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Bond Beyond Nation: Sinographic Network and Korean Nationhood, 1860–1932

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BOND BEYOND NATION:
SINOGRAPHIC NETWORK AND KOREAN NATIONHOOD, 1860–1932

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Abstract

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Songyeol Han

This study consists of the cultural and intellectual interactions between literary elites in China and Korea that took place from the late nineteenth century to 1945. Although most of the relevant historiography of modern Korea emphasizes the influence of Japanese colonial rule (1910–1945) on Korea’s modern historical path, I examine the ways that the post-nineteenth-century cultural and intellectual interactions between the literary elites in China and Korea contributed to the rise of modern Korea. In particular, I focus on Korean literary elites in China—envoys, educators, and exiles—to account for the ways that their engagement with Chinese officials and intellectuals stimulated the swift metamorphosis of Korea that began in the 1860s and continued until the end of Japanese colonial rule over Korea.

The first two chapters of the dissertation investigate early Sino-Korean relations before the arrival of Western influences, examining these relations through exchange envoys and the modern print culture in Shanghai, which strongly influenced Korea in the late nineteenth century. These chapters comprise the first part of the dissertation that focuses on Korea’s encounter with the modern world through China. I show how the perceptions of Korean intellectuals in China contributed directly to the change in Korea’s attitude toward the West, and indeed the world, pushing perspectives far beyond the traditional tributary system toward embracing a broader intellectual curiosity and pursuit. Following this, the next two chapters explore the interactions

between Chinese and Korean intellectuals in Shanghai during the Japanese colonial period. Each chapter focuses on influential Korean nationalist thinkers and their activities to legitimize Korea's anticolonial struggle through a Sino-Korean nationalist dialogue and the political impact of Sino-Korean nationalism in East Asia in the twentieth century.

Sino-Korean relations in the early twentieth century illustrate the essential transnational role of intellectual ideas relating to reform, national history, and nationalist thought in shaping cultures and countries. In the conclusion, I suggest how such a historical argument can support the construction of a regional history of East Asia as an approach for examining the political tension in East Asia that has been caused by historical disputes. This study of sinographic dialogues within the East Asia region contributes in developing a nuanced understanding of regional interaction and its dynamic in East Asia.

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Convention

- For the Romanization of Korean language materials, I use the McCune-Reischauer system; for the Chinese language material, I use Pinyin system; for Japanese, I use Hepburn system.
- I use *the 17th Chicago Manual of Style Online* for the citation and bibliography. As for Korean sources, I refer to “Quick Guide on Citation Style for Chinese, Japanese and Korean Sources: Chicago Manual Examples,” Research Guides, Yale University Library, last updated September 7, 2017, <http://guides.library.yale.edu/c.php?g=296262&p=1974227>.
- The names of Korean, Chinese, and Japanese people are written with their surnames followed by given names without having a comma between the surname and given name, except for those conventional used with their own Romanization style and name order. For example, Syngman Rhee (Yi Sŭngman), Chiang Kai-shek (Zhang Jieshi).
- Korean authors’ names that are published in English are presented as they appear in the publication; for consistency, I put the McCune-Reischauer Romanization form in the bracket following the name that appears in the publication. For example, Young Ick Lew [Yu Yŏngik]. *The Making of the First Korean President: Syngman Rhee’s Quest for Independence, 1875-1948*. Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2014.
- Two systems of date are used in this dissertation: Chapter One exclusively follows the lunar calendar system, while other chapters follow Gregorian calendar.

Abbreviations

GMD	Guomindang 國民黨
HM	<i>Han'guk mun'wŏn</i> 韓國文苑
KPG	Korean Provisional Government 大韓民國臨時政府
KW	<i>Kang Wi chŏnjip</i> 姜瑋全集
PPC	<i>Paegam Pak Ŭnsik chŏnjip</i> 白巖朴殷植全集
MJCG	<i>Han'guk munjip ch'onggan</i> 韓國文集叢刊
SS	<i>Soang sŏlsaeng munjip</i> 素昂先生文集
SJWIG	<i>Sŭngjŏngwŏn ilgi</i> 承政院日記
SDK	The Society for the Diffusion of Christian and General Knowledge among the Chinese 廣學會

Introduction

As the Japanese team marched in the opening ceremony of the 2018 Winter Olympics, NBC commentator Joshua Cooper Ramo observed the following: “Japan, a country which occupied Korea from 1910 to 1945. But every Korean will tell you that Japan is a cultural and technological and economic example that has been so important to their own transformation.” This brief description enraged the people of South Korea, who demanded an apology, which they eventually received along with Ramo’s removal from his position.¹ It was not merely the inappropriate and insensitive content and tone of Ramo’s remarks that so insulted Korea’s national pride and historical sensibility; more critically, this incident reflects a problematic tendency (similarly reflected by the dominant trend in modern Korean historiography) to privilege the role of Japan at the expense of integrating other historical factors and agencies in narratives concerning the modernization of Korea.

Over the last few decades, the study of modern Korean history has evolved, moving to overcome prevailing nationalistic historical narratives of modern Korea. Between the late 1990s and the early 2000s, a new generation of South Korean and North American historians emerged to challenge the predominantly nationalistic historiography of modern Korea, which is derived largely from the notion that the “Korean people were severely exploited under the Japanese colonial rule.” In stark contrast to the nationalistic perspective, this new generation of scholars identified the concept of colonial modernity as a useful framework for analyzing the historical narrative of modern Korea and its

¹ “Olympics: NBC boots analyst over Japan comment at Pyeongchang Games,” *Reuters*, February 11, 2018, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-olympics-2018-nbc/olympics-nbc-boots-analyst-over-japan-comment-at-pyeongchang-games-idUSKBN1FW037>.

experience of the Japanese colonial rule. These historians attributed developments such as the modern reformation of the Korean government, the transition from a premodern agrarian society to a capitalistic market economy that abolished traditional conceptions of social status, and the emergence of modern culture all to the juridical authority of Japanese colonial rule, the centripetal force of the Japanese imperial economy, and the civilizing influence of Japanese culture.² Although there was an ebb and flow that generally characterized the years preceding 1910, the period between 1875 and 1910 is generally regarded as Japan's step-by-step colonization of Korea. From this view, after the Sino-Japanese rivalry of the 1890s and the Japan–Russia rivalry of the 1900s, Japan emerged as an imperial power from the fierce territorial struggles over East Asia, with its reward of a colonized Korean Peninsula firmly in hand.

One of the great accomplishments from the study of colonial modernity is the framework that emphasizes how modernization in Korean history relates to the broader narrative of globalization. Historical investigations of the impact of Japanese colonialism on the formation of Korean modern culture have generated the analytic framework required to challenge the conceptions of Korea as a monolithic nation. The study of colonial modernity has focused not only on the political and economic history of the period, but also on the social, cultural, and intellectual features of Korean society under

² In Anglo-American scholarship, the *Colonial Modernity in Korea* has well addressed the key issues of this new research. In South Korea, *Haebang chŏn-husa ūi chae insik* (*Rethinking the History of Pre/Post Liberation Korea*) and *Kŭndae rŭl tasi ingnŭnda: Han 'guk kŭndae insik ūi saeroun p'aerŏdaim ūl wihayŏ* (*Revisiting the Modern: Toward a New Paradigm of Understanding Modern Korea*) sparked the discussion of colonial modernization/modernity in the study of modern Korea. Gi-Wook Shin and Michael Robinson, eds., *Colonial Modernity in Korea* (Cambridge: Harvard University Asia Center, 1999); Pak Chihyang et al., *Haebang chŏn-husa ūi chae insik* (Seoul: Ch'aek sesang, 2006); Yun Haedong et al., *Kŭndae rŭl tasi ingnŭnda: Han 'guk kŭndae insik ūi saeroun p'aerŏdaim ūl wihayŏ* (Seoul: Yŏksa pip'yŏngsa, 2006).

Japanese colonial rule. A more complex understanding of how Japan's imperial presence and the modern West's cultural influence on the Korean peninsula collaborated to help form a heterogeneous culture in Korea amplifies our ability to use this framework to comprehend the connections between Korean history and global history.

Studying colonial modernity has provided the additional benefit of increasing the emphasis on cultivating a better understanding of the influence of Japanese colonialism on Korea, not only regarding its immediate impact, but also concerning its long-term legacy. Trying to understand contemporary politics in Korea in terms of the Japanese colonial legacy is a classic example of this effect. If we consider the origins of the Korean War (1950–1953), it is critical to recognize the significant role of class conflicts that were long-suppressed under Japanese colonial rule in the breakout of a civil war. In other words, the war represented a clash between, on the one hand, the South Korean anticommunist establishment that had flourished as a bourgeois class under the patronage of the imperial state and emerged as the successor to the Japanese colonial bureaucracy and, on the other, the North Korean socialist state, aggressively endorsed by a peasant class insistent on liquidating the vast evil accumulated during Japanese colonial rule.³ As recently as a few years before 1992, South Korean government leaders and major corporate executives were still widely regarded as residual Japanese collaborators who had managed to preserve their political and social privilege.⁴ The miraculous success of the South Korean economy in the 1960s and 1970s has been described as a “positive” result of “colonial modernization,” an interpretation that provoked a dramatic response

³ Bruce Cumings, *The Origins of the Korean War: Liberation and the Emergence of Separate Regimes, 1945–1947* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981).

⁴ Carter J. Eckert, *Offspring of Empire: The Koch'ang Kims and the Colonial Origins of Korean Capitalism, 1876–1945* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1991).

from the South Korean media in the 1990s and 2000s. A reexamination of Korea's colonial past asserts its intent to shift away from the controversy involved in assessing its colonial legacy but insists on basing the study on the foundational premise that Japan's dominant influence over Korea—whether positive or negative—is a historical fact.⁵ Such studies all seem to imply that Japanese imperial rule was not only the most crucial contextual aspect of Korean history, but also that it is inseparable from any narrative of Korea's historical path in the twentieth century.

That being said, recent studies have raised questions about Japan's dominant role in modern Korean history. In his recent book, *Rationalizing Korea: The Rise of the Modern State, 1894–1945* (2016), Korean historian Kyung Moon Hwang observes that the tendency to focus exclusively on the binary relationship between the Japanese empire and its Korean colony has marginalized the research and study of Korea's interaction with forces other than Japan. According to Hwang, “over the past two decades or so it has become commonplace, at least outside of the peninsula, to associate Korean modernity mostly with Japanese colonial rule (1910–1945).” Notwithstanding the efforts and aims of the aforementioned new generation of scholars, Hwang's observations suggest that such goals are not actually being met. Hwang further insists that “[t]aken together, the

⁵ There are many works on the impact of Japanese colonialism in Korean politics, society, and culture, but here, I suggest a few representative works that came out in the last two decades. Yumi Moon, *Populist Collaborators: The Ilchinhoe and the Japanese Colonization of Korea, 1896–1910* (Cornell University Press, 2013); E. Taylor Atkins, *Primitive Selves: Koreana in the Japanese Colonial Gaze, 1910–1945* (University of California Press, 2010); Theodore Jun Yoo, *The Politics of Gender in Colonial Korea: Education, Labor, and Health, 1910–1945* (University of California Press, 2008); Alexis Dudden, *Japan's Colonization of Korea: Discourse and Power* (University of Hawaii Press, 2005); Soon-Won Park, *Colonial Industrialization and Labor in Korea: The Onoda Cement Factory* (Harvard University Press, 1999); Carter J. Eckert, *Offspring of Empire: The Koch'ang Kims and the Colonial Origins of Korean Capitalism, 1876–1945* (University of Washington Press, 1996).

multiplicity and diversity of Korea's modern transformation merged into a vast historical experience that cut across the temporal and national boundaries of political control."⁶

In fact, the scholarly determination to incorporate this vast historical experience into the narrative is not exclusive to the study of the origin of the modern state in Korea. In her study of the formation of modern womanhood in Korea, Hyaeweol Choi contends that the history of the transformation of gender norms in Korea cannot be adequately understood within the confines of the Japanese imperial narrative. Choi further argues that although "Japanese colonial power provided a unique platform" for the introduction of notions of womanhood based on modern Christian gender norms, it was the American missionaries who took the leading role (among other narratives, including the Japanese colonial discourse) in establishing a baseline for modern womanhood in Korea. That is, the American missionary narrative is one of various narratives—which include the Japanese one—responsible for determining modern Korean womanhood.⁷

Frank Hoffman also acknowledges his concerns about the geographical scope engendered by constraining the study of modern Korean history within the narrow domain of the Japanese empire. In *Berlin Korean, 1909–1940*⁸, Hoffman claims that "[t]he Berlin Koreans show how the special conditions that account for colonial modernity, as we have come to name and define it since the 1990s, reached well beyond the borders of colonial empire." He proposes a new framework to "challenge prevailing assumptions about how and to what extent the Korean modernity project was tied to a

⁶ Kyung Moon Hwang, *Rationalizing Korea: The Rise of the Modern State, 1894–1945* (Oakland: University of California Press, 2016), xii.

⁷ Hyaeweol Choi, *Gender and Mission Encounters in Korea: New Women, Old Ways* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2009), 11.

⁸ Frank Hoffman, *Berlin Koreans, Pictured Koreans* in Andreas Schirmer ed., *Koreans and Central Europeans: Informal Contacts up to 1950*, vol. 1 (Vienna: Praesens, 2015).

specific institutional framework,” namely the traditional framework of the Japanese colonial empire.⁹

Early Modern Korea and the Japanese Colonial Rule (1910–1945)

My study of the evolution of modern Sino-Korean relations and its connection to the rise of modern Korea shares the concerns of the aforementioned scholars who also engaged in efforts to understand the trajectory of modern Korean history. However, such concerns do not render colonial modernity invalid. Rather, colonial modernity becomes even more crucial to understanding the complexity of modern Korean culture and the hybrid formed by the mixture of Korean and foreign cultures (so integral to Korean culture). In his study of the role played by Chinese in the generation of a Korean ethno-national consciousness and self-perception, Vladimir Tikhonov argues that the self-image of Korean nationhood developed out of complicated interactions with foreign others. Although he pays equal attention to Russian/Soviet, Chinese, and Japanese influences throughout his book, Tikhonov states that “intra-regional mutual perceptions and images contributed to the formation of all the nationalisms of East Asia, including the Korean one,” such studies have been “thoroughly perioherialized in both Korea and Japanese/Chinese studies.”¹⁰ Tikhonov’s emphasis here is not on the lack of materials available for the study of modern Sino-Korean relations, but rather on the lack of attention paid to the pursuit of such research.

Although Korea engaged with countries outside the Asian continent, even before its colonization by Japan, the virtually exclusive focus on Korea’s encounter with modern

⁹ Frank Hoffman, *Berlin Koreans, Pictured Koreans*), 10.

¹⁰ Vladimir Tikhonov, *Modern Korea and Its Others: Perceptions of the Neighbouring Countries and Korean Modernity* (London: Routledge Taylor and Francis, 2016), xi.

Japan has also led to excessively restricted conceptions of Korea's foreign interactions before the late nineteenth century. Korea's traditional (i.e., pre-colonial) foreign relations were often interpreted according to a hierarchical conception of world order that reflects the Confucian worldview; this hierarchical order has been described by John K. Fairbank as the "Chinese World Order."¹¹ Per this sinocentric hierarchical system, the ruler of the central plain of China claimed suzerainty over "all lands under the Heaven (Ch. *tianxia* K. *ch'ŏnha*)," including Korea; the Korean ruler enjoyed political security by acknowledging the Manchu emperor's superior status and justified his domestic rule by accepting the investiture provided by the Manchu emperor until Japanese colonialism in the late nineteenth century forced Korea to move away from this Confucian world order, which had never been challenged before then.

However, recent studies of the foreign relations of late Imperial China (1368–1911) challenge the sinocentric view and provide evidence of early modern notions of sovereignty and territorial concerns and their legacy in the Chinese state's engagement of historical and territorial dispute with neighboring countries in the contemporary regional politics. These studies allow us to challenge the premise of traditional East Asian order as an unchallenged exemplar that was imposed on the history of East Asia; they also enable us to expand our understanding of the development of ideas about the territoriality and nationhood in Korean interactions with the Qing Empire. In her study of Qing colonial expansion beyond its southwest border, Laura Hostetler addresses the extent to which aggressive Qing expansionism resembled the imperial actions of European empires

¹¹ John K. Fairbank and Ta-tuan Ch'en, *The Chinese World Order: Traditional China's Foreign Relations* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968).

during that time.¹² Peter Purdue's study of Qing military expeditions in the northwest borderland, which occurred in response to emerging nomadic kingdoms and Russian interventions in the region, have forced scholars in the field of Chinese history to reconsider Qing foreign relations in ways that go beyond Confucian rhetoric.¹³ Chosŏn-Qing relations are not an exception. Seonmin Kim studied Chosŏn-Qing trade and border issues, and her work highlights the agency of the Chosŏn dynasty in the development of the Qing Empire.¹⁴ Kirk Larsen's study of Yuan Shikai's Regency in late Chosŏn Korea (1882–1894) shows how the Qing Empire, much like contemporary Western imperial powers, tried to impose colonial rule on the Korean peninsula in the late nineteenth century. This is to say that Qing China was hardly inferior to other imperial powers, including Japan, in terms of the motivations and behavior for achieving the goal of colonizing Korea.¹⁵ These studies allow us to conclude that it may be possible to understand Sino-Korean relations according to the framework of “colonial modernity.”

