Chinese and French respondents had experienced upward mobility, less than a quarter of American respondents had. American downward mobility was more common than upward mobility, while the inverse was true in the other two countries. However, it was not upward mobility that affected support for redistribution (those coefficients were all smaller and non-significant). Rather, the experience of downward mobility is related to greater support for redistribution in the country where social advancement is the least likely.

To approach the issue about equality of opportunity from another perspective, I also examined perceptions about it. I found that those who believed more strongly that family advantages and political connections were necessary to get ahead in their societies were more supportive of redistribution. Thus, redistribution social policies may be seen

as offering a chance to level the playing field. I also looked at the effects of essentially believing the opposite—that hard work generally leads to getting ahead in life, and that one has a great deal of choice and control in life. In the case of freedom of choice and control, the results generally suggested that those who felt more in-control were less supportive of redistribution, which likely seemed less essential—especially in China and the U.S., the less egalitarian countries. However, in the case of the hard work item, the results were less consistent. While the belief that hard work brings success was associated with lower support for redistribution in the developed countries—France and the U.S.—across both public opinion data sets, the belief in the efficacy of hard work was associated with higher support for redistribution in China and Brazil—the developing countries. Moreover, an examination of data over time for these countries reveals that these effects changed from negative to positive for both Brazil and China between 1990-1991 and 2006-2007, a period when both countries experienced rapid economic development. Thus, the vastly improved standard of living in both of those countries may have increased the faith of their citizens in the utility of hard work[34] and, at the same time, the efficacy of government social policies.

Finally, I sought further evidence to support the finding in Chapter IV that support for redistribution is greater in more diverse countries. First, I assessed the effects of minority status itself under varied socioeconomic and political circumstances. The results suggested that minority groups' attitudes toward government social policy can differ

[34] Indeed, the mean of the "hard work brings success" variable increased during this period from 4.4 to 6.3 out of 10 in Brazil, and from 6.0 to 7.3 in China.

vastly. Most prominently, being a member of one of China's Muslim minority groups was associated with a 2.5-point decrease (out of 10) in support for redistribution. Moreover, the size of the coefficient increased dramatically from 1990 to 2007, a period when relations between Chinese Muslims and the state became particularly acrimonious (Steele and Kuo 2007). On the other hand, American minorities, especially African-Americans, were more supportive of redistribution, and became even more so over time during a period when cuts to social spending disproportionately affected them. Thus, as Chinese Muslims may have wished for less government involvement, American minorities may have wished for more.

Since immigrant status may have provided a unique perspective on social spending, I attempted to examine immigrants separately from other minorities. There was no measure in either data set of respondents' own country of origin. However, the WVS provided a measure in Brazil and the U.S. only of whether or not parents were immigrants. The effect of having at least one immigrant parent was positive but non-significant. However, better measures of immigrant status are needed before any conclusions can be drawn.

Given that support for redistribution should be higher where social cohesion is greater, and tolerance is an essential component of communal life, I asked whether individuals who were more tolerant of ethnic differences and who believed in the merits of greater diversity were more supportive of redistribution. Indeed, both greater tolerance of ethnic difference and greater appreciation for ethnic diversity were associated with greater support for social welfare policies. The effects were small and not significant

except in the case of the U.S., where ethno-racial fractionalization is particularly high (Alesina and Glaeser 2004).

From another perspective, I looked at the intersection of diversity and opportunity by examining respondents' perceptions of the importance of race, religion, and gender for advancing in their societies. Americans who perceived these characteristics to be an important determinant of life chances were more supportive of redistribution. Thus, Americans who are concerned about discrimination may see greater government involvement in social policy as a solution. Moreover, if anything can be concluded from comparing the coefficients for support for diversity from the very limited 1995 wave to the 2006 wave, we would see that support for diversity has become more important over time in predicting support for redistribution as the U.S. has become increasingly diverse.

However, in China and France, those who believed that race, religion, and gender were important for getting ahead were less supportive of redistribution. As mentioned above, in China, discrimination based on language, religion, and ethnicity remains very much institutionalized at the level of the federal government. Thus, it is logical that those who view discrimination as a larger problem would not want the government to become even more involved in social policy. Likewise, government involvement in minority affairs has not been particularly welcomed by France's Muslims. In particular, the government's 2004 ban on visible signs of religious affiliation in public places was widely viewed as a discriminatory policy targeting veiling by Muslim women.

Perhaps the result that stands out as the most consistent difference between developed and developing countries across studies is an issue pertaining to the extent to which respondents' faith in their economy is related to their faith in government.

Specifically I find that Brazilians and Chinese who believe hard work leads to success are more supportive of redistribution, while French and Americans who believe the same are less supportive. Indeed, an examination of the WVS "confidence in government" variable,[35] reveals that Brazilians and Chinese are much more confident in their government at each point in time than French or Americans.

However, to divide these countries into developed and developing would be an oversimplification. While the results presented herein largely support the findings from the 91-country analyses in Chapters III and IV, there are also a couple of instances where they highlight the importance of accounting for country-specific circumstances. For example, I demonstrated the importance of examining the difference in relations between minority groups and their states, as well as how the meaning of perceptions about opportunity in relation to support for redistribution may differ by level of economic development.

[35] The 4-category variable, e069_11, is recoded to a dummy variable where [1] indicates "a great deal" or "quite a lot" of confidence in the government.

F. APPENDIX

F.1 Types of welfare regimes

i. Highly developed countries

In his seminal book on welfare states, Esping-Andersen (1990) explores how institutionally different welfare regimes shape the lives of their citizens. Among other things, welfare-state policies may determine the size of the labor supply, the division between work and leisure, and the gender division of labor. Esping-Andersen (1990) limits his study to the member countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), and contends that they represent three clusters of welfare-state types.

In "liberal" welfare states—such as the United States, Australia, and Canada—the progress of social reform has been severely circumscribed by traditional, liberal work ethic norms. Rules about welfare benefits are therefore strict and often associated with stigma. Means-tested assistance,[36] modest universal transfers,[37] or modest social-

[36] Means-tested welfare systems require that "applicants for public assistance submit to investigation of their needs and resources. The means test originated as a method of limiting the payment of public assistance to those truly in need in order to reduce the cost of such programs to taxpayers. Because of its tendency to be intrusive, however, it often deterred needy persons from applying for assistance." ("Means Test." Encyclopædia Britannica Online Academic Edition. Encyclopædia Britannica Inc., 2013. Web. 16 May. 2013. http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/660184/means-test)

insurance plans predominate. Benefits are typically small and cater mainly to a clientele of low-income, usually working-class, state dependents. The state promotes the centrality of the market, either passively—by guaranteeing only a minimum, or actively—by subsidizing private welfare schemes. The consequence is that this type of regime minimizes the effects of de-commoditization,[38] effectively containing the realm of social rights, and erecting an order of stratification that is a blend of a relative equality of poverty among state-welfare recipients, market-differentiated welfare among the majorities, and a class-political dualism between the two.

In conservative or "corporatist" welfare states—like Austria, Germany, Italy, and France—the liberal obsession with market efficiency and commoditization was never pre-eminent and, thus, the granting of social rights was hardly ever a seriously contested issue. Rather, what predominated was the preservation of status differentials, meaning that rights were attached to class and status. These states were ready to displace the market as the provider of welfare so that private insurance and occupational fringe

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[37] Universal benefits are those provided to all citizens of a welfare state. For a debate about the meaning of universalism, see Bergh (2004) [Bergh, Andreas. 2004. "The Universal Welfare State: Theory and the Case of Sweden." *Political Studies* 52: 745–766.]

[38] Esping-Andersen defines "de-commoditization" as the liberation of personal livelihood reliance on the market (1990:22) in terms of such aspects of public pension, sickness, and unemployment benefits as their "income replacement rates" and duration of "coverage," characterizing it as "the mainspring of modern social policy" (1990:35).

benefits play a truly marginal role. However, the state's emphasis on upholding status differences means that its redistributive impact is negligible. Corporatist regimes are also typically shaped by the Christian Church, and hence strongly committed to the preservation of the traditional family. Therefore, social insurance typically excludes non-working wives, and family benefits encourage motherhood; day care and similar family services are conspicuously underdeveloped. The principle of "subsidiarity" serves to emphasize that the state will only interfere when the family's capacity to service its members is exhausted (1990:27).

"Social democratic" welfare regimes, which are only observed in Scandinavia, favor universalistic policies. The right to work and the right of income protection have equal status. The level of services and benefits are tailored to the middle class, which goes well beyond the minimal-needs level pursued elsewhere. All strata are incorporated under one universal insurance system, but benefits are graduated according to accustomed earnings. In contrast to the corporatist model, the ideal is to maximize capacities for individual independence, which is a "peculiar fusion of liberalism and socialism" (1990:28). This regime is entirely dependent on the attainment of full employment and must minimize social problems and maximize revenue income to be sustainable.

ii. Brazil and China

Thus, the United States represents a liberal regime and France represents a corporatist regime. Although Brazil and China were not included in Esping-Andersen's original typology of welfare states, in a later volume he edited (1996), he does specifically mention Brazil and briefly discusses East Asian systems. He views Brazil

(along with Costa Rica) as exemplifying a group of emerging new welfare states that had "so far shunned neo-liberalism," and had taken some steps toward strengthening their public social safety nets, adopting a fairly universalistic approach in terms of population coverage (1996:21).

In that same volume, Huber (1996) claims that Brazil circa 1980 resembled a corporatist welfare state regime. Then, the combination of the financial crisis of existing systems in Latin America and those states' glaring inability to deal with the intensifying problem of poverty opened the door for reforms of the existing systems that led Brazil toward the universalistic public provision of pensions and health care. She contends that Brazil created the legal foundations for a universalistic welfare state, aiming to provide basic income security to all citizens, but that the implementation of these policies had been hampered by the inadequate extractive capacity of the state and the inability of the political system to pass reforms that would reduce social spending for privileged groups.

Though he does not specifically mention China, Esping-Andersen (1996) describes the East Asian group of emerging new welfare states as "paradoxically both globally unique and a hybrid of existing welfare state characteristics" (1996:21). This group shares with the continental European model an emphasis on familialism and an aversion to public social services, with its embryonic social insurance schemes being far from comprehensive. He points out that by default more than design, the vacuum of social protection has spurred the rise of company-sponsored occupational welfare, especially in Japan, and that as a consequence, a certain degree of 'Americanization' has evolved; the modesty of public welfare rests on the assumption that primary-sector male workers will be covered under private plans. (Interestingly, a *New York Times* article on

April 21, 2010 [Fackler 2010] has reported that because of weaknesses in its social safety net, Japan is also following in the U.S.'s footsteps in terms of fostering structural poverty with steep barriers to upward mobility.)

However, Lin (1999) does not think that Asian welfare belongs to one of Esping-Andersen's three welfare regimes, contending that those regimes' philosophical bases and policy prescriptions are quite different. In an examination of China, Japan, Hong Kong, and Singapore, he finds some parallels between Confucian welfare beliefs and the (neo)liberal school of thought, which promotes residual welfare based on an ideal of hard work and individual responsibility. However, in Confucian Asia, "familistic groupism" provides a network of welfare reliance while supporters of neo-liberalism have championed the forces of markets. He concludes that Confucian East Asia is a distinct welfare cluster, where the ideology of Confucianism remains a potent force in society.

Brazil, China, France, and the United States represent four major economic powers with very distinct socioeconomic systems. The International Labour Organisation's (ILO) "Global Wage Report 2008/09" observes that since 1995 inequality between the highest and lowest wages has increased in more than two-thirds of the countries surveyed, often reaching socially unsustainable levels. The U.S. (along with Germany and Poland) is cited as one of the developed countries in which the gap between top and bottom wages has increased most rapidly, while China (along with Argentina and Thailand) is named as one of the developing countries in which inequality has increased most sharply. The countries cited as most successful at reducing wage inequality include France and Brazil (along with Spain and Indonesia).

F.2 Development, inequality, and social welfare policies in Brazil, China, France, and the United States

i. Brazil

Brazil is the largest country in Latin America—in terms of both population and landmass, in addition to having the region's highest GDP and the world's tenth largest economy. In 2005, Brazil's GDP growth rate[39] was 3.3 percent, and its GDP per capita[40] was US$4,297 (slightly down from US$4,427 in 1995, a trend that will be discussed below). The Brazilian economy is expected to become one of the five largest in the world in the decades to come, and is one of a group of four emerging economies called the BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) countries.[41] The BRIC countries are expected to overtake the G6 in terms of the combined size of their economies. Moreover, according

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[39] In this section, data on GDP growth rates comes from the International Monetary Fund's (IMF) World Economic Outlook database.

[40] In this section, data on GDP per capita comes from the IMF's World Economic Outlook database and is in current prices in US dollars.

[41] From Wilson and Purushothaman (2003): Using demographic projections and a model of capital accumulation and productivity growth, the authors map out GDP growth, income per capita, and currency movements in the BRICs economies until 2050. They find that in less than 40 years [from 2003], the BRICs economies together could be larger than the G6 in US dollar terms. By 2025 they could account for over half the size of the G6. In 2003, they were worth less than 15 percent of it.

to the OECD, Brazil is resisting the global downturn better than many other countries as a result of sound policies developed during recent years (OECD 2009b).

