From the holdings of the Department of Special Collections , Princeton University Library, Princeton, NJ

These documents are either in the public domain, or can only be used for educational and research purposes (Fair use) as per U.S. Copyright law (text below). By accessing this file, all users agree that their use falls in the public domain or within fair use as defined by the copyrightlaw. We do not charge any permission or usage fees for the publication of images of material inour collections, including those provided by Princeton University Library, via our website, catalog, or directly from staff.For more information regarding copyright, credit, and citation please review the information onthe Copyright, Credit and Citation Guidelines page of our website.
https://library.princeton.edu/special-collections/policies/copyright-credit-and-citation-guidelines. If you have any questions, including how to order higher-quality images from the collection, contact Special Collections Public Services via our Ask Us! Form. https://library.princeton.edu/special-collections/ask-us

---

Doctoral Dissertations, 2011-2026 Classics

2017

Loss and the Boundaries of the Self in Statius' Silvae

Klause, Amanda

Princeton, NJ : Princeton University

---

http://arks.princeton.edu/ark:/88435/dsp01f4752k35p

U.S. Copyright law: The copyright law of the United States (Title 17, §108, United States Code) governs the making of photocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. Under certain conditions specified in the law, libraries and archives are authorized to furnish a photocopy or other reproduction. One of these specified conditions is that the photocopy or reproduction is not to be used for any purpose other than private study, scholarship, or research. If a user makes a request for, or later uses, a photocopy or reproduction for purposes in excess of fair use that user may be liable for copyright infringement. This institution reserves the right to refuse to accept a copying order if, in its judgment, fulfillment of the order would involve a violation of copyright law. https://www.copyright.gov/title17/title17.pdf

LOSS AND THE BOUNDARIES OF THE SELF IN STATIUS' *SILVAE*

Amanda Ruth Klause

A DISSERTATION

PRESENTED TO THE FACULTY

OF PRINCETON UNIVERSITY

IN CANDIDACY FOR THE DEGREE

OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

RECOMMENDED FOR ACCEPTANCE

BY THE DEPARTMENT OF

CLASSICS

Adviser: Denis Feeney

June 2017

© Copyright by Amanda Ruth Klause, 2017. All rights reserved.

Abstract

This dissertation is a study of the consolatory poems in Statius' *Silvae*, the most detailed and systematic examination yet offered of these works. The bereaved figures with whom Statius communicates in his consolations mourn the losses of their spouses, parents, and slaves. Drawing on recent inquiries into the history of the emotions in literature, my study focuses on the nature of the suffering caused by bereavement and the remedies for the alleviation of this pain that Statius proposes. I indicate how Statius' grieving addressees are enmeshed in networks of relationships both with other people and non-human elements in their environment. In every case, the mourner's bond with his loved one had been vital to his self-definition. The death, therefore, of that beloved person results in the dissolution of the mourner's sense of self. Statius' poems demonstrate the devastating effects of such a loss, including violent physical pain and alienation from natural environmental processes. I propose that the poet's consolation consists in helping to reconfigure the survivor's network and orientation in the world, whether through quasi-religious devotion to material objects or "replacement."

The dissertation is organized according to the types of loss for which Statius attempts to console his bereaved acquaintances: the death of a slave, the death of a wife, the death of a father. Each chapter develops thickly contextualized readings of Statius' poems, exploring the particular significance of the relationships that Statius depicts for individual addressees, and considers how Statius modifies his consolatory tactics to suit different kinds of loss. The miscellaneous nature of the *Silvae* and of the consolations themselves provides a kaleidoscopic view of the various networks of relations in which Statius and his contemporaries found themselves involved. The poet, in his guise as consoler, emerges as an expert on the management of these bonds.

Table of Contents

Abstract iii

Acknowledgments v

Introduction 1

Chapter 1: Sympathy, Slavery, and the Limits of Kinship in *Silv.* 2.1, 2.6, and 5.5 29

Chapter 2: Encounters with the Dead and the Divine in *Silv.* 2.7, 5.1, and 5.3 94

Chapter 3: Grief in the Cosmopolis: Claudius Etruscus and Empire in *Silv.* 3.3 162

Chapter 4: Are We Out of the Woods? Consolation and the Environment in *Silv.* 5.3 224

Afterword: Grief, Vulnerability, and Relations 293

Bibliography 299

Acknowledgments

Thanks are due first of all to the members of my committee: Denis Feeney, Yelena Baraz, and Andrew Feldherr. Their advice and guidance throughout this project has been invaluable. They have been extremely generous with their time and expertise and the dissertation is much the better for their suggestions.

I am also indebted to a number of other members past and present of the Princeton Classics Department. Stephanie Lewandowski and Jill Arbeiter have both contributed greatly to my happiness and success throughout my graduate career. I have also had the extreme good fortune of sharing my time at Princeton with a talented and engaging group of graduate students. I have appreciated both their friendship and their willingness to read my work in Dissertation Writers' Seminar. Special thanks are due to Brahm Kleinman, Hanna Gołąb, Clem Wood, Paul Touyz, Caroline Mann, Emma Curran, and Emily Hulme Kozey.

I must also convey my thanks to my parents, John Klause and Patricia Hill, without whom I could never have produced this dissertation. My father deserves special gratitude for faithfully reading and commenting upon each chapter I produced, even before I sent it to my committee. And, finally, I owe an enormous debt to Patrick Shields, who has tirelessly supported me throughout the vagaries of graduate school and who has managed to keep me sane.

Introduction

> It is the experience of the death of others by the living that is so hard to bear, because it is what is palpable…The omens of mourning I have been discussing speak to the pain associated with another becoming other—a second, a thing—another that is no longer an I, no longer a possible part of a becoming-*us*-in-relation, or at least not for the moment. For the living mourners, death marks a rupture.
>
> Eduardo Kohn, *How Forests Think*, 211

The anthropologist Eduardo Kohn writes that the death of another person affects those living so strongly because it is "palpable." By this he suggests, as I understand it, that death causes those who survive to recognize retrospectively how entangled the deceased had once been in their own lives. This recognition is facilitated by the sudden absence of the dead person from what had previously been the unremarkable pattern of daily existence. Statius, I think, would have understood what Kohn meant. As Statius grieved with his friend Atedius Melior over the death of his beloved *deliciae* and freedman Glaucias, he lamented the boy's inability to continue his day to day interactions with his former master: *inceptas quis ab ore dapes libataque vina/aufert…quis matutinos abrumpet murmure somnos/impositus stratis?* "who will steal the half-eaten food and half-drunk wine from your mouth…who will break your morning slumber, sitting among your sheets?" (2.1.60-3).[1] Whereas formerly Glaucias filled his patron's house with chatter and kept him company in bed, Statius complains that now: *muta domus, fateor, desolatique penates,/et situs in thalamis et maesta silentia mensis*, "the house is silent, the household gods are deserted, there is dust in the beds, and a mournful silence at the table" (*Silv.* 2.1.67-8). Though Statius describes a coercive and abusive relationship between former slave boy and master, the reader is made to understand that the pair lived in intimate proximity. The loss of Glaucias also involved the loss of the pressure of his touch and the destruction of a routine. Statius thus admits that Glaucias' absence had a real effect on the fabric of Melior's

[1] All translations are my own unless otherwise noted.

daily life. Glaucias' death therefore constituted a painful "rupture" for his patron. Indeed, Statius states that Melior was "wounded" by his *deliciae*'s death (2.1.3-7). This response accords with James Krasner's suggestion that grief involves "physical adjustments based on the fact that a body that was always here, in a certain relation to our own, is now gone" (2004, 219). Grief, in other words, is the result of the disappearance of a habitual relationship. This dissertation is a study of the strategies that Statius employs in his consolatory poems to help his addressees speed the process of readjusting to the idea that there is, in Kohn's terms, no longer the same "becoming-us-in-relation."

Texts and Genre

Statius' *epicedion* for Melior is only the first of a series of consolatory poems in the *Silvae.*[2] These poems are directed to a wide variety of mourners and console them for the loss of various members of the *familia*. The bereaved figures whom Statius depicts in his consolations are profoundly affected by the loss of spouses, parents, and slaves. They mourn them viscerally and violently. Statius' willingness to console mourners for the deaths of people across the social spectrum has often left him open to criticism. Nisbet and Hubbard dismissively point out in their commentary on Horace's consolation to Virgil in the wake of Quintilius' death (*Od.*1.24), "Statius…was always ready to oblige a friend on the loss of a father or a slave-boy" (1970, 280). Because of this lack of "discrimination," however, Statius' poems offer a glimpse at a segment of society largely absent from earlier consolation.[3] The grief that overcomes Statius' addressees indicates the vital roles the deceased had performed in the lives of the survivors. His consolatory

[2] I follow Scourfield in making no meaningful distinction between poems labeled *epicedia* and those labeled *consolationes.* As he points out, the differences between these poems are not really noticeable, and the two poems with the most "formal" consolatory content, 2.1 and 5.1, are respectively labeled *epicedia* in the prose preface to Book 2 and the transmitted title of 5.1 (2013, 7). Esteve-Forriol essentially uses the terms interchangeably (1962, 112), as do Van Dam (1984, 67) and Laguna Mariscal (1992, 69).

[3] See Dominik 2016, 429 for a discussion of patronage and consolation. In this, Statius' consolations are reminiscent of the so-called *Laudatio Turiae*, which scholars have often characterized as a relatively private graveside speech for a non-imperial elite woman (Hemelrijk 2004; Ramage 1994).

works provide a perspective on how the Romans valued their relationships with the people (and animals) that surrounded them and with whom they interacted that differs from other extant examples of Roman consolation. Indeed, Statius' poetry has often been used as historical evidence for the character of a variety of relationships in the Flavian period, particularly between slaves, freedmen, and their masters and between imperial freedmen and the emperor.[4] It is not my intention to write this kind of social history. Instead, I shall develop thickly contextualized readings of Statius' poems, exploring the particular significance of such relationships that Statius depicts for individual addressees, and consider how Statius modifies his consolatory tactics to suit different kinds of loss. I shall concentrate primarily on six of these poems: 2.1, 2.6, 2.7, 3.3, 5.1, and 5.3, whose themes represent a relatively unexplored aspect of the *Silvae*. I shall also consider 5.5, Statius' lament for his own lost boy, which is possibly unfinished and does not contain a formal *consolatio*. The lament, however, resembles the consolatory poems in its depiction of the symptoms of intense grief and is therefore a good point of comparison.

It is not so easy, however, to find exact parallels for Statius' pieces in previous tradition. Formally and structurally, the poems have much in common with epideictic rhetoric, particularly the funerary oration.[5] Stephen Newmyer has identified the formal features of the consolatory poems in the following fashion: the *exordium,* in which Statius usually describes the violent grief of the mourner, the *laudatio,* in which the virtues of the deceased are praised, the *lamentatio,* in which Statius himself speaks of the cruelty of the loss, and the *consolatio* proper, in which Statius explicitly soothes his addressee (1979, 64-5).[6] Donka Markus argues that these are the conventions of the Roman *laudatio funebris*, which included the *insinuatio,* "the pretence that

[4] See e.g. Wrede 1971, Laes 2010, Mouritsen 2011, 64.
[5] As Laurent Pernot notices, both the Greek *epitaphios* and the *laudatio funebris* developed over the course of the Roman imperial period, and were offered more frequently on behalf of elite private persons rather than sovereigns. He points, for instance, to the eulogy for Turia (2015, 22).
[6] Esteve-Forriol 1962, 78-107 proposes a similar schema.

the poet endorses and encourages the laments of the mourners" (2004, 128).[7] Alex Hardie has suggested instead that Statius draws on a Greek epideictic tradition (1983, 104). Harm-Jan Van-Dam points out that Statius' *consolationes* bear a great deal of resemblance to Greek *epitaphioi logoi* of the second century CE which are concerned with private individuals (1984, 63). The elements Newmyer categorizes are also similar to those found in the prescriptions of third century rhetorical treatises like those of Menander Rhetor (Gibson 2006, xxxii), who encourages aspiring orators to employ praise in funeral speeches in order to demonstrate the reasons for which the deceased is to be missed before they move on to consolation proper (*RG* 3.421.10ff).[8]

Whatever rhetorical tradition Statius imagined that he was emulating, his consolatory pieces differ in important ways from formal funeral speeches. As we have seen, the deceased figures whom Statius writes about are not the typical candidates for a public honorific address.[9] Furthermore, the *laudatio funebris* and the *epitaphios logos* addressed themselves to all those present at the funeral. For example, in his *epicedion* for the boy Eteon, which structurally resembles Statius' consolations, the orator Aelius Aristides announces that he offers consolation: πόλεως ἕνεκα καὶ τῶν οἰκείων τῶν Ἐτεωνέως καὶ προσέτι γε ἡμῶν αὐτῶν, "for the sake of the city and the family of Eteon in addition to myself" (*Orat.* 31.1). In contrast, Statius largely composed his consolations in the second person.[10] They are offerings directed to individuals and maintain a pretense of privacy (Hardie 1983, 110). The work of his consolations is (ostensibly)

---

[7] Van Dam, however, does not wish to see a connection between Station consolation and the *laudatio funebris* because he believes that the latter "is not concerned with survivors" (1984, 64).

[8] Statius' practice stands in stark contrast to Cicero or Seneca in this regard. Amanda Wilcox notices that Cicero "consistently minimizes the role of the deceased. He, she, or they are rarely even mentioned" (2012, 61). Though Seneca is a bit more voluble than Cicero about the qualities of the deceased, he devotes the great majority of his consolatory works to ruminations on the transitory nature of life and fortune. Statius, by contrast, never underplays the significance of the deceased's relationship with the survivor.

[9] Even the orations for "private" persons which became popular during the Second Sophistic were primarily directed toward people of good family or civic benefactors. See e.g. *Arist. Orat.* 31 and 32.

[10] The exceptions are those poems Statius addressed to himself and 2.7, which is addressed to the deceased Lucan but which Statius proclaims was a gift for Polla in the prefatory epistle (2 *Praef.* 24-5).

to take place on a personal rather than a communal level. In this, Statius follows the conventions of his Roman predecessors. The most familiar Roman consolations are prose epistles, like those that Cicero wrote to various acquaintances and Seneca wrote to Marcia and the imperial freedman Polybius.[11] There are scattered examples of poetic consolation in the oeuvres of Statius' predecessors; Horace's consolatory ode to Virgil (*Od.* 1.24) and the anonymous *Consolatio ad Liviam*, ostensibly composed for Livia after the death of Drusus, are the most prominent examples. Though all of these works were ultimately made available to broad audiences, they all purport to offer solace to a single individual.

Of course, Statius' consolatory poems contain important deviations from the consolatory tropes of their Roman predecessors.[12] One of the most obvious differences between Statius' consolatory corpus and the more familiar philosophical consolations of the late Republic and early Empire is the former's attitude toward indulgence in grief. Recent work on the consolatory compositions of Cicero, Horace, and Seneca emphasizes the strongly ethical dimension of consolation. In his discussion of consolation as a "genre" in ancient literature, J.H.D Scourfield remarks that its purpose was usually to remind an addressee of "the demands of right behavior" (2013, 5). Grief, for many Roman authors, was a feminine weakness to be eradicated. Scholars of Roman consolations have argued that these texts utilize gender stereotypes to inculcate traditional *virtus* in their addressees. Consolations, on their account, draw a distinction between "feminine" and "masculine" responses to death; the former is characterized by "softness" and

[11] As Scourfield points out, the "hard core" of ancient consolation is prose (2013, 4). He calls attention to the fact that the word *consolatio* itself is not a word that appears with any regularity in poetry or as a label for poetry. The title of the *Consolatio ad Liviam* only appears in much later manuscripts (2013, 3). In fact, Statius' description of his own poem to Melior as a *consolatio* is one of the earliest ascriptions of that title to a poem (2013, 3).

[12] It is perhaps their very strangeness that has prevented the *Silvae*'s inclusion in more general studies of Roman consolation. Most recent work has focused on Cicero, Seneca, and the anonymous *Consolatio ad Liviam*. For recent treatments of these figures' contributions to the consolatory genre see Wilcox 2005a and b, 2006, 2012; Jenkins 2009; Peirano 2012; Williams 2006; Fantham 2006. Scourfield's recent effort to define a "genre of consolation" acknowledges that the *Silvae* share certain of the rhetorical features of other consolations, but has difficulty fitting them into his classificatory scheme (2013, 7).

fragility and the latter by steadfastness and restraint (Wilcox 2006, 74-6).[13] Horace acknowledges that such restraint is difficult but necessary: *durum: sed levius fit* ***patientia****/quicquid corrigere nefas*, "it is hard: but endurance makes lighter what it is not right to correct" (*Od.* 1.24. 19-20). This dichotomy persists even when consolations are addressed to women. Mairéad McAuley**,** for instance, claims that Seneca's attribution of *virtus* to his mourning mother masculinizes her and elevates her above other women who fail to exhibit her fortitude in the face of loss (2016, 183-4).[14] The function of such consolations is to encourage an addressee to slough off unbecoming behavior and to re-embark on the project of living virtuously. Statius simply does not utilize the usual gender stereotypes in order to suggest that mourning is evidence of an ethical deficiency.[15] Rather, he provides graphic depictions of his addressees' suffering and even encourages what other consolers would call excessive displays of mourning; he advises Atedius Melior *satiare malis aegrumque dolorem/libertate doma,* "indulge in misery and master your troubled sorrow with freedom" (2.1.14-15).[16] Statius does not encourage his patron to grieve indefinitely, but states that Melior ought to let his legitimate grief run its course.[17]

---

[13] For more on this topic in Seneca's corpus, see Lavery 1997.

[14] Jenkins 2009 makes a similar argument about the characterization of Livia in the *Consolatio ad Liviam.* The attitude toward the appropriateness of excessive mourning in this poem is complex. Although the poet initially wants to let Livia mourn without restraint (7-10), he later praises Tiberius for forcing his mother to cease her irrational mourning (416-22).

[15] Newlands 2011, 11 and Rühl 2006, 181-6 make similar observations. McCullough 2011, 188 argues that Statius' valorization of excessive male mourning is part of a larger readjustment of Roman masculine ideals under the principate. Pace Hulls 2011, 154, who see Statius' depiction of Claudius Etruscus' extreme grief as a condemnation of him. As I shall make clear in the third chapter, I do not find Hull's reading convincing.

[16] Donka Markus makes a similar argument, and sees these lines as a strong rejection of Stoic *severitas* (2004, 130). See also Van Dam 1984, 65-7.

[17] In this, perhaps, Statius' position resembles that of Epicurus as David Konstan has recently described it (2013a, 205-6). However, as Konstan notes his Roman follower Lucretius had little sympathy with prolonged grief (2013a, 206-7). There are no particular textual indicators in the consolatory pieces which would suggest that Statius adopts an orthodox Epicurean perspective, though some of his other occasional poems do contain Epicurean resonances (Laguna Mariscal 1996).

Despite his lack of the ethical agenda that motivated earlier Roman writers, however, I believe that Statius thinks about the effects of grief in some ways as did his predecessors. Cicero incidentally describes the symptoms of grief as he explains the purpose of consolation in the *Tusculan Disputations*: *omnibus enim modis fulciendi sunt qui ruunt nec cohaerere possunt propter magnitudinem aegritudinis. Ex quo ipsam aegritudinem λυπήν Chrysippus quasi solutionem totius hominis appellatum putat*, "those who collapse and are not able to hold themselves together on account of the magnitude of their grief are to be supported in every way possible. It is for this reason that Chyrsippus thinks that grief itself is called *λυπήν*, since it is as a loosening of the whole man" (3.61). Cicero apparently recognized that grief involved a kind of dissolution of the self and the work of consolation ought to be to restore him to himself. I shall argue that Statius held a similar view, though his conception of what this process ought to involve (and even his vision of what constitutes a "self") differs from that of Cicero. We have already seen that Statius speaks of his addressees as having suffered "wounds," an indication that the grieving person is no longer an unbroken whole. Furthermore Statius, like Cicero, uses the metaphor of "loosening" to speak of the effects of grief. On more than one occasion, he speaks of the mourner as *fusum*, either on the ground or over the body of the deceased (2.1.170, 3.3.177). The image, of course, is of the mourner's outsretched body. But *fusus* has a metaphorical sense of "having been melted" or "poured out." The prostrate men that Statius describes are, as Cicero would have put it, unable to hold themselves together.

Loss and the Boundaries of the Self

In a similar vein, Erinn Gilson has proposed that grief is a "dispossession, a way of being undone by loss; to grieve is not only a sign that one loved a valued one who is lost, but also an indication that the other was (and is) a part of who one is (2013, 56)." The death of an intimate

thus reconfigures the boundaries and contours of the survivor's sense of self. Likewise, it is my contention that the "web" of relationships in which Statius' addressees are (often physically) enmeshed constitutes and defines them. When death results in the absence of one of the participants in a relationship, the survivor experiences the pain and the "loosening" associated with grief. My treatment of this web of relationships that Statius depicts is indebted to the work done by scholars of the "posthuman" to expand the definition of the self. The liberal Cartesian individual, still central to many contemporary notions of selfhood, is characterized by a strong mind/body dualism. The self is constituted by his internal consciousness, which is to be contrasted both with his body and with the external universe. [18] The Cartesian model thus involves a firm distinction between interior self and exterior world. Those thinkers who have developed posthumanism(s) often assert that this model is no longer viable in the contemporary world, as technology increasingly blurs the boundary between human and machine. However, as Eve Keller has shown, the Cartesian conception of the self would have seemed foreign to many premodern Europeans as well (2007). In a world where philosophers and medical practitioners variously argued that environmental factors affected the character of the body (Reiss 2003, 154) or that the vital *pneuma* in the blood was created from a mixture of the air that we inhale and exhalations from the humors (Lloyd 2007), the idea that body and soul or interior and exterior are firmly distinguishable from one another becomes difficult to defend.[19]

This proposition, however, is not in accord with much recent thought about the self in Roman antiquity. Since the publication of Michel Foucault's *Care of the Self* (1988), the idea that something like the modern individualistic self became an object of concern during the

[18] See Gill 2006, 331-3.
[19] I refer to the theories of the Stoics and Galen respectively. Aristotle thought that *pneuma*, whose origin was celestial, was present in human beings and involved in human reproduction because semen had *pneuma* (Lloyd 2007). Even on this scheme, the boundary between man and his environment seems somewhat fluid.

Hellenistic and Roman periods has become commonplace. The shift from democratic (i.e. communal) modes of government to autocratic and monarchical systems has been seen as the historical impetus for this increasing attention to and valorization of the inner life of the private individual. [20] As man stopped participating in the government of his community, he began to govern himself. The philosophy of the period is said to reflect this state of affairs. A. A. Long, for instance, strongly urges that scholars recognize the "special emphasis of the imperial Roman epoch on care of the self as a life-long project, engaged in for its own, rather than for the community's sake" (2009, 29). Long is able to dismiss the importance of the community in this formulation because his definition of the "self" focuses exclusively on the individual. He writes:

> selfhood…[is] a name for one's individual and temporal identity from two distinct but necessarily overlapping perspectives- one objective and the other subjective. I am (or I have) a unique human body of determinate age, ethnicity, parentage…these are objective facts over which I have no control. But I am also a unique centre of agency and consciousness with a particular intentionality, temperament, and range of beliefs, likes, and dislikes.
>
> (2009, 26)

The vision of the self here is largely similar to the Cartesian.[21] Long confines the self to the individual body; it is the "unique centre" of personal agency and consciousness. He does not allow, as Keller does, for a relational self.

Not all aspects of his view have been universally accepted, however. Christopher Gill has called for a replacement of an individual subjective conception of ancient selfhood with an

---

[20] For a discussion of this fact, see Gill 2006, Sorabji 2006, 49-50. Foucault does acknowledge, however, that the cultivation of the self took place in the context of social relations (1988, 52-3).

[21] Long does allow for certain elements of the objective self for which Gill advocates. Long has elsewhere argued that Stoic ideas about the self were precursors of liberal thought. For instance, he sees in the writings of Epictetus for the belief that "all human beings are alike in their natural ownership of the one thing that makes them essentially human—an autonomous mind" (1997, 21). Similarly, Troels Engberg-Pedersen argues that, for the Stoics, the individual's self-consciousness was constitutive of selfhood (1990, 66-71). But Christopher Gill has shown that the Stoics (and the Epicureans) did not privilege consciousness (mind) over body. Rather, he argues, they subscribed to a "psychophysical holism," which assumed that humans and other animals were "embodied psychological wholes" (2006, 4). Such a conception is incompatible with a Cartesian view of the subject.

objective-participant self.[22] On this model, the self is articulated and defined by its place in a community and according to a series of objective norms.[23] In a discussion of the Roman Stoics' view on the matter, Timothy Hill expresses a similar view: "agents are analyzed in Stoic ethics not as 'discrete entities' but as 'parts of a far greater unity to which they are related in variety of ways.' Individuating or idiosyncratic action and motivation are therefore relevant only insofar as they affect the agent's ability to engage with other elements in this relational matrix" (2004, 70). Gill and Hill both downplay the importance of a singular interior consciousness as a defining feature of the self. But the communal "society" in which they describe ancient actors as participating is something of an abstraction. By contrast, Keller argues that the salient features of the pre- and postmodern selves are "embodiment (the self is inextricable from its material substrate);" and "embeddedness (the self is not an inviolable entity but rather a point in a network of relations)" (2007, 20). Keller suggests that the self is entangled both in the broad "social" networks like those that Gill and Hill describe and in more intimate physical ones with other humans and objects animate and inanimate. Material objects and environments help to define the self. That the self was embedded in its environment is not incompatible with Gill's model or Stoic and Epicurean thought; the two schools, he writes "converge in presenting psyche and body and human beings and other animals as relatively complex material structures (or wholes) *within* a universe similarly conceived" (2006, 16, emphasis mine). The Stoics, Katja Vogt explains further, believed simultaneously that a human was an individual entity and "a

[22] For the argument that the subjective-individualist and objective-participant models are compatible, see Sorabji 2006, 49.

[23] Gill explains: "Individuality is sometimes contrasted with membership of a community or group; but I focus here, rather, on the idea of *participation* in interpersonal or communal relationships and in the modes of discourse by which these are constituted. The term 'participation' is designed to avoid the rather common modern idea that there is a radical dichotomy between 'individual' and 'society', which may be taken to imply that social involvement requires the individual to surrender her identity. Rather, participation in interpersonal or social relations can be seen as absolutely central to one's selfhood or personality" (2006, 341).

portion of the *pneuma* pervading the cosmos" (2008, 135).[24] But there is another advantage to Keller's approach. Keller's entangled self may be unique; any self is involved in different networks and attachments which differentiate it from others. As M.J.O. Verheij explains, Gill's objective participant model, in its articulation of the self from a "third person perspective," fails to accommodate ancient discussions of unique personal characteristics (2014, 189). For instance, though the Stoic self is part of the larger cosmos, it has its own particular features (Vogt 2008, 135). And this is not simply a Stoic position. That the different material conditions of various environments had different effects upon the constitution of the body, an idea famously articulated by the author of the Hippocratic treatise *Airs, Waters, Places,* was still standard medical and ethnographic wisdom by the time of Cicero and Seneca (Reiss 2003, 131, 154).[25] These theories recognize that the self develops in tandem with the world in which it exists. This self is deeply affected by apparently "external" factors; indeed it is "inextricable" from its material conditions.

The contours and boundaries of the ancient "self" I have been describing appear only in the context of its dealings with other elements in its world. This model of the self's coming into existence bears no little resemblance to the relational ontology articulated by the feminist and posthumanist Karen Barad. According to her, the defining characteristics, even the boundaries, of "things" are determined through their "intra-action" with one another. For Barad, the primary units of existence are not subjects and objects with determinate boundaries and properties, but phenomena. She explains that phenomena are "relations without pre-existing relata," that is "it is

[24] See also Reydams-Schils 2005b, 42-3. This is not simply a Stoic position, however. K.S. Myers has shown that for Ovid, "Human physiognomy and the cosmos are intimately related because of their identical constituents [the four elements]. This close relationship may suggest why in the *Metamorphoses* the transitions between human, animal, and natural phenomena seem to be so frighteningly easy" (1994, 43).

[25] See Parker 2016, 290. Interestingly, the human body's incorporation of "external" elements of like food or microbes has now become standard evidence for the lack of distinction between human and non-human in posthumanist criticism. See Alaimo 2010, 12-13 for a summary of the literature.

through specific intra-actions that the boundaries and properties of the 'components' of phenomena become determined and that particular embodied concepts become meaningful" (2008, 133). Barad developed these ideas in large part as a response to the work of the physicist Niels Bohr; but, as she herself would say, her conclusions need not only apply to the laboratory.[26] I contend that the relations in which the people who inhabit the pages of the *Silvae* are enmeshed give them shape and identity. Statius, of course, does not make precise philosophical or scientific proclamations on the matter. But, I would argue that he, in his own way, acknowledges the entanglement of individual and world. His addressees are in many ways defined by their relationships with other bodies, physical objects, and surroundings.[27] Sometimes the body of the person now dead had extended that of the addressee beyond the confines of his skin.[28] Sometimes the deceased had served as a kind of triangulating third term in the mourner's relationship with his environment, a relationship which in turn affected the mourner's sense of himself. In every case, the mourner's bond with his loved one had been vital to his self-definition. The death, therefore, of that beloved figure results in an adjustment to the network of relations of which the mourner was a member. The pain and the figurative wounds experienced by Statius' addressees are symptoms of their perception of this fact. Statius, I argue, recognizes

[26] Barad would herself like to generalize her observations and to make them relevant on a macroscopic level: "Phenomena are what are observed in laboratories, but they are more than that: they are the basic units of existence" (2007, 333).

[27] Alston and Spentzou see instead evidence for a tripartite Lacanian view of the self in the consolatory poems (2011, 93-105). They also find useful Emmanuel Levinas' view that the self is always in relation with an Other (104). I find that his model reinforces the boundaries between self and Other in an unproductive way.

[28] David Konstan, in an essay on Lucian, also argues that grief is the result of the loss of a part of the self. But he does so in a largely figurative sense: "If love is in some sense a union of selves, then the experience of loss upon the death of another is a response to the dissolution of that joint identity" (2013b, 144). He speaks mainly as though this union of selves was a mental phenomenon. People who love one another, he writes "have projects in common and feel what they do or achieve is not theirs alone but belongs to both of them"(143). Later, he adds that the loss of someone who has "been a continual presence in their thoughts" causes people pain (144). But I want to move beyond the idea that the "self" is purely a product of an interior consciousness and that it has a material basis. The types of self-extension that I examine in the dissertation are based in the material and involve intercorporeal relations between bodies, as the example with Priscilla and Abascantus suggests.

that a survivor's network needs to be reorganized in the wake of loss and his consolations aim to help his addressees reconfigure themselves in appropriate fashion.

In order to illustrate these ideas, I turn to the relationship between the imperial freedman Abascantus and his wife Priscilla, which Statius describes in 5.1. The poet asserts: *vos conlato pectore mixtos/ iunxit inabrupta Concordia longa catena,* "enduring Concord joined you, mingled in your hearts, by an unbroken chain" (5.1.43-4). In this image, Priscilla and Abascantus' bodies are mingled (*mixtos*) with one another. Their hearts were brought together, as though they shared a single body.[29] This metaphoric fusion of bodily interiors was made permanent by an unbroken chain. Long's association of selfhood with the unique individual body falls short here. Though Priscilla and Abascantus retain their own bodies, their intimate contact after their nuptials makes the boundaries between them become more difficult to discern. Statius makes clear that marriage combined Priscilla and Abascantus into a single unit. In Keller's terms, Abascantus was no longer himself a discrete, "inviolable" entity. He and Priscilla were like inextricable extensions of one another.

And, the two were not only physically entangled with one another. Their relationship was conducted among and through the mediation of the material objects present in their daily lives. Over the course of their shared existence, the couple developed a certain set of relations with these objects. These relations in turn shaped their very identity as a couple. Statius explains in great detail their daily routine: *ipsa dapes modicas et sobria pocula tradit/…velut Apula coniunx/agricolae parci vel sole infecta Sabino,/quae videt emeriti iam prospectantibus astris/ tempus adesse viri, propere mensasque torosque/instruit exspectatque sonum redeuntis aratri,* "she herself gives him modest dinners and sober cups…just as an Apulian wife of a miserly

[29] See Bruce Gibson for a discussion of how the phrase *conlato pectore* points to ancient etymologies of the term *Concordia* (2006, 96n43-4).

farmer or one touched by the Sabine sun, who sees, by the appearing stars, that it is almost time for her husband to return, and hurriedly sets up tables and couches and waits for the sound of the returning plow" (5.1.121-6). The portrait of marriage that Statius provides emphasizes its physical trappings. The Sabine wife sets out the couches and tables in the home in which she and her husband share. Strikingly, her daily routine is determined by the stars and the sound her husband's plow. The physical space and implements (sober cups, a modestly set table) of a shared home are no less important for Prisicilla and Abascantus' relationship than they were for their Apulian and Sabine forebears. And in fact, their humble possessions defined them as frugal participants in an old-fashioned marriage. As Barad would put it, the "intra-action" of Priscilla and Abascantus' bodies and the environment of which they were a part produced their "particular determinate…properties" (2007, 142).

When Abascantus loses Priscilla, therefore, he loses a woman who had shaped his own identity. Her death not only deprives Abascantus of the woman whose body he had shared, but changes his relationship to the spaces and objects that the pair had lived among. Abascantus' intense grief and pain at the death of his wife is therefore also a reaction to a sense that he had himself undergone an alteration. Statius' consolation, I argue in the second chapter, aims to persuade Abascantus that Priscilla's death has not fully severed her from him. The poet encourages Abascantus to carry on as though Priscilla could continue their relationship. The poet approves of the fact that Abascantus transferred his tables and meals to Priscilla's tomb complex: *circumstant famuli consuetaque turba/obsequiis, tunc rite tori menssaeque parantur/adsiduae,* "slaves stand at the ready and the crowd accustomed to these duties, then couches and continuous meals are prepared ritually" (5.1.235-7). He will suggest that Abascantus can remain in intimate contact with his wife through such ritual interaction with her.

His consolatory message is that Priscilla's loss need only involve a modification in Abascantus' network of relations.

Statius attempts to help his addressees navigate such shifts in all of his consolatory poems, though his advice is not the same in each case. This should hardly be surprising. The consolatory poems are peopled by a diverse cast of characters. Statius' addressees include two wealthy men of indeterminate status, the likely daughter or granddaughter of a Greek epigrammatist, a notable man of equestrian rank, and an imperial freedman.[30] The dead themselves range from a young slave boy to the poet Lucan. It is clear that not all of these figures shared the same kinds of relationships with one another. The deceased figures had contributed to different aspects of the survivors' selves. Their losses, therefore, did not all require the same type of adjustment on the mourner's part. The consolation that Statius sees as appropriate, and recommends, changes according to the terms of the connection between mourner and mourned. For instance, Statius recognizes that a beloved *deliciae* had, in a manner analagous to that of a wife, once functioned almost as the extension of his master's body. But he nevertheless indicates that proper response of a master to the loss of a beloved slave ought to be pragmatic, focusing on the acquisition of a new "self-extension." In the lament for his own father, the extended *laudatio* illustrates how vital an influence Statius the Elder had possessed over his son's environment. In the final moments of the poem, Statius imagines how his father might continue to exert that power in order to console himself. The miscellaneous nature of the *Silvae* and of the consolations themselves provides a kaleidoscopic view of the various networks of relations in which Statius and his contemporaries found themselves involved. The poet, in his guise as consoler, emerges as an expert on the management of these bonds.

[30] See Nauta 2002, 204-235 for the identification and prosopography of Statius' addressees.

Statius and the Roman Consolatory Tradition

It is worth considering whether the consolatory corpus of a Cicero or a Seneca could profitably be subjected to this kind of analysis. Although, as I have mentioned, Statius' consolatory works do not share some of the ethical concerns of his Roman predecessors, they are no less designed to incite a process of self-rejuvenation than those of other authors. Recent approaches to Roman consolation, primarily exemplified in work on Cicero and Seneca, have also suggested that the purpose of these works was to reintegrate the grieving addressee into the community, whether the public sphere of politics or the more circumscribed community of philosophical *amicitia*.[31] Amanda Wilcox has shown that Cicero's consolatory letters must be understood in relation to his other epistolary output; that they are *officia,* and as such take part in "the competitive fabric of Roman aristocratic life" (2005b, 239-40). Elsewhere, she argues that Cicero's consolatory letters are "fully embedded in the social economy. They are gifts. As such they knit together and maintain social bonds" (2012, 20). At various points, Cicero reminds his addressees that they must give up their grief in order return to their public roles. For instance, Cicero berates Brutus for appearing weak in front of his troops: *tibi nunc populo et scaenae, ut dicitur, serviendum est; nam cum in te non solum exercitus tui sed omnium civium ac paene gentium coniecti oculi sint, minime decet propter quem fortiores ceteri sumus eum ipsum animo debilitatum videri*, "now the people and stage, so to speak, must be served; nor not only are the eyes of all the states and nearly all the peoples fixed on you, but it is least of all fitting that the one through whom we are all made stronger seem himself to be weak in spirit" (*Ad Brut.* 17.2).[32]

[31] See especially Ker 2009, 92ff and Wilcox 2012. Wilcox distinguishes more strongly between Seneca's consolatory techniques and those of Cicero than Ker does. She puts more of an emphasis on Seneca's articulation of the philosopher's self-sufficiency in general (157-74).

[32] In fact, this is similar to the reproach that Cicero himself receives from Sulpicius Rufus, who exhorts: *Denique noli te oblivisci Ciceronem esse et eum qui aliis consueris praecipere et dare consilium*, "finally don't forget that you are Cicero, that man who is accustomed both to direct others and to give counsel" (*Ad Fam.* 4.5.5).

In his *Tusculuan Disputations,* Cicero refers to a list of public figures whom he had employed in his (lost) *Consolatio* as examples of men who had put aside their grief in order to to display their manhood: Quintus Fabius Maximus, Marcus Cato the Censor, and Lucius Aemilius Paullus (3.70). These men were public figures of important rank who did not allow the loss of their children to prevent them from continuing to serve the republic.[33] *Exempla* such as these are typically vehicles of social reproduction. They are designed both to remind readers of the standards of the community and, by encouraging emulation of these standards, to ensure its continuing stability and existence.[34] By deploying exempla, then, Cicero hoped that grieving readers could be reincorporated into the larger community from which they had temporarily removed themselves.

Seneca's consolatory pieces betray a similar attitude. He informs the imperial freedman Polybius that he must resume his public duties: *Magnam tibi personam hominum consensus imposuit; haec tibi tuenda est…tibi nullum secretum liberum est*, "public acclaim has placed on you a great role, you must keep this intact…you are not free to have privacy" (6.1-2). Seneca claims that Polybius must not neglect his public "persona" in the midst of his private grief. Furthermore, like Cicero, Seneca provides a number of *exempla* on whom Polybius ought to model his behavior. In addition to the usual Republican heroes, Seneca culls examples from the imperial family; he recalls, for instance, that although Augustus lost his grandchildren and Tiberius lost his brother Drusus they continued to serve the state (*Polyb.*15.3-5). As in Cicero's work, *exempla* serve to show the bereft man that there is a larger community of which he ought to remain a part. Even when, in the *Consolatio ad Marciam*, Seneca consoles a woman without a

[33] See Wilcox 2005a for further discussion of these exemplars, and their relation to a similar list in Cicero's response to Sulpicius Rufus' command that he put aside his mourning.
[34] For a discussion of the social functions of exempla, see Riggsby 1998. Although he writes about Pliny's epistolary corpus, his observations are easily transferable to that of Cicero.

formal political role he is concerned with his addressee's return into society.[35] He advises Marcia that she model her behavior not on Octavia but on Livia, because the latter willingly resumed her place in society while the former cloistered herself away: *Si illud prius sequi vis, eximes te numero vivorum: aversaberis et alienos liberos et tuos ipsumque quem desideras*, "if you want to follow that first example, you will remove yourself from the number of the living: you will turn away from the children of others and your own, and even from him you miss" (*Marc.* 3.3). Seneca hopes that Marcia will return to the "number of the living," that is, into her role as a member of the human community.[36] Both Cicero and Seneca, then, felt that their consolations helped to re-solidify the networks in which their addressees were embedded. In this sense, they resemble Statian consolation. But their tactics are not those of Statius.

Statius, like Cicero and Seneca, is sometimes intent on reintegrating his addressees into their society at large. To return to the example of Abascantus and Priscilla, Statius clearly expects the imperial freedman to continue his dutiful service to his *dominus* Domitian despite his wife's demise (5.1.260-3). In the epistolary preface to Abascantus, Statius explicitly states his hope that the proffered consolation will result in *propiorem usum amicitiae tuae*, "the closer enjoyment of your friendship" (5 *praef.* 10).[37] In this sense, Statius' consolations are as embedded in the "social economy" as Cicero's consolatory letters.[38] But he attempts to accomplish the reintegration of his addressees in a very different fashion. I argue in the second

[35] This is also the case in the *ad Helviam.* See Williams 2006, 168-9 on the social world to which Seneca hopes to attach his mother.
[36] The scholarly emphasis on Seneca's cultivation of self-sufficiency and isolation is at times misleading. As Marcus Wilson notes, "The recent preoccupation of Senecan scholarship with the theme of the 'self' seriously undervalues another side of his thought, namely his desire to influence the lives of others" (2013, 113).
[37] For the relation between Statius' expression of friendship, gift exchange, and the poet's attempt to make a living see Coffee 2015, 110.
[38] See Rühl 2006, 164 for a similar view. Here we differ from Alston and Spentzou, who argue that these poems work to "dismantle conventional social stratifications" (2011, 106).

chapter, for instance, that Statius implies that Abascantus' return to public life is to be made possible by his ability to have an ongoing relationship with his wife.

Statius not only aims at social reintegration in a fashion different from his predecessors, but imagines other forms of adjustment to the death of a loved one. The poet on more than one occasion works to reintegrate his addressees into domestic networks rather than public and civic ones. What accounts for Statius' willingness to valorize "private" relations in this manner?[39] It is not so much that Statius has a networked view of the self and Cicero and Seneca do not. Indeed, I shall argue in the third chapter that the Roman state itself may comprise a portion of a person's network of relations.[40] But Cicero and Seneca's views about what kinds of relationships are most important in constituting self-identity are simply different from those of Statius. Of course, Cicero and Seneca are motivated by philosophical and ethical convictions that do not especially concern Statius. In order to achieve these goals, Cicero and Seneca had to deny the gravity of the losses that their acquaintances suffered. They insisted instead that the relationship with the loved one was less important than the others of a more public nature in which they were also involved.

Cicero firmly advocated that a man had duties to his community that took precedence over his personal concerns (*De Off.*3.26). Elizabeth Gloyn has shown that, in the *Consolatio ad Polybium*, Seneca encourages Polybius to regard Claudian Rome as the Stoic cosmopolis, the cosmic city that was the home of gods, sages, and men. Further, she argues, he wishes Polybius to take up his role as a wise man in this city and work to benefits his fellow sages (2011, 468ff). Gareth Williams proposes that Seneca's consolatory material in the *Natural Questions* aims to

---

[39] Statius' focus on the "private" is mirrored elsewhere in his work. Carole Newlands has argued, for instance, that the *Silvae* generally "portray a society where traditional civic values are now largely nurtured in the private sphere"(2002, 6). This state of affairs, she believes, is the result of Domitian's regime. Similarly, Valerie Hope suggests that in the increasingly private world ushered in by the empire, "there may have been a more sentimental attitude toward the family and also to remembering and marking their loss" (2011, 114).

[40] As Bruno Latour once put it, "Is it our fault if the networks are *simultaneously real, like nature, narrated, like discourse, and collective, like society*?" (1993, 6, emphasis original).

persuade readers to adopt a "cosmic perspective," the opinion that local disasters were "ordinary aspects of cosmic functioning" (2012, 256-7). Whereas Seneca primarily emphasizes man's connections to the broader cosmos of which he was a part, Statius acknowledges bonds with earthly objects and takes such connections into consideration when crafting his consolations. Sometimes Statius' consolatory focus is not on the human community at all; as I have already proposed, some of his consolation works to recalibrate a mourner's relations with the non-human elements of the environment of which he is a part. Certain of the poet's consolations center on the addressee's relationship with objects and bodies other than those in the political or cosmic spheres that might contribute to a person's sense of himself, objects including statues and tombs. In tracing the connections between a man, his loved ones, and their shared physical world, Statius' consolatory works provide a new perspective on intimacy and emotion at Rome.

Sympathy

The dissertation primarily focuses on the networks of relationships in which Statius' addressees are embedded. It is important to remember, however, that Statius published his consolatory poems, ensuring their availability to an audience beyond individual addressees.[41] Therefore, I also consider, to a different extent in each chapter, the position of Statius' larger audience in these networks. Statius' readers are brought into contact with the bodies, objects, and environments contained in his poetry. Alex Purves has called attention to the way in which literary texts mediate relationships between readers and new objects: "As readers…we don't encounter these objects directly, but instead as a result of poetic focus and technique" (2015, 80). Statius' consolatory poems present their readers with bodies, memorial objects, and spaces to which they would not previously have had access, involving readers with these entities. But what

[41] The poet's very interest in the material entanglements of various mourners may itself be related to his artistic program. David Wray speculates that the title *Silvae* is related to the Greek concept of ὕλη, a fact which would explain the collection's attention to the material world (2007).

relationships do these poems instantiate between reader and the bodies and objects on display? Do readers gain a voyeuristic pleasure from reading about the pain of others? Or do readers become attached to the figures in the *Silvae* and feel sympathy for their suffering?[42] This might seem like an anachronistic question. It has often been assumed that the concept of sympathy, as it is now understood, developed in the seventeenth century. Scholars have speculated that sympathy transitioned then from a belief in the interconnection of all of the parts of the universe to a connection between subjects, a sense of "fellow feeling" (Lobis 2015). But Seth Lobis argues that this dichotomy is too simplistic and charts the ways in which the latter tradition was in dialogue with the former (2015, 312). Indeed, Brooke Holmes has shown that the ancient conception of sympathy involved the "coaffection" of two entities at some distance from one another (2013, 148-9). These entities might be moon and the tide-waters or they might be the liver and the stomach. "Fellow feeling" between humans might easily also be classified as a type of coaffection; humans, after all, were no less a part of the interconnected cosmos than other objects. So, how attached do readers of the *Silvae* become to the suffering people contained in the collection? Should we expect that readers suffered in tandem with the inhabitants of the world of the *Silvae*?

While there can be no absolute answer to this question, it is worth attempting to arrive at generalizing conclusions. In order to establish a framework for doing so, I shall consider as *comparandum* the body of sentimental literature produced in the nineteenth century. Sentimental novels quite explicitly attempted to make readers experience for themselves the pain of others.

[42]I recognize that some scholars might speak of empathy here rather than sympathy. They make a distinction between sympathy and empathy, defining the former as feeling "for" and the latter as feeling "with" (Monani 2014). Other scholars, however, believe that sympathy and empathy are more closely intertwined, noting that both "engage a capacity or disposition to respond with concern to another's situation" (Plantinga 2009). I shall consistently employ "sympathy" in its etymological sense of "suffering with." In her discussion of the sympathetic suffering of the body and soul in ancient philosophical thought and in the writings of Galen, Brooke Holmes writes that sympathy sometimes meant only that "two entities… are affected in tandem" (2013, 148-9).

The development of this genre was influenced heavily by the moral sense philosophy of the Scottish Enlightenment (Barnes 1996). The philosophers David Hume and Adam Smith expounded theories of sympathy, which they felt formed the basis of society. Broadly speaking, the theory of sympathy involved the imaginative projection of oneself into the sufferings of another. As Adam Smith put it,

> By the imagination we place ourselves in his situation, we conceive ourselves enduring all the same torments, we enter as it were into his body, and become in some measure the same person with him, and thence form some idea of his sensations, and even feel something which, though weaker in degree, is not altogether unlike them.
> (*TMS* I.i.1)

In order to inspire sympathy in readers, sentimental fictions deployed graphic descriptions of suffering and developed a repertoire of images to express anguish: tears, scars, and cries (Nudelman 1992, 946). These images, it was supposed, would cause a corresponding tear to develop in the eye of the reader (Sanchéz-Eppler 1993, 26-7). Though popular in their heyday, sentimental novels have often since been disparaged as saccharine and incapable of arousing real emotion. Adam Smith himself insists upon the incompleteness of sympathetic passion: "Mankind, though naturally sympathetic, never conceive…that degree of passion which naturally animates the person principally concerned…The thought that they themselves are not the real sufferers continually intrudes itself upon them" (*TMS* I.i.4). Smith instead casts the sympathetic man in the role of spectator at the theater (Abruzzo 2011, 56). At their worst, sentimental novels have been shown to involve the reader in a kind of voyeuristic sadism. Karen Haltunnen, for instance, compares graphic images of sentimental suffering to pornography (1995).[43] She notes that readers often described their experiences of sentimental novels as arousing a "dear delicious pain" (1995, 308). Readers, at a safe remove from the sources of pain that plagued fictional

[43] Compare also Christopher Castiglia's argument that "sympathy was form of surveillant discipline...in which the black sufferer must imagine himself or herself always in the eyes of whites, becoming a body shaped by the idea of a body" (2002, 37).

characters, could indulge in imagining themselves in danger. Readers were spectators while others suffered.

Furthermore, some have been skeptical of the idea that widely circulated and mass produced items like books and photographs might arouse authentic emotion. John Jervis explains that it is the repetitiveness of "popular forms" that arouses some of this suspicion. In order to be conveyed to wide audiences, he posits, expressions of emotion are transformed into clichés, "precisely because clichés are standardized and repetitive" (2015, 21). Part of this unease also stemmed from the association of mass-produced items with the market. In a discussion of nineteenth century daguerreotype memorial portraits depicting dead children, Karen Sanchéz-Eppler remarks: "Perhaps more perfectly than any object for sale, [these portaits] meld commercial replication and unique, emotional individuality, for what is commodified by these portraits is not the unique plate or the individual's image, so much as a form, the standard poses, accouterments, and presentation of the daguerreotype portrait" (2005, 132). The distinction that Sanchéz-Eppler makes between commercial replication and individual emotion is important. Because the commercial replication depends upon the existence of a series of stock tropes, repeatable "standard poses," it is difficult for many to believe that conventions designed to make sales arouse authentic emotion.[44]

Statius' consolatory poems present some of the same issues just described. Though they were not mass-produced, the books of the *Silvae* were published for circulation and consumption by people other than the immediate addressees of individual poems. Furthermore, as I have already mentioned, most of the consolatory poems contain a similar structure and include the same rhetorical devices. Statius even uses the same conventional language of wounding to

[44] I should say that Sanchéz-Eppler herself actually does not dismiss these conventions, but acknowledges that they have troubled others.

describe the pain of all of his grieving addressees. What effect did Statius believe that these consolatory works would have on his readers? Were they intended simply to admire his literary prowess and ingenuity? This is certainly possible. But Statius is perhaps less pessimistic than contemporary thinkers about the possibility of "suffering with" a near stranger at a distance. For instance, in 5.1, Statius describes the response of a crowd to the spectacle of Abascantus' violent grief on the occasion of his wife's funeral procession: *is dolor in vultu, tantum crinesque genaeque/noctis habent. illam tranquillo fine solutam/ felicemque vocant: lacrimas fudere marito,* "such grief is in his face, his hair and his cheeks have so much gloom, they call her happy because she was released [from life] by a tranquil end, they pour out tears for the husband" (5.3.219-221). The signs of grief that Statius remarks upon are not unique to Abascantus, and the Roman crowd had surely seen grieving family members pass through the city before. But the crowd in these lines responds to Abascantus' suffering, despite the conventionality of his symptoms. In fact, they have precisely the bodily reaction to Abascantus' suffering that Abascantus himself had to his wife's death. Statius speaks early on of the tears that Abascantus shed continuously for Priscilla (5.1.19). The tears of the crowd for the husband mimic the tears of the husband for the wife. Of course, Statius does not suggest that the spectators of the funeral experienced anything near the intensity of Abascantus' distress. But they do feel something of his suffering in a real, bodily way. If spectators on the Roman street might "suffer with" Abascantus to some extent, the same possibility may be open to Statius' readers. I consider the evidence that Statius provides on this matter in individual poems throughout the dissertation.

Chapter Summaries

The study is broadly organized according to the kinds of loss for which Statius attempts to console his bereaved acquaintances: the death of a slave, the death of a wife, the death of a father. The first chapter looks primarily at a group of three poems: *Silvae* 2.1, 2.6, and 5.5. The first piece is a consolation addressed to Atedius Melior on the occasion of the death of his young freedman Glaucias, the second to Flavius Ursus for the death of his slave Philetus, and the final is Statius' first-person lament for a lost freed *puer delicatus.* For a contemporary reader, it is difficult to reconcile the claims that Statius and his addressees had been profoundly attached to these children with the fact that the three boys had been (or continued to serve as) their property and had been the objects of sexual abuse. A considerable portion of the chapter, therefore, parses the nature of the relationships between master and slave and patron and freedman as Statius depicts them. Particularly important for this discussion are Statius' ambivalent descriptions of the fictive kinship relationships that existed between man and boy. These statements in the poem are considered in the light of scholarly discussions of paternalism in the antebellum American South. The discussion leads to the conclusion that in order to console his addressees, Statius reminds them (and perhaps himself) that their lost *pueri* did not belong to them as biological children might; at a fundamental level they were prized property. Property, as Statius bluntly informs Ursus, may be easily replaced. The chapter ends with a discussion of how Statius might have expected his broader audience to respond to these consolations and considers whether they might feel "sympathy" for the plight of a Melior or an Ursus.

The second chapter deals with poems dedicated to a man and a woman who had lost a spouse: 2.7, composed for the poet Lucan's widow Polla, and 5.1, addressed to the imperial freedman Abascantus in the aftermath of his wife Priscilla's death. Statius' description of his

mother's reaction to his father's death in 5.3 is also briefly considered. I argue that these spouses had served as self-extensions of one another. However, Statius does not recommend that the bereaved spouses remarry in order to replace their lost partners. Instead, the chapter reaches the conclusion that Statius encourages them to remain in contact with the deceased spouses through devotion to memorial objects (a devotion that is considered from the perspective of modern approaches to religion and material culture). Not only could the survivors recreate the intimate, intercorporeal relationships they had formerly enjoyed with their spouses with tangible memorials of them, but Statius implies that the dead spouses were, in a sense, present in their monuments. Statius partially divinizes the deceased husbands and wives in order to suggest the possibility that they might make an epiphanic appearance in and through their statues. The final sections of the chapter treat the subject of Statius' audience and the relationship that Statius imagined they might have with the memorial objects that he places before their eyes.

The third chapter is a study of 3.3, Statius' consolation to Claudius Etruscus for the death of his father, the emperor Vespasian's imperial freedman and former *a rationibus* who had been later exiled by Domitian. The chapter examines how Statius advises that bonds with homeland, family, state, and cosmos are to be managed in the face of death. Etruscus grieves so intensely in the wake of his parent's death in part because his father did not have the chance to enjoy the recall to Rome from his Campanian exile that Etruscus and his brother had procured from the emperor. Etruscus complains that his father's demise has robbed him of the opportunity to perform his filial duties. Etruscus' sense of himself as an exemplar of *pietas* is disrupted. Statius' consolatory technique is therefore twofold. First, the poet mitigates the evil of exile, deploying the tropes of Stoic consolation to make clear to Etruscus that his father had always, even during his absence, been part of the Roman cosmos and an object of the emperor's concern. Then,

Statius changes his tactic somewhat and implies that, although his father had always in some sense been included in the Roman empire, his local and familial ties had been equally important. Statius implies that such bonds may be maintained even after death (when participation in the civic sphere is no longer possible) and that in cultivating these private ties Etruscus might remain his father's dutiful child.

The fourth and final chapter examines in further detail Statius' lament for his father and especially the problems posed by the poet's attempts at self-consolation. The focus is on Statius' description of distressing alterations in his physical environment in the wake of his father's death and his proposed remedy to the situation. The first part of the chapter establishes that Statius' tendency to speak as though the death of his father had occasioned sinister environmental changes results from the poet's sense that his father had exercised a great deal of influence over their shared environment. The death of the Elder Statius thus occasioned his son's impression that the relationship between himself and the natural world had shifted. Because of the strangeness of these new environmental conditions, the grieving Statius feels that his very identity as a poet is threatened. Though the poem lacks a formally marked *consolatio*, Statius does make an attempt to restore equilibrium and to soothe the symptoms of his grief. In the second part of the chapter, I propose that the poet requests that his father inhabit the grove of the poets in the Elysian Fields rather than a celestial home so that Statius the Elder might remain in proximity to his son and continue to regulate his interactions with his environment. Although Statius does not make absolutely clear whether he was successful in assuaging his grief, the evidence of the surrounding poems suggests that such an outcome is certainly plausible. Once again, the chapter concludes with a consideration of the position of Statius' audience in the

"environment" that the poem constructs and whether they are meant to feel anything of the poet's anguish.

Chapter One: Sympathy, Slavery, and the Limits of Kinship in *Silv.* 2.1, 2.6, and 5.5

On the 20th of May 1861, Mrs. Eliza Roberts of Georgia wrote to Charles Colcock Jones and his wife about her reaction to the death of her slave Hannah: "I feel her death more as a friend. You both know what that feeling is…you have the same sympathies for these members of our household as we have…When we lose our servants, the loss of their services is the last thing we think of; it is the shadow on our household when an attached faithful one is removed."[45] There is no shortage of such feelings among Roman slave-owners. Roberts' sentiments are startlingly similar to those expressed by Pliny the Younger, who had suffered a like misfortune, in a letter to his friend Paternus:

> *Non ideo tamen velim durior fieri. Nec ignoro alios eius modi casus nihil amplius vocare quam damnum, eoque sibi magnos homines et sapientes videri. Qui an magni sapientesque sint, nescio; homines non sunt. Hominis est enim affici dolore sentire, resistere tamen et solacia admittere, non solaciis non egere.*
>
> I would not wish, however, to become harder. For I'm aware that other people call misfortunes of this sort nothing more than a financial loss, and for that reason they seem to themselves to be great and wise men. Whether they are great and wise, I don't know; they are not men. For it is man's lot to feel himself afflicted with sadness, then to resist and to accept solace, not to lack the need for solace.
>
> (8.16.3-4)

Pliny, like Roberts, emphasizes that he does not feel the loss of some of his slaves as an economic one. And Pliny was not alone among Roman men of letters in expressing such sentiments about slaves. Cicero admitted that he mourned the death of his *anagnostes* Sositheus more than was perhaps fitting (*Att.* 1.12.4). Martial composed several epigrams memorializing his dead slave girl Erotion, his *deliciae* (5.34, 5.37, 10.61). Martial divides his time between hoping for the girl's kind reception in the underworld, praising her tender beauty, and describing his own despondent behavior. The reader learns how the poet beat his breast and tore his hair in response to the girl's death (5.37.19). What is the reason that Pliny and Martial felt so strongly

[45] Quoted in Genovese 2011, 80-1.

for their slaves? Pliny is not interested in sharing this information—he is more concerned to advertise his own humanity. Indeed, his letter comes to focus exclusively on the writer himself and his network of friends. He even suggests at the end of the letter that there is a certain *dolendi voluptas* (8.16.5). Martial's epigrams perhaps provide greater clarity; the poet's sexualized cataloguing of Erotion's beautiful features may suggest that he mourned the loss of an erotic object.[46] But neither figure so explicitly or succinctly describes the reason for his grief as Eliza Roberts does; the Georgia plantation mistress states that it is the absence of "an attached faithful one" that has occasioned her sense of loss. What is the nature of this "attachment" between mistress and slave and why did it involve Hannah serving as an object of her "sympathy"? Roberts does not elaborate.

As I began to suggest in my Introduction, however, those consolatory poems that Statius composed on the occasion of the deaths of a slave and freedmen provide their own set of answers to such questions. *Silvae* 2.1, addressed to Atedius Melior, memorializes his freed *deliciae* Glaucias.[47] *Silvae* 2.6 consoles Flavius Ursus for the loss of his slave Philetus. *Silvae* 5.5 is a (possibly fragmentary) lament Statius composed for his own lost favorite.[48] Though this last piece, in contrast to the poems from Book 2, contains no formal elements of consolation, it resembles them in its depiction of the symptoms of intense grief and therefore may flesh out our picture of the relation between master and *puer* in the *Silvae.*[49] Statius' poems differ from the other works discussed above because they do more than briefly express sorrow. They are extended pieces that contain physical descriptions of the master's grief for his deceased slaves

[46] See Richlin 2015, 365-6 for the view that Martial and Erotion had a sexual relationship.
[47] Martial tells us that Glaucias was *libertus Melioris ille notus*, "that famous freedman of Melior"(6.29.4).
[48] The question about whether or not 5.5 is complete remains unresolved. M's damaged state suggests that it could be unfinished. Gibson, however, warns against a romantic attachment to the "unfinished last poem" (2006, 393). Ultimately, as Courtney remarks in his apparatus (1990): *Utrum textus mutilatus sit an carmen imperfectum reliquerit poeta incertum*.
[49] Indeed it has been suggested that the unfinished state of the poem may account for the missing *consolatio* (Newmyer 1979, 69).

and freedmen. In keeping with his reputation, Statius does not shy away from disturbing detail. The poems clearly depict a relationship that the deceased slave or freedman had with his master or patron prior to his demise, giving a vivid sense of the nature of the attachment between the two. Though they do not reveal that Melior, Ursus, or Statius himself felt "sympathy" for their slaves or freedmen in the sense that they pitied them, they do provide ample reason for the master's experiencing a "sympathetic reaction" to the death of a favored slave or freedman. Unlike Eliza Roberts' letters or Martial's epigrams, of course, the ultimate purpose of Statian consolation is to heal the wound caused by the loss of the "attached faithful." It will then be the work of this chapter to determine how the poet imagined that this might be possible.

In order to ascertain the logic motivating the poet's consolatory efforts it will be necessary to establish what role Statius imagined the *pueri* played in the lives of their masters. I proposed in the Introduction that the symptoms of grief are attributable to the loss of a habitual relationship. The nature and significance of that relationship determine the intensity of grief, and therefore dictate what kinds of consolation are appropriate. In exploring how Statius conceived of the attachments that existed between master and slave or patron and freedman, I shall consider historical evidence about how the Romans conceived of the enslaved and the freed. I subsequently argue that the slave and freedmen introduced in the *Silvae* are "prosthetic" extensions of their masters, whose loss is painful. I then consider what consolation is available to men who have suffered such truncation and how Statius implies that they may "reconfigure" themselves in the wake of their respective bereavements. And, because Statius' poems were literary creations intended to reach a broad readership, I conclude with a discussion, informed by ancient theories of emotion and the imagination, of how Statius' poems might have affected the

Romans who read them, as they are invited into what my discussion shows to be a stratified "community of sympathy."

Paternalism, Sex, and *Societas*

What exactly was the nature of the relationship between Melior and his favorite Glaucias in 2.1? Glaucias is referred to as Melior's *delicatus* in the title of the poem. This title was not Statius' own invention, but its characterization of Glaucias does have textual support.[50] Statius refers to the boy as Melior's *deliciae* at 2.1.71 and 2.1.200.[51] Unfortunately, there is no firm consensus about what the term *deliciae* denotes. Although it often seems to refer to a kind of "sexual pet," Laes and Nielsen conclude on the basis of funerary inscriptions that it need not always do so (2011, 1990). Contemporary literary usage provides no firm definition. Martial, for instance, calls his lost slave girl Erotion *meas delicias* (5.34.2). The girl's tender age of six years might suggest that she was not her master's sexual plaything, but Martial's language is ambiguous. As mentioned above, he describes her beauty in great detail (5.37) and is not shy about recalling their shared *oscula* (5.34.2).[52] The lack of clarity surrounding this term has resulted in divergent understandings of the nature of Glaucias and Melior's connection, which has been characterized in starkly opposed terms. Some critics have assumed that the relationship between man and boy was one of foster parent and child (Nielsen 1990; Bernstein 2005; Zeiner 2005, 162-8; Newlands 2006, 217) and have argued strenuously against the view that the relationship involved a sexual component. Bernstein and Zeiner strongly maintain that the poem

[50] Kathleen Coleman has argued that these titles were added in the decades immediately following Statius' death, because the full names of the addressees were known (1988, xxxii). Busch agrees, pointing out that even if the titles of the individual *Silvae* were not Statius' own, they represent the interpretation of an early audience of the poems (2013, 67).

[51] Martial, who also wrote two epigrams on the occasion of Glaucias' death, calls him *breves deliciae* (6.28.3).

[52] See Richlin 2015, 365-6 for the view that Martial and Erotion had a sexual relationship. Richlin, on the basis of the evidence of Martial and Statius, also strongly suggests that the relationship between Melior and Glaucias had a sexual component (364-6). She further argues that because the poems are "a form of entertainment," Statius' audience must have taken pleasure in Melior's grief (366). I shall propose below that this position is too simplistic.

is a kind of paean to Melior's paternal *pietas*. Part of their argument rests on Statius' reference to Glaucias as Melior's *alumnus* (2.1.1).[53] Bernstein and Nielsen in particular believe that the term merely denoted "quasi-adoption."[54] The fact of Glaucias' manumission also suggests that the "fosterage" relation was quite important, because an *alumnus* was eligible for manumission before the age of 30 whereas a *deliciae* was not (Rawson 2003, 262). Although commentators such as Asso (2010), Busch (2013), Laes (2011), and Richlin (2015) do not deny that Statius refers to Glaucias as Melior's foster child, they argue that the poem contains hints that the pair also had a sexual relationship.[55] I see no reason not to accept their conclusions. It has been long established that slaves were often sexually abused by their masters (Bradley 1994; Perry 2014). While Statius never explicitly mentions sex, he does suggestively note that Glaucias used to wake him in the morning with acts of seeming affection: *matutinos abrumpet murmure somnos/impositus stratis, abitusque morabitur artis/nexibus aque ipso revocabit ad oscula poste?,* "[who] straddling the bed will interrupt your morning slumber and will delay your departure with his arms about you and will from the bedpost call you back for kisses?" (2.1.62-4). The image of Glaucias and Melior's tangled limbs and frequent kisses certainly does not appear platonic. Shackleton Bailey's suggestion that the presence of *matutinos* implies that Glaucias did not "spend the night" with Melior strikes me as wishful (2003, 108n. 8).

---

[53] Statius also emphasizes that Glaucias was a home-born slave (2.1.76). The classic study of *vernae* is Hermann-Otto 1994. Scholars have often assumed that homeborn slaves (*vernae*) and masters shared a great deal of intimacy. Evidence suggests that *vernae* were often appointed to prized positions in the household (Harris 1980, 118; Laes 2011, 165). Epitaphic evidence shows that masters would commemorate favorite *vernae* (Rawson 1997, 227; Hermann-Otto 1994, 35-83). *Verna* has even been thought to denote a relation of quasi-kinship (Nielsen 1991, 237). However, as Trevor Burnard notes, greater intimacy with a slave master could often imply "more circumscribed autonomy" for a slave (2004, 192). See also Nielsen 1991 for the view that *vernae* did not necessarily hold a special position in the household (226).

[54] Nielsen has since changed her opinion. She concludes, after a survey of epithets applied to foster children, that the Romans did not have the same expectations of foster children and blood relations (1997, 203).

[55] Beryl Rawson also notes that there was often an overlap between the terms *alumnus/a*, *verna,* and *deliciae* (2003, 262).

Yet as Asso emphasizes, the sexual undertones in the poem *do* coexist with the language of foster-parentage (2010, 675).[56] Statius says that Melior had treated the boy as his own since infancy: *raptum sed protinus alvo/sustulit exsultans ac primida lucida voce/astra salutantem dominus sibi mente dicavit/amplexusque sinu tulit et genuisse putavit*, "but he immediately lifted you up when you were torn from the womb; and when you addressed the shining stars with your first cry, your master called you his in his mind and lifted you into his embrace and thought that he sired you" (2.1.78-81).[57] Although offensive to modern sensibilities, the suggestion that a slave master should consider himself his slave's "father" is unremarkable. One of the defining features of slavery in a legal sense is the slave's "natal alienation" (Patterson 1982). Slaves were often separated from their native lands and families. Under Roman law, slaves were not allowed to marry. A slave father could not be a *paterfamilias* with children *in potestate.* Because a slave had no ancestors in legal terms, he took the name of his master if he were manumitted. Henrik Mouritsen claims that freedmen were often discussed in terms of quasi-filiation (2011, 37).[58] Although Richard Saller has convincingly shown that slaves were treated much more harshly than children, both slaves and children were technically *alieni iuris* and subject to the authority of the *paterfamilias* (1994, 133).[59] Statius' near contemporary, Seneca the Younger, nostalgically

---

[56] See also Busch 2013, 93.This is not so unusual. Beryl Rawson has a balanced description of the liminal position of alumni: "But when such children are taken in by someone other than their natural parent it is their fostered status which is identified by alumnus/a. They were not formally adopted, so were not 'full' sons or daughters: they fulfilled some of the roles of such children, but also some of the roles of slaves. It may sometimes have been an uncomfortable middle position, but it gave a chance of survival and rearing to some children" (2003, 254). Clearly, Glaucias could have continued to perform as a freed alumnus the same sexual services he did as a slave.

[57] Busch suggests that Statius uses *raptum* to criticize Melior for stealing the child from its biological parents (2013, 86). Zeiner argues that this was an adoption ceremony (2005, 164), but as Brent Shaw (2001) has demonstrated the so-called *susceptio* ritual does not seem to have actually existed.

[58] Publilius Syrus, a former Syrian slave and composer of *sententiae* in the first century BC, famously quipped, *Probus libertus sine natura filius est* (*Sentent.* 450).

[59] See also Matthew Roller's chapter " Modeling the Emperor: The Master-Slave Relationship and Its Alternatives" (2001) for a discussion of the strategies the emperors in the Julio-Claudian period used to cast their autocratic rule as paternal rather than domineering. Roller's discussion, like Saller's, shows that while there were conceptual similarities between the master/slave and father/son relationship, the latter had more positive connotations. But his discussion also makes clear that the label of *pater* could be ascribed to someone who acted more like a *dominus*.

recalled a time when *omnem invidiam maiores nostri dominis, omnem contumeliam servis detraxerint[.] Dominum patrem familiae appellaverunt, servos, quod etiam in mimis durat, familiares*, "our ancestors removed all ill will against masters, and all reproach from slaves. They called the master the "father of the family" and the slaves, what is even now the custom in mimes, they called "familiars"' (Ep. 47.14).

Seneca makes explicit that masters had their slaves refer to them in familial terms in order to render them more docile. The attitude that Seneca displays is characteristic of a kind of paternalism. We might compare Seneca's sentiment with Lacy Ford's recent discussion of the rationale for paternalistic attitudes in the antebellum American south: "the day-to-day governance of a slave population should be conducted [as] male household heads governed their white families, that is with a combination of fairness and firmness, a balance of affection and discipline. This familial treatment would produce the master's preferred form of subordination among slaves, willing obedience" (2009, 147).[60] The Reverend Benjamin Morgan Palmer, a staunch defender of the morality of slavery in America, defined the source of this "willing obedience" as love. He writes: "Neither the husband nor the father is simply a ruler. In these relations he is immeasurably more; and even in the lowest relation, the rule is softened by a sentiment of sympathy and kindness…Conversely, too, the obedience of the ruled is the homage paid, not so much to authority, which is the outward body, as to love."[61] This rhetoric is not very dissimilar to Statius' claim about the existence of the love shared by Melior and Glaucias.

But as Eugene Genovese pointedly remarks, "Southern paternalism, like every other paternalism, has little to do with Ole Massa's ostensible benevolence, kindness, and good cheer.

---

[60] Ironically, proponents of slavery in the American south often felt that they had improved upon Roman (pagan) slavery. Eugene Genovese summarizes the position of George Armstrong and others: "The spread of Christianity…influenced heads of households to accept limits to their power and to respect the rights of their dependents and influenced the state to promulgate a much more humane legal code" (1991, 76).

[61] Quoted in Genovese 1991, 76-7.

It grew out of the necessity to discipline and morally justify a system of exploitation. It did encourage kindness and affection, but it simultaneously encouraged cruelty and hatred" (1976, 4).[62] Genovese has instead seen the tendency on the part of masters to insist upon their benevolence and fatherly affection toward their slaves as an attempt to come to terms with the slave's ambiguous status between property and person (1976, 5).[63] Certainly the same ambiguity would have shaped master/slave relations in Rome. And although Statius never criticizes Melior's paternalistic tendencies, his language suggests that there is something slightly paradoxical about Melior's parental affections.[64]

In an unusual address to *Natura*, Statius betrays his anxiety about privileging ties of affection over biological ones. He feels compelled to prove that he has the permission of Glaucias' biological parents to state Melior's greater attachment to the child: *fas mihi sanctorum venia dixisse parentum*, "it is right for me have spoken thus with the pardon of his venerable parents" (2.1.82). The adjective *sanctorum*, applied as it is to freed slaves, serves as a strong indication of the status which Statius accords to Glaucias' biological family. Statius acknowledges the claims that Glaucias' parents have on his affection and the consideration which they deserve from their son. Further, Statius must ask *Natura*'s permission to stake Melior's claim over his freed *deliciae* (*sinas, oro*) and provides her with a detailed rationale: *non omnia sanguis/proximus aut serie generis demissa propago/alligat; interius nova saepe ascitaque serpunt/pignora conexis. Natos genuisse necesse est,/elegisse iuvat,* "close blood relations or offspring descended from the family line do not bind everything; often newly

[62]We must remember that Statius presents only Melior's perspective on his relationship with Glaucias. According to paternalistic logic, Melior's fatherly affection for Glaucias would not preclude sexual abuse. Brian Connolly points to paternalistic, proslavery Southerners' blindness toward the implications of their views: "if the plantation functioned as an organic, sentimental family, then sex with slaves with incest" (2014, 207).

[63] The issue of whether paternalism and capitalism were co-implicated in the American South is an important one, although I shall not address it here. For a discussion see e.g. Johnson 1999.

[64] See Busch 2013, 82-6 for a similar view.

acquired connections creep further into our affections than kin. It is necessary to give birth to sons, it is pleasing to choose them" (2.1. 84-7). He goes on to adduce the relationships between Chiron and Achilles, Phoenix and Achilles, Acoetes and Pallas, and Dictys and Perseus (2.1.87-95) as evidence for this position. But these examples are not entirely effective. Achilles asks after Peleus, not Chiron or Phoenix, in the *nekuia* of the *Odyssey* (11.494). Evander, Pallas' father, and Acoetes, his caretaker, both mourn the youth extravagantly in Book 11 of the *Aeneid* (85-9, 152-81). Statius' mythological *exempla* thus fail to illustrate completely the point that foster relationships are often more meaningful than those with biological parents. Furthermore, it is significant that these lines are part of Statius' second address to *Natura* in 2.1. When Statius reminded Melior that he, the poet, had also mourned the loss of a beloved relative, he had exclaimed: *quem, Natura, patrem*! "What a father, Nature" (2.1. 34). Van Dam points out that *Natura* appears relatively rarely in poetry (1984, 114n82-6).[65] Its occurrence twice in this poem is thus particularly marked. The fact that in her first appearance *Natura* appears in conjunction with a reference to a biological parent and in her second with a plea for the recognition of quasi-filial relationships is surely significant.[66] Which type of attachment is more "natural?" Statius addresses this question again at the end of the poem. In the final line and a half of the poem, Statius reminds Glaucias of his biological relatives: *desolatamque sororem,/qui potes, et miseros perge insinuare parentes*, "and you, since you can, come, introduce into favor your desolate sister and wretched parents" (2.1.233-4). Why should Statius end a poem dedicated to the alleviation of Melior's grief with an exhortation to Glaucias to recommend his parents and sister

[65] Indeed, praise of *Natura* is not widespread in the *Silvae.* Myers and Newlands have demonstrated that Statius often praises his patrons for having dominated nature in the villa poems (2000, 108-11; 2002, 179-80). Statius' laudatory address to *Natura* is therefore doubly surprising.

[66] See Håkanson 1969, 49 for the view that *Natura* is used in cases where Statius wishes to denote the closeness of the relationship between the deceased and the survivor.

to his patron? What does this counsel tell us about Glaucias' relationship with both parties?[67] Statius gives the impression that Glaucias could use his intimacy with Melior in order to promote his parents' and sibling's interests. Evidence earlier in the poem corroborates this interpretation. Statius reminds Glaucias that his parents had been freed to please him: *carus uterque parens atque in tua gaudia liber/ne quererere genus*, "and each of your dear parents is free for your pleasure, lest you complain of your ancestry" (2.1.77-8). Despite Melior's desire to fulfill a paternal role, Statius still refers to Glaucias' parents as forming his *genus*, or ancestral line. Melior's displays of paternal affection have not diminished the significance of biological ties for Glaucias, to whom it was apparently important to have respectable parents. The superficial character of Melior and Glaucias' fictive kinship relation is thus exposed.

Statius demonstrates a similar attitude toward the relationship of Ursus and Philetus.[68] Gibson asserts that Statius' treatment of Philetus has even more erotic charge than that of Glaucias (2006, xxxix). But Statius is still concerned about the nature of biological and fictive kinship relations in 2.6. While Philetus is not referred to as Ursus's *alumnus*, Ursus does attempt to usurp the role of the boy's biological family in certain ways. Ursus, like Melior, surpasses Philetus' putative biological family in his display of grief. He beats himself more violently than the boy's father or mother would have, and Philetus' brother *erubuit vinci*, "blushed to be surpassed" (2.6.83-5). But was Ursus' paternal grief for a slave justified? Statius lists various family members whose losses would merit tears and lamentation. He notes how emotionally difficult it is for a parent to cremate *primaeva…pignora*, "young children" and *surgentes…natos*, "growing sons" (2.6.2-3). It is right, Statius insists, for a deserted husband to bewail the part of the marriage bed left empty by a dead wife gone too soon (2.6.4-5) or for siblings to mourn one

[67] Busch also sees a "dialogic tension" in these lines (2013, 93).
[68] Pace Rühl 2003, who believes that Statius strongly differentiates Glaucias and Philetus as a result of his closer friendship with Melior than Ursus.

another (2.6.5-6). Statius recognizes that a premature death provokes natural grief.[69] Anyone who would place a limit on mourning for the survivors, Statius tells us, would act too harshly (2.6.1). Yet Statius, although ostensibly speaking against *discrimina* in bereavement (2.6.1), differentiates Philetus from these family members. He describes the loss of the boy as a *plaga minor*, "a lessor blow," whereas he characterizes the deaths of family members as *maiora vulnera*, "greater wounds" (2.6.7-8).[70] Harm-Jan Van Dam comments that *maiora vulnera* signify not only "wider wounds," but also "more important losses" (1984, 397n6-8). Statius thus distinguishes the comparatively insignificant slave Philetus from a spouse or biological relation.[71] The reader learns, however, that Ursus' *plaga minor* paradoxically surpassed such *maiora vulnera*; the slave's demise apparently affected his master more than the loss of a child would have (2.6.6-8). The poet's paradox emphasizes the curiosity, even the unnaturalness, of Ursus' behavior. How, Statius implies, could a lesser blow actually surpass larger wounds and more significant losses?

This question becomes still more vexed when we consider Statius' description of his own anguish upon the death of his young freedman. Statius, like Melior, likens his affection for the boy to the love of a parent for a child.[72] He admits that the child did not bear his *nomina* or *iura* (5.5.10-11), but compares his grief to that of a mother who *ardentes restinxit lacte favillas*,

---

[69] It is undeniable that child mortality rates were much higher in antiquity than they are now. Some scholars have argued that this would have meant that parents were accustomed to their children dying and would not have been affected the way the death of a child affects parents today (e.g. Russell 1985, 49). This notion is belied by a great deal of our inscriptional evidence, as Beryl Rawson and Suzanne Dixon (1991) have pointed out. For instance, the epitaph of one Flavius Hermus speaks of the boy's talkative nature and congenial relations with various members of the family and friends: *delusit fratrem patris, quia|nimius erat blandus ad illum, avi/umque suum adlectabat voce| pusilla, ut cuncti vicini dicebant:|O, dulce Titu!* "He delighted the brother of his father because he was kind to him and he charmed his grandfather with his small voice, so that all the neighbors used to say 'O Sweet Titus!'"The boy is also said to have left *luctum* (*CIL* 6.18086).

[70] Newlands sees this as an exaltation of fictive kinship ties over biological ones (2011, 204n6-8).

[71] Van Dam argues that Statius "makes the central idea of the poem not the contrast between real and adopted children…but puts all the weight on the contrast slave/free" (1984 393n1-2). However, Statius' description of the mourning appropriate for young sons or siblings suggests to me that biological kinship relations are in play here.

[72] Gibson argues that this poem lacks the erotic elements of 2.1 and 2.6 (2006, xl). I believe that this is largely true, although I shall later discuss the intense physical intimacy Statius and his boy shared.

"extinguished the burning ashes with her milk" (5.5.17). He later asks *quid plus tribuere parentes?,* "what more did his parents give?" (5.5.72) and recalls the many signs of loving affection that he showed the infant (5.5.79-87). The poet writes that while the homeborn slave-boy was alive, *natos/non cupii,* "I did not desire sons" (5.5.79-80). But though Statius doted on the child, he here proves that he differentiated him from a biological son and heir. Furthermore, the poet acknowledges that there is something unnatural about his grief. Statius, writing that he gave the boy *alios ortos*, "a second birth" and freedom while he was still suckling at the breast (5.5.73-4), follows with the strange claim that he did so *cum munera nostra/rideres ignarus*, "when unconscious you laughed at our gifts" (5.5.74-5). The image of the smiling baby recalls the end of Virgil's fourth *Eclogue*, in which Virgil admonishes the child who will usher in the Golden Age: *risu cognoscere matrem*, "recognize your mother with a laugh" (4.60). There, the laugh of the child signals its ability to recognize its parent. Similarly, in Catullus' wedding hymn, the poet expresses his wish that young Torquatus *matris e gremio suae/porrigens teneras manus dulce rideat/ad patrem,* "stretching out his tender hands from the lap of his mother laugh sweetly at his father" (61.213-15). In the lines immediately following these, Catullus hopes that child will be *similis* to its natural father, making the point that the young Torquatus should be recognizably the biological child of his father. In light of these intertexts, the fact that Statius' boy should laugh *ignarus* on the occasion of his "rebirth" as a freedman serves to heighten the inauthenticity of the relationship. It might be easy to ignore or to dismiss the import of these allusions if it were not for the poet's final address to *Natura*. Statius suggests that she will be ashamed (*pudebit*) because *tanta mihi feritas, tanta est insania luctus*, "so great was my ferocity and insanity" (5.5.22-3). This apostrophe to *Natura* follows an invitation from the poet to grieving parents to compete with Statius in a display of mourning (5.5.15ff). Why should *Natura*

feel shame in the face of Statius' mourning (cf. 2.1.34)? The implication must be that it is unnatural to mourn for a former slave boy as though he were one's child.

To summarize, then, Statius suggests that the bond between masters and their "foster children" may approximate but never precisely replicate that between parents and children. But in what, exactly, would this similarity lie? The answer to this question must surely be influenced by contemporary discussions about the nature of the bond between parents and children. In his *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle had theorized that children were part of their parents' substance (ὥς ἑαυτῶν τι ὄντα), and that therefore they were more "attached" to their parents than vice versa because, just as teeth or hair, they belonged to their producers (1161b18-24).[73] It is possible that his ideas influenced later Stoic and Peripatetic theories of *oikeiosis*.[74] The term is notoriously difficult to translate, but I find Gisela Striker's formulation attractive. She defines *oikeiosis* as a "recognition and appreciation of something as belonging to one" (1983, 145). The main tenet of Stoic *oikeiosis* is that animals and humans naturally recognize their own coherent constitutions. That is, they recognize that their bodies belong to them. This recognition leads to appropriation: animals and humans strive after self-preservation, searching for the things necessary to their survival and avoiding those things that are harmful to them (Blundell 1990, 227, Boys-Stone 2007, 85).[75] But the Stoics also maintain that animals and humans recognize their own offspring

[73] There is an important difference between this and Aristotle's claim that the friend is a ἕτερος αὐτός (*EN* 9.9.1). Aristotle's model of friendship depends on reciprocity, whereas the parent/child relation is unequal.

[74] I shall mostly discuss the Stoic theory in what follows. Stobaeus has summarized the view of the Peripatetics on the matter. He recorded their belief that humans have a natural affinity (as *oikeiosis* may also be translated) to their children, parents, brothers, household members, and fellow citizens (2.7.13-14). However, as Daniel Richter points out, Stobaeus suggests that "our common love of humanity is much stronger for those who are closest to us" (2011, 76), like our children. Hermann Görgemanns (1983) compares Stobaeus' summary to the concentric circles of Hierocles which I shall discuss below. For a discussion of the Perpipatetic view more generally see Trapp 2007, 147. For another formulation of Peripatetic *oikeiosis* see Book V of Cicero's *De Finibus*.

[75] However, as Alex Dressler points out, this process results in the self's recognition of its dependence on external things: "On the one hand, Cicero's Cato begins by suggesting that the sense of self is primary. On the other hand, Cato explains that the animal feels its ownness as soon as it is born *together with* ownness for that which preserves it" (2016, 119). This is not quite a Cartesian model of selfhood.

as part of themselves.[76] In order to illustrate this concept, Gretchen Reydams-Schils points to Chrysippus' assertion that "we have an appropriate disposition relative to ourselves as soon as we are born and to our [body]parts and to our own offspring" (2005b, 57). His statement might seem to make a claim for the special character of the bond between parents and their biological children; Chrysippus places only "our own offspring" in the same category as our body parts. But some thinkers used the idea that parents regard children as "part" of themselves as a foundation for further self extension. For them, other kinds of relationships bore an analogical resemblance to that enjoyed by parents and their offspring.

One of the clearest formulations of this kind of argument in the Roman period is to be found in Cicero's *De Finibus,* where the Stoic Cato also makes a strong argument for the sociality of all men:

> *Pertinere autem ad rem arbitrantur intellegi* ***natura*** *fieri ut liberi a parentibus amentur. a quo initio profectam communem humani generis societatem persequimur...atque etiam in bestiis vis* ***naturae*** *perspici potest; quarum in fetu et in educatione laborem cum cernimus,* ***naturae ipsius vocem*** *videmur audire… ex hoc nascitur ut etiam communis hominum inter homines naturalis sit commendatio, ut oporteat hominem ab homine ob id ipsum, quod homo sit, non alienum videri.*
>
> They, however, think that it is important to understand that it happens by **nature** that children are loved by their parents, from which we come upon the origin of the common society of the human race…and even among animals is the power of **nature** visible; when we see their labor in giving birth and in rearing their young, we seem to hear the voice of **nature** herself…from this it also happens that the common attraction of men toward one another is natural; thus it is fitting on account of this that no man should feel alien to another man.
>
> (3.62-3)

Cato pointedly emphasizes the "naturalness" of parents' love for their children and he makes this originary other-regarding love the basis for a universal human community. Keimpe Algra argues that Cato conceived of *oikeiosis* as a multi-stage process that culminated in the social

[76] These two aspects have been called "personal" and "social" *oikeiosis* respectively (see e.g. Inwood 1983, 183; Blundell 1990, 221). Keimpe Algra explains: "*oikeiosis* can be described as the gradual realization that something or some person is οἰκεῖον or οἰκεῖος, i.e. that it belongs to the sphere of the self" (2003, 284).

appropriation of all human beings (2003, 287-8). In so theorizing, Cato moves beyond the Aristotelian notion that parents love their children because their offspring are a portion of their substance. According to his logic, all humans feel a kinship with one another, whether or not they share close biological relations.[77] Cicero's Cato was hardly alone in espousing such a view.[78] The second century Stoic Hierocles famously described *oikeiosis* as a series of concentric circles. The mind was imagined in the center, with the body in the first circle, the immediate family in the next, followed by the extended family, and finally by community. Hierocles advocates that one should try to contract the circles in order to "intensify the lower degrees of relationships" (Reydams-Schils 2005b, 72). To use Mary McCabe's terminology, individuals "extend" themselves and are encouraged to consider everyone "*as us* or *ours"* (2005, 415).[79] These accounts of *oikeiosis* make it seem entirely plausible that a slave boy could "belong" to his master in a manner analogous to a biological child. There is reason to suppose, however, that the analogy would have its limits.