A new way of understanding the historical transformation of the East Asian regional order has emerged in more recent studies that examine the development of an economic network among overseas Chinese merchants and its endurance through modern trade under international treaties in East Asia.¹⁶ In accordance with this new view of East

¹² Laura Hostetler, *Qing Colonial Enterprise: Ethnography and Cartography in Early Modern China* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001); Peter C. Perdue, *China Marches West: The Qing Conquest of Central Eurasia* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2005).

¹³ Peter Perdue, *China Marches West: The Qing Conquest of Central Eurasia* (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2005).

¹⁴ Seonmin Kim, *Ginseng and Borderland: Territorial Boundaries and Political Relations between Qing China and Chosŏn Korea, 1636–1912* (Oakland: University of California Press, 2017).

¹⁵ Kirk W. Larsen, *Tradition, Treaties, and Trade: Qing Imperialism and Chosŏn Korea, 1850–1910* (Cambridge: Harvard University Asia Center, 2008).

¹⁶ Takeshi Hamashita, Linda Grove, and Mark Selden, *China, East Asia and the Global Economy: Regional and Historical Perspectives* (London: Routledge, 2008).

Asian regional dynamics, recent studies of trade and commerce between late-Qing China and late-Chosŏn Korea have shown the significance of Sino-Korean trade in understanding Korea's entry into the looming global network of the late nineteenth century. In his study of overseas Chinese merchants in Korea, Ishikawa Ryōta challenges the convention of emphasizing Japanese merchant activity in the Korean market. Ishikawa shows how Chinese merchants assumed the role of mediator to integrate the Korean economy into the modern market system that was emerging in Asia.¹⁷ Based on these studies, it is possible to conclude that modern Sino-Korean relations have also played a significant role in the formation of colonial modernity.

In my study of the history of Sino-Korean relations in the modern period, I address China's changing role in the emergence of colonial modernity in Korean culture. Both as participants and observers of Chinese anti-imperialistic nationalism in the early twentieth century, Korean nationalists in China rationalized their identity in response to being defined as "colonial subjects" by the Japanese colonial power; being portrayed as victims of Japanese colonization; or being stigmatized as the vanguard of Japanese imperial expansion in China. In *Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World*, Partha Chatterjee asserts that the critiques of imperialism by colonial nationalists always rest on an imperialistic rationale that fundamentally undermines the anticolonial claims of the critics. Chatterjee demonstrates that the post-Enlightenment rationality and material superiority characterized Western ideology, even though the culture of the Orient remained rooted in spiritual superiority, as defined by the philosophies of renowned

¹⁷ Ishikawa Ryōta, *Kindai Ajia shijō to Chōsen: kaikō, kashō, teikoku* (Nagoya: Nagoya daigaku shuppankai, 2016).

Indian nationalists.¹⁸ As Indian nationalists constructed a discourse of their distinctive spiritual assets relative to Western materiality, Korean and Chinese intellectuals also generated a discourse of their homeland and neighbors that was deeply influenced by Western colonial views. However, many Chinese intellectuals viewed Sino-Korean relations under sinocentrism—regarding Korea as sovereign from China, even under modern international norms. Korean exiles in China had rather conflicted political goals through their intellectual and cultural activities and failed to solve the internal dilemma nested within modern nationalism.

In Search for Modern Korea in the Sinographic Sphere (1860–1945)

In the following work, I examine cultural interactions between Korean and Chinese intellectuals, both before and during the Japanese colonial period. This Sino-Korean cultural interaction was mediated by various forms of textual transmission—envoy brush talks and its impact in the new treaty negotiation (Chapter 1), Chinese translations of Western books in the late nineteenth century and its impact on Korean society (Chapter 2), the circulation of a biography of a Korean patriot written by Korean exiles in Shanghai (Chapter 3), the Chinese reception of anthologized collections of Korean literature and the question of Korean national liberation in Republican China (Chapter 4)—are representative examples among numerous other forms of texts that were transmitted back and forth between Korean and Chinese people.

The linguistic barrier between the Chinese and Korean people, especially in the early twentieth century, is an important subject worthy of discussion. Prior to this period,

¹⁸ Partha Chatterjee, *Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World: A Derivative Discourse* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993), 11–16.

elites from China and Korea could communicate without the aid of interpreters through “brush talk” (*p’ildam*) that employed classical Chinese writing; however, radical language reformers in both China and Korea launched fierce attacks on the literary Chinese writing system for its obsolescence and inextricable ties to the traditional mindset. These attackers regarded the elevation of the vernacular language to the status of “national language” as the beginning of the formation of a national identity, adopting contemporary Western discourse about the progressive nature of vernacular language in the context of linguistic reforms in early modern Europe. Hence, it is commonly understood that this newly-created hierarchy between classical and vernacular language expressed through nationalist discourse led to the disavowal of literary Chinese writing, which was replaced by “vernacular languages”—*Baihua wen* (plain speech writing) in China and *Han’gŭl* (Korean script) in Korea. However, recent studies on the language reforms in East Asia challenge existing presumptions about the use of classical Chinese writing as opposed to vernacular languages in premodern Korea, Japan, and Vietnam under the Eurocentric model.¹⁹ Applying the classical and vernacular language dichotomy to East Asia is problematic because the emergence of the vernacular language from the classical language is a historical experience unique to early modern Europe because it occurred in lockstep with the invention of letterpress, the emergence of Enlightenment mentalities, and the rise of nationalism.²⁰

Challenging the common understanding of the modernization of East Asian language consisted of a shift from the traditional Chinese logographic language to a

¹⁹ Benjamin Elman ed., *Rethinking East Asian Languages, Vernaculars, and Literacies, 1000-1919* (Leiden: Brill, 2014).

²⁰ Susan Baddeley and Anja Voeste eds. *Orthographies in Early Modern Europe* (Berlin: De Gruyter Mouton, 2012), 1.

phonetic “national” language, Saito Mareshi argues that in Japan, a “sinographic sphere”²¹ developed in the Tokugawa period (1603–1868) that also contributed to the modernization of the Japanese language in the Meiji period (1868–1912) that followed. Saito supports his argument with the historical fact that even radical reformers in Japan commonly used the sinographic writing system and composed *kanshi* (K. *hansi*)—sinographic poems—even in their expressions of modernity. Sinographic logograms continued to contribute to the modernization of the Japanese language, especially in the case of coining new words to keep up with the rapid absorption of the new Western material and psychological culture. Instead of Hiragana or Katakana, sinographic logograms were extensively used to coin new words that were then widely circulated throughout East Asia. Modern Japanese elites commonly relied on the ethos of the traditional culture embedded in Chinese logograms to communicate the profound goals residing in their sophisticated minds and to win intellectual sympathy and agreement among their contemporaries.²² With few exceptions, it was also true that Korean and Chinese elites continued to use the sinographic writing system into the modern period. The emergence of Korean linguistic nationalism and the increasing use of Korean script (*Han’gŭl*) often overshadowed the continuity of writing and reading practices based on the sinographic writing system. However, as Ross King shows, contrary to the myth,

²¹ Japanese literary scholar Saito Mareshi refers to the transcendental writing of Chinese writing in Meiji

Japan as “the pulse of sinographic writing” (*Kanbunmyaku* 漢文脈). I follow translations of Kanbun (漢文) as “sinographic writing” rather than “Chinese writing” because readers may confuse the Chinese writing system exclusively as a contemporary Mandarin writing system. Neither “classical Chinese writing” nor “traditional Chinese writing” is proper because the sinographic writing also includes newly coined terms to indicate new ideas and materiality in East Asia via a combination of existing Chinese characters.

²² Saito Mareshi, *Kanbunmyaku no kindai: Shinmatsu meiji no bungakken* (Nagoya: Nagoya daigaku shuppankai, 2005).

Korean script attained the status of a national writing system much later in the Japanese colonial period.²³ Beyond the discussion of Korean linguistic nationalism, I argue that the use of the sinographic-style writing system as a “lingua franca” facilitated by the efforts of Korean nationalist exiles to assert the legitimacy of their anticolonial struggle in East Asia during the Japanese colonial period.

My study includes an investigation of intertextuality—the relation between texts—among different languages and cultures, a comparative textual analysis, and a study of translated texts and ideas flowing westward (Japan to China to Korea) and vice versa. Despite having disparate forms and content, text written in the sinographic writing style traveled back and forth between Korea and China, and my study traces the journeys of these texts. To analyze the brush talks between Chosŏn envoys and Qing scholar-officials, I compare them with other texts included in same person’s literary collections (*munjip*) and also with official records, such as the *Veritable Records of Chosŏn dynasty* (*Chosŏn wangjo sillok*), *Diary of the Royal Secretariat* (*Sŭngjŏngwŏn ilgi*), and *Daily Records of the Royal Court and Important Officials* (*Ilŏngnok*). I use biographies, memoirs, and existing prosopographical research to enhance the understanding of how the political and social contexts are reflected in the text. For texts published as printed books, I use the relevant bibliographical data accessible through the library and archive catalogues and WORLDCAT (OCLC) to verify basic information about the author, editor, and publisher, as well as their interactions; I extensively used the Chinese National Index to Chinese Newspapers & Periodicals (*Quanguo baokan suoyin*) and

²³ Ross King, “Nationalism and Language Reform,” in Hyung Il Pai and Timothy R. Tangherlini, eds., *Nationalism and the Construction of Korean Identity* (Berkeley: Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, Berkeley, 1998), 33–72.

found writings of Korean exiles in China that had not been introduced before. I also rely on the additional aid available in the form of extant biographies and company histories, which have been overlooked as resources in previous studies. I also made extensive use of personal literary collections, newspapers, magazines, and pamphlets to gain a comprehensive understanding of the wider network that existed among the texts themselves and their reception by society, which, in this case, covers a broad community of readers. I examine various versions of similar narratives contained in a text, different editions of a text by a single author, forwards and afterwards authored by a third reader, literary reviews, advertisements that appeared in newspapers, and personal reading notes left on the pages of a literary collection to determine how such texts were received by certain readers and to see how Korean scholar-officials and nationalists in exile continued trying to direct the country's future through ongoing interactions with Chinese intellectuals and revolutionaries who were engaged in the practice of writing, editing, and reading various types of texts.

Chapter Summaries

Through the exchange envoys and modern print culture in Shanghai that strongly influenced Korea in the late nineteenth century, Chapters 1 and 2 investigate early Sino-Korean relations prior to 1910. These chapters constitute the first part of my account of Korea's encounter with the modern world through China. I show how Korean envoys' perceptions of China contributed directly to the change in King Kojong's attitude in the modern treaty negotiations with Japan. Following the cultural history of Sino-Korean relations before the Japanese colonial era, Chapters 3 and 4 explore the interactions among Chinese and Korean intellectuals in Shanghai that occurred between 1910 and

1945. Each subsequent chapter focuses on an individual influential Korean nationalist thinker and the extent to which that thinker's activities helped to legitimize Korea's anticolonial struggle.

Chapter 1 focuses on Korea's envoy missions to China between 1860 and 1876 to determine the extent to which traditional Sino-Korean relations contributed to Korea's openness to engage in new international diplomacy. Contrary to the conventional view, which identifies 1876—the year that Korea signed its first international treaty with Meiji Japan—as a turning point, I argue that the central catalyst for Korea's increased openness (to international engagement) was the experience of Korean envoys who traveled to Beijing and saw firsthand the changes that the two Opium Wars had wrought on the Qing empire. During the centuries-long Chosŏn period (1392–1910), Korean envoys were sent to Beijing annually, and in the nineteenth century, each mission gave envoys another chance to witness the dire repercussions of China's encounter with Western imperialism. The envoys' travelogues and written reports, as well as their audiences with the king before and after such missions, reflect the efforts of the Chosŏn elites to accept their conception of the international political landscape from their ideological perspective on the eve of Western imperial intrusion in East Asia. Despite the massive damage the envoys witnessed, they described the potential for Western invasion as a relatively minor threat, more often than not to avert outbreaks of chaos in Korea. By 1876, the Chosŏn elites were already under the influence of Western imperialism. The influence of cultural interactions between the Chosŏn envoys and Qing officials on Chosŏn Korea's later decision to enter into treaty relations with Japan modeled the adoption of Western civilization that took place among many Korean intellectual elites. The envoy missions,

regarded as a ritual characteristic of traditional Sino-Korean relations, along with the evolution of Western influence, played a significant role in Korea's willingness to transition to a new regional order in East Asia. Of course, such changes were not as dramatic as those experienced by the Japanese people.

Chapter 2 investigates the translation and dissemination of new knowledge in Korea from 1882 to 1910. As Western imperialism advanced, new knowledge from the West assumed a central role in shaping the epistemological transformation in Korea; although this has been extensively documented, there have been few studies on how new modes of cultural production in East Asia mediated this transformation. In this chapter, I focus on examining the transnational circulation of modern sinographic printed materials—books, magazines, and newspapers—in Korea during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Given the inevitable introduction of Chinese perspectives and biases via the translation process, I argue that this Chinese interpretation of Western texts is essential to understanding the various facets of the modern experience in Korea in the early twentieth century. This intellectual process—the absorption, refraction, and polarization of Western ideas through a filter of Chinese ideals—sparked the imaginations of Korean intellectuals in the late Chosŏn period and directly informed the Korean reform movements that took place before 1910. I demonstrate how the perceptions of Korean intellectuals influenced by the Chinese translation of Western and Japanese books contributed directly to the shift in Korea's attitude toward the West and the world, delineating Korea's new “national” border and “international” position in the world.

While the two previous chapters considered the social impact of imported Chinese

books in the 1900s, focusing on the unilateral flow of information and its cultural consequences in Korean society, in Chapter 3, I turn my attention to the biographical narratives on An Chunggŭn (1879–1910), a Korean patriot in Korea and assassin of a renowned Japanese statesman. The chapter traces the political context in which Korean exiles Kim T’aeg’yŏng (1850–1927) and Pak Ŭnsik (1859–1925), arguably the two most prolific Korean exile writers in China, published and edited the biography of An Chunggŭn. I address the popularity of these texts among Chinese readers, suggesting that it was based on shared concerns about national crisis and the role of patriotism, as well as the strategic qualities of this writing and editing. The writing and rewriting of the epic of An Chunggŭn engendered it with a cosmopolitan value, as well as the format and literary style that was shared between Korean writers and Chinese readers.

In Chapter 4, I discuss Cho Soang’s presentation of the political legitimacy of an independent Korea in the 1930s. Cho Soang (1887–1958) was the central figure of the Korean nationalist movement in China and a political thinker known for his “Three Equality System” (*Samgyun chedo*) theory, which served as the foundation for the constitution of the Korean Provisional Government (1914–1945 hereafter KPG) and that of South Korean government (1948–). Cho claimed that the “Three Equality System” is derived from the history of the Korean people. This effort was parallel to the Chinese Kuomintang government’s ideological project of reevaluating their tradition and history in response to the radicals of the New Culture Movement from the middle of the 1910s to 1930. Cho Soang’s anthology of Korean traditional literature was thus analogous to the intellectual shift in Republican China. What Cho Soang encountered as the author and editor of *Korean Literary World* (Ch. *Hanguo wenyuan*, Ko. *Han’guk mun’wŏn*,

published in 1932) was, however, a conflict among Korean literary sources that hardly fit into the modern nationalist mythology.

In the conclusion, I discuss how Sino-Korean relations in the early twentieth century illustrate the essential transnational patterns of cultural and intellectual interactions between the Korean and Chinese people regarding the question of national reform and the history of writing on shaping cultures through the exchange of sinographic writings. This was a crucial dynamic in the period leading up to Korea's colonization, it continued in force throughout the colonial and postcolonial era (1945-). Focusing on relational history, I investigate historical areas that are not currently understood or appreciated, thereby contributing to the ongoing discussion of historical reconciliation among East Asian countries and benefiting scholars who are searching for new historical precedents or models.

Chapter 1

China is the Window to Foreign Countries: Korean Envoys to Qing and the Korea-Japan Treaty Negotiation, 1863–1876*

Rethinking the Origin of Korea's Modern Foreign Relations

The idea of Japan as a modernizer in Korean history is not just limited to the Japanese colonial occupation (1910–1945); it also stretches to the transformation of Korea's traditional foreign relations. In 1875, the Unyō Incident on the Korean coastline broke out between Japan and Korea, resulting in Japan demanding an apology and requesting to sign a treaty of amity and commerce, which resulted in the 1876 Treaty of Kanghwa between Chosŏn Korea and Japan. Through this new treaty, the traditional diplomatic relations that the Chosŏn Dynasty had with the Tokugawa Shogunate was abolished, and the new treaty was signed based on the terms of Western European international law. The 1876 Treaty of Kanghwa was followed by an international treaty with the U.S. in 1882 and with Britain in 1883, and with more countries later. In this respect, 1876 was the beginning of a new era in Korea's foreign relations in new terms. Along with the Treaty of Nanjing between the Qing Dynasty and Britain (1842) and the Treaty of Kanagawa (1854) between Japan and the U.S., the Treaty of Kanghwa can be seen as the beginning of unprecedented cultural and economic exchange between the West and East.

* Unlike other chapters, dates this chapter exclusively follows the lunar calendar system.

However, this view has been criticized because of its 1) neglecting of China's, Japan's, and Korea's agency and their own efforts in the process of treaty negotiation with Western imperialism and 2) neglecting cultural and economic networks crossing the East and West that existed long before the introduction of the Western international treaty system.²⁴ Despite these criticisms, the treaty system is often marked as a beginning of Korea's modern foreign relations in major historical narratives: the convincing historical evidence of Japan's successful modernization and Chosŏn Korea's belated (or unwilling) response to Western imperialism in East Asia, which ultimately led to Japan's colonization of Korea.