Classifying the level of human development in Brazil as "high", the United National Development Programme (UNDP) ranked Brazil 70th in the world on its Human Development Index (HDI)[42] with a score of 0.800, (up from a score of 0.753 in 1995).

(1) Economic inequality. Although Brazil emerges as one of the less equal countries in the world (it ranked 11th in this category in 2008), opposing global trends, both the Gini Coefficient and the Theil Index for Brazil have decreased, reflecting decreasing inequality. In 2005, Brazil's net Gini coefficient[43] was 49.1, compared to 51.6 in 1995 (Solt 2009). Similarly, the Theil Index[44] decreased from 0.126 in 1995 to 0.098 in 2005.

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[42] "The Human Development Index (HDI) measures the average achievements in a country in three basic dimensions of human development: a long and healthy life, knowledge and a decent standard of living" (UNDP 2010).

[43] Or, post-tax and -transfer Gini coefficient (see Section III Appendix, [III.F.3] for a discussion of why the post-tax measure was selected)

[44] From Conceic□ão and Ferreira (2000): The Theil Index is intended to provide a way to measure the discrepancy between the structure of the distribution of income across groups and the structure of the distribution of individuals across those same groups—a numeric expression to address such a discrepancy between the structure of the distribution of income and the structure of the distribution of population. "Groups that have their 'fair share' of income contribute nothing to the Theil index. If all groups have

Falling rates of inequality have made a substantial contribution to poverty reduction (Ferreira, Leite, and Litchfield 2007). As the Gini declined by six points, or 10 percent, from 1993 to 2004, poverty incidence also decreased from 0.33 to 0.22. Ferreira, Leite, and Litchfield (2007) find that the decline in inequality, which began in 1993, was associated with declining inflation, but was also influenced by four structural and policy changes: declining returns to education; pronounced rural-urban convergence; increases in social assistance transfers targeted to the poor; and a possible decline in racial inequality.

Referring to the decline in per capita GDP mentioned above, Kakwani, Neri, and Son (2006) also observe that poverty fell during the same period, even though average income was declining. They suggest that the case of Brazil is notable for refuting the assumption that positive (or negative) growth results in a decrease (or increase) in poverty. The sharp decline in inequality over this period offsets the adverse effect of negative growth on poverty, in their estimation.

(2) Social stratification. Other important determinants of overall inequality in Brazil include family type, race, region, and the urban or rural location of a household, according to Ferreira, Leite, and Litchfield. Telles (2004) observes that two of these determinants are related; social development (in terms of HDI) coincides with the racial composition of regions of Brazil. While he points out that there is considerably more

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their 'fair share' of income, the Theil index attains its minimum value: zero." It can be decomposed into between-group and within-group contributions to an overall inequality measure.

miscegenation (about 25 percent of Brazilians marry someone of a different skin color) and less residential segregation than in the other countries considered, the U.S. and South Africa, Brazil continues to suffer from severe racial inequalities. Blacks comprise a disproportionate percentage of the poor and remain virtually absent from the middle and upper classes. They also earn half the salaries of whites and are more likely to be unemployed. Moreover, racist attitudes impede upward mobility, giving rise to the "discriminatory glass ceiling" that prevents non-White Brazilians from advancing. Afro-Brazilians and Amazonians, whose mineral-rich land and environment are being rapidly depleted by non-indigenous developers, are included in the Minorities At Risk Data (2009).[45]

From a historical perspective, Brazil has been an immigration country. Initially, migration catered to the interests of the Portuguese Crown and assured occupation of its territory. After this period, it was the slave trade that ensured the highest number of immigrants. Around the nineteenth century until the first quarter of the twentieth century, a new wave of immigrants from Italy and Japan made their way to Brazil in response to the growing call for manual labor. During the 1990s, Brazil received an important number of immigrants (regular and irregular) from South Korea and from Latin America, especially from Bolivia and Peru. Although the government has not encouraged regional immigration, Brazil has become an important, attractive destination for Latin Americans from various socio-economic backgrounds. At the same time, emigration has become a

[45] For more details about these groups, see http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/mar/assessments.asp?regionId=99

notable phenomenon. Estimates of the number of Brazilians living outside the country range from 1 million to 3 million (IOM 2010).

(3) Social welfare policies. Furthermore, in the opinion of Justino, Litchfield, and Niimi (2004), purely economic analyses of inequality may overestimate the level of inequalities in Brazil, and a more holistic approach is preferable. They find that education and other non-monetary welfare benefits are actually more equally distributed in Brazil than income. All of these measurements may explain why Brazil has managed to sustain relatively high levels of income and political stability (in comparison with other Latin America countries where political violence and civil unrest have reached unsustainable levels) despite suffering from some of the highest levels of inequality in the world.

In terms of social welfare policies, Brazil performs comparatively well. Dixon (2000) ranked[46] Brazil 37th (tied with the United Kingdom) out of the 172 countries he

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[46] From Dixon (2000): "The social security system design feature evaluation methodology used in this study to rank national social security systems […] involved four steps. The first step was to articulate a very comprehensive set of 860 social security system design features related to constituent program coverage, benefit eligibility requirements, benefit provision, and financing and administrative arrangements. […] The second step was to further categorize those design features into those that made a national social security system 'more' acceptable and those that made it 'less' acceptable. The third step was systematically to review the design features of 172 national social security systems, largely using a descriptive database compiled by the United States Social Security Administration derived, in large part, from the annual survey on developments

evaluated, noting that it had one of the "better-designed systems in Latin America" along with Bolivia (27th) and Uruguay (33rd) He gave Brazil a "social security design score"[47] of 888, which qualified it for inclusion in a group of countries with social security systems whose design scores were between 10 and 20 percent below those of the best-designed system (Australia's).

Brazil's welfare system is divided into three parts (Ministry of Social Welfare 2009): The General Policy (*Regime Geral de Previdência Social*, or General Social Welfare Policy), managed by the National Institute of Social Welfare; special welfare, covering public servants and the military; and complementary welfare, which is voluntary and privately managed. Health benefits and social security are nearly universal, having been separated from formal employment and contributions.

Retirement and disability benefits are assessed according to the official minimum wage and, according to Hudson (1997), comprise such a large portion of the government budget that the government was unable to raise the minimum wage for the active workforce. However, Hudson also notes that the middle class considers these benefits

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and trends conducted by the International Social Security Association, and to assign a subjective score—the quantitative expression of a qualitative judgment—to the existence (or non-existence) of each design feature. […] The final step was to calculate a ranking score for each national social security system."

[47] The highest score among the 172 countries in Dixon's study using 1995 data was 1,089 (Australia) and the lowest was 318 (Azerbaijan, which did not have a functional administrative system at that time).

insufficient and, may prefer other alternatives such as private social security plans. Estimating public expenditure at 18.8 percent of GDP in the 2000-2001 fiscal year, Draibe (2005) also notes that the relatively high level of social spending in Brazil ranks it among higher-spending Latin American countries, including Uruguay, Argentina, Chile, and Mexico.

A notable recent reform in the Brazilian welfare system was the introduction of the *Bolsa Família* (family stipend, grant, or allowance) program, which was a centerpiece of President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva's social policy. The program provides financial aid to poor families (based solely on monthly family per capita income) on the condition that school-age children attend school at a rate of at least 85 percent, children 0-6 years old maintain up-to-date immunization cards, and pregnant and breast-feeding women visit health centers regularly (Veras Soares et al. 2006).

At present, the *Bolsa Família* is the largest conditional cash transfer program in the world, praised for circumventing habitual problems with corruption by direct delivery of funding to recipients rather than third-party involvement. “Citizen Cards” are mailed directly to families and operate like debit cards to withdraw their allocations from a government-owned savings bank with more than 14,000 locations. Credited as one of the primary antipoverty operations in Brazil, UNDP (Veras Soares et al. 2006) found that the *Bolsa Família* program and a similar program for the elderly and disabled (BPC—The Continuous Cash Benefit Program) were responsible for 28 percent of the decline in the Gini Coefficient from 1995 to 2004 (see also Ferreira, Leite, and Litchfield 2007). Other contributing factors include the improved job market and real gains in the minimum wage.

ii. China

With more than 1.3 billion people, China has the largest population in the world and, as of 2006, the world's fourth-largest economy. In 2005, China's GDP growth rate was 9 percent, and its GDP per capita was US$1,462 (up from US$578 in 1995). China is also one of the closely watched BRIC countries.

With a score of 0.777 (up from a score of 0.691 in 1995), UNDP ranked China 81st in terms of HDI, and classified its level of human development as "medium."

(1) Economic inequality. Regarding inequality, both the Gini Coefficient and the Theil Index for China increased, reflecting increasing inequality. In 2005, China's net Gini coefficient was 44.0, compared to 36.1 in 1995 (Solt 2009). Likewise, the Theil Index showed a similar trend, increasing from 0.045 in 1995 to 0.080 in 2005. As Gustafsson, Shi, and Sicular (2008) point out, changes in the level and distribution of income in a country like China hold implications for global inequality and poverty. Furthermore, an understanding of such dynamics in Brazil and China, in particular, can in turn help to clarify the relationship between inequality and development, a paradigm of transition that may be applicable to other developing countries hoping to emulate their perceived success.

Dixon ranked China's social welfare state 80th out of 172 countries, giving it a social security design score of 782.[48] While some increase in inequality was inevitable as

[48] Gao (2002) describes the current Chinese social welfare system as being comprised of five areas of coverage: pension, medical insurance, unemployment insurance, work-related injuries, and childbirth insurance.

China introduced a market system, there are a number of other contributory factors (Dollar 2007). Leung and Nann (1995) primarily attribute the fact that China's demographic indicators appear favorable among countries at comparable levels of economic development to the extensive pre-reform welfare policy (Leung and Nann 1995).[49] Yet, some problems of the current welfare system in China partially originated

[49] Leung and Nann (1995) argue that social welfare in China from 1949 to 1995 can be characterized by an amalgamation of traditional and socialist concepts and practices. They describe the evolution of China's social welfare system as having the Chinese cultural roots of familism, charity, collectivism, Confucianism, filial piety, and hierarchical and bureaucratic control, as well as the socialist flavor of equalitarianism, self-reliance and pragmatism. They sum up this combination of features as "authority and benevolence."

At the end of the 20th century, Croll (1999) described China's welfare package (*shehui fuli*) as multi-faceted. Known as "social security" (*shehui baozhang*), the package had been composed of three broad constituent categories during the previous 50 years: social insurance or protection, social provisioning or services, and social assistance or relief. Social insurance (*shehui baoxian*) included protection arrangements for retirement pensions and medical treatment; unemployment, maternity, sickness and work-related injury or disability benefits; and subsidies for widows and orphans. Social services (*shehui fuwu*) referred to specialized support for the elderly, disabled and abandoned, as well as public services such as education, health, and housing. Social relief (*shehuijiuji*)

in pre-reform economic policies that favored the urban, industrial, and state sectors (Leung and Nann 1995).[50]

Inter-provincial disparities comprise one important axis of inequality in China. Ravallion and Chen (2007) point out that the provinces that started the reform period with (relatively) high inequality had a harder time reducing poverty. Inequality is continuing to rise and poverty is becoming much more sensitive to rising inequality. They find that aggregate growth is increasingly coming from sources that bring fewer gains to the poorest. Thus, they expect that the historically high levels of inequality found in many provinces will inhibit future prospects for poverty reduction—just as the provinces that started the reform period with higher inequality had less success with poverty reduction. Gustafsson, Shi, and Sicular (2008) also note the wide variation in living conditions across China's 31 provincial units, each having a population comparable in size to that of many countries. Comparing provinces to countries, they find that Shanghai and Beijing would earn HDI ranks (based on the 2005 Index) of 25 and 30, respectively, close to Greece and Hungary, while Guizhou and Tibet would rank 122 and 129, comparable to Morocco and Namibia.

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involved assistance in cash and kind to the old and disabled without income or other forms of familial support.

[50] Problems that partially originated in pre-reform economic policies included favoring the urban, industrial, and state sectors, and accumulated disadvantage for groups such as the poor, the unemployed, the disabled, the dislocated, neglected female children, the elderly, and women.