Cicero, despite his insistence on the universality of the bond connecting humans to one another, goes on to make the claim that there are degrees of human *societas.* Significantly, he claims that: *Artior vero colligatio est societatis propinquorum…prima societas in ipso coniugio*

---

[77] Daniel Richter finds that the transition from children to universal society is rather too swift. He claims that Cato's view of *oikeiosis* is primarily local, in any case: "The striking feature of Cato's cosmopolitanism is its insistence on the importance of local ties. Indeed, we see in Cato's formulation of Stoic thought on this point a seed of Appiah's 'rooted cosmopolitanism.' For Cato's Stoic sage, the natural affinity with all of humanity provides the basis of local and specific political allegiance. The sage cares for others more than he cares for himself because he understands that the good of the part is the same as the good of whole: 'we naturally prefer the common advantage to our own.' This is a claim which, as we have seen, often appears in the abstract; for Cato, however, consciousness of one's affinity to the group draws the attention of the individual to the series of local relationships in which she is enmeshed" (2011, 82)

[78] Cicero speaks in his own voice of the *universi generis humanae societate*, the universal society of the human race, in his *De Officiis* (1.50). Seneca later acknowledges *hominem homini natura conciliat*, "nature recommends man to his fellow man" (*Ep.* 9.17).

[79] Although Hierocles lived after Statius, his ideas were not wholly novel. They bear a certain similarity to views Plato expresses in the *Republic*. There, Plato designed an educational and social system that was meant to create a population united by bonds of *philia*, whereby, as Mary Blundell puts it, " The *polis* must resemble as far as possible a single human being, so that when one suffers it affects the whole" (1990, 275, paraphrasing *Rep.* 462c-e).

est, proxima in liberis, deinde una domus, "but the bond of the social union with those close to us is tighter…the first bond of union is in marriage itself, the next among [parents and] children, then, finally one household" (*De Off*. 1. 53-54).[80] An anonymous second century commentator on Plato's *Theatetus* argues that it is foolish (and contrary to human experience) to care for the "furthest Mysian" as one does for oneself (Long and Sedley 57H3). To return to the *Silvae,* it is evident, then, that an *alumnus*, even a former slave could plausibly comprise part of the master's extended self. But there is also good reason to doubt that Melior's or Statius and his *puer*'s relationship could really be the same as that of a parent and child.[81] I should make it clear that I do not suggest that Statius is writing philosophical doctrine or even that he consciously draws on Stoic theory. I want to make the claim that he, like a Cicero or Seneca, displays an interest in the nature of the networks and relationships that people form.[82] After all, Statius was also the product of a society that had developed a rich theoretical apparatus for conceptualizing the degrees of connection between various individual and groups. The questions about kinship, possession, and belonging that the theory of *oikeiosis* involves are also ones that concern Statius.[83]

In Statius' second brief address to *Natura*, he clearly mentions the physical link between biological parents and children: *sanguis* (2.1.84). As Giana Pomata has pointed out, Greek and Roman medical wisdom insisted that children were the products of semen that was concocted

---

[80] I have drawn here on the translation of Walter Miller.
[81] M.R. Wright argues that for the Stoics, at least, "slaves are members of the human community" (1995, 191). I am not sure the answer is so simple.
[82] This interest is not unique to the *Silvae.* Statius explores similar questions in his depiction of Achilles' relationship with his foster father Chiron in the *Achilleid.* For a discussion of Achilles and Chiron see Fantham, 1999.
[83] Michael Trapp argues that these questions were important even more generally during the imperial period: "In broad terms, at least, [philosophers'] emphasis on the natural worth of human solidarity and community could be seen as endorsing and providing a theoretical base for both the local, civic value of concord (homonoia), and the wider Imperial ideal of a myriad of communities and races united by loyalty to a single head" (2007, 241-2).

from the blood (1996, 53ff).[84] Children were literally connected to their parents by blood. But Statius is not explicit about what connects foster parents and children. He says that adopted and foster children *serpunt*, "creep" into our affections (2.1.86). Newlands points out that the verb is often associated with plant growth and suggests that Statius is trying to naturalize the connection (2011, 87n86). We might ask, however, by what mechanism slave or freed foster children "creep" into us?[85] At one point, the poet claims that *te iam fecerat illi/mens animusque patrem,* "now his mind and spirit had made you his father" (2.1.102-3). But it is not clear that these are physical or "natural" connections.[86] How strong are the bonds created by *mens* and *animus*? I shall ultimately argue that Statius' vision of the relationship between master and *puer* involved a kind of modified *oikeiosis*.[87] But despite Statius' rhetoric about the closeness of the foster relationship, his consolatory remarks signal that the slave or freedman was not so essential a "part" of his master as a biological child would have been. The loss of a slave or freedman, Statius consoles his addressees, need not affect the master in the same way as the loss of child would. After all, as Plato's anonymous commentator notices, we do not care about the loss of our hair and nails in the same way that we do the loss of an eye or a finger (Long and Sedley, 57H6).

Quasi-Objects, Quasi-Subjects: Slaves, Freedmen, and Animals

Of course, it is not only the absence of blood relations between Statius' addressees and their favorites that prevents the boys from filling the roles of biological children; their status as enslaved or formerly enslaved persons precluded their doing so. Examination of 2.6, which sheds

---

[84] See Moreau and Hardin's pieces in Johnson et al. (2013) for criticisms of Pomata's approach.

[85] An obvious point of comparison here is the Roman practice of adoption. Scholars recently have argued that agnatic ties remained more important than juridical ties even after adoption. Hugh Lindsay concludes on the basis of his study of Roman adoption and inheritance law: "It is clear that Romans regarded natural relationships as the strongest bonds and neither emancipation nor adoption could completely erode *patria potestas*" (2009, 99). See also Bernstein 2009, 333-4 for a discussion of the differences between formally adopted children and slaves.

[86] See Zeiner 2005, 162 for the opposite view.

[87] For a broader discussion of the metaphorical ways in which some ancient Greeks and Romans conceived the slave as an extension of the master, see Fitzgerald 2000, 13-31. My discussion shall focus more on the physical connections between master and slave than his does.

light on the differences the poet perceived between slaves and other humans, can help to define what Statius perceived to be the limitations on the relationship that between slave and master. Statius is apparently at pains at the beginning of the poem to reassure Ursus that his slave Philetus was in fact a human: *tuum hominem gemis*, "you groan for your human being" (2.6.15). Statius seems to be alluding to Seneca's 47th letter, in which the philosopher responds to the imagined protestations of his peers about his willingness to regard slaves as potential friends with the observation: *Immo homines*, "But they are men" (47.1). A few lines earlier, however, Statius had announced to Ursus: *famulum gemis*, "you groan for a slave" (2.6.10). Why does Statius clarify his previous remark?[88] Is there a distinction to be made here? Ruurd Nauta contends that Statius, like Seneca, is anticipating the criticisms an audience might harbor. He maintains that "affection for someone of non-free descent…was still not generally approved of" and that Statius thought he could "influence the mentality of its audience" (2002, 305).[89] Statius' subtle attempt to understate Philetus' history as a slave is perhaps unsurprising in the light of comparative history. Jamie Warren documents the case of plantation mistress Virginia Shelton, who boasted that her slave Lythe rested in a coffin made of fine cherry wood "as neat as any white person's" (2015, 120). Warren suggests that Shelton's treatment of Lythe as though she were white was part of a common phenomenon: "white Southerners used nineteenth century traditions of sentimentality to deny difference and bodily particularities during moments of death" (2015, 120). The purpose of such "white-washing" was to allow a white person to form an emotional bond with a black one. To treat someone as "white" was tantamount to treating her as though she were a full member of the human community in nineteenth century America. As scholars like Arthur Riss have demonstrated, there is something disingenuous about this

[88] Any attempt to answer this question is of course complicated by the lacuna in front of *hominem gemis.*
[89] See also Rühl 2003, 119.

behavior. The analogical treatment "as if white" reveals the limitations of the grant of humanity (2006, 93).[90] Similarly, Statius' claim that Philetus was human partially obscures the inhuman treatment he received in life. But there are indications that Statius was unwilling to allow that Philetus was fully human. The poet, for instance, qualifies Seneca's sentiment in *Epistle* 47 by referring to Philetus as "your" (*tuum*) human being, hinting at the fact that the boy had served as Ursus' property. And some lines later, Statius finally reveals the emptiness of his rhetoric in a telling comparison. He thinks of Philetus as an animal.

The poet argues that because various groups mourn for their dead pets, Ursus' lamentations for a slave are perfectly acceptable. Parthians grieve for their dead horses, Statius writes, Molossians mourn their dead dogs, birds have pyres, and Maro his stag (*cervusque Maronem*) (2.6.19-20). Statius talks about Philetus almost as though he were on the same ontological plane as an animal. Comparisons between animals and slaves were not uncommon in antiquity. Aristotle, in his *Politics,* compared the natural slave to non-human animals (1254a17–1254b39). Varro in his advice manual *De Re Rustica* famously referred to the slave as an *instrumentum vocale* (1.17). The Twelve Tables and the third century *Lex Aquilia* treated slaves in the same categories as livestock (Bradley 2000, 111).[91] Statius is unusual only in that he compares Philetus primarily to domestic pets.[92] But his choice to make this particular

[90] Riss refers to the "blindness of the body" that such sentimentalism encouraged, the way in which it ignored the lived experiences of black bodies.

[91] The supposition was not limited to Rome's early period, however. The second century jurist Gaius provides evidence that the *Lex Aquilia* with its assumptions about the animality of slaves was still *au courant* (*Dig.* 9.2.2.2). Keith Bradley has shown how even Apuleius's *Metamorphoses* draws repeatedly on the trope of slave cum animal (2000).

[92] Some antebellum American slave-owners seem to have treated slave children like pets. Fanny Kemble reports of a visit to the Butler plantations in Glynn County, Georgia, that she saw young boys and girls "kept as a sort of pet animal and allowed to pass the night on the floor of some sleeping apartment of some member of the family" (quoted in *Swing the Sickle For the Harvest is Ripe*, 2007, 35). For broader discussions of animals and slaves in the American South see e.g. Peterson 2013.

comparison is significant because pets have often been seen to possess the same uncertain status in the human community that slaves did.[93]

Ingrid Tague writes that in the eighteenth century "pets [were] seen by their human owners as simultaneously part and not part of the family; and as simultaneously human and nonhuman" (2008, 290).[94] The degree to which animals and humans were related to one another was also a matter of some debate in antiquity. In the passage from *De Finibus* quoted above, Cato seems willing to make observations about human nature on the basis of analogies with animals and their offspring (*et etiam in bestiis vis naturae perspici potest*).[95] But these animals appear ultimately excluded from the society of men (*hominum inter homines*). But other theorists have imagined that animals were "like us" or "ours." Porphyry, for instance, reports Theophrastus' teaching that men and animals were *oikeious* to one another because they were made up of the same tissues and shared passions (Sorabji 1993, 156).[96] But it does not seem that Roman thinkers were generally convinced by arguments that animals and humans were part of the same community, following the Aristotelian and Stoic position that animals lack reason.[97] Statius, of course, was capable of forming his own opinion on the question of the kinship between animals and humans. Statius' climactic comparison between Philetus and "Maro's" pet deer is of particular interest in this regard. Since Statius elevates Maro's *cervus* to the status of exemplum, we should consider more closely Virgil's treatment of Silvia's pet.

---

[93] For a similar observation see Brown 2010, 68 and Colleen Boggs 2013, 44. Some scholars believe that "pets" in the modern sense did not appear until the eighteenth (or even nineteenth) century when animal space finally became separate from human domestic space (e.g. Tague 2008, 290), but I cannot believe that this is true. One need only think of Odysseus' Argus.

[94] Tague follows Marc Shell 1986, 123.

[95] For a discussion of *oikeiosis* and human/ animal analogies see Holmes 2014.

[96] Certain Platonists, like Plutarch, seem to have accepted his reasoning (Newmyer 2006).

[97] The Stoics, like Aristotle, believed in the existence of a *scala naturae*, which placed humans above animals, plants, and inanimate objects like stones (Frede 2003, 185). The distinction that various other philosophers, beginning with Aristotle, made between humans and animals was that animals did not possess reason (Sorabji 1993, 12). Some Epicureans denied reason to animals, but Lucretius does seem to suggest that horses, lions, and deer have a *mens* and an *animus* (Sorabji 1993, 28-9).

The deer to which Statius refers must be Silvia's stag of *Aeneid* 7, the creature whose death precipitated the war between Aeneas and the Latins. This animal differs from the others on Statius' list by virtue of its explicitly human characteristics. Virgil emphasizes that the stag displayed a certain amount of agency. The beast, we learn, made sure to come home at night: *ipse domum sera quamvis se nocte ferebat,* "although late, the stag brought itself home at night" (7.492). The demonstrative *ipse* at the beginning of the line and the reflexive *se* both heavily emphasize the voluntary nature of the stag's behavior, prompted by his affectionate relationship with Silvia. That the stag chooses to go home (*domum*) nightly makes it seem like a rational human subject. The beast's death is also described in human terms. The stag is similar to one *imploranti* (7.502). It is described as *gemens* and its dying cry is referred to as a *questus* (7.501), words elsewhere associated with human cries in the *Aeneid*.[98] The bloody creature, penetrated by Ascanius' arrow, prefigures the suffering of the soldiers soon to die in the war with Aeneas. But despite the stag's similarities to the humans who love it and with whom it lives, it is not treated as a full member of the human family, as the servile qualities that Virgil also attributes to the stag make evident.[99] Silvia and her human family are explicitly likened to slave owners. The stag's subordination to their whims definitively shapes his relationship with them. The stag is accustomed (*adsuetum*) to Silvia's orders (*imperiis*) (7.487). It endures petting and dines at the *mensae erili*, "the table of its master" (7.490). Further, Silvia takes pleasure in decorating the stag's horns with garlands: *mollibus intexens ornabat cornua sertis*, "interweaving its horns with soft garlands she adorned [it]" (7.488). As we shall see later, Melior exerted a great deal of effort in choosing *texta* for his young alumnus (2.1.132). The stag, like Glaucias, is an object, the plaything of its mistress. Most significantly, Virgil describes the stag in terms similar to those

[98] E.g. 10.674, 11.633. See Horsfall 2000, 335n. 501. Horsfall notes that *gemens* can be used of animal cries, but that the verb appears in conjunction with human groans as well.
[99] And, of course, personification always involves the simultaneous recognition of similarity and difference.

used in Statius' portrayals of the various slave children discussed here. The stag, like Statius' own boy (5.5.73), is *matris ab ubere raptum*, "snatched from its mother's womb" (*Aen.* 7.484) so that Silvia can care for it. Though Silvia might stand *in loco parentis*, the stag's presence in her household is the result of its enforced separation from its own biological parent. The stag's servile state prevents the beloved pet from being a full member of his mistress's family.

Statius' conflation of the slave Philetus and this creature signals that the former necessarily occupies an analogous position between human kinsman and subhuman object. It is easy to see why this should be so in the case of Philetus, who had not been manumitted. But we have also seen the poet's unease about fully including Glaucias or his own boy in the biological families of their respective masters.[100] Why should this be the case? The Romans, like other inhabitants of slave societies, had long grappled with the slave's ambiguous status between man and object. As scholars like Peter Garnsey (1996) have observed, the Romans did not share Aristotle's belief in the natural slave.[101] Seneca the Younger famously exhorted Lucilius to accept that slaves were men (*Ep.* 47.1). Yet the Romans did not hesitate to form an idea of a "slavish" character and physical appearance.[102] Recent scholarship on Roman freedmen has

[100] Busch comes to a similar conclusion: "Statius' servile representation of Glaucias is particularly impressive in light of the fact that the boy apparently had been freed, as Martial's poems on the occasion of his death reveal (6.28, 29). Statius not only neglects to mention Glaucias' liberation, but persistently reminds his readers that Glaucias was Melior's slave" (2013, 67).

[101] Certainly Roman law recognized the "natural" humanity of the slave. The jurist Florentinus, for instance, wrote: *Servitus est constitutio iuris gentium, qua quis dominio alieno contra naturam subicitur*, "Slavery is an arrangement of the *ius gentium*, by which someone is given over to a foreign master against nature" (*Dig.* 1.5.4). See also Ulpian's opinion on the matter (*Dig.* 50.17.32).

[102] Cicero criticized L. Calpurnius Piso Caesonius for having *color iste servilis* and the accompanying hairy cheeks and putrid teeth (*In Pisonem* 1). The sources also frequently use the term *servilis animus*. See for example Tac. *Ann.* 2.39 and 15.54.4 and Val. Max. *Fact.* 3.3 ext. 7. This is not to claim that slaves in the Roman empire actually shared common phenotypical characteristics. As Michele George has shown, the Romans created stereotypes about slave appearance and behavior precisely because there was no good way of distinguishing the slave from the free (2002). See also Tacitus *Annales* 13.27, where senators reject a plan to provide slaves with a distinctive costume on the grounds that they do not want the slaves to realize how few their masters were.

made it increasingly clear that such characteristics were believed to have persisted even after manumission. [103]

Myles Lavan has suggested that despite their rejection of a theory of natural slavery, the Romans believed that the development of a slavish character was a direct result of slavery (2011, 299). [104] His theory echoes Mouritsen's discussion of the so-called *macula servitutis,* "stain of slavery." Mouritsen argues that the physical treatment of the body during slavery resulted in a degradation of the slave. As Mouritsen notes, mind and body were not easily separable from one another in Roman thought. He therefore suggests that "slavery itself may change the person subjected to it" (2011, 22). [105] The "stain" of slavery may explain the perception of freedmen as second-class citizens and their continuing dependence upon and subjugation to their former masters. [106] As mentioned earlier, Glaucias seems to continue, even after his "liberation," to have

[103]Historians of Roman slavery have demonstrated that manumission practices in Rome differed significantly from those of other slave societies insofar as manumitted slaves became full Roman citizens. This fact, combined with relatively high rates of manumission, has often been seen as mitigating the circumstances of enslavement in Rome. Moses Finley, for instance, contrasts the (conspicuously) black freedman in the New World to his Roman counterpart who could seamlessly integrate himself into free society "within one or at the most two generations" (1980, 97). See also Watson 1987. For the view that manumission was performed in the self-interest of the master, see Bradley 1984(81ff) and Morabito 1981, 174. Recently, historians like Marc Kleijwegt have criticized the view that most freedmen were fully integrated into Roman society (2006, 41).

[104] Literary evidence bears him out. Horace utters scathing criticism of a freedman in his fourth Epode, asserting that the difference between the rich freedman and himself was as great as that between a wolf and a lamb (4.1-2). He further reminds the freedman that, despite his immense wealth, *Fortuna non mutat genus*, "Fortune does not alter your birth" (*Ep.* 4.6). As Henrik Mouritsen points out, the imagery here comes from the natural world, and Horace may be suggesting that there are inherent differences between slaves and the freeborn (2011, 18). Horace is not alone. In fact, Statius attempts to console Claudius Etruscus for his father's servile origins by attributing the "fault" to the former's grandparents (3.3.45).

[105] Mouritsen also suggests that the mere fact of the slave's dependency could change his character: "Slavery represented the ultimate state of dependency and lack of self-control, and the slave's total subjection to the will of another inevitably shaped his or her personality. As Longinus noted, slaves were unable to produce oratory, since servitude acted as a 'cage of the soul'. The slave could not develop the degree of rationality and moral maturity required for oratory, because he was not master of his own life" (2011, 23). For a discussion of this issue from a Greek medical perspective see Nancy Demand 1998, 69–84. For criticisms of Demand's position see Niall McKeown 2002.

[106] The freedman usually owed his former master, now patron, *obsequium* and *operae*, respect and a certain number of days of labor. Freedmen who failed to exhibit due deference to their patrons could be charged with "ingratitude" (Masi Doria 1993, 81; Harper 2011, 485-6). The first obligation broadly entailed proper respect and devotion. The second mandated days of work provided for the master (although occasionally the freedman could pay his master in lieu of performing the work). See Masi Doria's 2012 discussion. She writes: "From a sociological point of view, it is clear that we are dealing with the extension, albeit to a lesser degree, of the services due to the *dominus* by the slave.

a sexual relationship with Melior.[107] More important, Glaucias and Statius' boy, by virtue of their ages, would have remained functionally dependent upon and subservient to their apparently benevolent patrons. Saidiya Hartman forcefully makes the argument that the "indebtedness" of the freedman to his former masters resulted in a fundamentally different subjectivity for emancipated blacks than for whites in the postbellum American South. She writes: "I have opted to characterize the nascent individualism of emancipation as 'burdened individuality' in order to underline the double bind of freedom: being freed from slavery and free of resources, emancipated and subordinated, self-possessed and indebted, equal and inferior, liberated and encumbered, sovereign and dominated, citizen and subject" (1997, 117). Hartman, of course, speaks of this "burdened individualism" in the context of a society that embraced liberalism's possessive individualism. Terms like "sovereign" and "dominated" carry ideological weight in an American context that they would not have borne in ancient Rome. Hartman also speaks of freedmen's subjection to the former master class rather than to particular masters. But her fundamental insight, that the former slave's continuing obligations to and dependence upon white masters functionally limited his elevation to the status of [white] personhood, might easily be applied to the Roman context. Mouritsen almost makes a similar argument about the depiction

---

(113-114). Susan Treggiari suspects that many freedmen continued to live and work with or near their patrons, especially because many were unqualified to find work elsewhere (1969, 71, 88). For instance, one disgruntled master complains that his freedwoman Acte abandoned her responsibilities to him though he had manumitted her for free (*CIL* 6.20905). Matthew Perry writes of this inscription: "placing the emphasis on the *gratis* nature of Acte's manumission communicated two points. Not only did it signify that manumission was a reward, earned by the slave's dedicated service…it implied the freedwoman's continued obligation" (2014, 56).

[107]This will not have been entirely uncommon. In his *Controversiae*, Seneca the Elder recounts part of the speech of the orator Quintus Haterius on behalf of a freedman who had been accused of serving as the *concubinus* of his former master. Haterius made the claim that *inpudicitia in ingenuo crimen est, in servo necessitas, in liberto officium*, "unchastity is a crime in the freeborn, a necessity in a slave, and a duty in a freedman" (*Contr.* 4 *praef.* 10). Although James Butrica has persuasively argued that *officium* in this context refers to no legally established "duty" of the freedman and that Haterius' position is the self-interested one of a person advocating for his client (2005, 212-221), the case remains important for our purposes. The case shows that, irrespective of the legality of sexual relations between freedmen and their patrons, such relations existed. For the question of whether the *Lex Scantinia,* a third century BC law which made illegal *stuprum* against a freeborn male, was applied to freedmen see Butrica 2005, 214 and Cantarella 2002 [1988], 111-112.

of even the successful freedmen in *Silvae* 3.3 and 5.1, suggesting that modesty, discipline, and obedience were "specific libertine qualities" (2011, 64). The purpose of the foregoing discussion has been both to show that the Romans, whatever their ostensible rhetoric, viewed slaves as less than fully human and that the nature of the relationship between master and slave was not transformed beyond all recognition by the fact of the latter's manumission. Freed slaves may have had more claim to humanity than the enslaved, but the difference was a matter of degree. Their belonging in the *societas* of the human race was limited at best. It is therefore understandable that Statius is unwilling to treat Glaucias or his boy as the biological children of Melior or himself. Their histories of enslavement meant that they too straddled the uneasy divide between human family member and inhuman other.

I have intimated that Statius' subtle reminders that the familial nature of the modified *oikeiosis* of man and slave is in fact a fantasy are part of a consolatory strategy. The master need not react to the death of his favorite as though he were really his son.[108] In order to demonstrate why this knowledge would have the potential to soothe, however, it will be important to consider how kinship, *oikeiosis,* and the experience of grief are related. In Book 7 of his *Problemata*, Pseudo-Aristotle himself wonders if we suffer mentally when we see someone being cut, burned, or tortured because of our kinship to him: τῷ πάσχοντι διὰ τὴν οἰκειότητα, "on account of being kindred to the one suffering" (7.7).[109] Though Pseudo-Aristotle does not explain his logic, his meaning is not entirely opaque. Kinship or *oikeiosis* involves regarding other people as somehow belonging to us, so that we form a kind of unity with one another. [110] Therefore, we can "be affected" together. Indeed, we will have to be affected by their suffering, because they comprise

[108] For the relationship of *oikeosis* and property see Long 1997.
[109] I would like to thank Brooke Holmes for alerting me to this passage and its implications.
[110] For the explicit connections between kinship and sympathy see Rosenmeyer 1989, 107-113. Marcus Aurelius provides a very clear later formulation of sympathy and kinship at *Med.* 9.9. Also recall Cicero's comments at *De Off.*1.53-54.

part of us. Similarly, if one who has been "part" of us dies, we will feel pain at their loss. This "co-affection" is what Brooke Holmes has identified as the ancient definition of sympathy (2013, 148-9). The strength of the sympathetic reaction, logically, ought to depend on how great a sense of kinship we feel with others.[111] The pain of those who are not so fundamentally "part" of us as close kin will arouse a correspondingly less intense response in us.[112] Statius' own treatment of human reactions to dead animals illustrates this difference nicely.

In 2.5, Statius describes the death of a tame lion killed as part of a sport in the amphitheater.[113] This creature, like Silvia's stag, is an animal/human hybrid. It is addressed as *vastator docte*, "learned destroyer" (2.5.7). Statius emphasizes in the first lines of the poem that the lion has successfully learned to act in a manner contrary to its natural impulses: *quid scelus humanasque animo dediscere caedes [profuit]*, "[what good was it] to have unlearned crime and human bloodshed" (2.5.2). Contrary to Stoic or Epicurean beliefs, the lion appears to have a rational capacity, the supposed province of the human. As Van Dam and others have pointed out, the lion is compared to a wounded human soldier in an inversion of an epic simile (1984, 383n19). Statius also relates that the audience reacts to the beast's death as if it were a gladiator

---

[111] Seneca's anecdote about Stilbo is also relevant. The philosopher maintains that the wise man will follow the example of Stilbo, who, upon the capture of his country and the death of his wife and children, exclaimed: *Omnia…bona mea mecum sunt*, "all my goods are with me" (*Ep.* 9.18). Stilbo does not behave as though a part of himself is lost with his wife and children. Indeed, he emphasizes his continued integrity. Elsewhere, Seneca insists that even when bodily integrity is not retained, the sage will not suffer, comparing the loss of friends to the loss of extraneous limbs (*Ep.* 9.4-5).

[112] This is not only an ancient perspective. Indeed, Smith argues for such a circumscribed sympathetic capacity thus: "To man is allotted a much humbler department, but one much more suitable to the weakness of his powers, and to the narrowness of his comprehension; the care of his own happiness, of that of his family, his friends, and his country" (*TMS* VI.ii.3.6). Fonna Forman-Barzilai has argued that the progression Smith imagines from man's care for his own happiness to that of his country is indebted to Hierocles' theory about the concentric circles of *oikeiosis*. She claims, however, that Smith did not advocate the gradual collapse of these circles and the subsequent extension of the self (2010, 139ff).

[113] Busch (2013, 94-6) and Dietrich (2002) have already noticed the connection between *Silvae* 2.4 and 2.5 and 2.1, involving the deaths of animals, and the consolations to Melior and Ursus, but primarily focus their discussions on 2.4 and the issue of parody. Busch argues that the similarity between the poems on animals and slaves is meant to "express anxiety regarding the underlying values of a community in which the deaths of enslaved people and of pets can be registered as analogous losses" (2013, 95). I am not sure that Statius is so critical or anxious as Busch supposes.

(2.5.26). Domitian was also apparently grieved by the loss of the lion, despite the fact that so many Scythian, Libyan, Egyptian, and German beasts died in the arena, whom it was *perdere vile*, "cheap to lose" (2.27-30). The uniqueness of the emperor's grief differentiates the lion from other animals. We might think that its singular human qualities, its inclusion in the human community, would result in the audience's co-affection with it. There is perhaps some suggestion that the audience "suffers with" the lion. Statius tells us that the mournful crowd *ingemuere* at the lion's demise (2.27). In her commentary, Carole Newlands asserts that Statius chose the verb, one also used of wild animal noises, to convey the audience's "empathy" with the victim (2011, 200n27). But the intensity of their response is not as great as that shown by the other lions in the arena.

The compatriots of the wounded lion lose some of their artificially inculcated calm because of their anger at their comrade's demise: *hoc licuisse nefas placidi tumuere leones*, "the placid lions grew angry that such a crime had been permitted" (2.5.13). The juxtaposition of *placidi* and *tumuere* emphasizes the contrast between the trained lions' customary calm and their sudden rage. The poet remarks that their manes droop and that *puduitque relatum/aspicere, et totas duxere in lumina frontes*, "they were ashamed to watch him brought back and they all furrowed their brows over their eyes" (2.5.14-15). The lions' silence contrasts with the groans of the human spectators. The *pudor* and anger the lions feel at the ignoble death of their fellow-creature finds no counterpart in the audience's grief. I find that the animals suffer more with their dead comrade than does the human audience in the amphitheater. Though Statius does attribute a certain amount of *pudor* to the dying lion (even if it does not overwhelm him) (2.5.17), it is really in his anger that the dying lion resembles his fellows. As Newlands and Van Dam have

noticed, the domesticated animal's "natural" character returns in its dying moments.[114] The lion forgets the training it received at the hands of humans and attempts to attack the wild beast that dealt it the fatal wound. No longer is it content calmly to let loose the prey that it captured (2.5.4).[115] The tame lion and his fellows thus react in similar fashion to his unnatural wounding. While the spectators feel sorrow on behalf of the lion, they are not affected in tandem with it to the same extent that the members of the lion community are. If sympathetic suffering is predicated upon the recognition of a certain kinship with the sufferer, perhaps the human spectators' comparatively subdued response to the death of the tame lion, who was only ever an animal/human hybrid, is understandable.

What bearing does this discussion of interspecies sympathy have on the reaction of masters and patron to the deaths of beloved slaves and freedmen? I have shown that the *pueri* whom Statius and his addressees mourn are, like pets, bound to their masters by purely fictive kinship relations. If Statius could persuade his addressees that that their favorite *pueri* were not so fundamentally a "part" of them as kinsmen would be, their symptoms of suffering might be alleviated to some degree. Of course, Statius, writing as he was to potential patrons, had to do so delicately in order to avoid insulting his addressees.[116] He therefore could not deny outright that the pain they experienced was understandable. In what follows, I shall demonstrate that the freed children and the slave *do* indeed comprise part of their masters' selves, but not quite in the same way that biological offspring, legitimate family members, would. They extend their masters insofar as they are (or functionally remain) their property, not because they are of the same

[114] Newlands writes: "Ironically, when the tamed lion here reverts to 'nature', it reveals its true nobility and courage and acts like an epic hero" (2011, 198n. 16-30). See also Augoustakis 2007, 213.
[115] Of course, Statius' attribution of anger and shame to lions also endows them with "human" feeling. See Augoustakis 2007, 215 for this view. In its dying moments, then, the lion is a man/animal hybrid. It belongs to neither the human nor animal communities fully.
[116] For the relationship between poet and patron in the Flavian era see Nauta 2002 and White 1975.

substance. The masters therefore experience a kind of sympathetic reaction to the loss of their "attached faithful ones." But the fact that property is replaceable, Statius implies, may ultimately temper the master or patron's suffering.

Prosthetics

What may we imagine the extension of the master would involve, since we have seen that a slave is not, in the manner of biological offspring, a continuation of the physical substance of his master? Is the process a physical one? An epistle of Seneca may provide a model. The philosopher, despite his reservations about investing too heavily in externals, suggests that the wise man should not necessarily be confined to his body. In an epistle to Lucilius on the matter of friendship, Seneca writes: *Se contentus est sapiens. Hoc, mi Lucili, plerique perperam interpretantur, sapientem undique submovent et intra cutem suam cogunt,* "The sage is self-sufficient. This, my Lucilius, many interpret incorrectly, for they isolate him completely and they force him within his skin" (*Ep.* 9.13). In the following parts of the letter, Seneca goes on to say that the sage may acquire friends, marry, and have children. Do these relationships force the sage outside of his own skin, then? Seneca appears to be hinting that by forming such connections, the sage extends himself beyond the limits of his own body. Seneca may be speaking figuratively, but the idea that someone might transcend the boundaries of his physical body merits further consideration. From this notion may arise an intercorporeal model of human relationships, in which the self is merely a point in a network of relations. Statius, I contend, unlike Seneca's wrong-headed interpreters of self-sufficiency, fuses the bodies of the masters and boys whom he depicts. I shall claim, however, that despite so doing Statius maintains the unequal character of the bond between the master and slave or patron and freedman. The slave may be incorporated somehow into his master's body, but the poet never depicts the occurrence of the reverse.

Statius' attitude is typical of imperial authors. Sarah Blake has recently argued that slaves in the Roman Empire served as prosthetic extensions of their masters.[117] Blake draws on evidence from Pliny the Younger's description of his famous uncle to illustrate this claim, noting that, in his nephew's account, Pliny the Elder was constantly surrounded by slaves who took his dictation, read to him, and even dressed him. Examining Pliny the Younger's language, she concludes:

> The actions that Pliny's anonymous slaves perform are indicated predominantly in the passive voice, which effectively transfers their actions back into Pliny's possession, blurring them with his own body's movements. The slaves that attend Pliny's body might be best understood here as 'prosthetic limbs.' Any actions performed under the auspices of 'Pliny the Author' can uniformly be considered 'Pliny's actions'; that is, the slave bodies act just as authentically for Pliny as his own body does. The texts produced by Pliny the Author are no less his own because they have passed through slave ears, eyes, and hands.
>
> (2012, 194)

Blake's discussion of slaves as prosthetic limbs remains highly metaphorical. She considers the ways in which slaves "attend" to the bodies of their masters and perform menial tasks on their behalf, but does not discuss fully the manner in which slave masters regarded the bodies of their slaves as "part" of themselves.[118] To take an example from Pliny's corpus, consider the epistle in which Pliny discusses his belief in phantoms. There, Pliny's dreams about his slave boys turn out to be about their master.[119] Pliny tells his addressee Sura that these "phantoms" cut the hair of several of his freedmen and slaves in order to signify that Pliny would escape prosecution by Domitian. He reasons: *quia reis moris est summittere capillum, recisos meorum capillos depulsi quod imminebat periculi signum fuisse,* "because it is the custom for defendants to grow out their

[117] Blake's discussion is surely influenced by the recent posthuman turn in the humanities. Compare, for instance, Katherine Hayles' assertion that " the posthuman view thinks of the body as the original prosthesis we all learn to manipulate, so that extending the body with other prostheses becomes a continuation of a process that began before we were born" (1999, 3). On such a view, slave owners' extension of themselves via slave prosthetics is unsurprising. In fact, Blake herself elsewhere calls the Roman slave master a cyborg (2016, 100).
[118] Blake goes further in this regard elsewhere (2016).
[119] William Fitzgerald sees a similar phenomenon in *Satire* 2.7 when Davus admonishes Horace: "the slave as metaphor is overlaid by the slave as metonym: the part of the master that is his self –consciousness" (2000, 18-19).

hair, the cut hair of my slaves was a sign that the danger which had hung over me was removed" (*Ep.* 7.27.14). Pliny treats the hair of his slave boy and freedman as his own; the fact that the boys' hair was cut by the ghosts signified that Pliny would not have to grow his hair long. This anecdote illustrates Russell Belk's contention that "in claiming that something is mine we also come to believe that the object is me" (1988, 141).[120] Of course, this "prosthetic" extension of Pliny's body does not involve an actual artificial limb, and so the use of the term "prosthetic" remains a metaphor to a degree. But this anecdote does imply the actual expansion of Pliny's body to include another physical body.[121]

There is a similar phenomenon in the *Silvae.* While Statius would not himself have used the language of prosthesis to describe the relationships between masters and their favorites, his description of the connections between the two groups suggests that the terminology is more than metaphorically appropriate. Glaucias, Philetus, and Statius' *pueri* come to comprise in some sense part of their masters' bodies. Since these boys lived in extremely close proximity to their masters and patrons, and their bodies intertwined with those of Melior, Ursus, and Statius, the implications of these close bodily connections are important to consider. Some recent critics would argue that this kind of touching would inevitably result in a kind of "inter-" or "trans-" corporeality between boy and master.[122] Their analysis concludes that touch, the temporary contact of two surfaces, blurs the boundaries between the entities involved. This idea is relevant because it provides a model whereby the slave or freedman hanging onto his master could

---

[120] Blake has more recently called the Roman slave master a "shifting coalition of tools," all of which compose the master's extended self (2016, 100).

[121] Compare this anonymous comment in "Negro and White Slavery" in the *Southern Quarterly Review:* "We love our negroes…As a larger family, associated in the same home interests, in the same hopes and the same fears, they are of *us*—a part of ourselves (1851,123)."

[122]Theorists in the tradition of Merleau-Ponty would cite his "circle of the touched and the touching" which involves a near reversibility between the object of touch and the one doing the touching (1968*,* 143). For a full discussion of this position see Cataldi 1993. Others of a more Deleuzian bent might speak of the "sensorial flows and movements" between bodies and things as a result of their "affective entanglements" with one another. See e.g. Hamilakis 2014, 116.

become a "part" of his body. While most contemporary theorists of touch rely on the insights of twentieth-century philosophers, ancient conceptions of the senses allow for similar conclusions.

Aristotle's discussion about the medium of touch is particularly suggestive in this regard. According to Aristotle's theory of sensation, an object directly in contact with a sense organ cannot be perceived. In order for perception to occur, the object and sense organ must be separated by an intervening medium. For the so-called non-contact senses this medium is something like water or air. But what is the medium of touch? Aristotle argues that it is flesh. The sense organ of touch, he argues in *De Anima*, is something internal. Aristotle felt that touch was different from the other senses insofar as we perceive tangible objects at the same time as the medium: αἰσθανόμεθα…τῶν δὲ ἁπτῶν οὐχ ὑπὸ τοῦ μεταξὺ ἀλλ᾽ ἅμα τῷ μεταξύ, ὥσπερ ὁ δι᾽ ἀσπίδος πληγείς· "but we perceive the things touched not through the medium but at the same time as it, just as a man struck through his shield" (*De An.* 423b14-16). The idea that the medium, usually something external, should be physically part of the body of the perceiver results in boundary confusion.[123] Rebecca Goldner argues that Aristotle's position results in "the concept of the flesh as kind of limit of the external and the internal" (2011, 442). What happens, then, when skin touches skin? Do bodily exteriors and interiors meet? Michel Serres' description of skin and the sense of touch does not seem like an inadequate answer:

> The skin is a variety of contingency: in it, through it, with it, the world and my body touch each other, the feeling and the felt, it defines their common edge…I do not wish to call the place in which I live a medium, I prefer to say that things mingle with each other and that I am no exception to that, I mix with the world as it mixes with me.
>
> (2008 [1985], 80)

The subtitle of Serres' work is, fittingly, "A Philosophy of Mingled Bodies." I would say that the intimate touches shared by the masters and boys of the *Silvae* result in the same "mingling" of

[123] Jean-Louis Chrétien formulates this problem quite well: "Strange as well is the theme of an enveloping flesh surrounding us like a garment or natural surface. Who, us?" (2004, 126).

their bodies. Serres' description of touch, however, has an affirmative exuberance that I do not think appropriate for my analysis. Instead, I believe that Blake's insistence on the subordinate status of the slave owner's "prosthetic limb" is relevant. Master and slave may mingle, but the slave is always the "extra" appendage (from the master's perspective). This is not to say, however, that the "prosthetic limb" has no status and power of its own at all.[124] As we shall see, the separation of man and prosthesis involves some violence.

I begin my consideration of these issues in the *Silvae* with the portrayal of Melior and Glaucias. The metaphorical imagery that Statius uses to describe the "*alumnus*" relation supports Blake's interpretation of slaves as prosthetic extensions. Statius compares foster children to grafted limbs (*transertos…ramos*) which grow higher on a foreign tree than they would have on their own parent trees (2.1.101-2). Grafted tree limbs are not dissimilar to prosthetic limbs. They are foreign elements that are artificially fused with a new trunk. But Statius also includes details outside the realm of metaphor that confirm Glaucias' attachment to Melior's body. Statius recalls how Glaucias would steal Melior's *inceptas…ab ore dapes,* "half-chewed food from his mouth" (2.1.60). The logistics of the theft would require that Glaucias and Melior be conjoined (at least temporarily) at the mouth. Indeed, their bodies often seem connected. I have already noted that Melior's and Glaucias' limbs were apparently often intertwined (*artis nexibus*, 2.1.63) in the morning. Statius describes how Glaucias would *in ora manusque prosiliet brevibusque umeros circumdabit ulnis*, "leap on [Melior's] head and hands and surround his shoulders with his small arms" (2.1.65-6). In the midst of his lament for the lost beauty of Glaucias, Statius mournfully recalls: *heu lactea colla/bracchia quo numquam domini sine pondere cervix!* "Alas for the milky

[124] For a discussion of slave agency more broadly see e.g. MacLean 2012 and Connolly 2014, 166ff.

neck and the arms whose weight was always upon the neck of the master" (2.1.50-1).[125] Melior and Glaucias seem to share the same body space. Glaucias' weight affects his master's posture and the way in which Melior holds his neck. Skin unites with skin. Man and boy form an assemblage. In the confusion of entangled limbs, the boundaries between master and freedman become difficult to discern. Glaucias, "permanently" fastened to his master's neck, extends Melior's body.

Glaucias fulfilled other bodily functions for his patron. Man and boy were so attached to one another that, Statius tells us, Glaucias regulated Melior's internal composition to a certain extent. Glaucias apparently possessed the power to soften Melior's anger and Statius laments his inability to continue to do so: *accensum quis bile fera famulisque tumentem/leniet ardentique in se deflectet ab ira*, "who will calm you when you are inflamed and swelling with angry bile against your slaves and who will deflect you from your burning anger to himself?" (2.1.58-9). As Statius' formulation makes apparent, many Romans believed that anger was associated with a physiological change in the body. Van Dam points out that the bile, one of the bodily humors, "swells and seethes" in an angry person (1984, 104n58-9).[126] By moderating Melior's bile, Glaucias made an impact on his master's internal constitution and health. The idea that a slave should regulate his master's wrath is unusual. While several Roman thinkers wrote treatises about the management of anger, none advocated that a favorite slave boy could help moderate that anger. Seneca, for instance, deplores the fact that men assent to anger when their slaves misbehave (*De Ira* 3.35). The philosopher relates a famous anecdote about Socrates' attitude

[125] I am following Carole Newlands' text. M reads (unmetrically) *bracchiaque*. Courtney prints *bracchiaque [et] numquam domini sine pondere cervix*, which would suggest that it was Glaucias' neck rather than Melior's which was burdened. It would not matter (much) to my argument if this were the case. Either reading supports my notion that the two were intimately connected to one another.

[126] Vivian Nutton has shown that not all medical practitioners subscribed to the same "Hippocratic" theory of the four humors which Galen professed, but does note that "phlegm and bile are frequently mentioned in both medical and non-medical sources from an early date" (2005, 115).

toward the punishment of slaves: *Inde est, quod Socrates servo ait: "Caederem te, nisi irascerer." Admonitionem servi in tempus sanius distulit, illo tempore se admonuit*, "It's for this reason that Socrates said to his servant, 'I'd beat you if I weren't angry.' He delayed the admonishment of his slave until a healthier time, but at that moment admonished himself" (*De Ira* 1.15.3). Seneca's emphasis here is on the sage's ability to regulate his own passions. The emotional therapy he imagines is a personal one, with the slave playing no role in tempering his master's ire. In fact, the slave's behavior is the cause of the master's emotional distress, not of his relief. In managing Melior's anger, Glaucias is thus performing an action that his patron ought to perform himself. Glaucias, in Blake's terms, is "acting on behalf" of his master.[127] Once again he appears to be his master's extension.

Glaucias fulfills Blake's definition of a human "prosthetic" in multiple senses. He both performs actions "under his master's auspices" and is a physical extension of his body. Statius' young infant did not yet "act" for his master, but does function physically as a prosthetic limb. Indeed, Statius and his *puer* almost appear to have formed one entity prior to the latter's demise. Statius complains: *morientibus ecce lacertis/viscera nostra tenens animamque avellitur infans,* "behold, that infant holding my viscera and soul with his dying arms is torn away" (5.5.8-9). Gibson believes that *viscera* should be read in a figurative sense, as "the innermost parts of the body regarded as the seat of thought, emotion" (2006, 398n9). As a result, he finds the physicality of the boy's *morientibus lacertis* in comparison a bit difficult to explain. I contend that the reader is supposed to understand *viscera* more literally than Gibson does. [128] After all the

[127] We might compare Glaucias' regulation of Melior to an epigram of Martial's in which the poet describes how a slave helps his master urinate: *et delicatae sciscicator urinae/domini bibentis ebrium* ***regit*** *penem*, "and prober of the delicate urine, guides the drunken penis of his drinking master"(3.82.16-17).

[128] Ultimately, he concludes that because Statius can say elsewhere that a woman could embrace a man "with [her] *viscera* and *anima*" (5.1.47) it is not "an abuse of language" to say that a dying child could hold onto a soul and *viscera* with his arms (2006, 398n9).

distinction between *viscera* as the seat of emotion and *anima* as soul or vital part (*OLD* 3-5) is not particularly strong. Furthermore, Statius emphasizes elsewhere in the poem the bodily intimacy he shared with the child: *primo genitor quem protinus ortu/implicui fixique mihi,* "whom as a father from the first moment of his birth I embraced and fixed to myself" (5.5.80-1).[129] The use of *implicui* is striking. The verb is often used to mean "enwrap" or "entwine" and thus strongly suggests the intercorporeal relation between Statius and his boy. Statius heightens the sense of their entanglement in the final lines of the poem. He ends with the image of the child in his arms: *blandoque sinu iam iamque <cadentes>/permulcere genas,* "and in gentle embrace I soothed his already drooping eyes" (5.5.84-5). The connection between Statius and the boy in both of these cases is physical. Indeed, Statius makes it seem as though the child was a kind of permanent appendage, "attached" to the poet at the time of the child's birth.

Although Statius does not provide as much detail about Ursus and Philetus as he does about Melior and Glaucias, the poet nevertheless leaves the reader with a strong sense of the pair's intimate attachment. Their very bodies seem linked to one another. In the midst of various laments about the cruelty of the Fates and Fortuna, Statius reintroduces the personified *Invidia* who was the cause of Melior's grief: *sed gnara dolorum/Invidia infelix animi vitalia vidit/laedendique vias*, "inauspicious *Invidia*, clever in causing pain, saw the vital parts of my soul and the paths of wounding me" (2.6.68-9). The metaphorical use of the term *vitalia* here is striking in itself. Usually, the word refers to specific parts of the body, such as the interior of the thoracic cavity or the intestines (André, 1991).[130] But the relationship that Statius imagines

[129] I am following Gibson's text here. M reads *implicuit fixitque mihi*. This reading would entail a dramatic change of subject from Statius to the boy. However, the subject of the verbs does not change my argument that the boy served as kind of physical extension of Statius.

[130] There is even a sense in which the "*anima*" that Statius refers to could be physical. *Anima* often refers to breath (*OLD* 1-2). Both the Stoics and Epicureans believed in a physical soul. Furthermore, Statius elsewhere claims to have seen the *anima* of Glaucias *plorantemque…sua funera* (2.1.22).

between Philetus and Ursus is particularly unusual. Carole Newlands points out that where *Invidia* embraced (*complexa*) the boy in 2.1, here she aims at the master (2011, 216n69). *Invidia* acts as though Philetus himself comprises part of Ursus' *animi vitalia* (2.6.77ff). [131] The associations of *vitalia* with the body heighten the sense that Philetus is physically part of Ursus.[132] The suffering of Philetus' body thus resulted in the "wounding" of the master. Indeed, the pair's simultaneous experience of pain fits the definition of ancient sympathy that Brooke Holmes has proposed; he and the boy are "affected in tandem" (2013, 148-9).

The poem contains further evidence of such a sympathetic response. In the days prior to Philetus' death, Statius recounts, *Nemesis* attacked the boy's beauty: *carpsitque immitis adunca/ora verenda manu,* "and, savage, plucked at the face to be revered with her curved claw" (2.6.78-9). Statius' description of Ursus' grief suggests that the master tried to replicate these wounds by turning his own hands against himself: *non saevius atro/nigrasset planctu genetrix tibi salva lacertos,* "not more savagely would your living mother have blackened her dark shoulders in lament" (2.6.82-3). Statius even worries that his consolation has inflamed Ursus' desire to die by reminding him of Philetus' excellent qualities: *subdo/ipse faces*, "I myself supply the torches" (2.6. 14-15). Carole Newlands recalls that this is the phrase commonly used to describe the lighting of the funeral pyre (2011, 205n14-15). Statius metaphorically suggests that the grieving Ursus has cast himself on the pyre.

Ursus' experience is by no means unique. Melior, too, had been ready to suffer the injuries that his favorite endured. In describing Glaucias' seven-day illness and death, Statius refers to the ravages of disease asking the *Parca*: *quo, diva, feros gravis exseris ungues?,*

---

[131] Later it will be *tristis Rhamnusia* that actually deploys her *adunca manu* against Philetus, but both Van Dam and Newlands point out that *Nemesis* behaves as *Invidia* herself does in 2.1 (1984, 433n72-5; 2011, 217n74-5).
[132] See Habinek 2016, 20n57 for a similar observation about the relationship between Philetus and Ursus in this poem, though his understanding of the extension of personhood is rather more metaphorical and abstract than mine.

"against whom, cruel goddess, do you stretch out your savage claws?" (2.1.138). The Fate's unsheathed, wild talons apparently dealt the boy fatal wounds. Melior endured similar, if less fatal wounds. In one of the opening images in the poem, Statius describes Melior's grief as a physical wound: *abruptis etiamnunc flebile venis/vulnus hiat*, "even now the lamentable wound gapes with cut veins" (2.1.3-4). One could imagine that the talons of the *Parca* would create such a metaphorical wound. Furthermore, as Carole Newlands notes, cutting one's veins (*vena abrumpere*) was a common form of suicide (2011, 67n3-4). In this initial description of his friend's grief, Statius foreshadows Melior's thwarted suicide. Statius later reports that he barely constrained Melior when he attempted to join Glaucias and had *complexumque rogos ignemque haurire parantem*, "embraced the tomb and was preparing to drink the fire" (2.1.24). Melior's desire to commit suicide betrays a desire to suffer and die in sympathy, to share the condition of his dead freedman.

Statius is not as explicit about his own sympathetic suffering with the dead infant as he is about Melior's or Ursus' attempts to suffer like their boys. Yet he does provide subtle indications that he shared something of his boy's fate. Statius repeatedly likens himself to a corpse. He tells the audience that he is *adclinis* at the boy's tomb (5.5.25). He later adds: *absumptae vires et copia fandi/nulla mihi*, "my strength is sapped and I lack the ability to speak" (5.5.49-50). Statius lies prostrate on the ground like a dead man. He has no strength and cannot speak. [133] In an address to his boy, he asks his beloved to forgive the poor quality of his poem: *ignosce, puer: tu me caligine mersum/obruis,* "forgive me, boy, you overcome me sunken in darkness" (5.5.52-3). Gibson observes that the phrase *caligine mersum* often refers to the darkness that overcomes a person about to lose consciousness (2006, 416n52). Statius once again casts himself as a nearly dead man.

[133] For the various associations of the phrase "*absumptae vires*" with weakness and death see *TLL s.v. absumo* C.

It is not immediately clear why the disconnection of a mere "prosthetic extension" should produce the dramatic effects in masters and patrons that Statius describes. As David Wills correctly remarks, a prosthesis is defined by its "nonintegrality, detachability, and replacement" (1995, 71). However intimate one's relationship with a prosthesis, there must always be some sense that it is "other."[134] If we imagine a typical prosthetic limb, there must be a place where plastic, metal, or wood and flesh meet one another. The person wearing the limb might incorporate it into his sense of self, man and prosthesis might comprise a unified assemblage, but that limb will always be detachable. Why should this separation be painful or trigger a sympathetic reaction? Levi Bryant's discussion of what he calls "machinic assemblages" may help us to understand why a slave's loss is figured as a physical wound. Bryant explicates a passage from Deleuze and Guattari's *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia* in which they discuss how a smith's hammer and anvil affect his body. In this scenario, the tools and the smith comprise part of a single assemblage. The hammer, for instance, extends the smith's hand as it simultaneously interacts with the anvil. Yet the elements in the assemblage retain something of their individual characters and have the power to affect one another. Bryant claims the authors' point to be that "the smith's body takes on a new form and set of dispositions as a result of his interaction with other corporeal bodies or machines such as the hammer…The repetition of these movements with his hammer and anvil creates certain muscular dispositions, the capacity for certain operations" (2014, 127). In an analogous way, the masters' daily interactions with their slaves, whom they have come to depend on as prosthetic extensions of themselves, have shaped their own body schemas. For instance, Glaucias had regulated Melior's bile. The weight of Glaucias' body on Melior's shoulders would have affected such bodily habits

[134] Compare, for instance, Vivian Sobchack's discussion of her own prosthetic. She views it as part of her "whole body" unless there is a problem that "provokes a sense of irritation at the alienated body object that I "have" rather than transparently and intimately "am" (2010, 62).

as his patron's posture and mode of walking. Similarly, Statius' body had become accustomed to the weight and touch of his boy. The idea that death should "tear" the "infant" from Statius' physical *viscera* thus makes sense. The loss of the boy *did* result in a drastic bodily readjustment for the poet.[135] The demise of the slave therefore has an effect on the master's functioning; the boy's death "wounds" the master and he responds in kind.[136] In this sense, the master and slave or patron and freedman suffer in tandem. Bryant's re-interpretation of Deleuze and Guattari is appealing, though, because it acknowledges both the agency of the tool and the master without losing sight of the asymmetrical dynamic of power between the two.[137] Bryant sees that one element in an assemblage may be "alienated in the operations of another" (2014, 130). [138] In other words, although the anvil may have the power to change the orientation of the smith's body, the smith ultimately puts the hammer and anvil to his own use. The destruction of the hammer or anvil would affect him, but the loss would not be fatal. Similarly, there is an obvious hierarchy between master and slave or freedman. After all, it is likely that these boys were the objects of what we would call sexual abuse. I argue that Statius reminds his addressees (and himself) of this asymmetrical power dynamic in order to diminish the intensity of the master's sympathetic suffering with the favored boy and thus to assuage his grief. The master, the poet implies, can survive the loss of his prosthetic.

---

[135] Blake has recently observed something similar of Pliny's emotional distress over his sick slaves: "Illness as rupture here has made visible aspects of the physical world that typically go unnoticed" (2016, 96). However, she suggests that Pliny also wants to purify himself, to separate himself as an individual from the collective of the *familia (*97). I do not see this phenomenon in Statius' consolations.

[136] David Konstan also speaks of loss as a "kind of amputation," but does so in a largely figurative sense without considering intercorporeal connections (2013b, 141).

[137] Deleuze and Guattari have been accused precisely of ignoring this power dynamic. For a discussion of the possible critiques from a feminist perspective see Grosz 2001.

[138] Bryant puts the case very clearly: "Many machines…might strive to transform their machinic parts into docile bodies, but this forever remains an *ideal* never fulfilled in practice. There are always subterranean plots, machinic intrigues, tiny acts of treason, and furtive acts of disobedience" (2014, 130). For a discussion of small acts of disobedience by slaves see e.g. Genovese 1976.

Clearly, one could not reasonably expect that a Roman would actually kill himself in order to achieve "full" sympathetic suffering with his biological child. However, I would say that the manner in which Statius tries to persuade Melior, Ursus, and, to a certain extent, himself, to curtail any such sympathetic endeavor differs from the method he would have used to console a parent.[139] Statius' rhetoric makes clear that the slave or freed boy is only part of his master insofar as he is (or essentially remains) his property. As we have seen, his consolations remind his addressees that the slave or freedman belongs to his master in a fundamentally different manner than a son does. Further, Statius suggests to Melior and Ursus that a new slave, a new self-extension could be easily acquired. It was more difficult for the Romans to imagine that a son could be fully replaced.[140]

In order to illustrate this last point, I shall examine Statius' own depiction of the death and funeral of the infant Opheltes in the *Thebaid,* in which the poet considers at some length the differences between a foster parent and biological parents. The relationships in this episode, of course, differ from those in the *Silvae.* The enslaved Hypsipyle is nurse to the royal infant Opheltes, whose biological parents still live. But Hypsipyle nevertheless conceives of herself as the boy's "mother" in some sense. In her lament after the boy's untimely death, Hypsipyle recalls that she suckled the child with her *ubera…materna,* "maternal breast" (*Th.* 5.617-8). This maternal bond, however, is not quite like the one shared by biological relatives.[141] As Antony Augoustakis has noticed, Hypsipyle acknowledges that her infant charge was a kind of substitute

[139] As I acknowledge elsewhere in the chapter, Statius' lament for his boy does not contain a strong self-exhortation to stop grieving, indeed the poet seems almost proud of his grief at times (5.5.59-65). But his characterization of his boy as property is similar to the pattern one finds in the formal consolations. It is therefore plausible that the finished poem was a self-consolation. For the view that 5.5 stages the failure of consolation see Gibson 2006, xlvi-l. I find that Gibson overstates the case, however.

[140] Clearly, a biological child could in some sense be "replaced" with another by adoption. Seneca even advocates that Marcia accept her granddaughters as substitutes for her dead son (*Marc.* 16.8). A master, however, could replace a slave with less complication by purchasing a new one or by engaging in slave breeding.

[141] See Augoustakis 2010, 39 for a similar observation.

for her own children (2010, 54). She claims: *mihi desertae natorum dulcis imago*, "you appear to desolate me the sweet image of my sons" (*Th.* 5.608). The term *imago* here is important. It signifies both Opheltes' similarity to Hypsipyle's twins and his difference from them. He resembles her lost children, but this similarity falls short of coincidence. Opheltes might occupy a position in Hypsipyle's affections analogous to that of her biological sons, but he apparently could not fully replace them.[142] Indeed, when Hypsipyle is reunited with her children shortly after Opheltes' death, Statius asserts that she momentarily forgets the loss of the infant: *cesserunt luctus, turbataque munere tanto/corruit, atque alio maduerunt lumina fletu,* "[her] mourning ceased and surrounded by so great a gift she fell down and her eyes grew wet with a different kind of tear" (*Th.* 5.727-8). Meanwhile, Opheltes' biological mother Eurydice attempts to commit suicide at her son's funeral (*Th.* 6.35-8) and vigorously laments that she entrusted her precious son to an untrustworthy stranger: *alienos impia partus,/... silvaeque infamis tramite liquit,* "this undutiful woman left another's child…on the path of a notorious wood" (*Th.* 6.154-5).[143] Eurydice further acknowledges that while Hypsipyle fulfilled the functions of a mother during the infant's life, she alone remained the dead child's mother (*nunc ego*) (*Th.* 6.165-7). Eurydice even attempts to have Hypsipyle removed from Opheltes' funeral, crying: *quid se funesta parenti/miscet?* "Why does she, mournful, insinuate herself with the parent?" (*Th.* 6.182-3). While Eurydice's accusations about Hyspipyle's disregard for Opheltes are exaggerated, Eurydice's sense of total bereavement does form a contrast with Hypsipyle's ability to find

[142] Lucretius also hints at the irreplaceability of biological children. The distraught cow he describes in Book 2 who searches in vain for her slaughtered offspring refuses to allow the other calves in the field to distract her from her grief because *usque adeo quiddam proprium notumque requirit*, "she so urgently seeks her own and well known [offspring]" (*DRN* 2. 366). Lucretius describes the other calves as *aliae species*, "foreign looking" (2.364). The opposition between *aliae* and *proprium* is especially important. *Proprium* can of course refer to personal property, but can also refer to members of the same family or *gens* (*OLD* 2c). The cow's family tie to her calf may thus be said to prevent her from enjoying the charms of the "other" calves who might replace her own in her affections.
[143] For a discussion of Eurydice's own failures as a mother, see Newlands 2006, 208.

solace in her own children. Ultimately, Statius implies that the biological bond differs in an essential way from constructed kinship relations.[144]

Statius' poetry does not provide the only evidence that certain Romans harbored an understanding of the uniqueness of biological bonds. A brief comparison with the reaction of another Roman to the death of his children demonstrates the differences perceived between a Glaucias or Philetus and a biological child. Quintilian's response to the death of his two sons in the preface to the sixth book of his *Institutio Oratoria* provides a contemporary viewpoint. Quintilian's account is particularly important because the orator informs his readers that this son had been adopted into a consular family in order to improve the child's prospects: *Tene consulari nuper adoptione ad omnium spes honorum propius admotum, te avunculo praetori generum destinatum,* "you were recently moved closer to the hope of all honors by adoption into a consular family, you were destined to be the son-in-law and nephew to a praetor" (*Inst. Or.* 6 *praef* 13). But the adoption appears to have been little more than a political convenience. The boy's adoption did not disrupt the uniquely intimate bond between biological father and son. It was, after all, Quintilian, not the adoptive father, who received his dying son's final breath (*Inst. Or.* 6 *praef.* 12). Furthermore, Quintilian continued to conceive of his son as a part of his extended self. Quintilian tells his readers that he wished to cast his oratorical treatise on his elder son's pyre: *infaustum opus et quidquid hoc est in me infelicium litterarum super immaturum funus consumpturis viscera mea flammis inicere,* "to throw this ill-omened work and whatever unlucky letters are in me above that premature pyre with its flames that will consume my innards" (*Inst. Or.* 6 *praef.* 3). Notably, Quintilian refers to his dead son as *viscera mea*. Donald Russell translates this as "the fruit of my loins," but in doing so he obscures the fact that

[144] This observation is also largely borne out in the *Achilleid.* Although Chiron certainly loved Achilles, it is Thetis' love for her son that dominates and even precipitates the action of the epic.

Quintilian speaks about his son as though he were actually a part of his body. In this respect, Quintilian minor receives treatment similar to that of Philetus in Statius' poem. Quintilian, however, describes his son as the repository of his future hopes in terms that Statius does not use of Glaucias, Philetus, or his own boy.

Quintilian tells the reader that, despite the adoption, he relied upon the boy as his sole hope after the death of the child's mother and brother: *in quo spem unicam senectutis reponebam,* "in whom I placed the only hope for my old age" (*Inst. Or.* 6 *praef.* 2). Later, Quintilian admits: *Una post haec Quintiliani mei spe ac voluptate nitebar,* "after this I relied only upon the hope and pleasure of my Quintilian" (*Inst. Or.* 6 *praef.* 9).[145] Finally, Quintilian addresses his dead son as *o meae spes inanes,* "o, my vain hope" (*Inst. Or.* 6 *praef.* 12). Quintilian makes clear that he had hoped his son would take up his own career as an orator, even admitting that he had intended his oratorical treatise to be a part of his son's inheritance (*Inst. Or.* 6 *praef.* 1). His language thus suggests that he depended upon his son both to support him and to carry on his legacy.[146] The relationship between Quintilian and his biological child was of a more permanent nature than the one Statius describes between master and slave or patron and freedman. Statius never makes the claim that he or Melior or Ursus relied upon their favorites to be the future bearers of their legacies. In 2.1, Statius does employ the trope that a child might make old age endurable, claiming that Glaucias was a *domino requies portusque senectus,* "a respite for his master and the haven of his old age" (2.1.71). But this formulation differs from Qunintilian's in several important ways. First, as Newlands points out, Statius refers to Melior as a *dominus* rather than a father, emphasizing Glaucias' subservience to him (2011, 84n70).

[145] See Konstan 2013b, 144 for a similar observation about Quintilian's relationship with his son.
[146] We find similar sentiments on some surviving epitaphs. For instance, one reads: *Cernis ut orba meis, hospes, monumenta locavi/et tristis senior natos miseranda requiro./**Exemplis referenda mea est deserta senectus*** (*CE* 369). The idea that the bereaved will be neglected in their old age is relatively commonplace (Lattimore 1962, 184-91).

Further, Statius speaks of Glaucias as though he had been his patron's present source of enjoyment rather than the guarantor of his future reputation. In the following line, Statius clarifies that Glaucias was his master's "respite" in the sense that he was his plaything, not the vehicle of his ambitions, stating: *tu modo deliciae*, "you were just now [his] pet" (2.1.72).[147] The reader is forcefully reminded that Glaucias never filled the role of a biological child. Indeed, Statius suggests instead that a Glaucias or a Philetus was an easily replaceable commodity.[148]

It is clear even on the level of structure that Glaucias and Philetus function as property, even though the former had been formally freed. In the second book of the *Silvae,* Statius praises variously his friend Pollius' Surrentine villa, Melior's pet parrot, a tree on Melior's Caelian estate, and a tame lion. We have already seen that Statius compares Philetus to pets. The boys are treated as objects among others.[149] Here, comparison of the *pueri* with actual prosthetics from antiquity may be productive. Though there are few extant prosthetic appendages from the Classical period, those that we know about seem to have been cosmetic accessories. The only extant prosthetic leg from the Classical period, for instance, is covered in decorative bronze sheets. Lawrence Bliquez remarks that the wearer of the prosthetic "must have cut quite a fashionable figure" (1983, 29).[150] Similarly, Martial refers on more than one occasion to prosthetic teeth (the most common prosthetic device to survive from the period) as *emptos,* "purchased," emphasizing their status as commodities designed to improve one's appearance.[151] The human prosthetics whom Statius depicts are more precious than the others, more difficult to

---

[147] For a discussion of the status of *deliciae* see Laes 2010 and Rawson 2003.
[148] See Zeiner 2005, 166 for the opposite view. While she is correct that Statius asks who will now amuse Melior (2.1.56ff), this is not the same as saying that Glaucias was Melior's "only hope."
[149] See Busch 2013 for a similar argument. The only exception is the book's final poem, which was written for the occasion of the dead poet Lucan's birthday. Statius does claim that Glaucias, a *verna,* was never on sale at the slave market (2.1.73). This does not mean he was not property, however.
[150] See also Bliquez 1996, 2670-2671. The cosmetic function of the leg is particularly important because Bliquez casts doubt on the functionality of the leg.
[151] See *Ep.* 1.72, 5.43, and 1.72.

live without, but they remain objects nonetheless.[152] For instance, at Glaucias' funeral Melior burns a number of precious perfumes, including Cilician saffron and Indian spices together with the boy's corpse (2.1.160). But Statius says that Melior wanted to make an even more extravagant gesture: *cupit omnia ferre/prodigus et totos Melior succendere census/desertas exosus opes,* "lavish Melior wished to bring out all his goods and to burn his whole fortune, hating his deserted wealth" (2.1.162-4). There are a few noteworthy elements in these lines. First, much as in 2.6, the various spices and perfumes share the dead boy's fate. More important, however, is Statius' reference to Melior's *desertas opes*. The adjective *desertas* is a curious choice. Why emphasize that Glaucias "deserted" Melior's wealth rather than the man himself? This might simply be a case of a transferred epithet, but it is a telling one. As it stands, the line gives the sense that Melior "hated" his deserted wealth because Glaucias no longer numbered amongst those possessions. Without Glaucias, Melior's other wealth seems worthless to him.

It is not just that the dead Glaucias becomes one object among others. Glaucias's status as a commodity during his lifetime (even after manumission) becomes obvious when Statius praises Melior for clothing the boy. This is a bizarre moment in the poem. Statius has been describing Glaucias at the moment of his death. The youth is about to turn twelve, on the cusp of boyhood and manhood, and growing at an alarming rate (2.1.124-7). Suddenly, Statius adds that the boy was always outgrowing his clothing and takes the opportunity to describe the various outfits that Melior purchased for his *alumnus*:

> *cum tibi quas vestes, quae non gestamina mitis*
> *festinabat* ***erus****? brevibus constringere laenis*
> *pectora et angusta telas artare lacerna,*
> *enormes non ille sinus sed semper ad annos*
> *texta legens, modo puniceo velabat amictu*

[152] In an interesting passage in *The Ignorant Book Collector,* Lucian tells the story of a rich man who made himself wooden prosthetic feet after an accident resulting in the amputation of his feet and used both the feet and the support his slaves to move around (6). The prosthetic feet and slaves are both used as extra appendages in this story.

> *nunc **herbas imitante** sinu, nunc dulce rubenti*
> *murice; tum **vivis digitos incendere gemmis***
> *gaudebat;*
>
> Since what outfits, what decorations did your sweet master not hastily prepare for you? He would constrain your breast with small tunics and contract the fabric with a narrow cloak, choosing cloth not for long folds but always in accordance with your years; now he would cover you with a scarlet garment, now with a fold imitating grass, now with sweetly blushing purple; then he delighted to set fire to your fingers with vivid jewels. [153]
>
> (2.1.128-135)

This eight-line excursus is most revealing.[154] Statius refers to Melior as Glaucias' *erus*, a word most often used of slave masters. There is no pretense that Glaucias is Melior's son here, although a son might expect similar indulgence. Statius goes on to mention that the only thing missing from Glaucias' ensembles is the *tunica praetexta* of a freeborn youth (2.1.136).[155] The very clothing he wears marks his unfree birth. The passage also has the effect of transforming Glaucias into an object. Despite his putative freedom, he is a vehicle whereby Melior can display his wealth.[156] Statius indicates that Melior spared no expense in dressing his *deliciae*; Van Dam explains that tight fitting clothes were fashionable and more costly than loose fitting garments which the boy might not have outgrown so quickly (1984, 131n128-35).[157] Walter Johnson observes that slave traders in the antebellum American South dressed slaves in order to increase their appeal on the market: "This was the traders' version of necromancy—the magic that could steal a person and inhabit their body with the soul of another—the forcible incorporation of a

---

[153] My translation owes a debt to that of Shackleton-Bailey, with certain modifications by Van Dam.
[154] I am following Van Dam's text here. Newlands follows Courtney in emending M's *telas* to *nolens* on the grounds that "otherwise these lines would suggest Melior's cruelty in constricting the boy in tight garments for fashion's sake rather than his considerate choice of clothing" (2011, 97n. 129-30). Courtney's *nolens* is a drastic emendation, and there is no reason to assume that any Roman reader would find Melior's behavior particularly "cruel." As I have observed, slaves were maltreated with great regularity.
[155] By contrast, Lauren Hackworth Petersen has emphasized how often freed slaves erected memorials on which they were depicted wearing the toga of the citizen (2009, 209). See also Sebesta 2005, 113 for the observation that children in *praetextae* were "not to be sexualized." Cleary, this restriction did not apply to Glaucias.
[156] See Slater, "Pueri, Turba Minuta", 1974 for a discussion of ornamental slave boys and the conspicuous consumption of their masters. Even Bernstein acknowledges that Glaucias served as Melior's ornament (2005, 272).
[157] Melior surely also turned Glaucias into an erotic object, much as the elegiac poets did when they "dressed" their *puellae* in diaphanous Coan silks. For more on the dress of elegiac *puellae* see Keith 1994, Wyke 1994.

slave with a slaveholder's fantasy" (1999, 134). Although Melior was not preparing Glaucias for sale, he paid no more attention to the boy's desires when adorning his boy for public display than such traders did those of their victims. Statius tells us that Melior's adornments constrained the boy's body (2.1.129). We learn that Melior "delighted to set fire to [Glaucias'] fingers with vivid jewels." Glaucias apparently had no control over his *digitos* which Melior adorned in accordance with his own desires.[158] In other words, Melior treats Glaucias as though he were a doll. Furthermore, after his description of Glaucias' various fashions and the crowd of attendants surrounding him, Statius quips, *haec fortuna domus,* "such is the fortune of the house" (2.1. 137). In context, it seems as though Statius must be referring to the felicity and prosperity of Melior's household.[159] It is unclear exactly what the antecedent of *haec* is. Shackleton Bailey translates: "Such the fortune of the house." But what constitutes this *fortuna*? Is it the lavish clothing and jewelry that Melior could afford, the *turba comes*, or Glaucias himself? Freedman and material wealth are nearly equivalent to one another.

This slippage between boy and property is made possible by the fact that the property appears surprisingly animate. Statius shows that objects can have "human" qualities, which allow owners to become invested in commodities. However, they never quite lose their status as property. Statius' discussion of Glaucias' adornment illustrates this tension. The objects in this passage are not passive. One garment "imitates" grass. The rings on Glaucias' fingers are "living" (*vivis*).[160] Glaucias was in some sense also a "living" object. The personification of all

---

[158] In fact, Seneca lists among his examples of the inhuman treatment of slaves the compulsory adoption of luxurious and effeminate dress (*Ep.* 47.7).

[159] Fortuna may also refer explicitly to "wealth" or "property" *OLD*12. Furthermore, Hanne Nielsen has shown that *vernae* were often thought of as a symbol of the household's wealth (1991). Horace describes a group of *vernae* as the *ditis examen domus,* "the troop of the wealthy house" (*Ep.* 2.61).

[160] For this metaphor about stones generally see Plumpe, 1943. For the argument that the ancients thought that certain minerals were actually "living" see Halleux, 1970. There is actually a great deal of similarity between Glaucias and the rings. At the end of the poem Statius asks that Glaucias appear *vivis vultibus* to Melior (2.1.232).

these things transforms them into something like what Gillian Brown has termed "sentimental possessions." She makes the case that "possession…[is] a personalization of things which supplements and transmutes the thing's objecthood: once a thing becomes familiar through the association ownership entails, it seems (more) personal, more self-expressive of its owner" (1990, 42).[161] She suggests that this process of personalization involves an apparent mutual empathy between the object and its owner.

Statius gives us a clear sense of this connection between master and object in his lament. I noted earlier how intimately connected Glaucias was with Melior, how the boy served almost as a permanent appendage of his patron. 5.5 records a similar "empathy" between Statius and his *puer.* Statius even claims that he and the child were "self-expressive" of one another: *risus et a nostro veniebant gaudia vultu,* "your laughter and delight came from my face" (5.5.87). The so-called empathy between owner and object that sentimental possession entails, of course, has its limits. Brown concludes that the fact of sentimental possession does not eliminate the master's proprietorship of an object. It merely defines such an object as a "protected and properly valued" possession (1990, 41). Statius makes clear that the young child was functionally his property, despite his free status. The poet is adamant that he did not buy the child from a Pharian ship (5.5.66). But despite the fact that the boy did not disembark from a ship with other slaves, Statius does not deny the child's servile origin. The boy was actually an especially prized possession because he was a *verna.* As with the others discussed above, this freed slave continued to be identified by his slave past. And though the poet ultimately freed the boy, he apparently continued to exhibit a possessive attitude toward him, remarking: *meus, ille, meus*, "mine, he was mine" (5.5.69).

There is obviously a certain irony in asking a dead man to appear with "living features." There is a similar irony involved in referring to the "lives" of precious stones.

[161] See also Lori Merish's discussion of "sentimental ownership" and slavery in *Uncle Tom's Cabin* (1996, 17-19).

Igor Kopytoff argues that although a beloved slave may possess some qualities of a "singular individual" in a master's mind, the slave "continues to have a potential exchange value" (1986, 212). In other words, sentimental possessions retain the qualities of property, including transferability and fungibility.[162] The manumission of Statius' *puer* might have protected him from exchange in a slave market, but Statius hints that, though freed, Glaucias remained transferable. When Statius finally gets down to the business of exhorting Glaucias to weep no more, he inserts a curious description of Glaucias' life in Elysium. There, we learn, Glaucias meets Melior's deceased friend Blaesus, who takes him up and agrees to fulfill Melior's role in the boy's "life" (2.1.191ff). Blaesus does so after he realizes that the child was the *rari* ***pignus*** *amici*, "the token of his dear friend" (2.1.200). *Pignus* often refers to a pledge or security for a debt, reminding the reader that Glaucias was a kind of possession (*OLD* 1).[163] The Romans did sometimes call children *pignora*, but usually did so in a metaphorical sense as the guarantees of a marriage (*OLD* 4). Blaesus and Melior were not married and Glaucias was not their child.[164] Indeed, it is in this same line that Statius refers to Glaucias as Melior's *delicias*. This plaything has been transferred to the care of Blaesus, perhaps in recognition of a debt that Melior owed his friend. Though the poet promises that Glaucias continues to "remember" his former master (2.1.206), it is clear that, for all practical purposes, that he has become an erotic object for Blaesus. Statius recounts that Blaesus plies his charge with the "gifts" available to lovers in Elysium—"sterile branches," "silent birds," and "faded flowers" (Newlands 2011, 113n203-4). Furthermore, Glaucias is incorporated into Blaesus' body schema much as he had once been into

[162] Stephanie Smallwood finds that the process of commodification involves defining and imagining things "in the terms that best facilitate their exchange and circulation" (2004, 293).
[163] We might compare this with Seneca's claim that Marcia's father welcomed her son in the afterlife (*Ad Marc.* 25. 2). Blaesus initially mistook Glaucias for a descendant of his, but soon realized his mistake (2.1.199-200).
[164] Glaucias' earlier characterization as property heightens the economic resonance of the term here. Pace Van Dam 1984, 68.

that of Melior. Blaesus binds (*ligat*) the child to his neck and carries him in his hand (2.6.202-3). Perhaps the knowledge that his former sentimental possession was in safekeeping might be of some comfort to Melior.[165] Furthermore, having transferred the boy to his friend, Melior might more freely find a replacement for Glaucias. The boy was initially Melior's *amissi…solacia Blaesi,* "the solace for his lost Blaesus" (2.1.201).[166] If the boy could serve as a consolation for the loss of Blaesus, there is no reason that Melior could not find another boy to serve as one for Glaucias.

Statius ends the poem by suggesting that Glaucias make an epiphanic appearance to his former master. This request might seem like an indication that Statius imagined that Melior and Glaucias could continue to carry on a relationship. But, in the final two lines of the poem, Statius makes clear that he asks for Glaucias' return for the express purpose of his "introducing into favor" (*insinuare*) his *desolatemque sororem*, "desolate sister" and *miseres…parentes,* "wretched parents" (2.1.233-4). The verb *insinuare* occurs only rarely in Statius' extant corpus. As my translation suggests, its basic sense is "to introduce into favor." Carole Newlands makes the attractive suggestion that the verb retains something of the sense of its component parts, *in sinu*. She argues that the final image is thus of Glaucias "enfolded in his family" (2011, 120n234). I would counter that the breast in question belongs to Melior. Glaucias should enfold his family in his patron's bosom, allowing them to enjoy the same proximity and intimacy with Melior that he did while alive. This would seem to suggest that these figures could replace Glaucias in Melior's affections. Austin Busch has even conjectured that the sister could replace Glaucias as an object

[165] It must be noted that Glaucias is allowed to remember his master and we know that he merely "shares" his love for Melior with Blaesus (2.1.206-7), so Statius is not imagining that the affection between the pair is fully transferred. See Rühl 2003, 121 for the view that Glaucias is irreplaceable.

[166] The disparity in rank between Blaesus and Glaucias does pose a conundrum. Why was Glaucias a suitable substitute for Blaesus? This question is further complicated by the fact that we have no real way of identifying Blaesus. It is possible that he was Junius Blaesus, an anti-Flavian aristocrat who served under Vitellius during the civil wars of 64 (Hardie 1983, 67).

of sexual interest (2013, 93). We know that Glaucias' parents had been freed (2.1.77-8), but it is more than possible that his sister remained Melior's slave. In other words, Statius imagines that Glaucias may be replaced in his master's affections by others who "belonged" to him. Although Statius ostensibly directs these remarks at Glaucias, he has included it in a poem dedicated to Melior. Statius reminds his addressee of the assets that he continues to hold. It would seem that the latent knowledge that a slave or a freedman was a renewable commodity mitigated his loss.

There is warrant for this view in the way that Statius writes about Ursus and Philetus. The poet's discussion of Philetus follows a pattern similar to that used of Glaucias. Statius again includes subtle references to Philetus' status as property, implicitly comparing Philetus to various other sources of Ursus' wealth. Statius laments that Ursus should have lost his favorite slave rather than his estates at Locri, Pollentia, Lucania, and elsewhere to natural disasters (2.6.61-65). This comment suggests that Philetus was even more valuable than Ursus' other property. It is significant that Statius does not tell Ursus that he would bear the loss of a father, mother, or spouse with greater equanimity.[167] Philetus was apparently comparable only to other possessions.

More can be discovered in the language that Statius uses to express this sentiment. The poet assures Ursus: *o quam divitiis censuque exutus opimo/fortior, Urse, fores*, "would that you had rather been stripped of your money and your high census rank, Ursus" (2.6.60-1). The metaphorical use of *exutus* here is quite interesting. Financial loss is figured as the stripping away of clothing. Thus the comparison of Philetus to a garment is implicit in this lament. Because we know that Ursus had not been stripped of his wealth, it must be his slave's loss that had denuded him. Like Glaucias, Philetus is represented as his master's accessory. Yet the image Statius provides of Ursus is one expressive of extreme vulnerability. The naked Ursus appears

[167] See Zeiner 2005,122 for a similar view.

incomplete somehow. Scholars of dress, arguing that clothing becomes part of a person, have formulated this idea in various ways. Eicher and Roach Higgins refer to dress as "an assemblage of modifications and/or supplements to the body" (1992, 1). More recently, Stephen Seely has rejected the idea of the dress as "supplement," insisting rather that garments and bodies form an entity wherein "the molecules, fibers, and textures of the fabric endlessly fold in and out of the surfaces of the body, as skin and cloth, organic and nonorganic, body and thing become one (2013, 250-1).[168] Extending the metaphor of master as body and slave as garment, one might say that the master and slave were fused in the manner that Seely imagines. Seely's model helps to illustrate once again why a master exhibits sympathy with a commodity or sentimental possession: the slave and master form a single assemblage. When Philetus dies, Ursus' very body is affected by the change. Once again we can conclude that Ursus suffered with Philetus because the slave boy was in some sense part of him.

But the slave/commodity's fungibility mitigates this loss in the long term. Clothing may be easily replaced. Statius' final consolatory move is to suggest to Ursus that either Fate will give him "another Philetus" or *forsan et ipse dabis, moresque habitusque decoros/monstrabis gaudens similemque docebis amorem,* "perhaps even you will give [yourself another Philetus], and you will show him the proper customs and clothing and joyfully will you teach a similar love" (2.6.103-5). [169] Ursus has the ability to purchase another slave whom he can dress up and display and teach to love him. This new slave, Statius insists, could easily replace the part of the master that was destroyed when Philetus died. Ursus has the opportunity and the means to

[168] See also Puar 2007, 193.

[169] The text here is very difficult. Newlands, whose text I tentatively follow, accepts Shackleton Bailey's emendation of *dabit*, *docebit*, and *monstrabit* to the second person. She sees a reference to the end of Virgil's second *Eclogue* where the Corydon consoles himself *invenies alium….Alexin* (2.73). The parallel is very nice, and it is even more attractive in light of the interpretive difficulties presented by the third person verbs. Vollmer (1898, 372n104) simply suggests that Philetus will find a new boy for Ursus, but provides no parallel for a dead person finding and training a new lover. Van Dam retains the text of M, but is clearly unsatisfied (1984, 449n103-5).

reassemble himself. According to Statius' logic, the particular slave who forms part of his master's extended self does not matter. Another slave will do.[170] The sympathy between a possession and its owner need not long outlast the former's demise.

Audience

Although Statius ostensibly dedicates Book II of the *Silvae* to Melior, the poetry was intended for much wider publication and consumption. Where does this larger audience fit in the networks of kinship and belonging that I have been tracing? What emotion might Statius' depiction of suffering elicit among these readers? To what would an audience's grief be directed, with what intensity, and with what limits?

In answering these questions, I shall turn to some comparative material, again from the modern era. In the decades preceding the American Civil War authors with abolitionist tendencies produced a spate of "sentimental novels" about slavery. These works depicted in graphic detail suffering of slaves; scenes of savage beatings and families separated at the auction block were typical of the genre. The novels were intended to arouse the sympathy of (white) readers for the plight of the slave and to persuade them to support the abolition of the "peculiar institution."[171] The most famous of these books was Harriet Beecher Stowe's *Uncle Tom's Cabin.* Stowe concludes her novel with the exhortation to her readers that they "feel right," reminding them that "An atmosphere of sympathetic influence encircles every human being; and the man or woman who *feels* strongly, healthily and justly, on the great interests of humanity, is a constant benefactor to the human race" (1852, 452).[172] Stowe seems to insist here upon the

[170] See Rühl 2003, 120 for a similar observation.
[171] Pro-slavery authors retaliated by publishing sentimental novels of their own. *The Planter's Northern Bride* is a good example of the genre.
[172] Stowe's views on the "humanity" of the slave are actually much more complicated than this excerpt suggests. Scholars have often felt that Stowe espoused a racial essentialism. For a discussion of Stowe's views on the matter, see Donovan 1995 and Riss 2006, 63-70.

humanity of the slave, his or her inclusion in what Cicero might have termed the natural *societas* of the race. Stowe is even more explicit in her *A Key to Uncle Tom's Cabin* (1853), where she observes:

> There is one way of studying human nature, which surveys mankind only as a set of instruments for the accomplishment of personal plans. There is another, which regards them simply as a gallery of pictures, to be admired or laughed at as the caricature or the beau ideal predominates. A third way regards them as human beings, having hearts that can suffer and enjoy, that can be improved or be ruined; as those who are linked to us by mysterious reciprocal influences, by the common dangers of a present existence, and the uncertainties of a future one; as presenting, wherever we meet them, claims on our sympathy and assistance (138).

The sympathetic orientation that Stowe advocates necessitates the simultaneous rejection of an instrumental view of human nature and the adoption of the stance that humans are connected by "reciprocal bonds" that permit mutual feeling. Stowe refrains from even using the word "slave" here, instead focusing on the sympathetic unity of all mankind.

Stowe's theorization of sympathy is indebted to the moral sense philosophy of the Scottish Enlightenment discussed in the Introduction. It is easy to see why such a theory was attractive to thinkers like Stowe. According to Adam Smith's formulation of the process by which sympathetic sentiment was aroused, visible signs of cruelty could induce similar physical sensations in a viewer. Margaret Abruzzo explains: "The *sight* of a whip descending on a victim's back produced sympathetic cringes in the backs of observers" (2011, 71). Yet Adam Smith and David Hume also both emphasized that distance negatively impacts the potential for sympathy. Adam Smith harshly criticized those "whining and melancholy moralists" who expected that sympathy should be aroused on behalf of "those miseries which we never saw, which we never heard of" (quoted in Abruzzo 2011, 72).[173] As we saw before, Smith's sympathy

[173] Compare Hume: "In general, it may be affirm'd, that there is no such passion in human minds, as the love of mankind, merely as such, independent of personal qualities, of services, or of relation to oneself" (2007[1739-40],

depended upon spectatorship. Man could acquire the knowledge necessary for sympathy with another when he was close enough to actually see him (Forman-Barzilai 2010, 142). Stowe's rhetoric, however, appears to dismiss some of the problems theatricality and distance posed for sympathy. After all, *Uncle Tom's Cabin* brought the sufferings of slaves directly into the homes of the American middle class.[174] Readers were not meant to look upon the sufferings of the characters as a "gallery of pictures," but to recognize them as fellow humans.[175]

How do these debates of the eighteenth and nineteenth century relate to the thinking of antiquity? Certainly Statius' audience would not have exactly shared Hume or Smith's definition of sympathy. And where an abolitionist like Stowe strove to arouse sympathy for the sufferings of slaves, Statius, I would say, focuses his attention less on the travails of the slaves and freedmen in their final illnesses than upon the intense suffering of their grieving masters.[176] But the kinds of questions that the moral sense philosophers posed about how proximity and distance affect the capacity for feeling may also be applied to Statius' poetry. The problem of distance is particularly acute in the case of these consolatory poems. I have shown that the masters' sympathetic responses to the deaths of their favorites were the result of the habitual intimacy.

---

309). However, Smith and Hume's thinking on this matter seems to have been inconsistent. See Jervis 2015, 108ff for a discussion of the various discrepancies and contradictions in their work.

[174] Scholars, however, have often found Stowe's brand of abolitionist sentimentalism problematic. Simon Strick has argued that such sentimental literature actually reinforced the distance between whites and blacks. Black bodies suffered while white bodies felt sympathy (2015, 12). For a discussion of Smith and Hume's views on vivid descriptions and sympathy, see Forman-Barzilai 2010, 144.

[175] See also Christopher Castiglia's argument that "sympathy was form of surveillant discipline...in which the black sufferer must imagine himself or herself always in the eyes of whites, becoming a body shaped by the idea of a body" (2002, 37).

[176] Statius does not work very hard to bring the boys' actual suffering "home" to the audience. For instance, Statius does not pair his detailed description of Glaucias as he was in the bloom of health with a description of his final illness. Much of the detail about that illness is couched in metaphor or is idealized. Although Statius makes an elliptical mention of the *feros…ungues* of Fate (2.1.138), he ultimately insists that the boy's seven day illness left his *puerile decus* intact (2.1.155). Elsewhere, Statius refers to the *Parcis fragiles urgentibus annos*, "the Fates straining his fragile years' (2.1.148). This line gives some sense of Glaucias' vulnerability and the painful nature of his illness, but it does not even begin to approach the level of detail in something like Thucydides' account of the Athenian plague. In fact, one of the few details that Statius provides of Glaucias' final illness is that as death approached his *frigentia lumina torpent*, "cold eyes grow numb" (2.1.146). The opacity of the boy's eyes prevents the audience from really knowing the boy.