The current chapter maintains the view that the Kanghwa Treaty is a significant historical event that transformed Korea's foreign relations, but here, I challenge the conventional view that Chosŏn Korea's attitude toward the Western countries and Japan played a significant role in the process of Korea–Japan treaty negotiations. In his study of King Kojong's role in the Korea–Japan treaty negotiations, James Palais favors the conventional view of emphasizing Japan's progressive role in coercing Korea to sign the treaty. Palais asserts that when Japan demanded a treaty, Kojong was hesitant and even lacked confidence in pushing his earlier decision in 1874 to normalize diplomatic relations with Japan. Palais finds that Kojong was an “intellectual captive of Confucian learning,” who lacked any interest in having a systematic understanding of the West. The primary reason for Kojong's change of attitude in 1874 was somewhat an emotional reaction of fear from the possibility of foreign invasion because of the rumors coming

²⁴ Evelyn Rawski, *Early Modern China and Northeast Asia: Cross-Border Perspectives* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015); Takeshi Hamashita, Linda Grove, and Mark Selden, *China, East Asia and the Global Economy: Regional and Historical Perspectives* (London: Routledge, 2008).

through Qing China.²⁵ That is, if there was no such fear, Kojong wouldn't even think about letting Westerners freely come to Korea and spoil his people.

Contrary to the conventional view of King Kojong being a weak, unintelligent monarch who was unable to stop the decline of his country, Yi T'aejin emphasizes Kojong's active role in modernizing Korea,²⁶ and in a similar vein, Yi argues that Kojong eventually decided to change Korea's foreign policy and open trade with Westerners, in the vein of wanting to become a benevolent ruler following the Confucian kingship modeled after his predecessor, King Chǒngjo (r. 1776–1800), seeing it as the inevitable choice.²⁷ Yi contends that King Kojong's adamant determination to initiate open trade and create an enlightenment policy led Chosŏn delegates to continue the treaty negotiation at Kanghwa Island, regardless of the fierce resistance that Kojong met from conservatives in the court. As a result of active engagement in the negotiation, Chosŏn delegates demanded revising nine out of the twelve treaty articles initially proposed by the Japanese delegate.²⁸ Despite the difference between their evaluation, both Palais and Yi leave further questions of what kind of information on the West and Japan Kojong and the Chosŏn government had in helping them have a systematic understanding of the superior military power of Western countries and Japan and the benefit of normalizing

²⁵ James B. Palais, *Politics and Policy in Traditional Korea* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991), 253.

²⁶ Yi T'aejin's revisionist view received wide attention among a wide range of scholars, sparking academic debates in the 2000s about the perspective and limit of King Kojong's modernization policy, with more focus on Kojong's reign after he changed the name of the country; See Yi T'aejin and Kim Chaeho, *Kojong hwangje yŏksa ch'ŏngmunhoe* (Seoul: P'urŭn yŏksa, 2005).

²⁷ Yi T'aejin addresses that Kojong inherited the idea of democratic ruler from King Chǒngjo, who regarded his relationship with his people as a "bright moon reflected on ten thousand of stream and river" (Manch'ŏn myŏngwŏl chuin). Yi T'aejin, "Minbon esŏ minju kkaji – Han'guk'in chŏngch'i ūisik ūi kwagŏ wa mirae", *Han'guksa simin kangjwa* 26 (2000): 19–46.

²⁸ Yi T'aejin, "1876 nyŏn Kanghwado choyak ūi myŏng'am," *Han'guksa simin kangjwa* 36 (2005): 124–139.

the diplomatic relations, which resulted in the attempt of normalizing diplomatic relations with Japan in 1874 and the 1876 Kanghwa Treaty.

Martina Deuchler contends that Kojong's audience with returning envoys and the culmination of the information brought back to Korea led to the eventual decision to establish foreign relations in new terms.²⁹ Since the two foreign incursions in the mid-1860s, the envoys' written reports and their audiences with Kojong were the "old ways" that transmitted "new information," allowing Kojong to collect intelligence on Japan and Western countries and observe Qing China's interactions with Japan and Western countries. I reassert Yi T'aejin and Deuchler's early assertion of the internal change in the Chosŏn court through its absorption of new information from China, here extending the scope of research from Kojong's personal change to its direct impact on the transformation of the behavior of Korean envoys to Qing China and arguing that this change ultimately contributed to Korea's progressive manner adopted toward the treaty negotiation with Japan.

The rest of this chapter will discuss the tradition of the envoy mission to Qing in general and examine previous studies on envoy missions to Qing China in the 1860s, a period when Korean envoys faced the presence of Western imperial power in Qing China's capital city after the Second Opium War (1856–1860). What they report back to Korea was somewhat different from what they saw, as one can see in the difference between their travelogue and reports. This discrepancy was mainly due to the stiffened atmosphere in the Chosŏn court under the dominance of the royal consort clan during the era of King Ch'ŏljong (r. 1849–1864), who reigned right before King Kojong.

²⁹ Martina Deuchler, *Confucian Gentlemen and Barbarian Envoys: The Opening of Korea, 1875-1885* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1977), 12–13.

Next, I focus on the history of imperialism in East Asia in the 1870s, including the changes of the power dynamics in international relations that contributed to the shift of the Chosŏn's diplomatic relations with Japan, which was disrupted in 1867 during the rule of Taewŏn'gun. During his royal training under Taewŏn'gun's regency, King Kojong began to realize his persona as a sovereign ruler outside of Korea, as well as within, from the information Kojong received from China contributed to.

The Scope and Limits of Chosŏn Envoy's Interaction with Qing Officials 1700–1860s

In 1832, when the British ship *Lord Amherst* reached a small island off the coastline of the Ch'ungch'ŏng Province, the British contacted local authorities to request open trade. After receiving the report, the Chosŏn government rejected the request, insisting there could be no interactions with Westerners because the Chosŏn was a vassal state, serving the greater country, namely the Qing Dynasty. In their response, the Chosŏn government reiterated the idiom “people and vassals do not intercourse with each other” from the *Rite of Zhou* and gently refused the foreigner's request. In the response, the Chosŏn government continued to explain that “Britain was too far from Chosŏn to get enough information of what their true intention is. And it continued to explain that engaging in private trading relations with other countries directly was breaking the proper ritual for the tributary states.”³⁰ Even for practical reasons, considering any possible threat to state security, the Chosŏn government lacked the information on the British people, which made it difficult to make a hasty decision to accept their request.

³⁰ *Pibyŏnsa tŭngnok* 1832/07/08, cited from Min Tugi, “19 segi huban Chosŏn wangjo ŭi taeoe wigi ŭisik: che 1 ch'a, che 2 ch'a chungyŏng chŏnjaeng kwa iyangsŏn ch'ulmol e ŭi taeŭng,” *Tongbang hakji* 52 (1986): 259–279.

In addition to believing that opening trade with Westerners would result in national calamity, the ruling elites in Chosŏn Korea wanted to eliminate any external threats that could have contributed to internal dissent. In line with this, Chosŏn Korea maintained its prohibition policy of trade with Westerners. In the 1830s, the Chosŏn government's concern centered on the opium trade and the dissemination of Christianity in Korea.³¹ When the Andong Kim clan seized control over the monarch, they legitimized their dominant power by claiming to be the protectors of society from the evil influences outside. These court politics severely restricted the rise of a new political group that could challenge them, as well as any information that could jeopardize the existing political system they had built.³² Hence, Korea's foreign policy in the early nineteenth century was highly seclusive. The ruling elites attempted to eliminate any external threats that may contribute to internal dissent. Ha Chŏngsik observed that when the yangban elites seized control over the monarch, the yangban elites legitimized their dominant power by claiming to be the protectors of society from evil outside influences. These court politics severely restricted the rise of a new political group that could challenge them, as well as any information that could jeopardize the existing political system they had built.³³

However, one should not consider such prohibition as an unchanging policy throughout the Chosŏn period. King Yŏngjo's (r. 1724–1776) and his successor Chŏngjo's (r. 1776–1800) rule in the eighteenth century and their legacy in the early half

³¹ Min Tugi, "19 segi huban Chosŏn wangjo ūi taeoe wigi ūisik: che 1 ch'a, che 2 ch'a chungyŏng chŏnjaeng kwa iyangsŏn ch'ulmol e ūi taeŭng," 261–266.

³² Ha Chŏngsik, "Yŏnhaeng chŏngbo wa Chosŏn wangjo ūi t'aep'yŏng ch'ŏn'guk insik ūi chŏngch'ijŏk paegyŏng," *Yŏksa hakpo* 145 (1995): 194.

³³ Ha Chŏngsik, "Yŏnhaeng chŏngbo wa Chosŏn wangjo ūi t'aep'yŏng ch'ŏn'guk insik ūi chŏngch'ijŏk paegyŏng," *Yŏksa hakpo* 145 (1995): 194.

of nineteenth century are crucial in understanding the nature of the intellectual network between Korean envoys and Qing scholar-officials and the consort clan that dominated Chosŏn court politics. In historiography, Chŏngjo and his grandfather Yŏngjo were regarded as strong rulers who led the peak of Chosŏn society over its reign of nineteen centuries.³⁴ Compared to this, the nineteenth century was seen as a period of decline because of weak and unintelligent rulers. In recent studies, on the other hand, historians of the late Chosŏn period problematized the epistemological gap between the eighteenth and nineteenth century and find persisting aspects between the two centuries. As we will see in the case of Kim Chosun (1765–1832), the dominance of consort clans in court politics was the legacy of King Chŏngjo's favoritism. Moreover, contrary to the conventional view that emphasizes a sharp contrast between the magnanimous scholarly activities in the eighteenth century and the stagnation in the nineteenth century, in fact, there were number of literary elites in Chosŏn society continuing to pursue extensive learning.³⁵

During the eighteenth century, both King Yŏngjo and Chŏngjo tried to end the factional disputes in the court, which had significantly weakened the monarch's autonomy in statecraft. During Yŏngjo's reign, his Crown Prince Changhŏn (1735–1762) suffered an unfortunate death because of the factional struggle. Therefore, Yŏngjo and his grandson Chŏngjo attempted to regain their authority by implementing the impartiality

³⁴ Hwang Hyŏn's *Maech'ŏn's Unofficial History* (*Maechon Yarak*, 1910) and Pak Ŭnsik's *Painful History of Korea* (*Han'guk t'ongsa*, 1915) are the early exemplars of a similar historical view that evaluates nineteenth century Korea in its declining phase as the end of the traditional dynastic cycle.

³⁵ Yŏksa pip'yŏng p'yŏnjip wiwŏnhoe, *Chŏngjo wa Chŏngjo ihu: Chŏngjo sidae wa 19-segi ūi yŏnsok kwa tanjŏl* (Koyang: Yŏksa pip'yŏngsa, 2017).

policy (*t'angp'yŏng ch'aek*) to repress the dominance of one faction over the others.³⁶

Chŏngjo pursued a “Confucian sage king,” which can be compared to the “philosopher king” that Plato (428?–424? BCE) addressed in his *Republic*. As a sage king, the monarch could legitimately implement the policy of impartiality with his superior morality and depth of knowledge. The era of King Yŏngjo and his successor Chŏngjo (r. 1776–1800) has been regarded as the Korean Renaissance because of the patronage of this strong kingship. Scholars often compare Chŏngjo to the Great King Sejong (r. 1418–1450) because of Chŏngjo’s peculiar interest in the promotion of learning as a significant part of his rule.

The seclusive and even hostile attitude toward the West in the nineteenth century is sharply contrasted with that of the eighteenth century, when there was space to foster curiosity of foreign lands and their culture in a much more open manner through the information that Korean envoys to Qing China could gather. This cultural interaction peaked in the eighteenth century with the establishment of Kyujanggak—King Chŏngjo’s royal library—in 1776, which symbolized his interest and effort in the promotion of learning. King Chŏngjo (r. 1776–1800) appointed young, talented scholars and trained them to work for his statecraft. Chŏngjo often asked for books from the Qing, sending envoys to Qing China to collect books such as the Qing *Imperial Encyclopedia* (Ch. *Gujin tushu jicheng*, K. *Kogŭm tosŏ chipsŏng*), which was published in 1726. As historian Min Tugi points out in his study of Pak Chiwŏn’s *Yehol’s Diary* (*Yŏrha ilgi*),

³⁶ For details on the relation between kingship and politics in eighteenth century Korea, see JaHyun Kim Haboush, *The Confucian Kingship in Korea: Yŏngjo and the Politics of Sagacity* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001); Yu Ponghak, *Chŏngjo taewang ūi kkum: kaehyŏk kwa kaltŭng ūi sidae* (Seoul: Sin’gu munhwasa, 2001); Pak Hyŏnmo, *Chŏngch’iga Chŏngjŏ* (Seoul: P’urŭn yŏksa, 2001).

the envoy missions were an “officially recognized pathway for contact with Chinese culture” and a diplomatic channel between the two states.³⁷ In fact, it was not only the Chinese culture that Korean envoys absorbed, but also information of Western countries.

The envoys’ cultural contact with Chinese scholar officials in the eighteenth century contributed to the promotion of learning inside and outside of Chŏngjo’s statecraft. For example, Pak Chiwŏn (1737–1805), Pak Chega (1750–1815), and Kim Chŏnghŭi (1786–1856) devoted their efforts to the study of Northern Learning (*Pukhak*), which broadly includes the study of institutions in the Qing empire (1636–1912), evidential studies among the Qing literati, and Western learning, including Western technology and Christianity.³⁸ Pak Chega wrote the *Discourse of Northern Learning* (*Pukhak ŭi*) after his visit to Beijing, which shows his reform ideas on a broad range of social and economic problems in Chosŏn society.³⁹ At Beijing, Pak Chega acquainted himself with Qing literati such as Weng Fanggang (1733–1818), a renowned Qing scholar of philological studies.

Scholars often use the term “dispatch of envoys of submission” (*sadae saheang*) to refer to diplomatic relations between Ming China and Chosŏn Korea⁴⁰ and Qing China and Chosŏn Korea. The envoy mission was often called to “present oneself to the emperor (*choch’ŏn*),” meaning “entering the palace and receiving an audience with the emperor (Ch. *tianzi*, K. *ch’ŏnja*),” which symbolizes the hierarchal relations between the

³⁷ Tu-Ki Min [Min Tugi], “The Jehol Diary and the Character of Ch’ing Rule,” in *National Polity and Local Power: The Transformation of Late Imperial China*, ed. Tu-Ki Min, Philip A Kuhn, and Timothy Brook (Cambridge: Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard University, 1989), 1.

³⁸ Benjamin A. Elman, *From Philosophy to Philology: Intellectual and Social Aspects of Change in Late Imperial China* (Cambridge: Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard University, 1984). For discussion on the influence of Qing scholarship in Korea, see Chapter 4 in this paper.

³⁹ Yu Ponghak, *Chosŏn hugi hakkye wa chisigin* (Seoul: Sin’gu munhwasa, 1998).

⁴⁰ Tu-ki Min [Min Tugi], “The Jehol Diary and the Character of Ch’ing Rule,” 1.

Ming and Chosŏn governments. Here, the political elites, who were trained in Confucian learning and recognized the practice of a Chinese ruler bestowing an official title to the ruler of the Korean peninsula as the legitimate diplomatic relation between two states, were sent on the envoy missions. Also, it is true that Confucian international system reinforced the image of “Chinese World Order.” Because of the increased tension between the Qing and Chosŏn, both states needed more contact to earn the trust of their hostile counterpart. By investigating existing historical records, Im Kijung finds that between 1368 and 1636, the Chosŏn dispatched envoy missions 83 times to the Ming, and between 1637 and 1893, the Chosŏn dispatched envoy missions 491 times to the Qing.⁴¹

Envoy missions to Beijing are especially important for understanding how the Chosŏn elites observed the world. Observing Western countries became an important objective of envoy missions after the threat of Western imperialism increased in the late nineteenth century. Yi Kŏnch’ang (1852–1898), a scholar-official who visited Beijing in 1874, writes, “China is the window to foreign countries: if one enters China and spies on them, one can learn about foreign countries.”⁴² During the early period of Chosŏn–Qing relations, the ruling elites in Korea were reluctant to be sent to the heart of the enemy’s country; however, as the Qing rule of the mainland became an inalterable fact and China achieved cultural prosperity, the envoys’ attitudes toward their missions changed.

⁴¹ Although a total sum of the number of envoy missions I have listed is given in “Table 1. Overview of Envoy Mission,” it is different from the number Im suggested in his description. Im Kijung, *Yŏnhaengnok yŏn’gu* (Seoul: Ilgisa, 2002), 11-29.

⁴² Yi Kŏnch’ang, *Myŏngmidang simun jip sŏjŏn*, vol. 16 of *Myŏngmidang jip in Han’guk kojŏn chonghap DB (DB of Korean Classics)*, comp. Institute for the Translation of Korean Classics (Seoul: Han’guk kojŏn pŏnyŏgwŏn, 2018-), http://db.itkc.or.kr/inLink?DCI=ITKC_MO_0661A_0170_010_0040_2009_A349_XML.