(2) Social stratification. The Tibetans, Hui Muslim, and Turkmen (Uighurs, Kazakhs, and Tajiks) ethnic groups have been identified as particularly marginalized by the Minorities at Risk Data (2009).[51] Although each group has its own autonomous region, the economic development in these regions has disproportionately benefited Han Chinese migrants to those regions (Steele and Kuo 2007). Advocacy for independence from China is not unusual in Tibet or Xinjiang (the predominantly Uighur region). Immigration is not yet a major issue in China. According to the latest 2010 Census figures, 593,832 foreigners—mainly from South Korea, the United States and Japan—are residing in the country, while the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences estimates that there are 35 million Chinese living overseas. However, as described above, China is experiencing the largest internal migration movement in the world with approximately 230 million migrants moving from rural areas to the country's growing cities.[52]

(3) Social welfare policies. Other issues have arisen from the reduction of welfare benefits and the marketization of welfare services in the reform era (Leung and Nann 1995), in which the state is limiting itself and retreating slowly from social welfare provision—putting more responsibilities in the hands of the individual, family, community, businesses, social organizations, and even international donors. Gao (2002) raises concerns about the narrow extent of the coverage of this social welfare system,

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[51] For more details about these groups, see http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/mar/assessments.asp?regionId=99

[52] http://www.iom.int/cms/en/sites/iom/home/where-we-work/asia-and-the-pacific/china.default.html?displayTab=additional-resources

which mainly targets urban residents. He observes that farmers, employees of township enterprises, and immigrants from rural areas to urban areas, who constitute a larger proportion of the population, are essentially not covered by the welfare system. Only state-owned-enterprise (SOE) employees are fully covered. Furthermore, even within cities, all employees are not covered. For example, at the time Gao was writing, the system was designed for full-time, not part-time workers.

China's uniquely decentralized fiscal system relies on local government to fund basic health and education, which has left many villages unable to afford to provide good services, and poor households unable to cover the high private costs of basic public services (Dollar 2007). In Gustafsson, Shi, and Sicular's (2008) analysis of China Household Income Project (CHIP) data, they find that despite the level of income inequality in China remaining relatively stable from 1995 through 2002,[53] the large urban-rural income gap had increased to become an even more dominant source of overall inequality as inequalities in benefits from health and education systems had grown (Dollar 2007; Gustafsson, Shi, and Sicular 2008). Moreover, although poverty declined during the same period, this trend was accompanied by rising inequality in the distribution of wealth (Gustafsson, Shi, and Sicular 2008).

[53] Gustafsson, Shi, and Sicular (2008) attribute this stability to the emergence of certain equalizing processes, including the spread of off-farm wage employment in rural areas, the catching up and convergence in household per capita income among provinces in eastern China, and the beneficial effects of widely shared macroeconomic growth.

Opportunities for the relatively poor rural population were further reduced by restrictions on rural-urban migration and the inability to sell or mortgage rural land (Dollar 2007). Moreover, inequalities persist even when individuals migrate to more prosperous provinces. Labor market discrimination against rural migrants and women is rampant (Chen 2005). And government efforts to reduce income disparities by means of pro-migration programs such as "Go West" have been thwarted by a dearth of laws and regulations—and the lack of enforcement of those that do exist—which would safeguard the rights of rural migrants, women, or disadvantaged groups in general (Chen 2005).

Croll (1999) contends that the acceleration of economic reform in the early and late 1990s repeatedly drew attention to the importance of social welfare for maintaining economic growth, social stability, and political authority. In her opinion, each of these decade-long goals could be seen as resting on either establishing or maintaining an accessible social welfare package. Moreover, reports of urban unrest resulting from lay-offs and loss of welfare benefits, and of rural discontent resulting from the continued absence of welfare benefits, suggest to Croll that social stability and political authority are dependent on the government's ability to reform social welfare provisioning. Moreover, in a discussion in a Chinese daily (*Economic Information Daily*) of what type of social welfare system would be best for China, Gao (2002) points out that compared to social welfare taxes in other countries, China's tax rate is very high, with most OECD countries having lower rates. Although disequalizing forces continue, in contrast to the beginning of the reform process when policy makers did not talk openly about inequality as a problem, more recent political discourse and policy announcements have increasingly emphasized distribution and fairness (Gustafsson, Shi, and Sicular 2008).

iii. France

France is the largest European Union state in terms of landmass, and has the world's fifth largest economy. In 2005, France had a GDP growth rate of 1.5 percent, with a GDP per capita of US$33,855 (up from US$26,451 in 1995). With a score of 0.952 (up from a score of 0.925 in 1995), UNDP ranked France 10th in terms of HDI, and classified its level of human development as "very high."

(1) Economic inequality. France is also notable for having relatively low levels of inequality, ranking far down on the global list as the 101st most unequal country. Its net Gini coefficient (Theil Index scores were not available for France) was just 27.4 in 2005, down from 28.2 in 1995 (Solt 2009).

As reported by the OECD (2008), France is one of only five member countries where income inequality and poverty (people who live on less than half median incomes) have declined over the past 20 years. Though these rates have not reached the very low levels of the Nordic countries, they are below OECD averages. Notably, while the richest 10 percent of the French population and the French middle class have income levels similar to OECD averages, the poorest 10 percent have an income about 25 percent higher than the average for OECD countries. While inequality in the labor market—for example, of all full-time gross wages—increased by almost 20 percent since 1985 in a typical OECD country, it actually declined by 10 percent in France. In addition, employment rates of those with low levels of education have increased, unlike in most other OECD countries, where employment rates of people with low levels of education have fallen.

(2) Social stratification. Yet, stratification by gender, race, and ethnicity persist. For example, according to Savidan and Maurin (2008), the median salary for women in 2005 was only 82 percent of the median for men. Ethnic origin is also an issue with a 22.6 percent poverty rate among households of North African origin, compared to around 6 percent for the whole population. In the Minorities at Risk Data (2009), Muslims, Corsicans, and Roma are identified as vulnerable groups.[54] Moreover, 15 percent of immigrant households fall below the poverty line, compared with 5.6 percent of non-immigrant households. Smith (2004) contends that the social spending in France is not sufficiently redistributive. He argues that it overwhelmingly benefits certain sectors of the population, like the public sector and middle-class retirees, that are already wealthy and protected, while others—such as immigrants, women, and youth—are left out.

(3) Social welfare policies. Nonetheless, as a whole, the French social welfare system is one of the most generous in the world. Dixon ranked France 3rd out of 172 countries, with a very high social security design score of 1,009. In particular, France has garnered praise for the strength of its healthcare system, having ranked 1st in the World Health Organization's (WHO) ranking of the world's health systems (WHO 2000).[55]

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[54] For more details about these groups, see http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/mar/assessments.asp?regionId=99

[55] The WHO ranking of health systems is derived from measures of the overall level of health in a country; the distribution of health in the country's population; the overall level of responsiveness of the country's healthcare system; the distribution of responsiveness; and the distribution of financial contribution to the healthcare system (WHO 2000).

Among OECD countries, France ranks highest for spending on public social programs, which accounts for one-third of national income, compared with an OECD average of 24 percent (OECD 2009a).

The welfare system is divided into a several sectors (branches): health care, old age, family, and unemployment insurance, and fragmented into different schemes (régimes) covering different occupational groups (Palier 2000). While Palier (2000) describes the government's supervisory role (*la tutelle*, or tutelage) as crucial, he points out that the lines of responsibility have never been entirely clear for laying down the basic principles of the Social Security system, setting benefit and contribution levels, and attempting to ensure the system's financial stability; many decisions are made by means of negotiation between trade unions and employers' representatives, with varying degrees of pressure by the State.

iv. United States

The United States has both the third largest land mass and third largest population in the world, and continues to have the world's largest economy—by far, with a GDP close to triple that of the second largest economy, Japan. In 2005, the U.S. GDP growth rate was 3.5 percent, and its GDP per capita was US$41,976 (up from US$27,763 in 1995). UNDP ranked the U.S. 12th in terms of HDI, with a score of 0.951 (up from 0.931 in 1995), classifying its level of human development as "very high."

(1) Economic inequality. Yet, this prosperity is not shared by all citizens. In terms of inequality, net Gini coefficients for the U.S. were 37.1 in 2005, up from 36.2 in 1995 (Solt 2009). Indeed, the United States has the highest overall level of inequality of any rich OECD nation (Smeeding 2005b). Piketty (2003) highlights an important divergence

between U.S. and French inequality dynamics in recent years. While top income shares increased sharply in the United States from the 1970s, they remained flat in France. He attributes the very steep rise in top incomes observed in the United States to large increases in high-skill wages and executive compensation, coupled with large declines in top tax rates.

(2) Social stratification. In addition, there is notable stratification by gender and race/ethnicity. U.S. Census Data (DeNavas-Walt, Proctor, and Smith 2009) from 2008 shows that a woman who worked full-time, year-round had median earnings that were 77 percent of an equivalent man's. Foreign-born (naturalized and non-citizens combined) households earned median incomes that were 85 percent of those earned by their native-born counterparts. Finally, Black and Hispanic (any race) median household income was 62 percent and 68 percent, respectively, of White (non-Hispanic) median household income. Moreover, the recent recession appears to have disproportionately affected minorities. While non-Hispanic Whites had experienced a 2.7 percent decline by 2008 from income peaks prior to 2001, the household incomes of Blacks declined by 7.8 percent, and those of Hispanics were 8.6 percent lower. African-Americans, Hispanics, Native Americans, and Native Hawaiians are included in the Minorities At Risk Data (2009).[56]

(3) Social welfare policies. In another contrast to France, the U.S. has a relatively weak welfare state tradition. Dixon ranked the U.S. 62nd out of 172 countries, giving it a social security design score of 827, below Brazil's and that of the poorest designed

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[56] For more details about these groups, see http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/mar/assessments.asp?regionId=99

system in Western Europe (Malta, at 58th). Indeed, the American welfare state is one of the most minimal in the developed world. Kenworthy (1999) found that American social-welfare programs are less effective than those in most of the other OECD countries he studies, with the tax/transfer system in the U.S. being comparatively ineffectual at reducing the incidence of poverty. In contrast, while France has a higher pretax/pretransfer poverty rate than the U.S. (27.5 percent versus 21.0 percent), its posttax/posttransfer relative poverty rate is much lower (4.8 percent compared to 11.0 percent).

Similar to Kenworthy (1999), Smeeding (2005a) finds that the effects of government policies and social spending efforts in the U.S. are lower than any other rich nation; both low spending on cash benefits and low wages have a great impact on the final income distribution, especially among the nonelderly. Starr (2008) draws attention to the different ways in which the American welfare system affects its oldest and youngest beneficiaries. He states that "The persistent problems affecting children and the deteriorating economic position of young adults stand in contrast to the historic improvement in the well-being of the elderly during the same period" (2008:A6). Crediting the expansion of social security and Medicaid, Starr observes that the proportion of seniors living in poverty fell by two-thirds—from 30 percent in 1965 to 9.4 percent in 2006. In contrast, he cites a recent UNICEF study that measured the well-being of children and adolescents in 21 rich countries and ranked the U.S. next to last. He also refers to U.S. Census Bureau data, which showed that in 2006, 17 percent—about the same proportion as in the 1970s—of children were growing up in families with incomes below the poverty line.

The U.S. differs from most nations that achieve lower poverty rates because of its emphasis on work and self-reliance for working-age adults, regardless of the wages workers must accept or the family situation of those workers. Yet, he contends that labor markets alone cannot reduce poverty because not all of the poor can be expected to "earn" their way out of poverty. In particular, single parents with young children, disabled workers, and the unskilled would all face significant challenges earning an adequate income, no matter how much they worked.

Though what Kenworthy (1999) calls the "general stinginess" of U.S. programs is partly to blame, the only country in his study that had lower levels of transfers as a share of GDP over the 1960-91 period was Australia. Yet, Australia had the highest score for social security design among all 172 countries in Dixon's study. As Kenworthy points out, even in nations with transfer levels similar to those in the U.S., redistributive policies tend to do a better job at reducing poverty; he refers to Canada for a particularly telling comparison. Although the U.S. and Canada are nearly identical in both pretax/pretransfer poverty and government transfer expenditures' share of GDP, the U.S. posttax/posttransfer poverty rate is nearly double that of Canada.

Fragmentation characterizes both the French and American welfare systems. MaCurdy and Jones (2007) name six programs most commonly associated with the U.S. system: (1) Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), (2) the Food Stamp Program (FSP), (3) Supplemental Security Income (SSI), (4) Medicaid, (5) housing assistance, and (6) the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC). Lindert (2005) calls the system—with different sets of rules and regulations governing benefit eligibility across over 80 programs that serve low-income individuals and families—a "patchwork quilt."

Similarly, MaCurdy and Jones highlight the fact that various programs have different, sometimes competing goals, inconsistent rules, and over-lapping groups of beneficiaries. Moreover, responsibility for administering the programs is spread throughout the executive branch of the federal government and across many committees of Congress, and is also shared with state, county, and city governments, which actually deliver the services and contribute to funding.

VI. CONCLUSION

Recent public protests from New York to Athens to Cairo have raised questions about whether and why people want greater economic equality. In this dissertation, I analyzed attitudes about income inequality and social welfare policies using a unique data set that includes more than 370,000 individuals from 91 countries, 68 of which are developing. I combined individual-level data from the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) and the World Values Survey (WVS) with country-level data from more than a dozen sources.

Most studies of public opinion about redistribution have focused either exclusively on the United States, or on comparisons among a small number of developed, Western countries. In the dissertation, I built on this existing body of research on stratification beliefs while including the developing world in my analyses and constructing theories appropriate for understanding a more socioeconomically diverse group of countries.