Readers, unlike a Melior or an Ursus, would not have considered the boys as their quasi-children or even their property. Their connection to the *deliciae* would have necessarily have been much less intimate than that of the addressees. They would have been in the position of Smith's distant spectator. Could Statius bring his subjects into intimate enough proximity to his readers that they would experience something akin to the pain of the bereaved?[177]

Whether or not vivid description could sufficiently reduce the distance between an audience and a sufferer to allow for imaginative suffering was of particular interest to the ancients. Roman theorists of the subject studied the process by which an audience might be moved in hearing about events at which it had not been physically present. Quintilian suggests that emotions may be aroused by vivid mental images, which the orator calls *fantasias* (6.1.28). In using the term he is drawing on a tradition beginning with Aristotle and the Peripatetics and elaborated upon by the Stoics. Aristotle described *phantasia* as something like the faculty of imagination and involved mental images (Sheppard 2014, 9-10).[178] A temporary encounter with a sense object left a kind of imprint on the mind, and the resulting image (*phantasma*) retained something of the affective power of the original object in question (Moss 2012, 59-60).[179] For instance, Aristotle explains that the thought and *phantasia* of painful and pleasant things are nearly always μετὰ ψύξεώς τινος καὶ θερμότητος, "accompanied by a certain cold or warmth"

[177] Of course, not all audience members will have reacted in the same way. Statius' poems had a potentially diverse audience. The poems' addressees Melior and Ursus were both wealthy men (and the latter seems to have been of equestrian rank). It is difficult to say more about either man, because our information about their biographies comes from the poetry of Statius and (in Melior's case) Martial. It is possible that Ursus was the Ursus who served as suffect consul under Domitian (Hardie 1983, 69; Newlands 2011, 21, Van Dam 1984, 391). But some of the readers will have been elite men of senatorial rank, and most, if not all, would have owned slaves. But the audience might well have included literate slaves (perhaps someone like Cicero's *anagnostes*) and imperial freedmen. Their reactions to the poems may have differed in certain respects from those of freeborn readers.

[178] This is not an unproblematic interpretation. For a discussion of *phantasia* and mental images see additionally Sorabji 2004, xiv-xix and Nussbaum 1978.

[179] See Aristotle's own formulation of this idea at his *Rhetoric* 1370a. Jamie Dow summarizes: "So Aristotle sees the passions as involving sensory pleasure and pain, which itself involves an exercise of *phantasia*, itself a particular kind of exercise of the capacity for sensation" (2015, 193).

(*MA* 8.702a1).[180] In other words, *phantasia* could recreate the physical and emotional experience of encountering a given object. Orators in the 1st centuries BC and AD had adapted such ideas about *phantasia* to suit their own purposes, but seem to have been influenced by Aristotle's account of the affective qualities retained by mental images (Bussels 2013, 63-4).[181]

Despite the mental image's ability to transport the reader to the scene of tragedy, theorists were unsure how efficacious *phantasia* was in producing strong emotion. Seneca says that an *atrox pictura* has the power to move man's mind inadvertently, by the same mechanism that spreads laughter from one man to another. But, he maintains, these inadvertent movements of the mind *non sunt irae, non magis quam tristitia est, quae ad conspectum mimici naufragii contrahit frontem…sed omnia ista motus sunt animorum moveri nolentium nec adfectus sed principia proludentia adfectibus*, "these are not anger, any more than that is sadness, which contracts the brow at the sight of a mimed shipwreck…but all these are the movements of souls not wishing to be moved, nor are they emotions, but the initial preludes to emotions" (*De Ira* II.2.5). Seneca's analysis of these *principia proludentia* is based on a Stoic understanding of emotion, which requires rational assent to an impulse. However, Quintilian also speaks about the emotions aroused by orators as *illa quam dicendo effinximus imago*, "that image which we make by speaking" (6.1.28). Quintilian and Seneca acknowledge that a vivid description or picture does not quite recreate the experience of actually being involved in a tragedy. Despite the orator's best

[180] These changes result in animal movement, as David Charles explains: "As a result of these changes in temperature, that part of the body which initiates movement changes in size in the way required to move the limbs of the body" (2011, 84).

[181]The Stoics did not make the same distinction that Aristotle did between *phantasia* and *phantasma*, but simply believed that *phantasiai* were the impressions that we receive from the things which "appear to us" (Sheppard 2014, 10-12). For more on the continuing use of the Aristotelian notion in imperial literature see Webb 1997, 234. Most often orators meant something like "visualization." As Quintilian's comments suggest, the orator's task was to transmit a set of these mental images to the audience, to "put them before the eyes" of the listeners so that they could be moved (Webb 2009, 117). While Cicero and the author of the *Rhetorica ad Herennium* do not specifically mention *phantasia*, they speak of similar phenomena. Cicero speaks of *evidentia* and *inlustratio*. The author of *ad Herennium* writes of ocular demonstration (Bussels 2013).

efforts to transport his audience elsewhere, *phantasia* always imply some distance between spectator and object. *Phantasia* may bring the spectator to the scene of some tragedy, but he retains a sense that the suffering is over "there." Despite this caveat, it is important to still remember that the *imago* of an emotion did have real consequences. Seneca talks about the physical movement of the soul that the *atrox pictura* causes. Quintilian's *imago* might have less staying power than a real emotion, but he nevertheless believed that an audience could shed real tears in response to it.

Statius himself was highly schooled in the rhetorical tradition (Hardie, 1983). His own imagery is very vivid (often explicitly ekphrastic). In other words, the poet would not have been unaware of *phantasia'*s capacity to arouse the emotions. His consolations do contain the kind of rich description discussed above. In Statius' graphic descriptions of Melior's grief, he tells how Melior surpassed with his flailing arms the *bracchia matrum*, the arms of mothers (2.1.23) and how he beat his breast and kissed the dead boy's cold lips (2.1.171-3). As we have already seen, Statius compares Ursus' bruised arms to those of a mourning mother (2.6.82-3). Ruth Webb has noticed that Quintilian believes that familiar imagery was most effective at arousing emotion in an audience (2009, 121).[182] In comparing, therefore, Ursus' behavior and appearance to the conventional image of a grieving mother, Statius helps his readers to imagine the appearance of the distraught man. In his own lament, Statius asks readers to observe the symptoms of his grief: *cernite fletus/liventesque genas et credite planctibus orbi*, "behold my tears and my bruised cheeks and believe in the cries of the bereaved" (5.5.11-12). Such details would certainly allow readers to vividly imagine his suffering, to feel as though they were present at the scene that the poet describes.

[182] She argues that this is because the audience must be able to imagine what the orator describes: "They, too, have souls stocked with images, derived from sense perception, or from shared cultural knowledge. The speaker's words act as triggers for the retrieval of stored images which are recombined as necessary" (2009, 121).

But Statius is not content to simply offer readers the images that might cause them to shed tears of pity; the poet's depiction of his own feelings in 2.1 provides a model of how a reader might be expected to react. After all, the poet was also an observer of the events surrounding Glaucias' death. Significantly, Statius' description of his reaction to the affair suggests that his experience had more elements of proper sympathy or "co-affection" than purely spectatorial pity. The poet flaunts his credentials as a mourner, making it clear that he sympathizes with Melior in his grief. Statius reminds his audience that the Romans have heard *me fulmine in ipso*, "me in the midst of the thunderbolt" (2.1.30). He makes a proleptic reference to his grief upon the death of his father (2.1.33-4). The poet further imagines himself as part of a community of fellow-feelers: *ego iuxta busta profusis/matribus at<que> piis cecini solacia natis*, "I have sung solace to pious mothers prostrate by the tombs and pious sons" (2.1.31-2).[183] But Melior's suffering seems particularly to affect Statius. Statius depicts himself as an almost equal partner in Melior's grief.[184] He begs: *comitem sociumque doloris/si merui luctusque tui consortia sensi*,/*iam lenis patiare precor*, "now I pray that you, gentle, endure me as a companion and compatriot in sorrow, if ever I have merited it and have felt fellowship in your mourning" (2.1.29-30).[185] The emphasis here is on the poet's status as *socius* and *comites* to his grieving friend.[186] The poet also tells the audience that when he saw Melior beating his breast and tearing his garments while prostrate on the ground by Glaucias' tomb, *horror habet sensus*, "horror held my heart" (2.1.166). Statius describes his own reaction here in physical terms. *Horror* often referred to a shudder or tremor. Van Dam glosses *sensus* as "heart" (1984, 152n

[183] Carole Newlands sees the same communal mourning in 2.6. Statius claims that he fans the flames of Ursus' grief (*subdo ipse faces*). Newlands comments that the phrase suggests "his solidarity with the bereaved and hence his authority to write this poem" (2011, 206n14). Pace Rühl 2003, 123.
[184] Zeiner notices a similar phenomenon (2005, 162-4).
[185] Laes 2010, 248-9 makes a similar observation. Rühl believes that Statius often has an ulterior motive in calling himself his addressee's *socius doloris* (2006, 163).
[186] For the importance of friendship and patronage in Statius' *epicedia* see Rühl 2003.

166). Statius claims, then, that the sight of Melior's grief had a violent bodily effect on him. Furthermore, the *horror* that Statius experiences is sympathetic; he relates that one of Melior's physical manifestations of grief was a *barbarus horror* (2.1.169). Melior's physical symptoms provoke an involuntary physical response in Statius.

Furthermore, Statius actually seems to share something of Melior's suicidal intentions. We have seen that Statius prevented Melior from killing himself. But reconsideration of the line shows that Statius was hesitant to stop his friend. *Vix tenui*, Statius writes, *similis comes offendique tenendo*, "scarcely did I restrain [you], a similar comrade, and I offended by restraining" (2.1.25). In Van Dam's words, this is "a line full of paradox" (1984, 87). Statius' characterization of himself as Melior's *similis comes* is puzzling.[187] Even as he restrained his friend, Statius implies that he also wished to kill himself.[188] It is evident that Statius' emulation of Melior's feeling is the result of his having enjoyed a relationship with Glaucias similar to that of his friend. In the preface to the second book of the *Silvae*, the poet makes the tantalizing remark: *Glauciam nostrum…† apud te complexus amabam iam non tibi †* (*Praef.* 5-7).[189] While commentators have not reached a consensus about what the obelized portion of the line means, all agree that Statius claims to have loved Glaucias (and, like Melior, enjoyed his embraces). Statius apparently enjoyed a relationship with Glaucias that was a less intense imitation of the one between the boy and Melior. It therefore follows that his reaction to Glaucias' death should

[187] Here, we might be reminded of Eliza Robert's claim that her correspondents both "know what that feeling is." Roberts apparently focused on the "feelings" of privileged (white) mourners rather than on her slave's fate.

[188]Timothy Hill has argued that suicide for the Romans did not have the same associations with privacy that self-killing does for contemporary Anglo-Americans. He believes instead that the Romans, influenced by Stoic ethics, felt that "Individuating or idiosyncratic action and motivation are therefore relevant only insofar as they affect the agent's ability to engage with other elements in [a] relational matrix" (2004, 71). Suicide, according to Hill, was one such socially driven action. It should therefore not be surprising that Statius viewed Melior's attempted suicide as an event in which he could take part.

[189] Here is the full text: *Glauciam nostrum, cuius gratissima infantia et qualem plerumque infelices sortiuntur † apud te complexus amabam iam non tibi. †* (*Praef.* 5-7). The function of *iam non tibi* is unclear. Shackleton Bailey and Calderini have suggested that it must be understood with *amabam*, with the sense "I loved [the most charming infant], no longer for your own sake[i.e. Melior's]." Van Dam and Vollmer construe *gratissima infantia* with *iam non tibi*: "whose charming infancy no longer belonged to you." Newlands, whom I follow, despairs of a solution.

mimic, however faintly, that of Melior. Most readers, of course, would not possess Statius' personal familiarity or affection for Glaucias, but I propose that the poet's discussions of the *pueri* are designed to make the audience feel as though they possess an intimate knowledge of the deceased and therefore to experience pain at the knowledge of their loss.

The poet provides the audience with quite vivid, erotic descriptions of the boys at the height of their beauty, making his audience feel as though they are in the presence of these beautiful creatures, only to remind them that the boys are gone forever. The audience is made strongly aware of Philetus' attractive figure. Indeed, the most vivid images of Philetus that Statius provides are those describing his beauty. In a seven-line excursus, Statius details the boy's features: his manly face, his *blandi* eyes, his downy cheeks, and his simple hair (2.6.38-45). Statius ends this catalogue by comparing Philetus to paragons of youthful beauty: Paris (2.6.25), Achilles, as he was when Thetis hid him on the *litore virgineo,* "virgin shore" (2.6.31), and Parthenopaeus, as he was *bellus iam casside visu*, "beautiful to see in his helmet" (2.6.43). All of these figures are "feminized" in the Greco-Roman mythological imagination. Such comparisons could help the audience feel as though they were in close proximity to Philetus. After all, orators emphasized that tropic language could help achieve *enargeia.* The author of the *ad Herennium* defines *similitudo* as "a manner of speech that carries over an element of likeness from one thing to a different thing. This is used to embellish or to prove or clarify or to place *ante oculos*" (4.45.59). Statius' mythological comparisons qualify as *similitudines* insofar as they assume likeness between Philetus and figures of myth. Statius' figurative language thus make this desirable boy seem as though he is in close proximity to the reader.

Statius' description of Glaucias appearance is also erotic, as Asso and Busch have established, and may have appealed to readers at that level. For instance, Statius also compares

Glaucias to a flower that is about to die: *velut primos exspiraturus ad austros/mollibus in pratis alte flos improbus exstat,* "just as a flower about to die at the first storm winds stand in the soft fields shamelessly high" (2.1.106-7). The imagery, Carole Newlands points out, recalls the famous similes at Catullus 11.21-4 and *Aeneid* 9.435-7 (2011, 92n106), both of which appear in erotic contexts. In the former, Catullus compares his love for Lesbia to such a flower. In the latter, Virgil writes of the beautiful youth Euryalus. Statius elsewhere laments the lost beauty of Glaucias in place of the child himself: *o ubi purpureo suffusus sanguine candor/sidereique orbes radiataque lumina caelo/et castigatae collecta modestia frontis/ingenuique super crines?*, "o where is that whiteness suffused with purple blood, and starry eyes furnished with rays from heaven, and the compact modesty of your smooth brow, and your hair (worthy of one freeborn!) above" (2.1.41-4). Statius' description of the *puer*'s blush hints at a kind of erotic innocence.[190] As R.O.A.M. Lyne has shown, in a discussion of Lavinia's blush (*Aen.* 12.64-9), the Romans saw connections between blushing and *amor* (1983). [191] But the poet's portrait does more than advertise Glaucias' desirability; he conveys something of his virtue and modesty. Van Dam has noticed that the abstract quality *modestia* is visible in the boy's wrinkle free skin (1984, 96n43). The eyes, which Statius also describes, also convey information about the boy's inner qualities. Van Dam and Vollmer suggest that the language Statius uses to describe these features of Glaucias has physiognomic undertones (1984, 96n43). Glaucias' eyes are "starry orbs" and "furnished with rays by heaven."[192] The eyes were important physiognomic markers, and

[190] The contrast between the purple blood and the whiteness of the skin was one that clearly appealed to Statius (see Seo 2013, 133). In an eroticizing description of the youth Parthenopaeus' death, Statius writes: *ibat purpureus niveo de pectore sanguis*, "purple blood spurt from the snowy white breast" (9.883). For Parthenopaeus and the tradition of the "beautiful death" see Seo 2013, 125. Seo suggests that it is the boy's very beauty that necessarily leads to his downfall.

[191] For references to blushes in an erotic context see: Prop. 2.3.10, Catull. 61.185 ff, Tib. 3.4.30ff. See Busch 2013, 70 for a discussion of Glaucias' blush in similar terms.

[192] I use Newlands' translation, although the precise meaning of *radiata caelo* is not clear.

brilliant or starry eyes were often signs of a great or divine character.[193] According to physiognomic theory, the mutual affection of the body and soul allow the body to serve as marker of interior states (Boys-Stone 2007). The reader thus simultaneously perceives the child's attractiveness and worth.

The feeling of erotic desire and admiration that these descriptions of Glaucias or Philetus might arouse in a reader would parallel the connection between the boys and their masters, albeit without the fiction of kinship. The death of these boys could then result in an analogous feeling of loss. A reader might thus experience sympathetic suffering with the bereaved masters. Of course, as Quintilian and Seneca would emphasize, this *imago* of emotion would not be of the same intensity as the grief experience by a Melior or an Ursus. A reader might not even feel as much sympathy with these men as Statius claims to have done. But, certainly, readers could begin to understand what prompted Melior's grief. As Nauta suggests, Statius justifies his addressees' behavior to his broader audience. And Statius accomplishes something else; he provides all his readers with a consolatory logic that might be useful to them. Not only could the knowledge that Glaucias or Philetus were replaceable commodities assuage any grief that readers might feel in reaction to their deaths, but readers might apply this lesson to similar experiences of their own. The poet does subtly suggest that the audience could expect to feel such pain at some point. In the world of the *Silvae*, grief has a contagious quality.

Comparison with Statius' lament for his own boy corroborates this idea. In this poem, the consoler himself needs consolation. The poet begs those whom he had formerly comforted for succor: *nunc tempus, amici,/quorum ego manantes oculos et saucia tersi/pectora: reddite opem, seras exsolvite grates*, "now is the time, friends, whose running eyes and wounded breasts I have

[193] See Suetonius' account of Augustus' eyes at *Aug.* 79.2. See Evans 1969 for a full discussion and Rohrbacher 2010 for qualifications of her positions. I do not argue that Statius is using specific scientific terminology here, but that he has what Evans calls the physiognomic consciousness.

dried: return the favor, pay back your late thanks" (5.5.43-5). Here, more than in 2.1, Statius acknowledges limits to sympathetic suffering. There is undoubtedly a kind of temporal disjunction between Statius and those whom he once consoled. Statius recalls the many times in the past when his poems served as salves for the wounds of the bereaved: *ille ego qui (quotiens!) blande matrumque patrumque / vulnera, qui vivos potui mulcere dolores*, "I am that one who (so many times!) was able to sweetly soothe the wounds of mothers and fathers, and living sorrows" (5.5.38-9). Statius' ability to soothe the bereaved *blande* provides a sharp contrast with their wounded bodies and vivid sorrows. Statius also implies that despite the large number of occasions (*quotiens*) on which he was called upon to console these parents, he remained to some extent unaffected by their sorrows.[194] It is not until the death of his own boy that Statius suffers the same symptoms as the erstwhile mourners: *deficio medicasque manus fomentaque quaero/vulneribus subitura meis*, "I fail and I seek curative hands and plasters to go on my wounds" (5.5.42-3). But by this point, those parents consoled by Statius no longer exhibit their wounds so prominently. Statius, after all, has already wiped away their tears and healed their injured breasts (5.5.44-5). They are late in offering solace to the poet. Statius endures his pain in a present that apparently he shares with no one. Statius and the other mourners he invokes do not suffer precisely in tandem. Yet Statius does see essential similarities between his grief and that of his previous addressees. As I have shown, he even uses the same tropes to describe his experience as he does theirs, speaking as though he had suffered physical wounds. It is as though by engaging with the distress of others, Statius fell victim to it himself. If the poet is susceptible to the very pain he earlier attempted to alleviate in his addressees, it would follow that his audience is equally so. They might well need the kinds of consolation that Statius could provide.

[194] See Rühl 2003, 116 for a discussion of Statius' poetic agenda in these lines.

Chapter Two: Encounters with the Dead and the Divine in *Silv.* 2.7, 5.1, and 5.3

In the poems studied in the previous chapter, Statius considered how masters reacted to the deaths of their favorite slaves and freedmen. In the works now to be examined, Statius wrote of the responses of men and women to the loss of a beloved spouse. I shall focus on three poems: 5.1, a consolation composed for the imperial freedman Abascantus, 2.7, a *genethliacon* for the dead poet Lucan that contains an inset consolation for his wife Polla, and those portions of 5.3, Statius' lament for his dead father, that depict his mother's response to her husband's death. In some ways, one might expect the poet to treat these bereaved spouses as he had bereaved masters and patrons. After all, Statius had strenuously insisted on the strength of the fictive kinship relations that bound master and boy. Marriage also involves the creation of bonds at least as close and strong. Wives and husbands in the *Silvae* come to complement one another's bodies in ways that the slaves and freedmen extended those of their masters. Spouses and masters both desire to suffer sympathetically with the deceased. In 5.1, for instance, the imperial freedman Abascantus exhibits the same inclination to commit suicide after his wife's death that Melior had on the occasion of Glaucias' funeral (5.1.199-200).

Despite these similarities, however, Statius values the spouse more highly than the slave or freedman. Statius does not console bereft husbands or wives with the notion that their spouses are replaceable. A spouse is not, for Statius, a sentimental possession, as the example of 5.1 illustrates. When Abascantus' wife Priscilla dies, Statius does not inform him that he will find an *alium Phileton* (2.6.103). Instead, he respects Abascantus' efforts to maintain contact with his wife. Statius admiringly notes the *egregia pietas* with which the freedman commissions portraits and statues of his wife: *sic auferre rogis umbram conatur, et ingens/certamen cum Morte gerit, curasque fatigat/artificum inque omni te quaerit amare metallo,* "so he attempts to take back

your shade from the pyre, and wages a huge competition with death, he wearies the efforts of the artisans and seeks to love you in every metal" (5.1.7-9). These lines raise a number of questions—about how seriously we should take the claim that the commission of memorial portraits constituted a "competition" with death and about how much of "*te"* could really be present in the metal of a statue fashioned by mortal artisans. I shall propose that Statius' poem encourages Abascantus to persevere in his endeavor, providing him further reasons to accept that his wife really is present in her images and that the competition with death is one that he can win. These issues are not unique to 5.1; Statius does not reserve these sentiments for Abascantus alone. The poet makes the suggestion, in various poems in the collection, that a continued relationship with a deceased spouse can be maintained via physical media. It is with this hope that Statius implicitly attempts to soothe the grief of his addressees.[195] In order to appreciate why Statius felt that such a strategy of consolation would be efficacious, it will first be necessary to examine the depiction of spousal relations in the *Silvae* more broadly to establish what role in the mourners' "networks of relations" deceased spouses had performed. I shall then examine the method by which Statius felt that this relationship could be reconstituted. To that end, I shall explicate Statius' description of his mother's interaction with his father's tomb in 5.3 and illustrate the kind of relationship that Statius imagined that memorial objects could facilitate. Next, I shall consider how Statius deploys his views on this matter in his consolatory offerings to Polla Argentaria and Abascantus, paying special attention to Statius' discussion in 2.7 of the statue of the deceased poet that Polla keeps in her bedroom and the description in 5.1 of the elaborate mausoleum and statues of his wife in the guise of various goddesses that Abascantus

[195] Statius' efforts at consolation do not always appear in the formal, rhetorical "*consolatio*" sections of these poems. However, I shall argue that 2.7 and 5.1 are designed holistically to assuage the grief of the addressee.

erected. I conclude by discussing how the poet may have hoped that his readers at large would respond to these poems.

Flesh of My Flesh: Marriage and the Extended Self

In his consolatory material, Statius emphasizes that husbands and wives enjoyed a bodily intimacy similar to that of the masters and *deliciae* discussed in the previous chapter. The idea that husbands and wives in some sense shared a body was not foreign to Roman discourse on marriage. Seneca describes his relationship with his wife in quite touching terms in a letter to Lucilius. The philosopher explains that he worked hard to maintain his health because he knew how his illnesses affected his wife Paulina: *Nam cum sciam spiritum illius in meo verti, incipio ut illi consulam, mihi consulere*, "for since I know that her spirit depends on mine, I begin to take counsel for her as though for myself" (*Ep.* 104.2). Seneca admits to feeling a close bodily connection with Paulina, even claiming that her breath is dependent on his.[196] The structure of the line further reflects this intimacy. Seneca embeds the phrase *incipio ut illi consulam* in the middle of the line and places the adjective *meo* and the pronoun *mihi* on either side of it, resulting in the sense that Seneca somehow encompasses his wife. Seneca's description of his reciprocal relationship with Paulina finds several parallels in the *Silvae.* I shall use the example of 5.1 to illustrate this parallel because it provides the most detailed portrait of marriage among these poems; Statius implies, however, that the other marriages of which he writes were characterized by the same *concordia* that defined the union of Priscilla and Abascantus.

As I mentioned in my Introduction, the poet speaks as though Priscilla and Abascantus' bodies were conjoined: *vos conlato pectore mixtos/iunxit inabrupta Concordia longa catena,*

[196] Richard Gummere, for instance, translates *spiritum illius in meo verti* as "her very life breath comes and goes with mine." For more on this passage, see Dressler 2016, 33-4. He does not stress reciprocity here and argues that "Paulina…bears the burden of the self-sufficient male's own past and continued vulnerability" (34). Such inequality may have characterized the pair's actual marriage, but it seems safe to say that Seneca did not intend to convey this sense in the epistle.

"long-standing Concord joined you, mingled in your hearts, with an unbreakable chain" (5.1.43-4). In this image, Priscilla and Abascantus' bodies mingled with one another. Their hearts were brought together, as though they shared a single body.[197] This metaphoric fusion of bodily interiors was made permanent by an unbroken chain. Priscilla is also said to have embraced her husband Abascantus *visceribus totis animaque*, "with all her innards and soul" (5.1.47).[198] Once again, their love is described in the language of physical contact. Statius heightens the sense that the couple enjoyed extreme physical intimacy in an epithalamian simile in which he compares Priscilla to an elm and Abascantus to a vine: *qualiter aequaevo sociatam palmite vitem/ulmus amat miscetque nemus ditemque precatur/autumnum et caris gaudet redimita racemis,* "as the elm loves the kindred vine with branches of the same age and mixes foliage and prays that autumn be fruitful and rejoices when crowned with the dear clusters" (5.1.48-50).[199] Much of the language in this simile emphasizes the close connections between husband and wife (Gibson 2006, 97n48-9). The vine is the same age (*aequaevo*) as the elm. I suppose that the implication must be that that the two plants have grown up with one another. The elm also mixes its foliage with the vine; this image recalls the earlier description of Priscilla and Abascantus as *conlato pectore mixtos.* Finally, the elm enjoys being encircled by the same grapes that adorn the vine. The combination in short order of the description of the couple's marriage and the vegetal simile suggests that Priscilla and Abascantus were extensions of one another, in much the same way as

[197] See Bruce Gibson for a discussion of how the phrase *conlato pectore* points to ancient etymologies of the term *Concordia* (2006, 96n43-4). For *Concordia* as a marital virtue in the *Silvae* see McCullough 2011, 181-2.
[198]Statius uses similar language to describe his relationship with his own wife, Claudia. He speaks of Venus having yoked them (*iunctam*) when he was young and later describes their bodily attachments: *visceribus complexa tuis* (3.3.30). Statius also tells Lucan's widow Polla that he knows that she keeps her (dead) husband *imis altius insitum medullis* (2.7.127). This formulation will find an echo later in Book 5 in Statius' description of his own relationship with his *puer* who, as we saw previously, held the poet's *viscera nostra…animamque* with his arms (5.1.8-9).
[199] Cf. Catullus 61.102-105. Denis Feeney has argued that the Catullan simile actually illustrates the imparity of the marriage, as the vine is portrayed in an active role (2013, 90). I do not see such imparity here; it is true that the elm is the subject of the main verb, but the rest of the language emphasizes the idealized equality of the pair. For a discussion of this image's long history, see Gibson 2006, 97n48-9.

Glaucias and Philetus extended Ursus and Melior. The difference, of course, is that Statius is careful to suggest that Abascantus and Priscilla were somehow equals. The vine surrounding the elm is *sociatam*, an adjective that Statius never uses to describe Glaucias or Melior.

Priscilla and Abascantus' intimacy seems to continue even until the moment of her death. After a speech in which Priscilla prophesies Abascantus' continued success and imperial favor, Priscilla dies in her husband's arms. Statius records that *haec dicit labens sociosque amplectitur artus/haerentemque animam non tristis in ora mariti/transtulit et cara pressit sua lumina dextra,* "thus she spoke, sinking, and embraces her kindred arms and, happy, transferred her remaining breath into the mouth of her husband and presses her eyes with his dear right hand" (5.1.194-6). Once again, Statius makes clear that Priscilla almost views her husband's body as her own. His limbs are *socios*, an adjective which once more emphasizes the pair's equality. She transfers her *anima* into his body. It is a bit strange that Priscilla actively transfers her final breath to Abascantus; we often hear of family members *receiving,* not of *giving,* a loved one's dying breath.[200] Priscilla, in her dying, almost seems to act in her husband's stead. She closes her own dying eyes rather than waiting for her husband to do so after death. Statius does not make entirely clear whether she closes them with her own hand or with his. Gibson prefers the latter interpretation, but it seems equally possible that the "dear hand" belongs to Priscilla herself. There is an evident confusion about where one spouse's body begins and the other ends. Like Melior, Abascantus attempts to recreate his lost intimacy with his wife by kissing her corpse: *nunc ore ligato/incubat amissae*, "now he, fastening his mouth on hers, lies on his lost

[200] The author of the *Consolatio ad Liviam* reports that Livia wished to receive Drusus' final exhalations (95). Quintilian records that he caught his dying son's final breath, despite the fact that the boy had recently been adopted into a consular family (*Inst. Or.* 6 *praef.* 13). Glaucias also gives Melior his dying breath, so Statius may have been interested in this reversal more broadly.

wife" (5.1.200-1). Their joined mouths and bodies mimic the entanglement that the couple once enjoyed. Abascantus, like Melior and Ursus, has lost a part of his extended self.

Yet, despite the similarities between Abascantus' and Melior's reactions to the death of the beloved, Statius does not employ the same consolatory strategy for both men. I have shown that Statius urged the bereaved master to replace his beloved boy, who was ultimately only a sentimental possession, and thereby to reconstitute his damaged "network of relations." But, as mentioned above, Statius gives Abascantus or the other bereaved spouses no hint that he ought to remarry or even find a mistress. I proposed in the Introduction that Statius alters his consolatory tactics according to the terms of the connection between mourner and mourned. Where Glaucias and Philetus were treated as property, Priscilla is depicted as Abascantus' partner. The pair acted in tandem and mutually extended one another. Statius apparently felt that the wound occasioned by the departure of so fundamental a portion of the mourner's self ought not to be healed through replacement.

Instead, the poet exclaims that Abascantus deserves to have his wife returned to him as a painting or a statue: *namque egregia pietate meretur/ut vel Apelleo vultus signata colore/Phidiaca vel rasa manu reddare dolenti,* "for by his extraordinary piety he has deserved that either your face, rendered in the colors of Apelles or sculpted by the hand of Phidias, be returned to him as he grieves" (5.1.5-6). The meaning of *reddare* in this context is ambiguous. It might simply mean that Priscilla ought to "be rendered" or "represented" in sculpture or a painting for her grieving husband. But *reddare* could equally mean that Priscilla "be returned" to her husband in a new form. I will suggest that, for Statius, these two possibilities are fundamentally related. He will encourage Abascantus to continue his relationship with his wife via memorial images. Priscilla really could be "returned" to her grieving husband, not despite but

because of a change in physical substance. Priscilla's *vultus* remains recognizably hers no matter what form it is in. Although Statius betrays some modest doubt in his ability to provide Abascantus with the images of his wife that the freedman deserved (5.1.1-4), he soon gives up the pretense of helplessness. A long section of the poem is devoted to a description of Priscilla's burial monument and the statues that adorn it. Statius displays a similar interest in statues and memorial objects in the other poems that I intend to discuss. Their presence in his texts raises questions about the poet's consolatory technique. Why should statues or other physical memorials be of particular use to someone grieving? Does their value consist entirely in their honoring of the deceased, who has passed into the unknown distance?

"Art and Agency"

Contemporary theories about the agency of objects and images may point towards possible answers. David Morgan has suggested that an image comprises part of the extended embodiment of the person whom it represents and that it provides access to this absent figure (2012, 33). This view is similar to the one proposed by the anthropologist Alfred Gell, who, eschewing the idea of a biologically bounded body, articulated the idea of distributed personhood. According to Gell, a person "consist[s] of a spread of biographical events and memories of events, and a dispersed category of material objects, traces, and leavings, which can be attributed to a person and which, in aggregate, testify to agency" (1998, 222-3). A portrait or statue, then, would contain something of the "person" it represented. These ideas are not wholly foreign to ancient concepts. Deborah Steiner, following J.P. Vernant, has shown that statues of the deceased in archaic Greece could take the place of their prototypes in social exchanges and were "visible assertions" of the continuing relationship of the living with the dead (2001, 11). Although these attitudes clearly were not universally held, I shall argue that Statius exploits

similar views in the *Silvae.* The memorial images that Statius depicts in his consolatory poetry *do* serve as part of the extended body of the deceased. However, these dead partners are no longer quite "persons," in the limited human sense. In each of the poems I consider in this chapter, Statius assimilates the lost husbands and wives of his addressees to the gods. Their tombs are more like temples than burial sites. Their images often function not simply as portraits, but as cult images.[201]

The idea that an individual might become "divine" after death is not foreign to Roman thought. By the time Statius was writing in the late first century, the Romans had been performing rites associated with the cult of the ancestors for many generations. It has often been stated, however, that the dead did not become individual gods in their own right. Instead, they were subsumed into the collective of the *di manes*, the divine shades, who did have some authority over the living.[202] Recently, some scholars have argued on the basis of epigraphic and literary evidence that, in the early years of the empire, it became increasingly common for the individual dead to be referred to as *manes* (in the plural) and to obtain divine status of their own (King 2009, Tantimonaco 2015).[203] Charles King, for instance, posits that these individual *manes*, though not precisely the same as other kinds of Roman gods, shared their ability to affect human lives, to answer prayers, and had a similar "desire to receive worship from humans in return for granting benefits" (2009, 101). Statius, as King himself has noted, exhibits a similar willingness to deify the deceased loved ones of his addressees. However, the figures whom he deifies are assimilated to other kinds of gods in ways for which King's description of the *manes*

[201] The fact that these images *function* in the same way as cult images is important. Statius does not always make the divinization of the deceased explicit. However, in making them seem *like* gods, he provides his addressees with a model for interaction with them.
[202] See e.g. Beard, North, and Price 1998, 31. This view has also been stated recently, see Koortbojian 2013 and North 2015, 130.
[203] See also Bettini 2009, 125.

does not account.[204] For example, Statius assimilates the dead of his addressees on more than one occasion to imperial *divi*, both in terms of the rituals associated with their worship and in terms of the kinds of monuments and statues they receive. Further, like more traditional gods, Statius suggests that the deceased spouses of his addressees may be present in the spaces and statues associated with them. These quasi-divine spouses are not themselves to be identified as new Olympian deities or even *divi*; Statius capitalizes on the familiar attributes of the latter to demonstrate to his addressees how they could expect to interact with their divinized beloveds.

As Richard Gordon noticed long ago, ancient Greeks and Romans often felt that the statues of their gods were somehow "alive" (1979, 10). Ancient authors often recalled that cult statues moved, spoke, or changed expression (ibid). Examples of this phenomenon abound. For instance, Dionysus of Halicarnassus and Plutarch both record the existence of a statue that began to speak at the moment of its consecration (Dion. Hal 8. 56; Plut. *Cor.* 37.3). Recently, Verity Platt has made the claim that the "animacy" of cult statues stems from their epiphanic potential: "images themselves have the potential to be viewed as epiphanic embodiments of the divinities that they represent. They can simultaneously symbolize and constitute divine presence" (2011, 47).[205] In other words, the distinction between cult statue and god was not always particularly strong. In a similar vein, Bruno Latour has defined the "idol" as a representation of the divine which is man-made, but (nevertheless) autonomous (2010, 35). The idol's power ultimately derives from the deity whom it represents. Latour's formulation perhaps helps most to explain

[204] King, for instance, argues that the *divi* and the *manes* were different classes of god (2009, 111n31). He nowhere speaks of the statues of *divi* or the individual deified dead.

[205] Georgia Petridou's conception of a *pars pro toto* epiphany may also be useful here. She believes that something like a statue or a footprint of a god testifies to the presence of a god by synecdoche (2016, 72-82). For a slightly different interpretation see Steiner 2001, 116-121. She argues instead that statues of the gods functioned as vessels which contained something of the divinity.

why owning a cult image of one's dead spouse might provide solace. Such an image would not only make the lost wife or husband present once more, but would be able to act on its own.

Statius himself demonstrates elsewhere in the *Silvae* that statues may contain divine presence and agency. The equestrian statue of Domitian in the first poem of the *Silvae* demonstrates this phenomenon well. Statius insists that the divine emperor, present in the statue, sped its own construction along: *iuvat ipsa labores/forma dei praesens, operique intenta iuventus/miratur plus posse manus*, "the present form of the god itself aids their labors, and the youth intent on its work wonders that their hands are more powerful" (1.1.61-3).[206] Statius' reference to the *forma praesens* of Domitian is quite significant. Shackleton Bailey speculates that the phrase either refers to the statue itself or to the mold from which it was cast (2003, 14). In either case, the implication is that the material form of the god is a "present" version of the absent god. The statue of the god makes visible the absent god and partakes in some of its power. It is the "form" of the god that so efficaciously aids the workers in their labor.[207] But the statue is also a kind of conduit through which interaction with other gods is possible. Statius recounts that the statue is a kind of meeting place for the deified Flavians:

> *huc et sub nocte silenti,*
> *cum superis terrena placent, tua turba relicto*
> *labetur caelo miscebitque oscula iuxta.*
> *ibit in amplexus natus fraterque paterque*
> *et soror; una locum cervix dabit omnibus astris*
>
> Even here in the silent night, when the earth is pleasing to the gods above, your multitude will glide down, with heaven left behind, and will mingle close kisses.

---

[206] Geyssen comments: "Did the completed statue descend from heaven? The answer is provided by the very brevity of the question. On the other hand, though the answer is obvious, there is no need to assume that the question is valueless and unflattering; any suggestion of divine intervention, no matter how implausible, would enhance the dignity of the emperor" (1996, 44). His dismissal of the possibility of divine craftsmanship ignores somewhat the religious context of the poem.

[207] This line illustrates the observation of the anthropologist Alfred Gell who proposes that certain art objects have power over humans by means of what he terms the "enchantment of technology." Certain objects seem to have superhuman power, he speculates, because they are realized "by human agency but at the same time by an agency which transcends the normal sense of self-possession of the spectator" (1992, 49).

> Your son, brother, father, and sister will go into your embrace, one neck will gave a place to all the stars.
>
> (1.1.94-98)

These lines read like consolation, although the poem as a whole is generally regarded as panegyric (Geyssen 1996). Addressed to the living god Domitian, this passage expresses the hope that the emperor could continue to have physical connections with the deified members of his family. Statius emphasizes the mutual entanglement of Domitian and his relatives.[208] They will mingle *oscula iuxta* and share *amplexus.* It is the statue, and not even one associated with a particular cult, which allows for such posthumous intimacy. Of course, this is not exactly the same scenario that we have in the consolatory poems. Abascantus, for instance, does not have a statue of himself through which he can interact with Priscilla. Rather, he has images of his deified wife. However, it seems reasonable to apply certain observations about Statius' understanding of the way in which divine images function to divine images of Priscilla and others in the poems under consideration.

Of course, the Romans did not imagine that the gods were present in all their statues all the time (Petridou 2016, 46-7). But Denis Feeney has argued that while, on one level, the Romans knew that their gods occupied a sphere outside the human realm, they also used cult statues to ensure their presence in their cities: "the cultic representation of the gods in the city is a way of anchoring them as fellow citizens, who partake of the time and space of the other citizens" (1998, 94). Scholars have postulated that it was possible for mere veneration to "cause" a god to be present in his image, to make himself available to his worshipper (Klöckner 2010,

[208] Pace Newlands, who highlights the isolation of Domitian: "The evocative loneliness of the statue in the night square, addressed only by the figure of Curtius aroused from the dead, is then matched by the physical isolation of the emperor from the living: Idyll 17 of Theocritus celebrates the fertility of Ptolemy and his wife; the poem concludes with an emphatic portrait of the happy, prosperous royal couple together. In Statius' poem, however, Domitian is shown consorting only with the dead, including his son who should have been his heir. Thus, the visitation of the deified relatives inserts the statue into the troubling dynastic situation of the as well as into the more general context of earthly transience" (2002, 74).

107, Scheer 2000, 146). The consolatory function, then, of Statius' attempts to persuade to his addressees to observe the kinds of ritual behaviors toward their lost spouses that one would with a deity is evident. Despite the separation occasioned by death, Statius' addressees might "partake" of the same space as their lost partners. And it is not just portraits or statues of the deceased that may act as the media through which these relationships are to be enacted. Physical objects in the *Silvae* like altars or tombs also become media through which interaction with one's quasi-divinized spouse is made a possibility. The sacred architecture or space in which Statius places more than one of the lost spouses under consideration in this chapter helps to facilitate connection with him or her. A bereft spouse would, under such conditions, be hypothetically able to carry on a reciprocal relationship with his or her dead partner. The memorial object thus takes its place in the network of relations in which the surviving spouse is involved both as a physical object with which the mourner may interact and as a conduit through which the deceased member of the network may be reached. This, at least, is the hope that Statius grants his mourners. It is important to stress that Statius writes a poetry of implication and hope. He never explicitly claims that the dead about whom he speaks have experienced apotheosis. But his poems make this deification a real possibility.

The Mummy Returns: Osiris, Attis, and Statius the Elder

In his lament for his deceased father, Statius includes a very brief section on his mother's reaction to his father's death. Although the poet does not offer his mother consolation in these lines, I have chosen to begin my discussion with them because they depict Statius' *mater* engaged in the type of behavior that Statius urges his other addressees to adopt. The poet's discussion suggests that in acting as she does, his mother may expect to enjoy further contact with her deceased husband.

Statius' depiction of his parents' marriage displays many of the same qualities that we have already seen. His mother is his father's *unus amor.* Statius describes the inseparability of the couple even in death:

> *seiungere matrem*
> *iam gelidis nequeo bustis; te sentit habetque,*
> *te videt et tumulos ortuque obituque salutat,*
> *ut Pharios aliae ficta pietate dolores*
> *Mygdoniosque colunt et non sua funera plorant*
>
> I cannot separate my mother from your now cold ashes; she senses you and holds you, sees you and greets your tomb at dawn and dusk, as other women cultivate Pharian and Mygdonian sorrows with false piety and weep over bodies not their own.
>
> (5.3.241-5)

There are a number of points to notice here. The poet's mother apparently desires to maintain a very close connection to the body of her husband despite his death. The text literally claims that she clings to the cold remains of the pyre, the structure that had the final contact with the body of the elder Statius and the place where his ashes had collected. But it is possible that *bustis* refers to the ashes themselves (*OLD* 1). Statius' use of *seiungere* in this context thus becomes significant. *Seiungere* is the opposite of *coniungere*, a verb often used to describe joining two people in matrimony (*OLD* 7). If husband and wife are conjoined as *coniuges,* then to "*seiungere*" the couple would almost be to end the marriage. Statius' mother thus maintains the intimacy of the marriage bond with the physical remains of her husband despite his demise. The phrase *te sentit habetque*, *te videt* further emphasizes this fact. The repetition of *te* highlights the fact that Statius' mother really does interact with his father, that he is really present for her. But Statius' claim, that his mother greets the tomb at dawn and at dusk, might seem to sit more uneasily with the preceding. If Statius' mother sees and holds her deceased husband, why does she bother to visit his monument? Perhaps both her vision of Statius the elder and his tomb are of

comfort. After all, the monument is a visible and tangible entity that Statius' mother could literally see and embrace.[209] Indeed, there seems to be some lack of distinction between the monument and the body that it contains. After all, Statius' mother addressees (*salutat*) the tomb as though it were a person. In retrospect, it might even seem that Statius had trouble separating his mother from his father's tomb. Another possible definition of *bustis* is tomb (*OLD* 2). By interacting with her husband's tomb, Statius' mother is apparently able to communicate with her dead husband. But it is Statius' mysterious final comparison of his mother to the female worshippers of the *Pharios…dolores/Mygdoniiosque* that most suggests the continuing reciprocal relationship between Statius' parents.

Statius refers to the worshippers of Osiris and Attis, deities imported to Rome from the East.[210] The *dolores* that he speaks of are the premature deaths of both deities. In order to fully comprehend the significance of Statius' comparison it will be necessary to summarize the traditions and rituals surrounding their respective fates. Osiris, sometimes associated with Dionysus/ Bacchus by the Greeks and Romans, was a divine king who gave agriculture and viticulture to the Egyptians (Diod. Sic. 1.16; Plut. *De Is. et Os.* 13).[211] Osiris' evil brother Typhon murdered him and put his body in a chest and launched it into the sea. The chest washed up on the island of Byblos. Osiris' wife Isis, after a long search, finally found the chest, which

---

[209] Valerie Hope makes a similar observation about memorial objects like portraits and jewelry (2011, 189).

[210] In Statius' day, the worshippers of Isis carried out a number of public rites that would have made the story of Osiris accessible to casual observers (like the poet). On March 5, the *Navigium Isidis* celebrated the opening of the sailing season and also commemorated Isis' search for her missing husband. The *Inventio Osiridis,* observed in early November, honored the death and resurrection of Osiris. Worshippers led a public "search" for the mutilated god and celebrated his rediscovery. Later descriptions of the festival suggest that worshippers made images of Osiris from clay and grain that were covered with seeds in order to suggest the god's regenerative potential (Turcan 1996, 118). The *Menologia Rustica* of the first century CE mention the March *Navigium Isidis* and the October/November "*Heuresis,"* which roughly corresponds to the *Inventio Osiridis* (Lipka 2009, 37). The Roman *Inventio Osiridis* probably dated from the time of Caligula (Turcan 1996, 116). Statius would surely have been aware of the rites, especially because the emperor was so enamored of the cult and so actively supported its growth. See e.g. Vittozzi, 2011 for the connections between the Flavians and the cult of Isis.

[211] Our Greco-Roman literary sources for the cult of Osiris are Diodorus Siculus and Plutarch. Their versions differ in some details, but largely resemble one another.

she then hid. Unfortunately, Typhon found the chest's hiding place and divided Osiris' corpse into 14 parts, which he scattered. Isis searched once again for Osiris and reassembled his dismembered body (except for the phallus). Plutarch tells us that she then "consorted with him" after death and gave birth to a son (Plut. *De Is. et Os.* 14-19).[212]

Attis, the consort of the Magna Mater, also suffered a tragic fate. There are several versions of the story, but most agree that Attis died after castrating himself in a fit of divinely inspired madness.[213] At some point during the imperial period, the worshippers of Attis came to accept that he, like Osiris, was brought back to life after his death. Unfortunately, the dating of this shift is difficult to determine.[214] The fourth century Christian apologist Arnobius provides a polemical version of the myth as it existed in his day: Attis fell at the foot of a pine tree after having cut off his own genitals and died. Violets sprang up from his blood.[215] Jupiter agreed to let Attis' body escape putrefaction and to let his hair continue to grow and his little finger to move (Turcan 1996, 32-4). There appear to be clear points of contact between this myth and reconstructions of a Claudian festival celebrating the Magna Mater. During one event, tree bearers, *dendrophori*, carried a pine decorated with an image of Attis and the violets that his

[212] These accounts seem to correspond with the information we have about Osiris' death from other sources. There are of course some slight variations. According to the Egyptian version of Osiris' death, Isis has the dead Osiris reassembled and mummified and somehow magically restores him briefly to life and unites with his body and gives birth to Harpocrates (Turcan 1996, 79; Meyboom 1995, 58; Swetnam-Burland 2015, 111). The Romans seem also to have been aware of this version of the Osiris story. For instance, an Egyptian stele found at Philae from the late Ptolemaic period depicts Isis having Osiris' limbs attended to and mummified (Meyboom 1995, 58).

[213] See Pausanias 7.19.9-12 and Diodorus Siculus 3.58-60 for these accounts.

[214] Claudius had added a week-long festival in March to the traditional rites of the Magna Mater, the *Megalensia,* in April. The festival was centered on the death of Attis. What the March festival may have lacked at this point in time was the *Hilaria,* during which the resurrection of Attis was formally celebrated (Fishwick 1966, Turcan 1996). Duncan Fishwick concludes that the association of Attis with resurrection must have arisen sometime during the Antonine period, when we have the first evidence for the *Hilaria* (1966). However, as Mary Beard points out, the evidence for the development of the March festival is very flimsy and any reconstruction of it is necessarily speculative (1994). There is actually some reason to suppose that Claudius was aware of the tradition surrounding Attis' regeneration (Turcan 1996, 170).

[215] As Lancellotti points out, it is not entirely clear how much of Timotheus' account Arnobius preserves (or if he refers to a different Timotheus) (2002, 85). Roller notes that the similarity of Arnobius' account to Pausanias' second century account at 7.17.12, in which he states that Zeus prevented Attis' body from decaying suggests that Arnobius is not wholly inaccurate (1999, 244). Admittedly, a Christian author's account might contain polemical or anachronistic detail (Roller 1999, 244).

blood had caused to grow through the streets. This pine tree corresponds to the tree under which Attis died.[216] The violets with which it was decorated perhaps represented the violets that sprang from Attis' blood (Turcan 1996, 45). [217]

Even if Arnobius' account, colored, as it no doubt was, by contemporary practice, cannot really tell us what the symbolism of the violets was in the first century CE, we may still speculate about the significance of the pine. Ovid mentions in the *Metamorphoses* that the pine was beloved by the Magna Mater because *Cybeleius Attis/exuit hac hominem truncoque induruit illo,* "Cybeleian Attis put off his humanity for this and grew hard in that trunk" (*Met.* 10.104-5). Although Ovid suggests that Attis lost his humanity, the youth did not die. He was merely transformed into the pine tree and continued to live and grow even after his putative "death."[218] In this way at least, Attis was associated with posthumous regrowth and regeneration already by Statius' day.[219] Furthermore, the fact that Statius associates Osiris and Attis with one another may be significant. [220] Scholars have argued that Attis and Osiris were assimilated to one another later in the empire (Turcan 1996, 103). Apparently Statius saw something similar in the treatment of Attis and Osiris by their respective adherents.

---

[216] Mary Beard also notes that in some versions of the Attis myth, the youth was granted immortality in the form of the tree (1994, 172).

[217] Lancellotti disagrees about this interpretation of the violets and the pine tree (although she does see these as specifically "Roman features" of the tradition). She points out that violets are the flowers associated with the dead and that therefore the violets which decorated the pine "probably represent Attis himself as dead, and dead forever" (2002, 90). I do not dispute the fact that violets were connected with the dead and were often placed on graves. But Attis' transformation into a violet, whatever its connotations, would ensure his continuing growth and existence even after death.

[218] For an alternative reading, see Roller 1999 who argues that these lines merely constitute an "artificial aetiology" designed to explain why the pine was an important part of Roman Mother worship, when it seems to have been absent in other instantiations of her cult (279).

[219] First century sources like Valerius Flaccus may also contain hints that Attis' resurrection was already a feature associated with his worship in the late first century. He mentions that the worshippers' laments for Attis ended suddenly when the goddess was washed in the Almo (*Arg.* 8.239-42). Perhaps their change in mood was partially a result of Attis' rejuvenation.

[220] It is important to keep in mind that Statius need not be presenting his reader with a wholly accurate picture of the worship of Cybele in this line. He is a poet, and might be relying partially on literary allusions to Attis' immortality (like the Ovid passage mentioned above) or esoteric details contained in histories of religion rather than on the actual rituals of Attis' worshippers.

What then, is the logic behind Statius' comparison of his mother to the female worshippers of Osiris and Attis? Gibson comments that it is meant to create a contrast between his mother and these other grieving women (2006, 358n244-5). After all, Statius speaks of their *ficta pietate* and derisively refers to their failure to mourn over the bodies of their own relatives (5.3.245). Some scholars have even wished to emend *ut* to *at* in order to remove the difficulty.[221] But it is perhaps the ritual nature of his mother's devotion to his father's tomb to which Statius wishes to call attention, and thereby to suggest the divine qualities that his dead father has assumed. The eschatology of the Isis/Osiris cult (and quite possibly of the Attis cult) can help to explain the comparison. The worshippers of Isis and Osiris or Attis who mourned the death of the god did so only temporarily. Eventually, the resurrection and regeneration of Osiris obviates the need for their lamentation. According to their view, a lifeless body had the potential to regain life. Similarly, worshippers of Attis could still observe his presence in the world in the form of violets or pine trees. Except, he insinuates that his mother's veneration his father's tomb has the potential to have a greater effect than the activities of the worshippers of Osiris and Attis. Greco-Roman intellectuals were disturbed by the fact that Osiris had so many tombs. Diodorus Siculus contemptuously claimed that Isis stealthily fashioned a wax effigy over each piece of Osiris' body and distributed these to the priests in order to increase Osiris' divine honors (1.21.5-6). Perhaps Statius, too, found the proliferation of Osiris effigies distasteful. He therefore differentiates his mother from worshippers who venerate such objects. In fact, his mother's behavior is more similar to that of Isis herself. She, like Isis, mourns the death of her husband. She, like the goddess, holds her husband after his death. Statius' mother may expect that she too will be able to have a meaningful reunion with her husband, with his "real" body, which is

[221] Calderini proposed this emendation, and Gibson, although he does not print *at*, believes that Calderini may be correct (2006, 54).

actually present in his tomb. Statius implies that her belief is more comprehensible than the false piety of the venerators of the effigies of Osiris.

These similarities between Statius' mother and Isis may also shed light on the former's daily visit to Statius the elder's tomb. According to some authorities, despite Osiris' resurrection, the god's remains were supposed to be buried in a sacred grove, which the Greeks called the *Abaton* and which Isis guarded. The Nile flood, the most visible symbol of Osiris' resurrection, was supposed to have originated from this sacred tomb (Meyboom 1994, 61).[222] Isis' close connection with the tomb of her consort is a kind of model for Statius' mother. The fact that Osiris' tomb is also a site of his resurrection may point at Statius' mother's motive in visiting her husband's tomb so often. This interpretation is the more likely because Statius suggests the possibility of his father's quasi divinity and impending resurrection earlier in the poem.

Statius expressed his desire to build a shrine complex for his father:

> *atque utinam fortuna mihi dare manibus aras*
> *par templis opus, aeriamque educere molem*
> *Cyclopum scopulos ultra atque audacia saxa*
> *Pyramidum, et magno tumulum praetexere luco.*
> *illic et Siculi superassem dona sepulchri*
> *et Nemees lucum et Pelopis sollemnia trunci.*
>
> And would that it were my fortune to build altars to your shade, works equal to temples, and to raise up an airy mass, greater than the rocks of the Cyclopes and the bold rocks of the pyramids, and to cover your tomb with a great grove. There I would have surpassed the gifts of the Sicilian tomb and the Nemean grove and the ceremonies of mutilated Pelops.
>
> (5.3.47-52)

Gibson interprets these lines as the expression of Statius' desire to give his father "a grand poetic offering" (2006, 284n47-8). He points to the verbal echo of *Odes* 3.30.2, in which Horace claims to have built a poetic monument *regali situ pyramidum altius*, "higher than the regal structure of

[222] Of course, there is some question about how much of this information Statius' readers could be expected to know. Meyboom has argued that the Nile Mosaic at Palestrina depicts this tomb, so it was certainly possible that some Romans did know about this tradition (1994, 61).

the pyramids." This is certainly a possible reading. It is not, however, the only one. I would suggest that there is something ironic about the Horatian allusion. Horace speaks metaphorically of his poetic oeuvre as a monument. But Statius' explicitly stated desire is to construct a physical tomb and altars to rival other magnificent tombs.[223] In fact, Statius seems more interested in establishing his father's immortality than his own. The altars and the sacred grove Statius hopes to construct would be elements in his veneration of his semi-divine father (as we shall see they will be for Lucan). Furthermore, Statius wants his father's honors to surpass those of Anchises and Pelops. The gifts of the Sicilian *sepulchrum* refer to the honors that Aeneas paid to Anchises in Book 5 of the *Aeneid*. Anchises, though himself a character in a poem, does not receive a "poetic offering" from his son, but honors resembling those of a deity, including a sacred grove (*lucus sacer*) surrounding his tomb, a priest, and sacrifices (5.96-9, 760-1). The sacrifices that Aeneas makes to Anchises are often seen as an aetiology of the *Parentatio*, but their form is unusual.[224] Aeneas performs an animal sacrifice (*Aen.* 5.96-9), which, as we shall see below, was often reserved for the gods rather than the *manes* (Scheid 2000, 140). Servius comments that *quasi divini honores solvantur Anchisae*, "semi-divine honors are paid to Anchises" (*In Aen.* 5.45). Statius wants to surpass even these. He also hopes to excel the *sollemnia* of Pelops. The reference is to the cult of Pelops at Olympia.[225] Pindar provides one of the clearest descriptions of the honors paid to the hero: νῦν δ᾽ ἐν αἱμακουρίαις/ἀγλααῖσι μέμικται,/Ἀλφεοῦ πόρῳ κλιθείς,/τύμβον ἀμφίπολον ἔχων πολυξενω-/τάτῳ παρὰ βωμῷ, "but now he partakes in glorious blood sacrifices, lying by the bank of the Alpheus, having a busy tomb by the altar visited by

[223] Similarly, Carole Newlands points out that Statius speaks of a real temple to Hercules in conjunction with references to Vergil's poetic temple in *Georgics* 3 (1991, 442). For more on pyramids in Horace see Nisbet and Rudd 2004, 369n2.
[224] Cf. Ovid *Fas.* II. 533ff
[225] For the dating of the cult see Valavanis 2006. For the cult of heroes more generally see Antonaccio 1994; Currie 2005; Morris 1988.

many guests" (*Ol.* 1. 90-94). Again, though Pindar incorporates Pelops into his victory ode, he refers to a real monument. As Christoper Eckermann has shown, Pelops is integrated into the sacred landscape of Olympia (2013, 24ff). His tomb, a recycled Bronze Age tumulus, is next to the stream of the river god Alpheus and the ash altar of Zeus. Pelops even receives a share of blood sacrifices. Pelops' tomb is thus the focal point of his worshippers' interactions with him.

Statius' wish to establish even grander sacred architecture and rites apparently stems from a similar desire to continue his relationship with his father. The tomb complex provides a space for such interaction to occur. Statius imagines that he will be his father's *sacerdos* (5.3.58) and will offer to his father the *frondentia vatum/praemia*, "the leafy prize of the poets" (5.3.56b-7). Furthermore, he apparently believed in the possibility of his father's return from the dead and promises to sing his father's *reditum*, which neither Cerberus nor the "Orphean" laws could prevent (5.3.59-60).[226] If there were even a possibility that the deified Elder Statius might really return to his loved ones, then the poet's mother's devotion to her husband's tomb also becomes comprehensible.[227] Indeed, as we shall see, it is this kind of premise that had informed Statius' previous attempts to console Lucan's widow and the bereaved freedman Abascantus.

---

[226] Admittedly, M reads *gemitum*, but Gibson argues that its combination with *praecinerem* does not really work (2006, 289n59-60).

[227] Statius closes the poem with a prayer that his father, sent through the gate of horn, rather than the one of evil ivory, might appear to him in a dream (5.3.288-9). Statius, however, does not, as one might expect, compare his father to Aeneas, who famously exited the Underworld through the ivory gate (*Aen.* 6.897-9). Instead, the poet compares himself to Numa, Scipio, and Sulla: *sic sacra Numae ritusque colendos/mitis Aricino dictabat nympha sub antro/ Scipio sic plenos Latio Iove ducere somnos/creditur Ausoniis, sic non sine Apolline Sulla,* "thus the sweet nymph told Numa in the Arician cave the sacred lore and the rites to be observed, and thus Scipio is believed by the Ausonians to have had dreams full of Latian Jove, thus Sulla was not without Apollo" (5.3.290-3). Numa was visited by a nymph, Scipio by Jupiter, and Sulla by Apollo. Statius hopes to class himself amongst a group of men who were famously visited nocturnally by the gods; and therefore the Elder Statius would be playing the role of a god. Admittedly, Statius' examples are not wholly convincing. It is clear that not everyone believed Numa's story about being visited by the nymph (Livy 1.19) or Sulla's account of his supposed relationship with Apollo. However, these figures surely made the claim that the gods had visited them because it would have been plausible and persuasive to certain people. We need not assume that Statius employs these examples to indicate that he did not believe in the possibility of his father's visitation. It may simply be, as Bruce Gibson suggests, that Statius is simply not certain that his father will appear to him (2006, 376n290-3). See Nagel 2000, 55 for a discussion of the ambivalence surrounding these figures.

Lucan and the Birthday Epiphany

Statius' *genethliacon* for the deceased Lucan is something of a generic hybrid. As Denis Feeney points out, the birthday poem became popular amongst the Augustan poets in the wake of Caesar's calendar reform (2007, 148-60). But Statius' poem is unusual in that it celebrates the birthday of a dead man. For this reason, the poem contains certain similarities to Statius' more formal consolations (Van Dam 1984, 452). Various scholars have speculated that Lucan's widow Polla Argentaria commissioned the poem from Statius for a particular celebration (White 1975; Newlands 2011, 225).[228] What function did Statius want his offering to Polla to perform? I argue that Statius attempts to transform Lucan's birthday celebration into a solemn religious ceremony and to suggest to (or perhaps to remind) both Polla and his readers that Lucan continues "life" as a kind of god, one who is always potentially present in the statues that Polla keeps of him. The poet not only sanctions Polla's veneration of her husband, but asserts that it is efficacious.

The religious background of *Silvae* 2.7 has long been recognized. Carole Newlands rightly points out that birthday celebrations in Rome were religious occasions, and that the genre of the *genethliacon* often acknowledged this fact by calling upon the *genius* of the man who was to be celebrated (2011, 225n1-23).[229] It is not surprising, then, that Statius partially divinizes the subject of his *genethliacon*, the poet Lucan. Scholars have already suggested that Statius grants

---

[228] That Martial also wrote a series of three epigrams for the occasion would seem to support this position. Some scholars have suggested that Polla was Statius' wife at the time of this poem's composition. This is based on a passage from Sidonius which seems to imply that her second husband was Statius (*Carm.* 23, 165-6). However, as Van Dam points out, it is likely that this is based on Statius' reference to his wife's first husband as a poet (1984, 454). Another theory, defended by Nisbet, is that Polla is the Polla married to Pollius Felix of 2.2 (1978). Nauta 2002 believes that this is plausible, but not a provable fact (2002, 223-5). Newlands (2011, 21) also considers Nisbet's theory a possibility. As this discussion makes clear, no positive identification of a second husband can be made. The fact that Statius fails to mention Polla's new husband in the birthday poem suggests that if he existed, Polla ignored him to the point of exclusion.

[229] For instance, in Tibullus' poem on the occasion of Messala's birthday (1.7), the great man's *genius* is assimilated to the god Osiris/Bacchus. Julia Haig Gaisser summarizes the evidence: "Like Osiris [the Genius] wears festal garlands (52), like Osiris, he is invited to the feast…Much of the effect is achieved by the juxtaposition of the two gods; the picture of the Genius in festal attire… complements the more detailed description of Osiris as Bacchus in the lines above" (1971, 226). See Koenen 1976, 157 for a similar argument.

Lucan poetic immortality. Harm-Jan Van Dam concedes: "St., in a way, deifies Lucan" (1986, 506n133-5). Carole Newlands argues that Lucan was "the object of poetic cult" (2011, 225n1) and an "immortal" poet (2011, 251n120). I believe that Statius does more than metaphorically immortalize Lucan qua poet.[230] I shall argue that he treats him as though he were a god.

Statius begins the process of deification very early in the poem. He invites various deities, including Apollo, Bacchus, and the Muses, to the celebration of Lucan's *proprium diem* (2.7.1-10). The mere extension of such an invitation, of course, would not necessarily suggest that Lucan had achieved godlike status, but Statius' further instructions to these divine figures begins to hint at the dead poet's apotheosis. Statius exhorts the collected celebrants: *Lucanum canimus, favete linguis,* "Lucan we sing. Observe sacred silence with your tongues" (2.7.19). So far, there is nothing unusual. Horace, too, had asked that a crowd observe holy silence (*Od.* 3.1.2). But in the following line Statius repeats the imperative: *vestra est ista dies, favete, Musae,* "this is your day, Muses, observe sacred silence" (2.7.20). Carole Newlands and Shackleton-Bailey believe that this second *favete* must be understood to mean something like "be propitious" (2011, 230n19-20, 2003, 159). This is certainly a plausible option. However, Martha Malamud insists that Statius silences the Muses here (1995, 3). Indeed, it is entirely possible that Statius' first readers would not initially have made the distinction between the two imperatives. Without Newlands' semi-colon, it would be possible for a reader to assume that the Muses were addressed in both lines and that the second *favete* merely served an emphatic purpose. Of course, as Malamud acknowledges, it would be unusual for anyone to ask the Muses to observe a propitious silence, since the Muses are meant to inspire poetry. When Horace, in his guise as *Musarum sacerdos,* asks for such silence in order to create *carmina non prius audita,* "songs not

[230] Though, of course, poets were not only granted metaphorical immortality. Diskin Clay's work on the cults of the poets in Greece shows that already by the third century BC the traditional differences between the gods and heroes (among whom the poets were included) were disappearing (2004, 26).

heard before" (*Od.* 3.1.23), he does not address the Muses but his assembled listeners.[231] But in context, Statius' request that the Muses maintain a respectful silence in Lucan's presence may make a certain amount of (perverse) sense. Statius' rationale is that the *Romani colitur chori sacerdos,* "the priest of the Roman choir is worshipped" (2.7.22).[232] The idea that a priest should be worshipped is itself paradoxical. Statius seems to hint that Lucan's death has changed the natural order of things. The priest of the Muses is now a god worthy of worship himself, and perhaps, also merits the Muses' reverent silence.

The text provides other hints of Lucan's metamorphosis. Toward the end of the *genethliacon,* Statius exhorts Lucan: *adsis lucidus,* "shining, come" (2.7.121). As Newlands remarks, these words are part of "a hymnic formula for summoning a deity" (2011, 251n120). In other words, Statius appears to be speaking to Lucan as though he were a deity capable of appearing in an epiphany. In retrospect, we can see that the setting in which Lucan's birthday celebration is to take place is described in the manner of a sacred grove. Statius asks: *et plus, Aoniae, virete, silvae,/et si qua patet aut diem recepit,/sertis mollibus expleatur umbra,* "let Aonian woods be more green, and if anywhere the shade either breaks or lets in the day, let it be filled with soft garlands" (2.7.13-15). As Newlands herself points out, "thick, unbroken shade signaled the presence of divinity" to the Romans (2011, 229n14-15).[233] Furthermore, Statius orders that *centum Thespiacis odora luci/stent altaria victimaeque centum/quas Dirce lavat aut*

---

[231] Kershner finds that the difference between Horace and Statius at this instance is that the latter is more inclusive than the former. Horace, he says, uses the formula to elevate his poetry and exclude those unable to "hear the new moral message" of Augustan Rome, whereas Statius addresses a mixed group of deities (2008, 39). He views Horace's use of the term *sacerdos* as a purely literary technique of self-aggrandizement. He also believes that Statius is interested in self-promotion, but in order to ally himself with the wealthy and powerful (40).

[232] Martial, who wrote a series of epigrams about Polla's birthday celebration for Lucan, also hopes that: *Tu Polla, maritum/saepe colas et se sentiat ille coli* (Ep. 7.23.3-4). The reciprocity in this line is striking. Polla is to worship Lucan and he is to "sense" her veneration.

[233] Newlands adduces Seneca *Ep.* 41.3 as evidence. One might also think of the grove in which Aeneas performs Anchises' funeral rites in *Aeneid* 6. John Scheid has argued that Anchises received recognizably quasi-divine honors (2000, 136-7). See also Panoussi 2009, 163-5 for this view.

alit Cithaeron, "one hundred scented altars stand in Thespiae's sacred grove, which Dirce washes or Cithaeron nourishes" (2.7.16-18). Animal sacrifice to a deceased person could signify his divinity.[234] Admittedly, birthday sacrifices to the *Genius* were not uncommon at Rome, but these were usually bloodless (Newlands 2011, 229n16-17).[235] Censorinus cites Varro for the view that *id moris institutique maiores nostri tenuerunt, ut cum die natali munus annale genio solverent, manum a caede ac sanguine abstinerent,* "this is the custom that our ancestors held, that when they paid their yearly gift to the *genius* on their birthdays, they kept their hands free from blood and gore" (2.2). Of course, this precept was probably not always honored. Horace informs Maecenas that he will sacrifice a young lamb on his patron's birthday (*Od.* 4.11.6-8). Kathryn Argetsinger has noted that this putative offering "resembles…the type of ritual that could be performed for a god with whom a special cult relationship had been established as a return for a particular favor" (1992, 188). Her point is that Maecenas, as Horace's patron, played a "godlike" role in the poet's life. Similarly, Lucan seems to have attained divine status.[236]

However, Lucan, unlike Maecenas, is dead at the time of this birthday sacrifice. Birthday sacrifices had been a traditional part of Greek hero cult and were even a component of the cult paid to poets and philosophers (Clay 1998, 79).[237] Many Romans apparently associated such honors with divine status. Pliny the Elder complains that hypocritical Epicureans *Epicuri voltus per cubicula gestant…natali eius sacrificant feriasque omni mense vicesima luna custodiunt,* "carry the likeness of Epicurus to their bedrooms…they sacrifice on his birthday and hold

[234] Seneca for instance, complains to Lucilius that certain magi treated Plato as a god because they performed such sacrifices to him. *Ep.* 58.31
[235] Cf. Ov.*Tr.* 3.13.15-17, where an altar crowned with garlands, incense, and cakes marked the *genitale tempus.*
[236] Pace Newlands 2011 who sees the sacrifice not as a religious ritual at all but as a "metaphor for poetic genre: the large, rich offerings symbolize epic poetry and fittingly honor L" (229n16-17).
[237] Of course, sacrifices to the *manes* were made during such festivals as the *Parentalia*, but these were at set periods in the year, not on the birthday of the deceased.

festivals on the twentieth day of every month" (*NH* 35.2.5).[238] In the early imperial period, posthumous birthday animal sacrifice had another valence. It was a feature of the imperial cult. The *Acta* of the Arval Brethren record that a male *bos* was sacrificed to Divus Augustus on his birthday beginning in the mid 30's CE (Scheid 1990, 418). Michael Koortbojian speculates that the posthumous sacrifices on Julius Caesar's and Augustus's birthdays "formed the counterpart to the fact that these *divi* were no longer the object of *parentationes,* which would have commemorated their deaths" (2013, 175). This phenomenon, of course, was not limited only to dead and deified emperors. A bull was apparently sacrificed to the *Genius* of the living emperor Nero on his birthday by the Arval Brethren beginning in 55, within the living memory of Statius (Scheid 1990). The question of the divinity of a living emperor remains vexed and is beyond the scope of the current discussion, but the point is that a sacrifice of this form denoted the exalted and godlike status of its recipient and differentiated him from other divine *manes*.[239] So it would seem that Statius desires that Lucan receive the treatment accorded only to the most illustrious men.

Indeed, Statius likens Lucan to important political figures who had been deified in one context or another. Toward the end of the poem, Statius considers the possibility that Lucan has been brought up to the heavens: *at tu, seu rapidum poli per axem/famae curribus arduis levatus,/qua surgunt animae potentiores,/terras despicis et sepulchra rides…,* "but you, whether lifted up in the lofty chariots of fame cross the swift axis of the pole, where the more powerful souls rise, you despise the earth and laugh at tombs…" (2.7.107-10). As Malamud points out,

---

[238] See also Cicero's complaint about the logical inconsistency of the Epicureans in sacrificing to Epicurus on his birthday at *De Fin.* 2.31.101. He points out that because Epicureans believe in the dissolution of sensation after death, such sacrifices would appear meaningless. See Clay 1998 for a discussion of the cult of Epicurus.

[239] See e.g. Fishwick 1990, Koortbojian 2013, 24-8. and Gradel 2002. Although the number of birthday sacrifices the Arval Brethren performed was apparently curtailed under Vespasian and Titus, this was likely an attempt to downplay the significance of the Julio-Claudians rather than a denial of their divinity (Scheid, 1990).

these lines recall Lucan's own description of Pompey's apotheosis in Book 9 of the *Bellum Civile* (1995, 16).[240] Lucan describes how the great man's *manes* did not remain amongst his ashes, but that his spirit went to heaven:

> *Qua niger astriferis conectitur axibus aer*
> *Quodque patet terras inter lunaeque meatus,*
> *Semidei manes habitant, quos ignea virtus*
> *Innocuos vita patientes aetheris imi*
> *Fecit, et aeternos animam collegit in orbes:*
> *Non illuc auro positi nec ture sepulti*
> *Perveniunt. Illic postquam se lumine vero*
> *Inplevit, stellasque vagas miratus et astra*
> *Fixa polis, vidit quanta sub nocte iaceret*
> *Nostra dies, risitque sui ludibria trunci*.
>
> Where the black air is joined with the star-bearing axes, that [region] which lies between the earth and the path of the moon, the semi-divine shades inhabit, whom, innocent in life, fiery virtue has made to experience the bottom of the aether, and has brought their souls into the eternal orbs; those placed in gold and buried with incense do not come there. There, after he filled himself with true light and wondered at the wandering stars and those fixed in the poles, he saw how much our day is covered in night, and he laughs at the mockery of his mutilated body.
>
> (*BC* 9.5-14)

Lucan makes clear that not everyone can expect a posthumous apotheosis, specifying that only the *semidei* spirits inhabit this astral realm. Spencer Cole's work on the development of Cicero's belief in "merit-based posthumous deification" and "stellar immortality for civic benefactors" (2013, 110) shows that Lucan's notion had precedent.[241] Statius apparently shared his predecessors' views, noting that it is the *animae potentiores* who are able to escape to heaven. Therefore, if Lucan's soul were indeed *levata* to these heights, it would seem reasonable to assume that he had joined the ranks of the divine much as his character Pompey had done. Of

[240] Of course, Lucan's description itself recalls Cicero's *Somnium Scipionis.* Spencer Cole has recently described that episode as representative of a larger pattern of Ciceronian thought on the matter of the posthumous divinization of great men (2013, 98).

[241] Cole is able to base his argument on such statements of Cicero's as: *omnium quidem animos immortalis esse, sed fortium bonorum divinos*, "indeed everyone's soul is immortal, but those of the truly excellent are divine" (*Leg.* 2.19).

course, Statius acknowledges that Lucan might also have joined Gnaeus and Sextus Pompey and the Elder and Younger Cato in the Elysian Fields (2.7.11-115). Yet there are still hints that the dead Lucan, like his protagonist Pompey, attained the level of divinity reserved only for the best men. Statius immediately adds *tu magna sacer et superbus umbra/nescis Tartaron,* "you, sacred and proud, do not know Tartarus as a great shade" (2.7.116-7).[242] Carole Newlands comments that the adjective *sacer* suggests "the poet's semi-divinity through the Muses' protection and inspiration" (2011, 249n116). Lucan's description as a *magna umbra* likens him to Pompey, who, as we have seen, received celestial deification in the poet's own epic. By virtue of these adjectives, Statius differentiates Lucan from the other inhabitants of the Underworld and from the sinners in Tartarus. Admittedly, Statius goes onto specify that Lucan should ask the *deos silentium* for the opportunity to visit his wife Polla (2.7.127), indicating that the "traditional" gods continue to control Lucan and that the poet's divine power must remain limited. But a Roman reader might well have noticed that Statius's treatment of Lucan is contradictory in any case. Although Statius tells Lucan's widow that she might expect to see her dead husband for one day, we shall see that he also suggests that she can interact with him more often through the medium of his golden image as though he were a god.

The final lines of the poem illustrate this fact. Statius dedicates these lines to Lucan's wife Polla, the beneficiary of the *genethliacon.* He praises her appropriate devotion to her dead spouse: *haec te non thiasis procax dolosis/falsi numinis induit figura,/ipsum sed colit et frequentat ipsum/imis altius insitum medullis,* "Not wicked in mournful frenzies does she dress you in the figure of a false deity, but worships and attends you yourself, lodged in her deepest marrow" (2.7.124-7). Polla does not falsely assimilate her husband to a "traditional" god like

[242] I have once again deviated from Shackleton Bailey's text because he prints *noscis* for M's *nescis*. I do not accept this emendation.

Bacchus, but rather worships Lucan himself. Like Statius, Polla acts as though Lucan had attained divine status. Various critics have suggested that Statius praises Polla's cult activity because she does not worship an *image* of Lucan. Carole Newlands and Harm-Jan Van Dam claim that Statius emphasizes *ipsum* because Polla worships the poet himself, not a visual reproduction of him (2011, 252n126; 1984, 502n124-7).[243] Likewise, Erik Liddell emphasizes Polla's "inward devotion," which he opposes to the superficial worship of statues (2003, 32). However, such interpretations are complicated by the fact that Polla keeps a golden statue of her husband in her bedroom. [244] I suggest that, given Statius' treatment of Lucan as a god, this statue ought to be understood as a cult image of the poet.[245] Polla's very marrow might be full of her divine husband, but, I shall argue, the "god" is no less present in his statue. In retrospect, the emphatic *ipsum* which is the object of *colit* seems to double duty—referring both to the god himself and Polla's naturalistic image of him. After all, *ipse* can mean the [image of] the god himself, as Pliny the Younger demonstrates when he applies the intensive pronoun to a statue of the god Clitumnus in his temple (*Ep.* 8.8.5). Statius praises Polla not because she does not worship a graven image of Lucan, but because she reverences a true likeness of her husband "the god."

Unfortunately, a textual difficulty makes interpretation of the statue difficult. Manuscript M reads: *ac solacia vana subministrat/vultus, qui simili notatus auro/stratis praenitet incubatque somno/securae,* "and the face proffers vain solaces, which fashioned in similar gold shines above

[243] See also Wrede 1981, 103. He reads this as a "conservative" reaction against the new custom of *consecratio in formam deorum.* This interpretation seems unlikely, as Statius praises Abascantus' statues of his wife Priscilla in the guise of various deities. See below.

[244] It is not precisely clear what type of image Polla has installed in her bedroom. The material, we learn, is gold (2.7.129) and is therefore not one of the notorious wax ancestor masks. We are therefore probably concerned with a three dimensional portrait bust or sculpture. Statius mentions only the *vultus* of the statue (2.7.129), but this obviously need not mean that the rest of the poet's body was not also sculpted. As Peter Stewart has shown, the head was thought to be most important in determining the identity of both persons and statues (2003, 53). In any case, the actual form of the sculpture does not really affect my argument.

[245] For examples of this phenomenon in Greek literature see Scheer 2000, 51-2.

her couch and lies over her safe in sleep" (2.7.128-30). The *ac* introduces a striking change of thought. Since Statius has just said that Polla *ipsum colit*, why would he add that she also receives vain solace from an image of the poet? Van Dam explains that the image is only a "subsidiary" comfort (1984, 503n128-31). In order to make sense of this problem, Carole Newlands, following Slater and Courtney, emends *ac* to *at*. She argues that this line "provides a conventional reference to the limitations of the visual arts" (2011, 253n128-9). Shackleton Bailey adopts Schwarz's emendation of *at* to *nec* in order to remove the inconsistency altogether. I shall argue that his reading makes the most sense in the context of the poem and the consolatory poems of the *Silvae*. Statius repeatedly shows that statues and other memorial objects perform an important function in the lives of survivors.

This is particularly true in the case of Polla, because her statue of her husband retains the essential character of her husband. Statius' description of her statue of Lucan does not draw a firm distinction between the reproduction of his features and a living body. The first word that Statius uses of Polla's statue of Lucan is *vultus,* which most often refers to the face of a living person.[246] Indeed, Cicero claims that it is the animated expressivity of the *vultus* that differentiates men from other living beings: *qui appellatur vultus, qui nullo in* ***animante*** *esse praeter hominem potest, indicat mores*, "that which is called the *vultus*, which can be present in no **living** thing other than man, indicates his character" (*De Leg.* 1.9.27).[247] The *vultus,* in other words, displays the essence of the man. Quintilian is even more effusive about the importance of the *vultus.* For him, the *vultus* is primarily a medium of communication:

---

[246] The word may be used to refer to the face of a statue, but usually still refers to the "distinctive appearance of an individual's face, looks, features" (*OLD* sv. *vultus* 4) as they exist(ed) in the living prototype. For instance, Martial praises a bust of Maximus Caesonius for the ability of the statue to capture the spirit of the man: *cuius adhuc uultum uiuida cera tenet*, "whose *vultus* the living wax still holds"(7.44.2). It is significant that the wax must be "living" in order to capture Caesonius' *vultus*.

[247] Elsewhere, he refers to the *vultus* as the *imago animi* (*De Orat.* 3.21).

> *Hoc supplices, hoc minaces, hoc blandi, hoc tristes, hoc hilares, hoc erecti, hoc summissi sumus, hoc pendunt homines, hunc intuentur, hic spectatur, etiam antequam dicimus, hoc quosdam amamus, hoc odimus, hoc plurima intelligimus, hic est saepe pro omnibus verbis*.
>
> Because of this we are humble, because of this threatening, sweet, sad, funny, excited, subdued, men hang on this, this they look on, this is looked upon, even before we have spoken, because of this we love certain men, by this we hate, from this we understand many things, this often stands in for words.
>
> (*Inst. Or.* 11.3.72)

The *vultus* here is in a state of constant flux. The changing expressions of the animate *vultus* can tell the viewer something about the character of the person to whom it belongs, even before this person has uttered a word. It gives access to the qualities that make one either beloved or hated. This essence, unlike that of Pompey, is preserved in Polla's image of her husband. The *habitus* of Lucan's face does not change.[248] Statius notes that his features are marked *simili auro* (2.7.129).[249] Although Polla no longer has access to Lucan's physical body, she can continue to interact with him through the medium of the golden image. And so she does. Statius recounts that Lucan's face *stratis praenitet.* What, exactly, would Lucan's statue be doing in such close proximity to his wife's bed? Statius suggests that it is possible to have a relationship with a physical object that mimics the reciprocal conjugal bond.

Statius' implicit comparison of Polla to Laodamia helps to explain the presence of Lucan's statue. Some lines before the curious mention of Lucan's location, Statius makes the claim that *solet hoc patere limen/ad nuptas redeuntibus maritis,* "this door is accustomed to open for husbands returning to brides" (2.7.122-3). A learned reader might recognize an allusion to the

[248] Similarly, in her lament for Lucan, Calliope recalls how she watched the decapitated *non mutum caput* of Orpheus as it floated down the Hebrus. The head retained its living characteristic (2.7.99).
[249] Newlands feels that *simili auro* is an oxymoron because "gold suggests artifice" (2011, 253n129). I propose instead that the vital presence of the man is recreated in and by the gold image.

myth of Protesilaus and Laodamia.[250] Protesilaus was the first to die at Troy. The gods took pity on him and allowed him to visit his bereft wife Laodamia for three hours (Newlands 2011, 251n121-2). Similarly, Statius asserts that Lucan will be restored to Polla for *unum diem* (2.7.121). Some versions of the Protesilaus/Laodamia myth also maintain that Laodamia had a statue made of Protesilaus either during his absence at Troy or after his second return to the Underworld. In the thirteenth epistle of his *Heroides*, Ovid's Laodamia informs her husband that while he is absent: *quae referat vultus est mihi cera tuos:/illi blanditias, illi tibi debita verba,/dicimus, amplexus accipit illa meos,* "I have a wax which returns your face to me, I have spoken to it blandishments and the words which belong to you, that wax accepts my embraces" (152-4). The fabulist Hyginus offers a slightly different version. He recounts that after Laodamia's brief reunion with her dead husband, she *fecit simulacrum aureum simile Protesilai coniugis et in thalamis posuit*, "she made a golden simulacrum of her husband Protesilaus and placed it in her bed" (104.1). A slave then finds Laodamia *ab amplexu Protesilai simulacrum tenentem atque osculantem*, "holding the statue of Protesilaus in an embrace and kissing it" (104.1). That Laodamia's interactions with her statue are of a sexual nature is quite suggestive. Statius may well have placed Lucan's effigy near Polla's bed to imply that she imitated Laodamia's behavior in this regard.[251] If Lucan were somehow present in his image, Polla

[250] A reader might also be reminded of Admetus and Alcestis, but as Van Dam points out, the reference to Protesilaus and Laodamia is stronger. In some versions of the myth, Laodamia worships her husband in the guise of Dionysus and so Statius' emphatic insistence on Polla's worship of Lucan *ipsum* may serve to differentiate the two (Van Dam 1984, 501n120-3). Admetus does not propose to worship his wife though he dreams of holding the statue of his wife in his arms (*Alc.* 351-2). See note 251 for further analysis.

[251] It is also possible that there is a reference to Euripides' *Alcestis*, where Admetus proposes to sleep with his wife's statue (349).

would, in caressing or kissing it, seem to perpetuate her marital relationship with him.[252] Husband and wife would once more be "entangled" with one another.

Before arriving at this happy conclusion, however, further explication of the comparison to Laodamia is necessary. The parallel with Statius' Polla may be clear, but the force of the comparison is not. Laodamia's fate is a tragic one. According to Hyginus, Laodamia's father Acastus orders her statue to be burnt when he learns of its existence and Laodamia immolates herself on the same pyre as the effigy (104.3). In Ovid, Laodamia's letter to Protesilaus predates her suicide, but her statue certainly provides her little comfort. The Ovidian heroine's problem is that her relationship with it is one-sided. Laodamia speaks to the statue and embraces it, but Ovid gives no sense that the statue responds. It passively accepts her attentions. Indeed, Laodamia laments that the statue would actually be Protesilaus if only she could add *sonum cerae*, "a voice to the wax" (*Her.* 13.156). She ends the poem swearing by their *pares animi coniugiique faces,* "equal souls and the connubial torches," that she will accompany her husband on his next expedition (13.160). The emphasis Laodamia places on the reciprocity (*pares animi, coniguii*) of the marriage she hopes to revive stands in stark contradistinction to her relationship with Protesilaus' statue. The waxen effigy truly provides what Statius might call *solacia vana.* But there is a key difference between the Ovidian Laodamia's statue and Polla's reproduction of Lucan. Ovid gives no sense that Laodamia treats Protesilaus' image as a cult statue.[253] Indeed,

---

[252] And indeed, this might explain Statius' enigmatic claim that Lucan was *imis altius insitum medullis* (2.7.127). As I argued at the opening of the chapter, this is the kind of language that Statius uses to characterize the intimacy of marriage.

[253] Pace Hardie 2002, 159 and Van Dam 1984, 502n120-3.The basis for their view is that Laodamia had described herself as a maenad in a letter to her husband Protesilaus: *ut quas pampinea tetigisse Bicorniger hasta,/creditur, huc illuc, qua furor egit, eo*, "I go, as those whom Bacchus is believed to have touched with his ivy-covered spear, here and there, wherever madness directs" (*Her.* 13.33-4). There is some evidence that in Euripides' lost *Protesilaus* Laodamia worshipped a statue of Protesilaus as Bacchus, and we have two sarcophagi that depict Laodamia with Bacchic accoutrements. However, as Reeson points out Ovid's description of Laodamia' statue stresses "that it resembles Protesilaus extremely closely (153-4); Ovid's Laodamia does not venerate Protesilaus as Dionysus. That element of the myth…is cleverly and unobtrusively incorporated in our couplet" (2001, 132n34).

the only time that Laodamia gives even the slightest hint of belief in her husband's divinity, she speaks of his impending *reditus* and his *corpus* as her *numina* (13.159).[254] She locates all of Protesilaus' divine power in his physical body and does not seem to appreciate the presence of the "prototype" in the statue. She is even disturbed by his "epiphany" in her dreams.[255] She asks her husband the reason for his appearance: *Sed tua cur nobis pallens occurrit imago?/cur venit a labris multa querela tuis?* "but why does your pale image appear to me? Why do many complaints come from your lips?" (13.109-10). Although this *imago* makes the "sound" that Laodamia misses in her statue, her response to his sudden appearance is to venerate the *simulacra noctis* rather than her husband himself (13.111).[256] Laodamia might make offerings at every altar in Thessaly (13.112), but her sacrifices are directed at the gods, not at Protesilaus. Furthermore, Laodamia's aim in invoking the gods is to guarantee the return of her husband. His presence in her dreams and in the form of a wax effigy is not sufficient for her.

The same cannot be said of Hyginus' Laodamia. The fabulist claims that Laodamia treated the golden effigy of her deceased husband as a god. In his version, Laodamia's sexual attentions to the statue and her worship of Protesilaus are related: *et in thalamis posuit sub simulatione sacrorum, et eum colere coepit*, "and she placed it in her bed in the simulation of sacred rites and began to worship him" (*Fab.* 104.1). The reason that Hyginus gives for her behavior is that *fletum et dolorem pati non potuit,* "she was unable to endure tears and sorrow" (104.1). And the statue initially seems to have assuaged her grief. The slave who suspects Laodamia of sexual misconduct with another man certainly notices only the pleasure she takes in

[254] Hardie sees this as "ironic foreshadowing of the worship that she will offer to the dead Protesilaus" (2002, 135), but I would emphasize that this worship never occurs in the poem itself.
[255] Maurizio Bettini draws attention to the way in which the dream image and wax image that Laodamia possesses are assimilated to one another (2011, 20).
[256] Reeson identifies the *simulacra noctis* as the deities "whom, one assumes, she holds responsible for the disturbing nocturnal vision of her husband" (2001, 177n109-112).

the statue (104.2). Significantly, Laodamia commits suicide only when Ascastus burns the effigy of Protesilaus. If the statue were not a suitable partner, she could have gone to join her husband sooner.[257] Although Hyginus suggests that her veneration of Protesilaus *in formam deorum* is self-deceptive (and possibly sacrilegious), Laodamia's ritual interaction with the statue apparently satisfies her desire for union with Protesilaus.