What dominated the intercultural network between the Qing officials and the Korean envoys until the early nineteenth century was purely a “cultural exchange,” excluding any trace of political discussion regarding the state affairs in both countries. The communications between the literary elites in the two countries were under heavy surveillance from both governments, of which both Qing officials and Korean envoys were fully aware. As historian Ha Chöngsik analyzes, the envoys to the Qing could provide limited information regarding the Qing’s state affair and the activities of Western countries because of this fear of state censorship. Chinese officials were passive in their communication with Koreans because of the Qing’s strict control policies. Korean envoys also self-censored information in fear of political repercussions in Chosön Korea.⁴³ In other words, the information they brought back to Korea was thoroughly filtered. When the First Opium War (1839–1842) began, the Chosön government received information of the conflict immediately from China, but they paid little attention to it. The 1841 envoy mission to Beijing returned with the news of the British invasion of Guangdong and the resulting Treaty of Nanjing, but the Chosön court did not consider it a possible threat to Korea. Min Tugi observed that although the news alarmed the Chosön court, because of the limited information the envoys could gather, the Chosön court did not acknowledge it as a serious threat.⁴⁴

The academic communities that formed between Qing and Chosön scholars in the early nineteenth century were not under the total censorship by the states and were more

⁴³ Ha Chöngsik, “Yöonhaeng chöngbo wa Chosön wangjo üi t’aep’yöng ch’ön’guk insik üi chöngch’ijök paegyöng,” *Yöksa hakpo* 145 (1995): 147–194, <http://www.dbpia.co.kr/Journal/ArticleDetail/NODE01450777>.

⁴⁴ Daoguang 19/Hönjong 5/10/24, vol. 118 of *Sungjöngwön ilgi* (Hereafter *SJWIG*) [Diary of the Royal Secretariat], comp. National Institute of Korean History (Kwach’ön: Kuksa p’yöngch’an wiwönhoe), <http://sjw.history.go.kr/id/SJW-I05100240-01900>.

than a literary and artistic exchange: sometimes, it was an outlet to share their dissidence against the illegitimate rulers in their governments.⁴⁵ Kim Chŏnghŭi (1786–1856) went to Beijing in 1809 as his father’s personal attendant. There, Kim Chŏnghŭi met with Qing evidential scholars, including Ruan Yuan (1764–1849). This scholarly interaction between Qing scholars and Kim Chŏnghŭi⁴⁶ continued even after Kim went back to Korea. Yi Sangjŏk (1804–1865), Kim Chŏnghŭi’s pupil, was a Korean interpreter who was to follow the envoy mission to Beijing, serving as a pathway between Kim Chŏnghŭi in Korea and Qing scholars in China to vent their political dissent against the illegitimate man in power in their own governments.⁴⁷

Chŏngjo’s Crown Prince King Sunjo (r. 1800–1834) was too young to reign by himself and was only 10 years old when he ascended to the throne.⁴⁸ As the father-in-law of King Sunjo, Kim Chosun came to power as the guardian of the king. Kim Chosun, the leader of the Andong Kim clans, was in fact not far from the scholarly interest on

⁴⁵ Benjamin A. Elman, “Chaoxian hongru Jin Zhengxi yu Qingchao qianjia xueshu” [A Korean polymath Kim Chŏnghŭi and the academic learning in the Qing dynasty during Qianlong and Jiaqing era], *Shijie hanxue* 14 (2014): 35–48.

⁴⁶ Kim Chŏnghŭi had a vast network, which is evident in the great number of personal letters he exchanged with his close friends and pupils—*yŏng’ŭijŏng* (Chief State Councilor) Kwon Ton’in (1873–1859), Yi Haung (1820–1898), a fallen royal descendant who later became *Taewŏn’gun* (grand prince) as the father of King Kojong, Chŏng Yag’yong (1762–1836), another renowned polymath, and Sin Hŏn (1810–1884), a military officer who represented the Korean delegation during the treaty negotiation with Japan (1876) and the U.S. (1882), which made it difficult to assess his political legacy in nineteenth century Chosŏn Korea. An Oesun, “Ch’usa Kim Chŏnghŭi wa shirhak sasang ŭi kwangye e kwanhan chae koch’al,” *Tongyang kojŏn yŏn’gu* 21 (2004): 55–86

⁴⁷ Kang Wi is a significant figure whose diplomatic career exemplifies Korea’s historical transition from traditional tributary diplomacy to the modern treaty system. In 1874 and 1875, Kang Wi went to Qing China as the attendant of the envoys. In 1876, when Korea negotiated with Japan, Kang Wi was one of the Korean delegate’s advisory staff. In 1881 and 1882, Kang Wi went to Japan as a member of the Chosŏn’s investigation group. In 1882, Kang Wi served again as the advisor of the Korean delegate. Yi Hŏnju, *Kang Wi ŭi kaehwa sasang yŏn’gu* (Seoul: Sŏn’in, 2018); Yi Kwanglin, “Kang Wi ŭi inmul kwa sasang,” *Tongbang hakji* 17 (1976), 1–45.

⁴⁸ In Korean and Chinese calculations of a person’s age, Sunjo was 11 *se* (ch. sui) when he ascended to the throne.

extensive learning pursued by his teacher Kim Chŏnghŭi and other yangban elites in the capital area.⁴⁹ And for that, Chŏngjo favored Kim Chosun and his talent and selected him to become his son's closest guardian.⁵⁰ Kim Chosun appointed his consort members to key posts in the government.⁵¹ Kim's position as the leader of the dominant patriarch's faction (*Noron*) and the guardian of the king led him to implement policies that were rather intolerant to the scholarly trend that flourished in the last century. When King Ch'ŏljong (r. 1849–1864⁵²) ascended to the throne, Ch'ŏljong again married Kim Chosun's niece, which made Kim and his clan the closest maternal relatives of the kings in some six decades and hence one of the most powerful elites in nineteenth-century Korea. So the monarch's elder family members became his patrons and yielded power on behalf of the king, controlling government operations.

Kim Chosun's and his family members had little tolerance for heterodox learning because of the increased social unrest in local societies in Chosŏn Korea. In the nineteenth century, local *yangban* elites faced the gradual decline of their economic and social status, which no longer was equal to capital elites (*kyŏnghwa sajak*), who were

⁴⁹ Yu Ponghak, "P'unggo Kim Chosun yŏn'gu," *Han'guk munhwa* 19 (1997): 251–307.

⁵⁰ Kim Chosun's daughter married the Crown Prince after he became the king.

⁵¹ Carter Eckert, *Korea Old and New: A History* (Seoul: Ilchokak Publishers, 1990), 178. The literature touches on the issue of a political power struggle although not many scholars have discussed the broader intellectual and social background of the leaders of the politics of the in-laws, a prosopographical sketch on the cultural and intellectual history of nineteenth-century Chosŏn Korea. In contrast to the view that compares the golden ages versus the downfall, Yu presented Kim Chosun as an example that connects these seemingly different periods. Kim was one of King Chŏngjo's "body guarding bureaucrats" (*ch'inwi kwallyo*). Kim was also publicly criticized because his writing style was influenced by Qing literature during Chŏngjo's "Rectification of the Literary Style" (*Munch'e panjong*), but he quickly admitted his error and regained the favor of Chŏngjo. Yu Ponghak, "P'unggo Kim Chosun yŏn'gu" [Study of Kim Chosun], *Han'guk munhwa* 19 (1997): 251–307.

⁵² Ch'ŏljong died in the twelfth lunar month of 1863, which was January 1874 in the Gregorian calendar.

closely connected to the central government.⁵³ Before the eighteenth century, the local councils (*hyanghoe*), dominated by the local *yangban* elites, played a key role in mediating the central government's control over local society. However, as the social hierarchy became weaker in the eighteenth century, the central government tried to maintain control of local society by enhancing the power of local magistrates directly sent from the capital, especially by imposing a tax on the local areas outside the capital. The local magistrates and local collaborators were dominated the community compacts (*hyangyak*), local councils (*hyanghoe*), and village aid societies (*tonggye*).⁵⁴ Even with the increasing power and role of local society, the capital elites, who dominated the government positions, paid little attention to the local society's corruption and exploitation by local magistrates, despite their increasing role in local politics, which often led to large-scale social unrest in specific areas.⁵⁵ In response to social unrest, the ruling elites, including Kim Chosun and his family, worked on ideological control instead of tax reduction or other measures to ease the social and economic difficulty of living in the local areas.

All in all, in their effort to justify their dominant power over the monarchy, the ruling elites in the nineteenth century harshly attacked anything that was seen as causing disharmony with the state's ideology. Other government officials could not also easily

⁵³ Yu Ponghak. *Chosŏn hugi hakkye wa chisigin* (Seoul: Sin'gu Munhwasa, 1998).

⁵⁴ Kim Ingŏl, "Chosŏn hugi sahoe t'ongje ch'eje ūi wigi – tonggye ūi sŏnggyŏk pyŏnhwa rŭl chungsim ūro," *Chindan hakpo* 58 (1984): 97–143.

⁵⁵ Outside the control of the local *yangban* elites, in the nineteenth-century local people created their own public discourse (*konglon*) in their request to alleviate heavy taxation or have equal shares of it. Pae Hangsob argues that such public consensus among the local people became the platform for the large-scale revolts, such as the 1862 peasant rebellion in three southern provinces or the Tonghak rebellion at the end of nineteenth century. Pae Hangsob, "19 segi huban minjung undong kwa kongron," *Han'guksa yŏn'gu* 161 (2013): 313–347.

speak out against the heterodox learning or the approach of Westerners because they then could be seen as threats to the monarchy's power.

Sinographic Cultural Exchange between Chosŏn Envoys and Qing literati

If one mechanically applies Confucian learning as a norm of cultural domination of China over Korea, it is easy to overlook the possibility of Confucian learning as a means of social and political control in which the Korean people actively participated in their subordination to and resistance against China. In his critique of the current studies of “Neo-Confucianism” in Chinese intellectual and cultural history, Benjamin Elman criticizes the tendency of assuming the Confucian learning as being a system of Confucian cultural hegemony or a prison ideology, which appears in Foucault's writings, of being misleading. Confucian learning, in this regard, should not be seen as a “determinant” of state failure of Qing China, but rather as “valuable records” that need to be critically contextualized for a better understanding of the relations between Confucianism and statecraft in East Asia. This approach helps one avoid the pitfall of assuming history as being a functionalist consequence, neglecting the complex relationship between human agency and historical process.⁵⁶ We can carefully examine Korea's understanding of the world order and its relation to existing Confucian diplomatic rhetoric closer to Korea's own social and political concerns.

The Chosŏn envoys exchanged poems with Qing scholar-officials through their participation in Chinese poetry associations, which emerged in the early nineteenth century before the Opium Wars. The practice of literary exchanges was a powerful tool

⁵⁶ Benjamin Elman, “The Failures of Contemporary Chinese Intellectual History,” *Eighteenth-Century Studies* 43 no. 3 (2010): 371–91.

used to construct stable and peaceful relations between the Qing and Chosŏn governments. The Qing emperor had earlier banned poetry associations in the seventeenth century because the emperor viewed them as a type of partisan activism that pursued private interests beyond shared aesthetic tastes; however, James Polachek observes that poetry associations gradually regained a legitimate role in organizations among the literati, allowing the literati to form a network for political activism.⁵⁷

The Chosŏn envoys were able to express their political views and concerns regarding the demise of the Qing imperial power and the emergence of Western power in East Asia via the literary exchanges in these poetry associations. Im Kijung states that the poetry exchanges appear in travelogues to China, which were the most sophisticated “lingua franca” (*kukje ŏn’ŏ*) and the best method for “using minimalized language to express the most affluent contents with courtesy.”⁵⁸ In his study of Sino-Korean poetry exchanges between the Ming envoys and Korean literati, Sixiang Wang shows that Korea’s poetry exchange with the Ming literati created a sense of nobility and diplomatic confidence for the Korean envoys.⁵⁹ If one did not show an excellent mastery of literary skills through poem exchanges, then Chinese officials became dismissive and did not accept requests for additional meetings. It was common for the Chinese literati to disparage Korean people, who supposedly came from the periphery of Chinese civilization. Thus, outstanding literary skill was crucial to being selected for envoy

⁵⁷ James M. Polachek, *The Inner Opium War* (Cambridge: Council on East Asian Studies, 1992), 17–62.

⁵⁸ Im Kijung, *Yŏnhaengnok yŏn’gu* (Seoul: Ilgisa, 2002), 97, 120.

⁵⁹ Sixiang Wang, “The Sounds of Our Country: Interpreters, Linguistic Knowledge, and the Politics of Language in Early Chosŏn Korea,” in *Rethinking East Asian Languages, Vernaculars, and Literacies, 1000-1919*, ed. Benjamin Elman 58–95; Sixiang Wang, “Co-constructing Empire in Early Chosŏn Korea: Knowledge Production and the Culture of Diplomacy, 1392–1592” (Ph.D dissertation, Columbia University, 2015).

missions to Beijing.

The Korean envoys used Confucian rhetoric to achieve their diplomatic goals. The functionalist interpretation that regards Confucian learning as the undisputed foundation of Sino-centric diplomatic relations provides a historical interpretation of Sino-Korean relations; envoys paid special attention to communicating with Chinese people, which in turn furthered their own interests. Pak Chiwŏn (1737–1805), a late Chosŏn scholar-official famous for his literary brilliance, which is also reflected in his travelogue *Jehol Diary* (*Yŏrha ilgi*), comments on the attitude that envoys should adopt in the presence of the Chinese literati:

Therefore, in order to gain their heart, one must extremely praise the reputation of the great country and its civilization to make their minds calm and also sincerely show that China and our country (Korea) are one body to avoid any suspicion. On the one hand, add comments about their rituals and music pretending that you admire its elegance, and on the other hand, when you refer to their history, do not mention their recent past. And then bend your will and plead that you want to learn. Let them speak free from all anxiety, and disguise as if you don't understand to make them feel impatient. After doing that, the truth or lie will show up between their eyebrows, and you will be able to detect their favor while they laugh and talk: this is how I gained their influence from between the lines.⁶⁰

⁶⁰ Kim Kyŏngsŏn, *Kugyong kyoyu*, vol. 6 of *Yŏnwŏn chikji*, in *Han'guk kojŏn chonghap DB (DB of Korean Classics)*, comp. Institute for the Translation of Korean Classics (Seoul: Han'guk kojŏn pŏnyŏgwŏn, 2000-), http://db.itkc.or.kr/inLink?DCI=ITKC_BT_1428A_0070_010_0140_2004_010_XML.

A century later, when Kim Kyōngsŏn (1788–1853) became secretary of the envoy mission, he quoted Pak's words in his own travelogue to remind himself of the importance of the demeanor he should adopt in conversations with the Chinese literati. Pak Chiwŏn's passage taught Korean readers how to gain the Chinese people's favor by utilizing expressions of respect and even by manipulating facial expressions and maintaining a submissive and humble attitude. Although such intense communication strategies were not so helpful during the early nineteenth century, it became a crucial skill when Korean envoys were desperate in gathering information on Western countries in the late nineteenth century after hearing the news of the two wars between the Qing dynasty and Western countries.

Curtailed Report of Catastrophe: Beijing in Peace under Western Troops

The travel routes of the Chosŏn envoys to China were designed under the Qing's border control policy, who prohibited sea route travel by Chosŏn envoys until 1882. After the Manchus took control of mainland China in the middle of the seventeenth century, Ming loyalists fled to the southeast coastal area and adjacent islands and there held a continuous revival movement until 1683. To prevent a larger anti-Qing movement around the coastal area, the government initiated a strict policy of prohibiting maritime trade. Hence, before 1842, Westerners could only trade with China via ports in the Guangzhou region and were only able to trade with China under the supervision of Chinese merchants selected by the Qing government. As the demand for Chinese tea and silk sharply increased in Britain, there was a huge trade imbalance of trade between the Qing government and Britain. In 1759, Guangzhou was the only port that the British could access. The British government requested that China open additional treaty ports and

offer more trading rights, but the Qing government rejected these requests.

When the British increased the export of opium to China, it began to reverse the flow of silver. Because of its large economic impact, in 1839, the Qing government dispatched Lin Zexu (1785–1850) to Guangzhou to regulate the opium trade. The detention of British merchants and officials and the confiscation of opium sparked a military intervention by the British naval fleet. The battle between Qing's coastal defense and the British was the First Opium War (1839–1842), which ended after the Qing government chose to accept the British terms of the Nanjing Treaty (1842).

The Nanjing Treaty opened five treaty ports on the southeastern coastline of the Chinese mainland. Even though the British gained more trading rights after their victory in the First Opium War, the treaty ports—Canton, Xiamen, Fuzhou, Ningbo, and Shanghai—were all below the Yangzi River. The Qing government refused to provide any other open port in the northern bay areas close to the capital city, Beijing. Moreover, the treaty was signed between British authorities and the governor-generals of the southeastern provinces—not the Qing emperor. Because of this, whenever there was a conflict, the British could only negotiate with the local government authorities, who lacked ultimate power over the issue.