The analysis of two global public opinion data sets, the ISSP and the WVS, provided a valuable opportunity to test the robustness of my findings. Both data sets have important strengths; while the WVS (2009a) is the only data set that contains any measures of attitudes about redistribution from a substantial number of developing and non-Western countries, the 2009 "Social Inequality IV" module of the ISSP (2012) includes a range of more nuanced questions about redistribution than does the WVS.

In addition, I proposed a new method of measurement to address the issue of reciprocal causality between public opinion and public policy and enhance the comparability of attitudes formed within very different national policy contexts. This measure provided another valuable test of robustness and I presented evidence suggesting that it could reduce simultaneity in a wide range of studies about public opinion and policy.

The primary aim of the dissertation was to enhance our understanding of how factors that shape the everyday experience of inequality—differences in income between individuals, but also differences in wealth between countries, in national redistributive social policies, in regimes of social stratification, in access to institutions that can facilitate social class mobility, and in perceptions about fairness and discrimination in society—affect attitudes about income inequality and redistributive social policies.

In Chapter III, I examined the relationship between income inequality, equal opportunity, and attitudes about redistribution from a global perspective. Previous findings about the effects of income inequality on stratification beliefs have been mixed. At least to some extent, these inconsistencies may have resulted from the variation in the measures of inequality that have been used. While most scholars have studied the relationship between redistribution, policy attitudes, and inequality using measures of pre-tax and transfer inequality, I argue that post-tax and transfer inequality is more likely to reflect the ways in which individuals experience income inequality in everyday life, and should be the more influential factor in shaping attitudes about redistribution. Indeed, the results in Chapter III (and its Appendix) confirm that post-tax inequality is the better predictor of support for redistribution.

However, as hypothesized, structural and institutional factors that affect the experience of inequality emerge as more salient predictors of support for redistribution than does income inequality itself. The central finding of Chapter III is that there is a positive relationship between social mobility and support for redistribution. The structures and institutions that facilitate upward mobility—and potentially attenuate some of the detrimental effects of inequality—are generally the products of more comprehensive redistribution policies. Thus, the tangibility of redistributive social policies may bolster support for social spending. At the same time, individuals who had experienced greater social mobility were less supportive of redistribution, suggesting they might take for granted the policies that may have facilitated their success.

In popular discourse, generous social welfare policies are often portrayed as a luxury limited to only small, ethnically homogenous, wealthy countries, such as those in Scandinavia. In Chapter IV, I provide evidence to challenge that assumption. Previous research has found a negative relationship between ethnic diversity and actual social spending, and has assumed that this results from lower support for redistribution among the publics of more diverse countries. However, research on actual attitudes about redistribution has been largely limited to the United States and a few other Western countries. Using my 91-country data set, I explored the relationship between diversity and actual attitudes using two different cross-national public opinion data sets and three different methods of measuring diversity, and comparing models of both attitudes and context-adjusted attitudes.

I find that diversity is either positively related or unrelated to support for redistribution, but do not find any evidence to support the claim that diversity depresses

support for social spending. Thus, the findings from this chapter suggest that ethnic heterogeneity may not be the impediment to social welfare policies that it is commonly assumed to be. Policy-makers need not be constrained by the concern that their populations are too diverse to sustain support for a universal safety net.

Through case analyses of Brazil, China, France, and the United States in Chapter V, I examined in greater depth the findings from the global studies of the previous chapters. For the most part, the results were consistent with the global findings. However, the analysis of these four countries over time highlighted some nuances in the relationships between the key explanatory concepts—income inequality, equal opportunity, and ethnic diversity—and attitudes about social welfare policies.

I sought further clarification of the finding from Chapter IV that support for redistribution is greater in more diverse countries. Given that support for redistribution should be higher where social cohesion is greater, and tolerance is essential to cohesion, I asked whether individuals who were more tolerant of ethnic differences and who believed in the merits of greater diversity were more supportive of redistribution. Indeed, both greater tolerance of ethnic difference and greater appreciation for ethnic diversity were associated with greater support for social welfare policies.

However, the effects of perceptions about discrimination on support for redistribution differed by country. Americans who believed that discrimination was more prevalent were more supportive of redistribution, suggesting that they may see greater government involvement in social policy as a redress for discrimination. However, in China and France, those who perceived greater discrimination in their societies were less supportive of redistribution. Given that there have been prominent incidents between

French and Chinese minority groups claiming discrimination *by* their governments during the period under study, it is unsurprising that they might not want their governments to become more deeply involved in social policy.

On the topic of income inequality, I found some evidence for a relationship between income inequality and support for redistribution within countries over time. The importance of income for predicting support for redistribution in Brazil declined as inequality decreased there and increased in the U.S. as inequality increased, suggesting that when inequality is highest within a country, income becomes a more salient predictor of support for redistribution—that it matters most when inequality is greatest. However, the evidence from China and France challenges the robustness of this finding.

I then questioned how equality of opportunity for socioeconomic advancement was related to support for redistribution in these four countries. By disaggregating those who had experienced different types of social mobility, I found that it was not upward mobility, but downward mobility that affected support for redistribution. In fact, the experience of downward mobility was related to greater support for redistribution in the country where social advancement was the least likely—the United States. While more than 50 percent of Chinese and French respondents had experienced upward mobility, less than 25 percent of American respondents had. Americans were more likely to have experienced downward than upward mobility during their lifetimes.

In my analysis of perceptions about equality of opportunity, I found that those who believed more strongly that family advantages and political connections were necessary to get ahead in their societies were consistently more supportive of redistribution. This finding suggests that redistributive social policies may be seen as one

way to attenuate inherited disadvantage. Findings about those who believed in the efficacy of merit within their societies—that hard work generally led to success—were less consistent. While the belief that hard work brings success was associated with lower support for redistribution in the developed countries—France and the U.S.—across both public opinion data sets, the belief in the effectiveness of hard work was associated with higher support for redistribution in China and Brazil—the developing countries. Given that there were notable increases in faith in hard work in Brazil and China over time, and that the social and economic transformations in those two countries have been strikingly tangible during the same period, I explored a possible connection between the belief in hard work and confidence in the government. Indeed, Brazilians and Chinese expressed greater confidence in their governments than did French or Americans.

To summarize, equal opportunity (operationalized by means of social mobility) is a more important predictor of support for redistribution than is income inequality. In addition, ethnic diversity may predict support for redistribution—by increasing it—which is the opposite of what public figures have claimed in erroneously citing diversity as a threat to the survival of social welfare institutions.

VII. TABLES AND FIGURES

A. TABLES

Table 1. List of ISSP 2009 Countries and Observations by Geographic Region

Western	**n**	**Eastern Europe**	**n**	**Middle East/ North Africa**	**n**
Australia	1,525	Bulgaria	1,000	Cyprus	1,000
Austria	1,019	Croatia	1,201	Israel	1,193
Belgium	1,115	Czech Republic	1,205	Turkey	1,569
Denmark	1,518	Estonia	1,005	**Total n/ country-years**	**3,762/3**
Finland	880	Hungary	1,010		
France	2,817	Latvia	1,069	**Asia**	**n**
Germany	1,395	Poland	1,263	China	3,010
Great Britain	958	Russian Federation	1,603	Japan	1,296
Iceland	947	Slovakia	1,159	Philippines	1,200
New Zealand	935	Slovenia	1,065	South Korea	1,599
Norway	1,456	Ukraine	2,012	Taiwan	2,026
Portugal	1,000	***Total n/country-years***	***13,592/11***	***Total n/ country-years***	***7,127/5***
Spain	1,215				
Sweden	1,137	**Latin America**	**n**	**Sub-Saharan Africa**	**n**
Switzerland	1,229	Argentina	1,133	South Africa	3,305
United States	1,581	Chile	1,505	***Total n/country-years***	***3,305/1***
Total n/ country-years	***20,727/ 16***	***Total n/ country-years***	***2,638/ 2***		

Table 2. List of Countries, Years, and Observations by Geographic Region[57]

Western	n	year
Australia	1,421	2006
Austria	1,522	1999
Belgium	1,912	1999
Canada	2,164	2006
Denmark	1,023	1999
Finland	1,014	2005
France	1,001	2006
Germany	2,064	2006
Great Britain	1,041	2006
Greece	1,142	1999
Iceland	968	1999
Ireland	1,012	1999
Italy	1,012	2005
Luxembourg	1,211	1999
Malta	1,002	1999
Netherlands	1,050	2006
New Zealand	954	2004
Norway	1,025	2008
Portugal	1,000	1999
Spain	1,200	2007
Sweden	1,003	2006
Switzerland	1,241	2007
United States	1,249	2006
Total n/ country-years	**28,231**	**23**

Middle East/ North Africa	n	year
Algeria	1,282	2002
Cyprus	1,050	2006
Egypt	3,051	2008
Iran	2,667	2007
Iraq	2,701	2004
Israel	1,199	2001
Jordan	1,200	2007
Morocco	1,200	2007
Saudi Arabia	1,502	2003
Turkey	1,346	2007
Total n/ country-years	**17,198**	**10**

Eastern Europe	n	year
Albania	1,000	2002
Armenia	2,000	1997
Azerbaijan	2,002	1997
Belarus	1,000	2000
Bosnia & Herzegovina	1,200	2001
Bulgaria	1,001	2006
Croatia	1,003	1999
Czech Republic	1,908	1999
Estonia	1,005	1999
Georgia	1,500	2008
Hungary	650	1998
Kyrgyzstan	1,043	2003
Latvia	1,013	1999
Lithuania	1,018	1999
Macedonia	1,055	2001
Moldova	1,046	2006
Poland	1,000	2005
Romania	1,776	2005
Russian Federation	2,033	2006
Serbia & Montenegro	1,220	2006
Slovakia	1,095	1998
Slovenia	1,037	2005
Ukraine	1,000	2006
Total n/country-years	**28,605**	**23**

Sub-Saharan Africa	n	year
Burkina Faso	1,534	2007
Ethiopia	1,500	2007
Ghana	1,534	2007
Mali	1,534	2007
Nigeria	2,022	2000
Rwanda	1,507	2007
South Africa	2,988	2007
Tanzania	1,171	2001
Uganda	1,002	2001
Zambia	1,500	2007
Zimbabwe	1,002	2001
Total n/country-years	**17,294**	**11**

Latin America/ Caribbean	n	year
Argentina	1,002	2006
Brazil	1,500	2006
Chile	1,000	2005
Colombia	3,025	2005
Dominican Rep.	417	1996
El Salvador	1,254	1999
Guatemala	1,000	2005
Mexico	1,560	2005
Peru	1,500	2008
Trinidad	1,002	2006
Uruguay	1,000	2006
Venezuela	1,200	2000
Total n/ country-years	**15,460**	**12**

Asia	n	year
Bangladesh	1,500	2002
China	2,015	2007
India	2,001	2006
Indonesia	2,015	2006
Japan	1,096	2005
Malaysia	1,201	2006
Pakistan	2,000	2001
Philippines	1,200	2001
Singapore	1,512	2002
South Korea	1,200	2005
Thailand	1,534	2007
Viet Nam	1,495	2006
Total n/ country-years	**18,769**	**12**

[57] Years and observations are for the most recent wave to date measured in each country by the WVS (with the exception of Hungary, Iraq, and Slovakia). Regional classifications are drawn from the Polity IV data set (Marshall and Jaggers 2009).