Other versions of the myth point towards a similar conclusion. In some traditional versions of the story, Laodamia dressed this effigy in the guise of Bacchus. This fact is reflected in the iconographic features of two second-century sarcophagi on which Laodamia is pictured with an image of a statue adorned with the attributes of Bacchus. Maurizio Bettini notes that in one of these sarcophagi, the portrait of Protesilaus is accompanied by a separate depiction of the "ghost" of the hero. This demonstrates, he argues, that Protesilaus' spirit and the portrait function in the same way (2011, 20). The presence of the ghostly Protesilaus proves the efficacy of the portrait as mediator between the realms of the living and the dead. We saw earlier that Polla did not worship her husband with *thiasis dolosis*, so she is unlike Laodamia in this respect (Van Dam 1984, 501). But we have seen that Polla does generally interact with her husband as though he were a god: *ipsum sed colit et frequentat ipsum,* "but she worships you as yourself and as yourself consorts with you" (2.7.126). The fact that Statius does not make explicit whether he refers to Lucan or to a naturalistic portrait of him suggests that the distinction between the two is not entirely clear. Because Lucan has attained quasi-divine status Polla's "worship" of her husband's image has the potential to make him present in it, as one might expect a god to "be" in his cult statue during a ritual interaction. Polla may thus have real access to him when she comes into contact with his plastic form.

[257] Deborah Steiner argues that the statue displaces Protesilaus as the object of eros and "declares…distance from the model" (2001, 192). I would emphasize rather the efficacy of the statue in "re-presenting" Protesilaus.

In order to illustrate this point further, I shall consider the manner in which Lucan continues to have influence in his wife's life via his image. Statius informs his reader that Lucan's golden image *incubat somno/securae*, "watches over the sleep of the safe woman" (2.7.130-1). The text here is not very certain and critics have struggled to ascertain precisely what this somewhat inscrutable phrase means. *Incubo* has certain sinister connotations. Martha Malamud has argued that these lines are an allusion to Julia's portentous appearance to Pompey in Lucan's *Bellum Civile,* during which the general's ghostly wife says ***non securos*** *liceat mihi rumpere* ***somnos,*** "if only it were allowed to me to break your insecure sleep" (5.750). Malamud wants to see something sinister in Statius as well and suggests that Lucan "haunts Polla like an incubus" (1995, 185-7). But as Carole Newlands points out, despite the verbal echo of the *Bellum Civile*, Statius clearly imagines that Lucan's protection is benevolent (2011, 254 n130). Polla is "safe," and Lucan's statue has the power to keep her that way.[258] The agency of Lucan's portrait is striking. The power of Lucan's golden *vultus* to protect his wife suggests that something of the divine Lucan is present in it. The deified poet's image is inseparable from his supposedly "absent" self.

Although Lucan's presence is probably not so sinister as Malamud would suggest, her impulse to think about nocturnal epiphany is correct. I would suggest that another definition of *incubo* lurks in the background of this line. *Incubo* may sometimes be understood in a *sensu corporali* (*TLL* 1A). Statius himself uses the word elsewhere in the *Silvae* to refer to a grieving husband lying upon the body of his *amissa* as he kisses her (5.1.200-1). The location of Lucan's image in Polla's bedroom might further suggest that Statius is playing on the double meaning of the word. If I am right in thinking that Statius artfully hints that Lucan's image "lies with" his wife as she sleeps, the poet places Polla among the ranks of the Greco-Roman women who had

[258] Pace Van Dam 1984, 504n128-31.

been visited thus by their husbands in their dreams. Ovid's Laodamia complains that she has to make do with such nocturnal visits from Protesilaus: *aucupor in lecto mendaces caelibe somnos;/dum careo veris gaudia falsa iuvant,* "I, in my celibate bed, look for deceitful dreams; false joys please me while I lack the real ones" (*Her.* 13.107-8). Protesilaus' presence in his wife's erotic dreams does little to satisfy her. The pleasure Laodamia experiences in these visions is "false" and she emphasizes that her bed is empty. But Polla's sleep is less troubled than Laodamia's. Polla's bed is not empty; Lucan's statue is a real physical presence. Verity Platt has observed that, "Gods frequently appear in the form of their cult images in [ancient] dream narratives…because…the dream world facilitated the coalescence of deity and image that is always implicit in the form of cult statues themselves, allowing the *lebende Statue* to be fully animate" (2011, 258). Statius has improved upon the scenario of a dream cult statue. In his poem, a quasi cult image that is actually animate visits the sleeper. It should thus be no surprise that the solace provided by the image was not vain (2.7.128). Lucan's image is a good substitute for his body because it can perform some of the same functions for his wife that his living body had done. Statius has established that Lucan's image, a cult statue of sorts, is an efficacious physical medium through which contact with the semi-divine poet is possible. Polla, according to the poet, need not mourn the loss of her husband.

"The Matter of Belief:" Abascantus, Priscilla, and the Cult of the *Divi*

Some of the issues that I have explored in 2.7 and 5.3 are even more prevalent in 5.1, which is wholly devoted to the exemplary relationship of Abascantus and Priscilla. This consolatory poem reinforces the idea that the *tumulus* and images of one's spouse can facilitate interaction with him or her. Statius devotes even more attention to Priscilla's burial complex than

to his father's and encourages at greater length her husband's veneration of her than he does Polla's of Lucan.

In her dying moments, Priscilla begs that her husband continue to worship Domitian and that he donate a gold statue of the emperor in the Capitoline temple:

> *Tu limite coepto*
> *tende libens sacrumque latus geniumque potentem*
> *inrequietus ama. nunc, quod cupis ipse iuberi,*
> *da Capitolinis aeternum sedibus aurum,*
> *quo niteant sacri centeno pondere vultus*
> *Caesaris et propriae signent cultricis amorem.*
>
> You, willingly continue on the path we began and tirelessly love the sacred flank and the powerful *Genius.* Now, as you yourself desire to be ordered, give eternal gold to the Capitoline seat, where the sacred countenance might gleam in hundred pounds [of gold] and might signal the love of Caesar's own worshipper.
> (5.1.186-191)

Abascantus, despite his apparent devotion to his wife in other respects, does not follow Priscilla's instructions. Instead, he sets up a lavish tomb complex for his wife. Statius' poem, in no uncertain terms, condones Abascantus' decision to do so and provides an interpretation of the site. I shall argue that Statius' poem encourages Abascantus to view this monument as a shrine to the deified Priscilla and to pay her the kind of worship that she had asked be directed toward Domitian and his Genius.[259] Statius' consolation confirms that Abascantus' impulse to treat his deceased wife as a kind of goddess is appropriate and that such behavior will help to alleviate his suffering.

As in the example of Lucan, Priscilla's assimilation to a *diva* is incomplete. Statius ends the poem with the explicit statement that Priscilla's shade went down to the Elysian Fields: *egressasque sacris veteres heroidas antris/lumine purpureo tristes laxare tenebras/ sertaque et Elysios animae praesternere flores*, "and the ancient heroines came forth from the sacred caves

[259] This monument apparently really existed (Gibson 2006, 75), but Statius' description of it was surely intended to fulfill his own purposes.

and dispelled the sad shadows with purple light and adorned her soul with Elysian flowers" (5.1.255-7).[260] Thus, Statius claims, she "went down to the *manes*" (5.1.257). Charles King has proposed that the divinity of the *manes* is not incompatible with a "traditional" Underworld; the subterranean Underworld, he suggests, is simply the location in which the *manes* are based and from which they exert their power (2009, 113).[261] Whether or not this is a view that can be attributed to most Romans, it remains the case that Priscilla's journey to Elysium is not, fundamentally, at odds with the idea that she could function like a goddess or a *diva.* Abascantus, Statius subtly indicates, can continue to interact with his departed wife *as though* she had been formally deified, through the media of various memorial objects. Despite her residence in Elysium, Priscilla, like a goddess, is in some sense "immanent" in her embalmed body and her various statues.[262] Her statues, like those of any goddess, may make the absent "deity" present.

Statius' description of Priscilla's funeral includes the first hints of her assimilation to the *divi*. The poet provides a lengthy inventory of all the precious spices and incense that Abascantus had burnt during the funeral rites: Arabian and Cilician spices, Sabean flowers, the "harvest" of

---

[260] Wrede believes that these lines prove definitively that Priscilla was not considered divine by Statius or Abascantus (1971, 151). But by this point in history, the status of heroes and heroines as semi-divine figures has been well established. Even Odysseus was the recipient of cult. Furthermore, Bruno Currie suggests that certain heroes were assimilated to the gods in terms of ritual practice already by the Hellenistic period (2005,186-7). Currie speaks of a Greek context. But there is no reason to suppose that this was not also the case at Rome. Although Roller 2006, 35 argues that the Romans did not have a concept of something like the Greek hero, Mary Beard et al. argue that although Rome had fewer heroes than Greece, the Romans did believe that some men became gods (1998, 141). See also Koortbojian 2013, 19. Even Wrede observes that the cult offered to a certain Plutia Vera in her guise as Venus at her temple is *formally* similar to that found in Hellenistic hero cults in the Greek East (see more below), and that Statius' treatment of Priscilla may also resemble Greek practice in certain respects (1981, 90).

[261]Because King's view is based almost entirely on the treatment of Anchises in the *Aeneid,* I cannot accept his conclusions without some reservation, however.

[262] Verity Platt has observed something similar: "Such objects invest the deceased with the beauty and feminine qualities of Venus by borrowing the costume or habitus of the god; they may also make a claim for status and education by drawing upon the visual language of classicism. Yet, in doing so, they simultaneously evoke the sanctity of the Greek original—not necessarily to make grand eschatological claims about apotheosis and immortality, but to mobilise the image's epiphanic authority in order to generate a sense of encounter for those engaged in the act of commemoration" (2011, 382). Although I generally agree with Platt's position, I find that her focus on the visual nature of the epiphanic encounter is limiting. As I go on to show, physical interaction with the statue and care for it facilitates another type of encounter with the god.

the Indians, Judean incense, Corycian saffron and Cinyrean buds (5.1.210-214).[263] Scholars debate the function of this lavish display of Abascantus' wealth. Van Dam believes that Statius simply has a personal interest in spices (1984, 148n159-62). Gibson sees the list primarily as a compliment to Abascantus (2006, 153n210-14). However, Gibson also notices that the form of Priscilla's funeral borrows certain elements from aristocratic and imperial funerals. According to Plutarch, Sulla's funeral involved 210 litters worth of spices in addition to a large image of Sulla and a lictor formed from cinnamon and frankincense (*Sull.* 38.3). The historian Stefan Weinstock has seen Sulla's funeral as a precursor to imperial funerals (1971, 349-50).[264] Indeed, Pliny the Elder remarks that Nero burned more Arabian perfume at the funeral for his wife Poppaea Sabina than is grown in a year (*HN* 12.83). It is surely significant that in the sentence preceding this observation Pliny tells us that Arabia is called "Felix" because *beatam illam fecit hominum etiam in morte luxuria quae dis intellexerant genita inurentium defunctis*, "the luxury of men, even in death, has made that [country] blessed, when they burn those things for the deceased which they had understood to have been created for the gods" (12.83). Now this is clearly a jibe at the way in which Nero's *luxuria* has enriched the province of Arabia. But it is interesting that Pliny associates the burning of Arabian perfume with sacrifices to the gods. Nero, after all, had Poppaea deified. Perhaps the cremation of spices and perfume at her funeral was meant as a kind of offering to the new *diva*, while at the same time invoking her presence.[265]

Of course, as Pliny implies, spices and perfume were utilized not only in imperial funerals. Statius himself lists the vast array of spices that Melior burned at Glaucias' funeral (2.1.160-2), without any suggestion that Glaucias is deified. But other aspects of Priscilla's

[263] For the precise identification of these various spices see Gibson 2006, 153-6.
[264] See also Flower 1999, 123-125 for a more general discussion of Sulla's funeral.
[265] Ashley Clements has commented, in the context of Greek sacrificial practice, that not only were the "odours…of sacrifice…efficacious in calling up the gods" but that in some sense these scents signaled the presence of the deities to whom were supposed to appeal (2015, 46). This observation seems also applicable to the Roman context.

treatment, in conjunction with the spices, strongly hint at her quasi-deification. The valence of ritual activity is heavily dependent on context. We have seen that a birthday sacrifice of a cake is not the same as that of a male ox, *bos marem,* to or for a dead emperor on his birthday. Priscilla's funeral rites are more similar to those of Poppaea than of Glaucias.[266] Poppaea, Tacitus tells us, was not cremated: *corpus non igni abolitum, ut Romanus mos, sed regum externorum consuetudine differtum odoribus conditur tumuloque Iuliorum infertur*, "the corpse was not destroyed, as is the Roman custom, but in the fashion of foreign kings it was stuffed with perfumes and embalmed and placed in the tomb of the Julians" (*Ann.* 16.6.2). Tacitus clearly was struck by Nero's anomalous behavior. Cremation was still the primary form of disposal of human remains in the late first century, although this was soon to change (Toynbee 1971, 39-40; Morris 1992; Hope 2007, 109-110). As Tacitus says, embalmment was still the custom of "foreign kings" (*Ann.* 16.6.2). This reference to the "foreign kings" may in fact be to the Egyptian pharaohs, and Malcolm Donalson has even suggested that Nero hoped that his wife might become "like Osiris" (2003, 219).[267] Whether or not this was Nero's intention, there are certainly signs that he believed in his wife's immortality. He constructed a heroon for Poppaea, on which monument was inscribed the information that it was set up by "the women [of Rome] to the goddess Sabina-Venus." A statue of Sabina in the guise of Venus was likely inside (Hallett 2005, 260). I shall return shortly to the question of what the purpose of such a *consecratio in formam deorum* might have been, but for now it will be sufficient to point out that Statius' Priscilla receives remarkably similar treatment.

[266] Gibson also notes the formal similarity between the two figures (2006, 161n226).
[267] See also Counts 1996, especially p 197f-8 where there is a discussion of Nero's "Egyptomania." Counts, however, does not highlight the religious aspect of Nero's behavior, but focuses on his cultivation of a "fashionable" cultural aesthetic (198). For a consideration of Poppaea's Jewish (rather than Egyptian) connections see Baughman 2015.

Statius describes the final resting place thus: *hic te Sidonio velatam molliter ostro/eximius coniunx (nec enim fumantia busta/clamoremque rogi potuit perferre) beato/composuit Priscilla tholo*, "here your excellent spouse softly placed you, Priscilla, covered in Sidonian purple, in a blessed dome (for he could not bear the smoking ashes and the sound of the pyre)" (5.1.225-8). Abascantus apparently could not bear the thought of having his wife's body cremated. The various spices that the imperial freedman burns at Priscilla's funeral are therefore not consumed by flames on the funeral pyre, as they had been in Glaucias' case (2.1.159ff). Could they have been instead an offering to Priscilla? Statius provides further hints of her divinization. The poet specifies that Priscilla's corpse had been protected from decomposition: *nil aevi poterunt vitiare labores/sic cautum membris, tantas venerabile marmor/spirat opes*, "such care was taken with your limbs that no labor of the years will harm [them], such wealth the venerable marble exhales" (5.1.229-31). These lines make clear that Abascantus had his wife embalmed and placed in a marble sarcophagus. Gibson maintains that the *opes* which the marble "exhales" refer to the spices used to scent Priscilla's body (2006, 162n231) and thereby perform a function similar to the *odoribus* with which Poppaea's body is stuffed. If Poppaea was meant to be "like Osiris," does the same principle apply to Priscilla? Does Statius suggest to Abascantus that he could hope to have a meaningful relationship with the mummified body of his wife? Emma-Jayne Graham has made the point that by embalming and preserving a corpse the living could conceptualize it as any other object with which they could interact (2011, 24).[268] But Priscilla's body, Statius implies, is not just a lifeless object. The location of Priscilla's tomb may encourage us to consider the possibility of her eventual resurrection and regeneration. Statius begins his description of the tomb's position with the following information: *est locus ante Urbem qua*

[268] Graham has since suggested that the shift to inhumation from cremation in the late first and early second century was the result of new attitudes toward the body. She claims that inhumation became popular because it preserved the "integrity of the body" (2015, 51).

primum nascitur ingens/Appia quaque Italo gemitus Almone Cybebe/ponit et Idaeos iam non reminiscitur amnes, "there is a place before the city where the Appian way begins and where Cybele put away her laments in the Italian Almo and now does not remember Idaean rivers" (5.1. 222-3). The intersection of the Tiber and Almo is the place where Ovid recounts in the *Fasti* that the priest first washed the Magna Mater and her *sacra* upon her arrival into the city of Rome (4.337).[269] Indeed, it would seem that Statius plays on the new funerary associations of the *lavatio.* Ostensibly, the "laments" with which Cybele dispenses are those for her lost Idaean homeland. However, given the presence of these lines in a poem about the loss of a spouse, Statius' first readers might well have also thought about the laments for Attis that the goddess ceased during the *lavatio* (possibly because of his regeneration). Statius' implicit comparison of Attis and Priscilla may have signaled to readers that the carefully conserved body of Abascantus' "divine" wife remained potentially animate.

In order to appreciate the special character of Statius' consolatory technique here, we may compare his approach with that of the anonymous poet of the *Consolatio ad Liviam.* This poem is meant to console the empress Livia for the death of her son Drusus. The poet initially shares Statius' interest in the body of the deceased prince. He remembers that the soldiers amongst whom Drusus died on campaign wanted to burn his corpse in its military gear. But Drusus' brother Tiberius stole the sacred body: *abstulit invitis* ***corpus venerabile*** *frater/et Drusum patriae quod licuitve dedit*, "his brother took his venerable corpse from the unwilling [soldiers] and gave Drusus, or what was permitted of him, to his fatherland" (*Cons.* 171-2). The first line states that Drusus' body is worthy of respect on account of its sanctity (*OLD* 1). But the poet of the *Consolatio ad Liviam* does not allow for the possibility of communication with the

[269] Elaine Fantham notes that Ovid has described the *lavatio* which would be formally incorporated into the March Festival by Claudius (1998, 160). As I speculated earlier, this would have been part of the ritual that Statius knew well.

quasi-divine Drusus through the medium of his body. In the second line of the couplet quoted above, Tiberius is allowed to return Drusus to the Roman people only in part (*quod licuitve*). The man's corpse does not truly contain the man's essence. The description of Drusus' funeral itself contains a similar pessimism about the irrevocability of the loss of the slain hero.

Unlike the body of Priscilla, Drusus' is cremated. (*Cons.* 253ff).[270] The poet provides an extensive list of the qualities that are lost to the Roman people in the fire:

> *Uritur heu decor ille viri generosaque forma*
> *et facilis vultus, uritur ille vigor*
> *victricesque manus facundaque principis ora*
> *pectoraque, ingenii magna capaxque domus.*
> *Spes quoque multorum flammis uruntur in isdem*.
>
> Alas, his beauty is burnt and his noble beauty and friendly face, that vigor is burnt and the avenging hands and the eloquent mouth of the princeps, and his breast, the great and capacious home of his genius. Also the hopes of many are burned in the same flames.
>
> (*Cons.* 259-263)

The triple repetition of forms of *uror* seems to emphasize the finality of the loss. In fact, the poet's ultimate consolatory strategy will be to encourage his audience to replace Drusus rather than to cultivate a relationship with his ashes, statues, or tomb. In an extended address for Drusus' wife Antonia, the poet laments that *frigidus ille tibi corpusque refertur inane*, "that cold and empty body is brought back to you" (*Cons.* 315). Once again, Drusus' corpse lacks vitality and is literally "empty" of his presence. Later, the poet reminds Livia that he who has been carried off in Charon's skiff *non est revocabilis* (*Cons.* 427). The last lines of the poem encourage Livia to console herself with her remaining offspring and husband: *Parsque tui partus sit tibi salva prior;/Est coniunx, tutela hominum, quo sospite vestram,/Livia, funestam dedecet esse domum,* "the first portion of your offspring remains safe for you; you have a husband, the

[270] This is perhaps unsurprising, given the prevalent attitudes towards embalmment in the late republic and early empire; Cicero had also denigrated those people who treated human remains as though a corpse were still endowed with sense (*TD* 1.108-9).

guardian of men, and because he is safe, Livia, it is not fitting for your house to be mournful" (*Cons.* 472-4). Augustus in his already quasi-divine guise as savior of mankind is proffered as more than a suitable substitute for Livia's lost son.[271] Statius, on the other hand, sees no reason to offer Abascantus a living alternative to Priscilla. Her body is not the empty shell that Drusus' became; it is a medium through which Abascantus might truly come into contact with his wife.

And Statius is not content to leave Abascantus with the mere possibility that he might interact with the mummified Priscilla. He hints ostentatiously at other media that might afford communion with his semi-deified spouse.[272] Priscilla, like Poppaea, also receives statues *in formam deorum.* Statius enumerates the various deities who received Priscilla's features: *mox in varias mutata novaris/effigies: hoc aere Ceres, hoc lucida Cnosis,/illo Maia nites, Venus hoc non improba saxo*, "soon you are made anew, changed into various statues: here Ceres in bronze, here the splendid Cnosian maiden, there shining Maia, here chaste Venus in stone" (5.1.231-3). I contend that Statius highlights Priscilla's similarity to these divine figures in order to console Abascantus with the idea that his wife is like a goddess with whose body and statues he can interact as he might with a cult statue. I should note that this is not a popular view among scholars. The Flavian custom (particularly prevalent among freedmen) of erecting memorial statues with naturalistic heads and idealized divine bodies has been the subject of much scrutiny. Andrzej Wypustek has recently summarized the *communis opinio* about the function of such statues: "Presentation of the deceased as heroes or gods in literature and art is not a reference to the cult of their divinity, but to the divine virtues they possessed during their lifetime" (2012,

[271]The reference to Augustus' divinity is even stronger if we accept a Tiberian date for the *Consolatio*. See Jenkins 2009, 1-2 for a discussion of the date of the poem's composition. For the question of whether Augustus received divine honors during his lifetime see: Fishwick 1978; Gradel 2002; Koortbojian 2013; 175ff, Price 1984, 54ff.
[272] In this, Priscilla is not so different from the historical Drusus. John Scheid argues that although Drusus, Germanicus, and Augustus' grandsons were not formally divinized, their posthumous honors assimilated them to the gods (2000, 136-7).

38).[273] This view seems to circumscribe the range of possible beliefs held by the Romans. A statue of a deceased woman in the guise of Venus might well suggest to one person that she had been a beautiful and fertile wife, but another might believe that she had been deified. Statius could not, of course, ensure how his readers would react to his depiction of Priscilla. But I maintain that he encourages them on more than one occasion to consider Priscilla a goddess. Although there is ultimately some ambiguity about Priscilla's status, the text contains many indicators that Priscilla ought functionally to be treated like a goddess both by Abascantus and Statius' larger audience. In order to explore this idea, I look first at the space in which Statius places Priscilla's remains and then consider her statues in *formam deorum.*

Statius' initial digression on Priscilla's tomb strongly suggests her elevation to divine status. Michael Lipka has recently made the claim that space influenced the way that the Romans conceptualized their gods: "the cult statue of a specific god (meaning: the iconographic focus of a specific cult) was directly linked to the spatial focus of the god. In other words, no cult statue could function as such independently of or outside the spatial context in which it was placed." (2009, 13).[274] The placement of Priscilla's sarcophagus and her statues helps to establish her divinity. As noted above, Statius claims that Abascantus placed his wife in a *beato tholo*

[273] The first proponent of this view was Henning Wrede 1971 and 1981. Eve D'Ambra and Peter Stewart have argued that the divine body is a costume that communicates information about the social status of the person represented (1996; 2003, 51-3). Such an interpretation is indebted to Wrede's propositions that so many freedmen commissioned statues of themselves in the guise of Mercury because he was the god of business and prosperity, and that they likened their wives to Fortuna or Spes to symbolize their ascent from slavery (1981, 98-104). But this interpretation seems to me to privilege too heavily the head as marker of identity. The "costume," helps to shape (and change) the identity of the entity that is represented. Stewart notes that the jurists were concerned about this very matter; Paul the Jurist claims that the arm of a statue cannot belong to one man and the rest of its body to another because *tota statua uno spiritu continetur* (2003, 56). Michael Koortbojian also acknowledges the importance of both head and body as markers of identity in portrait statues (2008). See also Hallett 2005, 219-222. Valerie Hope also disagrees with the *communis opinio*, arguing instead that the images "blur" the lines between human and divine. She also discusses the possibility that these statues might have a certain "divine potency" (2011, 184). However, she assumes that their animacy was only in the "eyes and hands of the beholder" and largely discounts the objects' autonomous divine agency.

[274] For the application of this idea to the imperial cult see the arguments of Florence Dupont, who notes that the consecration of the emperor necessitated the designation of his tomb as a temple. She argues that consecration literally involved the transformation of a profane space into a sacred one (1986, 234).

(5.1.228). A *tholus* is a dome. It could simply be used of a domed tomb.[275] But it is often used to refer to sacred architecture, and Statius uses *tholus* elsewhere in this sense.[276] At the end of the second book of the *Thebaid*, the hero Tydeus promises Athena that he will dedicate his enemies' weapons in her *superbis tholis* (2.733-4). Are we meant to understand that Abascantus placed Priscilla in a shrine? Certainly, Statius strengthens this impression in the following lines. He describes the activity surrounding Priscilla's resting place: *circumstant famuli consuetaque turba/obsequiis, tunc rite tori mensaeque parantur/adsiduae. Domus ista domus! Quis triste sepulchrum/dixerit?,* "the slaves stand around and the crowd assigned to your obsequies, then, ritually, couches and continuous feasts are prepared" (5.1.235-7). The ritual meals at the burial site are not particularly unusual, and would have formed a part of the traditional *Parentalia* rites.[277] However, the information that Statius presents in the following lines might lead a first-time reader to re-evaluate the significance of these feasts.

Statius insists that Priscilla's burial complex is not a tomb. He emphatically calls it a house: *domus ista, domus* (5.1.237).[278] Gibson comments that such a repetition often has a "religious character" (2006, 165n237). This is surely correct in the context of the poem. In order to understand why this is the case, we should explore the question of why Statius is so concerned to differentiate Priscilla's "home" from a tomb. A letter of Cicero's to Atticus may begin to explain. After his daughter Tullia's death in 45 BC, Cicero became obsessed with the idea of building a shrine to her. On May 3 of that year, Cicero wrote of his plans to Atticus: *Fanum fieri volo…**sepulcri similitudinem** effugere non tam propter poenam legis studeo quam ut maxime*

[275] See Coleman 1988, 109n19 for a discussion of domed tombs during the period.
[276] Virgil also uses the noun in this manner (*Aen.* 9.407-8). There *tholus* metonymically refers to Diana's shrine.
[277] For a discussion of tomb-side dining as a ritual that transformed the dead into "sanctified ancestors" see Gee 2008.
[278] See Wallace-Hadrill 2008 for a different take on house tombs. See Graham 2004 for a study of dining at house tombs at Ostia. She finds that the dining served the purpose advertising social status.

adsequar ἀποθέωσιν, "I want a shrine to be made...I try to avoid similarity to a tomb not so much on account of the punishment of the law than that I might procure an apothesosis in the highest degree" (*Ad Att.* 12.36.1). Cicero is quite explicit: Tullia has achieved divine status and therefore deserves a shrine, not a tomb. Cicero's use of the Greek term apotheosis is striking and hints at the relative novelty of his attempt to treat his (Roman, not Greek) daugther like a god. [279] Of course, attitudes toward deification had changed between the late Republic and the end of the first century CE. The Roman emperors had been placing the remains of their family members in shrine-like monuments for decades.[280] In fact, Statius sees a parallel between Abascantus' decision to create Priscilla's *tholus* and that of Domitian to construct the *Templum Gentis Flaviae*, a monument on the Quirinal that housed the remains of his deified family members: *est hic, agnosco, minister/illius, aeternae modo qui sacraria genti/condidit inque alio posuit sua sidera caelo*, "he is, I recognize, the servant of that one, who just now created a shrine for his immortal race and placed his stars in another sky" (5.1.239-41).[281] The reference to Abascantus as Domitian's *minister* recalls one that Statius had included in the epistolary preface addressed to Abascantus. He writes: *praeterea latus omne divinae domus semper demereri pro mea mediocritate conitor. Nam qui bona fide deos colit amat et sacerdotes*, "besides I always try, according to my mediocrity, to deserve well of every side of the divine house. For the man who in good faith worships the gods also loves his priests" (5 *Praef.* 7-9). In this context, Abascantus is figured as a priest of the god Domitian, who inhabits the *divina domus.* In the poem proper,

[279] See further Cole 2013, 1-7.
[280] See Angelova 2015 on the Mausoleum of Augustus, for example. See Richard 1966 for a discussion of the *Templum Gentis Flaviae*.
[281] The immediate reference to the temple is of course the *sacraria*. But Kathleen Coleman has argued that the phrase *Flavium caelum* at *Silvae* 4.3.19 refers to the ceiling of the *Templum Gentis Flaviae,* which may have been decorated to mimic the starry heavens (1988, 109n19). There is good reason to suppose that *caelo* refers to that same structure here. See Gibson 2006, 166n239-41 for further justification of this view.

Abascantus also acts as a kind of servant to his wife, who herself lives in a *domus.* By analogy, Priscilla would also be a goddess. [282]

The "house" in which Priscilla rests is only one of the factors that contribute to her aura of divinity. The description of the statues *in formam deorum* and the attendants at the *tholus* immediately precedes the poet's recognition that Abascantus' memorial resembles the temple that Domitian had constructed. Visually and ritually Priscilla's monument functions like a temple. Statues placed in and around sacred architecture functioned differently from other "profane" images. Peter Stewart has shown that cult statues and other statues were distinguished by the Romans "in language, custom and ritual" (2003, 189). In order to better understand how the placement of Priscilla's statues *in formam deorum* in a hallowed space might have appeared in the eyes of Statius or Abascantus, we could point to the *simulacra* and mausoleum complex of Claudia Semne dating from the Antonine period as comparanda. Claudia's husband, the imperial freedman Marcus Ulpius Crotonensis, constructed a tomb for her on the Appian Way that very much resembles Statius' description of Priscilla's tomb (Wrede 1971; Hallett 2005, 222; Mayer 2012, 124). Claudia was placed in a small mausoleum. An inscription found at the site records that the mausoleum complex included a garden, a vineyard, a well, an arbor for open air dining (*triclia*) and *aediculae.*[283] Additionally, it claims that these *aediculae* contained *simulacra in formam deorum* (*CIL* VI.15593). An altar found at the site provides identities for these goddesses. The inscription on it reads: *Fortunae/Spei Veneri/et/memoriae/Claud. Semnes*,"to

[282] Scholars have insisted that this comparison between Abascantus and Domitian has more to do with politics than religion. Ruurd Nauta, for instance, says: "Statius claims that Abascantus, by braving the strictures of aristocratic taste in order to imitate his imperial master, had shown himself a true servant of Domitian" (2002, 302). The reasoning behind this kind of an interpretation is that Abascantus was on his way out of imperial favor at the time of the poem's composition and that Statius was attempting to re-ingratiate the freedman with the emperor. See also Hardie 1983, 185-7; Zeiner 2005 209-225; and Zeiner-Carmichael 2007, 179-80, who both believe that Statius wants to emphasize Abascantus' *pietas*. This is certainly a possible motive, but it is not clear why Domitian would be particularly pleased to learn that his freedman had constructed a tomb to rival the *Templum Gentis Flaviae.*

[283] See Bignamini and Claridge 1998 for a reconstruction of the tomb.

Fortune, Hope, Venus, and the memory of Claudia Semne" (*CIL* VI.15594). Each niche presumably contained a statue of Claudia. It has been suggested that a central life-size statue of Claudia as Fortuna was flanked by statuettes of her as Venus and Spes (Mayer 2012, 126). The mausoleum complex contained another image of Claudia in *formam deorum;* a marble pediment from the doorway to the tomb depicts a woman with an Antonine hairstyle who is iconographically assimilated to Venus (Bignamini and Claridge 1998).[284]

Scholars have been reluctant to claim that Claudia Semne was meant to be understood as really "deified."[285] Emmanuel Mayer, for example, argues that because the inscription on the altar spatially separates *memoriae Claud. Semnes* from the names of the goddesses in whose forms she appears, most visitors to the tomb would have differentiated the woman from the goddesses (2012, 126). It is certainly true that something sacred to the "memory" of Claudia Semne is not precisely the same as something sacred to Fortuna or Venus.[286] However, I believe that the situation is more complicated than Mayer and others would have it. What exactly, would Crotonensis' "belief" in his wife's divinity mean in this context? It is no longer widely accepted that Roman religion was purely composed of ritual behaviors, and we may once again speak of belief in a Roman context.[287] Recent theorists of religion have postulated that belief does not have so much to do with purely cognitive assent to a creed as with a disposition to (physically) experience the world in a certain way. David Morgan, one of the foremost proponents of this

[284] She wears a garment that has slipped her right shoulder and is surrounded by two Cupids.
[285] Stewart, for instance, argues that "The ancient sources that mention this 'divine' portrait usually stress appearance over actual identity: there is usually no confusion of statue and god, as there could be with cult images; these are images of x *as* the god" (2003, 54). One of the (two) sources he cites is *Silvae* 5.1.231-3. I see no definitive rejection, however, of the idea that Priscilla has not become *a* goddess however.
[286] See Laubry 2015 for a more extensive discussion.
[287] For a discussion of ritual, belief, and their connections with Greco-Roman literature see Feeney 1998, 12-46.

view, argues that belief is a "sedimentation of practice" (2012, xviii).[288] For him, material objects and our embodied experiences of them shape belief:

> People do what they want to believe…materiality mediates belief…material objects and practices both enable and enact it. Handling objects, dressing in a particular way, making gifts of particular commodities, and attending certain events are all activities that engage people in the social relations and forms of sacred imagination that structure their relations to the divine.
>
> (2010, 11-12)

I would say that Marcus Ulpius Crotonensis' decision to erect statues of his wife *in formam deorum* potentially allowed him to "enact" the belief that his wife is a goddess. This is precisely the kind of active belief, we shall see, that Statius would like to instill in Abascantus.

In creating material objects that resemble so closely the statues of the gods, Crotonensis allows for the possibility of engaging with his wife as one would with a god. We should recall that the inscription on the tomb claims that these images were *simulacra Claudiae Semnes.* Peter Stewart has shown that *simulacra* was the preferred Roman term for statues of the gods rather than of men (2003, 21-5).[289] This rule is not without its exceptions, but I would consider it likely that Marcus Ulpius Crotonensis was aware of the word's connotation. He had, after all, bothered to have statues commissioned of his wife in the guise of several goddesses. The fact that the statues of Claudia were publicly labeled *simulacra* would encourage their visitors to relate to them as they would to other divine images, to treat them as they would other images of the gods. The location of these *simulacra* further reinforces the sense that they do not differ so much from other depictions of the gods. The altar that was *sacrum* to Venus, Fortuna, Spes and Claudia's memory was placed in front of the niches that contained Claudia's likenesses. In this space, the distinction between the "memory" of Claudia Semne and Venus, Fortuna, and Spes blurs.

---

[288] Gordon Lynch offers a similar perspective: "Following Latour, the material forms through which the sacred subject is mediated also set their own possibilities for adherents' interactions with them" (2009, 50).

[289] Nicolas Laubry points out that this word is extremely rare in a funerary context (2015, 12), perhaps for this very reason.

Anyone performing a sacrifice on the altar (and especially Crotonensis himself) would surely have been aware that Claudia herself appeared as Fortuna, Venus, and Spes in his immediate vicinity.[290] If a visitor to the mausoleum were making a sacrifice to Fortuna, for instance, he might suppose that the immediate recipient of his offering would be Claudia Semne herself, the present manifestation of "Fortuna." If "belief happens in and through things and what people do with them" (Morgan 2005, 8), the idea that Crotonensis "believed" in his wife's divinity becomes more plausible. The context in which Crotonensis interacted with his wife's *simulacra* would have mediated this belief. By establishing Priscilla's tomb complex as a sacred space, Statius hoped to achieve a similar effect.[291]

Claudia Semne's burial complex provides particularly good grounds for comparison with Priscilla's monument as it appears in 5.1 not only because of the space in which her remains were housed, but because of the variety of goddesses in whose guise she appears. The statues of Priscilla as Venus, Ceres, Diana, and Maia that Statius mentions deserve re-evaluation in this regard.[292] The multiple divinities in whose guise Priscilla appears has often troubled scholars. For instance, Henning Wrede concludes that this heterogeneity itself proves that (the historical) Priscilla was not deified. The viewer would not have known which goddess Priscilla *really* was (1981, 88). This attitude may be too indebted to a monotheistic worldview. Henk Versnel has

[290] I do not think that Wrede's insistence upon the fact that the "Totenmahl" are brought exclusively for Claudia Semne's kline monument rather than the statue of her as Venus (1981, 89) can be correct. All of these monuments occupy the same physical space.

[291] See Laubry 2015 for a similar argument about the ritual function of Claudia Semne's mauseoleum complex, though he primarily speaks of the initial consecration of the site rather than the continuing interaction with the statues *in formam deorum*. Furthermore, he stresses the difference between Claudia and the statues of Venus, Spes, and Fortuna, thinking it likely that "les trois divinités associées recevaient elles aussi des honneurs religiuex" (14).

[292] I follow Wrede's suggestion that *lucida Cnosis* refers to Diana because *lucida* was an epithet of that goddess (1981, 76). Gibson suggests that this statue may also have been of Ariadne, whose crown was transformed into a constellation (Gibson 2006, 163n231-4). The particular identification of this figure does not make much difference for my argument. Ariadne was, perhaps like Priscilla, made immortal after her death through catasterism.

recently explained how a hymn composed to the deified ruler Demetrios Poliorcetes can assimilate him to both Dionysus and Demeter:

> Each virtue can --and should be-- stored in the mind of the reader (or singer) in order to be accumulated into an all encompassing image of bliss, whereas each individual role, after having delivered its message can --and must-- be discarded to make place for the next one. Viewed together-- all remaining active in the consciousness of the reader— the roles would yield a mess. Taken successively, hence separately, they yield a message. (2011, 454)

Demetrios is not precisely Dionysus or Demeter, but his similarity to them signals his own divinity. There is an important difference between a hymn comparing a ruler to various deities and several statues depicting the same woman in the guise of different goddesses. The statues cannot be "discarded" successively as Versnel suggests. But his essential point, that individual comparisons to a god or goddess may contribute to the larger sense that the person so honored is divine him or herself, does apply. The same is true in a Roman context. The Roman emperors and their families had long been depicted in the guise of various deities.[293] There are statues of *divus* Augustus both in the guise of Jupiter and Apollo (Koortbojian 2013, 211-16). Marianne Bergmann rightly acknowledges that these divine costumes and attributes function metaphorically. The emperor is both all-powerful, like Jupiter, and civilized like Apollo (1998-16-39). But, of course, the divinity of the emperor is often implied by such images.[294] The statues of them in the form of "traditional" deities simply spoke in a visual vocabulary with which people were familiar. As Michael Lipka has pointed out, the Romans deployed a relatively limited number of "types" in their representations of the divine: while countless different representations of divine concepts were conceivable, the number of actual iconographic foci was

[293] See e.g. Hallet 2005, Koortbojian 2013. It is surely true that some ancient Romans viewed the emperor's statues as little more than propaganda. But, as recent scholars have reminded us, we should not discount the idea that many people accepted the divinity of the emperor and various members of his family (Price 1984).

[294] See Price 1984: "Attributes were important elements of flexibility in the strategy of the representation of gods as men, which can be seen as a deliberate attempt to escape from the closure of evocation involved in this strategy. Attributes could suggest the range of non-human powers and functions that the gods possessed. Similarly the use of attributes with imperial images permitted the representations of the emperor to evoke the divine" (184).

extremely limited (2009, 91). Even Cicero acknowledges that the appearance of the gods was relatively fixed:

> *Nobis fortasse sic occurrit ut dicis; a parvis enim Iovem Iunonem Minervam Neptunum Vulcanum Apollinem reliquos deos ea facie novimus qua pictores fictoresque voluerunt, neque solum facie sed etiam ornatu aetate vestitu*.
>
> Perhaps it does happen for us as you say; from the time we are children we know Jove, Juno, Minerva, Neptune, Vulcan, Apollo, and the other gods by that appearance with which painters and sculptors have wished [to give them], not only in appearance but also in decoration, age, and garment.
>
> (*ND* 1.81)

An emperor borrowed these iconographic attributes in order to make himself appear recognizably divine. Similarly, Priscilla's statues were presumably not meant to advertise that she was Venus and Ceres and Diana all at once. Rather, Statius highlights Priscilla's variety of divine bodies in order to advertise the fact that she had taken on certain divine qualities.[295]

Although Priscilla was not to be identified as Ceres or Venus, there is a sense in which she, like such goddesses, was really present in her "cult" images. Statius writes: *mox in varias* ***mutata novaris****/effigies*, "soon you are made anew in various statues" (5.1.231-2). This line contains verbal echoes of the opening of Ovid's *Metamorphoses*: *In* ***nova*** *fert animus* ***mutatas*** *dicere formas/corpora*, "it is my intention to speak of forms changed into new bodies" (Met.1.1-2). The combination of *mutata* and *novaris* in Statius recalls a similar pairing of *nova* and *mutatas* in Ovid. Furthermore, *effigies* is a possible translation of *formas*.[296] Although *forma* often refers to outward appearance, it may also mean something like "likeness" or "image" (*OLD*

---

[295] Evidence for this idea may be found elsewhere in the *Silvae.* In the first poem of the collection, Statius discusses an equestrian statue of Julius Caesar in front of the temple of Venus Genetrix. There, Statius acknowledges that the original rider of the equestrian statue was Alexander the Great. In fact, his horse remains unchanged when Alexander's trunk receives Caesar's head (1.1.85-7). It does not seem to me that Caesar is merely in costume; his head fits on Alexander's body because he too has become immortal, the bearer of a non-human body. Furthermore, Caesar wields Alexander's power. *Divus* Julius, after all, had a set of accomplishments much like those of the divine Alexander.

[296] In Book 15 of the *Metamorphoses,* Pythagoras also speaks of *omnia verbis/in species translata novas*, "all things transformed into new appearances with words" (15.419-20). *Effigies* also has conceptual similarities with *species* (*OLD* 8).

14-15). It might be the case that Statius provocatively misread the *Metamorphoses* in order to fit the context of 5.1. Priscilla's transformation into stone goddesses thus becomes an Ovidian one. The metamorphoses that Ovid relates in his epic often involve a change of substance: girls transform into laurel trees, boys into animals and flowers. [297] But the essential identity of the victim of metamorphosis remains the same. Io the cow is still Io. Priscilla is simply made "anew" in the divine images that represent her; she may be actually identified with the plastic reproductions of herself.[298] As I have theorized elsewhere, a statue is the image of an otherwise absent deity, who may be present in it. Under certain conditions, it may serve as a conduit for connection with this same absent figure. Statius' language thus suggests that Priscilla may be no less "present" in her statues than she had been in her living body. When Abascantus visits these statues, then, he potentially comes into contact with entities that are "really" his wife. The pair could enjoy a reciprocal relationship that recreated the mutual dependence that characterized their marriage.

Statius makes clear to Abascantus that Priscilla continues to possess, and even amplifies, the power that she wielded in life.[299] In his description of Priscilla and Abascantus' exemplary marriage, Statius emphasizes the frequency with which the living Priscilla prayed on behalf of her husband. He says that she wearied the gods with her prayers and was a suppliant at every altar. In the following lines Statius informs the reader that *venitque gradu Fortuna benigno*, "Fortune came with kindly tread" (5.1.75). Abascantus' career as an imperial bureaucrat

[297] David Levene has suggested that, broadly speaking, the Romans believed that the gods were made of a different substance than men. After surveying various Roman accounts of apotheosis he concludes, "The language used in [such] descriptions …strongly implies that the process of creating an immortal god by purging mortality is a quasi-physical process quite different from the survival of the spirit beyond death" (2012, 63). Levene is attempting to dispute Ittai Gradel's claim (2002) that the boundary between gods and men was not one of substance, but of power differential.

[298] Similarly, an emperor's statue could serve as a stand in for the man himself, especially in the later empire. See Francis 2003, 577-8 and 585-8. This becomes important when we recall Priscilla's connection with the imperial cult.

[299] See King 2009, 110 for a similar observation. The ability to grant benefits to the living is one of the qualities that he feels make the *manes* divine.

flourished. Similarly, Statius implies that Priscilla continues to have the power to affect Abascantus' life and career in the afterlife.[300] Priscilla begs the Fates to allow Abascantus to die an old man while magically permitting Domitian to remain a *iuvenis*. The Fates ratify her prayers (5.1.259-62).[301] The grant of eternal youth to Domitian is a superhuman feat that far surpasses Priscilla's procurement of professional success for her husband.

It is important, however, to allow that Priscilla does not act in a vacuum. Her aid to Abascantus is met with his continuing support for her. The archaeologist Ian Hodder has recently reiterated the argument that "things" are entangled with one another and that humans and things are interdependent. The dependence of things on humans "draws humans in, sometimes seems to lock them in, to specific forms of behavior" (2012, 69). The point is perhaps obvious, but bears repeating. Priscilla's statues are entirely dependent on Abascantus, both for their creation and for their subsequent care. Abascantus entrusts Priscilla to the care of servants who continue to perform duties for their mistress: *circumstant famuli consuetaque turba/obsequiis*, "the slaves stand about and the crowd assigned to your obsequies" (5.1.235-6). What duties are these slaves performing for their mistress? They are apparently in charge of bringing out the couches and tables for the ritual banquets (5.1.236-7); but surely they were also responsible for the general upkeep of the burial site.[302] It is from this display of (prosthetic!) devotion to his wife that Statius proceeds to identify Abascantus as the *minister* of Domitian. But this is not the extent of Abascantus' "care" for his wife.

---

[300] The deathbed speech that Statius wrote for Priscilla also hints at this fact. It included the line: *non te fatis, non iam caelestibus ullis/arbitrium: mecum ista fero*, "nor is your judgment in the hands of the fates or any celestial ones, I bring it with me" (5.1.185-6). Priscilla's later prayers to the Fates contradict this assertion, however.

[301] Priscilla's continuing subordination to the Fates should not be taken as evidence against her divine status. We need only think of Juno's or Jupiter's dealings with the Fates in the *Aeneid.*

[302] For a discussion of Seneca's mockery of such practices see Feeney 1998, 95.

Statius emphasizes that the materials themselves in which Abascantus commemorates his wife are costly; Priscilla appears as Ceres and Diana in bronze. It is possible that the statue of Maia was gold (if we accept Markland's emendation of M's mysterious *tolo* to *auro*) and that the one of Venus was in marble (5.1.232-3).[303] Because Statius characterizes Priscilla as divine, the money that Abascantus spent in erecting the statues may be seen as a kind of offering to his wife. Sylvia Estienne has suggested that when statues of the gods are placed in a temple complex they come to comprise part of the "property of the gods" (2010, 264). It is quite clear that the Romans were conscious of the monetary value of their statues. In his *Res Gestae,* Augustus claims that he had silver statues of himself in some 80 cities melted down and used the resulting funds to dedicate *dona aurea* in the temple of Apollo on behalf of both himself and those who had initially erected the statues (*RG* 24). That Augustus donated the golden offerings on behalf of those who originally paid for the silver statues of the *princeps* demonstrates how important an aspect of propitiating a god the expenditure of funds really was.[304]

Even when statues were not made of silver or gold, their dedicators made sure to note the expense involved. For instance, an inscription from 168 CE found at a temple in Gabii reads: *templum cum/signo aero effigie Veneris item signis aereis N IIII dispositis in zothecis, et/balbis aereis et aram aeream et omni cultu a solo sua pecunia fecit*, "he made a temple from his own funds with a bronze image of Venus and with four bronze statues placed in niches, and bronze gates and a bronze alter with all its decoration" (*CIL* 14.2793). The dedicator in this case is a

[303] If one does not accept Markland's emendation, but Gibson's suggested *nites*, the statue of Maia will also have been in bronze. See Gibson 2006, 162-4 for the identification of the various materials.

[304] Simpson (1997, 111) and Pékary (1975) argue instead that Augustus was in the midst of a monetary crisis. Pliny the Elder's comments on the practice of the ancient Romans and Etruscans of creating statues of the gods from clay betray a similar idea. Pliny must explain why this practice was not to be censured: *hae enim tum effigies deorum erant lautissimae, nec paenitet nos illorum, qui tales eos coluere; aurum enim et argentum ne diis quidem conficiebant*, "for these were the most splendid effigies of the gods then, nor should we be ashamed of those who worshipped such items; for they didn't work up silver and gold even for the gods" (*HN* 35.45). Pliny anticipates the criticism that clay was not precious enough to be worthy of the gods. He expects his audience to believe that more costly metals like gold and silver are more appropriate.

man named A. Plutius Epaphroditus. The temple is dedicated to Venus Vera Felix Gabina, whom scholars have identified as "the cult name" of Epaphroditus' daughter Plutia Vera. It is likely she who appeared in the guise of Venus in the temple (Wrede 1981, 85; Rüpke 2014, 28-9).[305] The inscription indicates the pride that Epaphroditus took in his financial ability to provide these posthumous honors for his daughter. The logic informing offerings to the gods also apparently governed those to a woman *in formam deorum.* This is perhaps unsurprising, as the accoutrements of the temple, the statues and the altar, do not differ from those dedicated to the gods themselves.[306] The remaining portions of the inscription corroborate these observations. Epaphroditus recorded that he donated 10,000 sesterces to the municipality of Gabii so that the *decuriones* and *seviri Augustales* could hold an annual public banquet on his couches on Plutia Vera's birthday. What might have motivated this display of piety? The inscription does not provide an immediate answer, but we may speculate. The inscription further contains the threat that if they should fail to hold the banquet, the 10,000 sesterces should be forfeit to Tusculanum (*CIL* 14.2793). Once again, we see that Epahproditus' desire to honor his deified daughter induced him to spend an exorbitant sum of money. More than that, Epaphroditus was so concerned that the rites in honor of his daughter be performed that he threatened to disenfranchise Gabii if its officials did not carry them out. Epaphroditus apparently felt an obligation to see these rites enacted annually, an issue to which I will return momentarily. In retrospect, the expense Statius claims was involved in the continual banquets at Priscilla's burial

[305] Because the temple and its ornaments are not extant, all conclusions must remain in the realm of the hypothetical.
[306] Rüpke 2014 heavily emphasizes this point. He also argues that the statues in the niches were likely also portraits of Plutia Vera: "It is even more likely that the other four statues were of the character of portraits, marking the cult space as a memorial to a particular individual. Reflecting the Roman figurative practice in respect of sarcophagi, these images might portray the deceased in various roles and at various stages of life. These peripheral images are not merely incidental: even if their subordinate status is established by the positioning of the central statue, they do not differ in terminology and inherent religious quality from the statue that, in rituals, may have been the primary recipient of prayers or sacrifices" (2014, 29).

complex seems more significant. Abascantus' willingness to fund these ritual feasts symbolizes not only his devotion to his quasi-divine wife, but his fulfillment of a debt to her.

The transactional nature of Roman religious practices is well established (e.g., Ando 2008, 6). Men make offerings to the gods in order to gain their favor or aid. But this is not a one-way street. Men feel compelled by the gods to perform these actions. Statius gives us a sense of this idea in the preface to Book 5. He includes the following *sententia: uxorem enim vivam amare voluptas est, defunctam religio*, "for it is a pleasure to love a living wife, but a religious obligation to love a dead one" (*Praef.* 3-4). The poet characterizes Abascantus' relationship with the dead Priscilla as *religio.* Gibson translates *religio* as religion, but the English term "religion" does not really convey the variety of connotations associated with the Latin word. Clifford Ando suggests that it be translated as the "sum total of current cult practice" (2008, 13). But it may also imply something like "observance of religious duties."[307] When Cicero explains to Atticus why he is so keen to construct Tullia's shrine, he invokes the demands of *religio: ego me maiore religione quam quisquam fuit ullius voti obstrictum puto*, "I think that I am bound by a greater duty than anyone ever was by a vow" (*Ad Att.* 12.43.3).[308] Cicero speaks as though he is forced by his dead daughter to construct her monument; his duty to construct the shrine is greater than any vow he might have made to a deity. His language suggests an ongoing relationship with Tullia of sorts. The apotheosized daughter continues to depend on her father and to make demands of him.

---

[307]Jan Bremmer argues that *religio* was associated "with active worship according to the rules" (1998, 10). In *De Natura Deorum,* Cicero glosses the term as *quae deorum cultu pio continetur*, "those things which are contained in the pious cultivation of the gods" (1.42). For a more detailed discussion of *religio* see Sachot 1991; Bremmer 1998, 10-14.

[308] Cicero professes something similar in an earlier letter: *profecto consecrabo omni genere monimentorum ab omnium ingeniis sumptuorum et Graecorum et Latinorum. Quae res forsitan refricatura vulnus meum. Sed iam* ***quasi voto quodam et promisso*** *teneri puto* (Ad Att. 12.18). See Cole 2013, 4 for a discussion of this "duty."

The obligation to the deity does not cease once its shrine or cult statues are erected. Statues of the gods particularly make certain demands of the people who worship them. In a study of how Catholics have interacted with the icons of saints, David Morgan concludes: "If a mask is a frozen face hiding what is behind it, an icon is the visual trace of a living face that beckons and receives the viewer's regard to reveal the disposition of the sacred person returning the gaze of the devotee. To see the icon is to be addressed by the person, to see him seeing oneself" (2012, 92). Morgan further points out that the gaze of the icon demands that the devout respond. He can do so by greeting the icon, by offering it gifts, or even stroking its surface (91). The icon is a medium through which the saint and the devotee can perform their business with one another. Although Morgan deals specifically with early modern Catholicism, he would like to extend his conclusions beyond that context. I think that his analysis might, with very little modification, apply to a Roman religious framework. For instance, Varro complains about the foolishness of those people who think it necessary to give offerings to gods *ex aere autem facti, testa, gypso, vel marmore*, "made from bronze, clay, gypsum, or marble" (*ARD* fr. 22). But as Jörg Rüpke notices, Varro's complaints did not prevent anyone from continuing their behavior (2010, 186). The very fact that Varro felt it necessary to point out that the graven images of the gods were inanimate and could not be moved by gifts (or demand them) suggests that other people felt differently. Clearly, some Romans felt that the images of the gods did not lack "sensation" and that their gifts reached the god through the medium of his statue. They experienced something nearly like the reciprocal relation between icon and worshipper that Morgan describes. Statius insists that such a relationship is possible for Abascantus and Priscilla. In the poet's account, Abascantus' expenditures on and care for Priscilla's statues and ritual meals did not go wholly unnoticed. Priscilla rewards her husband's piety by continuing to

intervene on his behalf with the Fates. Her piety continues to equal his, and she serves as a partner in his endeavors as she did in life.

The preceding discussion has shown why Christoph Uehlinger has called for scholars to stop treating images as mere "re-presentations" of something or someone but instead to treat them as media. Such a shift, he argues, allows for a focus on the "processes of communication involving senders and recipients" in which the images participate (2015, 403). Although Statius acknowledges that Abascantus and Priscilla do not enjoy the same intercorporeal relationship that they did when the latter was alive, he suggests that the couple can partially recreate the reciprocity that characterized their marriage through the media of the statues that he erected and the sarcophagus that he placed in his wife's tomb-shrine. These media make the absent wife present to the grieving husband. Priscilla may remain a tangible force in Abascantus' life, despite her official residence in the Underworld.

Context, Audience, Conclusions

Statius' approach to consoling his mourners is remarkably consistent in the poems considered in this chapter. In each case, we have seen that Statius lauds his addresses' decision to erect monuments, to commission images of their deceased spouses, or to preserve the corpses of their lost husband or wife. He suggests that such physical memorials and remains may serve as points of contact with the lost spouse. As the earlier example of the attitude in the *Consolatio ad Liviam* toward the bodies of the dead began to demonstrate, this is not a typical method of consolation. Seneca's *Consolatio ad Marciam* provides further evidence that philosophical consolation had little truck with the idea that the deceased might be present in physical objects. Livia serves as an exemplary mourner, a model that Marcia ought to emulate. Seneca is not as explicit an advocate for the replacement of a lost son by another as is as the author of the

Consolatio ad Liviam. In certain respects, Seneca's description of Livia's behavior parallels that of a Polla or an Abascantus. Seneca relates that Livia surrounded herself with many images of Drusus: *Non desiit denique Drusi sui celebrare nomen, ubique illum sibi privatim publiceque repraesentare, libentissime de illo loqui, de illo audire: cum memoria illius vixit*, "she did not cease to praise the name of her Drusus, and everywhere in private and in public she had him represented for her, she spoke most willingly about that one, heard [others speak] about him: she lived with his memory" (*Marc.* 3.2). Like Statius' mourners, Livia "lived" with the memory of her dead son. However, Seneca's Livia does not seem to hold out hope for interaction with Drusus. His images passively surround her; Livia talks about her son and listens to others talking about him but does not address the images themselves. And, unlike Statius, Seneca does not think embalmment and inhumation a boon. It is not until after Drusus' body is fully disposed of that Livia stops grieving and finds composure: *ut primum tamen intulit tumulo, simul et illum et dolorem suum posuit, nec plus doluit quam aut honestum erat Caesare aut aequom Tiberio salvo,* "when first she placed him in the tomb, however, at the same moment she put aside her sorrow, nor did she grieve more than was respectful for Caesor or appropriate for Tiberius, as they were safe" (*Marc.* 3.2). It is in the absence of her son's body that Livia can fully return her attentions to the world of the living. In an echo of the *Consolatio ad Liviam,* Seneca subtly suggests that the loss of Drusus is offset by the continuing presence of Tiberius and Caesar.[309] Statius' emphasis, therefore, on the continuing importance of physical memorials is novel. It implies his rejection of certain philosophical tenets and serves to differentiate his poetry from other writings in the genre of philosophical consolation.

What then, does Statius see as the function of 5.1 and the other poems considered in this chapter? In 5.1, after a series of allusions to Horace's *Ode* 4.8, Statius assures Priscilla *haud alio*

[309] For the Tiberian date of the *Consolatio* see Jenkins 2009.

melius condere sepulchro, "you will not be better placed in another tomb" (5.1.15).[310] The poet has already established that he is incapable of fashioning wax likenesses or animating ivory or gold. But the products of an artisan's hand, he says, are a *mortalis honos* anyway (5.1.10). The thematic similarities with the Horatian ode are immediately apparent. Horace also attributes to the poets the power to grant immortal fame (*Od.* 4.8.22ff). [311] He even claims that Hercules became a god by the will of the Muses: *Dignum laude virum Musa vetat mori,/caelo Musa beat. Sic Iovis interest/optatis epulis impiger Hercules,* "the Muse forbids the man worthy of praise to die, the Muse makes him blessed in heaven. Thus tireless Hercules attends the desired feasts of Jove" (*Od.* 4.8.28-30). Statius certainly shares Horace's confidence in a poet's ability to deify mortals. But as Francesca Martelli has noted, he is not quite so dismissive of the plastic arts as Horace is in this particular ode (2009, 267).[312] In the prefatory letter to Abascantus, Statius laments that, although he had been looking for an opportunity to improve his friendship with the imperial freedman, he was not happy to have found the means to do so (*invenisse materiam)* so soon (5.*Praef.* 10-11). The *materia* of which Statius speaks literally refers to the occasion of Priscilla's death. But the word is strongly associated with physical matter. Statius' *materia* surely includes the various physical objects in the poem: Priscilla's embalmed corpse, statues, and tomb.[313] Further, he metaphorically likens his poetry to a *sepulchrum* in 5.1, calling it "another" tomb, where Horace more firmly differentiates his verse from the inscribed marbles that

---

[310] For a discussion of Horace's relationship to the visual arts see Barchiesi 1996; Hardie 1993.
[311] As Hardie puts it, "The implication is that in truth it is songs, rather than statues, that have the magic power to bring the dead back to life" (1993, 134).
[312] Martelli argues that the language that Statius uses to describe the durability of the monument reverses the claim at the opening that his poetry would outlast any painting or statue (though she acknowledges that there may be a subtle irony in these lines). For the opposite view see Rosati 2002, 247 and Lovatt 2007. The latter argues that Statius believes poetry is an alternative to the plastic arts (2007, 154), but I do not think they are so easily separable in Statius' work here.
[313] Carole Newlands echoes Philip Hardie's observation that Horace "avoids description of the visual arts in his poetry" (2002, 73).

commemorate war heroes (4.8.13ff).[314] Statius' monument, of course, is superior to the likes of those created by an Apelles or Phidias (5.1.5-6). But it is superior for a different reason than Horace would perhaps have thought. Horace asserts that the Muses more effectively commemorate one's achievements than public monuments (4.8.19-22). By contrast, Statius' poem itself determines the function of monuments and enhances their power.[315] Statius sees that his poetic *sepulchrum* not only may tap into the power of monuments by incorporating them into his verses, but also may script how people ought to relate to them.[316] His ekphrasis of Priscilla's tomb, for instance, attempts to show both Abascantus and readers how to interpret and to interact with the physical object that his poem has constructed.

Statius begins his discussion of Priscilla's tomb complex with a quite conventional ekphrastic formula: *est locus* (5.1.222). And the details that he provides certainly set Priscilla's new home before the eyes of his audience in all its geographical specificity. The blessed dome stands near the beginning of the Appian Way and the Almo River. Any Roman reader would be able to imaginatively construct a mental picture of how this setting looked. As I observed in the previous chapter, oratorical treatises proclaimed that familiar imagery was most effective at arousing emotion in an audience (Webb 2009, 121). By referring to well-known topographical landmarks Statius ensured that most of his readers would be able to imagine where Priscilla lay. Furthermore, as we saw previously, the mythological resonances of Priscilla's burial site would also have been known to a well-read audience because of Statius' allusions to the *Fasti* and the rituals of the *Megalensia.* These associations would help to fill out a reader's picture of the

[314] Jean-Michel Hulls makes a similar observation about 3.3, but insists that the monument that Statius constructs for his addressee Etruscus is not effective as consolation (2011, 157-8). I shall return to this issue in the next chapter.
[315] In a similar vein, Statius makes the claim that Domitian's equestrian statue will endure Jupiter's storms and the passage of time, a clear allusion to *Od* 3.30.1-5 and *Met.* 15,871-2. Carole Newlands notices that: "in a deferential gesture, Statius turns the referent of opus back to the statue" (2002, 69).
[316] This is more similar to Horace's technique in Ode 3.30.1-5 where the poet compares the *monumentum* comprised of his poetry to lesser physical monuments.

setting in which Abascantus placed his wife. The other details that Statius provides about the cloth in which Prisicilla's body was wrapped, the statues that adorned the tomb, and the crowds of slave attendants help to flesh out the image further. In providing his readers with the mental images necessary for them to feel as though they were present at the tomb, Statius effectively constructs the monument himself. Statius does not shy away from the "material." He gives Abascantus not just *carmina*, but includes a monument within his song. We have seen how Priscilla's lavish burial complex could contribute to Abascantus' continuing relationship with his wife. But how might Statius' broader audience be expected to react to it?

Abascantus, perhaps, did not really need to be reminded that his wife had attained quasi-divine status. After all, he (purportedly) chose to commemorate her in a manner that suggested her divinity. But Statius' audience might not know that they should treat her tomb as a temple and her statues as cult images. Statius does more than make his readers feel as though they are really at the site of Priscilla's tomb. The poet scripts the relationship that readers *ought* to have with Priscilla and her lavish tomb complex. His casual comparison of her tomb to the temples (*sacraria*) that Domitian constructed for his deified family helps readers to understand to what class of structure it belonged. The very "universality" of the sculptural types in which Priscilla is commemorated communicates to Statius' audience how she should be treated. As we saw before, objects come to be sacred and to demand certain responses from those who encounter them: "the sacred object is made real through the historical sedimentation of spaces, practices, and discourses about the sacred other that stretch beyond it" (Lynch 2009, 50). Statius transforms Priscilla into the kind of object that his readers would be culturally conditioned to venerate. Her tomb is linked with Cybele, it is adorned with goddesses, and her body is embalmed after the fashion of *Diva* Poppaea.

Jörg Rüpke has asserted that individual performances of ritual are not simply "repetitions of an eternally fixed pattern," but the conscious efforts of individuals to "repeat an honoured pattern, to perform it and for others in a specific situation, in a particular place" (2004, 25). Texts, he says, are therefore indispensable to certain rituals because they provide information about how these rituals should be performed. Individual performances are shaped by such communication about the ritual (2004, 40). Statius' description of Priscilla's tomb and the crowds of *famuli* who assist at the meals at the site of the tomb provides precisely such information to his readers. It should be noted that Statius does not provide a "representation" of some real ceremonial here. Rather he hopes to capitalize on some of his readers' religious preconceptions in order to instantiate a new ritual.[317] But why should he do so? On the one hand, by procuring worshippers for the "cult" of Priscilla, Statius honors her and flatters Abascantus. But, it is also conceivable that, if Statius' lengthy panegyric of Priscilla and her virtues elsewhere in the poem (5.1.43-74) persuaded readers that they ought to mourn her loss, the possibilities that Statius offers for "ritual" interaction with her might well appeal to them.

Statius has a similar design in the poems about Lucan and his father. The poet actively encourages his readers to venerate Lucan. Statius opens the *genethliacon* by inviting all the poets and several of the gods to celebrate Lucan's birthday (2.7.1ff).[318] In line 19, he announces *Lucanum canimus*. It is possible that the plural *canimus* implies the royal we, but it also suggests that the gathered crowd of deities and poets celebrate Lucan's divinity together. Statius' reader is also subtly invited to join in the festivities, to become involved with those assembled in the poem. This is true again at the end of the poem, when Statius asks that grief (*luctus*) depart and

[317] This point is indebted to the discussion about the relationship of literary texts to religious rituals of Feeney 2004, 4-5. See Egelhaaf-Gaiser 2016 for a similar argument about 3.3.
[318] Kershner rightly argues that Statius shares the title of "priest of the Muses" with Lucan, and that he is a "mediator" between the gods and people, much like the Horation *vates* (2010, 326-8).

that festal sorrow (*dolor festus*) worship (*adoret*) the man for whom it once wept (2.7.133-5). Though it is possible that Statius exhorts Polla alone to put aside her sorrow in these lines, the poet's failure to specify her as the subject of *adoret* suggests that he also addresses a more general readership (Van Dam 1984, 506n133-5). This public's grief is to be assuaged much as that of Polla is—through active worship of Lucan. Since Polla's devotion involves her cultivation of and care for Lucan's image, it is not unreasonable to suppose that the audience, once engaged in the community of worshippers, would also come to revere the image that contained something of the deceased poet's presence.

Finally, Statius aims to direct his readers' response to his father's tomb. As we saw, Statius plays the role of priest in his lament for his father. The poet imagines himself as a priest: *ipse madens oculis, umbrarum araeque sacerdos*, "myself, eyes streaming, the priest of the shades and of the altar" (5.3.58). Part of his activity in that role would be to recount the story of his father's *mores* and *facta* (5.3.61). There is surely some irony here. Statius' vision of what it would be like to be his father's priest entails precisely the task that he actually accomplishes over the course of 5.1. The poem simply is Statius' account of his father's habits and deeds. It would follow, therefore, that Statius already served as his father's priest and that the poem is the written version of the hymn that Statius had imagined himself composing. By reading the poem, Statius covertly asks that his audience participate in the imagined ritual before his father's tomb. In mentally "visiting" the elder Statius' tomb, readers would actually mimic the behavior of the poet's mother, whose continuing intimacy with her husband the poet admired.

Statius is hardly alone in advertising the divinity of absent beloveds to a wide audience. A near contemporary of Statius commissioned a tomb epitaph announcing the divinity of his kinsman M. Lucceius Nepos. The epitaph stages an imagined conversation between the deified

Nepos and this unidentified relative (*CIL* 6.21521).[319] Nepos appears in a dream to his grieving relative and commands him: *desine flere deum*, "cease to cry over a god" (4). Nepos also informs the author of the epitaph that Venus bore him *in caeli lucida templa*, into the shining temples of heaven (16). The author of the epitaph plays with space. Although the god is in the far off temples of the sky, he is also quite present in the dream. The author insists that *non fuit illa quies,/sed verus iuveni color et sonus*, "that was not a dream, but the true color and sound of the young man" (10-11). Of course, Nepos had undergone a metamorphosis. The new god was larger than he had been in life (12). But this change in form does not make his encounter with his kinsman any less of a reunion. Because of his deification, Nepos was able to communicate with his relatives. But Nepos' ability to converse with the living was not limited to this narrow circle of people. Anyone reading the epitaph would recreate the experience of those who originally held the dialogue. Mario Erasmo has proposed that epitaphs on tombs are the means by which the dead "engage the living in a way which causes one to question their status as 'dead'" (2008, 162). Through the epitaph, the deceased person continues to speak indefinitely.[320] This is not quite Statius' consolatory technique. He does not put words in the mouths of his deified characters. It is rather the physical forms of the deceased and the monuments that Statius constructs for them that signal to both addressees and readers how they might interact with the departed "gods." The consolations in the *Silvae* do not contain an eternal record of a single conversation with the deceased. Rather Statius creates the conditions under which repeated, reciprocal interaction with the deified dead might occur. His poems invite the reader to be a

[319] Erasmo, who accepts a Flavian date for the inscription, connects this epitaph to the contemporary tendency to commemorate the dead in the form of the gods (2008, 203).
[320] Certain Roman poets had written poetry in an "epitaphic mode." Some have characterized Propertius' funereal elegy for Cornelia, for instance, as a pseudo-epitaph because the matron's posthumous monologue employs epitaphic conventions (Erasmo 2008, 196-201).

participant in their cults, by allowing them access to the objects and spaces in which these "gods" and "goddesses" are present.

Chapter Three: Grief in the Cosmopolis: Claudius Etruscus and Empire in *Silv.* 3.3

The previous chapters have largely explored individual relationships, the intimate conjoinings of the bodies of *vernae* and their masters or of husbands and wives. My analysis has shown that the "self" in Statius' poetry extends beyond the boundaries of the physical body. In the first chapter, I argued that Statius' depiction of the master/slave and patron/freedman relationship blurs the distinction between "me" and "mine." In the second, I demonstrated that Statius' husbands and wives extend one another. The dying wife, for instance, uses her husband's hand to close her own eyes (5.1.196). The loss of a wife or a slave is cast as a loss of part of oneself. The work of Statius' consolations, as I proposed in the Introduction, consists both in helping his addressees to recalibrate their relationships with the deceased and to renegotiate their own identities. The present chapter looks beyond the self's network of relations with other people and outward toward its connections with society and the world around it. These networks do not have as strong a physical or material basis as those examined elsewhere in the dissertation, but they are no less important in contributing to a sense of self. Statius' consolation to the wealthy equestrian Claudius Etruscus for the loss of his father provokes questions about how people are connected with the land, the family, the state, and even the cosmos and constitutes a meditation on how to manage such relationships in the face of death. This chapter examines how Statius advises Etruscus to navigate the intersections of individual and communal identities in the face of his loss.

In his description of Claudius Etruscus' reaction to the death of his aged father, Statius makes the curious remark that an observer of Etruscus' behavior might think that the mourner had lost prematurely either a young wife or the *pubescentia…ora* of a son (3.3.11-12).[321] Etruscus seems to treat the death of his father as a *mors immatura,* despite the fact that the man

[321] Martial makes a similar observation about Etruscus (7.40.7-8).

had died at the age of 90 (Laguna-Mariscal 1992, 260n10b-12a).[322] There is a relatively simple explanation for this oddity. According to Statius, the old man had recently been reborn (3.3.154). Etruscus' father, whose name we do not know, was an influential imperial freedman.[323] Born in Smyrna in 2 or 3 CE, he was brought to Rome as a youth and spent a period in Tiberius' household as a slave. After receiving his freedom, he served various emperors: Caligula, Claudius, Nero, Vespasian, Titus, and Domitian. He reached the height of his career in the early 70s when he was made Vespasian's *procurator a rationibus* and was elevated (extra-legally) to the equestrian rank (Weaver 1965, 148). He was exiled to Campania in 82 or 83 by Domitian, who Gabriel Laguna-Marsical speculates was suspicious of his father's and brother's trusted freedmen (1992, 291n154-71). Although Statius attempts to downplay the length of the old man's exile (3.3.164), scholars have determined that the term of exile was probably eight years. Statius' poem suggests that he died soon after his recall, probably in 92 (Carradice 1979, 111). The occasion of Etruscus' father's rebirth, then, was his recall to Rome from the period of exile in Campania. Etruscus' complaint is that his father had not had time to enjoy the use of the *munus* that the emperor Domitian had granted him in allowing him to return (3.3.185), a gift which he and his brother had been instrumental in securing. The association of exile and death was common amongst Roman writers.[324] Seneca, for example, famously sent his mother a consolation for his exile on the model of a consolation for the deceased (*Helv.* 1.2). Cicero described his return to the city after his exile as *alterius vitae quoddam initium*, "as a kind of beginning of a second life" (*Att.* 4.1.8). Both men, however, lived for years after their exiles were cut short. Etruscus suggests that his father suffered a kind of second exile despite the goodwill of

[322] For a detailed description of the career of Etruscus' father see Weaver 1965 and Carradice 1979.
[323] See Weaver 1965, 145. It is clear that Etruscus' name comes from his mother's side of the family (Statius refers to her as Etrusca).
[324] There is hardly room here to do justice to the theme. For a compilation of various expressions of the idea that exile is like death see Bonjour 1975, 459-62, Claassen 1996, Narducci 1997, 71.

the emperor: *ad manes, ingrate, fugis,* "ungrateful, you flee to the shades" (3.3.155). This line may allude to the final line of the *Aeneid,* in which Turnus' spirit is said to have *fugit indignata sub umbras*, "fled, resentful, beneath the shades" (12. 952). In this case, *fugit* may be intended to give a sense that Turnus' shade left earth too quickly. Etruscus may feel similarly about his father. But a more literal meaning of *fugis* is no doubt in play as well. Etruscus characterizes his father's death as a second flight from his Rome, a second exile.

The brief summary of Etruscus' father's life makes it easy to imagine why his failure to enjoy the gift provided by Domitian might have caused his son distress. Dislocations had figured in the imperial freedman's experience. Etruscus' father was uprooted both from his native Smyrna and later from the city in which he had spent the majority of his life. Domitian's reprieve promised once again to grant him stability, to return him into a community in which he felt he belonged. There is perhaps a more pragmatic reason for Etruscus' reaction as well. Statius elsewhere explicitly states that Etruscus' own position was dependent on his father's: *quam dives in usus/natorum totoque volens excedere censu/testis adhuc largi nitor indesuetus Etrusci*, "how rich he was for the benefit of his sons, wishing to go beyond his wealth, the splendid elegance of generous Etruscus is witness to this" (3.3.147-149). These lines demonstrate both the extent of Etruscus' social ambitions and his reliance upon his father to achieve them. His father's good standing in Roman society was surely vital to the success of these ambitions. But the reason that Statius has Etruscus himself offers for his bitterness toward his father and his father's ungrateful behavior is that he himself felt robbed of the opportunity to aid his father in this re-transition and to act as a pious son ought. After he calls his father ungrateful, Etruscus laments:

> *Felix cui magna patrem cervice vehenti*
> *sacra Mycenaeae patuit reverentia flammae*
> *quique tener saevis genitorem Scipio Poenis*
> *abstulit et Lydi pietas temeraria Lausi*

> Happy is the man to whom the sacred reverence of the Mycenean flame gave way as he carried his father on his great neck! Happy tender Scipio, who snatched his father from the cruel Poeni, and happy the rash piety of Lydian Lausus.
> (3.3.188-91)

Etruscus declares that his own piety pales in comparison with the devotion of these exemplary sons from Roman and Italian history. His statement is, perhaps unsurprisingly, hyperbolic. The reader learns from Statius that Etruscus and his brother were in fact instrumental in securing their father's return from exile. The poet hints strongly that the petitions and promises that Etruscus and his brother made to the emperor Domitian resulted in their father's recall (3.3.155), yet his father's death made him feel as though he could no longer maintain his status as a dutiful child. Bianca-Jeannete Schröder has recently proposed that *pietas* is not simply an attitude, but a set of behaviors (2012, 357). Over time, performing *pietas* would become an ingrained habit and would come to define one who did so. It is easy to see, therefore, why the loss of his father affects Etruscus with such intensity. Etruscus feels that he has lost not only his father, but his customary mode of being in the world.[325] What consolation is available to one whose sense of self has been thus altered?

The bulk of Statius' consolation consists in a panegyric on the model of the *basilikos logos* or *laudatio funebris* that outlines the dead man's parentage, homeland, and public career (Laguna-Mariscal 1992, 244-5).[326] This speech both honors the shade of the departed father and consoles the son by reminding him of his father's achievements. Yet, Statius must also attempt to explain away the blights on Etruscus' father's record, his base origins, his enslavement, and his

[325] For the association of Etruscus with *pietas* in this poem see McCullough 2011, 185-6. She believes that he models his *pietas* on that of Domitian. The tension between public and private *pietas* will be important to my argument.

[326] This kind of praise may be related to the traditional Roman *laudatio funebris*, but is also indebted to the Greek epideictic tradition (Pernot 2015, 22). For a discussion of consolation and epideictic oratory see also Pernot 2005, 178 and 199-201.

exile.[327] These sections of the panegyric function almost as a secondary consolation, designed to illustrate that neither slavery nor exile diminished his standing in the Roman empire while he lived. In order to persuade Etruscus of this, Statius draws on the tropes of Stoic consolation to suggest that Etruscus' father's lifelong connection to the Roman "cosmos" was never severed. However, Statius cannot so plausibly claim that this bond remained intact after the imperial freedman's death. If Etruscus' piety consisted solely in bolstering his father's standing in Roman society, his parent's death indeed would preclude his performing his *pietas.* It follows that Statius' consolation must strike a delicate balance. On the one hand, as I have suggested, the poet must assure the distraught Etruscus that his father had always enjoyed "membership" in Rome and this his death had not deprived him of a *new* opportunity to enjoy the benefits of access to the city. But Statius also must show Etruscus that he could continue to fulfill his obligations to his father and maintain equally strong bonds with him despite his removal from the public sphere, that he could continue to perform his role as a pious son despite his father's death. [328]

The panegyric, despite its broadly universalizing rhetoric, does raise questions about what places and connections an individual ought to value. Should an adopted city supersede one's homeland? Can connections to the imperial family erase blood relations?[329] Statius' ultimate message, I contend, is that although the imperial freedman had always been a "part" of the Roman universe in some sense, this bond was not the only one of importance. The poet also valorizes his private relationships with his family and home, which could be maintained even after death. The end of the poem suggests that Etruscus can continue a relationship with his

[327] Peter White argues that Martial employs a similar strategy in his epigram (6.83) on the same subject (1975, 277).
[328] See Egelhaaf-Gaiser 2016, 65 for a similar argument, though she does not acknowledge the more public aspects of that *pietas.*
[329] Neil Bernstein believes that the answer is an unequivocal "yes" (2008, 84). He writes that the *Silvae* as a whole "validate efforts to separate perceptions of the individual's identity from expectations conferred by descent" (2008, 84).

father in the privacy of his own home, much as we saw that an Abascantus or a Polla could interact with their lost spouses. In this sense, Statius implies, Etruscus may remain a dutiful son, even though his piety no longer consists in helping his father to navigate the Roman civic sphere. To establish this conclusion, I shall consider both the evidence that Statius provides about the importance of the imperial freedman's participation in the Roman empire and the statements that would suggest both the limitations of such connections and the greater importance of familial ties.

Pius **Etruscus**

The tension between public and private affiliations arises already in the opening lines of the consolation, where Etruscus' identity as a dutiful son is advertised. There, Statius utters an invocation to the goddess *Pietas*, an act which, we shall see, raises questions about the proper object of devotion.[330] The poet invites the goddess to look upon the suffering of his addressee Claudius Etruscus as he mourns the loss of his father, a wealthy and once influential imperial freedman. Statius casts *Pietas* as the goddess who abandoned the Earth because of her sorrow at the wickedness of men.[331] The poet asks that she appear *qualis adhuc praesens nullaque expulsa nocentum/fraude rudes populos atque aurea regna colebas*, "as you were when still present and expelled by no crime of the wicked, and you cultivated primitive peoples and golden kingdoms" (3.3.4-5). Readers of Statius' *Thebaid,* however, would recall that *Pietas* had abandoned the

[330] Jean-Michel Hulls notes that such tensions characterize the poem as a whole. But he strongly argues that Statius' message for Etruscus is that filial *pietas* is no longer a virtue in Flavian Rome, and that the only important relationship one should cultivate is with the emperor (2011, 169-70). Therefore, he concludes that the poem is not really a consolation at all, but an exhortation. For a contrasting view, see White 1975, 279. I cannot agree with Hulls. The poet's discussion of Etruscus' grief is consistently laudatory—that is Etruscus is praised for the virtue of piety. For instance, Statius asks the goddess to behold Etruscus' pious tears and to dry his ***laudata*** *lumina* (3.3.7). Furthermore, as we shall see, the poem does enact consolatory failure.

[331] See Laguna Mariscal 1992, 257-8 for a discussion of Statius' references to the Golden Age in this passage.

earth out of despair in Book 11 of the epic (457-97).[332] There, *Pietas* was concerned that the war between Polyneices and Eteocles had sundered relationships among fathers, sons, and brothers (11.479). The epic, of course, also demonstrates the importance of bonds that the virtue *pietas* creates between husbands and wives and sisters and brothers. But these relationships are largely familial. For instance, when Tiresias begs his son Menoeceus not to kill himself, he reprimands his son thus: *Externi te nempe patres alienaque tangent/pignora? Si pudor est, primum miserere tuorum./ Haec* ***pietas****, hic verus honos,* "Do other fathers and foreign children move you? If you have shame, first pity your own. This is piety, this is true honor" (10.709-10). In 3.3, Statius informs *Pietas* that Etruscus' behavior toward his father has merited her return, despite his reservations about his own ability to be a pious son. He had begun to repair the family structure that had collapsed in the *Thebaid.* Father and son apparently maintained the strong connections to one another of which *Pietas* approved.[333] Indeed, one could easily submit Etruscus' relationship with his father to the kind of analysis offered in the preceding chapters. Statius describes how Etruscus' father sustained close, bodily connections with his beloved son: *hunc equidem amplexu semper revocante tenebas/blandus et imperio numquam pater,* "indeed you used constantly to hold your son in an embrace that called him back, always kind and never an imperious father" (3.3.151-2). Etruscus attempted to uphold this intimacy in his father's dying moments, receiving his parent's dying breath (3.3.19-20) and thereby incorporating a piece of the elder man in his own body.[334] The reader learns that Etruscus even entangled himself physically with his father: *tenet ecce seniles/leniter implicitus vultus,* "behold he gently embraces the aged

---

[332] For a discussion of *Pietas* in the *Thebaid,* see Feeney 1991, 385-9; Delarue 2000, 356-367; Ganiban 2007, McNelis 2007. Feeney makes the point that "Piety" is in fact defeated several times in the epic before her explicit expulsion (388).

[333] For a discussion of the affective, rather than purely obligatory, nature of *pietas,* see Saller 1994, 112-114.

[334] Laguna Mariscal believes that we are meant to imagine Etruscus kissing his father's corpse as Melior had kissed that of Glaucias (1992, 263-4n19-20). But it is preferable to see *frigidum* as a proleptic adjective because I do not believe a corpse would have an *anima.*

countenance" (3.3.17-18). The mental image suggested by *implicitus* emphasizes the intimacy that Etruscus strove to recreate with his parent's body.[335] Etruscus' behavior strongly recalls that of Melior, Ursus, and Abascantus. In 3.3, of course, the case is different: a son grieves over his father's demise. But Statius tells us that the physical and emotional effects of Etruscus' loss do not differ significantly from those experienced by bereaved husbands and parents (3.3.10-12). Statius assimilates Etruscus to these other kinds of mourners in order to demonstrate that his addressee had, in losing his father, lost an integral part of himself. In doing so, Statius suggests that Etruscus' impassioned display of grief is the understandable reaction of a devoted son. But it is not at all clear that Etruscus' *pietas* lay only in his behavior toward his father in private. Etruscus' performance of piety, after all, is enacted in public. Statius asks his audience to *observe* (*ecce*) the grieving son's obsequies toward his parent (3.3.17).

It seems that Statius cultivated an intentional ambiguity about the character of his *Pietas* to introduce a tension between family unit and the civic community that he will continue to explore throughout the poem. It might surprise some readers to know that *Pietas* had exited the earthly realm. After all, emperors often claimed *Pietas* as an imperial virtue.[336] *Pietas* might also represent the devotion owed by subjects to their emperor. Statius himself includes hints that his *Pietas* might not be purely familial. For instance, he mentions that Pietas inhabited the earth during the *aurea regna* (3.3.5). Poets often spoke about a virgin goddess who left the earth at the end of the Golden Age. Catullus and Ovid refer to her as *Astraea* (*Carm.* 64.384-408; *Met.* 1.149-50). [337] Virgil simply refers to her as *Iustitia* (*G.* 2. 474). These names are apparently

[335] There is similar imagery some lines earlier where Etruscus is said to have rained blows upon his chest and embraced his father's pyre and ashes (3.3.9).
[336] See e.g. Noreña 2001 and Wallace-Hadrill 1981 for a discussion of imperial virtues. They agree that the so-called canon of imperial virtues was probably not as fixed as earlier scholars suggested, but *pietas* remained prevalent in imperial self-representations on coins even in the high empire (Noreña 2001).
[337] For the connection of *Pietas* in the *Thebaid* with Astraea see Vessey 1973, 173.

interchangeable and refer to the constellation identified by Aratus as the Maiden, whom he tells us men called Δίκη, "justice" before her departure from earth (*Phaen.* 105). The presence of Justice in the world usually implied a community larger than the family in which just laws held sway. Aratus, for instance, spoke of Δίκη's presence in the market place and assemblies of elders (105-6). Some Romans also recognized the social nature of justice.[338] Cicero, who theorized extensively about *iustitia,* at one point made the claim that it was *ius* which bound together all of human *societas* (*Leg.* 1.15.42).[339] Thus, Statius' decision to address this goddess as *Pietas* has important implications. As suggested above, Statius' *Pietas* in the first lines of the consolation appears primarily concerned with the relationship between Etruscus and his father. Why does Statius transform Aratus' Δίκη, the hallmark of civilization, into the force that binds fathers and sons, a metamorphosis to which his readers would surely be attuned?[340] The seeds of this decision may lie in Catullus. In the so-called Song of the Fates at the end of 64, Catullus laments that justice disappeared after the end of the Golden Age. Subsequently, he remarks, brothers killed one another and children stopped mourning the loss of their parents (*Carm.* 64.399-400). The dissolution of the family serves as a sign of larger societal collapse. *Pietas* and *Iustitia* here seem intimately related to one another. This attitude was not anomalous in Rome. Cicero described *pietas* as the guarantor of justice: *pietate adversus deos sublata fides etiam et societas generis humani et una excellentissima virtus iustita tollatur,* "with the piety towards the gods removed, loyalty and the society of the human race and justice itself, the most excellent virtue,

[338] For an exploration of Ovid's feelings of partial exclusion from the Roman community bound by *ius* (with Augustus at its head as *iudex*) see McGowan 2009, 133-42. As we shall see, Etruscus' father's experience of exile makes the question of whether he was really a part of Rome's juridical community important.

[339] Cicero goes on to say that justice was a result of the natural human tendency toward sociability: *nam haec nascuntur ex eo, quia natura propensi sumus ad diligendos homines, quod est fundamentum iuris,* "for these things are born from that, because we have a propensity by nature to love men, which is the foundation of justice" (*Leg.*1.43). For a discussion of justice and nature in Cicero, see Atkins 1990, 285-9.

[340] It is clear that Statius differentiates between the two concepts to a certain extent. In his lament for his father, the poet asks that both *Pietas* and *Iustitia* mourn his father (5.3.89-90). For further discussion of Statius' use of this Golden Age motif, see Gibson 2006, 225-6n92.

shall be eliminated" (*ND* 1.4).[341] *Pietas* a*nd Iustitia* share the distinction of creating and maintaining healthy relationships in the community at large. The logic here demands that devotion to the gods also implies men's duties toward one another. Indeed, in the same work, Cicero's Academic spokesman Cotta argues that *pietas* toward the gods is the result of some *communitas* between gods and men that mirrors the relationships of men toward one another.[342] *Pietas* thus simultaneously implies intimate interpersonal relationships and civic, even cosmic, bonds.