The impact of the news of the Second Opium War (1856–1860) was more serious than that of the First Opium War. The biggest difference was that after 1860, Chosŏn envoys witnessed the presence of Westerners in the capital city of Qing China. In 1860, the Xianfeng Emperor (r.1850–1861) escaped to the summer palace in the northeast because Beijing was occupied by Western forces. The Franco-British army defeated Qing China and ravaged Beijing, the imperial capital of the Qing dynasty. The Western forces

also burned Yuanming yuan, a beautiful summer palace in suburban Beijing. After signing the Convention of Beijing (1860), the Qing established *Zongli Yamen* (foreign office), a government institute that managed Western affairs; this came with the rise of the Qing's self-strengthening movement, a serious campaign of military and economic reform. With the absence of the Xianfeng Emperor, Prince Gong (1833–1898) led the self-strengthening movement in Beijing. The Qing government established military arsenals by using Western military technology to strengthen the Qing's military and naval power. Wen Xiang (1818–1876) proposed the establishment of the New Corps (*Xinjiying*), a new army corps trained with advanced Western firearms—gifts from Russia—and that was established in Tianjin. The Westerners who were hired in the Chinese military arsenals assisted in the Qing's efforts to build a modern steamship and firearms. In 1863, Zeng Guofan (1811–1872), the commander charged with ending the Taiping Rebellion, established arsenals and shipyards in Southeastern China; he oversaw the construction of the first Chinese steamship, called the *Yellow Swan* (*Huanghu*). He also sent Chinese students to America to learn military technology and purchase modern machines and weapons. The Translation College (*Tongwen guan*) was established in Beijing in 1862, and there was a Translation Office established under the Jiangnan Arsenal at Shanghai in 1865; the Qing government established these offices to translate Western books on military technology and international affairs into Chinese and train Chinese students to learn English.

The Korean interpreter Kim Kyōngsu (1818–?) first delivered the news of the fall of Beijing to the Chosŏn court in the first month of 1860. Kim Kyōngsu had been dispatched to Beijing as a messenger in the previous year to receive the new calendar, but

because of the seriousness of what he witnessed, he wrote a report that detailed the information of the aftermath of the Western invasion of Beijing. When the news arrived in Korea, it circulated from the capital to the rural areas. Some of the ruling elites in the capital feared that Westerners would attack Seoul, so they retreated to rural areas.⁶¹ The news also shocked the people in the countryside. Ch'oe Cheu (1824–1864)⁶² feared that a Western invasion was coming. In response, Ch'oe founded Eastern Learning (*Tonghak*) to defend people from the evil influences of Western learning and Christianity.⁶³ Because of its widespread support, Eastern Learning later became the ideology of the peasant uprisings in the 1890s. In the *Song of Encouraging Learning* (*Kwŏnhakga*), the shock of the Western invasion in the East is inscribed in the following lyrics:

*Words spreading from the year of monkey (1860),
Sorcerous Western enemies invaded China,
Erected temples of Heavenly Lord highly and their so-called way
Is now spreading Everywhere under Heaven, how could one not laugh at it?*⁶⁴

The song describes the status of China under the heavy influence of Western heresy, namely Christianity. The high towers of the Christian church look down on the

⁶¹ Min Tugi “19 segi huban Chosŏn wangjo ūi taeoe wigi ūisik: che 1 ch’a, che 2 ch’a chungyŏng chŏnjaeng kwa iyangsŏn ch’ulmol e ūi taeŭng,” 268.

⁶² Ch'oe Cheu's father was a member of a fallen *yangban* line, and his mother was a remarried woman—his father being her second husband. It is possible that Ch'oe was even an illegitimate son.

⁶³ George L. Kallander, *Salvation Through Dissent: Tonghak Heterodoxy and Early Modern Korea* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2013), 28–57.

⁶⁴ Ch'oe Cheu, *Chuhae Tonghak kyŏngjŏn*, annotated trans. Yun Sŏksan (Seoul: Tonghaksa, 2009), 476.

city of Beijing, which vividly symbolizes the Chinese under the influence of Western culture. Through his new religion, Ch'oe urged people to practice the native way of learning to prevent Western influence.

However, when the 1860 envoy mission left, the envoys were unaware of the devastating conditions in Beijing. Sin Sök'u, the chief envoy of the 1860 envoy mission, was the first among the Chosŏn ruling elites who witnessed the aftermath of the Second Opium War. Sin represents a strong current in the intellectual atmosphere in the late nineteenth-century Chosŏn Korea. He was an influential political figure in the Chosŏn court; he passed the civil examination in 1834 and was appointed the local magistrate of Yonggang County, the district officer of Ich'ŏn, the governor of Kyŏngsang Province, and the minister of rites. Along with Pak Kyusu, he received special treatment from King Ch'ŏljong.⁶⁵

Most of all, Sin Sök'u was a close friend of Pak Kyusu (1807–1877), the grandson of Pak Chiwŏn. Sin is an important figure to study because of his close relationship with Pak Chiwŏn, the forerunner of Northern Learning in the previous century. Sin was a strong admirer of Pak Chiwŏn's scholarly achievement, including Pak's keen interest in learning from the Qing institution and its customs.⁶⁶ For example, when Sin was the governor of the Kyŏngsang province, he visited Anŭi County, where Pak Ch'iwŏn served as the county magistrate before, to show respect to Pak Chiwŏn. In Anŭi country, there were some pavilions that Pak Chiwŏn built, and Pak Chiwŏn named those structures after famous Chinese places; also, the structures were not built with

⁶⁵ Kim Myŏnggho, "Haehang Sin Sök'u ŭi Ip'yŏn'gi e taehan koch'al," *Kojŏn munhak yŏn'gu* 32 (2007): 465–488.

⁶⁶ Kim Myŏnggho, "Haehang Sin Sök'u ŭi Ip'yŏn'gi e taehan koch'al," 469–70.

wood but with bricks, itself imitating Chinese architecture.⁶⁷ In addition, he cherished Pak's *Yehol's Diary*: when Sin visited the places Pak wrote about, Sin wrote down quotations from *Yehol's Diary* in his travelogue.⁶⁸

Sin believed that Koreans should not disdain Chinese people who wore Manchu costumes and queues because there was much continuity in the genealogy, mentality, academia, and talent from one Chinese civilization to the Han Chinese literati who lived under the Manchu ruler. The Qing Dynasty also respected the civilizing power of the literary culture as other Chinese dynasties did. In particular, the *Complete Books of the Four Storehouses* (*Siku quanshu*) was a magnificent project that no other Chinese dynasty had ever accomplished. Sin also sensed a strong continuity with the Han Chinese people and their cultural power, which was the same as what other Korean travelers like him saw. In a letter to his friend Yun Yuk (1803–?) before leaving for Beijing as an assistant of the envoy mission to China in 1850, Sin expresses his admiration of the advanced culture in Qing China:

People admire the Chinese culture because it transforms barbarians. Today, Chinese literati and their genes, scholarships, and talents are no different from the past. Even though the writings that contain the Way were pillaged because of its superiority, the writings were collected and fill the bookshelves, which is more splendid than any time before. How could one look down on them and neglect them only because of their barbarian clothing and their queue!⁶⁹

⁶⁷ Pak Chongch'ae, *Na ūi abŏji Pak Chiwŏn*, trans. Pak Hŭibyŏng, (Seoul: Tolbegae, 1998), 102–103.

⁶⁸ Kim Myŏngho, “Haehang Sin Sŏk'u ūi Ip'yŏn'gi e taehan koch'al,” 472.

⁶⁹ Sin Sŏk'u, *MJCG* 127: 420, cited in Kim Myŏngho, “Haehang Sin Sŏku ūi Ip'yŏn'gi e taehan

Sin Sŏk'u favored Northern Learning, but he was reluctant to accept the value of Western learning; his concern, though, rested with the socio-economic conditions of Korea at the time, writing, "Opinion on reforming the administration of the three main sources of state revenue" (*Samjŏng ku p'yeŭi*) in 1862 after he returned from Beijing. Yun Chong'ŭi (1805–1886), one of Sin's long-time acquaintances, strongly opposed the spread of Western learning among Korean people. In his famous writing, *New Compendium of Dispelling Heterodoxy and Defending Orthodoxy* (*Pyŏksa sinp'yŏn*), Yun addresses the danger of Western learning and suggests fortifying Korea's maritime defenses to block any contact with the West so that the government can prevent the spread of Western learning in Korea. Yun believed that Christianity was the central ideology within Western learning and that it would eventually corrupt the minds of the Korean people. It was also Yun who compiled Sin's literary works after Sin passed away, and the fact that Yun was the compiler of Sin's work suggests their shared worldview.

The *Diary of Entering Yanjing* (*Ip'yŏn'gi*), a travelogue that Sin wrote during his mission, documents Sin's account of China after Western invasion⁷⁰ and is a useful source to see how the ruling elites in Korea responded to the events in Beijing. In the travelogue, Sin acknowledges the superiority of the Westerners' military strength:

Our country as a royal kingdom with a domain of six thousand li is facing a time when our neighboring country is in a critical moment. We don't promote

koch'al," 472.

⁷⁰ I used the Korean translation published in Sin Sŏk'u, "Sin Sŏk'u ŭi Ip'yŏn'gi yŏkju 1, 2" trans. Kim Yongt'ae and Chang Chinyŏng et al., *Hanmun hakpo* 32 (2015): 335–380; *Hanmun hakpo* 33 (2015): 135–177.

defending ourselves but merely sit down to see the evil invoked upon us, which is nonsense. People in our country easily fear the unrest, and those who are suppressive and high-handed hate to hear talk about a crisis. If there is really an uneasy situation, what should we do? The current situation is uglier than before; however, the listeners rather tried to close their ears with heavy self-indulgence. Alas! Why can't there be a strategy to suppress the enemy? It is only by planning and conducting it. If we truly want, the current affairs at Liaodong and Shenyang must be observed firsthand. Therefore, I kept the history of it short and gave lengthy words and details on the current situation to address those who are mindful of military and state affairs.⁷¹

In his writing, Sin regards Western learning as a threat to the Confucian learning, and as the Minister of Rites under the rule of Korea's consort clans, he acknowledges that the power of the Western military invasion does not logically lead to the claim of the necessity of Western learning as a means of strengthening Korea's military defense system. Instead, Sin believed that the traditional Qing defense system he saw at Liaodong and Shenyang was stronger than Western military power. It was the internal discord that temporarily weakened the Qing's defensive system and led the Western army to breach Beijing. Instead of promoting an open-country policy, Sin wanted to strengthen Korea's coastline defenses to protect the Chosŏn people from Western influence.

After he passed the Qing fortress castle Nigyan on his way to Beijing, Sin expressed that the strength of the Qing army remained at the castle where Yuan and his

⁷¹ Sin Sŏk'u, *Haejangjip*, *MJCG* 127: 576–577.

Ming army defeated Nurhaci's (1559–1626) army and had caused Nurhaci to die in fury. After close investigations of multiple layers of the castle walls and fortified gates, Sin admired the majestic wall defense system and could not believe the Qing Dynasty had inferior military technology.⁷²

When Sin exchanged poems with Qing officials, he expressed his discomfort in allowing the presence of Westerners in Chinese land.⁷³ Sin believed that the Qing should adopt a hardline policy against Westerners. The Qing officials who met with Sin viewed the Sino-Western treaty and the privileges of the Western people merely as extensions of a traditional “loose reins (*jimi*)” policy—endowing them with Chinese titles and treating them as officials under the direction of the Chinese government. These officials also predicted that increased Sino-Western contact would ultimately contribute to the growth of Confucian teachings in the Western world. In response to the Qing officials, Sin rebuked their optimism and expressed his concerns regarding the spread of Christianity in China and its outcomes, which could also seriously impact the Chosŏn people.⁷⁴ For Sin, those Qing officials were merely justifying the morally wrong decision that had allowed Westerners to associate with them.

After arriving in Beijing, Sin realized that the Qing Ministry of Rites would be unable to perform proper welcoming rituals for the Chosŏn envoys. So while staying in

⁷² Sin Sŏk'u, *Haejangjip*, in *MJCG* 127: 579.

⁷³ *Hanke Shicun* (Remaining poems by the Guests from Korea) contains volumes of literary works—poems, prose, and letters—exchanged between the Qing literati and Chosŏn envoys during the late Qing period. Dong Wenhuan died without completing his lifetime project of compiling a Sino-Korean literary exchange. Li Yu, a professor at Shandong University, collected Dong's remaining manuscripts and published them with the title *Hanke Shicun* in 1995. Kim Myŏngho, “Dong munhwan ūi Han'gaek sijon kwa hanjung munhwa kyoryu,” *Han'guk hanmunhak yŏn'gu* 26 (2000): 391–418.

⁷⁴ Dong Wenhuan, Li Yu, and Ch'oe, Yŏnghŭi eds., *Hanke shicun* (Beijing: Shumuwenxian chubanshe, 1996), 145.

Beijing, Sin sent a separate message to Korea, using vernacular Korean to keep it hidden from the Qing government and spoke of the current troubles. Because the emperor was not in Beijing, all the welcoming ceremonies where the Korean envoys could have an audience with the Qing emperor had been cancelled. Although they could not communicate with the emperor without a translator, an audience with the emperor was both the duty and privilege of the envoys, who had orders to see the emperor and show Chosŏn loyalty to the emperor on behalf of the Chosŏn king. Usually, there was a banquet, and the Qing emperor would offer liquor and food to the envoys and present gifts to them. In return, the envoys would present tributes they had brought from Korea and lay them at the emperor's feet; however, the Qing Ministry of Rites ordered the Korean envoys to remain at Beijing without visiting the emperor. The expected banquet was also cancelled. On New Year's Day, Sin could only bow toward the direction of the Qing emperor.⁷⁵

When Sin Sŏk'u returned to Korea, he feared the domestic chaos caused by the news more than the Western advance itself. After completing his duty, Sin Sŏk'u reported to the Chosŏn court on the 27th day of the third month of 1861. Before the throne, Sin emphasized that the situation in Beijing was less chaotic than the Korean people would expect, saying:

(Qing) forcefully made peace with Western Barbarians, the foreign invaders kept thriving, and the Imperial chariot fled to the North. Hence, it cannot not be said that the realm is not chaotic; however, the capital city, imperial palaces, local

⁷⁵ Sin Sŏk'u, *Haejangjip*, in *MJCG* 127: 587.

offices, markets, workshops, and villages are quietly settled down as before, and the troops on the outskirts are organized and at leisure. Enemies are hiding near provinces, but the troops are well-controlled and relaxed because the minds of the people were not stirred in advance, and the court doesn't insist on them with severity (to demand timely completion). Thus, the people are neither astonished nor perturbed.⁷⁶

For Sin, Beijing was now at peace, and there would be no further military action. Indeed, it was not a peaceful circumstance with the presence of foreign troops in the palace and the burned buildings and summer palace, but what Sin attempted to emphasize here was that the situation was no longer out of control, which was a fear of the Chosŏn court. Sin made sure to state that the military campaign of the foreign troops was over, and they were not preparing for immediate strikes. Sin attempted to emphasize that even if the situation was under control and peaceful, it was an unprecedented event to see the Chinese empire being humiliated by barbarian troops. What made Sin even more concerned was the possibility that this may even stimulate more disruptions in Korea. In other words, Sin's view was subject to his position as a ruling elite, one who had to try to maintain his power and status.

Sin acknowledges the seriousness of the Western invasion, but he does not want the news to stir the minds of the commoners in Korea. If the unfiltered news reached Korea, then it would be nothing but a stimulus for unruly people such as Hwang Sayŏng

⁷⁶ *Ch'ŏljong sillok*, 13.4a, Ch'ŏljong 12.3.ŭlmyo. comp. Kuksa p'yŏnchan wiwŏnhoe, ed., *Chosŏn wangjo sillok* (Kwach'ŏn: Kuksa p'yŏnchan wiwŏnhoe), http://sillok.history.go.kr/id/kya_11203027_001.

(1775–1801), who had tried to contact the Vatican to persuade Catholic churches and countries to come to Korea with military power to protect the Church’s missionary works and Korean proselytes. A Western invasion was another sign of the Qing Dynasty losing control of its population, and this did not necessarily mean a total defeat of Chinese civilization. Sin’s personal writings reveal the contradictory nature of the political power in the Chosŏn court, one that left Korea vulnerable to the encroachment of foreign powers.

Without leaving behind an heir, King Ch’ŏljong passed away in 1864. At the time, Queen Sinjŏng (1809–1890)⁷⁷ was the oldest senior in the royal family, so Queen Sinjŏng chose a collateral family—Yi Haŭng’s (1820–1898)⁷⁸ 12-year-old second son—and registered him to carry on the direct line of the royal family and become the next king. When Kjong (r. 1864–1907) ascended to throne, he was only 12 years old. Therefore, before he could govern the country, Queen Sinjŏng acted as regent. However, behind the scene, Kjong’s father, Yi Haŭng, better known as Taewŏn’gun (Grand Prince), became the de facto man of power.⁷⁹

Rise of Taewŏn’gun and His Defense Policy Against Western Invasion (1864–1874)

The rigid atmosphere in the Chosŏn court when it came to Western countries continued in King Kjong’s early reign, an era when his father, Taewŏn’gun, was the de facto ruler. Regarding foreign policy, Taewŏn’gun’s rule (1864–1874) was a continuation

⁷⁷ Queen Sinjŏng married Crown Prince Hyomyŏng (1809–1830), who died before ascending to the throne. Her son became king Hŏnjong.

⁷⁸ Yi Haŭng was a descendent of Prince Inp’yŏng (1622–1658)—third son of King Injo (r. 1623–1649), and registered as the stepson of Prince Namyŏn (1788–1836), who was the fourth son of the Crown Prince Changhŏn (1735–1762)—father of King Chŏngjo.