Table 3. Master Variable List: Country-level Measures

Variable Name in Text	Relevant chapt. III	IV	V	Variable Name(s) in Original Data Sets	Source(s)	Description	Range[a]	Transformation (if applicable)
Aged population		X		agedpop	WDI	Population ages 65 and above (% of total)	2.1, 19.9	
Education index	X			edindex*	UNDP	2/3(adult literacy index) + 1/3(gross enrollment index)	.25, 1.04	
Esteban and Ray polarization index		X		er	LHD	Esteban and Ray polarization index	0, .214	Standardized in some cases
Ethnic fractionalization (Alesina et al.)		X		ethnic	EFD1	Ethnic fractionalization index (Alesina et al.)	.002, .930	Standardized in some cases
Ethnic fractionalization (Fearon)		X		ef	EFD2	Ethnic fractionalization index (Fearon)	.003, .953	Standardized in some cases
Ethnolinguistic fractionalization (ESEG)		X		elf	EPR	Ethnic fractionalization index based on ESEG data (i.e. only ethnopolitically relevant groups)	0, .928	Standardized in some cases
Excluded population		X		rexclpop	EPR	Share ot excluded population relative to ethnopolitically relevant population	0, .87	
Female labor force participation rate	X			laborparticipationratefemaleoffe	WDI	Labor participation rate, female (% of female population ages 15+)	14, 53	
GDP per capita	X	X		gdppercapitapppconstant2005inte r	WDI	GDP per capita, Purchasing Power Parity (constant 2005 international $)	237, 57035	Log
Greenberg diversity index		X		gi	LHD	Greenberg Index of Linguistic Diversity	.001, .525	Standardized in some cases
Life expectancy index	X			lei*	UNDP	(mean country life expectancy-25)/(85-25)	.27, .96	
Migrant stock (% foreign born)		X		migstock*	WDI	International migrant stock (% of population)	.03, 45.7	Interpolated excl. yrs end in 0 or 5
Polity score	X			polity4	PolityIV; Gleditsch	Gov't democratic vs. autocratic; incl. Gleditsch (2008) for missing values	-10, 10	
Population size		X		populationtotal	WDI	Population, total	430,475, 1.2 bil	Log
Social mobility (variance)^	X			V44; V45	ISSP	Variance of V44-V45	1.3-1.4	
Social spending	X	X		efwredist	EFW	Taxes and transfers as a percentage of GDP	.2, 27.8	Standardized in some cases
Standardized gross Gini coefficient	X			gini_market	SWIID	Pre-tax and -transfer Gini Coefficient	26, 70	
Standardized net Gini coefficient	X			gini_net	SWIID	Post-tax and -transfer Gini Coefficient	16, 68	
Unemployment rate	X			unemploymenttotaloftotallaborfor	WDI	Unemployment, total (% of total labor force)	1, 77	Log
Year	X	X	X	s020	WVS	Year of measurement (1989-2009)	0, 20	1989=0 … 2009=20
Years of left government^	X			gov1rlc	DPI	Proportion of yrs largest gov't party left-leaning during previous 35 yrs	0, 1	

[a] Standard deviations for these variables are included in the Chapter-specific descriptive statistics tables (Tables 7, 9, 12, 22, and 23)

* Did not have a variable name in original data set (I assigned one)

^ Measure that I constructed

Table 4. Master Variable List: Individual-level Measures

Variable Name in Text	Relevant chapters: Ch. III	Ch. IV	Ch. V	Variable Name(s) in Original Data Sets	Source(s)	Description	Range[a]	Transformation (if applicable)
Outcomes								
Support for redistribution	X	X	X	V33	ISSP	Responsibilty of gov't to reduce differences in income	1, 5	Reversed (1-5); combined into index; standardized in some cases
Support for redistribution	X	X	X	V34	ISSP	Gov't should provide decent standard of living for the unemployed	1, 5	Reversed (1-5); combined into index; standardized in some cases
Support for redistribution	X	X	X	e037	WVS	Gov't responsibility for those in need	1, 10	
Context-adjusted support for redistribution	X	X		V33; V34; efwredist	WVS; EFW	Context-adjust support for redistribution	-5.2, 3.4	Standardized in some cases
Context-adjusted support for redistribution		X		e037; efwredist	WVS; EFW	Context-adjust support for redistribution	-3.9, 2.9	Standardized in some cases
Predictors								
Age: continuous				AGE	ISSP	Respondent's age (15-98 years)	15, 98	
Age: continuous	X		X	x003	WVS	Respondent's age (15-101 years)	15, 101	
Age: country-mean centered^	X	X		AGE	ISSP	Country mean-centered age	-37, 58	Country mean-centered
Age: country-mean centered^		X		x003	WVS	Country mean-centered age by wave	-35, 63	Country mean-centered
Age: dummy^			X	AGE	ISSP	Ages 60+	0, 1	Dummy
Age: dummy^			X	x003	WVS	Ages 60+	0, 1	Dummy
Connections important^			X	V6; V7; V11; V12	ISSP	R believes family or political connections important to getting ahead in life	1, 5	Reversed then combined into index
Discrimination important^			X	V14; V15; V16	ISSP	R believes race/religion/gender important to getting ahead in life	1, 5	Reversed then combined into index
Downward mobility^			X	V44; V45; mobility	ISSP	1=Lower social status than family	0, 1	Dummy
Ethnic diversity good for society			X	g032	WVS	Ethnic diversity good for society	1, 10	
Female	X			SEX; x001	ISSP; WVS	1=Female	0, 1	Dummy
Freedom of choice/control over life			X	a173	WVS	R feels freedom of choice and control over life	1, 10	
Gov't should spend more on poor	X			V35	ISSP	The government should spend less on benefits for the poor	1, 5	Standardized in some cases
Hard work brings success			X	V10	ISSP	R believes hard work important to getting ahead in life	1, 5	Reversed (1, 5)
Hard work brings success			X	e040	WVS	Hard work brings success	1, 10	Reversed (1, 10)

Variable Name in Text	Relevant chapters: Ch. III	Ch. IV	Ch. V	Variable Name(s) in Original Data Sets	Source(s)	Description	Range[a]	Transformation (if applicable)
High school completed^	X		X	DEGREE	ISSP	1=R completed high school or higher	0, 1	Dummy
High school completed^			X	x025	WVS	1=R completed high school or above	0, 1	Dummy
Immigrant parent^			X	g026; g027	WVS	1=Mother OR father is immigrant	0, 1	Dummy
Income differences too large	X			V32	ISSP	Differences in income in <Rs country> are too large	1, 5	Reversed (1-5); standardized in some cases
Income: country mean-centered^	X	X		INC_[country code]	ISSP	Family income median-centered by country	1.7, 5.5	Country mean-centered
Income: country mean-centered^		X		x047	WVS	Family income median-centered by country and wave	-6.9, 8.3	Country mean-centered
Income: country median-centered^			X	INC_[country code]	ISSP	Family income median-centered by country	-4.5, 8	Country median-centered
Income: country median-centered^	X		X	x047	WVS	Family income median-centered by country and wave	-8, 8	Country median-centered
Male		X	X	SEX; x001	ISSP; WVS	1=Male	0, 1	Dummy
Minority at risk^		X	X	x051; g015; g016; f025; s016; x048	WVS	1=R is a member of a group classified as a Minority At Risk (Gurr 2009)	0, 1	Dummy
Minority at risk^		X	X	ETHNIC; RELIGGRP; [country code]_REG; [country code]_PRTY	ISSP	1=R is a member of a group classified as a Minority At Risk (Gurr 2009)	0, 1	Dummy
Social mobility^	X			V44; V45	ISSP	Difference between R's social class & class of family R grew up in	-9, 9	V44-V45
Tolerant^			X	a124_02; a124_06	WVS	1=Tolerant of neighbors who are different race or immigrants	0, 1	Dummy
Unemployed^	X			WRKST	ISSP	1=R is unemployed	0, 1	Dummy
Unemployed^	X			x028	WVS	1=R is unemployed	0, 1	Dummy
Union membership^			X	UNION	ISSP	1=Current trade union member	0, 1	Dummy
Union participation^			X	a067, a084, a101	WVS	1=some union participation	0, 1	Dummy
University completed^			X	DEGREE	ISSP	1=R completed first university degree or higher	0, 1	Dummy
University completed^	X		X	x025	WVS	1=R completed first university degree or above	0, 1	Dummy
Upward mobility^			X	V44; V45; mobility	ISSP	1=Higher social status than family	0, 1	Dummy

[a] Standard deviations for these variables are included in the Chapter-specific descriptive statistics tables (Tables 7, 9, 12, 22, and 23)

***** Did not have a variable name in original data set (I assigned one)

^ Measure that I constructed

Table 5. ISSP Countries by Mean Support for Redistribution (from high to low)

Country	Standardized Mean Score	Country	Standardized Mean Score
Ukraine	0.55	Iceland	0.02
Turkey	0.47	Chile	-0.02
Russian Federation	0.39	Slovakia	-0.06
Estonia	0.39	Denmark	-0.07
Portugal	0.37	Cyprus	-0.08
Hungary	0.34	Sweden	-0.11
Latvia	0.33	Philippines	-0.13
Slovenia	0.32	Japan	-0.16
Croatia	0.29	Taiwan	-0.19
Bulgaria	0.27	Austria	-0.19
China	0.19	Czech Republic	-0.22
South Korea	0.11	Switzerland	-0.23
Finland	0.10	Germany	-0.24
France	0.09	Norway	-0.27
Spain	0.09	Belgium	-0.39
Israel	0.08	Great Britain	-0.40
Argentina	0.07	Australia	-0.55
South Africa	0.03	New Zealand	-0.73
Poland	0.03	United States	-0.93

Table 6. WVS Countries by Mean Support for Government Benefits (from high to low)

Country	Mean Score	Country	Mean Score	Country	Mean Score
Morocco	8.07	Bosnia And Herzegovina	6.48	Venezuela	5.45
Egypt	7.84	Slovenia	6.47	Philippines	5.42
Macedonia	7.81	Cyprus	6.43	Lithuania	5.38
Georgia	7.73	Albania	6.40	Rwanda	5.22
Jordan	7.71	Uganda	6.38	Saudi Arabia	5.20
Hungary	7.62	Ghana	6.28	Croatia	5.19
Russia	7.56	Italy	6.23	Australia	5.16
Tanzania	7.53	Chile	6.21	Peru	5.14
Slovakia	7.48	Turkey	6.20	Malta	5.13
South Korea	7.47	Serbia And Montenegro	6.17	Belgium	5.13
Armenia	7.47	Poland	6.15	Viet Nam	5.10
Israel	7.47	Algeria	6.11	Great Britain	5.07
Azerbaijan	7.41	Uruguay	6.11	France	5.06
Nigeria	7.30	Estonia	6.08	Thailand	5.06
Pakistan	7.13	Romania	6.07	United States	5.06
Iraq	7.09	South Africa	6.07	Finland	5.02
Iran	7.08	Argentina	6.05	Canada	5.00
Ukraine	7.04	Norway	5.91	Ethiopia	4.92
Zimbabwe	7.03	Mali	5.90	Czech Republic	4.90
Japan	6.97	Guatemala	5.81	El Salvador	4.86
Bulgaria	6.96	Singapore	5.79	Portugal	4.84
Brazil	6.69	Trinidad And Tobago	5.73	Switzerland	4.75
Latvia	6.68	Netherlands	5.71	New Zealand	4.74
Moldova	6.65	Mexico	5.67	Iceland	4.58
Burkina Faso	6.59	China	5.65	Ireland	4.58
Spain	6.58	Belarus	5.64	Sweden	4.55
Kyrgyzstan	6.54	Greece	5.63	Denmark	4.39
India	6.53	Malaysia	5.62	Luxembourg	4.33
Zambia	6.52	Bangladesh	5.56	Austria	3.97
Germany	6.50	Indonesia	5.54		
Colombia	6.48	Dominican Republic	5.53		

Table 7. Means or Percents, Standard Deviations, and Ranges of Variables Used in Ch. III Analyses

Variable	Mean or %	S.D.	Range
Country-level			
Taxes and transfers (social spending) as a percentage of GDP[1]	12.5	7.9	1, 28
Standardized net Gini coefficient[2]	34.1	9.8	22, 64
Variance of social mobility[3]	1.3	0.1	1.2, 1.5
Proportion of years left-wing political parties in power[4]	0.4	0.3	0, 1
Individual-level[3]			
Support for redistribution	-0.0	0.8	-2.8, 1.1
Female (male)[a]	54.4%		
Age	47.2	16.7	15, 98
Mean-centered income level	0.3	2.8	-4.5, 8.0
Social mobility	0.2	1.9	-9, 9
High school completed (not completed)	59.2%		
Unemployed (full- or part-time, self-employed, housewife, retired, student, other)	7.2%		
Income differences in <country> too large	4.2	0.9	1, 5
Gov't should spend more on the poor	3.7	1.2	1, 5

Notes: N (all countries) = 38,616
Sources: [1] Gwartney, Hall, and Lawson (2011), [2] Solt (2009), [3] ISSP (2009), [4] Beck et al. (2001).
[a] Reference categories are in parentheses.

Table 8. Robust-Cluster OLS Regression Models of Support for Redistribution (ISSP)

Outcome	Attitudes only[58]			Context-adjusted attitudes[59]		
	All countries	Excluding U.S.	*Stand. Coef.*	All countries	Excluding U.S.	*Stand. Coef.*
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Country-level						
Income inequality	0.00^	0.00*	0.04^	0.08***	0.08***	0.59***
	(0.00)	(0.00)		(0.01)	(0.01)	
Social mobility	0.86*	1.09***	0.09*	3.47*	3.67*	0.22*
(variance)	(0.33)	(0.21)		(1.39)	(1.37)	
Years of left-leaning	-0.11	-0.10	-0.04	-0.26	-0.26	-0.06
government	(0.10)	(0.08)		(0.47)	(0.45)	
Individual-level						
Female	0.02*	0.02*	0.01*	0.01	0.00	0.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)		(0.01)	(0.01)	
Age	0.00	0.00^	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.01
(country mean-centered)	(0.00)	(0.00)		(0.00)	(0.00)	
High school completed	-0.11^	-0.06^	-0.06^	-0.15	-0.12	-0.06
	(0.05)	(0.03)		(0.12)	(0.11)	
Unemployed	0.14***	0.14***	0.04***	0.05	0.04	0.01
	(0.03)	(0.03)		(0.08)	(0.09)	
Income	-0.03***	-0.02***	-0.09***	-0.03***	-0.03**	-0.07***
(country mean-centered)	(0.00)	(0.00)		(0.01)	(0.01)	
Social mobility	-0.01***	-0.02***	-0.03***	-0.01*	-0.01**	-0.01*
(country mean-centered)	(0.00)	(0.00)		(0.00)	(0.00)	
Income differences too large	0.38***	0.37***	0.42***	0.25***	0.23**	0.17***
	(0.03)	(0.03)		(0.07)	(0.07)	
Gov't should spend more on	0.09**	0.08**	0.13**	0.06	0.05	0.05
poor	(0.03)	(0.02)		(0.06)	(0.06)	
Constant	-3.10***	-3.35***		-8.34***	-8.53***	
	(0.48)	(0.36)		(2.00)	(1.96)	
Observations	38,616	37,338	38,616	38,616	37,338	38,616
Clusters	37	36	37	37	36	37
R-squared	0.26	0.25	0.26	0.43	0.44	0.43

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, ^ p<0.1

[58] Index of ISSP 2009 attitudes (Government's responsibility to reduce income differences & Government should provide decent standard of living for unemployed)
[59] Distance of index of ISSP 2009 attitudes (Government's responsibility to reduce income differences & Government should provide decent standard of living for unemployed) from actual level redistribution in respondent's country (social spending as percentage of GDP [Economic Freedom Dataset (Gwartney, Hall, and Lawson 2011)]).