Statius, I argue, takes advantage of *Pietas'* dual associations. Elsewhere in the *Silvae*, he makes the claim that Domitian is the author of *Pietas*' return to earth (5.2.92), his reign having inaugurated a second Golden Age. *Pietas* characterizes Domitian's Rome as a whole.[343] The fact that the emperor, the head of the Roman state, should be the cause of *Pietas'* return suggests that Statius recognized that she was not purely familial. In 3.3, Statius makes clear in the panegyric that Etrucus' father's piety was directed toward the emperors whom he served. At the opening of his description of the old man's post-slavery career, Statius writes: *Iamque piam lux alta domum praecelsaque toto/intravit Fortuna gradu*, "now a light from above entered the pious house and lofty Fortune in full stride" (3.3.85-6). The poet then lists the series of increasingly influential positions that Etruscus' father held in the imperial bureaucracy. Statius tells us that Fortune favored the "pious" house.[344] This would seem to refer to the imperial freedman's own residence, but Fortuna comes in her public guise. She grants Etruscus' father public honor and prestige. The house actually seems to be pious because of its cultivation of the imperial family. Public and

[341] See also Cicero's earlier statement in the same work that *est enim pietas iustitia adversus deos,* piety is justice toward the gods, (*ND* 1.116) Pease detects traces of Stoic thought in these lines, however (1979, 511 ad loc.). For Cicero's changing views about pietas over the course of his career see Wagenvoort 1980, 8-10 and Berdowski 2014.
[342] Cotta maintains that *pietas* is possible between humans because men owe devotion to other men for some benefit that they have received; he therefore argues that the same must hold true between gods and men (*ND* 1.116).
[343] It is true that this claim comes in the context of a son's treatment of his mother' memory. However, to say that Domitian's new society was *pius* is not to exclude *pietas* towards one's family.
[344] For *pietas erga patronum* as a value associated with freedmen see Lotito 1974-5, 308, 328-30.

private blur here.[345] Statius saw, then, that *Pietas* was not always the devotion of a son toward a father. It might well refer to a similar deference toward the emperor or perhaps toward the gods.[346] In fact, Etruscus' piety is not simply directed toward his father. When Statius speaks of Etruscus' birth, he emphasizes that the young man also owed a certain devotion to the emperor. Etruscus' father is said to have *fidos domino genuisse clientes*, "sired faithful clients for their master" (3.3.110). [347] And indeed, Statius speaks of Etrucus' devotion to Domitian and the *pia vota* that he made in order to secure his father's return from exile (3.3.154-4). In promising to fulfill these *pia vota*, Etruscus ostensibly displays his *pietas* toward Domitian. But he simultaneously demonstrates his filial piety by asking for his father's recall from exile. He felt that his identity as a pious son depended upon discharging such duties, as his lament that his father could not enjoy the *munus* that he had procured attests (3.3.185). Etruscus' performance of his obligations toward his father apparently also involved his supporting his father in a public, civic context and his helping to ensure his father's position in the society that they shared. It is clear that while his parent was alive, Etruscus was enmeshed in a complex web of obligation with both the emperor and his father. This is not unusual. As Schröder has illustrated, *pietas* was often simultaneously directed toward one's family and the state (2012, 348). In his *De Officiis*, for instance, Cicero makes the claim that it is beneficial to the state to have citizens who are pious toward their parents (3.90). The exemplars of devotion to whom Etruscus negatively compares himself all combined familial and patriotic *pietas*: Aeneas saved both his father and the

[345] Hulls comments of this line, "one gets the impression that this is *pietas* as it should be" (2011, 170).
[346] Richard Alston and Efrossini Spentzou notice a similar tension in Pliny's discussion of *pius* grief in *Ep.* 5.16: "Grief is *pietas* as it reflects the duties and bonds towards those one loves, especially family members, but also allows social bonds to be reinforced through the rituals of consolation (2011, 92). They also see a tension between Abascantus' grief in *Silv.* 5.3 and his *pietas* toward the emperor (97).
[347] Statius' use of *dominus* may introduce ambivalence. Gabriel Laguna-Mariscal convincingly remarks that the term does not indicate that the children were born prior to their father's manumission, but rather refers to Domitian's title as *dominus et deus* (1992, 286n110b). However, its introduction in this context may remind one that Etruscus' father had been a slave, that he had served an imperial master himself. The sons would then seem to be likened to slaves themselves. The implied criticism, if it is there, is very subtle.

gods of his country (*patrios Penates*) so that he might re-establish them in Rome (*Aen.* 2.717); Lausus avenges his father's wound by attacking the very man who ostensibly threatened the safety of Italy (*Aen*. 10.755-832); and Scipio saved his father, during the latter's consulship, at the battle of Lake Ticinus against the forces of Hannibal (*Polyb.* 10.3).[348] Etruscus recognizes that he can no longer perform this sort of dual *pietas*. Statius' task is thus a delicate one; he apparently did not wish to make the insensitive claim that the state of affairs which had obtained during his father's life was not valuable, but in order to console his grieving addressee the poet needed to reassure Etruscus that he could continue to fulfill his duties to his father despite the latter's absence from the civic sphere.

This discussion of *Pietas* and the problems that she raises in the context of the consolation has demonstrated that civic or cosmic ties and local and individual ones coexist in an uneasy balance. Is the family unit more important than Rome at large or vice versa? This question becomes more pressing when one recalls that Etruscus' father was an imperial freedman who had been born in Asia Minor. In what community did he primarily belong? The uncertainties that Statius' poetry reveals about which affiliations and relationships men ought to privilege were hardly novel. The Romans had long grappled with this problem, often casting it in terms of competing attachments to particular places. Cicero, who had himself been born in Arpinum, articulated the idea that the Italians who had been incorporated into the Roman citizenship had two *patriae:*

> *Ego mehercule et illi et omnibus municipibus duas esse censeo patrias, unam naturae, alteram civitatis: ut ille Cato…quom ortu Tusculanus esset, civitate Romanus, habuit alteram loci patriam, alteram iuris.*

[348] For the idea that civic *pietas* was of greater importance to Aeneas than filial, see Galinsky 1969, 57-9. The pious actions of all these exemplary sons are all fall under the rubric of *pietas* under "crisis" conditions that Schröder describes (2012, 348).

> By Hercules, I think that he and all men from the *municipia* have two fatherlands, one allotted by nature and the other by the state. Cato…since he was a Tusculan by birth and a Roman by citizenship, had one fatherland determined by place and another by law. (*Leg*. 2.2.5)

Cicero goes on to say that one should prefer the juridical fatherland to the natal, as the latter is subsumed in the former. Cicero does not deny the affective ties that bind a man to his native land, but concludes that the responsibilities owed the juridical community ought to outweigh any bond with a particular place (2.5).[349] Melanie Subacus has proposed that Cicero's assertion here recasts traditional Stoic cosmopolitanism in Roman terms, Rome standing in for the cosmic city of which, the Stoics asserted, gods and the wise were citizens (2015, 116).[350] Later Stoics, however, did not always accept Cicero's revisionism. Gareth Williams has illustrated that Seneca's cosmopolitanism was an attempt to escape the limitations of Neronian Rome (2011, 42). In *De Otio,* Seneca rewrites Cicero in order to emphasize the existence of *real* cosmic citizenship:

> *Duas res publicas animo complectamur, alteram magnam et vere publicam, qua dii atque homines continentur, in qua non ad hoc angulum respicimus aut ad illum, sed terminus civitatis nostrae cum sole metimur; alteram cui nos adscripsit condicio nascendi.*
>
> Let us embrace the fact in our mind that there are two republics—one, vast and truly common, in which gods and men are contained, in which we look neither to this corner of the earth nor to that, but we measure the boundaries of our citizenship with the sun; the other, the one which the condition of our birth assigned us. (1.4.1)

Seneca's imagery in this passage unites the heavens and earth. Men and gods are part of the same *res publica,* whose boundary may be measured by the revolution of the sun. In his scheme, Rome is simply one corner of the earth among many. All human boundaries are shown to be artificial

---

[349] Cicero expresses a similar sentiment at *De Domo Suo* 98. For a detailed study of Roman citizenship and Italian identity in the Republic see Dench 2005. For a focused discussion of Cicero's brand of cosmopolitanism, see Subacus 2015, 117ff. For a similar phenomenon in *De Re Publica* see Gallagher 2001. For the Stoic "cosmic city" see Schofield 1991 and Vogt 2008.

[350] See also Márquez 2012. His basic point is that since neither the Peripatetic model of the political community as the *polis* nor the Stoic model of the *cosmos* adequately described Cicero's Rome, Cicero adapted elements of each theory.

"accidents." Unsurprisingly, the philosopher goes on to assert that citizenship in the first commonwealth is preferable to the other (1.4.2). What does the contrast of the Ciceronian and Senecan viewpoints tell us? Both men acknowledge the existence of parochial connections but lend greater importance to the *patria* that transcends local boundaries.[351] They disagree, however, about the scope of this latter entity. Cicero's "cosmos" is Rome, while the boundaries of Seneca's cosmic city are coterminous with the path of the sun. Their differences suggest that the question of what one's relationship ought to be to one's natal land and familial origins, to the Roman empire, or to the cosmos at large remained open for debate in Statius' day. In addition to describing Etruscus' father's familial bonds, Statius deals extensively with the places in which the freedman spent his life. His concern about this matter contributes to the Ciceronian and Senecan discussion about the relative importance of local and global attachments. Statius consciously engages with Stoic ideas about cosmic citizenship in his consolation to Etruscus, even toying with the Ciceronian notion of Rome as cosmos. Etruscus' father's very membership in this cosmic city is presented as information that ought to soothe Etruscus' grief, as it is evidence of his having always enjoyed membership in the Roman empire. Yet, ultimately, his poem demonstrates that the second of Seneca's *res publicae* is of equal importance to the first. It is this message that Statius hopes will have the greatest power to assuage his addressee's grief.

The Advantages of the "Cosmic Viewpoint"

Cosmic language first appears in the panegyric for the deceased imperial freedman.[352] A few words about the function of this rhetorical set piece are in order. In his analysis of the structural principles of the *consolationes* in the *Silvae,* Newmyer notices that "The format of the

[351] Indeed, in the preceding portion of *De Legibus,* Cicero had described his abiding love for the place of his birth, and particularly the house in which he had been born and his grandfather and father had lived (2.3).

[352] This section is one of the formal features of a Statian *consolatio.* Stephen Newmyer has determined that this section comprises 43% of the consolation to Melior and 35% of the consolation to Ursus. Strikingly, Statius' formal praise of Etruscus' father constitutes fully 59% of the poem (1979, 67n11).

laudatio is unvarying. The beauty, both of person and character, the ancestry, and the accomplishments of the deceased are praised in turn" (1979, 67).[353] Statius' inclusion of these encomiastic elements indicates that he felt that they possessed some consolatory value, perhaps as reminders that the deceased had lived a worthy and full life.[354] But, as Newmyer goes on to point out, Statius encountered a difficulty in conforming to this formula in the case of 3.3 (67). The poet had to minimize the potential stigma associated with Etruscus' father's low birth and enslavement. Statius achieves this by inserting a consolation for the imperial freedman's experience of servitude:

> *nec pudor iste tibi: quid enim terrisque poloque*
> *parendi sine lege manet? vice cuncta reguntur*
> *alternisque premunt. propriis sub regibus omnis*
> *terra; premit felix regum diademata Roma;*
> *hanc ducibus frenare datum; mox crescit in illos*
> *imperium superis; sed habent et numina legem.*
> *servit et astrorum velox chorus et vaga servit*
> *luna, nec iniussae totiens redit orbita lucis.*
> *et (modo si fas est aequare iacentia summis)*
> *pertulit et saevi Tirynthius horrida regis*
> *pacta, nec erubuit famulantis fistula Phoebi.*
>
> Nor is that shameful for you. For what on land or in heaven remains without the law of obedience? All things are ruled in turn, and in turn impose on others. Each land serves its own kings. Happy Rome presses down the diadems of kings. Rome is given to her leaders to reign in. Then the rule of the immortal gods overshadows them. But even the gods are beholden to the law. The swift chorus of stars is enslaved, the wandering moon is enslaved, nor does the orb of light return again and again uncommanded, and (if only it is right to compare the lowly with the lofty) the Tirynthian bore the harsh covenant of a cruel king and Phoebus' flute did not blush when he was enslaved.
>
> (3.3.48-58)

[353] Newmyer consistently uses Latin names for Statius' rhetorical set pieces. The formal features of Newmyer's *laudatio* broadly correspond to those of Laguna-Mariscal's *basilikos logos* (which he draws from Menander Rhetor). For the interaction of Greek epideictic rhetoric and Latin oratory in the *Silvae* see Hardie 1983, 91-102.

[354] Menander Rhetor, writing some two or three centuries after Statius, wrote that such an encomium in an *epitaphios logos* would rekindle lamentation but give the orator the chance to remind his audience that the deceased was with the gods or in the Elysian Fields (*RG* 3.421.10-17).

As Gabriel Laguna-Mariscal comments, the perspective that Statius adopts in this passage has strong Stoic resonances (1992, 271n48-55).[355] Statius insists that everything in the earth (*terris)* and heavens (*polo*) is subject to a *lex parendi.* The idea that the entire universe obeys a single law was common Stoic doctrine.[356] This "law" was to be identified simultaneously with God, fate, and nature. In an epistle to Lucilius, Seneca expresses a sentiment similar to that of Statius in this passage. Seneca notes that *Natura…regnum mutationibus temperat,* "Nature moderates her kingdom with changes" (*Ep.* 107.8). He points out, for instance, that calm weather follows a storm. In concluding, he informs Lucilius that: *ad hanc legem animus noster aptandus est; hanc sequatur, huic pareat. Et quaecumque fiunt, debuisse fieri putet nec velit obiurgare naturam* "to this law our soul must fasten itself, this it should follow, this it should obey. Whatever happens, think that it had to happen, and do not wish to censure Nature" (*Ep.* 107.9). Seneca claims that the vagaries of the world are to be explained by necessity, or fate. All events "have to occur"; that is, they are part of some naturally (i.e. divinely) ordained plan. This is part of the message that Statius would like to convey to Etruscus. Statius' language even echoes Seneca's. Where the philosopher speaks of a *legem* which one should *pareat,* the poet refers to the *lex parendi.* But Statius' consolation to Etruscus for the imperial freedman's period of enslavement does not rest solely on the idea that his father's suffering was fated. Statius' adoption of a Stoic perspective in these lines affords him another means of alleviating distress. He advertises Etruscus' father's connection to all parts of the cosmos.

In order to demonstrate this fact, I shall return to a concept that was important in the first chapter, *sympatheia.* There, I used Brooke Holmes' definition of *sympatheia* as the ability of

---

[355] See also Lotito 1974-5, 310-312 on the relationship between this passage and Stoic views of necessity and fate.
[356] Cicero states the position of the Stoics in the following manner in his *De Legibus: lex est ratio summa, insita in natura, quae iubet ea, quae facienda sunt, prohibetque contraria,* "law is the highest reason, implanted in nature, it orders those things which must be done and forbids the opposite things" (1.18). See also Asmis 2009, 117; Scott 1999, 19; Vogt 2008, 70-1.

various entities to be "affected in tandem." Etruscus' father and the universe certainly seem to have suffered together. The man's experience of slavery is mirrored in the enslavement not only of various regions of the earth to Rome but of the stars and the moon to natural laws (3.3.49-55). This extraordinary deployment of the pathetic fallacy is not simply rhetorical embellishment. The Stoic undertones of the passage give the sympathetic connection between Etruscus' father and the physical world further significance.[357] For many Stoics sympathy was to be explained by the unity of the cosmos: *omne, quod esset, unum esse dixerunt*, "they said that everything which exists was one" (Cic. *De Div.* II.33). The extraordinary concord of the cosmos was predicated upon the idea proposed by the early Stoics that God, the providential ruler of the universe, physically permeated his entire creation in the form of divine *pneuma.*[358] Certain Roman Stoics accepted this idea.[359] For instance, Seneca informs his interlocutor Lucilius that Jupiter is omnipresent: *Vis illum vocare mundum, non falleris; ipse enim est hoc quod vides totum, partibus suis inditus, et se sustinens et sua,* "you want to call him the world, you aren't wrong; for he is himself all of this which you see, infused in his parts, sustaining himself and his parts."[360] Seneca's formulation illustrates the idea that the Stoic god is at once whole and diffused into the individual parts of the universe. Humans, stars, and planets are thus endowed with a portion of the same divine substance. They are all parts of the same whole, and therefore connected with one another.[361] It therefore follows that although Etruscus suffered enslavement, he was not isolated even from those more fortunate than he. By drawing on these Stoic ideas,

---

[357] For a discussion of the pathetic fallacy and Stoicism in Hellenistic poetry see Buller 1981.
[358] For Chrysippus' view see Lapidge 1989, 1384. More generally, see Vogt 2008, 134-5.
[359] For Seneca see Williams 2012, Setaioli 2007, 337. For Manilius' Stoic attitude on this issue see Volk 2009, 223.
[360] See also *De Ben*. 4.7
[361] This also explained the various parts of the universe would suffer together. As Suzanne Bobzien notes, this means that "in some sense everything in the universe emits some physical influence on everything else" (1998, 169-70). Katja Vogt further points out that the early Stoics advocated that sages should be well disposed toward one another because "all wise beings are commonly affected by the actions of any one of them" (2008, 152).

Statius would seem to suggest to Etruscus that his father simply suffered the shared fate of the universe, a tactic which Seneca himself employed in his *Consolatio ad Polybium* (1.4).[362]

I believe that Statius' message goes beyond this, however. The poet hints that the imperial freedman's individual experience was part of a larger providential plan.[363] Statius' description of the regular movements of the stars, sun, and the moon recalls, for instance, Balbus' discussion of such phenomena in his argument for the existence of divine providence in Book II of Cicero's *De Natura Deorum.* When Statius claims that the stars and moon obey the "law," he obliquely refers to their regular movement through the heavens. He is even more explicit about the regularity of the sun's revolution, indicating that the sun's light returns *totiens* because it has been ordered to do so (*nec iniussae*) (3.3.55). The poet highlights the repetitiveness of the sun's motion. His use of *iubeo* is also significant. Although Statius does not name explicitly who orders the sun to move through its course, it is clear that *someone* or *something* causes the sun to fulfill its life-giving function over and over again. Similarly, Balbus asks how anyone seeing heaven *conficientem vicissitudines anniversarias cum summa salute et conservatione rerum omnium,* "completing the yearly changes of the seasons with the greatest safety and with the conservation of all things," could doubt that these revolutions were effected *non solum ratione sed etiam excellentique divinaque ratione,* "not only by reason but by an excellent and divine reason" (*ND* 2. 97). He goes on to assert that anyone observing the beauty of the revolution of the sun and planets would immediately recognize the hand of *divina*

---

[362] Seneca asserts that *natura, quod gravissimum fecerat, commune fecisse, crudelitatem fati consolaretur aequalitas,* "Nature has…made universal what she had made hardest to bear in order that the uniformity of fate might console men for its cruelty" (1.4). Gareth Williams notes that the philosopher adopts a similar attitude in the *Natural Questions* (2012).

[363]The early Stoics claimed that all the parts of the universe were bound together in a *nexus causarum,* which largely corresponded to "fate" (Meyer 2009, 71-2). M. Lapidge explains that this chain of causes (fate) is related to cosmic sympathy: "Just as a movement in one part of the universe produces a corresponding movement elsewhere, so the alteration of one cause in the chain of fate produces a corresponding effect elsewhere" (1989, 1395). In Stoic terms, therefore, Etruscus' father's suffering was one link in a chain of causes whose purpose was ultimately beneficial to the human race. For a similar view about the role of divine providence see Lotito 1974-5, 312.

providentia (2.101-104).[364] If Statius indeed alludes to the fact that stars are ruled by a benevolent divinity, then so too must be the imperial freedman to whom they are compared. Statius' decision to cast Etruscus' father's period of enslavement as the work of divine providence might seem misguided. But there is a kind of logic to this consolatory technique.

Statius would appear to be comforting Etruscus with the notion, along Stoic lines, that his father's suffering as an individual was unimportant in light of his participation in and belonging to the larger, benevolently arranged cosmos. Gretchen Reydams-Schils, observing that the Stoics found appealing the idea that the "part was subordinated to the whole," used this notion to argue away apparent evils "as a matter of perspective" (1999, 7).[365] For instance, Seneca wrote to Lucilius that while the gods *humani generis tutelam gerunt,* "hold the guardianship of the human race," they are *interdum incuriosi singulorum,* "sometimes careless of individuals" (*Ep.* 95. 50).[366] According to this logic, Etruscus' father's suffering was a necessary part of a divine plan that will ultimately benefit the universe of which he is a part. This is the kind of "cosmic viewpoint" that Gareth Williams has recently argued Seneca encouraged. Williams has suggested that Seneca's *Natural Questions* were designed precisely to turn a reader's attention from the individual difficulties of social and political life under Nero to the "alleviating *totum*" (2012, 255).[367] One can see how this kind of argument might be an attractive means of consoling the

---

[364]For further discussion of this passage see Dragona-Monachou 1976, 149. This position is similar to the one that Manilius expresses in his *Astronomica*. He argues that unless *inposito pareret tota magistro ac tantum mundi regeret prudential censum,* the stars would not *servarent* their assigned courses (2.67-72). For the question of Manilius' philosophical eclecticism and his Stoic tendencies see Volk 2009, 227-251, Habinek 2011.

[365] Reydams-Schils believes that this attitude may have been influenced by a passage in the *Timaeus* in which Plato claims that things happen for the sake of the whole (903b4-d3) (1999, 74). For this universal perspective, see also Schofield 1991, 101.

[366] Cicero's Stoic spokesman Balbus elucidates a similar view at *ND* 2.167. See Frede 2002, 110-11 for a discussion.

[367] Williams explains in his introduction: "By personalizing the study of nature, as if giving the reader a sense of participation in a world far greater than the world of Rome; by constantly reinforcing the guiding principle that there *is* a governing *ratio* to things; by moving us toward the serenity of the detached, cosmic viewpoint—in these ways and more, the *Natural Questions* is no narrowly defined project of a forbidding, technical kind, but a work of very practical, therapeutic value" (2012, 10).

son of a former slave and an exile from Rome. But this is not actually the strategy that Statius employs.

I mentioned earlier that Statius does not specify who orders the sun to complete its course through the heavens. This was, perhaps, misleading. While Statius does not mention the master of the sun in the immediate context, he had already hinted at an identification. In the lines immediately preceding the passage cited above in which Statius states that slavery is a universal experience, the poet reminds Etruscus as he addresses the shade of his father: *nec dominos de plebe tulisti,/sed quibus occasus pariter famulantur et ortus,* "you did not take up masters from the mob, but those whom the east and the west equally serve" (3.3.46-7). My translation reproduces the sense of the lines, but loses the cosmological resonances of *occasus* and *ortus.* While these terms do signify east and west by synecdoche, they actually denote the setting and the rising of the sun. Thus, Statius' lines subtly imply that the very sunrise and sunset are subject to the power of the various emperors whom Etruscus' father served over the course of his long career. Such a reading would seem inconsistent with Statius' statement a few lines later that Rome obeys the *superis* (3.3.52-3). But this is a contradiction that Statius repeats elsewhere. The poet refers to the emperor Vespasian as *illum qui nutu superas nunc temperat arces,* "that one who now regulates the heavenly citadels with his nod" (3.3.138). Gabriel Laguna-Mariscal notices that this description casts Vespasian as Jupiter (1992, 290n138). Vespasian, assimilated to the king of the heavens, rules over the very citadel of the heavens (*arces*) that Statius had earlier claimed was the province of the gods. By casting Vespasian as Jupiter, Statius apparently equates his empire with the cosmos. This conflation of Rome with the cosmos, of course, is antithetical to traditional Stoic doctrine, but it was not without parallel.[368] Katharina Volk has

[368] See Obbink 1999, 195 for the reasons that doctrinaire Stoics would not have accepted the conflation of Rome with the cosmos. But Benjamin Straumann observes that "from the time of Cicero onward, there are cohesive

observed that Manilius, despite his largely Stoic orientation, sometimes "makes use of the contemporary discourse about the emperor's impending apotheosis and cosmic rule," (2009, 170).[369] Furthermore, as Jean-Michel Hulls notes, Vespasian is cast as a *Stoic* Jupiter (2011, 166). The verb *temperat* is an unusual choice in this context. It often means something like "maintains in a state of balance," but probably here connotes "regulates" (*OLD* 9). Laguna-Mariscal has proposed that Statius means that Vespasian kept the heavens in a state of equilibrium, as the Stoic god was supposed to do (1992, 290n138).[370] The regulated universe was a symbol of divine rationality and providence.[371] Vespasian, the emperor under whom Etruscus' father held his highest post and who ultimately integrated him more fully into Roman society by elevating him to the equestrian order (3.3.143-4), is thus the benevolent agent of that providential plan.[372] In retrospect, we can see that Statius advertises not Etruscus' father's membership in the universe beyond Rome, but his belonging in the Roman cosmic order.[373] The point seems to be that even during his tenure as a slave, Etruscus' father was a member of the Roman empire and therefore an object of its rulers' concern.

In fact, it is because of Vespasian's intervention in Etruscus' father's life that the connections between the imperial freedman and other parts of the empire are made apparent. Statius enumerates the responsibilities of Etruscus' father in his post as *a rationibus* in order to further demonstrate that the various parts of the empire exhibited sympathy with the freedman.

---

sources on Stoic doctrine in the fields of ethics and politicaly philosophy that…endeavor to clarify the practical implications of Stoic ethics for normal people" (2015, 111). See especially Asmis 2008 for a discussion of Cicero's use of Stoic theories of natural law in theorizing the laws of his own ideal society (Rome?) in the *De Legibus.*

[369] See note 364 above for references to discussions about Manilius' philosophical eclecticism.

[370] For the further association of the emperor with divine rationality see Lotito 1974-5, 382-5.

[371] Cf. Manilius *Astr.* II.82: *deus et ratio, quae cuncta gubernat,* "God and reason, who governs all things."

[372] Statius even emphasizes that Vespasian permitted Etruscus' father to participate in his Judean triumph (3.3.140). By taking part in the symbolic incorporation of Judaea into the Roman empire, Etruscus' father is allowed to demonstrate his identity as a conqueror and a "real" Roman.

[373] The idea that the Roman empire was a model of the larger cosmos was not foreign even to the early Stoics. Katherine Clarke, for instance, explicitly links Posidonius' view of the cosmos to the influence of Rome's consolidation of an empire (1999, 192).

In the section of the poem in which Statius praises the imperial bureaucrat's professional achievements, the poet catalogues all of the various goods that different parts of the empire sent to Rome as tax payment and of which Etruscus' father was in charge (3.3.87-98).[374] The imported materials come from the far flung regions of the empire: gold from Iberia, wheat from Africa, sheep from Lacedaemonia and ivory from India. Statius makes quite clear the universal scope of the bureaucrat's responsibility: *uni parent commissa ministro/quae Boreas quaeque Eurus atrox, quae nubilus Auster/invehit,* "to one minister alone are entrusted all the things which Boreas, which fierce Eurus and which cloudly Auster bring in"(3.3.95-7). Christopher Parrott rightly says that Statius presents Rome as the "focus of commerce, seated at the center of the Empire" (2013, 123).[375] But although Etruscus' father was in charge of the various imported commodities, elevated above them, man and goods resemble one another in certain ways. These products "obey" the imperial freedman, who is himself a servant (*minister*). Like their master, the *impendia* were sent from their native environments to the imperial center. The implication seems to be that despite differences in origin, all subjects of the Roman empire share common experiences by virtue of their inclusion in it. Etruscus' father's similarity to the items that he catalogued would seem to corroborate Thomas Rosenmeyer's observation that the compiler of catalogues "surrenders his role as enumerator (or discarder) and is himself pulled into the whirlpool of the inventoried universe. It is a universe in which he is both at home and an alien…because he is an inseparable part of it and it is of him" (1989, 161). Rosenmeyer's comments stem from his discussion of catalogues in Seneca's *Medea,* in which there is

[374] For a discussion of catalogues in the *Silvae* more generally see Morzadec 2009, 123-6. She sees the catalogues as rhetorical amplifications and aggrandizements.

[375] Randall Pogorzelski believes that the influx of objects "threatens to make the imperial court Eastern" (2016, 232). Of course, exchange between periphery and center will change both. However, his statement seems to me rather too simplistic. Rome remains Rome, even if what that means changes over time.

something sinister about the universe's sympathy with the depraved protagonist.[376] There is no indication that Statius wished to convey a similar pessimism to his readers. In fact, in the eyes of some Stoics, the connections forged between various peoples through commerce were to be seen as the natural outcome of divine providence. Seneca, for instance, wrote to Lucilius that different regions of the world produced different crops so that *necessarium mortalibus esset inter ipsos commercium, si invicem alius alidquid ab alio peteret*, "commerce among themselves would be necessary for mortals, if, in turn, one man should seek something from another" (*Ep.* 87.20).[377] Seneca apparently imagined that *commercium* fostered communication among various peoples that results in mutual cooperation and aid. Indeed, Mary Beagon reminds us that *commercium* and "contact" were related concepts for Seneca (1992, 190).[378] The philosopher believed that this intercourse between peoples was the result of divine benevolence, writing in *de Beneficiis* that *commercium* was given to the human race by god (*Deus*) for the common good (*communi bono*) (4.28.3).[379] *Commercium* tends to unify humans, to make the accident of one's birthplace less significant. It is true that Statius speaks primarily in 3.3 of items paid as taxes rather than trade; but the position of Etruscus' father in the imperial administration nevertheless brought him into contact with diverse groups because of the movement of goods. In this sense, Rome acted as the divine agent of unification.

---

[376] Rosenmeyer remarks: "The disarray and the destructive power of the several meteorological and geographical entities are brought into the compass of Medea's growing passion…Within the larger scheme of the play, the effect of the multiple catalogues is to weave Medea's purpose into a world experienced on a plurality of levels" (1989, 166-7). See also Henry and Henry 1985, 80. Segal argues, on the contrary, that "the vast geographical hyperboles serve to set off [the] inner world as a distinctive reality of its own" (1983, 175).

[377] Cicero espouses the similar view, supposedly borrowed from the Stoic Panaetius, that men help one another by importing and exporting goods (*Off.* 2.12). For the attribution of the view to Panaetius see Brunt 1973, 26-7.

[378] Patrick Glauthier has also argued that Manilius connects the concepts of *sympatheia* and *commercium* in his *Astronomica.* The idea is that the interactions of the stars provide evidence of the sympathetic unity of the cosmos (2011, 195-6).

[379] Pliny the Elder expresses a similar sentiment about the benefits of the *commercio rerum* facilitated by the Roman empire (*HN* 14.1.2).

A similar logic is at work in a secondary catalogue, which details the kinds of imperial expenses that Etruscus' father calculated as *a rationibus.* Statius proclaims:

> *et citus evolvit quantum Romana sub omni*
> *pila die quantumque tribus, quid templa, quid alti*
> *undarum cursus, quid propugnacula poscant*
> *aequoris aut longe series porrecta viarum*
>
> And swiftly he calculated how much Roman arms in every region require, how much the tribes, what the temples, what the lofty water courses, what the breakwaters, or the series of roads far extending demand.
> (3.3.99-102)

Statius here illustrates the universal scale and infrastructure of the Roman empire. Etruscus' father's boundless knowledge is matched only by the vastness of the empire he serves. Roman arms must be funded in every region, aqueducts and roads stretch throughout the empire. These roads and aqueducts physically connect the imperial center with her far distant territories. Roman money circulates from the coffers overseen by the imperial freedman to the outskirts of the empire. Etruscus' father's participation in the global marketplace in the metropolis solidified his identity as a member of the Roman empire, one who enjoyed relationships with other peoples and their goods under its purview.

But it is not just the other subject peoples of the empire with whom Etruscus' father shared a connection. Statius makes sure to highlight his ties to the imperial family. At one point, the poet praises the emperor Vespasian for producing Titus and Domitian: *progeniem claram terris partitus et astris*, "he has divided his illustrious progeny among the earth and stars" (3.3.139). In this line, the poet suggests that the benevolent ruler bound together the earth and heavens by a single family tie. More than that, however, the poet proposes that the emperor Domitian, the son of a god, has been sent to occupy the same earthly community as humans. In fact, Statius informs the reader that Vespasian even made equal the status of Etruscus' father to

that of his sons: *celso natorum aequavit honori* (3.3.145). The idea that gods and humans occupied the same community, "a cosmic city," was of long-standing Stoic provenance.[380] Cicero's Balbus proclaims that *est enim mundus quasi communis deorum atque hominum domus, aut urbs utrorumque,* "the world is as a common home of the gods and men or a city of each" (*ND* 2.154), because both men and gods share in the same divine *ratio* and observe the same law.[381] This is not to say that the Stoics denied that the gods were superior to (predominantly unwise) men. But the gods were nonetheless made of the same substance as men and upholders of the same law (Vogt 2008, 131).

Now, these global and imperial connections were in effect at a time prior to the relegation to Campania that so distressed Etruscus. But the poet provides good reason to suppose that these bonds were not severed by exile. After all, Statius' rhetoric has already demonstrated that *all* corners of the world participate in the cosmic city. Indeed, Statius may wish to imply that the divine Domitian was aware of his continuing connection with Etruscus' father when he administered justice to the imperial freedman who was an exile in Campania. The poet praises Domitian for remitting the sentence of Etruscus' father, an act whereby he displays his great *clementia* (3.3.169). In order to fully make sense of Statius' reference to Domitian's *clementia*, we must once again turn to Seneca.[382] In his *Consolatio ad Polybium*, Seneca claims that the emperor Claudius' *misericordiam* and *felicem clementiam* makes life for *all* exiles easier (13.4). The reason for this is that they are able to see the emperor's benevolence *totum orbem*

[380] Cf.Schofield 1991, Vogt 2008, Long 1997, 21-22.
[381] Cicero formulates the same view in his own voice at *De Legibus* 1. 23. Pease suggests that the view is Posidonian in origin (1979, 951 ad loc.).
[382] Hulls also draws a connection between Statius' discussion of Domitian and Seneca's discussion of Claudius in the *ad Polybium* (2011, 168-9).

pervagantem, wandering the whole world (13.3).[383] Seneca claims to believe that even though he is relegated to a small corner of the world, the emperor's compassion will not pass over him exclusively (*unum*) (13.3). The scope of the emperor's *clementia* is universal; he maintains connections even with peoples in the furthest reaches of the globe, which we are to understand that he controls. We can find a similar sentiment in Statius. The *clementia* that recalled Etruscus' parent is the same that gave the Chatti reasonable terms, granted the Dacians their mountain, and did not deem a Sarmatian triumph necessary (3.3.169-71).[384] Statius here refers to Domitian's merciful treatment of the Chatti and the Dacians over whom he celebrated a triumph in 89 and to the *ovatio* which he celebrated in lieu of a triumph in order to commemorate his (supposedly) subduing the Sarmatians in 93.[385] According to Statius, Domitian's clemency, like that of Claudius, truly extends over the whole earth. Etruscus is no less owed Domitian's benevolent treatment than all the other peoples over whom the emperor claimed to have influence.

Statius' invocation of Domitian's *clementia* is significant because of the relationship the term implied between the bestower of *clementia* and its recipient. Miriam Griffin has shown that, beginning with Cicero, the term was associated with the Greek concept of φιλανθρωπία (2003, 165). In the Hellenistic period, φιλανθρωπία had come to be seen as a ruler's benevolent attitude toward the human race (his subjects). In the early years of the Roman empire, *clementia* came to be regarded in the context of the fundamental unity of the human race. Griffin points out that the philosopher Seneca "characterizes *clementia* as the virtue most appropriate to man…on the Stoic

---

[383] Seneca's conflation of *misericordia* and *clementia* in this passage is somewhat strange. Although, as Miriam Griffin points out, Seneca uses the terms synonymously in Book 1 of the *De clementia* (2003, 171), the philosopher sharply differentiates *misericordia* and *clementia* in Book 2 (2.5).

[384] For the view that Statius uses the consolation to Etruscus partially as an opportunity for flattering Domitian, see Rühl 2006, 178.

[385] See Jones 1992, 144-53 for a discussion of these triumphs. There is some question about how effective Domitian's military campaigns were, but he certainly wished to make it seem as though they bent the conquered to the will of Rome. Dacia at least did become a client kingdom of Rome for much of Domitian's reign, though the Dacians would need to be later by subjugated by Trajan.

premise that man is a social animal born for the common good" (2003, 177). Seneca emphasizes the kinship presupposed by *clementia* in a letter to Lucilius on the concept, where he refers to *clementia* as a virtue which *alieno sanguini tamquam suo parcit,* "spares someone else's blood as though it were its own" (*Ep.* 88.30). There is some reason to suppose that Statius wants to evoke a Senecan vision of *clementia.* His description of Domitian's *clementia,* as Jean Michel Hulls has demonstrated, bears a great deal of resemblance to Seneca's evocation of Claudius' *clementia* in the *Consolatio ad Polybium* (2011, 169). There, Seneca speaks in the same breath of Claudius' future successes in subduing Germany and Britain and the *clementia* that will allow the philosopher to return from exile (*Polyb.* 13.2). Statius' mention of *clementia* in the context of Domitian's military successes is surely meant to recall this Sencan passage and to advertise that Statius knows the Senecan corpus. Though Statius refers most obviously to the *ad Polybium*, it is not unreasonable to suppose that his understanding of *clementia* had also been influenced by Seneca's more extended discussion of the imperial virtue in the *De clementia.* In some ways, Seneca's treatment of *clementia* in the consolation prefigures his thought in that advice manual.[386] In *De clementia*, dedicated to the young emperor, Seneca specifically acknowledges the role of the Roman emperor as the head of a cosmic order and his resulting kinship with his subjects. The philosopher employs the metaphor of the world as body and the emperor as its ruling spirit on several occasions.[387] One of the more striking instances of this trope comes at the opening of the second book:

> *Tradetur ista animi tui mansuetudo diffundeturque paulatim per* ***omne imperii corpus****, et cuncta* ***in similitudinem tuam*** *formabuntur****. A capite*** *bona valetudo: inde omnia vegeta sunt atque erecta aut languore demissa, prout animus eorum vivit aut marcet.*

[386] See Bessone 2013, 152. She feels justified in believing that Statius' conception of *clementia* would at least have been shaped by the discourse surrounding the virtue in the decades before the composition of the *Thebaid*, and the *De clementia* is clearly an important part of this background.
[387] See e.g. 1.2.2,1.3.5, 1.5, 1.14, 2.1.2. See also Star 2012, 117-18 for an extended discussion of this metaphor in *De clementia.*

> That gentleness of of your soul will be handed over, will be diffused little by little through all the body of the empire, and all things will be formed into your likeness. Good health comes from the head; thence all things are vigorous and upright or drooping with languor in accordance with the way in which their souls live or are feeble.
>
> (*De clem*. 2.2.1)

The idea that the empire is a body and the emperor its head is familiar from the first book.[388] The idea that the emperor's spirit is somehow diffused through the empire and that this process of circulation will result in the increasing similarity of emperor and empire is an important new addition. It suggests that a certain sympathy exists between ruler and subject, as the character of the one has a corresponding effect on the character of the other.[389] Seneca's comment also implies that being Roman involves a certain amount of assimilation. To be a part of the empire is to be molded into the likeness of the Roman emperor.[390] This assimilation has its benefits, as Seneca made clear in the first book. He advised Nero to consider his subjects as his children, and, like a father, to be slow to cut off his own "*membra"* (1.14.3). Children here are presented as part of the father's substance. For Seneca's advice to be effective, in this case the emperor must recognize his subjects as "like" enough to him to realistically comprise part of his extended self. Once this connection has been established, the emperor could, as Seneca puts it elsewhere, treat everyone as though they were not of foreign blood (*alieno sanguini*) but his own (*suo*). A similar logic seems to be at work in Statius' own corpus. Federica Bessone has convincingly shown that his depiction of Theseus and the *ara Clementiae* in Book 12 of the *Thebaid* draws on the universalizing Senecan notion that *clementia* is the quintessentially "human" virtue (2009,

---

[388] See Braund 2009, 387n2.2.1.
[389] Christopher Star comments: "Seneca endeavors to shape not only the soul of the empire but also the body of the empire so that the two can work together harmoniously" (2012, 118).
[390] Braund points out that similar ideas may be found in Cic. *Leg.* 3.30-2 and Plin. *Pan.* 45.6 (2009, 387 n2.2.1). Cicero, in particular, uses language that suggests "dissemination." He says that the vices of leaders "*infundunt in civitatem"* (*Leg.* 3.32).

199ff).[391] For instance, Theseus, the "agent" of *clementia,* announces that his decision to help the cause of the suppliant Argive women is motivated by his concern for the *terrarum leges et mundi foedera,* "the laws of the lands and the treaties of the world" (12.642).[392] This universalizing language demonstrates that the human race as a whole is the object of the hero's concern. In Senecan terms, the hero recognizes that he and all other humans are part of the same communal body. If, as some scholars have suggested, Theseus' *clementia* is to be associated with contemporary imperial manifestations of that quality, we may assume that the *clementia* which is attributed to Domitian in the consolation (3.3.169) resembles that of the Athenian hero. [393] Domitian's display of *clementia,* then, would prove that Etruscus' father was never fully severed from the emperor (and, by extension, from the empire that he represented); that despite his displeasure he recognized the old imperial bureaucrat's humanity. Domitian would have recognized Etruscus' father as a part of himself, and therefore of his empire.[394]

The foregoing discussion has demonstrated that Statius repeatedly emphasizes Etruscus' father's cosmic citizenship, his participation in the "body" of the empire. I shall now summarize what the poet may have imagined as the consolatory effect on Etruscus himself of this insistence upon the deceased's unity with the Roman cosmos. Etruscus' enslavement and exile were both cast as common symptoms of belonging to the Roman universe and attributable to the fact that everything is equally susceptible to the laws governing the universal Roman empire. In Stoic

---

[391] Burgess 1972 argued that Statius' version of *clementia* is different from anything that preceded it, but Delarue 2000, 162-5 demonstrated the treatment of *clementia* in the epic is indebted to Seneca's treatise on the topic. See McNelis 2007, 176-7 for more on the universalizing quality of Statius' *clementia.*

[392] Bessone also points, in a later work, to the description of the Altar of *Clementia* itself as the *commune animantibus aegris/confugium*, "common refuge for ailing souls" at *Th.* 12.503-4 (2011, 145).

[393]Admittedly scholars have not always seen Theseus in a positive light. For the (possibly negative) association with Domitian see Delarue 2000, 373. For the connection of Theseus to imperial figures more broadly, see Braund 1997, 11-12, McNelis 2007, 176 and Bessone 2009, 186ff. It has also been suggested that he displays *misericordia,* which Seneca criticizes, rather than clemency (Ganiban 2007, 215-221). He has also been connected with the Theseus of Callimachus' *Hecale,* a figure of dubious morality (McNelis 2007, 165-72).

[394] In this way, Domitian is likened to the Stoic Zeus, who Gretchen Reydams-Schils has argued was conscious of his relationship to humans (2005a, 593).

terms, the shared substance of the cosmos explains its tendency for co-affection. The poet's insistence upon the shared condition of suffering and the concomitant assurance that such pain was part of the emperor's providential plan had the obvious potential to alleviate Etruscus' distress about the treatment of his father. Most importantly, it seems that the poet intended Etruscus to understand that the old man had never lost his membership in the imperial cosmos, despite his enslavement and exile. These observations, however, serve to console Etruscus only for one aspect of his distress in the wake of his father's death. They do not fully explain why the grieving son ought to stop mourning the loss of his father. We might have expected that Statius intended Etruscus to understand his message analogically. If the universality of suffering (resulting from cosmic unity) had the ability to assuage the pain resulting from the elder Etruscus' banishment and exile, the same argument might also address the pain associated with his final loss. In other words, the panegyric speech could help Etruscus himself to realize that, by virtue of his own membership in the Roman cosmos, his grief was also part of a universal pattern. But this is not the direction in which Statius moves the consolation to its conclusion. After the panegyric, Statius shifts his focus from the cosmic bonds to local and personal ones.

Etruscus: Unruly Addressee?

After he concludes the encomium, Statius places the following speech in Etruscus' mouth:

> *Nec flectere Parcas*
> *aut placare malae datur aspera numina Lethes…*
> *Ergo et Thessalici coniunx pensare mariti*
> *funus et immitem potuit Styga vincere supplex*
> *Thracius? hoc quanto melius pro patre liceret*
>
> Nor are we allowed to bend the Fates nor to placate the harsh deities of wicked Lethe…Was a wife, then, able to balance the death of her Thessalian spouse with her own and was a Thracian suppliant able to conquer the formidable Styx? How much better that this be allowed for a father!
>
> (3.3.186-7, 192-4)

Although Alcestis and Orpheus, to whom Statius here refers, were faced with the prospect of the loss of a loved one, Etruscus suggests that they were happier than he. Both these figures were given the opportunity to grant their spouses life, an option denied to Etruscus. The fact that Orpheus was unsuccessful in bringing Eurydice back to earth and was killed by a band of maenads does not concern Etruscus. In fact, simply by claiming that such a figure is to be envied, Etruscus implicitly expresses the great magnitude of his own suffering. In other words, Etruscus does not accept for himself the idea that the suffering of others diminishes the significance of his own. In this respect, he seems to emulate Ovid's perspective in the exile poetry.

In a response to a consolation he had received from his friend Rufinus, the exiled Ovid parodies the consolatory trope whereby examples of others who suffered the same fate are adduced. He acknowledges that heroes like Patroclus, Jason, and Teucer were exiled (*Pont.* 1.3.73-80). But Ovid, like Etruscus, concludes that his fate was worse than that of anyone else:

persequar ut cunctos, nulli datus omnibus aevis/tam procul a patria est horridiorve locu,

"though I should go through them all, to no one in all the ages has a place been assigned so far from the fatherland or more terrible in location" (*Pont.* 1.3.83-4).[395] It is the particular character of Tomis that makes Ovid's exile so unbearable. Ovid refuses to accept the cosmic viewpoint because he cannot ignore the individual qualities of the country in which he finds himself.[396] It is this Ovidian view to which Etruscus subscribes. Another look at his speech will demonstrate that

[395] Ovid conveys a similar idea at *Tristia* 1.5.65-84 and 2.188. Furthermore, in *Tristia* 2, Ovid begs Augustus to allow him to move his place of exile. The poet says that he does not even ask to return to Italy, but merely for a quieter place so that *par delicto sit mea poena suo,* "my crime be equal to its punishment" (577). Ovid obviously felt that it mattered what kind of barren rock one lived on. Gareth Williams writes of this sentiment: "His plea is for the granting of a *mitius exilium*…a partial restoration of the stabilizing center" (1994, 163). His discussion clearly underscores that Ovid felt the superiority of the imperial center strongly.

[396] Pace McGowan 2009, 181 who argues that Ovid elsewhere compares himself to Ulysses in order to universalize his suffering. However, the passage to which McGowan alludes (*Tr.*1.5.65ff) actually emphasizes that Ovid's suffering was greater than that of Ulysses.

he similarly concerned with differentiating his individual experience from that of people from all corners of the world.

Etruscus identifies Alcestis simply by reference to her *Thessalian* husband and simply speaks of Orpheus as the *Thracian*. His identification of Alcestis and Orpheus by their ethnic identities is significant. An interest in regional and ethnic particularity is at odds with a universalizing Stoic perspective. Thessaly and Thrace, like Etruscus' father's native Smyrna, were integrated into the "universal" Roman empire, but Etruscus does not feel that the experiences of Thessalians and Thracians were to be compared with his own. We saw that in *De clementia,* Seneca postulated that all the subjects of an empire are molded *in similitudinem* to the emperor (and presumably to one another), but Etruscus highlights the differences between his experience and that of famous members of other "subject peoples." That people everywhere undergo similar losses does not annul the tragedy for which Etruscus weeps. He finds his inability to bring his father back from the Underworld particularly galling because, as he implies in the final line, the loss of a father is of greater seriousness than that of a spouse.

Statius' universalizing rhetoric in the encomium for Etruscus' father would initially seem to be at odds with Etruscus' concern about the specificity of his experience of grief. If cosmopolitan thinking will not help Etruscus to set his grief fully aside, what will? I shall demonstrate that Statius hopes that the knowledge that his unique bond with his father is not fully severed will have the power to heal the pious Etruscus. The poet ultimately makes clear that though Etruscus' father has left behind the public, cosmic sphere to which he once belonged, he may remain involved in local and familial relationships. Etruscus, in other words, could continue to perform his piety toward his father. In order for this consolatory scheme to work, Statius had to advertise that such personal bonds were as important as the lost cosmic ones.

As I proposed at the opening of the chapter, Statius maintains a delicate balance between the cosmic and the local, the civic and the domestic. There is no reason to suppose that his discussion of universal and cosmic bonds leaves no room for more personal and private connections. Clifford Ando has argued that Cicero makes common citizenship the basis of the unity of the state precisely because he felt that ethnic and cultural differences had a climactic and physical basis and therefore could not be erased. In other words citizens of his *res publica* were expected to retain their distinctive ethnic and racial identities (2002, 132-4).[397] Even cosmopolitan thinkers allowed for such diversity within unity. According to Cicero, the Stoic Chrysippus himself defended the right of individual humans to own private property in the shared cosmos using an analogy with the theater, pointing out that in the "shared property" of the theater, individuals had the right to particular seats (*Fin.* 3.20.67).[398] Indeed, even certain strains of the cosmopolitan Seneca's thought would seem to admit the importance of personal affiliations with certain people and places. This is especially so in the philosopher's discussion of his exile in the *Consolatio ad Polybium.* The philosopher complains that he is *defixus* in an *angulo* (13.3). Seneca's wretchedness at being confined to the small corner of the world complicates his depiction of Corsica's cosmopolitan character and his description in the *ad Helviam* of exile as a mere *commutatio locorum* which presents no harm (6.5).[399] Although Seneca elsewhere in the consolation encourages Polybius to adopt a "cosmic viewpoint" in order to soothe his grief (e.g. *Polyb* 1.1), Seneca seems willing to acknowledge that the "corner" in which one lives is important. The very word *angulo*, as Rita degl'Innocenti Pierini has

[397] See also Lavan 2016, 154-7 for a discussion of a similar expectation in the early imperial period.
[398] Seneca himself refers to this analogy at *Ben.* 7.12.3.
[399] See degl'Innocenti Pierini 1990, 136-7 and Williams 2006, 149-54 for a similar view. Scholars have long been troubled by this inconsistency. Diderot suggested that the *ad Polybium* was a forgery because he could not believe that Seneca would utter such base opinions (degl'Innocenti Pierini 1990, 213-4). For more contemporary attempts to reconcile the two consolations see Fantham 2006, Gloyn 2014.

demonstrated, evokes a dichotomy between a particular place and the *mundus* as a whole (1990, 136ff). Horace famously distinguished between the foreign locales to which his friend Septimius proposed to travel and his own estate at Tarentum: *ille terrarum mihi praeter omnes/angulus ridet,* "that corner of the world smiles more invitingly on me than all others" (*Od.* 2.6.13). Horace, of course, spoke of a particular region of the world that delighted him, while Seneca clearly wished to leave the one in which he found himself. But to speak of an *angulus* clearly meant to speak of a place with its own distinctive character, a place separate from the world at large. In expressing a desire to return from his *angulus* to Rome, Seneca implicitly admits that an individual's "home" in all its particularity is important. Regional differences and individual experiences matter, even for citizens of the cosmos.[400]

In retrospect, we can see that Statius included hints throughout the poem that local identity and cosmic citizenship in the Roman empire may coexist.[401]At times, the former may take on more importance than the former.[402] This is not to suggest that by de-emphasizing the imperial freedman's participation in a cosmic community the poet asserts that the old man was an isolated individual, that his "self" was confined to the boundaries of his body, but rather that he was also integrated in a circumscribed network of intimate relations, which might even matter more than more public bonds.[403] As I proposed above, Statius privileges on occasion local and familial bonds in order to enhance the consolatory value of the poem; the final sections of the

[400] The Stoics may also have believed in a less homogenous unity than I (and Statius) have been suggesting thus far. Katja Vogt has shown that the cosmic city of the Stoics involved strict hierarchies (2008, 11).
[401] This is not to say that Statius denied the reality of Etruscus' father's Roman citizenship or his success in the public sphere.
[402] It is no accident that 3.3 is followed by the journey of the imperial eunuch Earinus' locks back to his homeland Pergamum (3.4) and Statius' announcement of his retirement to his native Naples (3.5).
[403] Here, Christopher Gill's distinction between "individuality" and "the individual" is helpful: "Individuality is sometimes contrasted with membership of a community or group; but I focus here, rather, on the idea of *participation* in interpersonal or communal relationships and in the modes of discourse by which these are constituted" (2006, 340). Etruscus' father is not a lone "individual" but the communal relationships whereby his "individuality" is constituted happen to be primarily those of family and homeland.

piece demonstrate that they, unlike cosmic ties, may survive death. In order to demonstrate this, I shall reexamine the panegyric for Etruscus' father and consider Statius' attitude toward exile and the *patria* elsewhere in Book 3 of the *Silvae.*

The Cosmos which is not One: Personal and Private Bonds

We saw that in the panegyric for Etruscus' father Statius advertised the imperial freedman's participation in the benevolent cosmos. The old man's suffering was meant to appear diminished in light of the universality of suffering. But even this rationalization of the imperial freedman's enslavement, where the poet most aggressively advertises the sympathetic unity of that cosmos, contains indications that belonging in a universal world order does not erase particular differences. Statius, as we have seen, in order to diminish the significance of Etruscus' father's own enslavement, makes the claim that even gods like Hercules and Apollo endured slavery. Before this *exemplum,* the poet inserts the parenthetical comment: *modo si fas est aequare iacentia summis,* "if only it is right to compare the lowly with the most elevated" (3.3.56).[404] The idea that one must ask permission before comparing things of disparate size or influence with one another is a trope in Roman literature. Virgil's Tityrus, after noting the similarities between animals and their young, recalled that *sic parvis componere magna solebam,* "thus I was accustomed to compare great things with small" (*E.* 1.23). But Tityrus' point here is that such comparisons do not always work.[405] The shepherd admits that he foolishly believed that Rome was *huic nostrae similem,* "similar to our hometown" (*E.* 1.20). Rome and the village in the countryside resemble one another only as much as do cypresses and shrubs (*E.*1. 24-5). There

[404] For a discussion of who Statius is comparing to whom see Laguna-Mariscal 1992, 273-4n56. It seems to me that he must be referring to his comparison of Etruscus' father to the gods.

[405] Ovid betrays a similar attitude at *Metamorphoses* 5.416-17, where he ironically quotes Eclogue 1. There the nymph Cyane attempts to stop the abduction of Proserpina by reasoning with the lord of the Underworld. She says that her own husband Anapis used no force in his wooing. But Pluto does not accept the nymph's comparison of *magnis* with *parva* and continues with his abduction. Clearly, small and great things were not legitimately comparable in this case.

is a familial or species resemblance between these plants, but they no one would confuse a cypress for a shrub. There may, then, be some irony implicit in Statius' comparison of Etruscus' father's experience of slavery and that of the gods, some suggestion that their experiences do not wholly resemble one another. Etruscus' father's enslavement cannot necessarily be compared to that of the gods. And indeed, Statius' choice of reference to Apollo's slavery indicates this fact.[406] Gabriel Laguna-Mariscal notes that Apollo and Admetus are some of the Roman elegists' favorite mythological figures for *servitium amoris* (1992, 274n 57-8). In these works, Apollo is often shown to have chosen servitude.[407] Tibullus, for instance, implies that Apollo endured his slavery to Admetus happily despite the dismay of his family (2.3. 29-30). Statius tells his reader little about the circumstances under which Etruscus' parent came to Rome, simply noting, *sed neque barbaricis Latio transmissus ab oris*, "you weren't sent over to Latium from barbarian shores" (3.3.59). This formulation elides the violence that the youth's dislocation involved. The perfect passive participle *transmissus* is the only indication that Etruscus' father did not choose to come to the imperial center himself. Furthermore, he did not undergo the indignities of slavery in order to win the object of his affections as a prize. His enslavement does not resemble that of Apollo in the particulars. Much like the cypress and the shrub, Etruscus' father, Herclues, and Apollo broadly resemble one another, but their histories are not easily to be confused. In these lines, then, Statius subtly underscores the importance of individual difference and the particularity of experience.

---

[406] The reference to Hercules is less problematic. Laguna-Mariscal suggests that there is an allusion to Hercules' servitude to Omphale, another of the elegists' favorite mythological couples (1992, 274n57-8), but the text makes clear that Statius is referring to the hero's enslavement to the cruel king Eurystheus (3.3.56-7).

[407] Frank Copley comments that in the elegiac corpus, "godhead accepts a position, standards of conduct, and an attitude which are at the opposite pole from the appropriate and generally accepted—not only accepts them but glories in them" (1947, 294).

Statius also expresses the idea that local and regional identities cannot be fully subsumed into universalizing molds. My earlier discussion considered the possibility that Statius adopted a cosmic viewpoint in order to praise the unifying force of the empire. I suggested, for example, that Statius' catalogue of the exports which Etruscus' father inventoried demonstrated the global extent of Rome's empire and its centripetal pull on the periphery. Rome seemed to collapse mortal boundaries. But I shall now explain why this interpretation is not wholly satisfying. The catalogue betrays the poet's interest in the importance of boundaries. While the conclusion that the Roman empire's trade networks erased the boundaries between regions is valid for the catalogue taken as a whole, it fails to take into account the individual items mentioned in the passage. As noted before, each of the regions in the catalogue sends its unique merchandise to the imperial center. Spain sends gold, Africa corn, Lacedaemonia sheep, and India ivory (3.3.89-95). R. Witcher has shown that "territory and boundary were increasingly important concepts in the taxation and control of populations. Through these imperial strategies, gradually identities were tied down to specific territories" (2000, 221). Taxation, in other words, helped to solidify the notion that specific regions had particular characteristics. In fact, Statius' specificity about the differing products in different regions of the world recalls Virgil's insistence in the *Georgics* that each region of the world is suitable for different crops; Tmolus, he writes, exports saffron, India ivory, and Chalybes iron (1.56-9). Virgil repeats this sentiment in Book 2 immediately preceding the *Laudes Italiae,* arguing that Italy is preeminent although Media has beautiful groves and the Hermus River in Smyrna is filled with gold (2.136-7). These comments suggest not only that there are fundamental differences in character between the regions of the world but that some places are superior to others.[408] This fact, for Virgil, is a natural law: *continuo has*

[408] Admittedly, some scholars have seen pessimistic undertones in the *Laudes Italiae.* Richard Thomas, for instance, comments that "Virgil, in the *Laudes Italiae*, developed and extended traditional material in such a way as to

leges aeternaque foedera certis/imposuit natura locis, "immediately Nature placed these laws and eternal covenants on certain places" (1.60-1). This law is no less universal than the Stoic *lex parendi* that Statius insisted applies to everything.[409] But Virgil does not claim that this natural law arose at the beginning of time. He goes on to specify that these *leges* and *foedera* came into existence at the beginning of the age when Deucalion created the *durum genus* of men (*G.* 1.62-3).[410] In fact, the boundaries and the regional differences that characterize the contemporary world did not exist in the Saturnian Age as Virgil describes it. Men did not cultivate crops in all their variety at all; the Earth provided whatever nourishment men required. Virgil even says that making boundaries was impermissible during that period: *ne signare quidem aut partiri limite campum/fas erat,* "even to mark possession of the plain or apportion it by boundaries was sacrilege" (*G.* 1.126-7).[411] Statius' catalogue of *impendia* demonstrates that the unity which the Roman empire imposed on the globe was not so total as to undo history and erase the regional boundaries that traditionally arose after Saturn's reign. The Flavian emperors might have instituted a second Golden Age as Statius intimates in *Silvae* 5.2; but as Virgil would have said, the world under their reign retained *pauca…priscae vestigia fraudis,* "few vestiges of the old wickedness" (*Ecl.* 4.31).[412] I do not believe that Statius intended this lack of homogeneity as a criticism of the regime. Virgil, after all, praises the exceptional qualities of Italy even though

---

suggest that civilized Italy has crossed the limits imposed by nature" (1982, 49). Whether or not Virgil had his reservations about Roman imperialism, the point about the unique character of a place by virtue of variations in climate and location stands.

[409] Gale sees these lines as indebted to Lucretius, rather than to the Stoics (2000, 201-6). I do not find that Virgil's language makes entirely clear to which tradition he alludes.

[410] Virgil does not always employ the traditional Hesiodic "ages of man" sequence in the *Georgics*. Richard Thomas comments that Deucalion's creation of man "is the cultural equivalent of the transition from the Saturnian to the iron age" (1988a, 78n 60-3). For a discussion of the Golden Age throughout Virgil's *oeuvre*, including his inconsistencies, see Smolenaars 1987 and Perkell 2002.

[411] Seneca places the creation of boundaries in the third age. In his discussion of early men in Epistle 90, he quotes this passage from Virgil and argues that all the resources were held in common during this period (37-38). Ovid also places the creation of boundaries in the Bronze Age (*Met.* 1.135-6). Whichever chronology you follow, the Golden Age does not appear to have had boundaries.

[412] As Richard Thomas points out, one of the traces of ancient wickedness that Virgil mentions will remain in the future golden age *is* the walled city (1982, 42).

they are a product of the postlapsarian world.[413] The unity that characterizes the second Golden age respects the individuality of the various parts that make up the whole.

A reconsideration of Statius' description of Domitian's decision to recall Etruscus will further establish the importance the poet attributed to regional difference and unique identity. We have already seen that the cosmic perspective should involve the denial of the importance of such difference. But one should particularly abjure artificial, man-made territorial boundaries. As part of an argument for the superiority of the cosmic viewpoint, Seneca observes: *quam ridiculi sunt mortalium termini,* "how ridiculous are the boundaries of mortals" (*NQ* 1. *Praef.* 9).[414] He points out that ants probably divide a threshing floor into provinces in order to demonstrate the absurdity of creating boundaries (*NQ* 1. *Praef.* 10). Statius's Domitian has not received this message. Domitian appears as a good emperor in the poem precisely because he recognizes both the reality of local identities and the possibility of their existence in a cosmos controlled by Rome.[415] Domitian, as noted before, exhibits the kind of *clementia* of which Seneca would approve.[416] As head of the universal empire, he recognizes his connectedness with the peoples who inhabit it and acts accordingly. However, the sympathetic relationship that Domitian has with peoples in the far flung corners of the cosmos does not preclude their retaining local

---

[413] The question of whether the Iron Age introduced by Jupiter is actually better than the Golden Age has been much discussed. See Perkell 2002, 19ff for a summary of the pertinent points.

[414] For Seneca's view of boundaries, Rome, and the cosmos in the *Natural Questions* see Hine 2006. The *Somnium Scipionis* contains a similar sentiment (*Rep.* 1.26). See Lehoux 2012, 186 for a discussion of function of this idea in the *De Re Publica* as a whole.

[415] I stress here Statius' flattery of Domitian. I am, in general, suspicious of arguments that attempt to ironize Statius' explicit praise of the reigning emperor. However, Gareth Williams makes the valid point in his discussion of the exiled Ovid's attitude toward Augustus that "[the poet] can be regarded as either flattering or irreverent in his portrayal of the emperor…in each case the reader/user is left to resolve for himself the ambivalence inherent in the poem/material" (1994, 168). For a more recent assessment of Augustus' role in the exilic corpus, see McGowan 2009.

[416] This is perhaps to be contrasted with Ovid's ironic treatment of Augustus' *clementia* in the *Epistulae ex Ponto.* See Gaertner 2005, 9-12 for a discussion of this imperial virtue in that work.

identities.[417] Statius describes the quality of Domitian's *clementia* in the following manner: *haec est quae victis parcentia foedera Cattis/quaeque suum Dacis donat clementia montem/quae modo Marcomanos post horrida bella vagosque/Sauromatas Latio non est dignata triumpho,* "this is the clemency that grants mild treaties to the conquered Catti and their mountain to the Dacians, and that recently, after terrible wars, did not find the Marcomani and the wandering Sarmatians worthy of a Latian triumph" (3.3.168-71). Whatever the reality of the geopolitical situation in the 90's, Domitian is made to seem as though he was in a position to dictate terms to the peoples whom he conquered and incorporated into the sphere of Roman influence.[418] But he does not simply subsume these peoples into a homogenous Roman empire. Notice that Domitian grants the Dacians their own (*suum*) mountain. Statius no doubt refers to the fact that Domitian had transformed Dacia into a client kingdom, with a certain amount of independence. Though Dacia was formally subordinated to Rome, it was allowed to retain control of its own distinctive geographical features and land. Furthermore, the Marcomani and the Sarmatians were not subjected to a triumph in Rome, despite their military subjugation to the Romans. This meant that all the accoutrements of a triumph were missing: prisoners were not (formally) paraded by the emperor in the imperial capital, maps and depictions of the conquered territory were not on display for Romans in the city to gaze at. Statius implies that although Domitian might have forced these to peoples to come to the imperial capital, they are largely allowed to retain their

[417] Domitian's recognition of these identities forestalls the potential tension that Seneca's *De clementia* acknowledges between the emperor as *pater* and the families of "*singulorum"* (1.8.7)

[418] Clearly, Domitian's victories against all the peoples Statius lists were not unequivocal. Susan Mattern points out that Trajan's campaigns in Dacia signify that not everyone was satisfied with the outcome of Domitian's efforts against them or the treaty that he signed (1999, 190). However, this need not mean that Statius' praise is insincere here. John Geyssen has argued that Statius' description of the equestrian statue dedicated in honor of Domitian's triumphs over the Chatti and the Dacians is sincere panegyric, and we need not expect the poet's attitude to be different here (1996). For a discussion of Statius' attitude toward Domitian's Dacian wars in the *Thebaid* see Pagàn 2015.

freedom and to remain in their lands. Domitian's *clementia*, despite its universal concern for humans, apparently recognized the importance of regional and individual identities.[419]

Domitian's sense of the importance of place is evident even in the sentence that he passed upon Etruscus' father. In order to console Etruscus and his father, Statius emphasizes that the freedman, unlike Ovid before him, was relegated to desirable locations. The poet notes that while the imperial freedman himself went to the *molles…oras* of Campania (3.3.162) his colleague was driven on rough seas *procul Itala rura*, "far off from Italian fields" (3.3.161).[420] The implication is that Etruscus' parent was allowed to remain close to the city in which he had served various emperors and which housed his family. Statius, deviating from a cosmopolitan attitude, makes a firm distinction between the Italian peninsula and those places separated from it by harsh seas. Statius may also emphasize the unity of the Italian peninsula in announcing that Etruscus' father was also required to retire to the "citadels of Diomedes" (3.3.163). Shackleton Bailey comments that Statius here must refer to a second order "removing him further away from Rome" (2003, 212). But Statius does not cast it as such. His description of Arpi as the citadel of Diomedes is no doubt an allusion to the conventional belief that the Greek hero settled that community in Italy after the Trojan War, a tradition to which Virgil had alluded in the *Aeneid.* It has been proposed that Virgil's Diomedes, in contrast to his Iliadic incarnation, is a unifying force. He has been seen as Aeneas' double (Papaioannou, 2000; Fletcher 2006). Sophia Papaioannou concludes:

> In the context of the *Aeneid,* the presence of Diomedes in Italy is intended to project in the legendary beginnings of Rome Vergil's contemporary historical reality of Roman

[419] I would say that a similar principle is at work in Statius' description of the *ara Clementiae.* Statius provides a very specific description of the particular *sedem* which *Clementia* chose for herself (12.481-496). Furthermore, as Ganiban points out, *clementia* is characterized as the particular virtue of the Athenian people (2007, 214). *Clementia* herself seems quite connected to a particular place in a particular city.

[420] It is perhaps also significant that Campania is the region to which Statius himself chooses to retire in 3.5. There the poet brags that his homeland is neither barbarian Thrace nor Libya, but Naples with its *mollis hiems* and *frigida…aestas* (3.5.81-3).

> worldwide political domination, and the vision of the Augustan age to promote and celebrate cultural integration inside the borders of the new *imperium sine fine.*
> (2000, 216)

Statius' references to a unified Italy give the reader the sense that the imperial freedman never really left Rome entirely. Emma Dench has shown that in the latter half of the first century CE, an idealized and unified Italy came increasingly to have the "potential…to stand for Rome" in a way that other areas of the empire did not (2005, 219). The language used to describe Etruscus' parent's exile thus suggests that Domitian, in his mercy, allowed the imperial freedman remain in at the center of the empire, despite his apparent disgrace. The emperor recognizes that the place where one lives in exile matters.

Even, however, as Statius praises Domitian's benevolence in allowing the aged retainer to remain in proximity to Rome during the period of his exile, the poet calls attention to the other kinds of regional and local affiliations that Etruscus' father maintained throughout his life. Statius description in the following lines of Etruscus' father's recall contains tension between the idea that Rome had always been a mobile society, composed of misfits and exiles, and the importance that the poet affords "home" and local identity.[421] Statius reminds Domitian of his mercy to the father and son: *Romuleum reseras iterum, Germanice, limen,* "you once again unbar the Romulean threshold, Germanicus" (3.3.166). Statius' reference to the entrance to Rome as the "Romulean threshold" reminds the reader of the city's initial character and Romulus' asylum. Rome's founder recruited exiles, slaves, and other criminals to serve as the city's first citizens, and Statius seems to suggest that the diverse character of the city had survived until his own day.

---

[421] For a discussion of this phenomenon broadly in imperial literature see Rimell 2015. She writes: "the concern with boundaries and containment--against the backdrop of a growing, ambitious empire…is often brought into relation with foundation myths which trace Roman origins to the exiled Trojans searching for refuge in Latium. Roman culture, through its imaginative literature, is particularly invested in the securing of safe, protected, homely space, as well as in the creative possibilities opened up by the loss of home, by the experience of being thrust into new, foreign lands" (32). For historical perspectives on the increased mobility facilitated by the Roman empire see Morley 2003; Scheidel 2005.

Etruscus' father, a native of Smyrna, could truly belong in such a society. But there is something unsettling about the poet's allusion to Romulus's asylum. Domitian generously allows the imperial freedman back into the city, but the poet does not precisely cast this as a homecoming. Instead, Etruscus' father is likened to the exiles who first populated Rome. Statius reminds the reader of a time when Romans were not really Romans; they were men who had been forced to leave their homelands for one reason or another. In assimilating Etruscus' father to these erstwhile exiles and slaves, the poet actually reinforces his original status as an outsider. He might have been included under the auspices of Roman society, but, like many other Romans before him, he would always retain his identity as one who was not born in the city itself.[422]

What role might we imagine that Etruscus' father's own identity as a subject from the provinces of the empire really played in his life after his arrival in Italy? If the city of Rome did not come to serve as a total replacement for the imperial freedman's native community, we should explore Statius' discussion of Etruscus' father's original home and his connection to it. Unfortunately, Statius does not provide much explicit information about his *patria*. The details that he does provide, however, may serve as the basis for speculation about the continuing attachment of the freedman to the place of his birth.[423] Statius' description of Etruscus' father as a young man, recently displaced, will find in 3.4 an echo in Statius' depiction of Domitian's favorite eunuch Earinus, a figure whose affection for his homeland Statius deals with at length.[424] Because the poet compares the experiences of these men to one another, Earinus'

---

[422] See Dench 2005, 154-222 for a discussion of this idea from a historical perspective.

[423] Etruscus' connection to his fatherland is clearly not to be predicated on the patriotism which developed in relation to the modern nation state. Márquez provides a useful discussion of what "*patria*" might have signified in antiquity and declares: "Yet though the patria is not a cultural or ethnic community, it is also not simply, unlike the people, a creature of agreement and law alone, *but the result of a historically concrete love for particular people, institutions, places, and stories*" (2012, 197, emphasis mine).

[424] Carole Newlands notices that Etruscus' father and Earinus both experienced turbulent lives at court (2002, 114), but does not discuss the other similarities that I deal with here.

connection with his *patria* may reveal something about how Statius imagined the absent homeland figured in the emotional life of Etruscus' parent.

Statius tells us that Etruscus' father came to Rome from Smyrna (3.3.60). The poet also recalls that the old man first served Tiberius during his adolescence (*vixdum ora nova mutante iuventa*), and that shortly thereafter he received his well-deserved liberty (3.3.68-9). This image of a young freedman, recently transported to Rome from the East, is almost the double of Earinus, who was transported to Rome from Pergamum. There is admittedly an important difference between the two men. Etruscus *senior* received his liberty even before he had quite grown his beard; Earinus would never grow a beard because he had been castrated.[425] 3.4 immortalizes a brief moment of his youthful beauty, the occasion on which he dedicated a lock of hair to the temple of Aesculapius at Pergamum. Nevertheless, Statius describes the terms of each man's slavery in similar terms. As we saw earlier, the poet reminded Etruscus and his father that the latter had been enslaved to the same masters whom the entire world served and that *non dominos de plebe tulisti*, "you did not receive masters from the plebs" (3.3.46). Statius expresses a similar sentiment in 3.4 through the mouth of Venus, the patroness of Earinus. When the goddess saw the eunuch as a small child in Pergamum, she resolved not to let him serve humble masters: *tu sordida tecta iugumque/servitii vulgare feres? procul absit. Ego isti/quem meruit formae dominum dabo*, "shall you bear squalid homes and a common yoke of slavery? Let that never happen! I shall give to this beauty of yours a master who deserves it" (3.4.33-5). Furthermore, Earinus, like Etruscus' parent, occupies a position superior to that of slaves and freedmen from other regions of the empire (3.4.61-3). Because of the similarities that Statius fabricates between the two men, it is worth looking at the relationship between Rome and

[425] On Statius' attitude toward Earinus' castration and to Domitian's anti-castration law (passed after Earinus' castration, apparently) see: Vessey 1973, 35; Henriksen 1997; Newlands 2002, 115-16; Busch 2013, 79-88.

Pergamum in 3.4. Is Earinus nostalgic for his lost birthplace? Does he belong in Rome? While the answers to these questions need not necessarily reflect precisely the attitudes of Etruscus' father, they provide reasonable comparative evidence about how Statius expected the imperial freedman to respond to his forced separation from his birthplace in Smyrna.

Statius' initial description of Earinus' arrival in Rome might well lead the reader to believe that the youth "belonged" in the city. As Carole Newlands has noticed, Statius casts Earinus as a new Aeneas, escorted to Rome under the guidance of Venus (2002, 108). Earinus arrives first on the Palatine hill, the site of Domitian's new palace. Statius obliquely refers to this place as the *veterisque penates/Evandri*, "the home of old Evander" (3.4.47-48). Evander, of course, was the king who first introduced Aeneas to the future site of Rome (Newlands 2002, 108). Like Aeneas, he was an exile and his *penates* had originally been located in Arcadia rather than on the Palatine. Rome, as Statius presents it, was home to the displaced from its earliest foundations. Earinus simply followed in that venerable tradition. Yet it is not at all clear that Statius' reference to Evander is meant simply to signal that Earinus could easily shed old allegiances to his homeland for a new Roman identity.[426] Some ancient discussions of Evander emphasize that he was ambivalent about his exile. Ovid tells us that Evander wept when he was forced to leave *Arcadiam Parrhasiumque larem*, "Arcadia and the Parrhasian hearth" (*Fast.* 1.478). He accepts his mother Carmentis's advice to accept his fate (*Fast.* 1.497), but it seems that he does so grudgingly.[427]

---

[426] Edwards (1996, 110-34) discusses the idea of Rome as a city of exiles more broadly. It is also a particularly Senecan trope (Montiglio 2006, 576). It appears in the *Consolatio ad Helviam* (7). See discussion below.

[427] Ovid elsewhere in the *Fasti* displays pessimism about the possibility of truly severing connections with one's homeland. Some of Evander's companions, those Argei who had chosen to remain in Rome after Hercules defeated Cacus, nevertheless *saepe tamen patriae dulci tanguntur amore*, "are touched by sweet love of the fatherland" (*Fast.* 5.653). One of these men even asked to be thrown into the Tiber upon his death so that the waves might carry him back to Argos (*Fast.* 5.655-6). For more on the connections between Evander, the Argei, and exile see Fantham 1992.

I contend that Earinus, as Statius portrays him, displays something of the same attachment to Pergamum.[428] Statius continues to refer to Pergamum as Earinus' homeland even after his removal from the temple of Aesculapius. The poet laments that, because of the boy's castration, his locks would travel alone *ad patrias oras*, without the shavings of his first beard (3.3.81-2).[429] Later, the poet claims that the mirror that Earinus also sent as an offering to the temple was a worthy gift for his *patriis…templis* (3.3.95-6). When Statius uses the word *patria* elsewhere in the *Silvae,* it usually designates the place to which one has the strongest affective ties. For instance, the poet describes his estate in Alba Longa as the *terra primis* ***post patriam*** *mihi/dilecta curis*, "the land first in my affections after my fatherland" (4.5.21-2).[430] Although Alba Longa was the site where Statius performed his greatest poetic feats (4.5.22-4), his *patria* retained the first place in his affections.[431] Indeed, as noted in chapter 2, Statius exerted a great deal of effort in persuading his wife to accompany him to Naples where he could *patria componere senium terra,* "put to rest my old age in the land of my fathers" (3.5.13). The lines immediately following explain the poet's desire to spend his old age in his homeland; he negatively contrasts noisy and vulgar Rome (3.5.15) with the *probitas*, *opaca quies*, "goodness and restful peace" and *sordida numquam gaudia*, "never foul joys" of Naples (3.5.17). Although Statius was a Roman citizen and had spent a considerable portion of his career in the imperial capital, he apparently staunchly preferred his birthplace to Rome. There is reason to suppose that Earinus felt a similar attachment to his homeland.

---

[428] Newlands also points out that Earinus remains "oriented toward the East" (2002, 110) but focuses more on his femininity and exoticism than I do.

[429] It seems that Statius here refers to Earinus' inability to perform the *depositio barbarae,* which usually occurred when a young man assumed the *toga virilis.* See Laguna-Mariscal 1992, 331-2n78-82a for a fuller discussion.

[430] This statement is particularly fascinating in the context of a poem that is about the essential "Italian" identity of a man born in Lepcis Magna in Libya. For further discussion of this poem see Coleman (1988, 158-9), Parrott (2013, 173-238), and my own comments below.

[431] Gianpiero Rosati argues that Statius, like Ennius, had *tria corda*: one Greek, one Roman, and one Neapolitan (2011, 31).

The very occasion of the poem indicates that Earinus maintained ties with Pergamum. As Carole Newlands observes, the youth might well have dedicated his locks to the temple of Aesculapius in Rome rather than sending them overseas to his native land (2002, 110). His preference for the temple in Pergamum suggests that Earinus felt a real affection for his first home. It is as though he sends his hair on the journey that he himself cannot make. Statius heightens this sense by employing the conventional language of the *propemptikon*, asking that the hair *facilem…transcurrite pontum,* "cross a calm sea" (3.4.1) and hoping that Venus would give *cursos…secundos* (3.4.3).[432] In using these formulae, Statius personifies Earinus' locks. They metonymically represent the eunuch himself. Gabriel Laguna-Mariscal compares Statius' technique here to Ovid's in *Tristia* 1.1, where he announces that his book will go *in urbem* without him (1992, 311n 1-3). This is significant because Ovid tells his book that it must mimic the *habitum* of its master; the book must have rough edges and tear stains (*Tr.* 1.1.4-14). But the book and Ovid are not synonymous, despite their similarities to one another. The book can go where Ovid cannot, to all his *loca grata* (*Tr.* 1. 1.15). Similarly, details in Statius' poem repeatedly remind the reader that Earinus must remain in Rome.

Statius writes, for example, that a mirror stamped with Earinus' likeness would accompany his hair to Pergamum. One of Venus' attendant Cupids had produced a mirror and asked of Earinus: *fige aciem et vultus hic usque relinque*, "fix your gaze and leave your face here forever" (3.4.97). The Cupid sent this mirror, with the *imagine rapta* of the eunuch (3.4.98), to adorn the temple of Aesculapius. The mechanics of this bizarre anecdote are somewhat unclear, especially because, as Shadi Bartsch points out, ancient scientists had insisted on the unreality of

[432] For a discussion of the elements in this poem which are characteristic of the *propemptikon*, see Morzadec 2009, 86.

the image in the mirror (2006, 38-9).[433] Seneca claims: *non est enim in speculo quod ostenditur*, "what is shown in the mirror is not in it" (*NQ* 1.15.7).[434] What is the relation of Earinus to the image trapped in a mirror? At best, it is an image composed of simulacra that did not have time to rebound off the mirror's surface because they were trapped by its lid. At worst, it is an entirely illusory image. In either case, the reader is aware that Earinus' reflection is not really a substitute for him.

The closing moments of the poem heighten the sense of the pathos of Earinus' separation from Pergamum. In the final lines of the poem, Earinus prays that Domitian might have a long life and reign. At first, the youth seems to have accepted his place in the Roman cosmos. He asks that Aesculapius preserve Domitian for the world (*orbi servare*) and notes that the stars, waters, and earth share this desire (3.4.102-3). Earinus acknowledges the universality of Domitian's rule and his beneficence toward the entire world. But then the youth continues: *propriosque penates*/[*dominus*] *gaudeat et secum Tarpeia senescere templa*, "let him rejoice that his own home and Tarpeian temples grow old with him" (3.4.104-5). This prayer reminds the reader that Earinus cannot ever hope to share the fate that he desires for his master. Although the eunuch apparently recognizes the appeal of growing old at home, he himself will never personally return to his *proprios…penates.* The final line of the poem, *sic ait, et motas miratur Pergamos aras*, "thus he spoke, and Pergamum wonders at the shaken altars" (3.4.106), further reinforces both Earinus' special connection with his *patria* and his absence from it. The altar at the temple of Aesculapius is the place where Venus first saw the young Earinus at play, and he would still

[433] Willard McCarty and Rabun Taylor both acknowledge that there seem to have existed folk traditions that emphasized the power of the mirror to "entrap" a viewer (1989, 173-4; 2008), and it may be that Statius draws on this notion. This is somewhat unlikely, though, because Earinus remains solidly in Rome and does not appear "lost" in the mirror.

[434] Even an atomist like Lucretius argued that the simulacra emitted from the body bounced off the smooth surface of the metal mirror and back into the eye of the viewer (*DRN* 4.99-109).

seem to have the power to move the local god (3.4.27). But, Earinus must pray at a far remove from the site of his worship. Perhaps Pergamum wonders at the moved altars precisely because it had not even been aware that anyone had been praying to Aesculapius.

Earinus' relationship, then, with Rome and his place in the Roman world is complex. On the one hand, he is a Roman exile among Roman exiles. On the other, he maintains his distinctive identity as a Pergamene. His belonging to the Roman empire does not erase his local identity, as the adoption of a cosmic viewpoint would encourage. Statius' portrayal of Etruscus' father points to a similar conclusion. As noted above, Statius makes sure to remind Etruscus and his father that the old man had not been brought to Latium *barbaricis…ab oris*, "from barbarian shores" (3.3. 59). Despite their common subservience to Rome, the parts of the empire are not a homogenous mass. Statius spends the next several lines establishing the illustriousness of Etruscus' father's origins. As Laguna-Mariscal has remarked, Statius employs the Homeric technique of identifying a man by the rivers from which he drank as a child (1992, 274n 60-1).[435] The old man once drank from the Meles with its *verendo fonte* and the waters of the Hermus, the golden river in which "Lydian" Bacchus dipped his horns in order to gild them (3.3.60-2).[436] It is clear from elsewhere in the corpus that Statius believed in the importance of rivers in the formation of identity.[437] In 4.5, Statius writes to his friend Septimius Severus that, despite Severus' birth in Lepcis Magna, anyone would think that he had left his mother's breast to suckle

[435] See Nisbet and Hubbard on the Greek background of this idea at Horace, *Od.* 2.20 (1978, 347).
[436] Both Statius' reference to Bacchus in this context and his decision to cast him as a "Lydian" are curious. Bacchus famously crossed the Hermus River on his journey to India (Laguna-Mariscal 1992, 275n61). But, according to the tradition, he did so as an exile. Ovid, for instance, compares himself to the Bacchus who was forced to drink foreign waters during his travels to the East (*Tr.* 5.3.20-4). Perhaps Etruscus' father is, unlike Ovid, to be contrasted with the god; his native land is the same place that Bacchus wandered through by accident. On the other hand, Etruscus' father's outsider status at Rome is similar to that of Bacchus in Smyrna.
[437] Statius was not alone in holding this view. Richard Thomas notes of rivers and the ethnographical tradition that "Herodotus gave them a special place, and they are clearly important in that so often they define countries. In historical ethnography they assume an even greater importance, in that they serve as the natural boundaries which enforce harmony on man, and their being crossed often implies a transgression which leads to disastrous consequences" (1982, 15).

on the *Fons Juturna* (4.5.35-6). Statius' imagery here suggests a physical connection between the river and the man who drinks it; man and river are bound in the way that a mother and infant are. The poet then goes on to say that Severus possessed *virtus* because he swam as a boy in Etruscan waters (4.5.39-40). The man's character was molded by his physical immersion in the water, an idea indebted to environmentalist medical theories.[438] Severus' arrival in Italy in his extreme youth made possible his Italian character.[439] Christopher Parrott's argument that this poem indicates Statius' adherence to the view that "an immigrant can be not just culturally assimilated but somehow transformed into a native-born citizen of his new locale" is thus warranted (2013, 225). But, Statius does not assimilate Etruscus' father in the same way that he does Severus. It is the rivers of Smyrna that formed the old man's identity, even though he came to Rome as a youth. It is *their* physical effects on the man that could not be undone. The fact that Etruscus' father retained the marks of his upbringing is significant in itself. But Statius' failure to identify Etruscus' father as a native Italian has another important consequence. It means that he drinks the waters at Rome as an outsider.

The strong connection between drinking from a foreign river and the indignity of exile had appeared already in Virgil. Tityrus, who seems not quite to have understood the severity of the plight of his comrade Meliboeus, announces cavalierly that sooner would deer live in the air, or that *exsul/aut Ararim Parthus bibet aut Germania Tigrim,* "an exiled Parthian would drink the Arar or Germany the Tigris," than that his young savior's face would fade from his memory (*Ecl.* 1.59-63). Tityrus' assumes that it is unnatural for people to leave their homes and to travel such

[438] The Hippocratic text *Airs, Waters, and Places* best describes this theory. The text was known at Rome; Galen even wrote a commentary on it (Miller 1962, 132). In fact, this is precisely the theory that Cicero uses to justify his discussion of ethnic difference (Ando 2002, 132).

[439] Severus seems to have spent almost no time in Leptis. As Grant Parker put it, "the emphasis is on the earliest period of youth" (2016, 287). The same might be said of Etruscus' father, but I would point out that where Statius denigrates Severus' connections to Africa, he celebrates Etruscus' father's association with Smyrna.

distances. Meliboeus immediately reminds him that he is about to perform exactly this journey: *At nos hinc alii sitientis ibimus Afros*, "but we others will go hence to thirsty Africa" (*E.* 1.64). Seneca makes use of the trope in a similar context. In one of the *Argo* odes in his *Medea,* Seneca puts in the voice of his chorus a lament that the first ship made travel so easy.[440] At one point, the chorus complains that *Terminus omnis motus et urbes/muros terra posuere nova/nil qua fuerat sede reliquit pervius orbis/Indus gelidum potat Araxen,/Albin Persae Rhenumque bibunt,* "every boundary is removed and cities have put down walls in new territory, the earth, easily crossed, leaves nothing in the place where it had been, the Indian drinks the cold Araxes, the Persians drink the Albis and the Rhine" (*Med.* 369-374).[441] The chorus's critique of sea travel is particularly appropriate in the *Medea* for obvious reasons. If Medea had not sailed off on the *Argo* and exiled herself from her home and family, she would have had no cause to murder her children.[442] The unnatural character of sea travel creates desperate exiles. In both of these cases, there is something menacing about the idea that the people in a postlapsarian world are displaced. I do not see quite this pessimism in 3.3. Statius does not, for instance, explicitly complain that Etruscus' father now had to be satisfied with foreign waters. The lines about his homeland simply celebrate the deceased's identity. The poet's purpose, after all, was to mitigate the stigma of slavery and exile. But he could not do so without acknowledging Etruscus' father's real roots, which even long decades of Roman citizenship could not eradicate.

---

[440] Of course, it is hard to know whether Seneca endorses the view of the chorus. The important point is that the connection between exile and the drinking of "foreign water" is tropic. For the relationship between Seneca's drama and his Stoicism see Star 2012, 62-5.