⁷⁹ For more details on Taewŏn’gun’s active part in the background, see James B. Palais, *Politics and Policy in Traditional Korea*, 23–42.

of the consort clans. Because Taewŏn'gun's strong involvement in political decision making postponed the direct rule of the monarch and weakened the monarch's authority, Taewŏn'gun directly attacked the yangban elites' privileges; however, Taewŏn'gun continued to earn strong support from the yangban elites for his strong push for a seclusion policy and purge of Christianity in Korea. In 1866, Taewŏn'gun ordered a nationwide persecution of Catholic priests and believers, known as the Pyŏng'in Persecution. This purge lasted for five years, and during the manhunt, nine French priests were captured and executed, along with Korean Catholic believers, totaling an estimated 8,000.

When the news of the Pyŏng'in Persecution was sent to France, the French government dispatched their fleet to Chosŏn Korea. The French occupied Kanghwa Island, a strategic point located at the mouth of the Han River, which is only 40 miles from Seoul, making the French a looming threat to the Chosŏn government. The French navy took the island for a month and pillaged and burned the royal treasures stored in Kanghwa; after facing strong resistance from Korean defense forces, the French finally withdrew.⁸⁰ Also in 1866, an American ship called the *General Sherman* sailed to the Taedong River and requested trade. Pak Kyusu, the governor of the P'yŏng'an Province, ordered the ship to be burned and the crew to be killed. In retaliation, in 1871, American warships attacked the Kanghwa Strait and requested a plenipotentiary for an apology and compensation, but they retreated back to their base in China without achieving their goal.⁸¹ Although both the French and Americans retreated without achieving what they

⁸⁰ Kibaik Lee, *A New History of Korea*, trans. Edward W. Wagner (Seoul: Ilchokak Publishers, 1984), 264.

⁸¹ Carter J. Eckert et al., *Korea Old and New: A History* (Seoul: Ilchokak Publishers, 1990), 195.

had set out for, this unprecedented intrusion by Western powers in Korea increased the young Kojong's concern of Western invasion.

It was not only the Westerners who threatened Korea. In 1867, *Zhongwai xinbao* (*News from Home and Abroad*), a Chinese newspaper in Hong Kong, published an article on Japan's preparations to invade Korea. Yadō Masayoshi, a Japanese samurai living in Hong Kong, claimed that Japan was preparing a military expedition to reprimand the king of Korea, because the Chosŏn king had abolished the old practice of paying tribute to Japan and the country's strong military power.⁸² The rumor of Japanese invasion was published in the second month of 1867; this was immediately reported to the Zongli Yamen, and in the third month of 1867, the Zongli Yamen sent an official letter to Korea to inform the Chosŏn government of the rumor of Japan's plan to invade. Later, at the Japan–Korea negotiation table in 1876, Sin Hŏn (1810–1884) used this occasion to blame Japan for aggravating the diplomatic relations between Korea and Japan by spreading rumors.

Back in Japan, the diplomatic skirmish between Japan and Korea developed into a discussion of a military expedition into Korea, known as *Seikan ron* (discussion on the conquest of Korea). Yoshida Shōin (1830–1859), one of the renowned intellectuals in the late Tokugawa period, addressed the “conquest of Korea” as Japan's first footstep toward regaining national power and prestige, which was lost by Japan's unequal treaty with Western imperial powers. Yoshida brought up the “Empress Jingu (201–269)'s conquest of Korean peninsula” in *Nihon shōki* (*The Chronicles of Japan*), using it as a historical precedent. As a renowned scholar in the Chōshū domain, many of the leaders of the Meiji

⁸² Sin Hŏn, *Simhaeng ilgi: Chosŏn i kirok han Kanghwado choyak*, trans, Kim Chonghak (P'aju: P'urŏn yŏksa, 2010), 113–116.

Restoration, such as Kido Takayoshi (1833–1877), Inoue Kaoru (1836–1915), Yamagata Aritomo (1838–1922), Itō Hirobumi (1841–1909), Katsusa Tarō (1848–1913), and Terauchi Masatake (1852–1919), were influenced by Yoshida’s expansionist thoughts.⁸³ The discussion on whether to “punish and conquer Korea” split the leadership of the Meiji Restoration, which culminated in the assassination of a political opponent and nationwide riots.⁸⁴ Regardless of its validity or practicality, the debate on the Korea problem allowed the Japanese to focus on securing their political, security, and economic interests.⁸⁵ In 1873, the Japanese government sanctioned Saigō Takamori’s plan to raise war against Korea; however, after the return of the Iwakura mission from Europe, the Japanese government reversed its decision to attack.⁸⁶

In Japan, the Meiji Emperor (r. 1867–1912) claimed direct rule and the end of the Tokugawa Shogunate (1603–1868). In 1868, the new Japanese government sent an imperial edict to Korea via the Japanese House (*Waegwan*) in Pusan, which the local

⁸³ Kido Takayoshi was the imperial advisor of the Meiji Emperor and was dispatched to Western countries to renegotiate unequal treaties. Inoue Kaoru served as the foreign affairs minister, agriculture and commerce minister, home minister, and the finance minister. Yamagata Aritomo was the minister of war, who later who served as the third prime minister. Itō Hirobumi was the first, fifth, seventh, and tenth prime minister of Japan and the first resident-general of Korea (1905–1909). Katsusa Taro was the vice-minister of war and later served as the eleventh, thirteenth, and fifteenth prime minister. Terauchi Masatake started his career during the Boshin War (1868–1869) and Satsuma Rebellion (1873–1877) and was appointed the minister of war in 1901. In 1910, Terauchi became the first governor-general of Korea (1910–1916). For a discussion of *Seikan ron*, see Yi T’aejin, “Yoshida Shoin kwa Tokutomi Soho – Kūndae Han’guk ch’imnyak ūi sasangjōk kijo,” *Han’guksa ron* 60 (2014): 55–602; Key-hiuk Kim, *The Last Phase of the East Asian World Order: Korea, Japan, and the Chinese Empire, 1860-1882*, 89-109.

⁸⁴ For details of the logic of *Seikan ron* and the opponent’s view, see Saigō Takamori, “Letters to Itagaki on the Korean Question,” Ōkubo Toshimichi, “Reasons for Opposing the Korean Expedition,” in *Sources of the Japanese Tradition* vol. 2, ed. Ryusaku Tsunoda (New York: Columbia University Press, 1958), 148–155.

⁸⁵ Andre Schmid, *Korea between Empires, 1895-1919* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), 26.

⁸⁶ James B. Palais, *Politics and Policy in Traditional Korea*, 22.

magistrate rejected. The official letter sent from Japan discarded Korea's seal of authorization: it used the unacceptable title of "emperor," "imperial decree," and "imperial house" to refer to the Japanese emperor. Moreover, the letter refers to the Chosŏn monarch as "king." Overall, the letter clearly shows the hierarchy between the two countries, which made Taewŏn'gun order a total refusal of the letter.⁸⁷ By refusing the letter, the official diplomatic relations between Japan and Korea were severed. The rumor of Japanese invasion came only a few months after Korea faced the French incursion at Kanghwa Island, and along with the official letter sent by Japan, Taewŏn'gun worked to further fortify Korea's defense system. Because the Chosŏn did not plan to build a naval fleet to protect Korea from the sea, Korea's maritime defense strategy focused on fortifying their fortresses along the coastline.⁸⁸

It was not only Chosŏn Korea that was alarmed by foreign incursions. In the early 1870s, the Qing's foreign policy focused on dealing with the foreign powers and their military occupation of Qing territory. It is important to consider the regional background that shaped the shift of the Qing's non-involvement policy and the purpose of the 1874–1875 envoy mission. Because of border disputes with neighboring countries, it was important for Li Hongzhang, the chief of the Zongli Yamen, to consider the possibility of China losing its influence over Korea.⁸⁹

Political unrest around the Chinese periphery regions posed a significant threat to the Qing's effort to control and stabilize its people. Hence, it was necessary to take every

⁸⁷ James B. Palais, *Politics and Policy in Traditional Korea*, 21–22.

⁸⁸ Yŏn Kapsu, "Pyŏng'in yangyo ihu sudogwŏn pang'ŏ ŭi kanghwa" *Sŏulhak yŏn'gu* 8 (1997): 57–97.

⁸⁹ Key-hiuk Kim, *The Last Phase of the East Asian World Order: Korea, Japan, and the Chinese Empire, 1860-1882*, 76.

measure to keep the status quo without any further military conflict. At the Chinese northwest frontier, the Muslim uprising in the Xinjiang area promoted the invasion and occupation of the region by Russian forces. In 1865, Muslims under Buzurg Khan, and later his deputy Yakub Beg (1820–1877), revolted against Qing authorities. In his effort to obtain power in the Xinjiang area, Yakub Beg also contacted Britain to wield its influence in China and force the Qing to accept the presence of the new Muslim state.⁹⁰ Later, in the 1880s, this incident was used as a pretext for Russia, which moved into the Ili (Yili) area, a strategic point in Xinjiang. The Qing negotiated with Russia and made Russian forces retreat, but as a bargain, the Qing ceded the Ili area to Russia in the 1881 Treaty of Saint Petersburg, also known as the Treaty of Ili. It became obvious that the Qing's failure to secure political control over their periphery areas had resulted in the intervention of Western powers in the Qing's sphere of influence. That is, if the Qing stayed out of the diplomatic discord between Korea and Japan, it may lead to Japan's conquest of Korea.

In the southeast coastal area, Japan planned a military expedition into the Southeast China Sea to distract the heated attention on *Seikan ron*.⁹¹ Although Ryukyu was also regarded as the Qing's tributary state, it had maintained tributary relations with Satsuma. In 1871, when Ryukyu envoys were returning from Japan, their ship drifted to Taiwan. There, Taiwanese aborigines killed the Ryukyu envoys. In response to this incident, Japan dispatched troops to take revenge. After Japan landed in Taiwan, their forces built a military camp and constructed roads for operation routes and support lines.

⁹⁰ Hodong Kim, *Holy War in China: the Muslim Rebellion and State in Chinese Central Asia, 1864-1877* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004).

⁹¹ Key-hiuk Kim, *The Last Phase of the East Asian World Order: Korea, Japan, and the Chinese Empire, 1860-1882*, 190-203.

The Qing protested Japan's use of armed forces in Qing territory and gathered an army to regain Taiwan and prepare for open war; however, after the intervention of Western powers, the Qing and Japan agreed to negotiate. The Japanese troops retreated from Taiwan, and the Qing government paid Japan 500,000 taels, which was not an "indemnity," as the Qing government insisted, but rather "relief money" for the families of the Ryukyu victims and for the facilities that Japan would leave behind in Taiwan; however, because of the cost and damages that the Japanese forces accrued from the expedition, it was an expensive war for Japan. Facing the consequences of being passive when it came to the encroachment of foreign powers, Li Hongzhang decided to intervene on behalf of the Chosŏn and advised opening up the country before the Qing Dynasty completely lost its suzerainty and saw Korea taken over by foreign powers. Specifically, Li Hongzhang believed that the war between the Chosŏn and Japan could lead to China's loss of suzerainty over Chosŏn Korea.

Kojong's Request for Foreign Information: Audience with Departing and Returning Envoys to Qing

In 1874, the Zongli Yamen sent a second message to the Chosŏn via the Board of Rites regarding the new rumor of Japan's plan of war against Korea, explaining that the Japanese government skillfully encouraged the *Seikan ron* to absorb the widespread dissent among the Samurai class in Japan. After receiving the information, King Kojong dispatched Cho Yongha to meet with Japanese officials who were staying in the Japan House at Pusan to find out their real intention. Palais maintains that it was "fear" that made King Kojong and his government move away from Korea's seclusion policy. It is true that King Kojong did not immediately start the renegotiation with Japan to end the

seclusion policy; however, contrary to the time in 1867 when King Kojong received the secret message, here, the monarch became more active in his effort to find hidden opportunities in the crisis, taking a step away from his father's closed-door policy.

Table 1. Envoy Missions to Qing, 1863–1874

Departure (year/month) ⁹²	Arrival	Title of the Envoy Mission
1863.10	1864.3	Winter solstice, appreciation
1864.1	1864.5	Obituary, investiture
1864.9	1865.2	appreciation
1864.10	1865.4	Winter solstice, appreciation
1865.10	1866.3	Winter solstice, appreciation
1866.4	1866.8	Celebration, appreciation
1866.10	1867.3	Winter solstice, appreciation
1867.10	1868.3	Winter solstice, appreciation
1868.11.	1869.3	Winter solstice, appreciation
1869.10	1870.3	Winter solstice, appreciation
1870.10 [†]	1871.3	Winter solstice, appreciation
1871.10	1872.3	Winter solstice, appreciation
1872.7	1872.12	Celebration, appreciation
1872.11	1873.4	Winter solstice, appreciation
1873.3	1873.8	Celebration, appreciation

⁹² I cited An Oesun's table of envoy missions to the Qing from 1863–1874, omitting the names of envoy officers and correcting errors of the dates in An Oesun's table. An Oesun, "Kojong ūi ch'ogi (1864-1873) taeye insik pyŏnhwa wa ch'injŏng - kyŏnch'ŏng hoehwansa sogyŏn ūl chungsim ūro," *Han'guk chŏngch'i hakhoebo* 30 (1996), 249. All years and months are in the lunar calendar.

1873.10	1874.3	Winter solstice, appreciation
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[†]Intercalary month.

When first coming to the throne, Kojong showed little interest in the envoys; the king's first dispatched envoy mission was in the first month of 1864 to proclaim his ascendance and receive investiture.⁹³ Queen Sinjŏng, as regent, corresponded with the envoys on behalf of the young king. Since 1864, Kojong began to hold audience with envoys without the help of Queen Sinjŏng. But it took some time for Kojong to understand the role of envoys. At first, he lacked the ability to differentiate between the departing and returning envoys. When Kojong held audience with the departing envoys in 1864 and 1867, he mistook them as returning envoys, and he tried to thank them for their service, which they had not started yet.⁹⁴

King Kojong's interest in the role of the envoys and the information they delivered gradually grew, as evidenced by his audiences with the envoys as recorded in the *Diary of the Royal Secretariat (Sŭngjŏngwŏn ilgi)*. As Kojong matured, he began to understand the importance of the information he received from the envoys and began to request investigations. In 1866, right after Chosŏn coastline was invaded by the French and an American ship, the *General Sherman*, was burned at nearby P'yŏngyang, Kojong ordered his envoys to investigate in detail the state of affairs in China regarding the West.⁹⁵ In 1868, Kojong ordered envoys to spy on Qing state affairs, especially regarding

⁹³ 1864; Tongzhi 19/Kojong 1/01/20, vol. 127 of *SJWIG*, <http://sjw.history.go.kr/id/SJW-K01100200-02200>.

⁹⁴ In both cases, the conversation after the misunderstanding is omitted. 1864; Tongzhi 3/Kojong 1/01/20, vol. 127 of *SJWIG*, <http://sjw.history.go.kr/id/SJW-K01100200-02200>; 1867; Tongzhi 6/Kojong 4/10/24, vol. 128 of *SJWIG*, <http://sjw.history.go.kr/id/SJW-K04100240-01300>.

⁹⁵ Tongzhi 5/Kojong 3/10/24, vol. 128 of *SJWIG*, <http://sjw.history.go.kr/id/SJW-K03100240->

the recent insurgents in China.⁹⁶ The Muslim Revolt in Xinjiang was too far away to impact Korea, but it is possible that Kojong was concerned about the impact that domestic insecurity in China could have on Korea. Diplomatic relations with Japan was severed at that moment, so it was necessary to consider if the Qing would be capable of aiding Korea if there was a war between Korea and Japan. In 1871, before ordering envoys to investigate this, Kojong asked if any of the envoys had been to Beijing before.⁹⁷ The chief envoy, Min Ch'isang, replied that he had been to Beijing before. As for investigating information, the envoys traveling to China for a second time could overcome many of the limitations of information gathering. If an envoy had any Chinese officials with whom they were already acquainted previously, the envoy could be a great source to hear what Chinese officials really thought about numerous topics. To make sure he was receiving the information he needed, Kojong asked without exception envoys if they had any experience in Beijing for every envoy mission sent between 1872 and 1874.⁹⁸

02600.

⁹⁶ Tongzhi 7/Kojong 5/11/2, vol. 129 of *SJWIG*, <http://sjw.history.go.kr/id/SJW-K05110020-01400>.

⁹⁷ Tongzhi 10/Kojong 8/10/22, vol. 129 of *SJWIG*, <http://sjw.history.go.kr/id/SJW-K08100220-00600>.

⁹⁸ Tongzhi 11/Kojong 9/7/2, vol. 130 of *SJWIG*, <http://sjw.history.go.kr/id/SJW-K09070020-00900>; Tongzhi 11/Kojong 9/11/10, vol. 130 of *SJWIG*, <http://sjw.history.go.kr/id/SJW-K09110100-01200>; Tongzhi 12/Kojong 10/3/10 vol. 130 of *SJWIG*, <http://sjw.history.go.kr/id/SJW-K10030110-01700>; Tongzhi 12/Kojong 10/10/24 vol. 130 of *SJWIG*, <http://sjw.history.go.kr/id/SJW-K10100240-00400>; Tongzhi 13/Kojong 11/10/28, vol. 130 of *SJWIG*, <http://sjw.history.go.kr/id/SJW-K11100280-00600>.