Table 9. Means or Percents, Standard Deviations, and Ranges of Variables in Chapter III Appendix WVS Analysis

Variable	Mean or %	Standard deviation	Range
Country-level			
Standardized net Gini coefficient[1]	37.9	9.4	24, 68
Standardized gross Gini coefficient[1]	44.0	7.8	27, 69
GDP per capita (PPP) in constant 2005 dollars[2 a]	$13,294	$12,743	$237, $57,034
Life expectancy[3]	0.8	0.2	.27, .97
Educational attainment index[3]	0.8	0.2	.25, 1.04
Female proportion of total labor force[2]	41.5	7.5	15, 53
Unemployment rate: percentage of total labor force[2 b]	10.2	9.8	1, 77
Polity score[4]	4.9	5.9	-10, 10
Individual-level[5]			
Support for government benefits	6.2	3.0	1, 10
Female (male)[c]	51.2%		
Age	40.6	16.1	15, 98
Median-centered income level	0.2	2.2	-6, 8
High school not completed (completed or above)	60.7%		
Unemployed (full- or part-time, self-employed, housewife, retired, student, other)	10.3%		

Notes: N = 95,031

Sources: [1] Solt (2009), [2] World Bank (2013), [3] UNDP (2010a), [4] Polity IV (2009), [5] World Values Survey (2009).

[a] GDP per capita (purchasing power parity) is presented in constant 2005 dollars. The natural logarithm of this measure is used in analyses.

[b] Unemployment is presented as a percentage of the total labor force. The natural logarithm of this measure is used in analyses.

[c] Reference categories are in parentheses.

Table 10. Robust-Cluster OLS Regression Models of Support for Redistribution by Country-level Income Inequality (WVS)

			Standardized Coefficients
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Year	0.009	0.020	-0.002
	(0.044)	(0.046)	(0.043)
Post-tax inequality	0.031*		0.146**
	(0.013)		(0.017)
Pre-tax inequality		-0.002	-0.095
		(0.019)	(0.024)
Constant	4.900***	6.077***	
	(0.550)	(0.821)	
Observations	95,041	95,041	95,041
R-squared	0.008	0.001	0.013

Clusters = 79
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* p < .05 ** p < .01 *** p < .001 (two-tailed test)

Table 11. Robust-Cluster OLS Regression Models of Support for Redistribution by Country- and Individual-level Opportunity Predictors (WVS)

Sample	All countries	Developed countries	Developing countries
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Year	0.06	0.32***	0.03
	(0.03)	(0.07)	(0.04)
Meltzer-Richard Hypothesis			
Post-tax inequality	-0.01	-0.04	-0.01
	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.01)
Median-centered income	-0.22***	0.02	-0.29***
	(0.05)	(0.12)	(0.06)
Interaction: Post-tax inequality X median-centered income	0.00*	-0.00	0.00**
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Country-level opportunity			
Log of GDP per capita (PPP)	-0.18	-1.45	-0.05
	(0.17)	(0.94)	(0.18)
Life expectancy index	-2.59	-8.48	-3.11*
	(1.35)	(10.00)	(1.26)
Education index	3.53***	-1.47	3.18**
	(1.02)	(4.50)	(1.02)
Female labor force participation rate	-0.05***	-0.28***	-0.05**
	(0.01)	(0.06)	(0.01)
Log unemployment rate	0.55***	0.17	0.56***
	(0.11)	(0.49)	(0.10)
Polity score	-0.05**	-0.11	-0.04**
	(0.02)	(0.34)	(0.02)
Individual-level opportunity			
Female	0.16***	0.17***	0.16***
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)
Age	0.00	-0.01**	0.01***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
High school not completed	0.11	-0.04	0.19*
	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.08)
Unemployed	0.08	0.55***	0.05
	(0.07)	(0.11)	(0.08)
Constant	7.40***	42.04**	6.95***
	(1.29)	(10.97)	(1.34)
Observations	95,041	19,977	75,064
Clusters	79	19	60
R-squared	0.06	0.11	0.05

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses
* p < .05 ** p < .01 *** p < .001 (two-tailed test)

Table 12. Means or Percents, Standard Deviations, and Ranges of of Variables Used in Ch. IV Analyses

Variable	Mean or %	Standard deviation	Range
Country-level			
Social spending as % of GDP[2]	12.5	7.9	1, 28
Greenberg diversity index[3]	.13	.13	.003, .518
Esteban and Ray polarization index[3]	.04	.04	.002, .214
Ethnolinguistic fractionalization[4]	.36	.27	0, .928
Migrant stock (% foreign born)[5]	7.1	8.8	.1, 46
Excluded population (share of ethnopolitically relevant population)[4]	.14	.17	0, .85
Population size[5 a]	69.9 mil	15.5 mil	430,475, 1.2 bil
GDP per capita (PPP) in constant 2005 dollars[5 a]	$16,395	$13,317	$740, $57,034
Aged population[5]	10.4	5.2	3, 20
Proportion of years left government in power[6]	.31	.27	0, 1
ISSP individual-level[7]			
Government should reduce income inequality	3.8	1.1	1, 5
Government should provide for the unemployed	3.9	1.0	1, 5
Male (female)[b]	48.0%		
Age	46.3	17.1	15, 98
Mean-centered income decile	.1	2.8	-4, 8
Member of marginalized minority group (not a member)	14.1%		
WVS individual-level[8]			
Support for government benefits	5.8	2.9	1, 10
Male (female)	51.8%		
Age	42.3	16.4	15, 98
Mean-centered income level	.14	2.2	-6, 7
Member of marginalized minority group (not a member)	11.6%		

Notes: N = 100,542 for 80 countries (WVS); N = 37,422 for 34 countries (ISSP)
Sources: [1] Solt (2009), [2] Economic Freedom Dataset (Gwartney, Hall, and Lawson 2011), [3] Desmet, Ortuño-Ortín, and Weber (2009), [4] Ethnic Power Relations dataset (Cederman, Min, and Wimmer 2009), [5] World Bank (2013), [6] Database of Political Indicators (Beck et al. 2001), [7] International Social Survey Programme (2009), [8] World Values Survey (2009),
[a] The natural logarithm of this measure is used in analyses.
[b] Reference categories are in parentheses.

Table 13. Robust-Cluster OLS Regression Models of Context-Adjusted Support for Redistribution by Country- and Individual-level Measures of Diversity, Economic, and Political (ISSP data)

Outcome	Attitudes only			Context-adjusted attitudes		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Greenberg diversity index	0.14*			0.03		
	(0.06)			(0.10)		
Esteban and Ray polarization		0.13*			0.03	
index		(0.05)			(0.10)	
Ethnolinguistic fractionalization			0.00			0.03
(ESEG data)			(0.09)			(0.16)
Migrant stock (% foreign born)	-0.00	-0.00	0.00	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Excluded population	-0.19	-0.36	-0.10	1.06	1.02	1.00
	(0.44)	(0.49)	(0.50)	(0.74)	(0.79)	(0.81)
Log of per capita GDP (PPP)	-0.52**	-0.52**	-0.53**	-0.42	-0.42	-0.42
	(0.18)	(0.17)	(0.19)	(0.33)	(0.33)	(0.34)
Log of population size	-0.88	-0.59	-0.71	-0.33	-0.26	-0.38
	(0.70)	(0.59)	(0.90)	(1.25)	(1.20)	(1.38)
Aged population	0.07*	0.05*	0.05^	-0.12*	-0.12**	-0.11*
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.06)
Left gov't (yrs in power)	0.02	0.01	-0.05	-0.58	-0.58	-0.59
	(0.23)	(0.22)	(0.22)	(0.49)	(0.49)	(0.48)
Male	-0.05***	-0.05***	-0.06***	-0.04*	-0.04**	-0.04*
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Age	0.00	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Income (mean-centered deciles)	-0.05***	-0.05***	-0.05***	-0.06***	-0.06***	-0.06***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Constant	7.63*	6.74*	7.26^	7.13	6.93	7.30
	(3.55)	(3.25)	(4.04)	(6.36)	(6.21)	(6.65)
Observations	37,422	37,422	37,422	37,422	37,422	37,422
Clusters	34	34	34	34	34	34
R-squared	0.10	0.10	0.09	0.41	0.41	0.41

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, ^ p<0.1
Note: Coefficients are standardized estimates

Table 14. Robust-Cluster OLS Regression Models of Context-Adjusted Support for Redistribution by Country- and Individual-level Measures of Diversity, Economic, and Political (WVS data)

Outcome	Attitudes only			Context-adjusted attitudes		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Greenberg diversity index	0.07^			0.15*		
	(0.03)			(0.06)		
Esteban and Ray polarization		0.07*			0.17*	
index		(0.03)			(0.07)	
Ethnolinguistic fractionalization			0.03			0.09
			(0.05)			(0.10)
Migrant stock (% foreign born)	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)
Excluded population	-0.11	-0.18	-0.11	0.20	0.03	0.17
	(0.25)	(0.25)	(0.27)	(0.37)	(0.38)	(0.38)
Log of per capita GDP (PPP)	-0.11**	-0.12**	-0.10*	-0.28**	-0.30**	-0.25*
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.10)
Log of population size	0.02	0.03	0.01	0.03	0.06	0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)
Aged population	0.01	0.01	0.01	-0.10***	-0.11***	-0.11***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Left gov't (yrs in power)	-0.21	-0.21	-0.23^	0.18	0.17	0.08
	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.29)	(0.28)	(0.29)
Male	-0.06***	-0.05***	-0.05***	-0.08***	-0.07***	-0.07***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Age	0.00*	0.00*	0.00^	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Income (mean-centered deciles)	-0.04***	-0.04***	-0.04***	-0.04***	-0.04***	-0.04***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Constant	0.74	0.63	0.81^	3.02**	2.77*	3.16**
	(0.45)	(0.45)	(0.48)	(1.12)	(1.11)	(1.11)
Observations	100,542	100,542	100,542	93,507	93,507	93,507
Clusters	80	80	80	75	75	75
R-squared	0.03	0.04	0.03	0.38	0.39	0.37

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, ^ p<0.1
Note: Coefficients are standardized estimates

Table 15. Diversity coefficients with and without economic and political country-level control variables

Model type	Without country-level controls[a]	With country-level controls[b]
	(1)	(2)
ISSP		
Attitudes only[c]		
Greenberg diversity index	0.10*	0.14*
	(0.05)	(0.06)
Esteban and Ray polarization index	0.13**	0.13*
	(0.04)	(0.05)
Ethnolinguistic fractionalization	0.01	0.00
	(0.04)	(0.09)
Context-adjusted attitudes[c]		
Greenberg diversity index	0.39**	0.03
	(0.13)	(0.10)
Esteban and Ray polarization index	0.18	0.03
	(0.13)	(0.10)
Ethnolinguistic fractionalization	0.46**	0.03
	(0.16)	(0.16)
WVS		
Attitudes only[c]		
Greenberg diversity index	0.08*	0.07^
	(0.03)	(0.03)
Esteban and Ray polarization index	0.06^	0.07*
	(0.03)	(0.03)
Ethnolinguistic fractionalization	0.04	0.03
	(0.04)	(0.05)
Context-adjusted attitudes[c]		
Greenberg diversity index	0.33***	0.15*
	(0.09)	(0.06)
Esteban and Ray polarization index	0.17^	0.17*
	(0.09)	(0.07)
Ethnolinguistic fractionalization	0.42**	0.09
	(0.13)	(0.10)

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, ^ p<0.1
Note: Coefficients are standardized estimates
[a] Individual-level control variables: gender, age, income
[b] Country-level control variables: for migrant stock, excluded population, per capita GDP, population size, aged population left government; Individual-level control variables: gender, age, income
[c] ISSP attitudes only and context-adjusted attitudes: n = 37,422 (34 clusters); WVS attitudes only: n = 100,542 (80 clusters); WVS context adjusted attitudes n = 93,507 (75 clusters)

Table 16. Robust-Cluster OLS Regression Models of Context-Adjusted Support for Redistribution by Country- and Individual-level Measures of Diversity, Economic, and Political including individual-level minority status (ISSP and WVS data)