[441] In the lines immediately following these, Seneca imagines that in the coming ages the world will essentially dissolve and that boundaries will mean nothing (375-9). There is obviously a difference between Seneca's vision of the postlapsarian world in the *Medea* and what we have seen of Virgil's. For Virgil, the end of the Golden Age ushers in an age of boundaries (and as we have seen, Seneca articulates something similar at *Ep.* 90. 37). Seneca here suggests that travel threatened to collapse natural boundaries. However, Seneca does not imagine that the collapse of boundaries erases individual identities. His Persians and Indians do not lose their ethnic identities when they drink foreign rivers. Furthermore, Seneca and Virgil do agree that travel arrived with the end of the Golden Age. The undifferentiated nature of Virgil's Golden Age earth meant that travel to other regions was not necessary.

[442] For the issue of Seneca's broader attitude toward travel see e.g. Montiglio 2006; Chambert 2005.

***Intra Tecta:* The Household Shrine and Tomb**

What does Statius achieve by providing to Etruscus these details suggesting that his father had had a continuing attachment to his "home"? After all, Etruscus had himself been born in Rome and did not have the ties to Smyrna that his father did. I would say that they do more than simply provide the reader a rationale for Etruscus' rejection of Statius' Stoicizing rhetoric in the panegyric section of the *consolatio.* Statius' celebration of private and local bonds also establishes the parameters of the correct response to the father's demise. We shall see that the poet endorses Etruscus' ultimate strategy for coping with his father's death because it privileges the deceased man's familial and local ties. In the closing lines of the poem, Statius even encourages the bereft Etruscus to go even further in promoting such connections. He forcibly reiterates to his addressee the comforting idea that even if death involved the irreparable loss of his father's place in the upper echelons of the Roman empire, the deceased could remain in intimate contact with both his family and his home. Such relationships, the poet has demonstrated, had always been as strong as civic bonds. Etruscus' could continue to perform his *pietas* unhindered.

Statius dramatizes Etruscus' decision to stop grieving in the final lines of the poem. We need not imagine that the historical Etruscus actually ceased from his mourning in the manner that Statius describes; the words that the poet places in his addressee's mouth indicate the attitude that Statius would like his addressee to adopt; they form part of the poem's consolatory material. It is therefore significant that after Etruscus negatively compares his own piety with that of Aeneas, Scipio, and Lausus, he finally recognizes that he can assuage his grief by celebrating the private and the familial aspects of his father's identity, precisely those aspects whose importance the poet has demonstrated. Statius records Etruscus' decision to build a shrine,

much like that of Abascantus, for his deceased father within the confines of his house. In the poem's final section, Etruscus announces to his father that he will keep his spirit *intra tecta* (3.3.196).[443] He recognizes that, despite his father's removal from the public sphere which they had navigated together, he may still enjoy with his father the intimacy they once shared. Etruscus exclaims: *non totus rapiere tamen, nec funera mittam/longius,* "you will not be wholly taken however, nor shall I send your remains further off" (3.3.195-6). Etruscus' admission that his father has not been *wholly* (*totus*) lost is significant. His father might be unable to perform his former role as a public servant, but his death has not wholly severed his connections to his son. Etruscus suggests that, like Abascantus, he might remain in private contact with his father through the medium of his physical remains. The son claims that he will continue to serve his father as though he remained under *patria potestas*: *ego rite minor semperque secundus assiduas libabo dapes et pocula sacris/manibus*, "I, lesser and always in second place, as is proper, will consecrate continuous food and drink to your sacred shade" (3.3.198-9). Etruscus' piety is no longer directed toward the emperor, his *dominus*, but to his father. In addition, Etruscus suggests that he expects his father to respond to these attentions: *inde viam morum longaeque examina vitae/affatusque pios monituraque somnia poscam,* "from them [statues of his father on the shrine] I shall ask the path of moral conduct and the considerations of a long life, and demand pious speeches and hortatory dreams" (3.3.203-4). Etruscus here imagines the kind of reciprocal relationship with his father that I described in the second chapter between husbands and wives. He provides offerings in return for advice and epiphanic appearances. The intimacy he hopes to

[443] Laguna Mariscal assumes that Statius refers here to a mausoleum (1992,299-300n195-202), but as Egelhaaf-Gaiser remarks, there is no good reason to do so (2016, 62n71).

continue to share with his father approximates that which he enjoyed in life.[444] Death, Statius' consolation suggests, cannot break this familial bond, even if dying involved the dissolution of civic ties.[445]

Similarly, death does not undo one's connections to one's hearth and home. In the following lines, Statius continues Etruscus' address to his father. He asserts that the old man will now be the *custos dominusque laris,* "guardian and master of the hearth," and that *tibi cuncta tuorum/parebunt,* "all your own shall obey you" (3.3.197-8). Let us consider the first claim. It is surely significant that Etruscus' father, a former slave, will now be the master of the hearth in his own right.[446] But Statius' choice to refer to the hearth metonymically as the *Lar* adds a further layer of meaning. Slaves traditionally worshipped the *Lares* of their master because they had no household gods of their own.[447] Etruscus, in a sense, gives his father back his household god (and therefore, a history and ancestors). By making his father the "*dominus*" of the hearth, Etruscus places his father in the role of the master whose *lares* his slaves worship. No longer does Etruscus' father belong to the household of the emperors who once enslaved him; Etruscus gives his father a home separate from the imperial household.[448] The *lares*, to be sure, were Roman deities and Etruscus' parent's custodianship of his *lar* signals his status as a member of Rome, but one who possesses his own place within that larger entity. His parent is the ruler of his own private empire. John Bodel claims that "the *Lares* were more closely tied to the concept of

---

[444] Here I differ from Egelhaaf-Gaiser, who believes that this reciprocal bond between father and son is a modification of more traditional *pietas,* which she does not believe was reciprocal (2016, 63). It seems to me that *pietas* would always involve a father making demands and his son obeying them.
[445] For the emperor's lack of influence over the familial realm see Lotito 1974-5, 350.
[446] Egelhaaf-Gaiser believes that Etruscus' father is somehow transformed into a *Lar* himself (2016, 62-4). The text ,however, says merely that he is the "lord of the Lar," which I believe would correspond better to the "head" of the household rather than to one of the *Lares.* See King 2009, 103n16 for this latter interpretation.
[447] Pollini 2008, 392.
[448] Egelhaaf-Gaiser argues that Statius transforms into a *lar* because Etruscus' father was not aristocratic enough to merit an ancestor mask and that this "points implicitly to the social ranks of the deceased" (2016, 62). I am instead making the argument that Statius transforms a former slave into a master in his own right. He wishes Etruscus to transcend his father's lowly origins, not to perpetuate them.

"home" than to that of "house,"' pointing out that the jurists defined the home of a man who owned multiple houses as the place "where [he] established his *Lar* for marriage" (2008, 265). This discussion highlights both the connection of the *Lar* to a particular family and to the place where they make their home.[449] For a man who had spent several years as a "guest" in Campania, the return, even in death, to the place where one's own *Lar* was located must have taken on a particular significance. Furthermore, by connecting his father with the *Lar,* Etruscus acknowledges the continuing importance of the deceased man's private ties to his family.[450] The second claim that Etruscus makes further emphasizes the familial. The phrase *tibi cuncta tuorum parebunt* is an echo of Statius' earlier remark that all of the goods of the empire obeyed the imperial bureaucrat, *uni parent commissa ministro* (3.3.95). This sentiment occurs at the end of the catalogue of the imports that I examined earlier. There, Etruscus' father was at the height of his public career. As I noted, he was at the center of the empire and involved in *commercium* with all of the nations of the earth. Etruscus' claim, therefore, that *cuncta* ***tuorum*** would obey his father implies a far more circumscribed role for the patriarch. Etruscus imagines that only the things and people that "belong" to his father will act in accordance with his wishes. What is encompassed in the purview of *tuorum?* It is likely that, given the placement of this shrine within Etruscus' private residence, only the deceased's *familia,* his kin and his slaves, are included.[451] Etruscus effectively replaces the cosmic community of Rome with the circumscribed community of the family.

---

[449] Bodel actually thinks that the *Lar* is more connected to a community than to a specific place. But I would point out that his own evidence about the jurists' attitude toward the *Lar* illustrates that the *Lar* is not simply present in all of the houses that a man and his family might inhabit. In this sense, place is important.

[450] For a discussion of Ovid's treatment of the public/private dichotomy in his exile poetry see McGowan 2009, 131-2.

[451] Shackleton Bailey's translation of *tuorum* as "your folk" express this concept nicely.

At the end of the poem, Statius strongly implies in his own voice that Etruscus' modified relationship with his father marks an improvement over the previous *status quo*. In the final lines of the poem, Statius endorses Etruscus' behavior in his own voice. Immediately after Etruscus' speech, Statius claims that Etruscus' father, pleased by his son's scheme, went down to the shades to tell of it to his *dilectae Etruscae* (3.3.206-7). In noting that the imperial freedman sought out his wife in the underworld, Statius replicates Etruscus' decision to privilege the familial and the private. The deceased man does not go to find his former rulers or colleagues. Instead, he goes to find the woman who quite literally gave him a family. But it is not just the man's intimacy with his wife that the poet emphasizes in these final lines of the *consolatio.* Statius closes the poem by addressing the deceased man himself. He attempts to comfort the *senior* with the information that his son will care for his tomb. The poet informs the imperial freedman that his urn will receive both libations of Assyrian perfumes and his son's tears. Both oils and tears mingle with the ashes of the deceased, but Statius privileges the son's substance over the foreign. He refers to Etruscus' tears as a *maior honos* (3.3.212-13).[452] Receiving the tears of one's own child is apparently more valuable than the expensive imports whose purchase was made possible by the expansion of Roman *imperium.* The reason for this is, perhaps, that the mingled tears and ashes symbolized the continuing intimacy of father and son, whereas the libation of perfume involved no such associations. Statius' language reasserts that the familial network of relations need not be disrupted by the death of a parent.

Additionally, Statius echoes Etruscus' emphasis on the importance of parochial attachment to one's own land.[453] He imagines the further services of Etruscus to his father (and

[452] The mention of Etruscus' tears might be taken to indicate that the man did not stop grieving. However, Statius' praise of them suggests that these tears are no longer the inappropriate signs of excessive grief.
[453] Pace Bernstein 2008, 84, who believes that Statius generally wants to separate an individual's descent and origins from his character.

implicitly suggests to his addressee that he should fulfill them). He announces to Etruscus' father that his son *eque tua tumulum tellure levabit* (3.3.214). This is a curious expression. Shackleton Bailey translates "and [he shall] raise a monument from your own soil." This translation conveys the literal meaning of the line. But as Laguna-Mariscal points out, the line is a play on the epitaphic formula *sit tibi terra levis*; *terra* has become *tellure* and *tua* stands in for *tibi* (1992, 303n214). Although grammar does not allow the sentence to mean "he will lighten the tomb with your earth," the verbal similarity between the epitaphic formula and Statius' verse surely means that the idea of "lightening" is implicit. The notion that the presence of "your" earth on your tomb could help to make the earth "*levis"* over your ashes is not so foreign to Roman attitudes. One of the horrors of exile for Roman writers was that the exile might not be buried in his *patria.*[454] Aeneas expressed the idea that those who died at Troy before the *ora patrum* were fortunate (*Aen.* 1.94-6). Catullus railed against the fact that his beloved brother was buried far from home: *Troia obscena, Troia infelice sepultum/detinet extremo* ***terra aliena*** *solo,* "a foreign land holds him, buried in hateful Troy, unlucky Troy, in distant soil" (*Carm.* 68.99-100). Even the exiled Ovid, for whom return to the city of Rome was often prized above return to his native Sulmo, expressed the desire that his ashes be placed in his ancestral tomb (*tumulo…avito*) and wished that *tactaque nascenti corpus haberet humus*, "the ground touched at my birth would hold my body" (*Tr.* 4.3.45-6).[455] The idea of touch is important here. As I argued in a previous chapter, touch involves, in a sense, the mingling of the entities in contact with one another. It is the process through which world and body intersect with one another. Ovid seems to be expressing the desire that his ashes will mingle once again with the soil that first came into

[454] See Bonjour 1975, 459-464 for a discussion.
[455] For an assessment of Ovid's relative attachments to Rome and Sulmo see Bonjour 1975, 201-6, 349.

contact with his body.[456] This is hardly a Senecan position. Seneca repeatedly fantasizes about the soul's separation from the body at death and its escape from the earth up into the divine and heavenly realm.[457] This attitude prizes the individual's kinship with the cosmos rather than a particular region of the earth. It is surely significant that in the final moments of his consolation Statius grants the kind of importance to *tua tellure* that a Catullus or an Ovid does rather than endorsing the notion of a disembodied existence in the upper regions. The poet imagines that Etruscus will himself forge the connection between his father's ashes and "his" land.[458]

There is a slight problem here, however. Statius does not tell us exactly *where* Etruscus' father's earth is. In the first edition of his Loeb, Shackleton Bailey speculated that it was soil from an estate at Alba Longa; but this suggestion has been removed from the most recent reprint (2015).[459] Even if the phrase *tua tellure* simply refers to land owned by the imperial freedman and his family, it is still clear that Statius speaks of private, individual connections to a specific plot of land rather than of wider connections to the Roman cosmos and the lands under its purview. Statius does not speak of *nostra tellure,* the soil of a shared home. Etruscus' father's land is buried in the earth that specifically belonged to him. Indeed, there is even another, admittedly speculative, possibility for the referent of *tua tellure.* It may be that *tua tellure* is soil to be transported by the dutiful Etruscus from his father's homeland in Smyrna to his tomb. Françoise Morzadec has shown that the possessive adjective combined with words like *terra* often signifies "fatherland" in the *Silvae* (2009, 195). Indeed, Statius himself refers to his

---

[456] Madeleine Bonjour also emphasizes this point: "…sont nombreux et profonds les liens qui attachent Ovide à cette terre. Et d'abord les liens que crée l'accoutumance à un pays, à son air, à son ciel" (1975, 349).
[457] See e.g. *Ep.*65.16-22 and the preface of *NQ* 1. François-Régis Chaumartin remarks that his attitude at times seems indebted to Platonic ideas: "Certaines formules suggèrent, en effet, non un immanentisme, mais un Dieu transcendant à la nature, vers lequel l'âme humaine peut aspirer comme vers un modèle ideal" (1996, 188). See Beagon 1992, 32-3 for a similar observation.
[458] We should perhaps not be surprised at Statius' attitude. As mentioned above, the poet himself returned to Naples to live out his remaining years (3.5.13).
[459] Indeed, I know of no evidence to suggest that Claudius Etruscus or his father had an estate at Alba Longa. The baths of Etruscus that Statius praises in 1.5 seem to have been in the city of Rome itself (Zeiner 2005, 152).

birthplace Naples as *nostra tellus* twice in his exhortation to his wife (3.5.71, 105). In the second instance, Statius is speaking of his affection (*amores*) for the geographical features of his homeland and goes on to say that his *tellus* created him (*creat*, 3.5.106) and is his *genetrix altrixque* (3.5.108). It is clear that in this case, the combination of the possessive adjective and *tellus* refers to the land that which first nourished and raised the poet, with which he first had a connection. Statius' readers, therefore, might assume that the poet referred to soil of the deceased's *patria,* which had been treated in some detail earlier in the poem. In this case, the reader would understand that the pious Etruscus attempted to reunite his father with his native land, a boon denied to Catullus' brother and to Ovid.

As mentioned above, Statius' final words are ostensibly addressed to the deceased. But they are equally directed at Etruscus by virtue of their inclusion in "his" consolation. Statius' fantasy about the worthy services that Etruscus will provide his father provides a template for his addressee's behavior and fulfills a consolatory function.[460] The poet provides assurance that the familial and domestic connections that the pious Etruscus will cultivate are valuable. Statius makes quite clear that the patriarch will appreciate his son's attentions. Not only does Etruscus have the ability to remain in intimate contact with his dead father, but he will even be able to please him. His habitual performance of *pietas* may thus continue on unhindered and his sense of himself as a pious son may remain intact. I have shown that the panegyric speech at the center of the consolation shows Etruscus that his displeasure at his father's failure to achieve full reintegration into Rome after his recall from Campania has no grounds. The material after that speech provides ample evidence that total unity with the cosmos identified with the Roman empire is not the only thing of value. It is the private *pietas* that Statius valorizes in the closing lines of the consolation that will ultimately allow Etruscus to put aside his grief.

[460] Pace Hulls 2011, 157.

Postscript

It is worth considering why Statius would choose to publish a poem that celebrates the virtues of the private and the familial for an audience beyond Etruscus.[461] Although the *Consolatio* itself is addressed to Etruscus, the third book of the *Silvae* in its entirety is dedicated to Statius' friend Pollius Felix. There the poet claims that the *Claudi Etrusci mei pietas*, "devotion of my friend Claudius Etruscus," merited (*merebatur*) the consolation (3 *Praef.* 15-16). I would suggest that Statius makes public Etruscus' grief in order to establish him as a model for readers. Statius does not ultimately ask his readers to sympathize with Etruscus' plight (although of course a reader might well have done so); instead the poet hopes that his audience will respect the intimate bond between father and son.

In the exordium of the consolation, Statius assures the distraught Etruscus that *venturosque tuus durabit in annos/me monstrante dolor*, "your grief shall remain throughout the coming years since I display it" (3.3.38-9). The sentiment is a strange one for a poet whose task is to offer consolation; Statius' primary purpose, as he notes three lines later, is to mitigate Etruscus' sense of loss rather than to prolong it (3.3.41-2). The logic underlying this claim, I would suggest, is that the poetic immortalization of Etruscus' pious reaction to his father' death will obviate the need for the man himself to continue to enact it. But Statius implies that the preservation of Etruscus' intense grief will have another purpose. The poet refers to his own activity in an oblique case: *me monstrante.* The use of *monstro* here is suggestive; it often denotes "pointing out" or "showing by example" (*OLD* 1, 2). Statius thus implies that he depicts

[461] Peter White notices that, in contrast to Martial's epigram on the subject of Etruscus' father's exile, Statius includes the "particulars" of the situation that make the poem comprehensible for readers who were not actually acquainted with the family (1975, 278). I would point out, however, that Statius does not actually make explicit mention of the reasons for exile, mentioning only *Fortuna* or the "error" of old age as possible causes. For a further discussion of Statius' multiple audiences and their varied positions toward the text see Newlands 2009, 232-3; Parker 2014; and Rosati 2015.

Etruscus' pious grief in order to "point him out" to his audience as a model son. The poet's latter parenthetical remark that Etruscus deserved his consolation because of his *exemplo* corroborates this interpretation (3.3.215). In order for Etruscus' mourning practice to serve as a useful *exemplum* for others, his experience would have to be part of a pattern of suffering common to their lives. I argued in the first chapter that grief has a contagious quality in the *Silvae,* and Statius' attitude here would seem to confirm this view. The poet toys once again with the idea of sympathy and universal experience.

Indeed, the poet admits that the experience of losing his own father prompted him to compose the consolation: *similis gemui proiectus ad ignem./ille mihi tua damna dies compescere cantu/suadet*, "like you I have groaned prostrate at the flame. That day persuades me to mitigate your losses with a song" (3.3.41-2). Statius heavily emphasizes the commensurability of his experience with that of Etruscus. The poem is presented as a gift from one sufferer to another, the product of a sympathetic impulse. These lines even indicate that there is a kind of universal form and body language of grieving. However, in keeping with the overall movement of the poem from a universal focus to a localized and private one, Statius' very expression of his sympathy for Etruscus contains hints at a recognition that cosmic sympathy has its limits. After all, the poet only indicates only that he was *similis* to Etruscus when he lost his own father. He does not claim to share in Etruscus' sorrow as he had in that of Melior, when his own eyes swam with tears even as he composed his consolation for his friend (2.1.18-20). Despite the similarity of their respective losses, Statius and Etruscus mourn in parallel rather than in tandem. The behavior of one may serve as a model for that of the other, but their individual privations do not directly concern one another.

The final moments of the poem point to a similar conclusion. There, the consolation no longer appears to be primarily the offering of the poet to a fellow sufferer. It serves instead to connect father and son. Statius claims that *nostra quoque, exemplo meritus, tibi carmina sancit,/ hoc etiam gaudens cinerem donasse sepulchro,* "having earned it by his example, he dedicates my poem to you, rejoicing also to have given your ashes this monument" (3.3.215-6). Surprisingly, the subject of *sancit* and *donasse* is Etruscus himself. One often expects to find a poet dedicating his poems himself, but, Etruscus gives his father the "sepulcher" that will ensure his immortality.[462] The poet does not directly interfere in Etruscus' relationship with his father; their private connection remains private. The poem thus ends with a portrait of the devotion of a son to his father, rather than a self-centered proclamation of Statius' power (although of course the poet does claim some credit). James Ker has proposed that the function of Ciceronian and Senecan consolation was to "reintegrate the addressee into society" (2009, 91). Statius instead isolates father and son, even distancing himself from the pair. He would appear to suggest that the relationship between father and son is to be admired, and perhaps even followed, from a distance. Etruscus' example is to be observed, perhaps even to be emulated. But the reader is not invited to be personally involved in the man's suffering, despite their common humanity.

[462] See e.g. *Silv.* 2.3. 63-4, Ov. *Am.* 1.10.60. For further discussion of Statius' references to poetic gifts see Laguna-Mariscal 1992, 268n 37-9.

Chapter Four: Are We Out of the Woods? Consolation and the Environment in *Silv.* 5.3

I now return to a poem that I examined in part in the second chapter: Statius' lament for his deceased father. That previous discussion focused primarily upon Statius' description of his mother's relationship with the tomb of her husband and the poet's quasi-deification of his parent. These elements of the *epicedion* are quite important and will remain in the background of my discussion, but they comprise a relatively small portion of the nearly three-hundred-line composition. As the longest poem in the *Silvae,* this lament deserves more extended attention. My earlier treatment left to one side some of the most striking features of the poem: its first person perspective and its extraordinary attention to landscape and to the environment, which I define loosely, using Eve Keller's terminology, as Statius' "material context." This includes non-human elements like rivers, caves, and trees, but also geographic areas like cities and even the four elements. Statius' description of the experience grief has something in common with what the ecocritic Timothy Morton has termed "Dark Ecology," which constitutes a rejection of a "naïve concept of interconnectedness" with Nature" (2008, 192). Morton argues, in paradoxical fashion, that it is precisely the feeling of loneliness or separation that "puts us in touch with a surrounding environment" (2008, 193). Such sensations force one to be aware of the world and its workings in a way that those free of such feelings need not be. Statius displays something of this environmental hyperawareness in the wake of his father's death, as he puts into the mouth of his textual incarnation formulations of the kind of isolation and alienation that Morton describes. Statius professes himself unable to interact as he had been accustomed with non-human elements in his environment. Physical landmarks and environmental processes take on a disturbing power over the poet. The catalyst for the poet's sense of alienation from his material context seems to be the sudden absence the Elder Statius from a world of which he had once been an integral part.

Close examination of Statius' lament for his father reveals that, as the poet represents it, the Elder Statius was instrumental in shaping his son's perception of and his relationship with the world around him. At times, Statius speaks of his father as a component of his personal landscape. The world in which Statius finds himself after his father's death, then, appears understandably alien to him.

The change that Statius perceives in his orientation toward his environment is significant because, as I suggested in the Introduction, the contours of personal identity are determined in the interaction not only between different bodies, but between a human and his material context. Statius repeatedly attributes his very status as a poet to his particular interactions with his surroundings. Because we are told that the Elder Statius had mediated his son's relationship with the environment, it follows that he helped, in turn, to cement his son's identity as a poet. And indeed, when the poet speaks of a perceived alteration in his relationship to the environment in the wake of his father's death, he simultaneously asserts that he is incapable of composition. The absence of his father from a formerly shared space jeopardizes Statius' sense of himself. I have shown that the consolatory pieces directed toward other addressees aimed to restore or to stabilize the network of relations in which the mourner is enmeshed and which define him. Since Statius' experience of grief is characterized by a sense of alienation and isolation from the environment and a concomitant inability to receive poetic inspiration, it follows that the work of a self-consolation must be to begin to reverse or help to overcome such feelings.

I should make clear at this juncture that, though the first-person perspective of the *epicedion* tempts readers to treat the textual and historical Statius as a single entity, the relation between the two is not straightforward. In what follows I often refer to "Statius'" feelings and perceptions, but these are filtered through the language that his textual persona employs. In this

chapter, then, I chart the poet's *representation* of his changing relationship with the world and consider the remedy that he proposes for estrangement. Admittedly, the *epicedion* for the Elder Statius does not so extensively engage in consolation as others I have considered. There is some debate about whether the poem, published posthumously, contains any elements of formal consolation at all (Gibson 2006, xxxvi-xlvi).[463] Some critics have identified the final lines of the poem, in which Statius hopes for his father's inclusion in the grove of the poets in the Elysian Fields and for his epiphany (5.3.277-93) as the poem's formal *consolatio* because of their similarity to the final lines of the consolation to Abascantus (Esteve-Forriol 1962, 104-5).[464] But Bruce Gibson identifies the poem as a demonstration of the failure of consolation, noting that consolatory tropes are absent from the majority of the poem and that when Statius does express the hope that his father will enjoy a blessed existence and visit him in his dreams, he does so with no certainty about these outcomes (2006, xlv-xlvi). Gibson attributes Statius' failure to alleviate his own grief to the fact that the poem is composed in the first person, which results in the "violent combination of consoler and consoled" (2006, l).

Gibson's claim that Statius is not sure of his father's fate is undeniably accurate. However, it does not seem to me that this alone is evidence for the "failure of consolation." The lament does not actually illustrate the effects of its consolatory material on its speaker. The poem simply *ends* with the prayer that his father reside in the blessed grove of the poets and that he appear to his son nocturnally in the manner of divine figures like Jupiter, Apollo, or Numa's nymph (5.3.290-3). The poet provides no explicit indication whether the consideration that his

[463] Recent discussions have instead focused on the ways in which the poem serves to advertise Statius' own poetic talents and his literary program (Nagel 2000, Gibson 2006,xxxvi-xxxviii, Ventura 2010, Zeiner 2005, 57). The poem has also been seen as providing historical evidence for the curriculum of *grammatici* in the first century (Hardie 1983; McNelis 2002).

[464] Newmyer identifies the same section of the poem as the *solacia* and therefore includes 5.3 among the "*consolationes*" in the *Silvae* (1979, 19). He also argues that it shares other formal features of consolation (an *exordium, laudatio,* and *lamentatio*) that the other consolatory poems do (64-5).

father might live on in the Elysian Fields and appear to him has had the power to assuage the grief of his textual incarnation or not. Unlike the omniscient consoler of 5.1 who professes to know that Priscilla has had a good reception in the Underworld (5.1.258), the bereft Statius cannot be sure of his father's fate. It is clear, however, that if his desire were to come to fruition, he would receive some measure of comfort. I shall now explore why and how this outcome would move the lamenting poet to put aside his grief.

The second chapter has already considered the consequences of the poet's quasi divinization of the Elder Statius. The present one explores the reasons that Statius hopes that his father's final abode will be the subterranean *nemus* of the poets. This subject might seem banal, but it is made more consequential by the fact that it is not the only destiny that Statius discusses as a possibility for his father. Statius acknowledges that his father's soul might have ascended to the heavens rather than descending to the Underworld (5.3.19-23).[465] Such a fate does not immediately strike one as unhappy (it was good enough for Scipio Aemilianus!), and Statius' omission of it in his final prayer must be explained.[466] Statius' final speech may be understood to contain a choice, a declaration of the circumstances that would please him best and have the greatest power to console him. In order to probe Statius' motivation, I shall consider the speech in the context of the whole poem. I shall demonstrate how, according to the internal logic of the poem, Statius the Elder's residence in the Elysian Fields could mitigate the destabilizing effects of his death on the poet and his environment and restore to his son a sense of equilibrium. I end with a reconsideration of the efficaciousness of self-consolation and imagine what the impact of

[465] Statius' stated lack of knowledge stands in contrast to his attitude in 5.1, where he informs Abascantus that his wife Priscilla had descended to the blessed regions of the Underworld with no difficulty (5.1.258). See Gibson 2006, xlv for further discussion of this difference between the two poems.

[466] Nagel hypothesizes that Statius had listed the two possibilities initially so as to guarantee "getting the right one" (2000, 59n35). But this does not explain why Statius omits the first possibility at the end of the poem. See also Griset 1962, 131-2.

this ostensibly private expression of emotion would have been on an audience of readers with no connection to the poet's father and how its relations with its environment might be affected by the news of the Elder Statius' death.

Statius' Dark Ecology:

The opening of Statius' lament alludes to a series of real and mythological places and landmarks in short sequence. In a matter of five lines, the poet evokes the Underworld with mention of the "Elysian fount" (5.3.2); he mentions Delian caves and Cirrha, as well as the "Corycian shade" and the "Ismarian hills" (5.3.4-7). What is the function of this proliferation of place names? On the one hand, Statius wishes to advertise the adverse effects his father's death had on his ability to compose poetry. While Delos, Cirrha, Corycia, and Mount Ismarus are all "real" places, they are, of course, also traditionally associated with poetic inspiration. Statius states that he has "unlearned" the poetic art that he learned from Phoebus and Bacchus in Corycia and Mount Ismarus respectively (5.3.5-7). [467] Statius conveys a similar message in his address to his father, where he proclaims: *neque enim antra movere/Delia nec solitam fas est impellere Cirrham/te sine*, "neither is it right to move the Delian caves nor to incite Cirrha in the usual way without you" (5.3.3-5). The poet alludes to Apollo through reference to his cult sites at Delphi and (possibly) Delos, and thus suggests that he no longer has the right to his patron god for inspiration.[468] The grief enveloping him in the wake of his father's death has diminished his ability to write poetry. But the observation that Statius employs tropic language to describe his

[467] Here is the text: *Corycia quicquid modo Phoebus in umbra/quicquid ab Ismariis monstrarat collibus Euhan*, "whatever Phoebus had shown me in the Corycian shade and whatever Bacchus taught on the Ismarian hills" (5.3.5-6). The poet here refers to the Corycian cave and grove on Mount Parnassus and to the Thracian hills sacred to Bacchus (Gibson 2006, 269n5). Clearly Statius links his poetic activity to the places in which he learnt his craft. But Statius makes his reader feel strongly his absence from his former haunts with the pluperfect verb *monstrarat.* Statius emphasizes the remove that he feels from the spaces in which he had been capable of applying his craft.

[468] Cirrha is the sea-port that served Delphi. Gibson seems to believe that both the Delian caves and Cirrha refer to Delphi, the seat of the Pythia (2006, 269n5). However, Ustinova 2009 speculates that there was an oracular cave at Apollo's oracle at Delos (2009, 117), and it may be that this is the cave which Statius has in mind.

lack of poetic inspiration only partially accounts for Statius' preoccupation with place in the opening lines. The poet, after all, might have expressed his predicament in literal terms without recourse to his metaphorical alienation from these conventional sites at all. Statius must have included these landmarks in order to convey something specific about his experience of grief.

Scott Knickerbocker emphasizes that "rather than confining us in a linguistic straitjacket, figurative language and thinking in general constitute our species' way of experiencing what Merleau-Ponty calls the 'flesh of the world"'(2012, 6).[469] Humans use figurative language, in other words, to articulate their embodied perceptions of the world. They often do so through reference to familiar experiences.[470] Mireille Armisen-Marchetti has demonstrated that many ancient thinkers felt that human intelligence is "incapable d'une totale abstraction" and viewed metaphorical language as a means of offering the mind "un support concret" (1989, 28). I propose, therefore, that Statius employed the series of figures that he did in order to communicate in comprehensible terms the pain that might otherwise be ineffable. When Statius advertises his sense of alienation from the poetic spaces that he, qua poet, once "inhabited," he conveys that the experience of loss is akin to the disorientation of inhabiting an unfamiliar and rapidly changing world. His father's death has made him feel as though his relationship with his environment, broadly speaking, had changed. The conventional and figurative language with which the poet reports his state after his father's demise therefore demands close and serious attention.

Let us return, then, to Statius' claim that he is no longer capable of producing poetry in the manner in which he had been accustomed. We moderns tend to think of poetic composition

---

[469] Consider also Lakoff and Johnson's contention that "the way we think, what we experience, and what we do everyday is very much a matter of metaphor" (1980, 3).

[470] For a discussion of the way in which Statius fails to differentiate between the metaphorical and the literal in the *Thebaid* see McAuley 2016, 313-14.

as a mental activity, and therefore often imagine writer's block as a failure of the mind. But the language Statius uses to describe the process of composition is surprisingly physical. He characterizes his inability to write as a failure to act in certain ways. Statius, we have seen, no longer felt capable of "moving" the Delian caves or "inciting" Cirrha. The Delian caves which Statius mentions are presumably to be identified with those from which the oracular speakers gave their pronouncements (Gibson 2006, 269n5). Gibson translates *movere* as "disturb," which would imply that Statius causes the cave to move by requesting poetic inspiration from Apollo. The movement of the cave would indicate the presence of the god. This interpretation is corroborated by the second activity that Statius describes, namely inciting Cirrha (*impellere Cirrham*). Statius' own discussion of Cirrha in the *Thebaid* helps to explain what "stirring up" Cirrha might entail. In his discussion of the superiority of divination as a prophetic tool in Book 3, the seer Amphiaraus includes an incidental description of the mechanics of the oracle at Delphi: *Cirrha deum promiserit antro*, "Cirrha sent forth the god from the cave" (3.474). Statius here identifies Apollo (*deum*) with the vapors which supposedly emanated from an opening in the cave and inspired the Pythia to pronounce oracles.[471] It would thus follow that when Statius "incited" Cirrha, he caused it to "send forth" Apollo. Strikingly, in both the *Thebaid* and the lament for his father, Apollo the god is not wholly distinguishable from his instantiation as a natural phenomenon. As a result of this lack of distinction, the process of poetic composition comes to be associated with a certain way of interacting with the environment.[472] Statius speaks as though he felt confident in eliciting a sympathetic response from the Delian caves and from

[471] Cicero refers to these as the *anhelitus terrae* or *afflatus ex terra,* "exhalations of the earth" or "breath from the earth" (*Div.* 2.5.7). Lucan expresses a similar sentiment in *BC* 5.82-5, where he claims that Apollo hid himself in sacred caves when he saw that the earth breathed forth oracular winds (*ventosque loquaces exhalare*). For a discussion of this passage in Lucan see Loupiac 1998, 71. See Ustinova 2009, 141-2 for a general discussion of the ways in which the Romans in the first centuries BCE and CE explained the Pythia's inspiration in physical terms.
[472] For the Greek association of poetry, music, and the landscape see Hardie 2006.

Cirrha while his father was alive. The poet is the agent of *movere* and *impellere.* Delos and Cirrha reacted when the poet needed them to do so. But in the present, rather than journeying to Delos or Cirrha in order to elicit a reaction from the caves, the poet announces that he lies prostrate at his father's tomb at Alba Longa (5.3.36). He no longer feels it is right (*fas*) even to ask for such a response from the familiar sources of inspiration. Though Statius speaks in a poetic idiom about his alienation from conventional poetic sites, he nevertheless communicates his perception that his father's death had changed the way that he operated in his world.

But it is not only the case that Statius no longer professes to feel comfortable in his usual "poetic" landscapes. He speaks as though his father's death occasioned physical environmental changes, as when the poet demands to know who is responsible for his changed circumstances: *quis sterili mea corda situ <perfudit et omne/eripuit studium misero>, quis Apolline merso/frigida damnatae praeduxit nubila menti?* "Who <suffused> my heart with sterile decay and <snatched all exertion from wretched me>, who has led cold clouds over my doomed mind, with Apollo, the sun, having sunk?" (5.3.12a-13). The text is once again difficult, but I am particularly concerned with the natural imagery which Statius uses to describe his distress. The poet adduces "rot" and "cold clouds" as the causes of his inability to compose. He refers metonymically to Apollo as the sun, who has set (*merso*).[473] Since Apollo is also the god of poetry, his absence further explains Statius' lack of inspiration. Statius adduces his inability to compose poetry to an alteration of his environment. The world without Statius' father seems a much darker and danker place than the one to which the poet had been accustomed. It is true that Statius speaks metaphorically in these lines. But I suggest that, here and elsewhere, the

[473] Gibson prints *verso* for *merso.* He acknowledges that, given the cloud imagery, Apollo does function as the sun in these lines. But he believes that "*merso* needs emendation precisely because of the imagery; *merso*…would mean that the sun had already set. If the sun had set, the cold clouds affecting Statius would then be superfluous" (2006, 274n12-13). I see no reason that Statius could not be referring to a cloudy night, however.

relationship between tenor and vehicle is not arbitrary.[474] Drawing on the recent work of cognitive linguists, who have suggested that metaphors for emotion are based on embodied humans' experience of their environment, Douglas Cairns argues that the idea that grief is like a dark covering has a phenomenological basis (2016, 9).[475] In other words, the experience of grief or depression is reminiscent of one's being surrounded by darkness or clouds.[476] What Statius has achieved in the description of his cloud-covered mind, then, is a return to this phenomenological basis of the metaphor for grief. The figurative language thus expresses the poet's impression that his body's orientation toward his environment has been altered in a real way in the wake of his father's death.[477]

In retrospect, we can see that Statius has all along been describing what he perceives as an alteration in the terms of his *relationship* with the environment. Apollo the Sun no longer looks favorably upon him from the sky. The poet no longer feels that it is appropriate to ask the Delian caves to respond to him. The problem seems to be that the grieving Statius did not feel, as he had once, that he was in a position to dictate the terms of this relationship. The philosopher Simon Hailwood suggests that humans come to feel estranged from that natural sphere not because of a total separation from it but because of their "inadequate participation" with the

---

[474] Feeney makes a related observation in a discussion of Statius' allegories in the *Thebaid*: "There is a deep flaw in any theory of reading which holds that meaning is independent of its expression" (1991, 379). For the interaction of tenor and vehicle see Steiner 1986, 11-13.

[475] See also Chiara Fedriani's explanation: "Metaphorical thinking arises from general cognitive processes, namely experiencing and interpreting an immaterial thing in terms of another that is easily perceivable, and relies on our bodily interaction with the physical world we inhabit" (2016, 116).

[476] I have expanded slightly on the implications of Cairns' argument. Cairns instead suggests that the metaphor comes from the fact that covering one's face was something that the ancient Greeks did during funerals (2016,9). For more on embodiment and cognitive science see Gibbs 2005.

[477] In some ways, my analysis here resembles that of Gordon Williams, who argues that the Roman poets employed metaphor and similes as "objective correlatives" in their poems, devices which enabled emotion "to be 'shown' rather than 'told'" (1980, 33).

world of non-human elements and processes (2015, 194).[478] This unsatisfactory participation, he argues, stems from humans' attitude that the non-human world is not arranged according to their interests and values (124).[479] The Elder Statius' death apparently caused his son to adopt such an attitude. As we shall observe, Statius attributes the feelings of isolation and alienation that were the symptoms of his grief to the natural world's newfound indifference, and even hostility, to him.

Statius speaks eloquently of nature's apparent lack of concern for him. At line 28, Statius repeats his request that his father send him poetic inspiration and clarifies why he needs this favor so urgently. The poet explains *nam me ter relegens caelum terque ora retexens/luna videt residem nullaque Heliconide tristes/solantem curas*, "for the moon, crossing the sky thrice and unraveling her countenance thrice, sees me sluggish and consoling my sad cares with none of the Muses" (5.3.29-31). The repetition of *ter* emphasizes the orderly and repetitious nature of the moon's movement, which stands in stark contrast to Statius' inactivity.[480] The moon observes the listless poet, continues on her regular course even though Statius' habits have been disrupted by his father's death; and Statius appears upset by her indifference. His complaint implies that the moon "sees" his suffering without intervening or without stopping sympathetically in her tracks.

Elsewhere, Statius describes the menacing behavior of his natural surroundings. The grieving poet complains: *funestamque hederis inrepere taxum/sustinui trepidamque (nefas!) arescere laurum*, "I endured the funereal yew's creeping over the ivy and (a crime!) the fearful laurel's withering" (*Silv.* 5.3.7-9). The ivy and the laurel are respectively associated with

[478] This is a sentiment with which Timothy Morton would certainly agree; his argument that we are at once most separate and connected to the environment in moments of melancholia and alienation acknowledges the impossibility of a clean break.

[479] Non-human entities, in other words, often exert their agency in ways that do not appeal to humans. On the increasing frequency of this phenomenon in the time of the Anthropocene see Latour 2014. His discussion of the agencies of Gaia has been important in formulating my argument.

[480] Scholars have been troubled about the timing of this poem's composition. It seems unlikely that the poem was really composed three months after his father's death. For a summary of the problem see Gibson 2006, 260-66.

Bacchus and Apollo, the very deities who used to inspire Statius' poetry. The reader might suppose that yew, as a symbol of mourning, has replaced the ivy and laurel crowns which had been the symbols of Statius' poetic prowess (Gibson 2006, 269-70n7-9). But this is not what Statius explicitly says. Instead he writes as though yew were taking over ivy vines and the leaves of the laurel bush itself were withering.[481] Statius speaks as though the enormity of these changing conditions threatens to overwhelm him; the poet can only "endure" as yew overtakes the ivy and the laurel withers away. The sense that the poet is dismayed by these developments is even further heightened if one retains manuscript M's *extimui* instead of Markland's conjecture *sustinui.* Bruce Gibson argues that the manuscript reading cannot possibly be correct, because he does not believe that *extimui* can govern two indirect statements in this case. He claims: "it would be peculiar to say '…I was afraid that the yew was creeping over the ivy and that the trembling laurel was withering'" (2006, 271n9).[482] Peculiar it might be, but such a statement would express the poet's sense that he was at the mercy of an environment with an agency all its own. Statius does not hesitate to attribute "human" emotions to the plants.[483] The yew is "mournful" and the laurel "fearful."[484] By speaking in this manner, Statius transforms these plants into subjects capable of action in their own right, some friends and some foes. In this case, the laurel shares Statius' consternation at the change in the natural world. The yew acts in a manner less amenable to the poet; its behavior actually causes the grieving poet's dismay.

---

[481] Although, as Gibson points out, one would usually expect ivy to creep amongst the yew rather than vice versa (2006, 270n8). For Statius' tendency to literalize figures of speech (especially metaliterary metaphors) see Chinn 2016, 117, 121.

[482] In fact, I find Shackleton Bailey's rendering of this line very sensible: "To my terror, deadly yew has crept upon my ivy and the laurel of the tripods (horror!) has withered" (5.3.8-9), though I read *trepidam* with Gibson rather than *tripodum.* We might suspect that *trepidam* is a transferred epithet and that Statius projects his own fright onto the dying laurel leaves. But, as it stands, the text states that the laurel recognized with Statius the horror of the changes to the environment set in motion by Statius the Elder's demise.

[483] Kathrin Winter notices a similar phenomenon in Senecan tragedy. She sees this evidence of nature acting "with [its] own intent" (2016, 130).

[484] Gibson suggests that "*trepidam*" is meant to suggest that the laurel was trembling, as in Call. *H.* 2.1-2 (2006, 271n9). This is certainly a possibility, but the fact that physical movement may be described with an adjective often used to describe an emotion necessarily entails an attribution of emotion to the moving object.

Statius thus accords to these plants the kind of "unruly agency" that Ailsa Hunt has proposed that the Romans recognized in trees. She contends that trees, by virtue of their ability to grow and change, possessed an obvious agency, but that this agency is "unruly" insofar as it "feels beyond human control and prediction" (2016, 174). Hunt observes that certain strands of Roman religious thought held that unexplained natural changes, like the death of a tree or the sudden withering of its leaves, were attributable to a simultaneous manifestation of natural agency and divine will (2016, 223). Statius certainly seems to recognize the portentous nature of the withering of the laurel, calling it *nefas* (5.3.9). That Statius should do so is no doubt the result of his feeling abandoned by the deities who once inspired him. However, his decision to cast their antagonism in terms of environmental change remains significant. As Hunt's analysis establishes, there is not always a clear distinction between the divine and the natural. I showed previously that Statius maintains that receiving poetic inspiration required a certain orientation to the "vital matter" of his natural environment, especially those places and landmarks associated with Apollo and Bacchus. When the ivy and the laurel flourish, so too does the poet. It is therefore logical that Statius should characterize the sudden absence of inspiration as a disturbing environmental shift. And as before, Statius' figurative language is not merely ornamental; it draws on that which is familiar to make concrete what might otherwise need to be expressed in abstract terms. By equating the experience of grief to the sensation of being privy to a fearful natural prodigy, Statius expresses his embodied perception that, in his grief, he was an inhabitant of a world he no longer could control or recognize.

Statius further emphasizes this lack of influence over his material environment when he likens himself to the dismembered Orpheus, to whom the animals and the trees no longer responded. This comparison takes the form of an address to the personified river Hebrus, to

whom Statius complains that Calliope observes Statius' distress in silence, *qualis post Orphea raptum/adstitit, Hebre, tibi cernens iam surda ferarum/agmina et immotos sublato carmine lucos*, "as she was when after Orpheus was snatched, she stood beside you, Hebrus, gazing on the now deaf herds of wild beasts and the woods unmoving because the song had been taken away" (5.3.16-18). The silence that pervades Statius' description here is surprising because it contradicts both his own previous account of Orpheus' dismembered head and those we find in Virgil and Ovid. In his birthday poem to Lucan, Statius had placed the following words in the mouth of Calliope as she lamented the fate of her protégé: *sic ripis ego murmurantis Hebri/non mutum caput Orpheos sequebar,* "thus was I following the not silent head of Orpheus on the banks of the murmuring Hebrus" (2.7.98-9). Calliope's professed movement contrasts with the stillness that Statius attributes to her in the lament for his father. More significantly, Orpheus' song has not been taken away (*sublato*) in 2.7, his head is *non mutum*, and the banks of the Hebrus seem to murmur in response to the song of the disembodied head. This is the state of affairs which we find in *Georgics* 4, where Virgil claims that the Hebrus echoed Orpheus' cries of "Eurydice" (524-6) and in *Metamorphoses* 11 where the river's banks echo the *flebile* utterance of the dead Orpheus' tongue (52-3).[485] Ovid includes the further detail that the *turba ferarum* and the *silvae* wept over Orpheus' death (11.44-5).[486] Statius' deaf throngs of animals and unmoving trees, then, constitute a striking revision of the previous poetic tradition. Yet the indifference of the trees and beasts that Statius describes does not mean that they are inactive. Statius' language suggests that they, like the ivy and yew discussed previously, are in fact human-like. *Surda* is an adjective that primarily modifies humans. *Immotus* may simply mean

[485] Elizabeth Young has suggested that Orpheus' *flebile* utterance is elegy (2008, 8-9). For more on Orpheus and the pathetic fallacy in the Augustan poets see Kania 2012, 666-667.
[486] Some scholars have also seen Virgil's Daphnis, to whose death nature responds in the same way, as an Orphic figure (Saunders 2008, 24).

unmoving, but often refers to someone who is "emotionally unmoved" (*OLD* 4). It is reasonable to assume that this latter meaning is in play in these lines, because Statius' unaffected trees stand in such contrast to the emotional distress experienced by the *silvae* in Ovid's account. Again, Statius recognizes that the non-human animals and trees are subjects and possess a kind of agency; they like the moon in the previous example, are simply indifferent to Orpheus' plight. Statius, I propose, has done away with the traditionally sympathetic reaction of the beasts and the trees in this case to illustrate his sense that he, like Orpheus, had lost control over the environment that he had once believed docile and responsive to him because of his father's death.[487]

Orpheus' extraordinary sympathetic rapport with his environment is well attested. Ovid, for instance, depicts Orpheus creating the environment in which he composed; the bard's music attracted shady trees to a spot where there had been none in barren Thrace (10.86ff). The non-human elements of his world responded to him just as the caves once responded to Statius. The living Orpheus thus traditionally modeled the kind of interaction that a poet ought to have with the world, the sort that Statius professes to have enjoyed himself.[488] The end of the remarkable sympathy between the mythic bard and the non-human environment that Statius describes thus marks a dramatic loss of power for Orpheus. In drawing the parallel between himself and this mutilated and impotent Orpheus, Statius implies that he suffered a similar reversal after the death of his father. [489] The grief that envelops Statius prevents him from feeling as though he enjoys the easy relationship with his environment characteristic of a good poet.

---

[487] It might seem strange that Statius would describe his emotional state after his father's death by reference to a dead poet--indeed one might have expected Statius' father to be the subject of the comparison—but the clear implication is that the grieving Statius suffered the same reversal that Orpheus had.
[488] For the associations between Orpheus, cosmology, and control of nature see Saunders 2008, 50-1. For Statius' various formulations in the *Silvae* of the poet's ability to control nature see Taisne 1994, 100-101.
[489] For a similar argument see Lovatt 2007, 158.

Statius the Elder and the Regulation of the Environment

The previous discussion has established that Statius characterizes the effects of his father's demise on him in terms of environmental change. But why should the Elder Statius' death have aroused in his son something like a sense of estrangement from the environment? I should now consider in detail the reasons that the *grammaticus*' death had such dire consequences. In previous chapters, I have shown that Statius' addressees and their loved ones served as extensions of one another's selves. That Statius imagined that fathers and sons could, as it were, share a body is clear. Statius compares his father to a man who feels the sufferings of his athletic offspring more keenly than the child does himself: *plus ipse ferit, plus corde sub alto/caeditur…,/crebro dum lumina pulveris haustu/obruit et prensa vovet exspirare corona*, "he himself strikes harder, he is struck deep in his heart harder…while he covers his eyes with handfuls of dust and vows that he will breathe his last when the crown is taken" (5.3.220-4). The father on whom Statius models his own parent suffers sympathetically with his child. He gives and receives blows together with his son. An action performed on the son's body has a corresponding effect on that of his father. Their unity in this regard makes difficult the notion that father and son are separate entities; as Karen Barad, a prominent theorist of relational ontology, might put it, their relationship "calls into question the very nature of two-ness, and ultimately of one-ness" (2010, 251). If one of the pair were to die, undoubtedly the other would feel as though something were missing. This, of course, is the reason that we saw that Melior and Ursus mourned for their lost *pueri delicati.* But Barad would point out that this analysis is incomplete. Father and son are not entangled with one another in a vacuum, they are also inseparably part of their material environment.[490]

[490] Statius, his father, and their environment form what Barad terms a phenomenon. As I acknowledge elsewhere Karen Barad's model of phenomena and ontology is based on her interpretation of quantum physics. For instance,

It is significant in this regard that father and son in Statius' example occupy the same place, the arena, in the metaphor of unity. If losing someone with whom you "shared" a body resulted in a sense of dismemberment, the disappearance of one with whom you "shared" your environment would no doubt result in an alteration to your perception of it. In fact, Statius demonstrates something of the sort in his *propemptikon* to Crispinus in the previous poem. The poet insists that his friend's absence from his poetic performance would leave him disoriented: *tu deris, Crispine, mihi, cuneosque per omnes/te meus absentem circumspectabit Achilles*, "I will miss you, Crispinus, and my Achilles will look around for you, absent, through all the rows" (5.2.162-3). In this case, the theater will maintain its form, possess the same rows and seats, but the space will feel empty without Crispinus present. Statius claims that his friend's unwonted absence will register even with his mythic protagonist, who will look in vain for the missing fixture from the audience. The athlete whom Statius imagines would surely also find the arena without his father in the audience different from the one that his parent had occupied.[491]

But the general state of affairs that Statius describes in 5.3 is direr than that of 5.2. It is not only the case that Statius missed his father's physical presence in the spaces that they once shared. He spoke as though his environment itself had undergone an alteration, becoming indifferent or even hostile to him in the period following his father's death. I propose that there are two reasons for Statius' tendency to equate his bereavement with alienation from his surroundings. First, the poet felt that his father had been instrumental in helping his son (and,

---

her refusal to make a distinction between entities is based on atomic phenomena. She writes: "In particular, the atom is not a separate object, but rather an inseparable part of the phenomenon (that includes the micromaser cavities, the photo-detector shutter sytem, the double slit diffraction grating, and the screen among other elements)…there is no spooky action-at-a-distance coordination between individual particles separated in space or individual events separated in time" (2007, 315). But as I have shown elsewhere, her model may be applied on the macroscopic level.

[491] It is obvious that Statius wished his reader to draw comparisons between the absent Crispinus and his lost father. The poet informs Crispinus that *venies melior*, "you will return better" (5.2.164) after his journey, whereas the poet hopes that his father will visit him through the gate of horn, whence *venias melior*, "you might return better" (5.3.288).

indeed, others) to remain in equilibrium with the environment, particularly the poetic environment, throughout his life. Second, the Elder Statius had functioned, in the eyes of his son, *like* a natural landmark himself, a constant feature of his offspring's environment. The final departure of Statius the Elder would thus result in the poet's sense that his environment had been reconfigured and explain the concomitant loss of his poetic identity. As in his expressions of his estrangement from nature, the poet often speaks about the triangulated relationship between himself, his father, and his material surroundings in figurative terms. But, as before, Statius may be seen to employ metaphorical language as a convenient means of articulating his experience of their entanglement and interdependence.

Statius provides evidence of his father's key role in shaping his interactions with the world surrounding him. He fondly recalls his father's formative influence on his poetic career: *nec enim mihi sidera tantum/aequoraque et terras quae mos debere parenti,/sed decus hoc quodcumque lyrae primusque dedisti non vulgare loqui*, "for you not only bestowed upon me the stars, waters, and earth which it is customary to owe to a parent, but you first gave me also the glory of the lyre, such as it is, and the ability to speak in uncommon fashion" (5.3.211-14). As Gibson explains, the stars, waters, and earth that Statius mentions in the first line correspond to several of the elements out of which matter was thought to be formed: fire, water, and earth (2006, 347n211-12).[492] Statius' choice of metaphor is important here. It demonstrates that Statius is quite literally a "part" of the world that surrounds him because he is composed of the same substances that constitute it. On this formulation, it is the Elder Statius who both provided the foundation for his son's connections to the surrounding universe and shaped his son's mode of existence in it. We learn that Statius' father not only provided the material from which his son

[492] Statius' reference to the elements does not prove his adherence to one philosophical sect or another. For the idea that the four elements theory was a commonplace already by the time of Virgil see Farrell 2014, 74.

was to be formed, but that he molded that material by teaching him how to be a poet.[493] I have shown that Statius felt that successful poetic composition was predicated upon a certain relationship with his environment; the poet implies in these lines that Statius the Elder's poetic instruction involved helping his son to establish the appropriate stance toward these surroundings.

A similar effect may be observed in the lines that immediately precede those which I have been examining. There, the poet announces that the Muses admitted him into the *vocales lucos* and *Boeota tempe* when he "knocked" because he told them that he was his father's son.[494] Statius employs a common metaphor to describe their relationship: *me… stirpe tua descendere dixi*, "I said that I descended from your stock" (5.3.209-210). Although it is not unusual for *stirps* to be used in this metaphorical sense, the term takes on particular significance here because of the way in which it blurs the boundary between human and tree.[495] Robin Nisbet and Emily Gowers have shown that the Romans often compared the human body to trees (1987, 243; 2005, 334-7). Pliny the Elder and Columella, for instance, both map human body parts like *bracchia* or *pedes* onto the corresponding features in trees, branches or roots (*HN* 17.37.224, *de Agr.* 3.10.11). Personified trees are not unusual in Latin literature.[496] I would suggest, however, that Statius partially reverses the trope, toying with the notion that he and his father are themselves like trees. Statius, after all, asked the goddesses permission to enter into *vocales lucos,* speaking

[493] Noelle Zeiner makes a similar observation: "Statius draws attention not to the fact that his father taught him *how* to speak, but *in what manner* to speak" (2005, 59). Zeiner rightly suggests that the elder Statius helped his son to acquire social capital, but does not discuss the function of the natural elements in lines 211-12.
[494] Baehrens' conjecture of *Boeota* for *biota* is a very uncertain, though Gibson prints it. The text may well have read *luoca* or *lustrata* (Gibson 2006, 346n209). The precise adjective that modified *tempe* does not concern me, as I merely require that Statius received entrance into valleys.
[495] For more on this usage of *stirps* see Gowers 2011, 89.
[496] See Thomas 1988b, Lowe 2010, Rimell 2013, 12-17. Statius himself personifies the tree of Atedius Melior in *Silv.* 2.3.

groves.[497] The trees in the groves, much like the poets whom they inspire, apparently possess a voice. It seems that Statius wishes to take his place with the other "vocal trees" both as a poetic speaker and as a feature of the poetic environment. [498] As mentioned, the poet attributes his success in these endeavors to the influence of his father, of good poetic "stock" himself. The poet credits Statius the Elder with an instrumental role in ensuring that his son assumed the proper orientation to the world and interacted in appropriate fashion with its constituent parts. But this fact does not fully explain why Statius' perception of his relationship with the world should have been altered greatly after his father's death. Since Statius already had been admitted into the figurative Boeotian vales, one might suppose that he would have been able to continue on in his habitual fashion even after his father's death. There are, however, certain indications that the poet felt that the Elder Statius continued to aid him in navigating the world throughout his career.

Statius recalls:

> *Nam quod me mixta quercus non pressit oliva*
> *et fugit speratus honos, cum lustra parentis*
> *invida Tarpei canerem, te nostra magistro*
> *Thebais urguebat priscorum exordia vatum;*
> *tu cantus stimulare meos, tu pandere facta*
> *heroum bellique modos positusque locorum*
> *monstrabas. Labat incerto mihi limite cursus*
> *te sine, et orbatae caligant vela carinae.*
>
> For as to the fact that the oak did not press my temples mingled with the olive, and the desired prize fled, when I sang the invidious festival of the Tarpeian parent, our *Thebaid* pressed on after the beginnings the ancient poets with you as a guide; you incited my song, you showed me how to relate the deeds of the heroes and showed the methods of war and the layout of sites. My course falters

[497] Trees are not the only poetic objects to receive the adjective *vocalis* in the *Silvae.* In the lament for his boy, Statius refers to the *vocalibus undis* of the Castalian spring (5.5.2). See Gibson 2006. 394n2. The idea that waters could speak is not so unusual in Roman poetry. Ennius, for instance, speaks of the nymph Egeria speaking through her *fons* (113 Sk.). See Hardie 2016, 56 for further explication of this fragment.

[498] This mixing of the literal and the metaphorical may have been widespread in Roman thought. Alessandro Buccheri has shown that the "vegetal sense of *stirps*" allows for it to have meaning as a term to describe "human lineage." He argues that it is important that the *stirps* is usually the "stable and productive" part of the tree, and so it makes sense that "*stirps* depicts the family (agnatic) line as a compact and organic whole, which blurs the individuality of its members and which perpetuates itself in time" (2016, 163).

> on an uncertain track without you, and the sails of my deserted ship are shrouded in darkness.[499]
>
> (5.3.231-8)

Statius here refers to his failure to achieve victory at the Capitoline contest, whose victor traditionally received an oak wreath. He imagines that under different circumstances the oak wreath might have crowned his head, mixed with the leaves of the olive wreath that he had won as a prize at the Alban contest (Gibson 2006, 353n231). According to Bruce Gibson, "the failure in the Capitoline contest is triumphantly redeemed by the father's encouragement for the *Thebaid*'s challenge to the epic poets," but notes the "slight awkwardness" of the transition between the two ideas (2006, 355n232-3). I propose that these ideas are more closely linked than Gibson allows. The poet's description of his father's encouragement has an explanatory force; Statius attributes his failure to the trembling uncertainty into which his father's death thrust him. The poet states that his father had been instrumental in helping him to maintain the favorable relationship toward the environment necessary for composing the *Thebaid* and acknowledges the dissolution of that rapport which was the result of his parent's death. The implication is that he was in no shape to compose, or to compete with real hope of success, after that event.[500]

Statius characterizes his father as his *magister* (5.3.233). Statius is here playing upon the various meanings of that term. Statius the Elder is, of course, his son's instructor, but in context

---

[499] I follow here Gibson's text and translation of *nam quod* and the following lines, with some modification. The text through line 237 is very uncertain. For a summary of various possible emendations see Gibson 2006, 354n232-3.

[500] To be sure, Statius does admit a few lines previously that he won the Alban contest some months before the Capitoline contest, so this statement of helplessness may not be without contradiction. It is not entirely clear whether his father was alive for this first competition. Alex Hardie makes the case that he was alive, but could not attend the Alban contest because of the illness alluded to at 5.3.229-230 (2003, 143). This certainly seems plausible to me, especially if the Elder Statius actually died around the time of the Alban Games in March and did not receive word of his son's victory in time for it to do him good. Gibson believes that he was already dead by the time of the Alban contest, and thinks that lines 225-233 are a later insertion (2006, 260-6). Gibson's view is based on the fact that Statius' victory at the Alban contest would seem to belie his assertion that he had not been able to compose for three months after his father's death. For the dating of the Alban and Capitoline contests see Gibson 2006, 261 and Coleman 1988, xvii. However, I cannot see why Statius' claim to be unable to compose should be taken as fact. It may well have been a part of the poet's *recusatio.* Vollmer shares the view that this claim is fictional (1898, 9n10). In any case, I am teasing out the implications of the text as it stands, contradictions and all.

he is also his helmsman. In retrospect, we can see that Statius has described the composition of the *Thebaid* as a journey; the poem pursued (*urguebat*) his poetic rivals.[501] Once again, Statius' chosen metaphor implies that poetic composition requires a certain kind of interaction with and navigation of one's environment and that his father had been instrumental in helping him to achieve the proper relationship with it.[502] The importance of the Elder Statius' assistance becomes even clearer in the aftermath of his death. Statius says that his ship had been abandoned (*orbatae…carinae*) because of his father's death (5.3.238) and that his poetic journey (*cursus*) faltered on an uncertain path (5.3.237-8). His language once again emphasizes the poet's difficulty in traversing his environment. *Limes* is literally a track or passage. Statius asserts that this track is *incertus,* which, in context, likely means "lacking clear visibility." Statius the Elder's exit from the world has left his son stumbling in unfamiliar places. The idea, of course, that poetic composition is "like" a journey is a commonplace, and it might well be objected that Statius' references to his interactions with a physical environment are incidental. However, the very metaphor that writing poetry is like a journey on rough seas will have been a culturally conditioned expression of some perceived phenomenological similarity between the two sets of experiences.[503] In fact, Statius gives us reason to suspect that the Romans possessed a certain self-consciousness about this matter. The poet plays with the idea that a man's experience of the upheavals of life may mirror those of a ship on troubled waters; what the "ship of poetry" suffers in the period after Statius the Elder's death, primarily the environmental shifts it encounters, is precisely that which troubled people endure.

---

[501] *Urgeo* may connote pursuit (*OLD* 5b). For the metaphor of poetic composition as a journey, see Curtius 1953, 128-30.

[502] In this regard, it may be significant that Statius tells us that his father's teachings included "*positus locorum"* (5.3.236). It could be, as Gibson suggests, that Statius speaks of stock scenes (2006, 356n235-7). However, I think it more likely that Statius speaks of ethnographic and geographic information, as Horace does at *Ep.* 2.1.252, when he expresses his wish to speak of *terrarumque situs*, "the placement of the lands." If this is the case, Statius' father literally orients his son in the world and its topography.

[503] For the relationship between culturally specific metaphors and embodiment see Ibarretxe-Antuñano 2013.

Statius describes how after his father's death, the sails of the "ship of poetry" became shrouded in darkness (*caligant*). It is not entirely clear by what means the ship's sails have grown dark. Are we to assume that the poet's father, like the sun, radiated a light that went out after his death? *Caligare* may simply mean to be shrouded in mist or clouds (*OLD* 1b). Perhaps Statius simply means that his father's death brought on gloomy environmental conditions. In either scenario, the Elder Statius' death and his absence from his son's "ship" results in a physical change in the vessel's environment. But *caligo* and its cognates may also be used figuratively to describe the gloom associated with mental upset. Bruce Gibson suggests Statius' *caligant* is a verbal echo of Catullus' assertion that the hero Theseus' mind was clouded in darkness when he forgot to exchange the dark sails which adorned his ship for white ones (*caeca mentem caligine Theseus/consitus*, 64.207-8) (2006, 357n237-8). Likewise, in 5.5, the bereft Statius exclaims to his lost *puer*: *me caligine mersum,* "I am sunken in darkness" (52). In these instances, Statius and Catullus speak of mental states (grief and forgetfulness), but do so in the language of physical and environmental change.[504] The metaphorical description of grief as "darkness," we have seen, is based on the perceived similarity between the phenomenological experiences of the emotion and of being shrouded in gloom. The poet's proclamation in 5.3, then, that his "ship of poetry" has encountered gloomy conditions should not simply be dismissed as a typically Statian extension of a common trope. That Statius uses the same language to describe the symptoms of grief and the darkness that envelops a vessel suggests that, when the poet employs the figure of the ship, he means for it to stand in for himself. The metaphor conveys to the reader the poet's sense that his body's relationship to its surroundings

[504] See below for a discussion of Statius' use of metaphor and the interaction between the literal and the figurative. For the idea that a person is like a ship see *Silv.* 1.4.120-2. There, Statius likens his relationship to Rutilius Gallicus to a small skiff attached to a larger ship which is buffeted by the same winds as the larger one during a storm. The purpose of this simile is to explain why Statius felt upset by his friend's illness. It would seem that Statius consistently speaks of emotional distress in physical and environmental terms.

had changed.[505] And, as the poet both announced at the beginning of the poem and implied in his discussion of his failure at the Capitoline games, this perceived shift resulted in his inability to compose effectively. Though Statius' description of his father's role in navigating the stormy seas of poetry is metaphorical, the audience understands from it that the Elder Statius must have helped to orient his son in the world in a real way.[506]

It should not be said, however, that the poet is content only to demonstrate his father's ability to aid him in interacting with his personal environment. Statius wishes to elevate his father's importance and therefore suggests that his father possessed control over the well-being of the world on a universal scale. Statius does not merely speak of his father's influence on seas or other natural features, but on the physical world as a whole. Near the end of his panegyrical account of his father's career, the poet establishes his father's figurative ability to impose order on cosmic confusion. Statius reminisces about his father's action in the wake of the Civil Wars of 69 CE, recalling that his father's normal activity had been interrupted by the outbreak of the conflict: *talia dum celebras, subitam civilis Erinys/Tarpeio de monte facem Phlegraeaque movit/proelia,* "while you performed such things, a civil Fury suddenly brandished her torch from the Tarpeian mount and stirred up Phlegraean battles" (5.3.195-7). As scholars have recognized, when Statius metaphorically refers to the strife between Vitellius and the forces of Vespasian as "Phlegraean battles," he likens it to the Gigantomachy, which traditionally occurred in the Phelgraean Fields (Lovatt 2005, 114-18; Gibson 2006, 343n196-8). These critics have noted that Statius' use of this metaphor is not particularly innovative; poets had long described

[505] This is slightly different from the model that Curtius proposes, as he believes the poet is the sailor and "his mind or his work the boat" (1953, 129).

[506] This is not to say that Statius had no part in shaping his father's world. A few lines before the passage under consideration, Statius speaks of his potential ability to affect his father's experience: *qualem te Dardanus Albae/aspexissed ager, si per me serta tulisses/Caesarea donata manu,* "how the Trojan field of Alba would have looked upon you, if you had borne garlands given by the hand of Caesar through me" (5.3.227-9). Statius states that if his father had been alive to witness his Alban victory, Alba Longa would have regarded him differently.

civil wars in Gigantomachic terms. However, a focus on the political implications of the Gigantomachic metaphor tends to obscure the elemental strife that it presupposes and which I believe Statius means to emphasize. The original Gigantomachy supposedly involved the invasion of heaven by the Earth-born Giants, a disruption of the equilibrium of the universe that resulted in the unnatural mixture of air and earth.[507] Statius' portrait of the battle between the supporters of Vitellius and Vespasian includes a similar confusion. Significantly, Statius claims that the instigator of the conflict is a *civilis Erinys.* This phrase immediately calls to mind another Fury who roused civil war in Statius' *oeuvre,* Tisiphone. Bruce Gibson suggests that Statius intends for his reader to remember Tisiphone's appearance on earth in Book 1 of the *Thebaid* when she brandishes a torch (2006, 343n196-8).[508] However, it seems equally plausible that a reader would also recall the episode in Book 8 in which Pluto orders Tisiphone to return to earth in the aftermath of the Underworld's "invasion" by Amphiaraus and to introduce horrors such as the *aether* had never seen (65-8). Pluto imagines that Tisiphone will be the agent of the disruption of the normal cosmic order.[509] The allusion to this passage is a strong possibility because Pluto likens his plan to the Gigantomachy, swearing that the inhabitants of the world above should be no less afraid to meddle in the affairs of the lower than *frondenti iungere Pelion Ossae*, "to join Pelion to leafy Ossa" (*Th.* 8.79).

The *civilis Erinys* in Statius' lament for his father is thus also to be seen as a creature from the Underworld who has entered the terrestrial realm in order to stir up chaos with her

---

[507] For more on this idea see Hardie 1986, 104; Zientek 2014, 107-9. Other thinkers employed the Gigantomachy as a metaphor for cosmic disorder. Plato, for instance, described the activity of materialist philosophers in Gigantomachic terms, accusing them of dragging down everything from heaven to earth (Reiche 1971, 296-7).

[508] Feeney suggests that Tisiphone's journey to earth in Book 1 itself involves a "breach" in the "organization of the cosmos" (1991, 347).

[509] Pluto also boasts: *habeo iam quassa Gigantum/vincula et aetherium cupidos exire sub axem/Titanas miserumque patrem*, "I have the shaken chains of the Giants and the Titans eager to go out beneath the airy sky, and wretched father [Cronos]" (8.42-4). Antony Augoustakis comments: "Pluto stresses that though the Gigantomachy has long ended, it could soon begin anew" (2016, 82n42-3). For further discussion of the Gigantomachic elements in Pluto's speech see Feeney 1991, 351-2; Ganiban 2007, 182; McNelis 2007, 125-6.

infernal flames (*facem*), mingling the two regions in an unnatural fashion.[510] At her urging, the *Latiae…cohortes* attack the temple of Jupiter on the Capitoline and Statius mentions that the very thunderbolts were taken captive (5.3.202). Thunderbolts, the emblem of Jove's power, are celestial in origin and usually symbolize the control of the god's power over the inhabitants of the earth. Their capture signals the disorder and confusion prompted by the Fury's Gigantomachic battles. In the midst of this cosmic disarray, Statius the Elder apparently decided to write consolatory verses for the *excisis…templis,* felled temples, even before the flames subsided (5.3.200-202). The effect of this poem was apparently extraordinary; Statius recounts: *mirantur Latii proceres ultorque deorum/Caesar et e medio divum pater adnuit igni*, "the Latin notables and Caesar the avenger of the gods are amazed and the father of the gods approves from the midst of the fire" (5.3.203-4). Let us consider the implications of this description. The *Latii proceres* are surely the same Latin cohorts who attacked the Capitoline at the behest of the Fury, and the emperor Vespasian must be Caesar the avenger of the gods, the representative of the Olympian order in this Gigantomachy; Statius makes it appear as though their mutual wonder resulted in the cessation of hostilities and therefore of cosmic strife and disarray.[511] Furthermore, Jupiter's acknowledgement of the Elder Statius signified the success of his consolatory venture.[512] In other words, Statius speaks as though his father had an important function in

[510] Pramit Chaudhuri identifies the mingling of the underworld with the terrestrial and heavenly realms as a common feature of theomachic narratives (2014, 140).
[511] See Hardie 1983, 12 for the identification of Caesar with Vespasian. See Nauta 2002, 202 for the identification of Caesar with Domitian, on the grounds that Vespasian was not at Rome during the siege of the Capitoline. As the "emperor" on whose behalf the battle was fought, however, Vespasian seems the more likely referent. Domitian, furthermore, could hardly be accused of having been the avenger of anyone in this particular historical battle. He is supposed to have escaped from the Vitellian forces disguised as a priest of Isis.
[512] Alex Hardie speculates that Statius' father really performed this poem on the Capitoline in front of the cult statue of Jupiter (2003, 140).

restoring cosmic order (presumably including that of the elements) in the wake of the unnatural civil strife.[513]

It is evident that Statius' idea that his father could quell the adverse effects of civil war or reestablish the equilibrium of the elements in the face of disaster does not stem from a literal belief in his father's supernatural control over the universe. It is more likely that he alludes figuratively to the power of his father's poetry to move its readers. The decision, however, to characterize this power as something capable of restoring the order of the universe in the wake of catastrophe remains significant. According to the logic of metaphor, the effects of the Elder Statius' poetry must be analogous to those created by one who restores order to the universe.[514] Statius' choice of figure thus suggests that he viewed his father as a dominant force in the world, a man who could even have a profound effect on his surroundings. In fact, when the Elder Statius dies and can no longer exert his influence, his son does not, he implies, suffer the consequences alone. In order to demonstrate this, I turn my attention to Statius' discussion of his father's final, incomplete poetic undertaking: a poem about the eruption of Vesuvius in 79.

The Elder Statius' success in forestalling the dissolution of world order in the wake of the conflict between Vitellius and the Flavians helps to explain why his unfinished poem on Vesuvius was a source of distress for his son: the poet's father did not have the chance to restore Campania to a state of equilibrium.[515] Statius' account of the Vesuvian conflagration contains the

---

[513] The power of poetry to put an end to strife is a conventional idea. In their gigantomachic poems, Horace and Pindar both claim that the Muses are capable of such a feat. Pindar specifically says that the Muses' lyre has the power to quench a fiery lightning bolt (*Pyth.* 1.5) Horace speaks more obliquely of the *lene consilium* of the Muses (3.4.41), but does so in the context of the peace ushered in by Augustus. See Nisbet and Rudd 2004, 69n41-2 for a discussion. It is significant, however, that Statius' father himself assumes the power the other poets attribute to the Muses. Their cosmic power is his.

[514] This is not such a wholly improbable comparison. See Hardie 2006, 61-5 for the archaic Greek association between the Muses and cosmic order.

[515] The question of when the Elder Statius' poem was composed is not really relevant to my argument. Statius' father's Orpheus-like powers of (re)imposing order on his world were surely available to him at whatever point he began this project. However, I tend to agree with Coleman's and Hardie's claims that the poem need not have been

same Gigantomachic undertones as the civil conflict that preceded it. The poet describes the event in the following terms: *Pater exemptum terris ad sidera montem/sustulit et late miseras deiecit in urbes,* "the Father lifted up the uprooted mountain to the stars and threw it down on the wretched cities far and wide" (5.3.207-8). This is a strange description of a volcanic eruption. Statius makes no mention of the *incendia* which he had hinted at a few lines previously (5.3.205) and which were standard in many poetic descriptions of eruptions, but focuses exclusively on the falling rocks and debris that accompanied the expulsion of lava from the crater.[516] Furthermore, Statius refers to these rocks by synecdoche, conflating them with the mountain itself. Statius' Jupiter extracts the mountain from the earth and throws it down upon the cities of Campania. I suggest that Statius tailors his account of Vesuvius' eruption in order to associate it with the Gigantomachy; the mountain-as-weapon is a feature of many accounts of the Gigantomachy, deployed by both gods and Giants against their opponents.[517] The poet's depiction of the eruption is also characterized by the same confusion of the elements that accompanies most Gigantomachic battle narratives. Significantly, Statius says that the mountain was uprooted, *exemptum,* from its original location. The verb *eximere* has quite a technical sense; it is often used to describe the extraction of plants or chalk from the earth.[518] Statius thus suggests to his readers that the Father of the gods removed Vesuvius from its natural seat in the earth and moved

---

begun in the immediate aftermath of the eruption (1988, xviii; 1983, 13). Nauta's attempt to reconcile Statius' claim that the poem was composed three months after his father's death and the mention of this planned poem about Vesuvius by assuming that the former is a later insertion does not strike me as convincing (2002, 195-6).

[516] Dio's retrospective description of the eruption does mention the rocks in addition to the flames (66.21-3). For a discussion of poetic descriptions of Vesuvius' eruptions, including those of Martial and Silius Italicus, see Sebesta 2006, 105-11.

[517] See Hardie 1986, 100-101 and Lowe 2015, 208-9 for discussions of this trope.

[518] See *OLD* 1b-c and Gibson 2006, 345n207. Interestingly, it is also the term that Ovid uses to discuss the creation of the world from chaos. The creator removed (*exemit*) the earth, sea, and sky from "a blind heap" (*Met.* 1.22-4). In contrast, Statius' Jupiter increases the disorder of the world.

it into the heavenly realm, blurring the natural boundaries of the universe.[519] Again, this is unusual. Volcanic eruptions are usually the result of the *end* of the Gigantomachy, when Jupiter has safely imprisoned the giants under the mountains and their occasional exhalations cause fiery eruptions (Connors 2015, 126). In other words, volcanoes are the side effect of the *re-imposition* of order on the universe. But, Statius' description of the eruption of Vesuvius suggests that Jupiter was still in the midst of the turmoil.

The poet strongly implies that the region had yet to recover from its loss of equilibrium, in part because of the Elder Statius' failure to restore order. Statius laments that his father had wished to set things right, but had not had the opportunity to do so: *mens erat et gemitum patriis impendere damnis*, "it was your intention to expend your groans for the losses of your fatherland" (5.3.206). *Impendere,* which denotes "to pay out," often appears where some kind of transaction is being described (*OLD* 1). Similarly, *damnum* frequently connotes a financial loss of some kind (*OLD* 1). It is clear that the Elder Statius felt he owed his *patria* a lament because of its contribution to his personal development. But the lines also imply that the *grammaticus* had something worthy to offer his suffering fatherland in return for its nurturing care.[520] *Impendere* metaphorically indicates that his father's lament for the losses suffered would have served as a payment for damages and would have contributed to the restoration of the status quo. Since Statius the Elder's previous consolatory poetry was so successful in reestablishing normality, there is no reason to assume that his intended offering to the cities of the Bay of Naples would be any less powerful. Instead, Statius implies that his father left him precisely at a

[519] Dunstan Lowe suggests that the rootedness of mountains is related to their sublime monstrosity in Gigantomachic contexts: "Their bulk, weight, lofty height, and deep-rootedness betoken the mathematical sublime" (2015, 208).
[520] For the relationship between Statius the Elder and his two (!) fatherlands, see 5.3.104-12 and 124-32.

moment when the universe remained in a flux.[521] The disorder and confusion wrought by the eruption of Vesuvius foreshadows symbolically the strangeness of the world in which Statius will find himself after his father's death. In fact, the eruption is the last event that Statius includes in his father's biography, and his death therefore appears as an extension of the disorder occasioned by the eruption.[522]

The observation that the Elder Statius' death was "like" a natural disaster leads me to the second reason for which Statius feels that it is appropriate to utilize the language of environmental change to describe the effects of his father's death. As we shall discover, Statius not only advertised that his father had the ability to control and to dictate his son's interactions with his environment, but portrayed him as an integral component of that environment. In a series of bold metaphors and personifications, the poet likens his father to non-human entities and landmarks. No doubt Statius does so in order to exaggerate his father's stature; Longinus argues that figurative language has a "natural grandeur" (μεγάλαι τε φύσιν) and that metaphors are particularly suited to evoke loftiness (ὑψηλοποιὸν αἱ μεταφοραί) (*De sub.* 32.6). Statius' comparison of his father to natural phenomena helps to establish him as an object of worthy of awe.[523] Such a panegyric impulse is common in consolations; in the mouth of a consoler, praise is meant to restore the spirits of the bereaved, to remind mourners of the fullness and value of the

[521] Statius speaks of the continuing devastation caused by Vesuvius elsewhere in the *Silvae*. In his letter to Marcellus, Statius announces that he writes from a region still suffering the ravages of Vesuvius. He writes that the volcano poses a continuing threat: *necdum letale minari/ cessat apex*, "not yet has the lethal peak ceased to threaten" (4.4.84-5). This is so pace Newlands 2010, 114-15, who sees in this line and those immediately preceding an optimistic look toward a happier future for the region.

[522] Smolenaars 2005, 326 makes a similar point. On natural disasters as prodigies and harbingers of evil see Davies 2004, 162, Keitel 2010, 334, and Rasmussen 2003, 39-117.

[523] Ferdinand Delarue speculates that the Elder Statius was, like Lucan, a poet of the sublime because of Statius' references to his intended poem on Vesuvius (2000, 22-3; 2013). See also Hardie 2013, 130. Statius would thus be transforming the man who wrote sublime poetry into a sublime object himself.

life of the person who has died.[524] But in the mouth of the mourner himself, praise also contains justification for the intensity of his grief. If Statius felt that his father were an established "part" of the world, that his loss should result in the poet's sense that his relationship to the environment had changed should be no surprise.

Statius claims for his father a kind of sublime grandeur:

> *Omnia namque animo complexus es, omnibus usus,*
> *qua fandi via lata patet, sive orsa libebat*
> *Aoniis vincire modis seu voce soluta*
> *spargere et* ***effreno nimbos aequare profatu***
>
> You embraced everything in your mind, used everything, where the wide path of speaking lies open, whether it pleased you to bind your words in Aonian measures or with loosened voice to scatter them and to match storm clouds with your unbridled speech.
>
> (5.3.100-3)

In addition to his father's all-encompassing intellect and poetic talent, Statius emphasizes his father's attempt to elevate himself to the stature of storm clouds. The idea that a poet might "equal" the clouds is Homeric in origin; Odysseus' words (ἔπεα) are likened to storm clouds (*Il.* 3.222). The stress in this Homeric line, however, is on the similarity of Odysseus' *speech* to storm clouds. The man is only incidentally like the clouds. Statius has shifted the emphasis slightly; it his father who comes to resemble the clouds *by means* of his speech, as he pours forth his unbridled stream of words. Although Statius the Elder is not metamorphosed into a storm cloud, his son announces that his father could function like one. Now this is perhaps not so unusual. Piet Schrijvers has recognized that the Roman poets often likened themselves and their rivals to natural phenomena (2006, 100).[525] Horace, he points out, referred to Pindar as a

[524] This kind of praise may be related to the traditional Roman *laudatio funebris*, but is also indebted to the Greek epideictic tradition (Pernot 2015, 22). For a discussion of consolation and epideictic oratory see also Pernot 2005, 178 and 199-201.

[525] See Taisne 1994, 136-151 for an overview of the comparisons that Statius himself makes between nature and man across his corpus. She argues that these comparisons are based on Statius' Stoicizing belief that there are

violently rushing river (*Od.* 4.2.5-8). But Statius, I argue, goes even further than these poets in assimilating his father to the landscape. The conceit that his father is like an element of the natural world is part of a larger trend in the poem, Statius' tendency to conflate the human and non-human. In a world where the two categories are treated interchangeably, even inanimate objects may be meaningfully compared with, not just imagined as, humans.[526] Statius' figurative references to his father as an element of his landscape symbolize how established a feature of his son's habitus the Elder Statius had been. The reader is left with the sense that the Elder Statius' disappearance from the world of the living created a sizeable void in his son's environment.

I have shown that Statius often blurs the distinction between humans and their non-human counterparts. He writes as though natural elements were animate and possessed a kind of agency. In what follows, I shall look more closely at those instances where he treats personified places and geographical regions as though they were human actors. That Statius substitutes personified landmarks and men for one another with such ease must be partly attributable to the logic informing personification. The author of the *Rhetorica ad Herennium* suggests that personification (*conformatio*) is the attribution of form and speech to formless or mute objects *ad dignitatem adcommodata*: "fitted to its status" (4.53).[527] The author's remark that the speech and form given to a personified object must be appropriate to its "status" deserves further consideration. This formulation assumes that inanimate, mute objects actually already possess

---

correspondences "entres les différents aspects de l'univers" (137). She does not, however, develop this claim or discuss personification.

[526] As it happens, this applies particularly well to the Greco-Roman antiquity. For instance, the impulse to project human characteristics on a macroscopic scale to the earth in antiquity often stemmed from a philosophical conviction that the earth itself was a living organism. This was particularly true for Seneca and the Stoics (Armisen-Marchetti 1989, 305-6). But see Taub 2012 for a discussion of Aristotle's deployment of it. Myrto Garani points out that Lucretius used the analogy extensively, but made clear that he, unlike the Stoics, did not believe that the earth was actually a living organism (2007, 94). Diskin Clay adds that Lucretius' personification metaphors "are contradicted by the very philosophy he is expounding" (1998, 162). It seems to me that Statius' position is closer to that of the Stoics.

[527] This idea is surely informed by the same logic that allows Ovid to "literalize the figurative" (as Hardie puts it) in the *Metamorphoses* (1999*,* 91). Hardie himself sees personification as a metamorphosis, however (96).

something like what humans call a personality or identity.[528] The author of the *ad Herennium* seems to have anticipated Samuel Levin's conception of personification as a trope that attributes specific human predicates to other objects because of the author's recognition that things have "life" (1981, 30).[529] But the idea that inanimate objects are really "like" human subjects may lead paradoxically to what James Paxson calls the "reification" of the human (1994, 52).[530] As nonhuman entities adopt "human" qualities, humans themselves take on those of their inanimate counterparts. I suggest that Statius posits such a similarity between his father and natural phenomena in order to advertise that his father had been an integral feature of his world—or as English idiom would have it, he had looked upon his father as "his rock."

Statius first conveys the idea that men and elements of the physical world are interchangeable with one another in a catalogue of his father's students:

> *Quid mirum, patria si te petiere relicta*
> *quos Lucanus ager, rigidi quos iugera Dauni*
> *quos Veneri plorata domus neglectaque tellus*
> *Alcidae, vel quos e vertici Surrentino*
> *mittit Tyrhenni speculatrix virgo profundi,*
> *quos propriore sinu lituo remoque notatus*
> *collis?*

---

[528] Thierry of Chartres, the twelfth century commentator on the *Rhetorica ad Herennium*, explains that this passage signifies that the *oratio* attributed to an inanimate object must be of the sort that the object itself would use if it were able to speak (*scilicet si sermone posset uti*). Quintilian makes a similar comment about *prosopopeia*, informing his students that even when they make mute objects speak: *quibus omnibus debetur suus decor*, "what is seemly must be attributed to each" (11.1.41).

[529] It is simply the limitation of human language that forces the writer to express the experiences of inanimate objects in human terms (Levin 1981, 28-9). Laurent Pernot notices a similar assumption in rhetoricians' discussions of how cities ought to be praised: This list of *topoi* supposes a sort of personification of the city. The city not only has a soul and a biography, but also a body, consisting of its constructions, its site, and its location (2015, 45).

[530] Alex Dressler points to a similar effect in Senecan metaphors, though he speaks of subjectivation rather than reification: "The classical interpretation of Seneca's metaphysics of metaphor suggests that the subject of the simile determines the choice of *illustrans* based on the predicates shared with the *illustrans*, and that representation is following reality. But this is not the only interpretation. If *exemplum* is similar to simile but different in that it aims to constitute reality ('Let us be the way that we described'), Seneca broaches, as we would expect, the possibility of the predicate changing the subject, of *illustrans*-Alexander changing *illustrandum*-us. When Seneca writes something like, 'Let us be like Alexander,' we are, as it were, subjected by Alexander: we are not literally made his subjects; but we are represented as subjects with certain of his predicates. We are, to use Butler's (1997, e.g., 1, 12–8) term, 'subjectivated"' (2012, 158).

> Why is it wonderful, if those whom the Lucanian field, the acres of stern Daunus, the wept-over house of Venus, the neglected land of Hercules, or those whom the watchful virgin of the Tyrrhenian deep sends from the peak of Surrentum, and those whom the hill in the nearer bay made famous for its horn and oar sent, sought you with their fatherlands left behind?
>
> (5.3.162-8)

Statius makes fields, houses, and hills (all associated with individual *patriae*) the agents who send youths to study with his father rather than their parents or guardians. Though this is a common technique in ancient poetic catalogues, it is worth considering the logical consequences of this type of personification. When Statius anthropomorphizes a space, he leaves room for man to be "spatialized." If cities are animate agents like men, then men are also like cities.[531] The last city in this catalogue demonstrates this fact particularly well. Misenum is represented by the trumpet and oar of its eponymous Misenus (Gibson 2006, 329-30). The attributes of Misenus, which accompanied the man in life, remain with the hill and the settlement that took his name. In Statius' account, Misenum acts as the human Misenus once did. The man has become a hill. Although Statius the Elder does not undergo so complete a transition into a geographical feature, his son classes his parent amongst the landmarks that sent him pupils.

Statius comments that the neighboring lands sent their youths to his father just as *ad Avernales scopulos et opaca Sibyllae/antra rogaturae veniebant undique gentes*, "people came from everywhere in order to inquire at the Avernian rocks and the dim caves of the Sibyl" (5.3.172-3). Bruce Gibson claims that Statius here compares his father to the Sibyl at Cumae (2006, 333n172-5), but this is not precisely accurate. Statius has constructed an analogy between Statius' father and the *spaces* the Sibyl inhabited, particularly her cave near Lake Avernus.

---

[531] K. Sara Myers argues that the scientific discourse about the human microcosm assumes something similar: "Human as microcosm is not merely subject to the same physical influences as the larger macrocosm, but itself forms and becomes part of the whole. The implied parallels between the natural and human world are underpinned by Ovid's use of the scientific terminology of his opening and concluding cosmogonic passages in many of his descriptions of the process of metamorphosis" (1994, 40).