Table 2. Kojong's audience with departing envoys, 1864–1870

Departure date	Response	Farewell	Itinerary	Gift grant	Investigation	Weather	Experiences
1864/01/08†	Chief	o	o				
1864/09/27		o					
1864/10/20	n/a	Welcoming (mistook as returning envoys)					
1865/10/20	n/a						
1866/04/09††	Chief	o	o				
1866/10/24	Chief				o		
1867/10/24	n/a	Welcoming (mistook as returning envoys)					
1868/11/02	Chief, secretary		o	o	o		
1869/10/22	n/a	n/a					
1870/10/25	Chief	o		o			
1871/10/22	Chief	o		o	o	o	o
1872/07/02	Chief, deputy, secretary	o	o			o	o
1872/11/10	Chief, deputy, secretary	o	o		o		o
1873/03/11	Chief	o	o	o		o	o
1873/10/24	Chief, secretary	o		o		o	o
1874/10/28	Chief, secretary	o		o	o		

†: Dowager Cho reminded envoys that this was the first mission sent on behalf of the new king.

(Kojong)

††: Request to discipline the accompanying interpreters.

Source: *SJWIG* 1864/01/08, 1864/09/27, 1865/10/20, 1866/04/09, 1866/10/24, 1867/10/24, 1868/11/02, 1869/10/22, 1870/10/25, 1871/10/22, 1872/07/02, 1872/11/10, 1873/03/11, 1873/10/24, 1874/10/28.

Pak Kyusu (1807–1877), the chief envoy of Korea’s 1872 summer mission, replied to Kojong that he went to meet with the Qing before and hence had many Qing officials he was acquainted with. Unlike other envoys who were uncertain about their investigation mission, Pak Kyusu assured Kojong that he could gather information in detail.⁹⁹ When Chŏng Kŏnjo, the chief envoy of the 1874 mission, was reporting his departure to Kojong, the king asked him to pay more attention to information gathering. Kojong said he knew that the envoys’ written reports (*mun’gyŏnnok*) would contain such information, but the envoys could gather information in detail outside these official reports. Chŏng Kŏnjo replied he would gather information from what he heard and saw, but he was incompetent for this type of mission. In reply, Kojong said there was no relation between the mission and talent or insight.¹⁰⁰ Chŏng Kŏnjo might have exaggerated his humbleness to Kojong; Chŏng Kŏnjo indeed paid serious attention to the special order he received from Kojong and eventually was accompanied by Kang Wi

⁹⁹ For more information on Pak Kyusu’s trip to Beijing and its relation to the formation of Pak Kyusu’s open-door policy, see Yi Wanjae, *Pak Kyusu yŏn’gu* (Seoul: Chipmundang, 1999); Son Hyŏngbu, *Pak Kyusu ūi kaehwa sasang yŏn’gu* (Seoul: Ilchogak, 1993); Kang Chaeŏn, *Chōsen no kaika sisō* (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1980).

¹⁰⁰ Tongzhi 12/Kojong 10/10/24 vol. 130 of *SJWIG*, <http://sjw.history.go.kr/id/SJW-K10100240-00400>.

(1820–1884), a man of literary talent, and asked him to keep additional records of his envoy mission to Beijing. From this travel, Kang Wi wrote *Diary of Travel to North* (*Puk'yu ilgi*) and *Notes of Conversation during Travel to North* (*Puk'yu tam ch'o*).

Kojong's Demand and the Change in Choson Envoys

Diary of Travel to North is a journal that Kang Wi kept on a daily basis to record the activities of the 1873 envoy mission from its departure until its return. Kang Wi also recorded Korean envoys' unofficial meetings with Qing officials. The dialogue that Korean envoys had with Qing officials in 1874 are recorded separately in *Notes of Conversation during Travel to North*. The Korean envoys were also known to have dialogues with Qing officials via brush talk (*p'ildam*). Qing officials appear in Kang Wi's record of brush talk and not only vary in their rank, but also in their personal opinion of Western countries, Japan, the Self-Strengthening Movement inside the Qing government, and, last but not least, advice on Korean foreign policy. Besides the monolithic Qing guidelines that Korean envoys heard from official meetings, the private and intimate gathering between the Korean envoys and Qing officials gave the opportunity to Korean envoys to hear different perspectives and discover facts which didn't appear in the official reports. Such information greatly helped Korean envoys understand the complexity of Qing state affairs and its foreign policy from multiple dimensions, and this insight contributed to the decision making in the Chosŏn government.

In fact, the Korean envoys having brush talk with Chinese officials was not an uncommon behavior. However, it was rare to keep a record of the brush talks for later use. In most cases, the written materials were destroyed. Just having a conversation on state affairs that are sensitive to security issues could have backfired, condemning the

people involved in the conversation as traitors. As historian Ha Chöngsik analyzes, the information gathered by envoys was limited because of this fear. Chinese officials were passive in their communication with Koreans because of the Qing's strict control policies. Korean envoys also self-censored information in fear of political repercussions in Chosön Korea.¹⁰¹ However, the stiffened atmosphere in the Chosön court drastically changed after Kojong ascended to rule in 1873 and showed great interest in the information from envoys. The Qing Zongli Yamen told the envoys that it was necessary to provide more information on the superiority the military power of Western countries and Japan and the possibility of the invasion of Korea if the diplomatic tension between Korea and those foreign powers could not be solved. There is no record of Kojong reading Kang Wi's *Diary of Travel to North* and *Notes of Conversation during Travel to North*, but because Kojong asked Chöng Kōnjo to investigate beyond the official records, it is highly possible that Kojong and other high officials in Korea had access to the information collected in Kang Wi's writings. After returning from China, Kang Wi showed his *Notes of Conversation during Travel to North* to his friends; "most of them slipped away because of the fear of getting trouble."¹⁰² In fact, Kang Wi was a transcriber; Chöng Kōnjo was the person who conducted the brush talk and could be charged. Yet Kang Wi's actions cannot be explained without the consensus he had with Chöng Kōnjo, who allowed him to transcribe the brush talk. And for Chöng Kōnjo, it was necessary to fulfil his special mission given by Kojong.

¹⁰¹ Ha Chöngsik, "Yöonhaeng chöngbo wa Chosön wangjo üi t'aep'yöng ch'ön'guk insik üi chöngch'ijök paegyöng," *Yöksa hakpo* 145 (1995): 147–194, <http://www.dbpia.co.kr/Journal/ArticleDetail/NODE01450777>.

¹⁰² Yi Kōnch'ang, "Kang Kohwan myojimyöng," *Myongmidang jip* in *DB of Korean Classics*, http://db.itkc.or.kr/dir/item?itemId=MO#/dir/node?dataId=ITKC_MO_0661A_0200_010_0100.

Later, there will be a detailed discussion about Kang Wi, who directly brought his diplomatic experience with Qing China to the Korea–Japan treaty negotiation in 1876, but it is important to first mention that Kang Wi also visited Beijing in the following year. In 1875, Kojong held an audience with Yi Kŏnch’ang (1852–1898), the secretary of the 1874 mission, among other envoys. The following is from this audience:

Kojong: When you enter [China], if there is valuable information, obtain it in detail and report back.

Yi Hoejŏng (chief envoy): I will obtain information in detail with sincerity and report back.

Kojong: The secretary should obtain broad information.

Yi Kŏnch’ang (secretary): There is a rule to submit opinions on gathered information when the [secretary] returns, but above this, I will obtain information more broadly and report back.

Kojong: Seeing cannot surpass the details of hearing.¹⁰³

Here, Kojong asks Yi to contact the Chinese people and directly hear what they say instead of merely walking around Beijing or gathering written sources. After returning back to Korea, Yi writes, “China is the window to foreign countries: if one enters China and spies on them, one can learn about foreign countries.”¹⁰⁴ The memory of

¹⁰³ 1874; Tongzhi 13/Kojong 11/10/28, vol. 130 of *SJWIG*, <http://sjw.history.go.kr/id/SJW-K11100280-00600>.

¹⁰⁴ Yi Kŏnch’ang, *Myŏngmidang simun jip sŏjŏn*, vol. 16 of *Myŏngmidang jip* in *Han’guk kojŏn chonghap DB (DB of Korean Classics)*, comp. Institute for the Translation of Korean Classics (Seoul: Han’guk kojŏn pŏnyŏgwŏn, 2018-), http://db.itkc.or.kr/inLink?DCI=ITKC_MO_0661A_0170_010_0040_2009_A349_XML.

the envoy mission was deeply connected with the heavy responsibility that he felt after having an audience with Kojong. Kang Wi was asked again to go Beijing as a personal attendant of Yi Kŏnch'ang. Although others would shake their hands and remain silent about Westerners, Yi knew Kang would welcome his suggestion. Yi Kŏnch'ang was new to Beijing, but at least Kang Wi had experience to expedite the information gathering. Again, in Beijing during his second visit, Kang Wi met with the Qing officials he had become acquainted with during the first trip and also had brush talks with other Qing officials. Kang Wi collected the brush talks and titled them *Sequel Notes of Conversation during Travel to North* (*Puk'yu sok tam ch'o*). As with *Notes of Conversation during Travel to North*, *Sequel Notes of Conversation during Travel to North* offers readers a multidimensional approach to understand the complexity of dealing with Japan and Westerners.

The scope and details of the information that Korean envoys brought back to Korea greatly increased in response to Kojong's strong interest. An Oesun's study of King Kojong's audience with the returning envoys shows that the questions Kojong asked changed dramatically, both in quality and quantity, over time.¹⁰⁵ An Oesun divides the research into three periods: early phase right after his ascension (1864–1865); middle phase (1866–1871); and the last phase (1872–1873). For example, in 1864, Kojong only asked one to fourteen questions, mostly about the Qing emperor's health and his appearance. But in 1872, Kojong asked twenty-seven questions; and in 1873, he asked

¹⁰⁵ It seems obvious that Kojong's change of foreign views is highly correlated with his increasing desire for direct rule; however, it is difficult to find a causal relationship between those two correlated behaviors, as An Oesun asserts. An Oesun, "Kojong ūi ch'ogi (1864-1873) taeoe insik pyŏnhwa wa qinjŏng - kyŏnch'ŏng hoehwansa sogyŏn ūl chungsim ūro" *Han'guk chŏngch'i hakpo* 30, no. 2 (1996): 247–265.

seventy-one questions.¹⁰⁶ In 1873, the questions focused on Chinese foreign affairs, especially China's relationships with other states, such as Western countries, Mongolia, Vietnam, and Ryukyu. King Kojong showed interest in the achievement of the Self-Strengthening Movement led by Prince Gong, and Japan's new relations with the Qing also caught Kojong's attention.

When the envoys had an audience with Kojong, not only was the chief envoy required to provide answers to Kojong's intensive interrogation, but also the deputy envoy and secretary had to answer questions. Before 1866, only the chief envoy, serving as the representative of the mission, responded to Kojong's questions. In April of 1873, when the envoy mission had an audience with Kojong, secretary Min Yŏngmok assisted the chief envoy, Kim Suhyŏn, in answering Kojong's questions.¹⁰⁷ In August of 1873, all three officials had to respond to Kojong's tenacious questions.¹⁰⁸

The fluctuation of regional order brought uncertainty to the door of the Chosŏn government, but it was also regarded as a chance to further King Kojong's desire to become a regional ruler. Kojong envisioned himself as the ruler of a suzerain state with its own tributary states. In 1873, during his audience with the envoys and while discussing other foreign entities in Beijing, Kojong asked which tributary states of China also paid tribute to the Chosŏn. Han Kyŏngwŏn replied that Ryukyu, Jurchens, and Siam paid tribute to Chosŏn Korea when the country was founded.¹⁰⁹ Kojong was proud to be a

¹⁰⁶ An Oesun, "Kojong ūi ch'ogi (1864-1873) taeoe insik pyŏnhwa wa ch'injŏng - kyŏnch'ŏng hoehwansa sogyŏn ūl chungsim ūro," 250-251.

¹⁰⁷ 1873; Tongzhi 12/Kojong 10/04/09, vol. 130 of *SJWIG*, <http://sjw.history.go.kr/id/SJW-K10040090-01500>

¹⁰⁸ 1873; Tongzhi 12/Kojong 10/08/13, vol. 130 of *SJWIG*, <http://sjw.history.go.kr/id/SJW-K10080130-00600>

¹⁰⁹ 1873; Tongzhi 12/Kojong 10/08/13, vol. 130 of *SJWIG*, <http://sjw.history.go.kr/id/SJW-K10080130-00600>

ruler of a country that was not merely a tributary state of China, but also a suzerain state that received tribute from neighboring countries. It is possible that the news of the Qing's weak status stimulated Kojong's sense of moral superiority over the Qing ruler, who was merely a regent of the Manchu emperor. Among many other problems was the lack of legitimacy of the Qing government, which was run by an ill-minded regent who wielded power that belonged to the emperor, not him.

When Kojong held an audience with Chŏng Kŏnjo, the chief ambassador of the 1874 mission, Kojong mentioned that the Lama Buddhist status in the imperial court was higher than that of the Imperial Academy and spoke ill of such a "barbarian custom" (*hop'ung*). Kojong disparaged China for being subservient to the demands of Westerners.¹¹⁰ Deuchler analyzes this as an indication that Kojong's and his high officials' "confidence in China was somewhat shaken."¹¹¹ The Qing's relative weakness was emphasized by Kojong's interest in Russia, which occurred after the Qing ceded maritime provinces of the Far East to Russia, meaning that the Russians were appearing at the northeast border beyond the Tuman (Ch. Tumen) River. Kojong asked about the size of the country, and when Chŏng said it was 40 thousand li from east to west, Kojong commented that Russia was "even greater than the great country (China)" in terms of its control over such a vast territory.¹¹²

On the other hand, King Kojong asked if there was anyone who continued to support the Ming Dynasty among the Han Chinese. He asked if any Han Chinese officials

¹¹⁰ 1874; Tongzhi 13/Kojong 11/03/30, vol. 130 of *SJWIG*, <http://sjw.history.go.kr/id/SJW-K11030300-02200>.

¹¹¹ Martina Deuchler, *Confucian Gentlemen and Barbarian Envoys*, 15.

¹¹² 1874; Tongzhi 13/Kojong 11/03/30, vol. 130 of *SJWIG*, <http://sjw.history.go.kr/id/SJW-K11030300-02200>.

knew of the existence of the Imperial Shrine to the Ming emperor in Chosŏn Korea, which reflected the Chosŏn's pride as the successor of Chinese civilization; however, Kojong also showed admiration for the Qing emperors, telling his royal lector Chŏng Kise (1814–1884) that the Qing Qianlong Emperor (1735–1796) was the wisest ruler in Qing history, and Chŏng agreed, adding that along with the Kangxi Emperor, they continued to preserve Chinese civilization.¹¹³ Kojong did not uncritically favor China, but he had respect for certain aspects of Qing culture, especially the exemplary rulers he wanted to emulate.

For Kojong, the outside world was an object of curiosity rather than one of fear, and the envoy missions satisfied his curiosity regarding exotic things outside of Korea. He showed great interest in the envoy's report on the elephant in Beijing. Among the twelve envoy missions between 1872 and 1877, Kojong always asked for information about elephants, such as asking all envoys if they had encountered them. When Pak Kyusu returned from his 1872 mission, Kojong asked him about seeing elephants, and he replied he did not see one.¹¹⁴ Kojong also expressed curiosity regarding the appearance of foreign people. When Yi Sun'ik mentioned the portraits of foreign people in the Chinese market, Kojong asked if he had brought a portrait to Korea.¹¹⁵ Kojong's curiosity of the foreign world fostered his desire to change diplomatic relations with other countries. Importantly, Kojong did not assume that commercial relations with foreigners would ultimately ruin the morality of his own people. In his defense of allowing Westerners to

¹¹³ 1868; Tongzhi 7/Kojong 5/10/11, vol. 129 of *SJWIG*, <http://sjw.history.go.kr/id/SJW-K05100110-02800>.

¹¹⁴ 1872; Tongzhi 11/Kojong 9/12/26, vol. 130 of *SJWIG*, <http://sjw.history.go.kr/id/SJW-K09120260-02200>.

¹¹⁵ 1875; Guangxu 1/Kojong 12/11/29, vol. 131 of *SJWIG*, <http://sjw.history.go.kr/id/SJW-K12110290-01900>.

trade with the Chosŏn people, Kojong stated that the Chosŏn should reconsider having unnecessary conflicts with French and American people, who had no initial animosity. Moreover, he added that even though there had been Westerners in China, not all Chinese people followed Western learning.¹¹⁶ Kojong's high expectations of the dispatched envoys and his intensive interrogations of the returning envoys also changed the attitude of the envoys, who then placed more effort into gathering information.

Kang Wi and His Role as the Transcriber of Intelligence

Chinese officials who engaged in brush talk with Korean envoys strongly admired the poems written by the Korean envoys, particularly the poems by Yi Kŏnch'ang and Kang Wi. In his autobiographical writings, Yi Kŏnch'ang states that when he went to Beijing in 1875 and showed his poems to Huang Yu, Zhang Jiayang, and Xu Fu, who were officials at the Hanlin Academy, they were all surprised by Yi's talent and wanted to write the preface to Yi's poetry collection.¹¹⁷ Huang even praised Yi, who inherited the incorruptible personality from his ancestor by mentioning Yi's grandfather, Yi Siwŏn, who died at Kanghwa Island during the French invasion.¹¹⁸

Kang Wi received an even brighter spotlight than Yi from Qing scholar-officials. After reading Kang's poetry book, Huang Yu praised Kang Wi's book, noting Kang's outstanding work by writing, "after we list the poets in Korea, we know that we should put him at the top."¹¹⁹ Xu Fu, who had a strong sense of the superiority of Chinese

¹¹⁶ *Kojong sillok*, 17.24a, Kojong 17.9. kyeyu. comp. Kuksa p'yŏnchan wiwŏnhoe, ed., *Chosŏn wangjo sillok* (Kwach'ŏn: Kuksa p'yŏnchan wiwŏnhoe), http://sillok.history.go.kr/id/kza_11709008_001.