	Attitudes only			Context-adjusted attitudes		
ISSP [a]	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Greenberg diversity index	0.24**			0.19^		
	(0.07)			(0.10)		
Esteban and Ray polarization index		0.17*			0.20**	
		(0.07)			(0.07)	
Ethnolinguistic fractionalization			0.22*			0.17^
(ESEG)			(0.10)			(0.08)
Minority at risk	0.09	0.15	0.09	0.06	0.10	0.06
	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.11)
Constant	10.67***	8.68**	10.96*	11.54*	10.00*	11.72*
	(2.53)	(2.83)	(3.78)	(4.65)	(4.47)	(5.06)
Observations	21,574	21,574	21,574	21,574	21,574	21,574
Clusters	17	17	17	17	17	17
R-squared	0.18	0.17	0.16	0.56	0.56	0.55

	Attitudes only			Context-adjusted attitudes		
WVS [a]	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Greenberg diversity index	0.04			0.13^		
	(0.03)			(0.07)		
Esteban and Ray polarization index		0.04			0.13	
		(0.03)			(0.08)	
Ethnolinguistic fractionalization			0.03			0.16
(ESEG)			(0.05)			(0.11)
Minority at risk	-0.05	-0.04	-0.05	-0.07	-0.05	-0.12
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.14)
Constant	0.81^	0.73	0.84^	3.15*	2.86*	3.24**
	(0.47)	(0.49)	(0.49)	(1.19)	(1.22)	(1.21)
Observations	80,067	80,067	80,067	75,364	75,364	75,364
Clusters	61	61	61	58	58	58
R-squared	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.31	0.31	0.31

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, ^ p<0.1
Note: Coefficients are standardized estimates
[a] Not shown: control variables including migrant stock, excluded population, per capita GDP, population size, aged population, left government, individual-level gender, individual-level age, individual-level income

Table 17. Robust-Cluster OLS Regression Models of Comparing Social Spending on the Right-hand Side of the Equation to Context-Adjusted Support for Redistribution (Social Spending on the Left-hand Side)

	Attitudes only			Context-adjusted attitudes		
ISSP [a]	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Social spending (% GDP)	0.02	0.02	0.02			
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)			
Greenberg diversity index	0.13*			0.03		
	(0.05)			(0.10)		
Esteban and Ray polarization index		0.13**			0.03	
		(0.05)			(0.10)	
Ethnolinguistic fractionalization			0.01			0.01
(ESEG)			(0.09)			(0.15)
Constant	7.69*	6.80*	6.99^	7.10	6.888	6.08
	(3.44)	(3.14)	(3.63)	(6.36)	(6.21)	(5.90)
Observations	37,422	37,422	38,723	37,422	37,422	38,723
Clusters	34	34	35	34	34	35
R-squared	0.11	0.11	0.10	0.41	0.41	0.41

	Attitudes only			Context-adjusted attitudes		
WVS [a]	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Social spending (% GDP)	0.01	0.02	0.01			
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)			
Greenberg diversity index	0.19*			0.15*		
	(0.10)			(0.06)		
Esteban and Ray polarization index		0.24*			0.17*	
		(0.09)			(0.07)	
Ethnolinguistic fractionalization			0.12			0.09
(ESEG)			(0.15)			(0.10)
Constant	7.82***	7.50***	7.99***	3.01**	2.76*	3.15**
	(1.45)	(1.41)	(1.52)	(1.12)	(1.11)	(1.11)
Observations	93,507	93,507	94,442	93,507	93,507	94,442
Clusters	75	75	76	75	75	76
R-squared	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.38	0.39	0.37

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, ^ p<0.1

[a] Not shown: control variables including migrant stock, excluded population, per capita GDP, population size, aged population, left-leaning government, individual-level gender, individual-level age, individual-level income

Table 18. Key Economic and Development Indicators

Country	Population (2005)[1]	2005 GDP per capita (current US$)[2]	1995 GDP per capita (current US$)[2]	HDI Rank (2005)[3]	HDI (2005)[3]	HDI (1995)[3]
Brazil	186,074,634	$4,297	$4,427	70	0.800	0.753
China	1,303,720,000	$1,462	$578	81	0.777	0.691
France	60,873,000	$33,855	$26,451	10	0.952	0.925
USA	295,561,000	$41,976	$27,763	12	0.951	0.931

[1] From World Bank (2013) World Development Indicators
[2] From IMF (2009) World Economic Outlook database
[3] From UNDP (2010b) Human Development Index

Table 19. Key Inequality and Welfare-state Indicators

Country	Gini Rank (2008)	2005 Gini Coef.	1995 Gini Coef	Theil Index (2005)[4]	Theil Index (1995)[4]	Social Security Programs Rank[5]	Social Security Design Score[5]
Brazil	11	56.4	59.2	0.079619	0.044631	37	888
China	34	46.9	38.2	0.098053	0.125690	80	782
France	101	30.2	28.0	Not available	Not available	3	1009
USA	56	46.4	38.8	Not available	Not available	62	827

[4] From University of Texas (2010) Inequality Project
[5] From Dixon (2000)

Table 20. World Values Survey Waves by Country

Years (Original Wave)	1989-1993 (2)	1994-1999 (3)	1999-2004 (4)	2005-2007 (5)
{Modified Wave}	**{1}**	**{2: "Modified Wave"}**[†]		**{3}**
Brazil	X	{X}		X
China	X	X	{X}	X
France	X		{X}	X
USA	X	X	{X}	X

[†] {X} demarcates country-waves included in the modified wave

Table 21. Chapter V Variable Availability by Concept, Country, and Wave

Study		*ISSP*			*WVS*												
Country		**CN**	**FR**	**US**		**Brazil**			**China**			**France**			**U.S.**		
Year	**(1990-2009)**		**2009**		**91**	**97**	**06**	**90**	**01**	**07**	**90**	**99**	**06**	**90**	**95**	**99**	**06**
CONCEPT	**MEASURE**																
***3.1.* Relative inequality**	Median-centered income	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X°	X°	X°	X°	X	X°	X	X
Demographic controls	Male	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
	Age 60+	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
	Union membership	X	X	X°	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
	High school completed	X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X		X	X		X	X	X
	University completed	X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X		X	X		X	X	X
***3.2.* Opportunity (experience)**	Downward class mobility	X	X	X													
***3.2.* Opportunity (perceptions)**	Freedom of choice/control over life				X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
	Hard work brings success	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X		X	X	X		X
	Life chance determined by connections	X	X°	X													
***3.3.a.* Diversity (individual status)**	Minority At Risk	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X
	Immigrant mother				X	X	X							X	X	X	X
	Immigrant father				X	X	X							X	X	X	X
***3.3.b.* Discrimination**	Life chances determined by race, religion, gender	X	X°	X													
***3.3.b.* Tolerance of**	Ethnic diversity				X	X	X	X	X	X				X†	X†	X†	X
	Neighbors of different race				X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
	Neighbors who are immigrants/foreign workers				X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X

° More than 10% of observations missing for this measure in the country-wave

† More than 20% of observations missing for this measure in the country-wave

Table 22. Means or Percents, Standard Deviations, and Ranges of Variables Used in Ch. V Analyses (ISSP)

Variable	Mean or %	S.D.	Range
Individual-level			
Support for redistribution	-0.1	1.1	-3.3, 1.3
Median-centered income level	0.6	2.8	-4, 6.0
Male (female) [a]	48.7%		
Age 60+	24.5%		
High school completed (not completed)	54.7%		
University completed (not completed)	17.7%		
Downward mobility (no change or upwardly mobile)	22.4%		
Connections are important	3.3	0.9	1, 5
Hard work brings success	4.0	0.9	1, 5
Minority at risk (not a minority at risk)	5.3%		
Discrimination is prevalent	2.2	0.9	1, 5

Notes: N = 5875

[a] Reference categories are in parentheses

Table 23. Means or Percents, Standard Deviations, and Ranges of Variables Used in Ch. V Analyses (WVS)

Variable	Mean or %	S.D.	Range
Individual-level			
Support for redistribution	4.9	3.1	1, 10
Median-centered income level	.2	2.2	-6, 8
Male (female) [a]	49.9%		
Age 60+	16.2%		
High school completed (not completed)	30.7%		
University completed (not completed)	11.9%		
Freedom of choice/control over life	7.3	2.3	1, 10
Hard work brings success [b]	6.4	3.1	1, 10
Minority at risk (not a minority at risk)	9.0%		
Tolerant of diff. ethnic/national groups	79.5%		
Diversity good for society	7.1	3.3	1, 10
At least one immigrant parent (no immigrant parent) [c]	39%		

Notes: N = 16,796

[a] Reference categories are in parentheses

[b] Reduced sample size (N = 13,421)

[c] Brazil and the U.S. only (N = 9316)

Table 24. OLS Regression Models of Median-Centered Income by Country (ISSP)

Country	**Brazil**	**China**	**France**	**U.S.**
Year	2009	2009	2009	2009
Model	.	(1)	(2)	(3)
Median-centered income		0.00	-0.06***	-0.13***
		(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Constant		0.22***	0.17***	-1.07***
		(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Observations		2,787	2,514	1,353
R-squared		0.00	0.03	0.09
Relevant country information				
Post-tax and transfer Gini coefficient [1]	*46.7*	*39.7*	*28.6*	*35.7*
Per capita GDP, PPP (2005 international $) [2]	*9572.9*	*6206.8*	*29,168.4*	*41,366.3*
Human Development Index [3]	*0.72*	*0.68*	*0.89*	*0.93*
Social spending as a percentage of GDP [4]	*8.8*	*6.8*	*26.8*	*15.4*

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, ^ p<0.1
[1] Source: SWIID (Solt 2009)
[2] Source: WDI (World Bank 2013)
[3] Source: Human Development Reports (UNDP 2013)
[4] Source: EFW (Gwartney, Hall, and Lawson 2011)

Table 25. OLS Regression Models of Median-Centered Income by Country (WVS)

Country		**Brazil**	
Year	1991	1997	2006
Model	(1)	(2)	(3)
Median-centered income	-0.20***	-0.08	-0.03
	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.04)
Constant	5.39***	5.49***	6.70***
	(0.09)	(0.11)	(0.08)
Observations	1,651	1,093	1,476
R-squared	0.01	0.00	0.00
Post-tax and transfer Gini coefficient	*52.2*	*51.4*	*48.6*

Country		**China**	
Year	1990	2001	2007
Model	(4)	(5)	(6)
Median-centered income	0.21***	-0.08	-0.06
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)
Constant	5.08***	5.18***	5.70***
	(0.09)	(0.11)	(0.08)
Observations	974	871	1,436
R-squared	0.01	0.00	0.00
Post-tax and transfer Gini coefficient	*31.8*	*39.5*	*44*

Country		**France**	
Year	1990	1999	2006
Model	(7)	(8)	(9)
Median-centered income	-0.11***	-0.14***	-0.23***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Constant	4.31***	4.04***	5.22***
	(0.09)	(0.07)	(0.09)
Observations	809	1,270	880
R-squared	0.02	0.02	0.03
Post-tax and transfer Gini coefficient	*27.1*	*26.8*	*27.9*

Country		**United States**	
Year	1990	1999	2006
Model	(10)	(11)	(12)
Median-centered income	-0.08*	0.01	-0.29***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Constant	3.48***	4.28***	5.00***
	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.08)
Observations	1,653	1,128	1,146
R-squared	0.00	0.00	0.04
Post-tax and transfer Gini coefficient	*33.5*	*37*	*36.9*

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, ^ p<0.1

Table 26. OLS Regression Models of Median-Centered Income with Demographic Control Variables

Study	***ISSP***				***WVS***			
Country	**China**	**France**	**U.S.**	**U.S.** *(w/out union)*	**Brazil**	**China**	**France**	**U.S.**
Year	2009	2009	2009	2009	2006	2007	2006	2006
Model	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Median-centered income	-0.00	-0.06***	-0.11***	-0.11***	-0.02	-0.05	-0.25***	-0.31***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.04)
Male	0.03	-0.03	-0.17*	-0.14*	0.01	0.07	-0.22	-0.15
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.08)	(0.06)	(0.16)	(0.17)	(0.18)	(0.16)
Age 60+	0.01	-0.08^	-0.30***	-0.24***	0.30	0.22	-0.59**	-1.20***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.09)	(0.07)	(0.23)	(0.23)	(0.21)	(0.18)
High school completed	0.01	-0.03	-0.49***	-0.48***	-0.10	-0.25	-0.17	-0.15
	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.13)	(0.10)	(0.31)	(0.18)	(0.25)	(0.17)
University completed	0.09	0.03	0.10	0.07	0.07	0.18	0.28	1.68**
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.09)	(0.07)	(0.39)	(0.33)	(0.32)	(0.56)
Union member	0.08*	0.40***	0.12		-0.84***	-0.28	-0.03	0.39^
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.12)		(0.20)	(0.24)	(0.29)	(0.21)
Constant	0.18***	0.09*	-0.57***	-0.55***	6.80***	5.77***	5.50***	5.34***
	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.13)	(0.10)	(0.12)	(0.13)	(0.15)	(0.13)
Observations	2,784	2,435	889	1,340	1,450	1,401	874	1,133
R-squared	0.00	0.06	0.11	0.11	0.01	0.01	0.04	0.09