Statius the Elder is the sort of "landmark" to his pupils that the Sibyl's cave and the rocks of Avernus are to people from all over. In comparing his father to caves and rocks, Statius continues to blur the boundary between animate humans and inanimate objects; the anthropomorphized cities send their promising young men to a teacher who is himself "like" a feature of the Campanian landscape. Now, it might seem that Statius' use of a simile at this juncture differentiates his father from the landmark to which he compares him more firmly than a metaphor might have done. After all, Homeric similes traditionally brought together a tenor and vehicle from decidedly different realms of life and experience (Garani 2007, 115).[532] However, I propose that Statius intended his audience to understand that *vates* and landmark should not be neatly separated from one another.[533]

That Statius chose the topographical elements associated with the prophetic Sibyl as points of comparison further hints strongly at the lack of distinction between man and nature. Statius' dual reference to the Avernian rocks and to the Sibyl's cave calls to mind Virgil's treatment of the Sibyl in the *Aeneid.* This is especially true because Virgil appears to have been the first poet to have conflated the Cimmerian Sibyl, traditionally located near Lake Avernus, and the Cumaean Sibyl, traditionally located in a cave near the Temple of Apollo at Cumae.[534] The allusion to the *Aeneid* is significant because Virgil himself failed fully to distinguish the Sibyl from her surroundings. When Virgil describes her cave, he includes the detail that the cave had one hundred "orifices" (*ostia*) through which the responses of the Sibyl come (*Aen.* 6.43-4). As Emily Gowers has noticed, the cave seems like an extension of the Sibyl's mouth, its hundred

---

[532] For more on the distance between tenor and vehicle in similes see Feeney 1992, 36-39. For Ovid's tendency to toy with the idea that " simile in fact falls [just] short of identity" see Hardie 2004.
[533] Indeed Garani goes on to say that the epic poet Lucretius consistently uses vehicles and tenors that "demonstrate their objective inner similarity" (2007, 115).
[534] The problem of Virgil's conflation of the two Sibyls and the locations of the respective caves is deeply vexed. See Austin 1977; 56-8, Horsfall 2013, 76-84; and Zetzel 1989, 279-80 for a discussion of the terms of the debate. See Clark 1996, 225-6 for a discussion of Statius' acceptance of Virgil's conflation.

orifices like the hundred mouths every epic poet desires (2005b, 179-80). The Sibyl, then, is simultaneously human in form and a natural phenomenon. By comparing his father to the Sibyl's caves, Statius alludes to the prophetess' ambiguous ontological status and suggests that his father shared something of her indeterminacy. The idea that Statius the Elder had functioned like a feature of the landscape for both his son and his students begins to seem less anomalous. As proposed above, Statius' comparison of his father to a famous landmark elevates the Elder Statius' importance. It gives the sense that his father was an established point of reference for both his son and others. Statius thus provides an explanation for his professed awareness of a dramatic shift in his relationship to his surroundings: Statius the Elder's absence from the world of which he had been a part left a figurative hole in the fabric of his son's environment.

Brave New World?

I return now to the questions about consolation with which I began the chapter. The foregoing discussion has demonstrated how and why the speaker of the lament felt as though the death of his father fundamentally altered his relationship to the world. What consolation is available to the poet in the face of this disorientation? As mentioned in the previous chapter, James Ker suggests that the work of Senecan consolation is to reintegrate the person consoled into Julio-Claudian society. But if grief is characterized in 5.3 not by social isolation but by the perception of something like environmental estrangement, the work that Statius' *epicedion* would have to perform, if it were to have a consolatory effect, would be to reconcile the poet with his physical environment. With this accomplished, Statius could re-establish his status as a composer of poetry. I propose that Statius hopes to achieve this reconciliation by introducing to himself the possibility that his father might remain immanent in his world and might therefore continue to guide him. We have seen that Statius couches his assertions of alienation from

natural processes and his material environment in figurative language and Elder Statius' potential reintegration into the fabric of the poet's surroundings is expressed in no less conventional terms. It is replete with learned allusions to his literary predecessors. Statius, after all, is a poet writing in the idiom appropriate to his profession. But the poeticized spaces he wishes his father to inhabit bear a great deal of resemblance to the physical world of human experience; they combine the actual and the ideal. [535] Their physical properties determine the extent to which the Elder Statius may "enter" into his son's world. The real-world implication of Statius' artistic choices, namely that the poet desires that his father remain a force in the world, is therefore discernible.

The first indications that the poet is ready to set aside his grief come after his initial articulation of his environmental alienation. Statius' impression that his usual accord with the environment has disappeared prompts his effort to reestablish a normal state of affairs. After Statius laments that the moon has merely observed his listless behavior for three months, he expresses a hesitant willingness to resume the business of composition. The poet announces that although his hand still shakes and his eyes are not yet dry, he is ready to begin again (5.3.35-6). Statius states his intention of shaking the mold (*situm*) from his lyre strings and recommencing his song (5.3.28). Armed with his customary lyre, the poet takes up what might seem to be his habitual stance in the world. But this time, Statius does not "stir up" Cirrha or ask for Bacchic inspiration. Instead, his father has become the god whom he asks for inspiration. The poet appeals: *da vocem magno, pater, ingenium<que> dolori*, "give voice and skill, father to my great sorrow" (5.3.28). That Statius replaces the traditional gods of poetry with his father is consistent with the conclusion in the second chapter that the poet wished to endow his father

[535] This argument is similar to Timothy Saunders's notion that Virgil's *Eclogues* exhibit "a belief in some kind of analogy between the literary universe on the one hand and the physical universe on the other" (2008, 31).

with quasi-divinity.[536] However, the present chapter has shown that the poet connected the receipt of divine poetic inspiration with the maintenance of a certain relationship with the natural phenomena associated with the deity in question.[537] In his old world, Statius purportedly had to interact with Cirrha and the Delian caves, the haunts of Apollo. It is not unreasonable, therefore, to assume that when Statius hopes to receive inspiration from his father, he imagines doing so in an environment of which his father was somehow once again a fundamental part. In what way would this be possible?

Statius is not even sure about where is father is to be found, a fact which becomes clear in the part of his invocation to his deceased parent after his brief address to the Hebrus. Statius expresses a conventional doubt about where the "deity" resides, using the traditional *seu…seu* formula:

> ***seu*** *membris emissus in ardua tendens*
> *fulgentesque plagas rerumque elementa recenses,*
> *quis deus, unde ignes, quae ducat semita solem*
> *quae minuat Phoeben, quaeque integrare latentem*
> *causa queat, notique modos extendis Arati*
> ***seu*** *tu Lethaei secreto in gramine campi*
> *concilia heroum iuxta manesque beatos*
> *Maeonium Ascraeumque senem non segnior umbra*
> *accolis alternumque sonas et carmina misces.*

---

[536] Statius hints at the divinity of his father elsewhere. The opening lines of the poem also recall the language of prayer. The first word of the lament is a kletic *ipse* and is followed by a direct request for *vires* and a *carmen* (5.3.1.). Alessia Bonadeo, however, draws a distinction between the inspiration Statius hopes to receive from his father and the inspiration of the Muses and other deities (2012, 117-18).

[537] Similarly, the three recipients of divine communications to whom Statius compares himself, Numa, Scipio, and Sulla interacted with the divine in sacred spaces (5.3.290-3). Statius mentions that Numa absorbed the teachings of the nymph Egeria *Aricino…sub antro*, "in the Arician cave." The poet records that Scipio met with "Latian" Jove, an allusion to the report that Scipio spent the night in the *cella* of the temple of Jupiter Optimus Maximus (Gibson 2006, 377n290-3). Statius' description of Sulla's relationship with Apollo is more difficult to understand in the context of nighttime visitations. Plutarch relates that Sulla prayed to a statue of Apollo before the battle of the Colline Gate (*Sull.* 29.11-12), but I am aware of no recorded dreams in which Apollo appeared to Sulla (although Sulla was visited by Aphrodite and Ma-Bellona). Sulla is said, however, to have visited the oracle at Delphi and received a favorable prophecy. It is possible that his statue of Apollo was obtained at Delphi (Flower 2015, 305). In other words, Sulla's relationship with Apollo was shaped by an initial encounter at the site of the god's oracle. For a discussion of the importance of sacred spaces in shaping and mediating the experience of the divine, see chapter 2 above.

> Whether you, sent forth from your limbs and heading into the upper realms, examine the shining regions and the elements of things, who god is, whence fires are, what path leads the sun, what cause makes Phoebe wane, and what is able to make her whole again when she hides, and you extend the verses of famous Aratus, or whether you, no lazier a shade, in the secret meadow of the Lethean field, near the councils of the heroes and blessed shades, live alongside Homer and old Hesiod and compose in alteration and mingle your songs. (5.3.19-27)[538]

Bruce Gibson claims that the options that Statius presents here are conventional, precisely the possibilities that Menander Rhetor would later advise orators to include in consolations (2006, 275-6n 19). But the poet makes clear that these suggestions are not merely rhetorical flourishes. He is invested in the answer to the question about the alternatives and prays at the end of the poem that his father dwell in Elysium with the poets (5.3.284-7). [539] Scholars have found this final request troubling. Emmanuele Griset has suggested that the discrepancy between the opening and close of the lament is part of the "problema*"* of the entire poem. Griset concludes that the two parts of the poem were composed at different times (1962, 131).[540] Whether the final request that his father live in Elysium was composed at the same time as the earlier segment of the *epicedion* or at a later date does not much signify; the concluding prayer constitutes a clear indication that Statius favored a subterranean home for his father over a celestial one. [541] His preference, the evidence of the poem indicates, is the result of a hope that his father might be

---

[538] For a discussion of *seu…seu* in a hymnic context see Van Dam 1984, 495n107-11. For a general discussion of hymnic elements in Statius' *corpus* see Gibson 2013.

[539] Statius also seems to be unsure whether his father writes didactic and cosmological poetry in the manner of Aratus or mythic epic in the fashion of Homer (Gibson 2006, 276-7). But I do not think the answer to this question of genre can be of primary importance to Statius. His father, the poet informs us elsewhere, wrote all kinds of poetry during his life (5.3.100-103), so it is not clear to me why Statius should suddenly express a preference for mythic epic.

[540] This position is by no means universally accepted. Bruce Gibson does not accept that Statius wrote the final lines of the poem later than the opening for structural reasons (though he believes that lines 225-33 are a later insertion), and instead posits that the discrepancies are the result of the poem's unfinished state (2006, 266n17).

[541] Statius at a couple of points offers a potential third option: *limine primo/fatorum et viridi, genitor, ceu raptus ab aevo/Tartara dura subis,* "on the first threshold of your Fate and as though snatched from your green youth you go down to harsh Tartarus" (5.3.73-4). He repeats the assertion that his father entered Tartarus at line 261. As Bruce Gibson points out, however, *Tartara* probably refers metonymically to the Underworld in general (2006, 294n74). In the moments in which he attempts to comfort himself, he consistently imagines that his father is in the region of the Underworld designated for the blessed.

able to maintain significant connections to the earth from Elysium more readily than from the heavens. This may be seen by examining the relationship between the Elder Statius and the earth that each scenario presupposes.

The image of the hypothetical ascent of his father's soul to heaven recalls the poet's formulation of a similar process in 2.7, where he asserted that Lucan's soul might well have joined the *animae potentiores*, "more powerful spirits," in the aether (107-10). In that instance, Statius imagines that Lucan looks scornfully down upon the earth (*terras despicis*) and laughs at the earthbound tombs (110).[542] The idea that the souls of great men travel to the heavenly realm also evokes Cicero's adaptation of Platonic and Pythagorean ideas in the *Somnium Scipionis* and Seneca's Stoic adaptation of it in his consolatory work.[543] Cicero's Scipio Africanus partakes of the same hostility toward the earth that Statius attributes to Lucan. Africanus repeatedly reprimands his grandson Scipio Aemilianus for the latter's continued attention to terrestrial affairs rather than to the wonders of the heavens (*Rep.* 6.17, 6.20). Africanus attempts to redirect his descendant's gaze by explaining the mechanics of the cosmos, of which the earth is a small and insignificant part (6.18-19). Contemplation of the universe beyond the earth replaces parochial concerns. In fact, Africanus advises his grandson that he ought to spend his remaining time on earth focused on returning to the Milky Way. Aemilianus is (perhaps ironically) to achieve this by serving his country well.[544] Africanus tells Aemilianus that in order to remain on the path of virtue that leads to the stars he ought to *alte spectare… atque hanc sedem et aeternam domum contueri, neque te sermonibus vulgi dedideris*, "look on high and watch this seat and

[542] The possibilities that Statius imagines for the deceased Lucan are precisely those he imagines for his father, although his preference for Elysium is not made quite as explicit in this instance (2.7.107-19).
[543] For the connections of the *Somnium* to Platonic and Pythagorean thought, see Edwards 1990, 468; Farrell 2014, 82-3. For the relationship between the *Consolatio ad Marciam* and the *Somnium Scipionis* see Manning 1981, 144; Setaioli 2000, 295-302. For the relationship between Seneca's thought about the separation of the body and soul after death in light of the *Somnium* see Gauly 2004, 181-90.
[544] See Feeney 1986, 4.

eternal home, and don't surrender yourself to the gossip of the mob" (6.25). Africanus, in other words, ought to despise the earth and his fleeting earthly reputation while he makes his way back to the heavens.[545]

Likewise, when Seneca adapts the Ciceronian fantasy in his *Consolatio ad Marciam*, he informs Marcia that though her father and son are able to look down upon her, they do so at a great distance and from a more desirable place. She is subject to the far-off gaze not of those men whom she knew, but *tanto excelsiorum et in summo locatorum,* "of those much loftier and placed on high" (25.3). Seneca further tells her that they study the courses of nearby stars (*vicinorum siderum meatus*), the secrets of nature (*arcana naturae*), and the causes of heavenly phenomena (*caelestium causas*) (25.2). Indeed, Marcia's departed son appears to have achieved Seneca's fantasy expressed in the preface to the *Natural Questions* of transcending the limits of the human body and arriving at a better place by looking into the workings of god and the universe (1 *praef.* 17).[546] It is therefore no surprise that when Statius imagines his father's soul taking its place in the heavens he also assumes that his father would explore the "causes" of things. Statius lists the objects of his father's inquiry: the shining regions of the heavens, the elements, god, fire, the course of the sun, and the cycle of the moon (5.3.20-22).[547] In this scenario, then, Statius' father apparently would have little concern for the earth itself.

Furthermore, there is some suggestion that on this scenario the deceased Elder Statius would be incorporated into the stuff of the celestial sphere. If Statius the Elder indeed ascended

---

[545] It is, admittedly, troubling that this praise of the heavens comes in a treatise devoted to the establishment of an ideal republic on earth. For a discussion of the ways in which Cicero's earthly republic maps onto the heavenly one, see Gallagher 2001. Statius, however, is not responsible for Cicero's inconsistencies.

[546] See Williams 2012. For the Platonic overtones of Seneca's rejection of the body-as-container, see Bartsch 2015, 6.

[547] These are precisely the kinds of celestial phenomena which Aratus, who was of Stoic orientation himself, treated in his *Phaenomena.* For a discussion of Aratus' Stoicism see Gee 2000. It is also interesting to note that when Ovid speaks of Aratus' afterlife in the *Amores*, he speculates that *cum sole et luna semper Aratus erit,* "Aratus will always be with the sun and moon" (1.15.16). The poet of the heavenly bodies takes his place among them in death. This is not the fate that Statius would wish for his father.

to heaven, Statius suggests that he would do so *emissus membris*, "sent forth from his limbs" (5.3.19). This view is Platonic in origin and later developed by the Stoics.[548] According to Stoic philosophers, the soul, when unencumbered by the body, could mingle with the celestial fire from which it originated. Seneca, for instance, reminds Marcia that her son and father are *intermixti… sideribus* (*Marc.* 25.3). The philosopher apparently draws on Stoic physics, which stipulates that the stars are composed of the same divine *pneuma* as the human soul. When the soul is released from the body, it moves upwards to come into closer communion with that *pneuma* (Setaioli 2000, 280). So, it may be that the reader is encouraged to understand that if Statius' father inhabited the upper realms of heaven, he would remain a vital part of the living cosmos. In this sense, of course, Statius the Elder would still belong to his son's world. But he would be at a great remove from the poet, and his connections with Statius' particular surroundings would therefore be relatively weak. Yet it is evident that Statius wished to remain in physical proximity to his father.

In the closing lines of the lament Statius hopes that his father will appear to him in a dream (5.3.288). But Statius does not just imagine a one-way exchange between upper and lower regions; he speaks longingly of his own *katabasis.* In the lines preceding the prayer to Proserpina, Statius states, in no uncertain terms, that he would like to be able to cross into the Underworld as Aeneas and Orpheus had done (5.3.271-6). Statius even expresses the desire for physical contact with his father: *fas mihi sit patrios contingere vultus,/fas iunxisse manus, et lex quaecumque sequatur*, "may it be right for me to touch my father's face and to join hands with

[548] See Gretchen Reydams-Schils 1999 for a general discussion. See Setaioli 2000, 295 for a consideration of the Platonic elements in discussion of this issue in the *ad Marciam.*

him, and let whatever punishment follow" (5.3.275-6).[549] In this, Statius wishes to emulate Aeneas, who he claims is lucky because the hero *patrem vacuis circumdedit ulnis*, "embraced his father with empty arms" (5.3.266).[550] Statius apparently considered valuable even the elusive contact that is possible with a shade. Such interaction would be possible only if the deceased Elder Statius resided in a place to which his son might journey. I shall establish that the second eschatological vision that Statius espouses, by virtue of its similarity to a Virgilian model, allows for a much more proximate connection to the physical world of the poet's experience than the Milky Way of the *Somnium*.[551] Virgil's and Statius' Elysium is a powerful space because it has putative connections to the "real" world: it is a subterranean space contiguous with and accessible from places that the poets and their readers might really visit. The logic informing Statius' preference that his father occupy such a space could hardly be clearer—the poet wished the Elder Statius to remain a presence in their shared environment.

It becomes evident over the course of the poem that Statius' Elysium closely resembles that of *Aeneid* 6. This is especially evident in the final lines of the poem, where Statius describes the qualities of the abode of the poets more fully. There, Statius speaks of a grove (*nemus*) where *nulla inrupit Erinys,/in quo falsa dies caeloque simillimus aer,* "no Fury has burst in, in which there is false daylight and air most similar to the heaven" (5.3.287). This description bears no small resemblance to Virgil's description of the Elysian Fields in the *Aeneid*, where he remarks

---

[549] Statius also seems to echo Aeneas' wish: *ire ad conspectum cari genitoris et ora/contingat*, "let it fall to me to enter into the sight of my dear father" (*Aen.* 6.108-9). Though there is no precise verbal echo, Denis Feeney suggests to me that Statius is playing with the aural similarity between *contingat* and *contingere.*

[550] Mariana Ventura thinks that this line assumes that Statius thought that Aeneas was lucky because of his "ability to avoid the father's embrace" (2010, 208). This view fails to take into account Statius' later assertion of the desire to touch his father. Statius actually seems to suggest that because Aeneas was in his father's presence and could make the move to embrace his shade, he was enviable.

[551] Feeney makes a similar point: "At issue here is a fundamental paradox, an eschatology which is expressed and presented within a recognized philosophical tradition, but which appears to champion mundane values disparaged by that tradition, turning our eyes consistently towards this corporeal world, away from the concerns of the soul" (1986, 2). My discussion, however, will focus more on physical and geographical features than Feeney's does.

upon the pleasant groves in which *largior hic campos aether et lumine vestit/purpureo, solemque suum, sua sidera norunt*, "a larger sky cloaks the fields with purple light and they know their own sun and stars" (6.640-1). In both descriptions, Elysium has an atmosphere similar to that of the world above. Also Virgil's Elysian Fields, as in Statius' formulation, are the home of the poets. It is in this environment that Aeneas and Sibyl see a group of shades who recite poetry and where Orpheus, the Thracian *sacerdos,* performs in harmony with them (6.644-6). Further details suggest that the Underworld which Statius envisages his father entering resembles a Virgilian model. The journey that Statius imagines for his father in the earlier portions of the prayer to Proserpina replicates that of Aeneas in miniature. The poet expresses the desire that when his father first descends to Hades, *Centauros Hydraeque greges Scyllaeaque monstra/aversae celent valles,* "remote valleys might hide the Centaurs, the herds of Hydras, and the Scyllaean monstrosities" (5.3.280-1). These monstrous creatures are strongly reminiscent of those that Aeneas encounters as he approaches Orcus from the cave at Lake Avernus. The hero observes various monstrous beasts, including centaurs, "bi-form Scyllas," Gorgons, and Harpies and must be stopped by the Sibyl from attacking them (*Aen.* 6.285-95). Statius' mention of these creatures illustrates that his father journeyed on the same path that Aeneas did. Evidence of this is abundant. Statius next imagines that his father will meet Charon at the Styx (5.3.282-3).[552] Finally, Statius' father will travel from the Styx (avoiding Tartarus, like Aeneas) to his final stop in the Elysian Fields. At the end of the lament, Statius hopes that his father will re-enter his world through the gate of horn rather than the gate of ivory (5.3.288-9), a clear allusion to the gates through which true and false dreams are said respectively to exit the Underworld in Book

[552] He writes: *umbram senilem/invitet ripis discussa plebe supremus/vector et in media componat molliter alno,* "may the final ferryman summon the elderly shade when the mob is dispersed from the banks, and may he place him gently in the ship." The suggestion that Charon place the Elder Statius in the bark gently may also be an allusion to the moment in the *Aeneid* when the living Aeneas weighs down Charon's skiff with his bulk and causes the boat to leak (6.413).

6.[553] The sustained allusions to Aeneas' progress through the Underworld, combined with the physical resemblance of Statius' grove of the poets to that of Virgil, suggest that Statius generally adopts the geographical and topographical features of his predecessor's depiction.

Given the similarity between Statius' Elysian geography and the Virgilian, it is reasonable to assume that when Statius proposes that his father's soul has either ascended to heaven or entered the Elysian Fields, he deliberately juxtaposes a Ciceronian (or perhaps Senecan) eschatology with a Virgilian one. Virgil, through the mouthpiece of Aeneas' father Anchises, provides his reader a clear vision of the details of the soul's fate in the afterlife. Anchises informs his son that the divine "breath" permeates all things, including humans. This divine element in man is polluted by the body in which it resides during his lifetime and must be purified after the body perishes. After a certain period, most souls drink from the river Lethe and return to the earth; a select few remain in the Elysian Fields and are completely purified of the taint of the body (6.724-51).[554] Scholars have pointed out the various similarities between this eschatological account and both Plato's myth in the *Phaedo* and the *Somnium Scipionis*: men's souls are heavenly in origin; the body pollutes the purity of the divine soul; the afterlife involves the purification of souls; a select few occupy an exalted position and are saved from the cycle of

[553] I do not have room here to discuss in great detail what, precisely, Statius means to convey by having his father come through the gate of horn rather than that of ivory. My suspicion is that Statius references as well Anchises' appearance to Aeneas at the end of Book 5. Although there is, in this instance, no linguistic allusion to Anchises' epiphany, there is a great deal of similarity of circumstance. Anchises appears to Aeneas at a moment of great doubt after the burning of his ships. The hero's father appears after nightfall (5.721), and Virgil describes his arrival thus: *visa dehinc caelo facies delapsa parentis/Anchisae,* "thence was seen the visage of Anchises having descended from the sky" (5.722). The *facies* of Anchises, an image of him as he had been in human form, appears to Aeneas. This *facies* is surely similar to the *imago* of his father that Statius hopes to meet. And indeed, the proposed allusion to Anchises' epiphany in Book 5 may explain why Statius chooses to have his father exit the underworld from the gate of horn. Anchises' information about Aeneas' impending *katabasis* turns out to be accurate, he is not one of the *falsa insomnia*.

[554] For a recent discussion (with bibliography) of Virgil's eclectic philosophical allegiances see Horsfall 2013, 501-504 ad loc. I have omitted Orphism from my discussion, but scholars have suggested that Virgil was also influenced by that tradition. See Clark 1975; Molyviati-Topsis 1994; Torjussen 2008; Bremmer 2009.

regeneration.[555] There are even Stoic resonances in Anchises' account: his assertion that the divine *spiritus* and *mens* permeate the *membra* of the world recalls Stoic accounts of *pneuma* and draws upon the Stoic notion that the world is like a body (Brenk 1999, 292). Yet Anchises' description and explanation of the afterlife differs in some respects from the philosophical traditions on which it draws.[556] According to the sources listed, the souls of good men journey upward toward the heaven from which they originated, as that of Statius the Elder does in the first scenario that his son presents.[557] Stoic physics, as I have mentioned, would even suggest that the ascent of the soul is necessary: earth and water, the primary elements composing the human body, are heavier than fire, the substance of the *pneuma* of the soul. Once freed of the body which weighs it down, the soul returns to the heavens (Clark 1979, 180). Virgil, by contrast, initially places the blessed few in a subterranean Elysium and, as Horsfall puts it, "only long thereafter, after further elemental purifications, is this élite turned into purest fire" (2013, 503n743-4).[558] This means that during the lifespans of their children, the élite inhabit Elysium; Aeneas, unlike Scipio, does not meet his sire in the Milky Way. Virgil's idiosyncratic model of the afterlife might be attractive to the grieving Statius of the lament for several reasons.

---

[555] So Austin 1977, 230n744. Anchises informs his son: *exinde per amplum/mittimur Elysium, et pauci laeti arva tenemus*, "thence we are sent through ample Elysium, and we happy few hold those fields" (6.743-744). I recognize that Virgil's text does not make quite clear whether the subject of *mittimur* should be understood as "we few blessed" or should be taken more generally (Horsfall 2013, 503n 743-4). Whether or not *pauci* is the subject of *mittimur* at 6.744, it is surely the case that the phrase *pauci laeta arva tenemus* refers to the fact that the elect inhabit a special portion of the Elysian Fields until they are finally cleansed (745-7). See also Habinek 1989, 228, Solmsen 1990, 218. For the view that Elysium is not a temporary abode, but the final resting place of the blessed, see Clark 1975, 131-3. The difficulties of Virgil's text need not concern us too strongly here, though, because Statius makes very clear that he wishes his father to reside in Elysium, which I shall demonstrate is in relatively close proximity to the terrestrial realm.

[556] See, e.g. Farrell 2014; Feeney 1986; Habinek 1989; Zetzel 1989.

[557] In the eschatological myth in the *Phaedo*, the souls of good men rise to the true surface of the earth, above the one that men inhabit (114c). His account, with its emphasis on the earth, may be closest to Virgil's (see note 572 below).

[558] Virgil's account contains another inconsistency; as James Zetzel has puts it, "on the one hand, there is the idea of an afterlife in which the shade permanently keeps the character and appearance of its previous human existence, and on the other hand there is an account according to which the soul is separate from the body, passes through a period of purification" (1989, 267). But this is an inconsistency which the *Somnium Scipionis* shares; Scipio Aemilianus must recognize his father and grandfather in order for the dream to work as a narrative. Surely the same holds for the *Aeneid.*

Anchises' eschatological account retains certain appealing elements of its philosophical forebears. It would allow for Statius' father, presumably one of the blessed like Anchises, to become "divine."[559] But, I shall maintain, it also would allow for his father to do so in an area closely connected to the upper world. In order to establish this, I shall re-examine Virgil's treatment of the Underworld, with particular attention to its location relative to the surface of the earth.

Statius' lament itself calls attention to the physical accessibility of the Virgilian Underworld from the terrestrial world and the permeable boundary between the exterior and the interior of the earth.[560] Statius' discussion of Aeneas' *katabasis* establishes this point. He writes that the Sibyl led Aeneas down (*detulit*) to the Underworld as the hero directed *vivos…in Tartara gressus*, "living steps into Tartarus" (5.3.269). In fact, in Virgil's account of the *katabasis*, the Sibyl did literally bring Aeneas "down" into the depths of the earth; the pair walked to the Underworld from the cave at the crater of Lake Avernus.[561] Their journey was made possible by the fact that the cave with its opening in the terrestrial realm lead into the interior of the earth. Virgil's characterization of this cave is also important. As scholars have noticed, Virgil strongly anthropomorphizes it (Horsfall 2013). The cave has a large aperture (*vasto hiatu*) from which exhalations (*halitus*) emerge (6.237-41). In other words, the cave is the mouth of the earth's body—the opening through which its subterranean bodily cavity may exhale its sulfurous breath. The exterior and interior of the earth are parts of a single whole. Does Statius share Virgil's sense that upper and lower worlds form a unity?

---

[559] This, of course, assumes that Statius the Elder might be one of those spared from entering life again in another body, as Anchises himself seems to have been. This, however, does not seem implausible given Statius' tendency to compare the two figures elsewhere.

[560] This is not to say that a *katabasis* is easy, simply that it is possible. Aeneas, after all, must find the golden bough in order to go down to the Underworld. For the difficulty of passage between upper and lower worlds in the Greek tradition see Edmonds 2015, 254-5.

[561] In the following lines, Statius also refers to Lake Avernus as the entry to the Underworld. He complains that a lesser cause (i.e. the loss of Eurydice) sent Orpheus and his lyre to *pigro Averno* (5.3.271).

Examination of Statius' mention of the Centaurs and monstrous Scyllas and his description of the Elysian Fields may point toward an answer. In the *Aeneid,* the placement of the Centaurs and other monsters in the Underworld indicates that the upper and lower are part of the same whole. Virgil relates that Aeneas first saw the monsters from the *vestibulum* of Orcus (6.273). He further specifies that the Centaurs and their monstrous companions were stabled at the gates (*foribus*) of Orcus. Traditionally, scholars have assumed that Virgil models his Orcus on the plan of a house; they suppose that Aeneas sees the monsters as he moves into the atrium from the vestibule (Wistrand 1960, 146-54; Clark 2003, 308).[562] However, Roberta Casagrande-Kim has convincingly argued that Virgil probably meant for his readers to imagine a city gate instead (2012, 108-9).[563] In either case the topography and architecture of the Underworld mirror that of the upper world. Expectations about how houses and cities look in the terrestrial realm can be transferred to the subterranean. In fact, Virgil's Orcus seems like an extension of the upper world.

By referring to Virgil's geography of the Underworld, Statius revealed that he shared the conceit that the world into which his father descended was a continuation of his own. This is not to say that Statius exactly reproduces Virgil's description.[564] Statius, after all, asks that remote valleys hide the monsters which Aeneas encountered. However, Statius assumes that there *are* valleys in the Underworld which could perform this function; his Underworld, like Virgil's, contains the same kinds of geographical features that appear on the exterior of the earth. The idea

---

[562] On the futility of totally mapping Virgil's Orcus onto a domestic space see Horsfall 2013, 246n 286.

[563] As she points out, the whole description of the entrance to Orcus centers on language associated with gates: *fauces, foris,* etc. There are no words that are associated with the types of architectural features that Clark and others imagine, like *cubicula*, *triclinia,* or peristyle (2012, 109). Furthermore, other poetic descriptions of the entrance to Orcus describe a city gate (such as that of Silius Italicus, which itself may be indebted to Virgil's description) (2012, 105). I would add that Classical authors like Cicero and Livy both use *vestibulum* metaphorically to talk about the entryway of cities in the way that Casagrande-Kim requires (*OLD* 1c).

[564] See Ventura 2010, 208 for further discussions of discrepancies between Statius' account of the journey to the Underworld and that of Virgil.

that the interior of the earth is similar to the exterior was a common feature of contemporary natural philosophy.[565] In the *Natural Questions,* for example, Seneca exhorts his reader:

> *Crede infra quicquid vides supra. Sunt et illic specus vasti ingentesque recessus ac spatia suspensis hinc et inde montibus laxa; sunt abrupti in infinitum hiatus, qui saepe illapsas urbes receperunt et ingentem ruinam in alto condiderunt. Haec spiritu plena sunt—nihil enim usquam inane est—et stagna obsessa tenebris et lacus ampli.*
>
> Believe that whatever you see above is below. There are also vast caves there and huge recesses and vacant spaces with mountains set here and there; there are infinitely deep gulfs, which often have received collapsed cities and hidden the huge ruin in their depths. These are filled with air, for nothing is ever void, and there are marshes overcome with darkness and large lakes.
>
> (*NQ* 3.16.4-5)

Seneca here imagines that the physical features of the earth's interior mimic their terrestrial counterparts.[566] For Seneca, the similarity of the interior and exterior regions of the earth is related to the fact that they are part of a unified body. [567] The interior of the earth is simply an invisible extension of the visible surface. It would seem that Statius and Virgil shared this view.

Their respective depictions of the Elysian Fields are based upon the same principle. As noted above, Virgil claims that Elysium has its own stars and atmosphere (6.640-1). Although Virgil and the Sibyl have descended below the earth, the Elysian Fields resemble the upper world so strongly in this figuration that they hardly seem subterranean.[568] Nicholas Horsfall comments that Virgil has combined elements of the "terrestrial Isle of the Blessed" with Elysium and concludes that the latter "both is…and is not…subterranean" (2013, 442-3n641).[569] Statius' reformulation of Virgil's description makes the situation seem somewhat less paradoxical. Statius says that the atmosphere (*aer*) in Elysium is *caeloque simillimus*, "most similar to the

---

[565] I cite Seneca here, but he himself seems to be drawing on a common trope. Pliny the Elder (*HN* 2.166) and Lucretius (6.536-42) also express similar views. For a discussion of the Senecan passage see Williams 2012, 75-6.
[566] For the associations of this passage with underworld imagery see Jones 2013, 75-7.
[567] In fact, in the section preceding this one that Seneca refers to subterranean channels as the veins of the body of the earth (*NQ* 3.15.1-6).
[568] For the idea that this detail suggests that Aeneas' journey was a dream, see Williams 1983, 52.
[569] Solmsen 1990, 215 expresses a similar view.

heavens" (5.3.287). It is not that the Elysian Fields are simultaneously on and below the earth, but that they resemble the upper world in terms of their physical makeup, as the passage from the *Natural Questions* cited above would suggest. Although Seneca does not, as Virgil and Statius do, speak in the passage cited above of stars or other natural sources of light, he does mention that the world below contains air (*spiritu*).[570] In drawing on the "scientific orthodoxy" that the same elements exist in the upper and lower regions of the earth, Statius thus alludes to the possibility that the two form a single unit.

Examination of another element, water, will help to confirm this conclusion. As it happens, the section from the *Natural Questions* I have been discussing comes in the context of Seneca's attempt to prove that rivers have subterranean origins; he needs to prove that the interior of the earth contains the elements (air and water) and conditions that would make emitting large quantities of water possible.[571] Although Virgil and Statius are not so philosophically or scientifically precise as Seneca, their discussions of rivers hint at a similar unity of interior and exterior. Virgil's Elysium, for instance, is not only similar to the regions above, but shares a geographical feature with it: the Eridanus River. Virgil describes the course of the rushing river in the following terms: *unde superne/plurimus Eridani per silvam volvitur amnis*, "whence upwards the mighty Eridanus rolls through the wood" (6.658-9). The exact sense of *superne* is not precisely clear. Servius, however, provides some clarification (such as it is) and explains: *id est ad superos*, "that is to the upper regions." In his commentary, Nicholas Horsfall concludes: "these words therefore naturally indicate here that the Eridanus starts in Elysium and

[570] *Spiritus* does not mean atmosphere in the same way that *aer* may (Williams 2012, 189-90), but the point that both Statius' and Seneca's subterranean regions have air in them stands.
[571] For the mechanics of this process see *NQ* 3.10.4-5.

thence flows normally, 'at earth level,' through ordinary European forests" (2013, 453n658).[572] Indeed, Pliny the Elder identifies "Eridanus" as the Greek name of the Po, whose stream he nonchalantly remarks flows underground (*in cuniculo*) for part of its course (*HN* 3.117).[573]

There is good reason to believe that Statius also alludes to the idea that bodies of water might connect the upper and under worlds.[574] As we saw in the opening lines of the poem, Statius asks that his father grant him a *lamentabile carmen* from the very waters of Elysium: *Elysio de fonte* (5.3.1-2). Let us consider the implications of this request. Water is often cited as the medium of poetic inspiration in Roman poetry (Jones 2005), but the rivers situated in the Underworld do not usually fulfill this function. Any number of generic explanations might exist for this absence of the Elysian font from the verses of poets like Horace, Ovid, or Propertius; it would hardly do for poetry on the theme of love to be sent to the poet from the Underworld. But there is also a practical reason for the omission. When the Roman poets describe their experiences of inspiration, they often write of physical interactions with the poetic waters in question. Propertius talks of his poetry as having been washed in the stream of Permessus (2.10.26). More commonly, poets claim to have drunk from inspirational waters like the Castalia or the Hippocrene (Crowther 1979, 6-8).[575] Statius himself speaks of having drunk from poetic streams earlier in the *Silvae* (1.2.259).[576] In all of these cases, the poet must imagine himself to be in some physical proximity to the water from which he receives inspiration. It is therefore not

---

[572] Pace Bremmer, who argues that the phrase likely means "from above" because Vergil borrows the topography of paradise in *1 Enoch* (2009, 201-2). However, if the river did indeed flow "from above" it might still be coming down from earth. The idea that rivers pass through both upper and lower regions of the earth is at least as old as Plato's *Phaedo.* See Kingsley 1995, 73ff.

[573] Virgil may imply that the waters of Lake Avernus and Acheron are connected (6.107). Horsfall points out that no such connection is attested, but does not discount the possibility (2013, 135n107).

[574] Baleriaux 2016 argues that Greek conceptions of a "wet" Underworld were the result of empirical observation of subterranean rivers.

[575] The first definite reference to a poet drinking from poetic waters is in Lucretius' *De Rerum Natura* (1.927-8). Propertius, Virgil, and Ovid both use this metaphor often. For a compilation of such occasions see Crowther 1979, 6-8 and Knox 1985, 117-19.

[576] For a discussion of Statius' references to poetic streams, see Gibson 2006, 264-5n2 and 396-7n7.

unreasonable to suppose that for Statius to receive his song from the waters of Elysium, the inspirational force of the water would have to be potentially accessible to him. This would not have been conceptually impossible for Statius; a subterranean river in Elysium that flowed into the upper world or vice versa might well satisfy this condition. And in fact, one of the two rivers in Elysium that Virgil mentions is the Eridanus, which, as luck would have it, passes directly through the sweet-smelling *nemus* in which the poets sing in choruses (6.657). The other river that Virgil mentions is Lethe, and it seems unlikely that Statius refers to the river of forgetfulness in this context, so it may well be that the Elysian *fons* that Statius speaks of is the Eridanus itself.[577] His opening prayer would thus signify his hope for the possibility of contact with his father and the permeability of the boundary between the land of the blessed and the surface of the earth. The waters of this *fons* would be no less available to the poet than the other poetic rivers from which he claims to have drunk. Statius' final prayer to Proserpina, I contend, simply reinforces the previously expressed desire that his father occupy a place that was in physical proximity to his own world, and so remain a "feature" of his lived environment.

Another detail of Statius' plaintive hope that his father might dwell in Elysium corroborates the view that the poet imagined the Underworld as a place potentially accessible to him. Statius' very address to the deity of the Underworld betrays his notion that the upper and lower regions of the earth are connected. The poet gives the Queen of the Underworld the strange name *Aetnaea Iuno* (5.3.277), which as Bruce Gibson notices, combines the tradition of *Iuno Stygia* or *infera* with an epithet appropriate to Proserpina.[578] *"Aetnaea"* is appropriate for the Queen of the Underworld because, according to some accounts, Aetna was the site of her

[577] As Gibson points out, certain identification is not possible (2006, 267n2).
[578] Gibson also points out that the epithet could apply to Ceres/Demeter, for whom Gelon planned to build a temple at Aetna (2006, 370n277). See also Pollman 2004, 151n270-7. Some editors have wished to emend *Aetnaea* to *Enn(a)eaque*, because Proserpina is more often associated with Enna than Aetna. As Gibson points out, however, the alternate tradition is well attested (2006, 370n277).

rape and abduction by Pluto.[579] Statius was clearly aware of this tradition; in the *Thebaid,* the poet refers to Ceres' search for her daughter on the *Aetnaeis…saxis* (12.270). Because Aetna was the place where Pluto emerged from the Underworld to steal away Proserpina, the site of the volcano is a kind of passageway to the subterranean realm, and Statius includes details to emphasize this.[580] He mentions that while Ceres searched for her daughter, the giant Enceladus *insanis ululatibus ipse remugit/…ruptoque vias inluminat igni*, "himself bellows in answer with maddened cries…and lit up the ways with fire that burst forth" (12.274-5). These lines refer to the fact that after the Gigantomachy, Jupiter purportedly trapped Enceladus under Aetna.[581] Statius demonstrates that the boundary between these terrestrial and subterranean landscapes is porous when Enceladus belches lava from the mountain and provides Ceres with light. [582] The giant's fiery exhalation easily passes from underneath the earth to its surface.[583] What is also extraordinary about these lines is the sympathy demonstrated between upper and lower realms. Enceladus, trapped under the earth, echoes back Ceres' grief-stricken cries. The verb *mugire* may also be used to describe natural phenomena. According to Virgil, when Aeneas performed the sacrifices that served as prelude to his *katabasis,* the earth (*solum*) resounded. Or Lucan, for example, speaks of caverns that resounded (*mugire*) with the motion of the earth (*BC* 3.418).[584] So although Statius speaks of Aetna's eruption in mythological terms, he also perhaps refers to

[579] Ovid's version of Proserpina's abduction is set at Enna rather than Aetna. But his account involves a similarity porosity of upper and lower worlds. Dis drives Proserpina through deep lakes and a series of volcanic lakes near Palike (5.405-8).
[580] Statius may also be alluding to an earlier Greek tradition that Etna was a passageway between the upper and lower realms. Pindar famously placed the giant pinned down by Etna *in* Tartarus (*Pyth.* 1.15-28). Peter Kingsley comments: "by placing his giant simultaneously in Tartarus and underneath Etna he was imply giving expression to the common and fundamental idea that the volcano, with its craters and caverns, is an opening to the underworld (1995, 73). Kingsley further points out that Plato himself used the subterranean volcanic features of Sicily in describing his underworld geography in the *Phaedo* (1995, 79-82). On this last point, see also Fowler 2007, 511.
[581] This description may be indebted to Virgil's portrayal of Aetna at *Aeneid* 3.578-82. For a discussion of the gigantomachy and volcanoes see Connors 2015, 124.
[582] For more on the porosity of Etna and the combination of myth and science in Greco-Roman discussions of the volcano see Buxton 2016.
[583] For an overview of Statius' references to Etna in the *Thebaid* see Leroux 2002, 73-6.
[584] For more such uses of *mugio* see *TLL s.v. mugio* I.B.1.b.

contemporary scientific explanations for volcanic eruptions: the movement of winds in the subterranean hollows of the earth which build up and cause Aetna's flames to burst from the mountain (Connors 2015, 125; Williams 2012, 213-57).[585] This scientific model again entails the notion that the interior of the earth resembles its exterior (much as Statius suggested that the grove of the poets in Elysium had a similar atmosphere to the earth).

Statius, of course, does not refer to these mythological or scientific details in his address to Proserpina. But by associating the goddess with Aetna, he surely alludes to these traditions. Furthermore, certain of Statius' descriptions of the world in this lament indicate his acceptance of the commonly held theory about the causes of volcanic activity. A passing reference early in the lament shows that Statius possessed knowledge of the theory that the earth was filled with cavities that contained substances like fire and air. When the poet discusses the volcanic region around the Bay of Naples, he alludes to Baiae's thermal waters: *Baianaque mittunt/litora, qua mediis alte permissus anhelat/ignis aquis et operta domos incendia servant*, "and the shores of Baiae send [students], where the fire, allowed into the deep, pants in the middle of the water and the hidden fires keep to their homes" (5.3.169-71). Although the text here is problematic, Gibson's suggestion that the "homes" of the "hidden fires" are subterranean chambers and are to be contrasted with the activity of the fire at the surface of the water (2006, 332-3n170- 1) is promising.[586] If Statius is suggesting that the thermal waters at Baiae are produced by subterranean fires, he once again demonstrates that the boundary between the interior of the earth and its surface is not impermeable. It is therefore reasonable to assume that when Statius

[585] For a discussion of the whole Greco-Roman tradition about the causes of earthquakes see Hine 2002.
[586] This is not an unusual idea. Seneca recounts that Posidonius saw subterranean fire "surviving" in the water during a period of volcanic activity (*NQ* 2.26.4-7). Dupraz sees Seneca's discussion of volcanism as evidence of his view that the world was a unified whole (2002, 238).

associates Proserpina and the Underworld with a volcano, he emphasizes that she is a deity who rules an undergound realm that has a porous boundary.[587]

Statius' combination of scientific and mythic models of the Underworld has an important effect. In her study of Virgil's attitude toward nature, Monica Gale shows that the poet "remythologizes" natural processes that his predecessor Lucretius had rationalized in order to assert the possibility that these "phenomena really are controlled by the gods" (2000, 122). Statius has done the opposite; he has transposed a traditional Underworld onto the world as the scientists of his day theorized it "really" was.[588] Proserpina, the Elysian Fields, and the Underworld occupy the same physical sphere in which the poet himself lived and moved. I argued earlier that Statius' tendency to equate grief with environmental alienation could be attributed to the sudden absence of his father from the material environment that they had shared. But if the Elder Statius were to inhabit the grove of the poets in one of the subterranean channels rather than exist as an incorporeal soul among the distant stars, Statius could be secure in the knowledge that his father remained part of the same world, even if at a further remove than he did previously. Under the terms of this scenario, the poet might feel as though his environment had changed, but not so drastically as the mourning Statius initially imagined. Statius the Elder

---

[587] Statius presents his view that the world and Elysium shared a passable boundary elsewhere in the *Silvae.* In the *genethliacon* for Lucan, Statius wonders whether his predecessor lives in Elysium: *seu pacis merito nemus reclusi/felix Elysii tenes in oris*, "whether you deservedly inhabit the grove of peace, on the shores of Elysium having opened up [to receive you]" (2.7.111-12). Carole Newlands argues that *reclusi* does not refer to Elysium as a site of refuge, but to the fact that Elysium "opened up" to receive Lucan (2011, 248n111-12). This language suggests that the ground physically opened up to receive Lucan, much as it had done to receive Amphiaraus in Statius' *Thebaid* (7.809-16).

[588] Statius does something similar in the *Thebaid*, when he provides a variety of possible mythic and scientific explanations for the chasm that swallowed up the seer Amphiaraus (7.809-16). Pramit Chaudhuri argues that this uncertainty "leaves open the possibility that one class of explanation—whether supernatural or physical—is simply mistaken" (2014, 282). I suspect it is more likely to demonstrate that the ancients made a less firm demarcation between science and myth than we do; both, after all, were ways of making sense of the world. For more on Statius' combination of scientific and mythic discourse see Morzadec 2003, 180. For a more general discussion of what distinctions we should make between ancient conceptions of mythic and rationalized versions of "reality" see Hawes 2014, 7.

could remain an influential and present force in his son's world, while the Ciceronian model would remove him from the earth entirely.

Up to this point, I have focused on Virgil's subterranean Underworld as a "part" of the physical mass that we call the earth, a state of affairs potentially comforting to the grieving Statius for the reason just cited. But Virgil allows for deceased individuals to remain immanent in a survivor's landscape in another manner. Various episodes in the *Aeneid* demonstrate that the soul of the deceased might reside in the subterranean Underworld while simultaneously remaining an important part of the world above it. Virgil insists that the dead can be present in the world of the living permanently, for example, as a numinous presence in a sacred landscape. Virgil's descriptions of Aeneas' experiences in Book 5, for instance, make clear that Anchises is immanent in the landscape surrounding his tomb. Aeneas himself recognizes his father's divinity and potential presence in the area surrounding his tomb. At the end of the book, the hero establishes a *sacerdos* for his father's tomb and has a *lucus sacer* attached to it (5.760-1). John Scheid called a *lucus* "une déchirure dans le tissu de l'espace humain," finding it a space on the earth that is either the property or habitation of a divine being (1993, 152). Ailsa Hunt, though she rejects the notion that a *lucus* is a god's property, has proposed that when the Romans refer to a tree or grove being consecrated to a god they often "talk in terms of an overlap" in the identities of god and tree (2016, 235).[589] For this reason, she posits that trees were always "potential point[s] of contact between the human world and the world of the divine" (2016, 291). Scheid and Hunt share the view that the sacred grove is a place in which a deity may be manifest, whether as a numinous resident or embodied by the trees themselves. Aeneas' decision to dedicate a sacred grove to his father therefore ought to be seen as his recognition of his father's

[589] Elsewhere, she writes "the characteristics, uses, and common location of the tree type could be felt to reflect or embody something about the entity of the god who enjoyed a relationship with it" (2016, 237).

potential immanence in his tomb and the space surrounding it.[590] Statius seems willing elsewhere to accept that a deified deceased figure might be present in the area around his burial place. In his letter to Victorius Marcellus, the poet informs his addressee: *Maroneique sedens in margine templi/sumo animum et magni tumulis accanto magistri*, "sitting on the edge of Maro's precinct, I take heart and sing at the tomb of my great teacher" (4.4.54-5). Virgil's tomb, transformed into a shrine by Silius Italicus (Pliny *Ep.* 3.7.9), advertises the divinity of the deceased poet. Merely by sitting in the vicinity of Virgil's tomb-shrine, Statius gains courage. Though it is clear that Statius hopes to receive guidance from his predecessor, who, like his father, was a *magister*, he believes that the place itself can provide inspiration.[591]

The lament itself provides an indication that Statius wished for his father to be like Anchises and Virgil in this respect. As I observed in the second chapter, when Statius imagines the rites that he might perform at his father's tomb, he expresses the desire to surpass the *Siculi…dona sepulchri*, the gifts of the Sicilian tomb (5.3.51). This is a clear reference to the funeral games Aeneas held in honor of his father in the fifth book of the *Aeneid.* But the poet also hopes to emulate the hero by establishing a sacred grove at the site of his father's tomb: *magno tumulum praetexere luco*, "to cover your burial mound with a great grove" (5.3.50). Although Virgil explicitly designated the grove Aeneas established for Anchises as a *lucus sacer* and Statius simply speaks of a *magno…luco,* Statius surely means for his father's grove to be compared to that of his predecessor. *Lucus* so often refers to a sacred space that Statius' failure to designate it as such directly need not mean that an audience would not understand it so, particularly since Statius had already compared his treatment of his father to Aeneas' obeisance

[590] Anchises also appears in incorporeal form to Aeneas in Book 5 as an *imago*, even as he lives in Elysium. The narrator does claim that the image of Anchises appeared from heaven, but Anchises' *facies* itself announces that *amoena piorum/ concilia Elysiumque colo*, "I live amongst the blessed councils of the pious and I inhabit Elysium" (5.734-5).

[591] Vollmer comments: "[Statius] erhofft *von dem Orte* dichterische Inspiration" (1898, 464n54). Emphasis mine.

to Anchises.[592] Statius' very wish to emulate Aeneas in honoring his father may result from a similar sense that his father could somehow be brought into the place where his tomb was.

Anchises, however, was not only an abstract presence in the space surrounding his burial site; he was active in policing it. As Aeneas performs sacrifices at his father's burial mound, a giant snake appears *adytis…ab imis*, "from the depths of the inner sanctum"(5.84). Lee Fratantuono and R. Alden Smith comment that Virgil's characterization of Anchises' tomb as an *adytus* is unusual and conclude that the poet employs the term in order to emphasize the sacrality of the space and suggest that the snake is Anchises himself, pointing to Anchises' quasi-deification and the fact that the *genius* of a place was often depicted in the form of a snake (2015, 189n84).[593] Significantly, the serpentine *genius loci* was an active force in its domain. It has been suggested that these snakes were apotropaic protectors of their territories (Boyce 1942; Frölich 1991; Tybout 1996, 361). Anchises, therefore, is not only present in the area surrounding his tomb, but retains the ability to act in it.

Statius displays a similar willingness throughout the course of the lament to allow that a burial site might be the continuing locus of the deceased's agency.[594] He implies on more than one occasion that since places may be animate objects with agential capacities, a dead person who has been subsumed into the landscape may continue to exhibit his former vitality. I cite once again Misenus/Misenum (a Virgilian figure!) to whom Statius alludes by oblique references to the site of his burial: *lituo remoque notatus collis,* "the hill marked out by the trumpet and the oar." This hill, bearing the attributes of the herald who rested there, was among those personified

[592] See Bodel 1994, 11 for *lucus*' resonances in the Classical period. My observation, of course, complements the argument in the second chapter about the "presence" of Statius' father in the tomb which his mother embraced. There, however, the focus was on the tomb as material memorial object, whereas I am more concerned here with the sacred grove surrounding the tomb. There is some slippage, of course, because the grove is also "material"; but the argument in this chapter is concerned more with orientations to and relationships with place than with objects.
[593] In identifying the snake with Anchises, they follow Galinsky 1968, 171.
[594] See Hardie 2002, 84 for a general discussion of tombs as "absent presences" which "re-present" the deceased.

places who sent pupils to Statius the Elder. As proposed above, the herald's tomb functionally becomes the departed man.[595] Misenus, then, is a curiously doubled subject. He is both a shade in the Underworld and the landscape that bears his name. Statius's treatment of his father's "step-parent" Naples also follows this pattern. He addresses his parent's adopted city by the name of the Siren, Parthenope, who had been buried there. In the first lines of his address to the Siren, the poet asks her to place a lock on his father's tomb and his remains: *exsere semirutos subito de pulvere vultus,/Parthenope, crinemque adflato monte sepultum/ pone super tumulos et magni funus alumni*, "lift your half-ruined face from the dust which appeared suddenly, Parthenope, and place the lock buried by the exhalation of the mountain above the tomb and remains of your foster-son" (5.3.104-6). Statius subtly alludes to the fact that the Siren was dead and buried. He describes her hair as *sepultum.* In the immediate context, this adjective refers to the burial of Naples under the wreckage caused by Vesuvius, but also reminds the reader of Parthenope's original burial (Gibson 2006, 305n104). Although the Siren is dead, Statius imagines that she remains an entity capable of action and even of mourning. Statius heightens the sense that Parthenope retains agency by endowing her with a human body; he refers to her ravaged face and to her hair.[596] As I argued previously, when Statius personifies geographic regions he does so in

[595] There may be a suggestion of something similar in Virgil's treatment of Palinurus. During Aeneas' sojourn in the Underworld, the Sibyl assures the despondent shade of Palinurus that that the inhabitants of the Lucanian coast would erect a cenotaph for him and that the place of his burial would bear his name forever: *aeternumque locus Palinuri nomen habebit* (6.381). K. Fletcher argues that the fact that Virgil makes *locus* the subject of *habebit* is significant: "The place itself, is the agent (*habebit*), making the name seem to be its own true possession" (2014, 203). In other words, the place of Palinurus' "burial" is not simply an entity, but a subject in its own right. For Virgil's metaphorical treatment of Palinurus as a promontory see Brenk 1984, 791-2.

[596] Statius first conveys the idea that Parthenope had a body when he refers to his father as the *alumnus* of his adopted city (5.3.106). He reminds her: *si tu stirpe vacans famaque obscura iaceres/nil gentile tenens, illo te cive probabas/Graiam atque Euboico maiorum sanguine duci*, "if you lacked offspring and you languished with poor reputation, having no indication of your birth, with him as your citizen you would prove that you were Greek and that you were sprung from the Euboean blood of your ancestors" (5.3.109-11). The city is an entity who might, like a human, be concerned about her pedigree. Although Statius has identified his father as Naples' foster child, he speaks as though the city and his parent shared common blood. I mentioned in my discussion of 2.1 that Greco-Roman medical thought indicated that children were the products of semen that was concocted from the blood, and that blood was therefore a physical link between different generations (Pomata 1996, 53ff). Statius thus suggests that

order to acknowledge the ways in which places may function like human actors. Although Parthenope has been conflated with the Neapolitan landscape, Statius endows the Siren with the same vital energy that all the various cities and landmarks in the poem receive.

What effect does the presence of figures like Misenus and Parthenope in the lament have? Does the text contain an indication that Statius hoped that his father would share their fate? The poet's prayer to Proserpina does not contain information on this point, but one of his earlier remarks points toward the conclusion that his father continued to remain an active force in the area surrounding his tomb. When Statius describes his father's final resting place, he suggests his father's continuing influence in the world beyond Elysium. Statius recounts that he lies prostrate at his father's tomb: *adclinis tumulo quo molle quiescis/iugera nostra tenens, ubi post Aeneia fata/stellatus Latiis ingessit montibus Albam/Ascanius, Phrygio dum pingues sanguine campos/odit*, "leaning on the mound where you rest peacefully, holding our lands, where starred Ascanius heaped up Alba on the Latian mountains, since he hated the fields fat with Phrygian blood" (5.3.36-9). Statius, like his mother, believes that his father is really "present" in his tomb. But I have argued that his mother was primarily interested in maintaining her intimate connection to her husband. Statius here betrays an investment in the idea that his father continues to exert control over the area around him. Statius the Elder is not only "present" at the site of his burial, but retains agential capacities. Statius tells us that his father "holds" the Alban lands that he and his son owned. In this context, *tenens* likely suggests that his father was also guarding

---

the shared origin of his father and Naples caused them to have a similar physical composition. Furthermore, the poet's reference to Naples' Greek blood asks the reader to imagine that she has veins through which this blood might flow, as it did through those of her foster child Statius the Elder. On the one hand, Statius plays with the idea that Naples was the burial place of the Siren Parthenope, who would herself have possessed a human-like form (Gibson 2006, 305n104), but he may also be drawing on a whole tradition in natural philosophy which consistently employed the human body as an analogy for the earth. Seneca, for example, had suggested that the passages in the earth through which air and water flow are like "veins" (*NQ* 3.15.1-6).See Taub 2003, 142-7 and Armison-Marchetti 1989, 305-7 for a discussion of Seneca's usage of this analogy. But Seneca is hardly the only thinker to employ the trope. Pliny the Elder, whose outlook was influenced by Stoic thought, also regularly personified the earth. See Beagon 1992, 39-41.

their property (*OLD* 9), much as Anchises had been the *genius* of the area surrounding his burial site.

The Elder Statius, of course, is unlike Misenus or Parthenope insofar as he is not explicitly conflated with the place of his burial. But it is nevertheless useful to think about the relation of Statius the Elder to these figures and not just to Anchises. Virgil is far less interested than Statius in blurring the conceptual boundaries between human and nonhuman. Statius had metaphorically described his father as a feature of the non-human landscape, just as he had figuratively treated Parthenope/Naples and Misenum as humans. I have argued that such metaphors indicate that the poet thought of his father as an established "part" of the landscape with which he interacted and was entangled.[597] The Elder Statius had functioned like a "part" of the landscape in life, and he could continue to act like "part" of the landscape in death.[598] The hill on which Misenus was buried and the shores of Naples in which Parthenope rested were the places in which their continuing agency was located. By attributing to his deceased father, as to Parthenope and Misenus, active influence over the *iugera* surrounding his tomb, Statius demonstrated his desire that Statius the Elder remain an "element of the landscape" with which his son might potentially carry on a relationship.

In this regard, it is significant that Statius is leaning on (*adclinis*) his father's burial mound in Alba Longa when, he claims, he summons the will to compose again (5.3.36-7).[599] My analysis has indicated the extent to which the poet felt his ability to compose was predicated upon Statius the Elder's presence in the world; Statius tells us that when he sensed that his father

[597] In a related vein, Morzadec argues that the anthropomorphism of Naples is the result of cosmic *sympatheia* (2009, 205).
[598] It is surely no accident that Statius locates the realm of his father's activity as the land surrounding his tomb. After all, it was the regions surrounding the respective burial spots of Palinurus, Misenus, and Parthenope that took on their identities and became animate entities.
[599] See also 5.5.25 where Statius begins to compose again after the death of his *puer* at the child's tomb.

was absent he was temporarily silenced. If, as Statius desires, his father were really an active force in that location, the poet could recreate the conditions he found amenable to productivity by contact with the tomb.

On the Efficacy of Self-Consolation

As I have shown, Statius' "self-consolation" consists in suggesting to the textual incarnation of himself the possibility that his father might live in a subterranean Underworld connected to his own and might therefore remain a vital force in his environment. He constructs this vision of how the two regions interact with one another by fusing mythic and scientific thought about the world. But did the resulting model of the universe really have the power to assuage his grief? Did the poet re-establish the proper relationship to his surroundings? The answer to this question is impossible to know for certain, and I have acknowledged that the relationship between the historical Statius' own feelings and those of the "Statius" who speaks in the lament is not a straightforward one. That the historical Statius produced a poem after his textual avatar claimed he struggled to do so, for instance, cannot serve as firm evidence of the abatement of grief. The question of whether Statius' textual persona put aside his grief is a more promising one, and it is with this that I shall concern myself. The poet provides a limited amount of information on this topic. I remarked previously that Statius' ending the poem with a prayer makes it difficult to judge on the basis of the lament alone whether or not the poet consoled himself successfully. It is therefore necessary to consider evidence provided by the surrounding poems.

The poem which traditionally follows Statius' lament for his father in the book, the sleepless poet's invocation to the god *Somnus*, sheds further light on this matter. Like 5.3, it is narrated in the first person and may well have been response to the Elder Statius' death. Antony

Augoustakis argues, against previous interpreters of the poem, that Statius' insomnia results not from grief over a lover's death but over his father's (2008).[600] This argument depends mainly on the point that Statius closed the *epicedion* for his father by asking his dead parent to appear to him *somni in imagine* (340). Augoustakis concludes that *Somnus*'s failure to appear in 5.4 means that Statius did not receive the poetic inspiration that he had requested from his father (346). I would add another point to his. Not only has Statius failed to be inspired by his father in his dreams, he has been unable to see him at all.[601] The journey through the gate of horn and the nighttime visitation that Statius imagines possible at the end of 5.3 has not been able to occur by the time of 5.4.[602] Despite his father's hypothetical proximity to him in the Virgilian Underworld, Statius remains unable to contact the Elder Statius. The poet cannot understand his inability to sleep and wonders aloud what *crimen* or *error* (5.4.1-2) has prevented him from falling into oblivion. As Gibson notices, the distinction between a crime and a mistake forms an ongoing motif in Ovid's exilic corpus (2006, 382n1-2).[603] The reader thus perceives that Statius' inability to sleep results in a kind of exile from his father's company. Logically, this should mean that the self-consolation that Statius staged in 5.3 had yet to prove effective. In fact, Statius' description of his state in the "insomniac's lament" mirrors the one that he describes at the

---

[600] For the arguments supporting the idea that Statius mourned his wife or a lover see Laguna Mariscal 1990 and Pomeroy 1986. For the view that Statius' poem is neither autobiographical nor connected to the laments preceding and following it, see Gibson 1996, 468.

[601] Ventura 2010, 213 makes a similar claim.

[602] Mariana Ventura claims that Statius means for his readers to understand that he does not believe that his father will ever appear. She bases this argument upon the content of the final lines of the lament, in which Statius compares his father's coming epiphany to those experienced by Numa, Scipio, and Sulla (5.3.290-3). Ventura points to various sources, including Valerius Maximus, Livy, Polybius, and Juvenal, who dismissed as political posturing the claims of these figures to have conversed with the divine and concludes that Statius recognized the improbability of his father's reappearance (2010, 213-14). I do not find, however, that Statius' examples are to be so readily dismissed. Where Ventura sees Statius' pessimism, there is sometimes an alternate explanation. For instance, she takes Statius' statement that Scipio was believed (*creditur*) to have seen Jupiter as an acknowledgement of the ambiguity surrounding the story (213). But it is simultaneously an indication that many people accepted Scipio's statements on the matter, as Nagel points out (2000, 55). Because Jupiter's visits to Scipio were conducted in the privacy of the god's temple, there existed no definitive proof of their veracity or lack thereof.

[603] Cf. *Tr.* 1.3.37-8, 3.1.51-2, 3.5.51-2, 4.10.89-90, *Pont*. 3.3.75.

opening of 5.3. Statius repeats his complaint that natural processes continue to occur in the same regular fashion in spite of his suffering: *septima iam rediens Phoebe mihi respicit aegras/stare genas; totidem Oetaeae Paphiaeque revisunt/lampades,* "now Phoebe, returning for the seventh time, sees my sick eyes stare; so many times do the morning and evening stars return" (5.4.7-9). Gabriel Laguna Mariscal notices that these lines echo the poet's similar complaint in 5.3 that the moon continued in her regular courses for three months without acknowledging his sorrow (1990, 132). Laguna Mariscal further suggests that these lines in 5.4 have the effect of making Statius into an Orpheus figure; Orpheus, according to Ovid, mourned Eurydice for seven days, which is precisely the length of Statius' wakefulness (1990, 132). Statius' similarity to Orpheus is evident elsewhere. The sleepless poet complains that his environment is unresponsive to his suffering: *tacet omne pecus volucresque feraeque/et simulant fessos curvata cacumina somnos,/nec trucibus fluviis idem sonus; occidit horror/aequoris et terris maria adclinata quiescent*, "all the cattle and birds and wild beasts are quiet and the curving tree-tops emulate exhausted slumber, nor do the violent waves sound in the same fashion; all the crashing of the sea has died down and the seas resting against the shore lie quiet" (5.4.3-6). The mute silence of the sleeping beasts particularly recalls the deaf herds of wild beasts that ignored Orpheus at the opening of Statius' lament (5.3.17-8).[604] As we saw previously, the poet compared himself explicitly to Orpheus in the first simile of the lament for his father. Generally speaking, then, the lack of sympathy between Statius and the non-human elements in his environment recalls the poet's sense of isolation in 5.3. We might readily conclude, then, that Statius had not ceased to experience the symptoms of his grief at the narrative time of 5.4. But this is not quite the whole story.

[604] See Ambühl 2010, 275-81 for a similar conclusion.

The preceding line of argument is very attractive, and Augoustakis' connection of *somnus* at the end of 5.3 to the *Somnus* invoked in 5.4 powerfully supports the idea that the two poems ought to be read and understood together. However, the claim that Statius' grief remains unassuaged hinges on the placement of 5.4 *after* 5.3, which is problematic because Book 5 was arranged and published by an editor after Statius' death.[605] It seems to me equally possible that Statius intended for 5.4 to precede 5.3. As I have shown, Statius' alienation from nature in 5.4 precisely mirrors the estrangement that he experiences at the *opening* of 5.3. Furthermore, Statius claims in 5.4 to have suffered insomnia for seven days but relates in 5.3 that he has mourned his father's death for three months.[606] So, unless we are to imagine that Statius' sleeplessness commenced well after he composed his lament for his father, it would make sense that the dramatic date of 5.4 should chronologically precede 5.3 and that the latter should serve as a kind of continuation of the former. And if this were the case, the allusion to *Somnus* in *somni in imagine* at the end of 5.3 would then have quite a different effect: the final lines would read almost as a second request that Statius' insomnia come to an end so that his father could appear to him. This is a far more optimistic reading than the other, even if the poet does not make it clear whether or not his desire has been granted. Insomnia rarely lasts forever, and if the boundary between Elysium and the terrestrial realm in the poetic universe Statius has created is

[605] Augoustakis argues that Statius may actually have arranged Book 5 before his death and that the task of publication was carried out by an editor after his death: "The careful insertion of the Somnus poem in between the two epicedia and the allusion of 5.3.279 to Statius the father as *imago somni* suggest to me the possibility of an arrangement of the poems by Statius, a process later completed by the editor of the book" (2008, 340n6). I find that this is too strong a claim to make on the basis of one verbal echo. The echo may have been deliberately emphasized by an editor through his own placement.

[606] Admittedly, as I indicated previously, the three months which Statius claims have elapsed since his father's death may in fact not be accurate. For the host of problems associated with this three month period see Gibson 2006, 260-66. If Statius' statement is not accurate, however, it seems likely that he composed the lament after a longer period of time than three months, not a shorter one. Whatever the reality, Statius claims to have mourned for his father for a period longer than his wakefulness.

truly as porous as the poet imagines and hopes that it is, the Elder Statius' eventual return would not be implausible.

The Self and Others

Although *Silvae* 5.3 contains elements of self-consolation, Statius is not the only one on whom the lament might have an effect. What would be the position of the poet's audience in the universe of the poem? How might reading about the death of the Elder Statius affect readers in their relations with the environment? Such questions are complicated by the fact that the lament for the poet's father is composed in the first person. Statius repeatedly highlights his isolation in the midst of his unbearable grief. How serious are such claims? Statius certainly never published this work during his lifetime; was it really meant to be a private expression of loss, the product of alienation and loneliness? In the first chapter, I dealt with the similar issues raised by the poet's *epicedion* for his boy. On the basis of Statius' request in 5.5 for consolation from those whom he previously consoled, I concluded that Statius believed in the existence of a community of mourners who could understand his grief to some extent because they had suffered the same wounds. Does 5.3 corroborate this claim?

Statius initially complains that no one recognizes the validity of his suffering. Why, he asks, ought a wife or mother be given leave to mourn their spouses and children with more intensity than he (5.3.68)? He acknowledges that such losses perhaps involve greater *invidia* against the gods and Tartarus and are more *miserabile visu* for strangers (5.3.69-71). These remarks would seem to indicate that Statius feels as isolated from his human community as he does from his environment. At times, Statius even revels in the idea that his experience is incompatible with that of others. The poet stresses his isolation from other mourners once more in the following lines, listing the kind of poetic lament that he will not compose:

> *Non ego, quas fati certus sibi morte canora*
> *inferias praemittit olor nec rupe quod atra*
> *Tyrrhenae volucres nautis praedulce minantur,*
> *in patrios adhibebo rogos, non murmure trunco*
> *quod gemit et durae queritur Philomela sorori:*
> *nota nimis vati. Quis non in funere cunctos*
> *Heliadum ramos lacrimosaque germina dixit*
> *et Phrygium silicem atque ausum contraria Phoebo*
> *carmina nec fida gavisam Pallada buxo?*
>
> I will not bring to my father's pyre the final offerings which the swan certain of its fate sends forth in tuneful death, nor what the Tyrrhenian birds on the black rock sweetly threaten to sailors, not what Philomela with her truncated tongue groans and complains to her harsh sister: they are poetic clichés. Who has not spoken of all the branches of the Heliades and their tearful resin and the Phrygian flint and the one who dared to compete with Phoebus in song and Pallas who rejoiced in the unfaithful boxwood?
>
> (5.3.80-8)

Statius insists both that the laments of the various mythological figures whom he mentions are clichés and that they are not good enough for his father, a man who "embraced everything in his mind" (5.3.99-100). He does not wish, ostensibly, to leave the impression that his grief could be properly communicated in the words or form of other such expressions. His loss is of a magnitude that the experiences of others cannot quite capture. Bruce Gibson is therefore right to conclude that "the rejection of direct comparison with these types of grief magnifies his own loss" (2006, 296n80-1). Yet, in true *recusatio*-fashion, even as Statius proclaims that the suffering of the most famous mythological mourners pales in comparison to his, he implicitly acknowledges something of their underlying similarity.[607] Statius and many of the mythical exemplars that he speaks of in this catalogue experienced loss in a similar way; their respective relationships to the environment are irrevocably altered in the wake of death or disappearance.[608]

---

[607] Peter Smith long ago noticed the irony implicit in many *recusationes*: "It is a technique that Steele Commager relates closely to the *praeteritio*, that transparent gambit of the Roman law-court" (1968, 57).

[608] I leave the swan, Philomela, and Marsyas out of the present discussion because they do not quite fit the pattern I shall lay out. Philomela does undergo a metamorphosis, but not explicitly because of her grief. Marsyas and the swan are not in Statius' position because they are the victims of death rather than the survivors. Their failure to

The Tyrrhenian birds to whom Statius refers are the Sirens. It is likely that Statius here alludes to Ovid's account of the transformation of the Sirens into sea-birds in Book 5 of the *Metamorphoses*, when he conjectures that the Sirens were among the companions of Proserpina when she was abducted by Pluto (5.555). Ovid suggests that the Sirens, frustrated in their search for their lost companion on land, desired to move onto the water so that the waters might also hear of their *curam* (5.557). The gods granted their desire and the Sirens received wings and plumage. In this version of the story, the song of the Sirens is a lament for the lost Proserpina. The Sirens' frantic grief led to their metamorphosis and their adoption of a new habitat. Similarly, the "branches of the Heliades" and the "tearful resin" presumably refer to the metamorphosis of Phaethon's sisters into poplar trees and the hardening of their tears into drops of amber in the wake of their brother's tragic demise (Ov. *Met.* 2.345-66). The "Phrygian flint" is likely to be Niobe, who was transformed into stone after her fourteen children were killed by Apollo and Artemis.[609] In each of these cases, the death of the beloved(s) involves the transformation of the mourner into a foreign element.[610] Like the Sirens, the Heliades and Niobe come to occupy a different place in the environment. In a sense, their metamorphoses make literal the change that Statius feels has taken place in his orientation to the world after the death of his father. There is a fundamental difference between Statius and the figures of mythology, of course, insofar as these latter mourners become *part* of nature rather than increasingly alienated from it. However, the basic idea that grief involves metamorphosis and re-orientation applies to both poet and the clichés he purportedly wishes to avoid. What Statius' erudite mythological references reveal, then, is the universalizing view that grief tends to have broadly similar effects

---

correspond to the pattern that I identify in the other cases does not really affect my argument, because Statius' similarity to the members of the catalogue whom I do discuss is only partial.

[609] For a discussion of Statius' use of Niobe and the Heliades in the *Silvae* see Taisne 1994, 126-31.

[610] Gibson 2006, 299n87 makes a similar observation.

even in disparate cases.[611] As in 5.5, the reader might be left with the sense that the universality of suffering and loss means that any given person's suffering ought to be comprehensible even to strangers, even if they do not suffer with them.

Statius' implicit comparison of his response to a universal "type," then, may have been intended to allow an audience unfamiliar with the deceased to relate to the poet's extended display of grief for a man whom he admits was 65 years old and *non indigus aevi, non nimius,* "neither lacking in years, nor too old" (5.3.252-3). But this is not the only possibility. Any potential reader of Statius' poem would not quite be a stranger to the poet's father. The lament contains extensive biographical detail. The poet's extravagant praise of his father throughout the lament is intended to illustrate the magnitude of the world's loss. And despite certain similarities between himself and the mythological exemplars he lists, Statius' "refusal" to speak in a hackneyed poetic idiom is ultimately an attempt to reinforce the idea that Statius the Elder was extraordinary. Statius explains that the lament of a Niobe or one of the Heliades would be inappropriate for his father because his father's stature was such that he deserved to be lamented in the divine language of *Pietas, Iustitia, Facundia,* and Pallas. Statius also allows that the "Heliconian troop" of Phoebus Apollo, which apparently included the Muses of epic, lyric, elegiac, and tragic poetry, ought to commemorate his father (5.3.89-99).[612] By emphasizing his father's extraordinary status, Statius might be said to attempt to convince a potential audience that they themselves ought to feel keenly the loss of such a figure. Furthermore, we have

---

[611] We can also see this when Statius compares himself to Erigone, whose laments for her father Icarius did not differ in kind from those of Andromache for her lost son Astynax (5.3.74-7). The fact that Statius is able to identify a model for his grief means that his isolation is not total. However, in the following lines, the poet makes clear that grief does not cause the same effects in all people. He reproaches Andromache for remarrying after the death of Hector instead of committing suicide as Erigone did (5.3.78-9). Statius' rebuke reminds the reader that the experience of grief cannot be generalized. In fact, Statius himself follows neither Erigone nor Andromache's example; he neither commits suicide nor replaces his father.

[612] Gibson believes that *cohors Heliconia* simply refers to the poets working in these genres (2006, 301n92). I suppose this is possible, although I cannot see why Statius rejects the clichés of the poets only to ask for them a few lines later. The Heliconian troop more usually associated with Apollo are the Muses.

observed that Statius calls attention to the cosmic ramifications of his father's demise, particularly as a result of his failure to put the world to rights after the confusion caused by the eruption of Vesuvius. Statius thus informs an audience that his father had been an important force in its universe, too. His loss, Statius implies, had an effect on the shared environment of thousands. I proposed that Statius' recourse to hyperbole in these sections and elsewhere in the panegyric might be said to transform his father into a sublime object; Longinus acknowledges that hyperbole may play a pivotal role in helping an audience to experience the sublime (*De sub.* 38).[613] If Statius could evoke in his audience a sense of wondrous admiration for his father, the knowledge of his demise could incude in them a sense of loss and disorientation not dissimilar to his own.[614] In this sense, the poem could simultaneously console the poet and arouse emotion in others, and it is for this reason that I suspect that Statius did intend to publish it. The lament demonstrates not only the desirability of Statius the Elder remaining a fixture in the world for his son, but for its other inhabitants.

[613] Statius and Longinus were near contemporaries, and I do not claim that Statius was influenced directly by Longinus' treatise. For the dating of the *De Sublimitate* see Day 2013, 12. However, a spate of recent work on the sublime in even earlier Roman poetry suggest that it is worth considering the aesthetic of the sublime as it developed broadly in the first centuries BCE and CE in the works of diverse authors (Day 2013; Most 2012; Hardie 2013).
[614] In fact, Longinus argues that the sublime object transports a reader outside of himself and leads him to identify with the author (*De sub.* 7.2). Henry Day comments: "the intensity of communication between author and reader leads practically to a fusion of the two" (2013, 38).

Afterword: Grief, Vulnerability, and Relations

Abruptis etiamnunc flebile venis/vulnus hiat magnaeque patet via lubrica plagae
Statius, *Silv.* 2.1.3-4

The image of the wound is ubiquitous in Statius' consolatory poems. The sudden absence of a former companion, whether of a wife, a father, or a favorite slave, plunges Statius and his addressees into agonizing grief. Their bodies are wounded and they are submerged in darkness. On more than one occasion Statius speaks of the impact of the loss of one beloved as a lightning strike (2.1.30, 5.5.50). Abascantus' heart is "thunderstruck" (*attonitus*) by the loss of Priscilla (5.1.29). In this compressed metaphor, Statius vividly conveys the sense of bodily shock and pain that accompanies loss. Though Statius' consolations are designed to heal, they simultaneously illustrate his addressees' vulnerability. Vulnerability is a consequence of the relational nature of the self. Erinn Gilson proposes that the self's mutual entanglement with other selves, objects, and environments leaves it dependent upon them and, therefore, vulnerable (2013, 132). Statius' consolations, I have argued, support her observation.

My study has demonstrated that the pain that Statius' mourners experience is the result of the severance of the bonds that had existed between themselves and the deceased. This is not to say that Statius depicts a homogenous set of connections; I have shown, for instance, that the bonds joining master and slave differ from those which yoke husband and wife. Though the loss of a favorite slave inflicts upon the master some of the same symptoms as the absence of a wife does a husband, the remedies that Statius proposes are not identical. Similarly, the methods of consolation appropriate for sons grieving their lost fathers in chapters 3 and 4 do not resemble one another in every respect. Both Statius and Etruscus seek solace in the hope of continued contact with their fathers, but Etruscus hopes to achieve this by re-incorporating his father into his house and the bosom of his family as the *dominus laris* and Statius by convincing himself of

his parent's proximity to the terrestrial realm. What the various bonds that Statius depicts have in common is that they involve what Eduardo Kohn has called a "becoming-us-in-relation." The boundaries and contours of each member in a relationship are defined, to a certain extent, by the other. A Glaucias or a Philetus extends his master's body and shapes his daily habits. Abascantus and Priscilla share a body. Etruscus' identity as a *pius* figure in large part depends on his orientation toward his father. Statius himself owed to his father his status as a poet. The work of Statian consolation is to restore the mourner to himself, whether by urging him to enter into a new relationship or to rekindle the old. As my analysis has demonstrated, Statius is willing to employ eclectic techniques in order to do so. The poet variously borrows Stoic ideas, draws upon religious experience, and makes use of Virgil's epic topography; Statius tailors his consolations to the particular needs of his addressees.

The poet's willingness to oblige his addresses in this fashion has often left him open to charges of sycophancy.[615] Statius certainly was not afraid to acknowledge his hope that the consolations he offers would endear him to the men (and woman) to whom he writes. As we have seen, he openly informed Abascantus that he wrote the *epicedion* for Priscilla as a result of his desire to cultivate *propiorem usum amicitiae*, "the closer benefit of your friendship" (5 *Praef.* 9-10). Likewise, Statius declared that the consolation for Ursus would be an *honorem* for him (2 *Praef.* 23). However, Statius' personal social ambitions did not prevent him from writing poems that contained real feeling. Often, Statius' motivations in writing were more complicated than the preceding comments suggest. Statius also tells Abascantus that he felt compelled to write on his behalf because Priscilla had been a dear friend of his wife (5 *Praef.* 4-5). And Statius claims to have loved Melior's favorite Glaucias (2 *Praef.* 7). Indeed, Statius attributes any faults in 2.1 to

[615] See Nisbet and Hubbard above, p. 2. For a more measured approach to Statius' attempts to win his patrons' favor see Newlands 2002, 32-35 and 2009, 231-4.

his haste in writing and his state of emotional disturbance in the wake of the boy's death: *et ceteris indico, ne quis asperiore lima carmen examinet et a confuso scriptum et dolenti datum, cum paene supervacua sint tarda solacia*, "and I point this [haste] out to others, lest anyone critique with a harsher file a poem written by one upset and given to one in mourning, since late solace is almost superfluous"(2 *Praef.* 10-13). As I noticed in the first chapter, Statius presents himself as Melior's companion in grief.

But Statius' comment raises another issue; it is a reminder that, as he says in a letter addressed simply to Melior, the poet courts the favor of a broader audience. In each chapter, I have tried to imagine what effect Statius' consolatory pieces would have on an audience who did not personally know the deceased, where they fit into the networks of relations under consideration. I have found that Statius wishes to justify the intensity of his addressees' grief and to allow them to recognize something of themselves in the various mourners by appeal to a common experience of loss. At times, I have suggested that Statius even wishes his readers to feel as though they themselves have lost something by the exit of the deceased from the world. This latter goal is implicit in the section from the preface to Book 2 quoted above. Statius warns his readers not to criticize his poem wielding a "harsh file" and asks them instead to recognize the immediacy and power of the emotions contained therein. Only poems written in the heat of the moment, he adds, may provide solace. In fact, Statius, Victoria Pagán observes, is "obsessed with time" in this preface (2010, 196). Elsewhere in it, the poet informs Melior that his poem about the death of the *leo mansuetus* had to be handed over to the emperor on the spot because *in amphitheatro prostratum frigidum erat…ni statim tradere,* "unless the [lion] prostrate in the amphitheater were handed over immediately, [the poem] would have fallen flat" ((2 *Praef.* 18-

19).[616] Of course, Statius is being somewhat disingenuous—if the poem conveyed no emotional impact after the elapse of time, the poet would presumably not have published it.[617]

Instead, Statius subtly advertises the opposite: the emotional impact that his short poem contains. The reader is promised a poem that preserves the emotion that the lion's death aroused in those who viewed the event (human and animal). As in other poems I have discussed, the reader may be meant to feel something of the emotion that those present did. Statius provides a vivid account of the lion's final moments, even comparing the struggling lion to a wounded gladiator (2.4.20-3), a sight with which his readers might have been familiar and which would have allowed them to visualize the lion's behavior and to be moved by his struggles. The reader would not, perhaps, feel the tame lion's loss so keenly as his fellow lions or even as the human spectators did, but his mental exposure to the beast's suffering might well result in a pang of sorrow. Statius often employs such vivid images of suffering to similar ends. For instance, Statius exhorts the audience to see how *lacrimis…et mea carmine in ipso/ora natant*, "my face swims with tears in the middle of singing" (2.1.17). He invites readers to form a mental image of his tear-stained face, to transport themselves into the poet's world, to observe his grief, and perhaps to shed a tear themselves. In this respect, comparison with nineteenth century sentimental fiction is illuminating. Karen Sánchez-Eppler has spoken of the process of reading sentimental novels as a "physical" one. She sees the purpose of such works is to "translate words into heartbeats and sobs." Tears, in particular, Sánchez-Eppler writes, "designate a border realm between the story and its readings, since the tears shed by characters initiate an answering moistness in the reader's eye" (1993, 26-7). Statius' recourse to such vivid imagery is evidence that he imagined that reading his consolatory work might be an equally "physical" process.

[616] I here produce Shacklteon Bailey's translation (2015) with some modification.
[617] Augoustakis 2007, 221 makes a similar claim. See Newlands 2009, 235-7 for an assessment of the veracity of Statius' self-deprecatory claims.

Jennifer Devereaux has proposed that the logic behind ancient rhetoricians' valorization of *enargeia* as a technique stems from bodily experience: "when we 'merely' imagine a visual scene, we to some degree activate the same cortical visual areas of our brain active during perception" (2016, 243). In other words, the act of listening to or reading vivid description may result in physiological reactions similar to those that physically observing the scene described would experience. In reading Statian consolation, readers might come to feel sympathy with the mourner.

This is not to say that what a reader feels is always the *same* as the mourning addressees themselves. The example of Etruscus demonstrates that, while spectators might recognize a universal pattern of suffering in his, some grief ought to remain a family matter. In the final poem of the collection, Statius even warns against becoming too emotionally invested in the losses of other people. He recalls that someone once rebuked him for such behavior: *qui damna doles aliena, repone/infelix lacrimas et tristia carmina serva*, "you who feel sorrow over external losses, misguided one, put back your tears and save your sad songs" (5.5.47-48).[618] Gibson suggests that *repono* in this context means "store away for later use" (2006, 413n48). The poet admits that the advice he received was good; having expended his *tristia carmina* for others, he lacks the words to express his own bereavement (5.5.49-50). These lines, however, implicitly warn the audience of their susceptibility to grief. What Statius' consolations do, in the end, is remind readers of human vulnerability and subtly point to the possibility of their own bereavements. In one sense, then, the consolations have opposite aims for the primary addressee and for a general readership. Statius attempts to mitigate the suffering of the one and to prepare the other to experience grief. However, like Senecan or Ciceronian consolation, Statius'

[618] The lines immediately preceding these are quite uncertain, and the identity of the person who reproaches Statius is lost to us. The precise meaning of *infelix* is not clear. I accept Gibson's proposal that it refers the fact that Statius was "misguided...in seeking to console others when he would be faced by his own bereavements" (2006, 413n48).

consolatory material has a didactic element. Statius not only reminds his readers that they are vulnerable, but provides them with strategies to alleviate their own grief. It is not only an Etruscus or a Melior who might benefit from Statius' soothing wisdom. Statius provides readers with methods for coping with different kinds of loss that they might experience over the course of their lives.

Bibliography

Abruzzo, Margaret Nicola. 2011. *Polemical Pain: Slavery, Cruelty, and the Rise of Humanitarianism*. New Studies in American Intellectual and Cultural History. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Alaimo, Stacy. 2010. *Bodily Natures: Science, Environment, and the Material Self.* Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Algra, Keimpe. 2003. "The Mechanism of Social Appropriation and Its Role in Hellenistic Ethics." *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* 25, edited by David Sedley, 115–30. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Alston, Richard and Efrossini Spentzou. 2011. *Reflections of Romanity: Discourses of Subjectivity in Imperial Rome.* Columbus: Ohio State University Press.

Ambühl, Annemarie. 2010. "Sleepless Orpheus: Insomnia, Love, Death and Poetry from Antiquity to Contemporary Fiction." In *Sub Imagine Somni: Nighttime Phenomena in Greco-Roman Culture*, edited by Emma Scioli and Christine Walde, 259-284. Pisa: Edizioni ETS.

Ando, Clifford. 2008. *The Matter of the Gods: Religion and the Roman Empire*. Berkeley: Univ of California Press.

---------. 2002. "Vergil's Italy: Ethnography and Politics in First-Century Rome." In *Clio and the Poets: Augustan Poetry and the Traditions of Ancient Historiography*, edited by David Levene and Damien Nelis, 123–142. Leiden: Brill.

André, Jacques. 1991. *Le vocabulaire latin de l'anatomie.* Collection d'études anciennes ; 59. Paris: Belles Lettres.

Angelova, Diliana. 2015. *Sacred Founders: Women, Men, and Gods in the Discourse of Imperial Founding, Rome through Early Byzantine*. Oakland: University of California Press.

Antonaccio, Carla M. 1994."Contesting the Past: Hero Cult, Tomb Cult, and Epic in Early Greece." *American Journal of Archaeology*: 389-410.

Argetsinger, Kathryn. 1992. "Birthday Rituals: Friends and Patrons in Roman Poetry and Cult." *Classical Antiquity* 11 (2): 175–93.

Armisen-Marchetti, Mireille. 1989. *Sapientiae facies: étude sur les images de Sénèque*. Collection d'études anciennes ; 58. Paris: Belles Lettres.

Asmis, Elizabeth. 2009. "Seneca on Fortune and the Kingdom of God." In *Seneca and the Self*,

edited by Shadi Bartsch and David Wray, 115-38. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

----------. 2008. “Cicero on Natural Law and the Laws of the State.” *Classical Antiquity* 27 (1): 1–33.

Asso, Paolo. 2010. “Queer Consolation: Melior’s Dead Boy in Statius’ Silvae 2.1.” *American Journal of Philology* 131 (4): 663–97.