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, ^ p<0.1

Table 27. OLS Regression Models of Opportunity Indicators (ISSP)

Country	**China**		**France**		**U.S.**	
Year	2009		2009		2009	
Model	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Median-centered income	-0.00	0.00	-0.06***	-0.05***	-0.12***	-0.10***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Male	0.04	0.03	-0.01	-0.05	-0.15*	-0.20**
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.07)	(0.06)
Age 60+	0.00	0.05	-0.01	-0.01	-0.25**	-0.27***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.08)	(0.07)
High school completed	0.01	0.01	-0.06	-0.07	-0.40***	-0.33**
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.11)	(0.11)
University completed	0.12^	0.09	0.05	0.05	0.07	0.05
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.08)
Opportunity - Experience						
Experienced Downward mobility	-0.03	-0.02	0.08	0.08	0.13^	0.12^
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Opportunity - Perceptions						
Connections are important		0.24***		0.13***		0.38***
		(0.02)		(0.03)		(0.05)
Hard work brings success		0.06**		-0.11***		-0.25***
		(0.02)		(0.02)		(0.06)
Constant	0.19***	-1.00***	0.18***	0.25*	-0.67***	-0.78**
	(0.02)	(0.10)	(0.05)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.29)
Observations	2,568	2,568	2,071	2,071	1,193	1,193
R-squared	0.00	0.06	0.03	0.05	0.10	0.16
Relevant country-level descriptive statistics						
% experienced downward mobility	*18.4%*		*21.1%*		*34.6%*	

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, ^ p<0.1

Table 28. OLS Regression Models of Opportunity Indicators (WVS: Last Wave Only)

Country	**Brazil**	**China**	**France**	**U.S.**
Year	2006	2007	2006	2006
Model	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Median-centered income	-0.02	-0.03	-0.22***	-0.25***
	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)
Male	-0.01	0.05	-0.19	-0.15
	(0.16)	(0.17)	(0.18)	(0.15)
Age 60+	0.30	0.12	-0.49*	-1.07***
	(0.23)	(0.24)	(0.21)	(0.17)
High school completed	-0.13	-0.25	-0.19	-0.12
	(0.31)	(0.19)	(0.24)	(0.17)
University completed	0.03	0.19	0.27	1.51**
	(0.39)	(0.33)	(0.32)	(0.55)
Opportunity - Perceptions				
Freedom of choice/control over life	0.03	-0.14***	-0.06	-0.22***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Hard work brings success	0.08**	0.11***	-0.14***	-0.14***
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Constant	5.94***	5.90***	6.70***	8.02***
	(0.33)	(0.36)	(0.36)	(0.40)
Observations	1,447	1,298	877	1,132
R-squared	0.01	0.02	0.06	0.13

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, ^ p<0.1

Table 29. OLS Regression Models of Opportunity Indicators Over Time (WVS)

Country	**Brazil**		**China**		**France**		**U.S.**	
Year	1991	2006[1]	1990	2007	1990	2006	1990	2006
Model	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Median-cntrd income	-0.20***	-0.02	0.14**	-0.02	-0.10***	-0.22***	-0.04	-0.24***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Male	-0.60***	0.04	-0.29	0.02	-0.49**	-0.18	0.02	-0.14
	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.19)	(0.17)	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.11)	(0.15)
Age 60+			0.72*	0.20	-0.22	-0.48*	0.02	-1.08***
			(0.32)	(0.24)	(0.22)	(0.21)	(0.13)	(0.17)
Age (continuous)	-0.02**	0.02*						
	(0.01)	(0.01)						
Opportunity - Perceptions								
Freedom of choice/control	0.01	0.07^	0.05	-0.14***	-0.01	-0.07	0.02	-0.22***
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Hard work brings success	-0.15***	0.07**	-0.21***	0.11***	-0.18***	-0.14***	-0.50***	-0.14***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Constant	6.92***	5.02***	6.11***	5.87***	5.83***	6.67***	7.05***	8.06***
	(0.36)	(0.44)	(0.35)	(0.35)	(0.35)	(0.36)	(0.28)	(0.40)
Observations	1,614	1,187	955	1,318	782	877	1,598	1,132
R-squared	0.05	0.01	0.07	0.02	0.06	0.06	0.24	0.12

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, ^ p<0.1

[1] This sample is limited to those ages 55 and under to maximize comparability with the 1991 sample

Table 30. OLS Regression Models of Diversity and Discrimination Indicators (ISSP)

Country	**China**	**France**	**U.S.**	
Year	2009	2009	2009	
Model	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Median-centered income	0.00	-0.05***	-0.09***	-0.09***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Male	0.03	-0.05	-0.19**	-0.19**
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Age 60+	0.05	0.00	-0.25***	-0.24**
	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.08)
High school completed	0.01	-0.07	-0.26*	-0.27*
	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.11)	(0.11)
University completed	0.08	0.06	0.07	0.08
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.08)
Experienced downward mobility	-0.02	0.08	0.08	0.08
	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Connections are important	0.26***	0.17***	0.29***	0.29***
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Hard work brings success	0.05*	-0.11***	-0.23***	-0.23***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Minority at risk	0.03	0.13	0.28***	
	(0.14)	(0.26)	(0.08)	
African-American				0.36**
				(0.11)
Latino				0.28*
				(0.12)
Native American				0.08
				(0.17)
Discrimination is prevalent	-0.09***	-0.08**	0.14**	0.13**
	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Constant	-0.82***	0.31**	-0.97**	-0.94**
	(0.10)	(0.12)	(0.30)	(0.30)
Observations	2,568	2,071	1,193	1,189
R-squared	0.08	0.05	0.18	0.18

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, ^ p<0.1

Table 31. OLS Regression Models of Diversity Indicators (WVS: Last Wave Only)

Country	**Brazil**		**China**	**France**	**U.S.**	
Year	2006		2007	2006	2006	
Model	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Median-centered income	-0.02	-0.03	-0.02	-0.24***	-0.31***	-0.31***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Male	0.04	0.03	0.07	-0.20	-0.10	-0.10
	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.17)	(0.18)	(0.15)	(0.15)
Age 60+	0.36	0.30	0.21	-0.55**	-1.09***	-1.09***
	(0.24)	(0.24)	(0.25)	(0.21)	(0.18)	(0.18)
High school completed	-0.14	-0.14	-0.26	-0.19	-0.04	-0.04
	(0.32)	(0.32)	(0.19)	(0.24)	(0.18)	(0.18)
University completed	-0.06	-0.10	0.15	0.28	1.56**	1.56**
	(0.40)	(0.40)	(0.33)	(0.32)	(0.56)	(0.56)
Minority at risk	-0.20	-0.18	-2.63***	0.50	0.79***	0.78***
	(0.26)	(0.26)	(0.48)	(0.41)	(0.20)	(0.20)
Immigrant parent(s)		0.68				0.04
		(0.47)				(0.24)
Constant	6.68***	6.68***	5.78***	5.47***	5.17***	5.17***
	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.14)	(0.15)	(0.14)	(0.14)
Observations	1,422	1,422	1,278	877	1,129	1,129
R-squared	0.00	0.00	0.03	0.04	0.10	0.10
Relevant country-level descriptive statistics						
% Minority at risk	*9.8%*		*2.4%*	*4.9%*	*20.2%*	
% Immigrant parent(s)	*3.1%*				*12.0%*	
Relevant country information						
Ethnic fractionalization (ELF)[1]	*0.504*		*0.666*	*0.047*	*0.490*	
Greenberg index (GI)[2]	*0.011*		*0.107*	*0.097*	*0.092*	
Esteban-Ray index (ER)[2]	*0.005*		*0.031*	*0.038*	*0.033*	
Net migration rate[3]	*0.367*		*0.048*	*10.258*	*13.398*	

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, ^ p<0.1
[1] EPR (Cederman, Min, and Wimmer 2009)
[2] LHD (Desmet, Ortuño-Ortín, and Weber 2009)
[3] WDI (World Bank 2013)

Table 32. OLS Regression Models of Diversity and Tolerance Indicators (WVS: Last Wave Only)

Country	**Brazil**	**China**	**France**	**U.S.**
Year	2006	2007	2006	2006
Model	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Median-centered income	-0.02	-0.01	-0.24***	-0.31***
	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)
Male	0.01	0.11	-0.20	-0.06
	(0.16)	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.15)
Age 60+	0.30	0.11	-0.58**	-1.04***
	(0.24)	(0.27)	(0.21)	(0.18)
High school completed	-0.12	-0.28	-0.17	-0.16
	(0.32)	(0.20)	(0.25)	(0.18)
University completed	0.02	0.19	0.29	1.47**
	(0.40)	(0.34)	(0.32)	(0.55)
Minority at risk	-0.19	-2.60***	0.50	0.75***
	(0.26)	(0.48)	(0.41)	(0.20)
Tolerant of diff. ethnicities	-0.28	0.10	-0.19	0.01
& nationalities	(0.40)	(0.28)	(0.23)	(0.35)
Diversity good for society	-0.03	-0.03		0.11**
	(0.03)	(0.05)		(0.04)
Constant	7.17***	5.88***	5.60***	4.42***
	(0.45)	(0.45)	(0.22)	(0.38)
Observations	1,413	1,128	877	1,116
R-squared	0.00	0.03	0.04	0.10

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, ^ p<0.1

Table 33. Full OLS Regression Models over Time (WVS)

Country	**Brazil**		**China**		**France**			**U.S.**	
Year	1991	2006	1990	2007	1990	2006	1995	1995	2006
Model	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Median-centered income	-0.19***	-0.02	0.12*	0.01	-0.10***	-0.21***	-0.13^	-0.03	-0.25***
	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Male	-0.65***	0.05	-0.25	0.08	-0.47**	-0.19	-0.88*	-0.35*	-0.10
	(0.17)	(0.18)	(0.21)	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.34)	(0.15)	(0.15)
Age 60+			1.06**	0.17	-0.24	-0.46*	-0.26	-0.59***	-0.90***
			(0.37)	(0.26)	(0.22)	(0.21)	(0.41)	(0.17)	(0.17)
Age (continuous)	-0.02**	0.02*							
	(0.01)	(0.01)							
Freedom of choice/control	0.02	0.07^	0.05	-0.11**	-0.01	-0.07	0.03	-0.06^	-0.24***
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.09)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Hard work brings success	-0.15***	0.06*	-0.22***	0.11***	-0.18***	-0.14***	-0.16*	-0.07*	-0.14***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.08)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Minority at risk	0.46^	-0.08	0.09	-2.59***	-1.47^	0.55	0.37	0.51*	0.77***
	(0.24)	(0.29)	(0.72)	(0.48)	(0.86)	(0.41)	(0.47)	(0.20)	(0.19)
Tolerant of diff. groups	0.25	-0.22	0.24	0.14	0.10	-0.03	-0.06	0.12	0.28
	(0.65)	(0.43)	(0.44)	(0.27)	(0.24)	(0.23)	(0.72)	(0.67)	(0.35)
Diversity good for society	-0.01	-0.02	-0.01	-0.03			-0.10		0.12***
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.07)	(0.04)			(0.08)		(0.03)
Constant	6.63***	5.42***	6.08***	5.77***	5.81***	6.73***	5.79***	5.01***	6.98***
	(0.76)	(0.63)	(0.76)	(0.54)	(0.36)	(0.39)	(1.21)	(0.76)	(0.50)
Observations	1,589	1,164	805	1,144	782	877	234	1,331	1,116
R-squared	0.05	0.01	0.07	0.04	0.06	0.06	0.09	0.03	0.14
Relevant country-level descriptive statistics									
% Tolerant of diff. races	*97.9%*	*95.6%*	*91.4%*	*84.1%*	*19.6%*	*77.3%*	*99.4%*		*96.1%*
% Tolerant of immigrants	*97.1%*	*93.3%*	*87.9%*	*79.8%*	*15.4%*	*63.7%*	*97.4%*		*86.3%*
Mean: Diversity good for society	*4.3*	*7.5*	*9.2*	*8.4*			*6.9*		*6.8*
% Confident in government	*23.0%*	*46.3%*	*95.5%*	*92.7%*	*6.9%*	*29.0%*	*7.0%*		*38.6%*
Relevant country information									
Net migration rate[1]	*0.52*	*0.37*	*0.03*	*0.05*	*10.12*	*10.26*	*9.32*		*13.40*

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, ^ p<0.1

[1] EPR (Cederman, Min, and Wimmer 2009)

B. FIGURES

Figure 1. A comparison of country-level mean scores of context-adjusted and non-adjusted attitudes about redistribution by level of social spending (ISSP)



Figure 2. Effect of individual-level high school completion on support for government benefits by education index (WVS)



Figure 3. Conceptual Diagram



Figure 4. Ethnolinguistic fractionalization vs. social spending and attitudes about social spending



Figure 5. Comparison of Economic and Social Indicators in Brazil, China, France, and the U.S.



Figure 6. Mean support for redistribution (ISSP 2009)



Figure 7. Mean support for redistribution (WVS by wave)



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