Atkins, E. M. 1990. “‘Domina et Regina Virtutum’: Justice and Societas in ‘De Officiis.’” *Phronesis* 35 (3): 258–89.

Augoustakis, Antony. 2016. *Statius, Thebaid 8: Edited with an Introduction, Translation, and Commentary*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

---------. 2010. *Motherhood and the Other: Fashioning Female Power in Flavian Epic.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

---------. 2008 “An Insomniac’s Lament: The End of Poetic Power in Statius’ *Silvae* 5.4.” In *Studies in Latin Literature and Roman History* 14, edited by Carl Deroux, 339- 447. Bruxelles: Latomus.

---------. 2007. “Unius Amissi Leonis: Taming the Lion and Caesar’s Tears (Silvae 2.5).” *Arethusa* 40 (2): 207–21.

Austin, R.G., ed. 1977. *Vergil: Aeneid VI. Edited with an Introduction and Commentary.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Baleriaux, Julie. 2016. “Diving Underground: Giving Meaning to Subterranean Rivers.” In *Valuing Landscape in Classical Antiquity: Natural Environment and Cultural Imagination,* edited by Jeremy McInerney and Ineke Sluiter, 103-21. Leiden: Brill.

Barad, Karen. 2010. “Quantum Entanglements and Hauntological Relations of Inheritance: Dis/Continuities, SpaceTime Enfoldings, and Justice-to-Come.” *Derrida Today* 3 (2): 240–68.

---------. 2008. “Posthuman Performativity: Toward an Understanding of How Matter Comes to Matter.” In *Material Feminisms*, edited by Stacy Alaimo and Susan Hekman, 120-54. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

---------. 2007. *Meeting the Universe Halfway: Quantum Physics and the Entanglement of Matter and Meaning*. Durham: Duke University Press.

Barchiesi, Alessandro. 1996. “Poetry, Praise, and Patronage: Simonides in Book 4 of Horace’s Odes.” *Classical Antiquity* 15: 5-47.

Barnes, Elizabeth. 1996. “Affecting Relations: Pedagogy, Patriarchy, and the Politics of Sympathy.” *American Literary History* 8 (4): 597–614.

Bartsch, Shadi. 2015. *Persius: A Study in Food, Philosophy, and the Figural*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

---------. 2006. *The Mirror of the Self: Sexuality, Self-Knowledge, and the Gaze in the Early Roman Empire*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Baughman, Karl E. 2015. “Poppaea Sabina, Jewish Sympathies, and the Fire of Rome.” *Women in Judaism: A Multidisciplinary Journal* 11(2): 1-18.

Beagon, Mary. 1992. *Roman Nature : The Thought of Pliny the Elder*. Oxford Classical Monographs. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Beard, Mary. 1994. "The Roman and the Foreign: The Cult of the ‘Great Mother’ in Imperial Rome." In *Shamanism, History, and the State*, edited by Nicholas Thomas and Caroline Humphrey, 164-90. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Beard, Mary, John North, and Simon Price. 1998. *Religions of Rome: A History*. Vol. 1. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Belk, Russell W. 1988. “Possessions and the Extended Self.” *Journal of Consumer Research* 15 (2): 139–68.

Berry, Daina Ramey. 2007. *“Swing the Sickle for the Harvest Is Ripe”: Gender and Slavery in Antebellum Georgia*. University of Illinois Press.

Bessone, Federica. 2013. “Religion and Power in the *Thebaid*.” In *Religion and Ritual in Flavian Epic*, edited by Antony Augoustakis, 145-62. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

----------. 2011. *La Tebaide di Stazio : epica e potere*. Biblioteca di “Materiali e Discussioni per l’Analisi dei Testi Classici” ; 24. Pisa: FSerra.

----------. 2009. “Clementia e Philanithrōpia. Atene e Roma nel Finale della Tebaide.” *Materiali e Discussioni per L’Analisi dei Testi Classici* 62: 179–214.

Berdowski, Piotr. 2014.“Pietas erga Patriam: Ideology and Politics in Rome in the Early First Century BC. The Evidence from Coins and *Glandes Inscriptae.*” In *Within the Circle of Ancient Ideas and Virtues. Studies in Honour of Professor Maria Dzielska,* edited by Kamilla Twardowska, 143-59. Krakow: Historia lagellonica.

Bernstein, Neil W. 2009. “Adoptees and Exposed Children in Roman Declamation: Commodification, Luxury, and the Threat of Violence.” *Classical Philology* 104 (3): 331–53.

---------.2008. *In the Image of the Ancestors: Narratives of Kinship in Flavian Epic*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

----------. 2005. “Mourning the Puer Delicatus : Status Inconsistency and the Ethical Value of Fostering in Statius, Silvae 2.1.” *American Journal of Philology* 126 (2): 257–80.

Bergmann, Marianne. 1998. *Die Strahlen der Herrscher: theomorphes Herrscherbild und politische Symbolik im Hellenismus und in der römischen Kaiserzeit*. Darmstadt: Verlag Philipp von Zabern.

Bettini, Maurizio. 2011. *Le portrait de l’amant(e),* translated by Geneviève Bouffartigue. Antiquité au présent. Paris: Belin.

---------. 2009. *Affari di famiglia: La parentela nella letteratura e nella cultura antica.* Bologna: Il Mulino.

Bignamini, Ilaria, and Amanda Claridge. 1998. “The Tomb of Claudia Semne and Excavations in Eighteenth-Century Rome.” *Papers of the British School at Rome* 66: 215–44.

Biondi, Giuseppe. 1984. *Il Nefas Argonautico- Mythos e Logos nella Medea di Seneca.* Bologna: Pàtron.

Blake, Sarah. 2016. “In Manus: Pliny’s Letters and the Arts of Mastery.” In *Roman Literary Cultures: Domestic Politics, Revolutionary Poetics, Civic Spectacle*, edited by Alison Keith and Jonathan Edmondson, 89-108. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

----------. 2012. “Now You See Them: Slaves and Other Objects as Elements of the Roman Master.” *Helios* 39 (2): 193–211.

Bliquez, Lawrence J. 1996. “Prosthetics in Classical Antiquity: Greek, Etruscan, and Roman Prosthetics.” *Aufstieg und Niedergang der Römischer Welt* 2.37.3: 2640-2676.

----------. 1983. “Classical Prosthetics.” *Archaeology* 36 (5): 25–29.

Blundell, Mary Whitlock. 1990. “Parental Nature and Stoic Οἰχείωσις.” *Ancient Philosophy* 10 (2): 221–42.

Bobzien, Suzanne. 1998. *Freedom and Determinism in Stoic Philosophy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Bodel, John. 2008. “Cicero’s Minerva, Penates, and the Mother of the Lares: An Outline of Roman Domestic Religion.” In *Household and Family Religion in Antiquity*, edited by John Bodel and Saul Olyan, 248–75. Hoboken: Wiley- Blackwell.

---------. 1994. *Graveyards and Groves: A Study of the Lex Lucerina. American Journal of Ancient History* 11.

Boggs, Colleen Glenney. 2013. *Animalia Americana: Animal Representations and Biopolitical Subjectivity*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Bonadeo, Alessia. 2012. "*Martem ... aequare canendo* (Stat. *silv.* 5, 3, 11): Divagazioni sulla Concezione della Poesia nelle *Silvae.*" *Materiali e Discussioni per L'Analisi dei Testi Classici* 68: 111-51.

Bonjour, Madeleine. 1975. *Terre natale : études sur une composante affective du patriotisme romain.* Collection d'études anciennes. Paris: Belles lettres.

Boyce, George K. 1942. "Significance of the Serpents on Pompeian House Shrines." *American Journal of Archaeology* 46 (1): 13–22.

Boyle, A.J. 2014. *Seneca: Medea*. First edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Boys-Stones, George. 2007. "Physiognomy and Ancient Psychological Theory." In *Seeing the Face, Seeing the Soul: Polemon's Physiognomy from Classical Antiquity to Medieval Islam*, edited by Simon Swain, 19–124. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Bradley, Keith. 2000. "Animalizing the Slave: The Truth of Fiction." *The Journal of Roman Studies* 90 (November): 110–25.

----------. 1994. *Slavery and Society at Rome*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

----------. 1984. *Slaves and Masters in the Roman Empire: A Study in Social Control*. Bruxelles: Editions Latomus.

Braund, Susanna. 2009. *Seneca: De Clementia: Edited with Translation and Commentary*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

---------. 1997. "Ending Epic: Statius, Theseus, Monsters, and a Merciful Release."*Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society* 42: 1-23.

Bremmer, Jan. 2009. "The Golden Bough: Orphic, Eleusinian, and Hellenistic-Jewish Sources of Virgil's Underworld in Aeneid VI." *Kernos. Revue Internationale et Pluridisciplinaire de Religion Grecque Antique*, no. 22(January): 183–208.

----------. 1998. '"Religion,' 'Ritual' and the Opposition 'Sacred vs. Profane': Notes Toward a Terminologlical 'Genealogy."' In *Ansichten griechischer Rituale: Geburtstags-Symposium für Walter Burkert,* edited by Fritz Graf, 9-32. Leipzig: Teubner.

Brenk, Frederick E. 1999. *Clothed in Purple Light: Studies in Vergil and in Latin Literature, Including Aspects of Philosophy, Religion, Magic, Judaism, and the New Testament Background*. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag.

--------. 1984. “Vnum pro Multis Caput : Myth, History, and Symbolic Imagery in Vergil’s Palinurus Incident.” *Latomus* 43 (4): 776–801.

Brown, Gillian. 1990. *Domestic Individualism: Imagining Self in Nineteenth-Century America.* The New Historicism ; 14. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Brown, Laura. 2010. *Homeless Dogs and Melancholy Apes: Humans and Other Animals in the Modern Literary Imagination*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Brunt, P. A. 1973. “Aspects of the Social Thought of Dio Chrysostom and of the Stoics.” *The Cambridge Classical Journal (New Series)* 19 (January): 9–34.

Bryant, Levi R. 2014. *Onto-Cartography: An Ontology of Machines and Media*. Speculative Realism. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.

Buccheri, Alessandro. 2016. “The Metaphorical Structuring of Kinship in Latin.” In *Embodiment in Latin Semantics*, edited by William Short, 141-76. Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing Company.

Buller, J. L. 1981. “The Pathetic Fallacy in Hellenistic Pastoral.” *Ramus* 10 (01): 35–52.

Burgess, John F. 1972. “Statius’ Altar of Mercy.” *The Classical Quarterly* 22 (2): 339–49.

Burnard, Trevor. 2004. *Mastery, Tyranny, and Desire: Thomas Thistlewood and His Slaves in the Anglo-Jamaican World*. Univ of North Carolina Press.

Busch, Austin. 2013. “Pederasty and Flavian Family Values in Statius, Siluae 2.1.” *Classical World* 107 (1): 63–97.

Bussels, Stijn. 2013. *Animated Image : Roman Theory on Naturalism, Vividness and Divine Power*. Munchen, DEU: Akademie Verlag.

Butrica, James L. 2005. “Some Myths and Anomalies in the Study of Roman Sexuality.” *Journal of Homosexuality* 49 (3/4): 209–69.

Buxton, Richard. 2016. “Mount Etna in the Greco-Roman *imaginaire:* Cultural and Liquid Fire.” In *Valuing Landscape in Classical Antiquity: Natural Environment and Cultural Imagination,* edited by Jeremy McInerney and Ineke Sluiter, 25-45. Leiden: Brill.

---------. 2009. *Forms of Astonishment: Greek Myths of Metamorphosis*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Cairns, Douglas. 2016. “Mind, Body, and Metaphor in Ancient Greek Concepts of Emotion.” *L’Atelier du Centre de recherches historiques* 16: 2-18.

Cantarella, Eva. 2002. *Bisexuality in the Ancient World*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Carradice, Ian A. 1979. “The Banishment of the Father of Claudius Etruscus: Numismatic Evidence.” *Liverpool Classical Monthly* 4: 101–3.

Casagrande-Kim, Roberta. 2012. “The Journey to the Underworld: Topography, Landscape, and Divine Inhabitants of the Roman Hades.” PhD diss. Columbia University.

Castiglia, Christopher. 2002. “Abolition’s Racial Interiors and the Making of White Civic Depth.” *American Literary History* 14 (1): 33–59.

Cataldi, Sue L. 1993. *Emotion, Depth, and Flesh: A Study of Sensitive Space: Reflections on Merleau-Ponty’s Philosophy of Embodiment*. Albany: SUNY Press.

Chambert, Régine. 2005. *Rome, le mouvement et l’ancrage: morale et philosophie du voyage au début du Principat*. Bruxelles: Editions Latomus.

Champlin, Edward. 2011. “Tiberius and the Heavenly Twins.” *The Journal of Roman Studies* 101 (November): 73–99.

Charles, David. 2011. “Desire in Action: Aristotle’s Move.” In *Moral Psychology and Human Action in Aristotle*, edited by Michael Pakaluk and Giles Pearson, 75–94. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Chaudhuri, Pramit. 2014. *The War with God: Theomachy in Roman Imperial Poetry*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Chaumartin, François-Régis. 1996. “La nature dans les *Questions naturelles* de Sénèque.” In *Le concept de nature à Rome: La physique*, edited by Carlos Levy, 177-90. Paris: Presses de l’École Normale Supérieure.

Chinn, Christopher. 2016. “The Ecological Highway: Environmental Ekphrasis in Statius *Silvae* 4.3.” In *Ecocriticism, Ecology, and the Cultures of Antiquity*, edited by Christopher Schliephake, 113-130. Lanham: Lexington Books.

Chrétien, Jean-Louis. 2004. *The Call and the Response*. New York: Fordham University Press.

Claassen, Jo-Marie. 1996. “Exile, Death and Immortality: Voices from the Grave.” *Latomus* 55 (Fasc. 3): 571–90.

Clark, Raymond J. 2003. “The Cerberus-Like Function of the Gorgons in Virgil’s Underworld (Aen. 6.273-94).” *The Classical Quarterly* 53 (1): 308–9.

---------. 1996. “The Avernian Sibyl’s Cave: From Military Tunnel to Mediaeval Spa.” *Classica et Mediaevalia* 47: 217-43.

---------. 1979. *Catabasis: Vergil and the Wisdom-Tradition*. Amsterdam: Grüner.

---------. 1975. “The ‘Wheel’; and Vergil’s Eschatology in Aeneid Book 6.” *Symbolae Osloenses* 50: 121-41.

Clarke, Katherine. 1999. *Between Geography and History : Hellenistic Constructions of the Roman World.* Oxford Classical Monographs. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Clay, Diskin. 2004. *Archilochos Heros: The Cult of Poets in the Greek Polis*. Washington: Center for Hellenic Studies, Trustees for Harvard University.

--------. 1998. *Paradosis and Survival: Three Chapters in the History of Epicurean Philosophy*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Clements, Ashley. 2015. “Divine Scents and Presence.” In *Smell and the Ancient Senses,* edited by Mark Bradley, 46-59. New York: Routledge.

Coffee, Neil. 2015. “Gift and Society in the Works of Statius.” In *Brill’s Companion to Statius*, edited by William Dominik, Carole Newlands, and Kyle Gervais, 106-122. Leiden: Brill.

Cole, Spencer. 2013. *Cicero and the Rise of Deification at Rome*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Coleman, Kathleen M., ed. 1988. *Silvae IV*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Connolly, Brian. 2014. *Domestic Intimacies: Incest and the Liberal Subject in Nineteenth-Century America*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.

Connors, Catherine. 2015. “In the Land of the Giants: Greek and Roman Discourses on Vesuvius and the Phlegraean Fields.” *Illinois Classical Studies* 40 (1): 121–37.

Copley, Frank Olin. 1947. “Servitium Amoris in the Roman Elegists.” *Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association* 78: 285–300.

Counts, Derek B. 1996. "Regum externorum consuetudine: The Nature and Function of Embalming in Rome." *Classical Antiquity*: 189-202.

Courtney, Edward, ed. 1990. *P. Papini Stati Silvae.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Crowther, N. B. 1979. “Water and Wine as Symbols of Inspiration.” *Mnemosyne* 32 (1/2): 1–11.

Currie, Bruno. 2005. *Pindar and the Cult of Heroes*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Curtius, E.R. 1953. *European Literature and the Latin Middle Ages*, translated by W. R. Trask. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

D’Ambra, Eve. 1996. “The Calculus of Venus: Nude Portraits of Roman Matrons.” In *Sexuality*

in Ancient Art: Near East, Egypt, Greece, and Italy, edited by Natalie Kampen, 213–32. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Davies, Jason P. 2004. *Rome's Religious History: Livy, Tacitus and Ammianus on Their Gods*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Day, Henry. 2013. *Lucan and the Sublime: Power, Representation and Aesthetic Experience*. Cambridge Classical Studies. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Degl'Innocenti Pierini, Rita. 1990. *Tra Ovidio e Seneca.* Edizioni e saggi universitari di filologia classica; 44. Bologna : Pàtron.

Delarue, Fernand. 2000. *Stace, poète épique : originalité et cohérence*. Bibliothèque d'études classiques ; 20. Louvain: Editions Peeters.

Demand, Nancy. 1998. "Women and Slaves as Hippocratic Patients." In *Women and Slaves in Greco-Roman Culture: Differential Equations*, edited by SJ Joshel and S. Murnaghan, 69–84.

Dench, Emma. 2005. *Romulus' Asylum: Roman Identities from the Age of Alexander to the Age of Hadrian*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Devereaux, Jennifer J. 2016. "Embodied Historiography: Models for Reasoning in Tacitus's *Annales*." In *Embodiment in Latin Semantics*, edited by William Short, 237-268. Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing Company.

Dietrich, Jessica S. 2002. "Dead Parrots Society." *American Journal of Philology* 123 (1): 95–110.

Dixon, Suzanne. 1991. "The Sentimental Ideal of the Roman Family." In *Marriage, Divorce, and Children in Ancient Rome*, 99–113. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Dominik, William. 2016. "Epigram and Occasional Poetry: Social Life and Values in Martial's Epigrams and Statius' Silvae." In *A Companion to the Flavian Age of Imperial Rome*, edited by Andrew Zissos, 412-433. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell.

Donalson, Malcolm Drew. 2003. *The Cult of Isis in the Roman Empire: Isis Invicta*. Lewiston: Edwin Mellen Press.

Donovan, Josephine. 1995. "A Source for Stowe's Ideas on Race in 'Uncle Tom's Cabin.'" *NWSA Journal* 7 (3): 24–34.

Dow, Jamie. 2015. *Passions and Persuasion in Aristotle's Rhetoric*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Dragona-Monachou, Myrto. 1976. *The Stoic Arguments for the Existence and the Providence of*

the Gods. Athens: National and Capodistrian University of Athens, Faculty of Arts.

Dressler, Alex. 2016. *Personification and the Feminine in Roman Philosophy.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

---------. 2012. "'You Must Change Your Life': Theory and Practice, Metaphor and Exemplum, in Seneca's Prose." *Helios* 39 (2): 145–92.

Dupont, Florence. 1986. "L'autre corps de l'empereur-dieu." In *Le temps de la reflexion: Corps des dieux*, edited by Charles Malamoud and Jean-Pierre Vernant, 231-252. Paris: Gallimard.

Dupraz, Emmanuel. 2002. "La représentation du volcanisme dans les *Naturales Quaestiones* de Séneque." In *Connaissance et représentations des volcans dans l'Antiquité*, edited by Éric Foulon, 231-58. Clermont-Ferrand: Presses Universitaires Blaise Pascal.

Eckerman, Christopher. 2013. "The Landscape and Heritage of Pindar's Olympia." *Classical World* 107, no. 1 3-33.

Edmonds III, Radcliffe. 2015. "Imagining the Afterlife." In *The Oxford Handbook of Ancient Greek Religion,* edited by Esther Eidinow and Julia Kindt, 551-564. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Edwards, Catharine. 2007. *Death in Ancient Rome*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

--------. 1996. *Writing Rome: Textual Approaches to the City*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Edwards, M. J. 1990. "Treading the Aether: Lucretius, De Rerum Natura 1.62-79." *The Classical Quarterly* 40 (2): 465–69.

Egelhaaf-Gaiser, Ulrike. 2016. "Giving the Gift of Eternity or: The Medium is the Message in Statius' *Silvae* 3.3." *Religion in the Roman Empire* 2.1: 38-71.

Engberg-Pederson, Troels. 1990. *The Stoic Theory of Oikeiosis: Moral Development and Social Interaction in Early Stoic Philosophy.* Aarhaus: Aarhaus University Press.

Erasmo, Mario. 2008. *Reading Death in Ancient Rome*. Columbus: The Ohio State University Press.

Esteve-Forriol, José. 1962. *Die Trauer- und Trostgedichte in der römischen Literatur, untersucht nach ihrer Topik und ihrem Motivschatz.* PhD diss. Munich.

Estienne, Sylvia. 2010. "Simulacra Deorum versus Ornamenta Aedium: The Status of Divine Images in the Temples of Rome." In *Divine Images and Human Imaginations in Ancient Greece and Rome*, edited by Joannis Mylonopolous, 257-71. Leiden: Brill.

Evans, Elizabeth C. 1969. “Physiognomics in the Ancient World.” *Transactions of the American Philosophical Society*, New Series, 59 (5): 1–101.

Fantham, Elaine. 2006. “Dialogues of Displacement: Seneca’s Consolations to Helvia and Polybius.” In *Writing Exile: The Discourse of Displacement in Greco-Roman Antiquity and Beyond*, edited by Jan Felix Gaertner, 173–92.

---------. 1999. “‘Chironis Exemplum’: On Teachers and Surrogate Fathers in Achilleid and Silvae.” *Hermathena*, no. 167 (December): 59–70.

---------. ed. 1998. *Fasti IV*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

---------. 1992. “The Role of Evander in Ovid’s‘ Fasti.’” *Arethusa* 25 (1): 155-71.

Farrell, Joseph. 2014. “Philosophy in Virgil.” In *The Philosophizing Muse: The Influence of Greek Philosophy on Roman Poetry*, edited by Myrto Garani and David Konstan, 61-90. *Pierides*: Studies in Greek and Latin Literature 3. Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing.

Fedriani, Chiara. 2016. “Ontological and Orientational Metaphors in Latin: Evidence from the Semantics of Feelings and Emotions.” In *Embodiment in Latin Semantics*, edited by William Short, 115-140. Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing Company.

Feeney, Denis. 2013. “Catullus 61: Epithalamium and Comparison.” *The Cambridge Classical Journal* 59: 70–97.

--------. 2007. *Caesar’s Calendar: Ancient Time and the Beginnings of History*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

--------. 2004. “Interpreting Sacrificial Ritual in Roman Poetry: Disciplines and their Models.” In *Rituals in Ink: A Conference on Religion and Literary Production in Ancient Rome Held at Stanford University in 2002,* edited by Alessandro Barchiesi, Jörg Rüpke, and Susan Stephens, 1-22. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag.

--------. 1998. *Literature and Religion at Rome: Cultures, Contexts, and Beliefs.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

--------. 1992. “Shall I compare thee…? Catullus 68B and the Limits of Analogy.” In *Author and Audience in Latin Literature*, edited by Tony Woodman and Jonathan Powell, 33-45. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

--------. 1991. *The Gods in Epic: Poets and Critics of the Classical Tradition*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

--------. 1986. “History and Revelation in Vergil’s Underworld.” *The Cambridge*

Classical Journal (New Series) 32 (January): 1–24.

Finley, Moses. 1980. *Ancient Slavery and Modern Ideology.* New York: Penguin.

Fishwick, Duncan. 1990. "Votive Offerings to the Emperor?" *Zeitschrift Für Papyrologie Und Epigraphik* 80: 121–30.

---------. 1978. The Development of Provincial Ruler Worship in the Western Roman Empire. *Aufstieg und Niedergang der Römischer Welt* 2.16.2: 1201–1253.

---------. 1966. "The Cannophori and the March Festival of Magna Mater." *Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association* 97: 193–202.

Fitzgerald, William. 2000. *Slavery and the Roman Literary Imagination*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Fletcher, Kristopher. 2014. *Finding Italy: Travel, Colonization, and Nation in Vergil's Aeneid*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

---------. 2006. "Vergil's Italian Diomedes." *American Journal of Philology* 127 (2): 219–259.

Flower, Harriet. 2015. "Sulla's Memoirs as an Account of Personal Religious Experience." *Religion in the Roman Empire* 1(3): 297-320.

---------. 1999. *Ancestor Masks and Aristocratic Power in Roman Culture*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Ford, Lacy K. 2009. *Deliver Us from Evil: The Slavery Question in the Old South*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Forman-Barzilai, Fonna. 2010. *Adam Smith and the Circles of Sympathy : Cosmopolitanism and Moral Theory.* Ideas in Context ; 96. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Foucault, Michel. 1988. *The History of Sexuality Vol. 3: The Care of the Self,* translated by Robert Hurley. New York: Random House.

Fowler, Peta G. 2007. "Review: Volcanoes and Their Cultural Effects in Antiquity." *The Classical Review* 57 (2): 508–12.

Francis, James A. 2003. "Living Icons: Tracing a Motif in Verbal and Visual Representation from the Second to Fourth Centuries C.E." *The American Journal of Philology* 124 (4): 575–600.

Fratantuono, Lee M., and R. Alden Smith. 2015. *Virgil, Aeneid 5: Text, Translation and Commentary*. Leiden: Brill.

Fredborg, Karin Margareta, ed. 1988. *The Latin Rhetorical Commentaries by Thierry of Chartres.* Studies and texts (Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies) ; 84. Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies.

Frede, Dorothea. 2003. "Stoic Determinism." In *The Cambridge Companion to the Stoics*, edited by Brad Inwood, 179–205. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

---------. 2002. "Theodicy and Providential Care in Stoicism." *Traditions of Theology: Studies in Hellenistic Theology, Its Background and Aftermath*, edited by Dorothea Frede and Andre Laks. Leiden: Brill, 85–117.

Fröhlich, Thomas. 1991. *Lararien-Und Fassadenbilder in Den Vesuvstädten: Untersuchungen Zur'volkstümlichen'pompejanischen Malerei*. Mitteilungen Des Deutschen Archaeologischen Instituts, Roemische Abteilung: Ergänzungsheft Vol. 32. Mainz: Verlag Philipp von Zabern.

Gaertner, Jan Felix. 2005. *Epistulae Ex Ponto, Book 1*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Gale, Monica. 2000. *Virgil on the Nature of Things: The Georgics, Lucretius, and the Didactic Tradition.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Galinsky, G. Karl. 1969. *Aeneas, Sicily, and Rome*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

----------. 1968. "Aeneid V and the Aeneid." *The American Journal of Philology* 89 (2): 157–85.

Gallagher, Robert L. 2001. "Metaphor in Cicero's *De Re Publica*." *The Classical Quarterly (New Series)* 51 (02): 509–19.

Ganiban, Randall T. 2007. *Statius and Virgil: The Thebaid and the Reinterpretation of the Aeneid*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Garani, Myrto. 2007. *Empedocles Redivivus: Poetry and Analogy in Lucretius*. Studies in Classics. New York: Routledge.

Garnsey, Peter. 1996. *Ideas of Slavery from Aristotle to Augustine*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Gauly, B.M. 2004. *Senecas Naturales Quaestiones: Naturphilosophie für die römische Kaiserzeit*. *Zetemata* 122. Munich: Verlag C.H. Beck.

Gee, Emma. 2000. *Ovid, Aratus and Augustus: Astronomy in Ovid's* Fasti. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Gee, Regina. 2008. "From Corpse to Ancestor: The Role of Tombside Dining in the Transformation of the Body in Ancient Rome." In *The Materiality of Death: Bodies,*

Burials, Beliefs, edited by Fredrik Fahlander and Terje Oestigaard, 59-68. Oxford: BAR.

Gell, Alfred. 1998. *Art and Agency: An Anthropological Theory*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

---------. 1992. "The Technology of Enchantment and the Enchantment of Technology." In *Anthropology, Art and Aesthetics,* edited by Jeremy Coote and Anthony Shelton, 40-66. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Genovese, Eugene D. 1991. "'Our Family, White and Black': Family and Household in the Southern Slaveholders' World View." In *In Joy and Sorrow: Women, Family, and Marriage in the Victorian South 1830-1900*, 69–87. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

---------. 1976. *Roll Jordan Roll: The World the Slaves Made.* Vintage Books. New York: Random House.

Genovese, Eugene D. and Elizabeth Fox-Genovese. 2011. *Fatal Self-Deception: Slaveholding Paternalism in the Old South*. Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press.

George, Michele. 2002. "Slave Disguise in Ancient Rome." *Slavery & Abolition* 23 (2): 41–54.

Geyssen, John W. 1996. *Imperial Panegyric in Statius: A Literary Commentary on "Silvae" 1.1*. New York: Peter Lang Publishing.

Gibbs, Jr., Raymond. 2005. *Embodiment and Cognitive Science*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Gibson, Bruce. 2013. "Hymnic Features in Statian Epic and the Silvae." In *Ritual and Religion in Flavian Epic,* edited by Antony Augoustakis, 127-44. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

---------. 2006. *Statius, Silvae 5*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

---------.1996. "Statius and Insomnia: Allusion and Meaning in *Silvae* 5.4." *The Classical Quarterly* 46 (2): 457–68.

Gill, Christopher. 2006. *The Structured Self in Hellenistic and Roman Thought*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Gilson, Erinn. 2013. *The Ethics of Vulnerability: A Feminist Analysis of Social Life and Practice.* New York: Routledge.

Glauthier, Patrick. 2011. "Census and Commercium: Two Economic Metaphors in Manilius." In *Forgotten Stars: Rediscovering Manilius' Astronomica,* edited by Steven Green and

Katharina Volk, 188-202. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Gloyn, Elizabeth. 2014. “Show Me the Way to Go Home: A Reconsideration of Seneca’s De Consolatione Ad Polybium.” *American Journal of Philology* 135 (3): 451–80.

---------. 2011. “The Ethics of the Family in Seneca.” PhD Diss. Rutgers University.

Goldner, Rebecca Steiner. 2011. “Touch and Flesh in Aristotle’s de Anima.” *Epoché* 15: 435–46.

Gordon, Richard 1979. “The Real and the Imaginary: Production and Religion in the Graeco-Roman World.” *Art History* 2 (1): 5–34.

Görgemanns, Herwig. 1983. “Oikeiosis in Arius Didymus.” In *On Stoic and Peripatetic Ethics: The Work of Arius Didymus*, edited by William Fortenbaugh.165–89. New Brunswick NJ: Transaction Books.

Gowers, Emily. 2011. “Trees and Family Trees in the *Aeneid*.” *Classical Antiquity* 30 (1): 87–118.

--------. 2005a. “Talking Trees: Philemon and Baucis Revisited.” *Arethusa* 38 (3): 331–65.

--------. 2005b. “Virgil’s Sibyl and the ‘Many Mouths’ Cliché (Aen. 6.625–7).” *The Classical Quarterly (New Series)* 55 (1): 170–182.

Gradel, Ittai. 2002. *Emperor Worship and Roman Religion*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Graham, Emma-Jayne. 2015. “Corporeal Concerns: The Role of the Body in the Transformation of Roman Mortuary Practices.” In *Death Embodied: Archaeological Approaches to the Treatment of the Corpse*, edited by Zoë Devlin and Emma-Jayne Graham, 41-62. Oxford: Oxbow Books.

---------. 2011. “Memory and Materiality: Embodying the Roman Funeral.” In *Memory and Mourning: Studies on Roman Death,* edited by Valerie Hope and Janet Huskinson, 21-39. Oxford: Oxbow Books.

---------. 2004. “The Quick and the Dead in the Extra-Urban Landscape: The Roman Cemetery at Ostia/Portus as a Lived Environment.” In *Proceedings of the Fourteenth Annual Theoretical Roman Archaeology Conference*, 133–43. TRAC 2004. Oxford: Oxbow Books.

Griffin, Miriam. 2003. “Clementia after Caesar: From Politics to Philosophy.” In *Caesar Against Liberty: Perspectives on His Autocracy*, edited by Francis Cairns and Elaine Fantham, 157–82. Cambridge: Francis Cairns.

Griset, Emmanuele. 1962. “Il Problema della “Silva” V.3 di Stazio.” *RSC* 10: 128-32.

Grosz, Elizabeth. 2001. “A Thousand Tiny Sexes: Feminism and Rhizomatics.” In *Deleuze and Guattari*: *Critical Assessments of Leading Philosophers*, edited by Gary Genosko, 1440-1463. New York: Routledge.

Gummere, Richard. 1925. *Seneca. Epistles 93-124.* Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Habinek, Thomas. 2016. “At the Threshold of Representation: Cremation and Cremated Remains in Classical Latin Literature.” Classical Antiquity 35 (1): 1–44.

---------. 2011. “Manilius’ Conflicted Stoicism.” In *Forgotten Stars: Rediscovering Manilius’ Astronomica,* edited by Steven Green and Katharina Volk, 32-44. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

---------. 1989. “Science and Tradition in Aeneid 6.” *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology* 92: 223–55.

Hackworth Petersen, L. 2009. “Clothes Make the Man”: Dressing the Roman Freedman Body.” In *Bodies and Boundaries in Graeco-Roman Antiquity*, edited by Thorsten Fögen and Mireille M. Lee, 181–214. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.

Haig Gaisser, Julia. 1971. “Tibullus 1.7: A Tribute to Messalla.” *Classical Philology* 66 (4): 221–29.

Hailwood, Simon. 2015. *Alienation and Nature in Environmental Philosophy.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Håkanson, L. 1969. *Statius’ Silvae: Critical and Exegetical Remarks with Some Notes on the Thebaid.* Lund: Gleerup.

Hallett, Christopher H. 2005. *The Roman Nude : Heroic Portrait Statuary 200 B.C.-A.D. 300*. Oxford Studies in Ancient Culture and Representation. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Halleux, Robert. 1970. “Fécondité des mines et sexualité des pierres dans l’Antiquité gréco-romaine.” *Revue belge de philologie et d’histoire* 48 (1): 16–25.

Halttunen, Karen. 1995. “Humanitarianism and the Pornography of Pain in Anglo-American Culture.” *The American Historical Review* 100 (2): 303–34.

Hamilakis, Yannis. 2014. *Archaeology and the Senses: Human Experience, Memory, and Affect*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Hamrick, William S. and Jan Van Der Veken. 2011. *Nature and Logos: A Whiteheadian Key to Merleau-Ponty’s Fundamental Thought.* Albany: SUNY Press.

Hardie, Alex. 2016. “The Camenae in Cult, History, and Song.” *Classical Antiquity* 35 (1): 45–85.

---------. 2006. “The Aloades on Helicon: Music, Territory and Cosmic Order.” *Antike Und Abendland* 52: 42–71.

--------. 2003. “Poetry and Politics at the Games of Domitian.” In *Flavian Rome: Image, Culture, Text*, edited by William J. Dominik and Anthony Boyle, 125–47. Leiden: Brill.

---------. 1983. *Statius and the Silvae : Poets, Patrons, and Epideixis in the Graeco-Roman World.* ARCA, Classical and Medieval Texts, Papers, and Monographs, 9. Liverpool, Great Britain: Francis Cairns.

Hardie, Philip. 2013. “Flavian Epic and the Sublime.” In *Flavian Epic Interactions*, edited by Gesine Manuwald and Astrid Voigt, 125–38. Berlin: De Gruyter.

---------. 2004. “Approximative Similes in Ovid. Incest and Doubling.” *Dictynna. Revue de Poétique Latine*, no. 1(June): 1-19.

---------. 2002. *Ovid’s Poetics of Illusion.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

---------. 1999. “Metamorphosis, Metaphor, and Allegory in Latin Epic.” In *Epic Traditions in the Contemporary World*, edited by Margaret Beissinger, Jane Tylus, and Susanne Wofford, 89-107. Berkeley: University of California Press.

---------. 1993. “Ut Pictura Poesis? Horace and the Visual Arts.” In *Horace 2000: A Celebration. Essays for the Bimillenium,* edited by Niall Rudd, 120-39. London: Duckworth.

---------. 1986. *Virgil’s Aeneid: Cosmos and Imperium*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Harper, Kyle. 2011. *Slavery in the Late Roman World, AD 275–425*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Harris, William V. 1980. “Towards a Study of the Roman Slave Trade.” *Memoirs of the American Academy in Rome* 36 (January): 117–40.

Hartman, Saidiya V. 1997. *Scenes of Subjection: Terror, Slavery, and Self-Making in Nineteenth-Century America*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Hawes, Greta. 2014. *Rationalizing Myth in Antiquity.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Hayles, N. Katherine. 1999. *How We Became Posthuman: Virtual Bodies in Cybernetics, Literature, and Informatics*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Hemelrijk, Emily A. 2004. “Masculinity and Femininity in the Laudatio Turiae.” *The Classical Quarterly (New Series)* 54 (01): 185–197.

Henriksén, Christer. 1997. “Earinus: An Imperial Eunuch in the Light of the Poems of Martial and Statius.” *Mnemosyne* 50 (3): 281–94.

Henry, Denis and Elizabeth Henry. 1985. *The Mask of Power: Seneca’s Tragedies and Imperial Rome*. Warminster: Aris & Phillips.

Herrmann-Otto, Elisabeth. 1994. *Ex Ancilla Natus: Untersuchungen Zu Den “Hausgeborenen” Sklaven Und Sklavinnen Im Westen Des Römischen Kaiserreiches*. Forschungen Zur ‘ Antiken Sklaverei, Bd. 24. Stuttgart: F. Steiner.

Hill, T. D. 2004. *Ambitiosa Mors: Suicide and the Self in Roman Thought and Literature*. New York: Routledge.

Hine, Harry M. 2006. “Rome, the Cosmos, and the Emperor in Seneca’s ‘Natural Questions.’” *The Journal of Roman Studies* 96: 42–72.

---------. 2002. “Seismology and Vulcanology in Antiquity?” In *Science and Mathematics in Ancient Greek Culture*, edited by C. J. Tuplin and T. E. Rihll, 56-75. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Hodder, Ian. 2012. *Entangled: An Archaeology of the Relationships Between Humans and Things*. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell.

Holmes, Brooke. 2014. “Greco-Roman Ethics and the Naturalistic Fantasy.” *Isis* 105 (3): 569–78.

---------. 2013. “Disturbing Connections: Sympathetic Affections, Mental Disorder, and the Elusive Soul in Galen.” In *Mental Disorders in the Classical World*, edited by William Harris, 147–76. Leiden: Brill.

Hope, Valerie. 2011. “Remembering to Mourn: Personal Mementos of the Dead in Ancient Rome.” In *Memory and Mourning: Studies on Roman Death,* edited by Valerie Hope and Janet Huskinson, 176-95. Oxford: Oxbow Books.

---------. 2007. *Death in Ancient Rome: A Sourcebook*. New York: Routledge.

Horsfall, Nicholas. 2013. *Virgil, Aeneid 6: A Commentary*. Berlin: De Gruyter.

----------. 2000. *Aeneid 7; A Commentary*. Leiden: Brill.

Hulls, Jean-Michel. 2011. “Poetic Monuments: Grief and Consolation in Statius *Silvae* 3.3.” In *Memory and Mourning: Studies on Roman Death,* edited by Valerie Hope and Janet Huskinson, 150-175. Oxford: Oxbow Books.

Hume, David. 2007 [1739-40]. *A Treatise of Human Nature*, edited by David Norton and Mary

Norton. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Hunt, Ailsa. 2016. *Reviving Roman Religion: Sacred Trees in the Roman World.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Inwood, Brad. 1983. "The Two Forms of Oikeiosis in Arius and the Stoa." In *On Stoic and Peripatetic Ethics: The Work of Arius Didymus*, edited by William Fortenbaugh, 190–201. New Brunswick NJ: Transaction Books.

Ibarretxe-Antuñano, Iraide. 2013. "The Relationship between Conceptual Metaphor and Culture." *Intercultural Pragmatics* 10 (2): 315.

Jardine, Alice. 1985. *Gynesis : Configurations of Woman and Modernity.* Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Jenkins, Thomas. 2009. "Livia the Princeps: Gender and Ideology in the Consolatio Ad Liviam." *Helios* 36 (1): 1–25.

Jervis, John. 2015. *Sympathetic Sentiments : Affect, Emotion and Spectacle in the Modern World.* WISH List. London: Bloomsbury.

Johnson, Christopher H., Bernhard Jussen, David Warren Sabean, and Simon Teuscher, eds. 2013. *Blood and Kinship: Matter for Metaphor from Ancient Rome to the Present*. Berghahn Books.

Johnson, Walter. 1999. *Soul by Soul: Life inside the Antebellum Slave Market*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Jones, Brian W. 1992. *The Emperor Domitian*. New York: Routledge.

Jones, Madeleine. 2013. "Seneca: The World According to Nature." PhD diss. Princeton University.

Jones, Prudence. 2005. *Reading Rivers in Roman Literature and Culture*. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books.

Kania, Raymond. 2012. "Orpheus and the Reinvention of Bucolic Poetry." *American Journal of Philology* 133 (4): 657–85.

Keitel, Elizabeth. 2010. "The Art of Losing: Tacitus and the Disaster Narrative." In *Ancient Historiography and its Contexts: Studies in Honour of A.J Woodman*, edited by Christina Kraus, John Marincola, and Christopher Pelling, 331-52. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Keith, Alison M. 1994. "Corpus Eroticum: Elegiac Poetics and Elegiac Puellae in Ovid's 'Amores.'" *The Classical World* 88 (1): 27–40.

Keller, Eve. 2007. *Generating Bodies and Gendered Selves : The Rhetoric of Reproduction in Early Modern England*. Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press.

Ker, James. 2009. *The Deaths of Seneca.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Kershner, Stephen. 2010. "Statius as Horatian Priest of the Muses in *Silvae* 2.7." In *Studies in Latin Literature and Roman History* 15, edited by Carl Deroux, 311-34. Bruxelles: Éditions Latomus.

---------. 2008. "Self-Fashioning and Horatian Allusion in Statius's 'Silvae.'" PhD diss. State University of New York at Buffalo.

King, Charles W. 2009. "The Roman Manes: The Dead as Gods." In *Rethinking Ghosts in World Religions*, edited by Mu-chou Poo, 95–114. Leiden:Brill.

Kingsley, Peter. 1995. *Ancient Philosophy, Mystery, and Magic: Empedocles and Pythagorean Tradition*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Kleijwegt, Marc. 2006. "Freedpeople: A Brief Cross-Cultural History." In *Faces of Freedom: The Manumission and Emancipation of Slaves in Old World and New World Slavery*, edited by Marc Kleijwegt, 3–70. Leiden: Brill.

Knickerbocker, Scott. 2012. *Ecopoetics: The Language of Nature, The Nature of Language.* Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press.

Knox, Peter E. 1985. "Wine, Water, and Callimachean Polemics." *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology* 89: 107–19.

Klöckner, Anja. 2010. "Getting in Contact: Concepts of Human–Divine Encounter in Classical Greek Art." In *The Gods of Ancient Greece: Identities and Transformations*, edited by Jan Bremmer and Andrew Erskine, 106-25. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.

Koenen, Ludwig. 1976. "Egyptian Influence in Tibullus." *Illinois Classical Studies* 1: 127–59.

Kohn, Eduardo. 2013. *How Forests Think: Toward an Anthropology beyond the Human*. Berkeley: Univ of California Press.

Konstan, David. 2013a. "Lucretius and the Epicurean Attitude towards Grief." In *Lucretius: Poetry, Philosophy, Science*, edited by Daryn Lehoux, A. D. Morrison, and Alison Sharrock, 193-208. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

--------. 2013b. "The Grieving Self: Reflections on Lucian's *On Mourning.*" In *Greek and Roman Consolations: Eight Studies of a Tradition and its Afterlife*, edited by Han Baltussen, 139-152. Swansea: The Classical Press of Wales.

Kopytoff, Igor. 1986. “The Cultural Biography of Things: Commoditization as Process.” In *The Social Life of Things: Commodities in Cultural Perspective*, edited by A. Appadurai, 64–94. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Koortbojian, Michael. 2013. *The Divinization of Caesar and Augustus : Precedents, Consequences, Implications.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

---------. 2008. “The Double Identity of Roman Portrait Statues: Costumes and their Symbolism at Rome.” In *Roman Dress and the Fabrics of Roman Culture,* edited by Jonathan Edmondson and Alison Keith, 71-93. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

Krasner, James. 2004. “Doubtful Arms and Phantom Limbs: Literary Portrayals of Embodied Grief.” *PMLA* 119 (2): 218–32.

Laes, Christian. 2011. *Children in the Roman Empire: Outsiders within*. Cambridge University Press.

---------. 2010. “Delicia Children Revisited: The Evidence of Statius’ *Silvae*.” In *Children, Memory, and Family Identity in Roman Culture,* edited by Véronique Dasen and Thomas Späth, 245-72. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

---------. 2003. “Desperately Different? Delicia Children in the Roman Household.” In *Early Christian Families in Context: An Interdisciplinary Dialogue*, edited by David Balch and Carolyn Osiek, 298–324. Grand Rapids MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company.

Laguna Mariscal, Gabriel. 1996. "Philosophical Topics in Statius' Silvae: Sources and Aims.” In *Epicedion. Hommage à P. Papinius Statius, 96-1996*, edited by F. Delarue, S. Georgacopoulou, P. Laurens and, A.-M. Taisne 245-56. La Licorne - UFR Langues Littératures: Poitiers.

--------. 1992. *Estacio, Silvas III: Introducción, Edición Crítica, Traducción y Comentario*. Madrid: Fundación Pastor de Estudios Clásicos.

---------. 1990. “La ‘Silva’ 5.4 de Estacio: Plegario al sueño.” *Habis* 21: 121-38.

Lakoff, George, and Mark Johnson. 1980. *Metaphors We Live By*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Lancellotti, Maria Grazia. 2002. *Attis, Between Myth and History: King, Priest, and God*. Leiden: Brill.

Lapidge, Michael. 1989. “Stoic Cosmology and Roman Literature: First to Third Centuries AD.” *Aufstieg und Niedergang der Römischer Welt* 36.3: 1379-1429.

Lattimore, Richmond. 1962. *Themes in Greek and Latin Epitaphs*. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.

Latour, Bruno. 2014. “Agency at the Time of the Anthropocene.” *New Literary History* 45 (1): 1–18.

---------. 2010. *On the Modern Cult of the Factish Gods*. Durham: Duke University Press.

---------.1993. *We Have Never Been Modern*, translated by Catherine Porter. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Laubry, Nicolas. 2015. “Sepulcrum, Signa et Tituli: Quelques Observations sur la «consecratio in formam deorum» et sur l’expression du statut des morts dans la Rome impériale.” In *Signa et Tituli. Monuments et Espaces de Représentation en Gaule Mériodionale Sous Le Regard Croisé de La Sculpture et de L’épigraphie*, edited by S. Agusta-Boularot and Emmanuelle Rosso, 160–173. BiAMA 18. Aix-en-Provence: Centre Camille Jullian.

Lavan, Myles. 2016. ‘“Father of the Whole Human Race:’ Ecumenical Language and the Limits of Elite Integration in the Early Roman Empire.” In *Cosmopolitanism and Empire: Universal Rulers, Local Elites, and Cultural Integration in the Ancient Near East and Mediterranean*, edited by Myles Lavan, Richard E. Payne, and John Weisweiler, 153-168. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

---------. 2011. “Slavishness in Britain and Rome in Tacitus’ *Agricola*.” *The Classical Quarterly (New Series)* 61 (01): 294–305.

Lavery, Gerard B. 1997. “Never Seen in Public: Seneca and the Limits of Cosmopolitanism.” *Latomus* 56 (Fasc. 1): 3–13.

Lehoux, Daryn. 2012. *What Did the Romans Know?: An Inquiry Into Science and Worldmaking*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Leroux, Virginie. 2002. “La représentation de l’Etna dans l’épopée latine.” In *Connaissance et représentations des volcans dans l’Antiquité*, edited by Éric Foulon, 57-78. Clermont-Ferrand: Presses Universitaires Blaise Pascal.

Levene, David. 2012. “Defining the Divine in Rome: In Memoriam S. R. F. Price.” *Transactions of the American Philological Association* 142 (1): 41–81.

Levin, Samuel. 1981. “Allegorical Language.” In *Allegory, Myth, and Symbol*, edited by Morton Bloomfield, 23-38. Harvard English Studies; 9. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Liddell, Erik. 2003. “The Figure of Orpheus in Silvae 2.7, the *Genethliacon Lucani ad Pollam*.” *NECJ* 30.1: 22-32.

Lindsay, Hugh. 2009. *Adoption in the Roman World*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Lipka, Michael. 2009. *Roman Gods: A Conceptual Approach*. Religions in the Graeco-Roman World ; v. 167. Leiden: Brill.

Lloyd, Geoffrey. 2007. "Pneuma between Body and Soul." *Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute* 13: S135–46.

Lobis, Seth. 2015. *The Virtue of Sympathy: Magic, Philosophy, and Literature in Seventeenth-Century England*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Long, A. A. 2009. "Seneca on the Self : Why Now?" In *Seneca and the Self*, edited by Shadi Bartsch and David Wray, 20-38. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

---------. 1997. "Stoic Philosophers on Persons, Property-Ownership and Community." *Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies* 41 (S68): 13–31.

Long, A. A., and D. N. Sedley. 1987. *The Hellenistic Philosophers: Volume 1, Greek and Latin Texts with Notes and Bibliography*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Lotito, Gianfranco. 1974-5. "Il tipo etico del liberto funzionario di corte (Stazio *Silave* III.3 e V.1)." *Dialoghi di Archeologia* 8: 275-383.

Loupiac, A. 1998. *La poétique des éléments dans la Pharsale de Lucain.* Collection Latomus ; v. 241. Bruxelles: Société d'Etudes latines.

Lovatt, Helen. 2007. "Statius, Orpheus, and the Post-Augustan Vates." *Arethusa* 40 (2): 145–63.

---------. 2005. *Statius and Epic Games*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Lowe, Dunstan. 2015. *Monsters and Monstrosity in Augustan Rome*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

---------. 2010. "The Symbolic Value of Grafting in Ancient Rome." *Transactions of the American Philological Association* 140 (2): 461–88.

Lynch, Gordon. 2009. "Object Theory: Toward an Intersubjective, Mediated, and Dynamic Theory of Religion." In *Religion and Material Culture: The Matter of Belief*, edited by David Morgan, 40–54. New York: Routledge.

Lyne, R.O.A.M. 1983. "Lavinia's Blush: Vergil, Aeneid 12.64–70." *Greece and Rome (Second Series)* 30 (01): 55–64.

MacLean, Rose B. 2012. "Cultural Exchange in Roman Society: Freed Slaves and Social Values." PhD diss. Princeton University.

Malamud, Martha A. 1995. "Happy Birthday, Dead Lucan: (P)Raising the Dead in Silvae 2.7." *Ramus* 24 (01): 1–30.

Manning, C.E. 1981. *On Seneca's "Ad Marciam."* Leiden: Brill.

Markus, Donka D. 2004. "Grim Pleasures: Statius's Poetic Consolationes." *Arethusa* 37 (1): 105–35.

---------. 2000. "Performing the Book: The Recital of Epic in First-Century CE Rome." *Classical Antiquity*, 138–79.

Márquez, Xavier. 2012. "Between *Urbs* and *Orbis:* Cicero's Conception of the Political Community." In *Cicero's Practical Philosophy,* edited by Walter Nicgorski, 181-211. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press.

Martelli, Francesca. 2009. "Plumbing Helicon : Poetic Property and the Material World of Statius' Silvae." *Materiali e Discussioni per L'Analisi dei Testi Classici* 62: 145-77.

Masi Doria, Carla. 2012. "Status and Contract in Ancient Rome: With Some Thoughts on the 'Future of Obligations.'" In *Obligations in Roman Law: Past, Present, and Future*, edited by Thomas McGinn, 102-130. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

--------. 1993. *Civitas operae obsequium: Tre studi sulla condizione giuridica dei liberti*. Naples: Jovene.

Mattern, Susan P. 1999. *Rome and the Enemy: Imperial Strategy in the Principate*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Mayer, Emanuel. 2012. *The Ancient Middle Classes: Urban Life and Aesthetics in the Roman Empire, 100 BCE-250 CE*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

McAuley, Mairéad. 2016. *Reproducing Rome: Motherhood in Virgil, Ovid, Seneca, and Statius.* Oxford Studies in Classical Literature and Gender Theory. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

McCabe, Mary. 2005. "Extend or Identify: Two Stoic Accounts of Altruism." In *Metaphysics, Soul, and Ethics in Ancient Thought: Themes from the Work of Richard Sorabji*, edited by Ricardo Salles, 413–43. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

McCarty, Willard. 1989. "The Shape of the Mirror: Metaphorical Catoptrics in Classical Literature." *Arethusa* 22 (2): 161.

McCullough, Anna. 2011. "One Wife, One Love: *Coniugalis Amor,* Grief, and Masculinity in Statius' *Silvae.*" In *Emotion, Genre, and Gender in Classical Antiquity*, edited by Dana Muntenau, 175-91. London: Bristol Classical Press.

McGowan, Matthew M. 2009. *Ovid in Exile: Power and Poetic Redress in the Tristia and Epistulae Ex Ponto.* Leiden: Brill.

McKeown, Niall. 2002. “Seeing Things: Examining the Body of the Slave in Greek Medicine.” *Slavery & Abolition* 23 (2): 29–40.

McNelis, Charles. 2007. *Statius’ Thebaid and the Poetics of Civil War*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

---------. 2002. “Greek Grammarians and Roman Society during the Early Empire: Statius’ Father and His Contemporaries.” *Classical Antiquity* 21 (1): 67–94.

Merish, Lori. 1996. “Sentimental Consumption: Harriet Beecher Stowe and the Aesthetics of Middle-Class Ownership.” *American Literary History* 8 (1): 1–33.

Merleau-Ponty, Maurice. 1968. *The Visible and the Invisible: Followed by Working Notes*, edited by Claude Lefort and translated by Alphonso Lingis. Evanston, IL.: Northwestern University Press.

Meyboom, P.G.P. 1995. *The Nile Mosaic of Palestrina: Early Evidence of Egyptian Religion in Italy*. Leiden: Brill.

Meyer, Susan Sauvé. 2009. “Chain of Causes : What Is Stoic Fate?” In *God and Cosmos in Stoicism*, edited by Ricardo Salles, 71-90. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Miller, Genevieve. 1962. “‘Airs, Waters, and Places’ in History.” *Journal of the History of Medicine and Allied Sciences* 17 (1): 129–40.

Molyviati-Toptsis, Urania. 1994. “Vergil’s Elysium and the Orphic-Pythagorean Ideas of After-Life.” *Mnemosyne* 47: 33–46.

Monani, Salma. 2014. “Evoking Sympathy and Empathy: The Ecological Indian and Indigenous Eco-Activism.” In *Moving Environments: Affect, Emotion, Ecology, and Film*, edited by Alexa Weik von Mossner, 225-248. Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier University Press.

Montiglio, Silvia. 2006. “Should the Aspiring Wise Man Travel? A Conflict in Seneca’s Thought.” *American Journal of Philology* 127 (4): 553–86.

Morabito, Marcel. 1981. *Les réalités de l'esclavage d'après le Digeste*. Paris: Ann. Lit. Besançon 245, Centre rech. anc. 39.

Morley, Neville. 2003. “Migration and Mobility in the Roman Empire.” In *Rome the Cosmopolis*, edited by Catherine Edwards and Greg Woolf, 147-58. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Morgan, David. 2012. *The Embodied Eye: Religious Visual Culture and the Social Life of Feeling*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

---------. 2010. “Introduction: The Matter of Belief?” In *Religion and Material Culture: The Matter of Belief,* edited by David Morgan, 1-17. New York: Routledge.

---------. 2005. *The Sacred Gaze: Religious Visual Culture in Theory and Practice*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Morris, Ian. 1992. *Death-Ritual and Social Structure in Classical Antiquity*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

--------. 1988. "Tomb Cult and the ‘Greek Renaissance’: The Past in the Present in the 8th Century BC." *Antiquity* 62, no. 237: 750-761.

Morton, Timothy. 2008. “John Clare’s Dark Ecology.” *Studies in Romanticism* 47 (2): 179–93.

Morzadec, Françoise. 2009. *Les images du monde: structure, écriture et esthétique du paysage dans les œuvres de Stace et Silius Italicus*. Bruxelles: Éditions Latomus.

---------. 2003. “Brumes et Nuages dans les Épopées de Lucain, Stace et Silius Italicus: entre Mythologie et Météorologie.” In *La Météorologie dans L’antiquité: Entre Science et Croyance: Actes du Colloque International Interdisciplinaire de Toulouse*, edited by Cusset, Christophe, 179–201. Saint-Étienne: Publications de l’université de Saint-Étienne.

Moss, Jessica. 2012. *Aristotle on the Apparent Good: Perception, Phantasia, Thought, and Desire*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Most, Glenn. 2012. “The Sublime, Today?” In *Dynamic Reading: Studies in the Reception of Epicureanism*, edited by Brooke Holmes and W.H. Shearin, 239–66. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Mouritsen, Henrik. 2011. *The Freedman in the Roman World*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Myers, K. Sara. 2000. ‘“*Miranda Fides:’* Poets and Patrons on Paradoxigraphical Landscapes in Statius’ *Silvae*.” *Materiali e discussioni per l’Analisi dei Testi Classici* 44: 103-38.

--------. 1994. *Ovid’s Causes: Cosmogony and Aetiology in the* Metamorphoses. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Nagel, Rebecca. 2000. “Literary and Filial Modesty in Silvae 5.3.” *Ramus* 29 (1): 47–59. *Empire*, edited by J. Miller and A. Woodman, 105–22. Leiden: Brill.

Narducci, Emanuele. 1997. “Perceptions of Exile in Cicero: The Philosophical Interpretation of a Real Experience.” *American Journal of Philology* 118 (1): 55–73.

Nauta, Ruurd R. 2002. *Poetry for Patrons: Literary Communication in the Age of Domitian*.

Leiden: Brill.

Newlands, Carole E. ed. 2011. *Silvae: Book II*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

---------. 2010. “The Eruption Of Vesuvius In The Epistles Of Statius And Pliny.” In *Latin Historiography and Poetry in the Early Empire*, edited by J. Miller and A. Woodman, 105–22. Leiden: Brill.

---------. 2009. “Statius’ Prose Prefaces.” *Materiali e Discussioni per l’Analisi dei Testi Classici* 61: 229–42.

---------. 2006. “Mothers in Statius’s Poetry: Sorrows and Surrogates.” *Helios* 33 (2): 203–26.

---------. 2005. “Animal Claquers: Statius Silv. 2.4 and 2.5.” In *Defining Genre and Gender in Latin Literature: Essays Presented to William S. Anderson on His Seventy-Fifth Birthday*, edited by W. M. Batstone and G. Tissol, 149–73. New York: Peter Lang.

---------. 2002. *Statius’ Silvae and the Poetics of Empire.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

---------. 1991. “Statius’ Poetic Temple: *Silvae* 3.1.” *Classical Quarterly* 41: 438-52.

Newmyer, Stephen. 2006. *Animals, Rights and Reason in Plutarch and Modern Ethics*. New York: Routledge.

--------. 1979. *The Silvae of Statius: Structure and Theme*. Leiden: Brill.

Nielsen, Hanne Sigismund. 1997. “Interpreting Epithets in Roman Epitaphs.” In *The Roman Family in Italy: Status, Sentiment, Space*, edited by Beryl Rawson and Paul Weaver, 169-204. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

---------. 1991. “Ditis Examen Domus? On the Use of the Term *Verna* in the Roman Epigraphical and Literary Sources.” *Classica et Mediaevalia* 42: 221-240.

---------. 1990.“Delicia in Roman Literature and in the Urban Inscriptions.” *Analecta Romana Instituti Danici* 19: 79–88.

Nisbet, Robin M. 1987. "The Oak and the Axe: Symbolism in Seneca, Hercules Oetaeus 1618ff." In *Homo Viator: Classical Essays for John Bramble,* edited by Michael Whitby, Philip Hardie, and Mary Whitby, 243-52. Bristol Classical Press and Bolchazy-Carducci Publishers.

--------. 1978. “Felicitas at Surrentum (Statius, Silvae II. 2).” *Journal of Roman Studies* 68: 1–11.

Nisbet, Robin M. and Margaret Hubbard. 1978. *A Commentary on Horace: Odes Book II.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

--------. 1970. *A Commentary on Horace: Odes Book I.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Nisbet, Robin. M., and Niall Rudd. 2004. *A Commentary on Horace: Odes, Book III*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Noreña, Carlos F. 2001. "The Communication of the Emperor's Virtues." *Journal of Roman Studies* 91: 146–68.

North, John. 2015. "Roman Funeral Rituals and the Significance of the *Naenia*." *Religion in the Roman Empire* 1.1: 114-33.

Nudelman, Franny. 1992. "Harriet Jacobs and the Sentimental Politics of Female Suffering." *ELH* 59.4: 939-64.

Nussbaum, Martha C. 1978. "The Role of Phantasia in Aristotle's Explanation of Action." In *Aristotle's De Motu Animalium*, 221-269. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Nutton, Vivian. 2005. "The Fatal Embrace: Galen and the History of Ancient Medicine." *Science in Context* 18 (01): 111–21.

Obbink, Dirk. 1999. "The Stoic Sage in the Cosmic City." In *Topics in Stoic Philosophy,* edited by Katerina Ierodiakonou, 178-95. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Pagàn, Victoria. 2015. "*Georgics* 2.497 and *Thebaid* 1.19-20: Allusion and Inspiration." In *Brill's Companion to Statius*, edited by William Dominik, Carole Newlands, and Kyle Gervais, 362-376. Leiden: Brill.

Panoussi, Vassiliki. 2009. *Vergil's Aeneid and Greek Tragedy: Ritual, Empire, and Intertext*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Papaioannou, Sophia. 2000. "Vergilian Diomedes Revisited: The Re-Evaluation of the Iliad." *Mnemosyne* 53 (Fasc. 2): 193–217.

Parker, Grant. 2016. "Foreigners and Flavians: Prejudices and Engagements." In *A Companion to the Flavian Age of Imperial Rome*, edited by Andrew Zissos, 277-95. Chichester: Wiley Blackwell.

--------. 2014. "*Tarda Solacia*: Liminal Temporalities of Statius' Prose." In *The Roman Paratext: Text, Frames, Readers,* edited by Laura Jansen, 112-128. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Parrott, Christopher Alan. 2013. "The Geography of the Roman World in Statius' 'Silvae.'" PhD diss. Harvard University.

Patterson, Orlando. 1982. *Slavery and Social Death : A Comparative Study.* Cambridge: Harvard

University Press.

Paxson, James J. 1994. *The Poetics of Personification*. Literature, Culture, Theory ; 6. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Pease, Arthur, ed. 1970. *M. Tulli Ciceronis: De Natura Deorum.* New York: Arno Press.

Peirano, Irene. 2012. *The Rhetoric of the Roman Fake: Latin Pseudepigrapha in Context*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Pékary, T. 1975. "Statuae Meae… Argenteae Steterunt in Urbe XXC Circiter, quas Ipse Sustuli: Interpretationen zu Res Gestae Divi Augusti 24." In *Monumentum Chiloniense: Studien zu augusteischen Zeit. Kieler Festschrift für Erich Burck zum 70. Geburtstag,* edited by E. Lefèvre, 96-108. Amsterdam: Adolf M. Hakkert.

Perkell, Christine. 2002. "The Golden Age and Its Contradictions in the Poetry of Vergil." *Vergilius (1959-)* 48: 3–39.

Pernot, Laurent. 2015. *Epideictic Rhetoric: Questioning the Stakes of Ancient Praise*. Austin: University of Texas Press.

--------. 2005. *Rhetoric in Antiquity*. Catholic University of America Press.

Perry, Matthew J. 2014. *Gender, Manumission, and the Roman Freedwoman*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Peterson, Christopher. 2013. *Bestial Traces: Race, Sexuality, Animality.* New York: Fordham University Press.

Petridou, Georgia. 2016. *Divine Epiphany in Greek Literature and Culture.* Oxford Scholarship Online. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Plantinga, Carl. 2009. *Moving Viewers: American Film and the Spectator's Experience*. Berkeley: Univ of California Press.

Platt, Verity. 2011. *Facing the Gods: Epiphany and Representation in Graeco-Roman Art, Literature and Religion*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Plumpe, J.C. 1943. "Vivum Saxum, Vivi Lapides: The Concept of 'Living Stone' in Classical and Christian Antiquity." *Traditio* 1: 1–14.

Pogorzelski, Randall J. 2016. "Centers and Peripheries." In *A Companion to the Flavian Age of Imperial Rome*, edited by Andrew Zissos, 277-95. Chichester: Wiley Blackwell.

---------. 2009. "The 'Reassurance of Fratricide' in the Aeneid." *American Journal of Philology* 130 (2): 261–89.

Pollini, John. 2008. “A New Bronze Lar and the Role of the Lares in the Domestic and Civic Religion of the Romans.” *Latomus* 67 (2): 391–98.

Pollmann, Karla. 2004. *Statius, Thebaid 12: Introduction, Text, and Commentary*. Schoeningh: Paderborn.

Pomata, Gianna. 1996. “Blood Ties and Semen Ties: Consanguinity and Agnation in Roman Law.” In *Gender, Kinship, Power: A Comparative and Interdisciplinary History*, edited by MJ. Maynes, A. Waltner, B. Soland, and U. Strasser, 43–64. New York: Routledge.

Pomeroy, A.J. 1986. “Somnus and Amor: The Play of *Silvae* 5.4.” *QUCC* 24.3: 91-7.

Price, Simon. 1984. *Rituals and Power: The Roman Imperial Cult in Asia Minor*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Puar, Jasbir K. 2007. *Terrorist Assemblages: Homonationalism in Queer Times.* Next Wave. Durham: Duke University Press.

Purves, Alex. 2015. “Ajax and Other Objects: Homer’s Vibrant Materialism.” *Ramus* 44 (1-2): 75-94.

Ramage, E. S. 1994. “‘The so-called ‘Laudatio Thuriae’ as Panegyric.’” *Athenaeum* 82:341–370.

Rasmussen, Susanne. 2003. *Public Portents in Republican Rome*. Analecta Romana Insituti Danici, Suppl.XXXIV. Rome: “L’Erma” di Bretschneider.

Rawson, Beryl. 2003. *Children and Childhood in Roman Italy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

---------. 1997. “The Iconography of Roman Childhood.” In *The Roman Family in Italy: Status, Sentiment, Space*, edited by Beryl Rawson and Paul Weaver, 205–32. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

---------. ed. 1991. *Marriage, Divorce, and Children in Ancient Rome.* Canberra: Humanities Research Center ; Oxford England.

Reeson, James. 2001. *Ovid Heroides 11, 13, and 14 : A Commentary*. Mnemosyne, Bibliotheca Classica Batava. Supplementum, 221. Leiden: Brill.

Reiche, Harald. 1971. “Myth and Magic in Cosmological Polemics: Plato, Aristotle, Lucretius.” *Rheinisches Museum Für Philologie* 114 (4): 296–329.

Reiss, Timothy J. 2003. *Mirages of the Selfe : Patterns of Personhood in Ancient and Early Modern Europe.* Palo Alto: Stanford University Press.

Reydams-Schils, Gretchen J. 2005a. “Le sage face à Zeus.” *Revue de métaphysique et de morale*, Les stoiciens et le monde, no. 48 (December): 579–96.

---------. 2005b. *The Roman Stoics: Self, Responsibility, and Affection*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

---------. 1999. *Demiurge and Providence : Stoic and Platonist Readings of Plato’s Timaeus*. Monothéismes et Philosophie. Turnhout: Brepols.

Richard, Jean-Claude. 1966. “Tombeaux des Empereurs et Temples des « Divi » : Notes sur la Signification Religieuse des Sépultures Impériales à Rome.” *Revue de l’histoire des Religions* 170 (2): 127–42.

Richlin, Amy. 2015. “Reading Boy-Love and Child-Love in the Greco-Roman World.” In *Sex in Antiquity: Exploring Gender and Sexuality in the Ancient World*, edited by Mark Masterson, Nancy Sorkin Rabinowitz, James Robson, 352–73. New York: Routledge.

Richter, Daniel S. 2011. *Cosmopolis: Imagining Community in Late Classical Athens and the Early Roman Empire*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Riggsby, Andrew. 1998. “Self and Community in the Younger Pliny.” *Arethusa* 31.1: 75-97.

Rimell, Victoria. 2015. *The Closure of Space in Roman Poetics: Empire's Inward Turn*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

----------. 2013. “The Best a Man Can Get: Grooming Scipio in Seneca Epistle 86.” *Classical Philology* 108 (1): 1–20.

----------. 2012. "The Labour of Empire: Womb and World in Seneca's Medea." *Studi italiani di filologia classica* 2, no. 2: 211-238.

Riss, Arthur. 2006. *Race, Slavery, and Liberalism in Nineteenth-Century American Literature*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Roach-Higgins, Mary Ellen, and Joanne B. Eicher. 1992. “Dress and Identity.” *Clothing and Textiles Research Journal* 10 (4): 1–8.

Rohrbacher, David. 2010. “Physiognomics in Imperial Latin Biography.” *Classical Antiquity* 29 (1): 92–116.

Roller, Lynn E. 1999. *In Search of God the Mother: The Cult of Anatolian Cybele*. Berkeley: Univ of California Press.

Roller, Matthew B. 2006. *Dining Posture in Ancient Rome: Bodies, Values, and Status*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

--------. 2001. *Constructing Autocracy: Aristocrats and Emperors in Julio-Claudian Rome*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Rosati, Gianpiero. 2015. "The *Silvae:* Poetics of Impromptu and Cultural Consumption." *Brill's Companion to Statius,* edited by William Dominik et al., 54-72. Leiden: Brill.

--------. 2011. "I *tria corda* di Stazio, poeta greco, romano e napoletano." In *Filellenismo e identità romana in età flavia: Atti della VIII giornata ghisleriana di filologia classica (Pavia, 10-11 novembre 2009)*, edited by Alessia Bonadeo, Alberto Canobbio, and Fabio Gasti, 15-34. Como: Ibis.

--------. 2002. "Muse and Power in the Poetry of Statius." In *Cultivating the Muse: Struggles for Power and Inspiration in Classical Literature,* edited by Efrossini Spentzou and Don Fowler, 229-251. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Rosenmeyer, Thomas G. 1989. *Senecan Drama and Stoic Cosmology*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Rühl, Meike. 2006. *Literatur gewordener Augenblick: Die Silven des Statius im Kontext literarischer und sozialer Bedingungen von Dichtung.* Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.

--------. 2003. "*Confer gemitus pariterque fleamus!* Die Epikedien in den Silven des Statius." *Hyperboreus* 9.1: 114-26.

Rüpke, Jörg. 2014. *From Jupiter to Christ: On the History of Religion in the Roman Imperial Period*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

--------. 2010. "Representation or Presence? Picturing the Divine in Ancient Rome." In *Archiv Fur Religionsgeschichte*, 12,181–96. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.

---------.2004. "Acta aut Agenda: Relations of Script and Performance." In *Rituals in Ink: A Conference on Religion and Literary Production in Ancient Rome Held at Stanford University in 2002,* edited by Alessandro Barchiesi, Jörg Rüpke, and Susan Stephens, 23-44. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag.

Russell, Josiah Cox. 1985. *The Control of Late Ancient and Medieval Population*. Memoirs of the American Philosophical Society ; v. 160. Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society.

Sachot, Maurice. 1991. '"RELIGIO/SUPERSTITIO' Historique d'une Subversion et d'un Retournement." *Revue de l'histoire des Religions* 208 (4): 355–94.

Saller, Richard P. 1994. *Patriarchy, Property and Death in the Roman Family*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Sanchéz-Eppler, Karen. 2005. *Dependent States: The Child's Part in Nineteenth-Century*

American Culture. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

--------. 1993. *Touching Liberty: Abolition, Feminism, and the Politics of the Body.* Berkeley: University of California Press.

Saunders, Timothy. 2008. *Bucolic Ecology: Virgil's Eclogues and the Environmental Literary Tradition*. London: Duckworth.

Scheer, T.S. 2000. *Die Gottheit und ihr Bild:Untersuchungen zur Funktion griechischer Kultbilder in Religion und Politik.* Munich: Beck.

Scheid, John. 2000. "Les Décrets de Pise et le Culte des Morts." In *La Commemorazione di Germanico Nella Documentazione Epigrafica: Tabula Hebana e Tabula Siarensis*, edited by Augusto Fraschetti, 131–40. Roma : "L'Erma" di Bretschneider.

---------. 1990. *Romulus et ses frères: le collège des frères arvales, modèle du culte public dans la Rome des empereurs.* Bibliothḕque des Ecoles françaises d'Athènes et de Rome ; fasc. 275. Rome: École française de Rome.

Scheidel, Walter. 2005. "Human Mobility in Roman Italy, II: The Slave Population." *Journal of Roman Studies* 95: 64–79.

Schofield, Malcolm. 1991. *The Stoic Idea of the City*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Schrijvers, Piet. 2006. "Silius Italicus and the Roman Sublime." In *Flavian Poetry,* edited by Ruurd Nauta, Harm-Jan Van Dam, and Johannes Smolenaars, 97-112. Leiden: Brill.

Schröder, Bianca-Jeanette. 2012. "Römische 'Pietas'- Kein Universelles Postulat." *Gymnasium* 119 (4): 335–58.

Scott, James. 1999. "The Ethics of the Physics in Seneca's Natural Questions." *Classical Bulletin* 75 (1): 55.

Scott, Kenneth. 1931. "The Significance of Statues in Precious Metals in Emperor Worship." *Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association* 62: 101–23.

Scourfield, J. H. D. 2013. "Towards a Genre of Consolation." In *Greek and Roman Consolations: Eight Studies of a Tradition and Its Afterlife*, edited by Han Baltussen, 1-36. Swansea: Classical Press of Wales.

Sebesta, Judith Lynn. 2006. "Vesuvius in Classical Literature." *New England Classical Journal* 33 (2): 99-111.

---------. 2005. "The *toga praetexta* of Roman Children and Praetextate Garments." In *The Clothed Body in the Ancient World*, edited by Liza Cleland, Mary Harlow, and Lloyd Llewellyn-Jones, 113-20. Oxford: Oxbow Books.

Seely, Stephen D. 2013. “How Do You Dress a Body Without Organs?: Affective Fashion and Nonhuman Becoming.” *WSQ: Women’s Studies Quarterly* 41 (1): 247–65.

Segal, Charles. 1983. “Boundary Violation and the Landscape of the Self in Senecan Tragedy.” *Antike Und Abendland* 29 (2): 172–87.

Seo, J. Mira. 2013. *Exemplary Traits: Reading Characterization in Roman Poetry*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Serres, Michel. 2008. *The Five Senses: A Philosophy of Mingled Bodies,* translated by Margaret Sankey and Peter Cowley. London: Continuum International Publishing Group.

Setaioli, Aldo. 2007. “Seneca and the Divine: Stoic Tradition and Personal Developments.” *International Journal of the Classical Tradition* 13 (3): 333–68.

---------. 2000. *Facundus Seneca: aspetti della lingua e dell’ideologia senecana*. Testi e manuali per l’insegnamento universitario del latino ; 68. Bologna: Pàtron.

Shackleton Bailey, D.R., ed. and trans. 2015. *Statius: Silvae,* revised by Christopher Parrott. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

---------., ed. and trans. 2003. *Statius: Silvae*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Shaw, Brent D. 2001. “Raising and Killing Children: Two Roman Myths.” *Mnemosyne* 54 (1): 31–77.

Shell, Marc. 1986. “The Family Pet.” *Representations*, no. 15: 121–53.

Sheppard, Anne D. R. 2014. *The Poetics of Phantasia: Imagination in Ancient Aesthetics*. London: Bloomsbury.

Simpson, Christopher J. 1997. “Caligula’s Cuit. Imitatio Augusti.” *Revue belge de philologie et d’histoire* 75 (1): 107–12.

Slater, W. J. 1974. “Pueri, Turba Minuta.” *Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies* 21 (1): 133–40.

Smallwood, Stephanie. 2004. “Commodified Freedom: Interrogating the Limits of Anti-Slavery Ideology in the Early Republic.” *Journal of the Early Republic*, 289–98.

Smith, Adam. 1767. *The Theory of Moral Sentiments: To Which Is Added, a Dissertation on the Origin of Languages*. G. Bell & Sons.

Smith, Peter L. 1968. “Poetic Tensions in the Horatian Recusatio.” *The American Journal of Philology* 89 (1): 56–65.

Smolenaars, J.J.L. 2005. “Earthquakes and Volcanic Eruptions in Latin Literature: Reflections and Emotional Responses.” In *Cultural Responses to the Volcanic Landscape: The Mediterranean and Beyond*, edited by Miriam Balmouth, David Chester, and Patricia Johnston, 311-29. Archaeological Institute of America.

---------. 1987. “Labour in the Golden Age: A Unifying Theme in Vergil’s Poems.” *Mnemosyne* 40 (3/4): 391–405.

Sobchack, Vivian. 2010. “Living a ‘Phantom Limb’: On the Phenomenology of Bodily Integrity.” *Body & Society* 16 (3): 51–67.

Solmsen, F. 1990. “The World of the Dead in Book 6 of the Aeneid.” In *Oxford Readings in Vergil’s* Aeneid, edited by Stephen Harrison, 208-223. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Sorabji, Richard. 2006. *Self: Ancient and Modern Insights about Individuality, Life, and Death*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

---------. 2004. *Aristotle on Memory*. 2nd ed. London: Duckworth.

---------.1993. *Animal Minds and Human Morals: The Origins of the Western Debate*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Star, Christopher. 2012. *The Empire of the Self : Self-Command and Political Speech in Seneca and Petronius*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Steiner, Deborah. 2001. *Images in Mind: Statues in Archaic and Classical Greek Literature and Thought.* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

---------. 1986. *The Crown of Song: Metaphor in Pindar.* London: Duckworth.

Stewart, Peter. 2003. *Statues in Roman Society : Representation and Response*. Oxford Studies in Ancient Culture and Representation. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Stowe, Harriet Beecher. 2002 [1852]. *Uncle Tom’s Cabin*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

----------. 1853. *A Key to Uncle Tom’s Cabin: Presenting the Original Facts and Documents Upon Which the Story Is Founded. Together with Corroborative Statements Verifying the Truth of the Work*. Boston: John P. Jewett & Co.

Straumann, Benjamin. 2015. *Roman Law in the State of Nature: The Classical Foundations of Hugo Grotius’ Natural Law,* translated by Belinda Cooper. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Strick, Simon. 2015. *American Dolorologies: Pain, Sentimentalism, Biopolitics*. State University of New York Press.

Subacus, Melanie. 2015. “Duae Patriae: Cicero and Political Cosmopolitanism in Rome.” PhD diss. New York University.

Swetnam-Burland, Molly. 2015. *Egypt in Italy: Visions of Egypt in Roman Imperial Culture.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Tague, Ingrid H. 2008. “Dead Pets: Satire and Sentiment in British Elegies and Epitaphs for Animals.” *Eighteenth-Century Studies* 41 (3): 289–306.

Taisne, Anne-Marie. 1994. *L’esthétique de Stace: La peinture des correspondances.* Paris: Belles Lettres.

Tantimonaco, Silvia. 2015. “«Singolari e Plurali»,«maschili e Femminili». Alcune Osservazioni sui ‘Manes’a Partire dalle Fonti Epigrafiche.” *Erga-Logoi. Rivista di Storia, Letteratura, Diritto e Culture Dell’antichità* 3 (1): 109–131.

Taub, Liba. 2012. “Physiological Analogies and Metaphors in Explanations of the Earth and the Cosmos.” In *Blood, Sweat and Tears*, edited by Manfred Horstmanshoff, Helen King and Claus Zittel 41–63. Leiden: Brill.

---------. 2003. *Ancient Meteorology*. New York: Routledge.

Taylor, Rabun. 2008. *The Moral Mirror of Roman Art*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Thomas, Richard F., ed. 1988a. *Georgics*. Cambridge Greek and Latin Classics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

---------. 1988b. “Tree Violation and Ambivalence in Virgil.” *Transactions of the American Philological Association (1974-)* 118: 261–73.

---------. 1982. *Lands and Peoples in Roman Poetry: The Ethnographical Tradition.* Cambridge: The Cambridge Philological Society.

Torjussen, Stian Sundell. 2008. “The ‘Orphic-Pythagorean’ Eschatology of the Gold Tablets from Thurii and the Sixth Book of Virgil’s Aeneid.” *Symbolae Osloenses* 83 (1): 68–83.

Toynbee, J. M. C. 1971. *Death and Burial in the Roman World*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Trapp, Michael B. 2007. *Philosophy in the Roman Empire: Ethics, Politics and Society*. Burlington, VT:Ashgate.

Treggiari, Susan. 1969. *Roman Freedmen During the Late Republic*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Turcan, Robert. 1996. *The Cults of the Roman Empire*. Translated by Antonia Neville. Ancient

World (Oxford, England). Cambridge: Blackwell Publishers.

Tybout, R. A. 1996. “Domestic Shrines and ‘popular Painting’: Style and Social Context. Thomas Fröhlich, Lararien- und Fassadenbilder in den Vesuvstädten. Untersuchungen zur ‘Volkstümlichen’ Pompejanischen Malerei (Mitteilungen des Deutschen Archaeologischen Instituts, Roemische Abteilung: Ergänzungsheft 32; von Zabern, Mainz 1991).” *Journal of Roman Archaeology* 9 (January): 358–374.

Uehlinger, Christoph. 2015. “Approaches to Visual Culture and Religion.” *Method & Theory in the Study of Religion* 27 (4-5): 384–422.

Ustinova, Yulia. 2009. *Caves and the Ancient Greek Mind: Descending Underground in the Search for Ultimate Truth.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Valavanis, Panos. 2006."Thoughts on the Historical Origins of the Olympic Games and the Cult of Pelops in Olympia." *Nikephoros: Zeitschrift für Sport und Kultur im Altertum* 19: 137-152.

Van Dam, Harm-Jan. 1984. *P. Papinius Statius, Silvae Book II: A Commentary*. Leiden: Brill.

Ventura, Mariana S. 2010. “The Death of the Father: A Contribution to the Study of the Flavian Reception of Virgil (Stat. Silv. 5.3).” *Materiali e Discussioni per l’Analisi dei Testi Classici* 64: 201–16.

Verheij, M.J.O. 2014. “Selves in Conflict: Gill vs. Sorabji on the Conception of Selfhood in Antiquity: A Reconciliatory Review.” *Classical World* 107.2: 169-97.

Vessey, David. 1973. *Statius and the Thebaid*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Versnel, Henk. 2011. *Coping With the Gods: Wayward Readings in Greek Theology*. Leiden: Brill.

Vogt, Katja Maria. 2008. *Law, Reason, and the Cosmic City*. Oxford University Press.

Volk, Katharina. 2009. *Manilius and His Intellectual Background*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Vollmer, Friedrich, ed. 1898. *P. Papinii Statii Silvarum libri*. Leipzig: B.G. Teubner.

Wagenvoort, Hendrik. 1980. *Pietas: Selected Studies in Roman Religion*. Leiden: Brill.

Wallace-Hadrill, Andrew. 2008. “Housing the Dead: The Tomb as House in Roman Italy.” In *Commemorating the Dead: Text and Artifacts in Context. Studies of Roman, Jewish, and Christian Burials*, edited by Laurie Brink, Deborah Green, and Richard Saller, 39–77. Berlin: deGruyter.

--------. 1981. “The Emperor and His Virtues.” *Historia: Zeitschrift Für Alte Geschichte*, no. H. 3: 298–323.

Warren, Jamie. 2015. “To Claim One’s Own: Death and the Body in the Daily Politics of Antebellum Slavery.” In *Death and the American South*, edited by Craig Thompson Friend and Lorri Glover, 110–30. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Watson, Alan. 1987. *Roman Slave Law*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Weaver, P. R. C. 1965. “The Father of Claudius Etruscus: Statius, Silvae 3. 3.” *The Classical Quarterly* 15 (1): 145–54.

Webb, Ruth. 2009. *Ekphrasis, Imagination and Persuasion in Ancient Rhetorical Theory and Practice*. Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing Group.

--------. 1997. “Mémoire et Imagination: Les Limites de l’enargeia dans la Théorie Rhétorique Grecque.” In *Dire l’Évidence: Philosophie et Rhétorique Antiques*, edited by Carlos Lévy and Laurent Pernot, 229-48. Paris: Editions l’Harmattan.

Weinstock, Stefan. 1971. *Divus Julius.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

White, Peter. 1975. “The Friends of Martial, Statius, and Pliny, and the Dispersal of Patronage.” *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology*, 265–300.

--------. 1983. *Technique and Ideas in the Aeneid*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Wilcox, Amanda. 2012. *The Gift of Correspondence in Classical Rome: Friendship in Cicero’s Ad Familiares and Seneca’s Moral Epistles*. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.

--------. 2006. “Exemplary Grief: Gender and Virtue in Seneca’s Consolations to Women.” *Helios* 33 (1): 73.

--------. 2005a. “Paternal Grief and the Public Eye: Cicero *Ad Familiares* 4.6.” *Phoenix* 59: 267-87.

--------. 2005b. “Sympathetic Rivals: Consolation in Cicero’s Letters.” *American Journal of Philology* 126 (2): 237–255.

Williams, Gareth D. 2012. *The Cosmic Viewpoint: A Study of Seneca’s Natural Questions*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

--------. 2006. “States of Exile, States of Mind: Paradox and Reversal in Seneca’s Consolatio ad Helviam Matrem.” In *Seeing Seneca Whole: Perspectives on Philosophy, Poetry, Politics,* edited by Katharina Volk and Gareth Williams, 147-73. Brill: Leiden.

--------. 1994. *Banished Voices: Readings in Ovid's Exile Poetry*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Williams, Gordon. 1983. *Technique and Ideas in the Aeneid.* New Haven: Yale University Press.

--------.1980. *Figures of Thought in Roman Poetry.* New Haven: Yale University Press.

Wills, David. 1995. *Prosthesis*. Palo Alto: Stanford University Press.

Wilson, Marcus. 2013. "Seneca the Consoler?: A New Reading of his Consolatory Writings." In *Greek and Roman Consolations: Eight Studies of a Tradition and its Afterlife*, edited by Han Baltussen, 93-121. Swansea: The Classical Press of Wales.

Winter, Kathrin. 2016. "Experience and *Stimmung*: Landscapes of the Underworld in Seneca's Plays." In *Valuing Landscape in Classical Antiquity: Natural Environment and Cultural Imagination,* edited by Jeremy McInerney and Ineke Sluiter, 122-147. Leiden: Brill.

Wistrand, Erik. 1960. "Virgil's Palaces in the Aeneid." *Klio-Beiträge Zur Alten Geschichte* 38: 146–154.

Witcher, Robert.E. 2000. "Globalisation and Roman Imperialism: Perspectives on Identities in Roman Italy." In *The Emergence of State Identites in the First Millenium BC,* edited by Edward Herring and Kathyrn Lomas, 213-225. London: Accordia Research Institute, University of London.

Wray, David. 2007. "Wood: Statius' *Silvae* and the Poetics of Genius." *Arethusa* 40.2: 127-43.

Wrede, Henning. 1981. *Consecratio in formam deorum: Vergottlichte Privatpersonen in der romischen Kaiserzeit*. Mainz: Von Zabern.

--------. 1971. "Das Mausoleum der Claudia Semne und die bürgerliche Plastik der Kaiserzeit" *RM* 78 : 125-66.

Wright, M.R. 1995. "Cicero on Self-Love and Love of Humanity in De Finibus 3." In *Cicero the Philosopher: Twelve Papers*, edited by J.G.F. Powell, 171–96. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Wyke, Maria. 1994. "Woman in the Mirror: The Rhetoric of Adornment in the Roman World." In *Women in Ancient Societies: An Illusion of the Night*, edited by Léonie J. Archer, Susan Fischler, and Maria Wyke, 134–151. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Wypustek, Andrzej. 2012. *Images of Eternal Beauty in Funerary Verse Inscriptions of the Hellenistic and Greco-Roman Periods*. Leiden: Brill.

Young, Elizabeth. 2008. "Inscribing Orpheus: Ovid and the Invention of a Greco-Roman Corpus." *Representations* 101 (1): 1–31.

Zeiner-Carmichael, Noelle K. 2007. “Perfecting the Ideal: Molding Roman Women in Statius’s Silvae.” *Arethusa* 40 (2): 165–81.

Zeiner, Noelle K. 2005. *Nothing Ordinary Here: Statius as Creator of Distinction in the Silvae*. New York: Routledge.

Zetzel, James E. G. 1989. “Romane Memento: Justice and Judgment in Aeneid 6.” *Transactions of the American Philological Association (1974-)* 119: 263–84.

Zientek, Laura. 2014. “Lucan’s Natural Questions: Landscape and Geography in the Bellum Civile.” PhD diss. University of Washington.

Southern Quarterly Review. 1851. “Negro and White Slavery,” July.