¹¹⁷ Yi Kŏnch'ang, "Myŏngmidang simunjip sŏjŏn," *Myŏngmidangjip*, *MJCG* 349: 233.

¹¹⁸ Hwang Hyŏn, *Maech'ŏn yarok*, trans. Yi Changhŭi (Seoul: Myŏngmundang, 2008), 72–73.

¹¹⁹ Huang Yu, "Kohwandang such'o shi ko sŏ," *Kohwandang such'omun ko* in *MJCG* vol. 318, 438.

culture, disdained Korean envoys, whose language he believed sounded like that of a people from the southwest frontier; however, after reading a Kang poem, Xu could not help but praise the greatness of it. He writes, “those who read his poems will realize that I am not favoring my private taste.”¹²⁰

The excellent quality of poetry from the Korean envoys led Chinese officials to regard the Korean envoys not as barbarian strangers who came from a foreign country, but as members of their civilization. In his tributary poem to Kang’s book, Zhang Shizhun praised Kang’s poem, which represented all the unique features of Qin, Han, Wei, Sui, and Tang poetry.¹²¹ Of course, the cultural bond did not always lead to a serious discussion of the political affairs in China and Korea. Zhang Jiayang, who also highly praised the exceptional talents of the Korean envoys, did not leave any records of having brush talks. Although Kang was able to leave his extensive brush talk records with Zhang Shizhun, Huang Yu, and Xu Fu, Zhong Fushou had no record of poetry exchange, and hence, Zhong’s brush talk was likely relatively short.

Besides the official report that Kojong received from his envoys, it is important to include Kang Wi’s brush talks as crucial material that provided a context and brought a nuanced approach to Chosŏn Korea’s foreign policy. Kang Wi is one of the most significant figures in this period, and his life helps in understanding the development of Korean enlightenment thought. Even though he never held a significant government position, Kang Wi was a member of the Korean delegation that signed a treaty with Japan and the U.S. In his biographical study of Kang Wi, historian Yi Kwanglin shows that

¹²⁰ Xu Fu, “Kohwandang such’o shi ko sŏ,” *Kohwandang such’omun ko* in *MJCG* vol. 318, 473.

¹²¹ Zhang Shizhun, “Kohwandang such’o shi ko chesa,” *Kohwandang such’o Kohwandang such’omu ko* in *MJCG* vol. 318, 476.

Kang's frequent travels to foreign countries, especially China and Japan, stimulated his enlightenment thinking.¹²² Although it is unknown if Kojong read Kang Wi's brush talk and applied it to his foreign policy, it is evident that the information preserved in Kang Wi's brush talk was actually brought into the treaty negotiation between Japan and the Chosŏn in 1876 because here, Kang Wi participated as a personal attendant of Sin Hŏn (1810–1884), the de facto minister of the plenipotentiary of the treaty negotiation.

From a young age, Kang Wi demonstrated extraordinary talent in writing and studied to pass the civil examination; while studying for the exam, Kang stayed with Chŏng Kŏnjo, a yangban elite who resided in the capital city, and they soon became close friends. This close relationship with Chŏng gave Kang the opportunity to follow Chŏng as his attendant when Chŏng was appointed chief ambassador of the envoy mission to China in 1873. Unlike Chŏng, Kang Wi believed that he could not pass the civil examination because of his low status, so he abandoned his preparation for the exam and searched for a master who could guide him through his exploration of the literary world.

During the 1875 envoy mission, Yi Kŏnch'ang and Kang Wi conducted brush talks with four Chinese officials: Zhang Shizun,¹²³ Huang Yu,¹²⁴ Xu Fu,¹²⁵ and Zhong Fushou.¹²⁶ There are seven manuscripts of the brush talks in Kang Wi's literary

¹²² Yi Kwanglin, "Kang Wi ūi inmul kwa sasang" *Tongbang hakji* 17 (1976): 1–45.

¹²³ Zhang Shizun's (張世準, 1823–1891) style name was Shuping (叔平). He was from the Hunan Province. In 1846, he was appointed an official on the Board of Punishment. Zhang was well-known for his calligraphy and painting.

¹²⁴ Huang Yu's (黃鈺, 1817–1881) style name was Xiaohou (孝侯). Huang was from the Anhui Province. Huang was the secretary of the Board of Punishment. Later, Huang wrote a preface to Kang Wi's literary collection.

¹²⁵ Xu Fu's (徐馮, 1836–1908) style name was Songge (頌閣). He passed the civil examination as a first-place candidate in 1862. Xu was an academician reader-in-waiting from Hanlin Academy. Later, he became the Director of the Board of Rites.

¹²⁶ I have not found any matching biographic information for Zhong Fushou (中福綬).

collection, but there is no specific date indicated in the manuscripts, and it is difficult to determine the timeline. As historian Yi Hŏnju points out, it is possible that Kang Wi realigned the order of the manuscript by locating his *Tamch'o sŏlmun*, which was used in multiple brush talks, to ask more specific questions and extract detailed information.¹²⁷

Table 3. List of Brush Talk in *Buk'yu sok tam ch'o*

order	Korean Envoy—Qing Official	Location in <i>Kang Wi Chŏnjip</i> v.2 (page number)
1	Kang Wi—Huang Yu	855–862
2	Kang Wi—Zhang Shizun	863–867
3	Yi Kŏnch'ang—Zhang Shizun	867–870
4	Kang Wi—Huang Yu	870–874
5	Yi Kŏnch'ang—Xu Fu	874–887
6	Yi Kŏnch'ang—Huang Yu	887–906
7	Yi Kŏnch'ang—Zhong Fushou	907

Yi Hŏnju summarizes the questions Kang Wi asked to Qing officials in three topics: 1) Japan's expedition to Taiwan; 2) the two Opium Wars and the Self-Strengthening Movement; and 3) Japan's and Westerners' attitudes toward Korea.¹²⁸ The answers Kang Wi received from Qing officials was implemented in the Chosŏn's change of foreign policy in 1876 when Korea first signed a modern treaty with Japan. Based on the dialogue, the envoys attempted to contact people from both sides: those favorable to

¹²⁷ Yi Hŏnju, "Chajujŏk Kaehwaron hyŏngsŏng e kwanhan yŏn'gu," *Kuksagwan nonch'ong* 108 (2006): 1–30.

¹²⁸ Yi Hŏnju, "Chajujŏk Kaehwaron hyŏngsŏng e kwanhan yŏn'gu," 9.

an open-door policy and those who insisted on seclusion. Yi Hŏnju concludes that the mission helped the participants formulate a voluntary open-door policy. Although Kang only wrote down the brush talk one last time, he actively participated in the conversation and asked questions of Qing officials in his 1874 visit to Beijing.

Among the various topics discussed during the brush talks, the envoys asked Huang why there was no information on the Taiwanese expedition in the *Beijing Gazetteer* (*Jing bao*), China's official source of information. Huang told Kang that the *Beijing Gazetteer* was not trustworthy because the Qing government was very selective on reporting news, only discussing what was not harmful to the prestige of the Qing state. At Beijing, American diplomats stationed in Beijing reported the Korean envoys' activities of gathering foreign books and magazines during their stay in Beijing. S. Wells Williams (1812–1884), an American Consul in Beijing, reported that these activities were a reflection of the recent changes in the political climate in Chosŏn Korea after Kojong's direct rule:

...At any rate, we know that some of the Coreans in this city last year purchased many copies of all the books on foreign countries, including the monthly magazine published in this city, to carry back with them.¹²⁹

The Korean envoys obtained information from newspapers (*sinmunji*) written by

¹²⁹ No. 141, "Mr. Williams to Mr. Fish," Peking, March 1874, in United States Department of State, *Executive documents printed by order of the House of Representatives. 1874-'75* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1874–1875), 254 (<http://digital.library.wisc.edu/1711.dl/FRUS.FRUS187475>, cited in Yun Soyŏng, "1870 nyŏn chŏnhu Chosŏn ŭi taeil insik kwa chŏngch'aek," *Han'guk kŭnhyŏndaesa yŏn'gu* 25 (2003), 208.

Westerners, such as *Peking Magazine*. *Peking Magazine* (*Zhongxi wenjianlu*) was the first modern magazine published in Beijing, which later continued being published in Shanghai. Founded in 1872 by William Martin, an American missionary in Beijing, *Peking Magazine* was a monthly magazine that focused on publishing the current news and events in China and the West, as well as articles on science,¹³⁰ and it also contained domestic and international news gathered by missionaries in Beijing. Korean envoys read *Peking Magazine* and obtained extensive information that was not available from other Chinese sources, but they needed to verify the value of it. Unfortunately, during brush talks with Qing officials, the Korean envoys could not double check the validity of the information listed in *Peking Magazine*,¹³¹ probably because of the Qing officials refusing to answer in fear of being accused of collaborators of the Western invasion of China.

When Yi Kōnch'ang asked about Japan's military expedition in Taiwan, Xu Fu, a proponent of a hardline policy against foreign military threats, thought it was a "hasty decision" not to use the Qing fleet at Fujian to retaliate against Japan's invasion of Taiwan. Contrary to Xu's response, when Yi asked about Huang's thoughts of the Taiwan expedition, an advocate of the appeasement policy, Huang noted that Japan's expedition to Taiwan was truly a skillfully designed military operation meant to test the Qing government.¹³² That is, Japan attacked Taiwan to show their sphere of influence in East Asia. Nonetheless, Huang Yu explained that if the Qing had attempted to punish Japan, it would have caused a full-scale war, but it only took 100,000 taels of an

¹³⁰ Benjamin Elman, *On Their Own Terms: Science in China, 1550-1900* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2005), 311–314.

¹³¹ Kang Wi, *Kang Wi Chōnjip*, vol. 2 (hereafter *KW*), 880, 893.

¹³² Kang Wi, *KW*, vol. 2, 889–890.

indemnity payment to bring about peace between the two countries.¹³³ This was the first occasion that the Koreans were provided with the rationale behind the Qing government's reaction to Japan's occupation of Taiwan in 1873, and the Korean envoys now realized that the benefit of the appeasement was to prevent further loss. It became clear to the Chosŏn envoys that Japan had a powerful army that it could use to target its neighbors. If the Japanese invaded Korea after Taiwan, then Korea would not be able to defend itself alone and would suffer tremendous losses. Yi realized that the Westernization of Japan had been successful and that the Japanese were closely aligned with Westerners, which increased the threat to Korea.

Christianity and the Military Strength of the West

During brush talks, the Qing official Huang Yu attempted to provide the Chosŏn envoys with a more nuanced understanding of the Westerners. In fact, "Westerners" was not a proper word because in his view, each Western country acted independently based on its own interests; this view was influenced by the recent news of the Franco-Prussian War (1870–1871). After the kingdom of Prussia defeated the Second French Empire, they proclaimed the establishment of a German empire under the leadership of Prussia. The French emperor, Napoleon III, was ousted, and the new republic government elected Adolphe Thiers (1797–1877) as the new president of France.

The news of war in Europe and the transition of power from France to Germany shaped China's understanding of Westerners. While discussing the French invasion of Korea in 1867, Huang said that the main interest of the French was to freely exercise

¹³³ Kang Wi, *KW*, vol. 2, 890.

their religion.¹³⁴ And this view resonated with the Korean people's fear of Christianity. For the Korean people, the spread of Christianity was historically a national security issue, which was due in part to the Hang Sayŏng Letter Incident in 1800. Taewŏn'gun's execution of a French priest in 1866 was a part of the strong policy of the time, but it cannot be denied that the purge also reflected the general fear of the spread of Christianity in Korea. Strong anti-Westernism was also reflected in the brush talks of Xu Fu, who adopted a highly negative attitude of all Westerners. Even if a ruler was replaced, Westerners continued to gather and celebrate and propagated their way of learning, which was "offensive and unseemly" to him.¹³⁵

When Yi asked Huang about the secret of the military superiority of Western people, the answer that Huang gave was somewhat different from the general fear that the Korean people held of Westerners. Huang emphasized that other Westerners wanted trade, not religious freedom. Although the Westerners aligned when their interests were similar, Huang told Yi that each country had its own separate army,¹³⁶ meaning that all the countries in the West protected themselves from each other.

After learning this, Yi Kŏnch'ang feared the imbalance of power between Korea and Western countries. To defend the country and its interests, Yi believed that Korea should take measures to develop a strength that was comparable to Westerners. Thus, Yi specifically investigated the benefits of Western machinery technology. He believed that the machines were the secret of Western power; however, Huang believed that the secret of Western superiority did not lie in their advanced technology. Huang noted, "Military

¹³⁴ Kang Wi, *KW*, vol. 2, 899.

¹³⁵ Kang Wi, *KW*, vol. 2, 877.

¹³⁶ Kang Wi, *KW*, vol. 2, 899.

power is not their [prior] principle.”¹³⁷ Huang also tried to explain that except for the French, who had strong ties to their religion, Westerners did not have religious tendencies; whereas the French used their religion as a principle of affluence, commerce and trade were the main principles of wealth.¹³⁸ Huang believed that the wealth that Western countries accumulated through the trade they conducted with foreign countries allowed them to build strong countries and armies. For Huang, only a “wealthy country” (Ch. *fuguo* K. *puguk*) can have a strong army (Ch. *qiangbing* K. *kangbyŏng*), a suggestion that reflects the capitalistic model of a nation-state.

Evaluating of the Qing Self-Strengthening Movement

When Yi asked about the reason for the second treaty with Westerners, Xu replied that it was because of the betrayers within China and the “ugly” collaborators outside.¹³⁹ Similar to what Sin Sŏk’u iterated in his 1860 envoy mission, Xu did not agree that it was the superiority of Western military power that had led them to defeat the Qing army. For Xu, the disloyalty that had spread among the Qing army was the reason behind the humiliation. Xu Fu added that there was no use making distinction between the Christianity and the Western technology. When Yi asked about the financial benefit that the Qing gained from trading with Westerners, Xu denied that these benefits existed, saying, “the wealth of around ninety thousand li in China is returning to the outside, but Western silver is flowing in abundantly, and little Chinese silver is going out.”¹⁴⁰

¹³⁷ Kang Wi, *KW*, vol. 2, 900, cited in Yi Hŏnju, “Chajujŏk kaehwaron hyŏngsŏng e kwanhan yŏn’gu,” 19.

¹³⁸ Kang Wi, *KW*, vol. 2, 905.

¹³⁹ Kang Wi, *KW*, vol. 2, 887, cited in Yi Hŏnju, “Chajujŏk kaehwaron hyŏngsŏng e kwanhan yŏn’gu,” 18.

¹⁴⁰ Kang Wi, *KW*, vol. 2, 876–878, cited in Yi Hŏnju, “Chajujŏk kaehwaron hyŏngsŏng e kwanhan yŏn’gu,” 18–19.

Kang asked about the underlying reason behind the Qing government's effort to adopt Western learning. More specifically, Kang asked how a brilliant person such as Zeng Guofan could send young Chinese students to barbarian countries to study;¹⁴¹ he could not understand how such a prominent scholar could admit that Western learning was superior to that of the Chinese. Zhang Shizun replied with the following:

Learning technology and machines and learning their language has deep meaning. It is to learn the strength of their own, to let them have nothing to rely on (after we have equal power). By using their techniques, we attack their heart. We learn their skills, and with those skills, we attack them, though not attacking as barbarian to barbarian.¹⁴²

Returning with Information, 1875

After returning to Korea, Yi Kŏnch'ang wrote the official report (*mun'gyŏn sagŏn*) to the court. Regarding the report on Japan's Taiwanese expedition, Yi's opinion aligned with the reasoning of what the proponents of the appeasement policy referred to as a diplomatic approach instead of a seclusion policy or military action. Yi highlighted Japan's efforts to resolve the issue using diplomatic measures and how Japan dispatched envoys to Beijing while occupying what rumors said to be the entire island of Taiwan, which led the Chinese government to negotiate. As a result of the negotiation, China spent 100,000 taels to relieve the Ryukyu victims and another 400,000 taels for the turrets

¹⁴¹ Kang Wi, *KW*, vol. 2, 857.

¹⁴² Kang Wi, *KW*, vol. 2, 864, cited in Yi Hŏnju, "Chajujŏk kachwaron hyŏngsŏng e kwanhan yŏn'gu," 19.

and paved roads constructed by the Japanese. China presented the compensation to the Japanese envoy and asked them to vacate Taiwan, so the Japanese army left the island, and the minister of ship building at Fujian Province submitted a request to patrol Taiwan in the first month and lift the ban on mainlanders so that they could exchange items with native peoples and allow the natives to irrigate the land beyond the mountain and trade miscellaneous goods.¹⁴³

From this report, one can see that Yi favored the explanation that Huang offered. Instead of Xu's negative evaluation of the Qing's negotiation as a "hasty decision" that eliminated its opportunity to showcase the Qing's naval power. It is important to note that this information contributed to Kojong's decision to resume negotiations with Japan, right after Kojong's claim of personal rule. From the information on the territorial dispute between the Qing and Japan, it is highly possible that Kojong made his decision to keep the peace with Japan by resuming diplomatic relations instead of continuing the military tension.

Qing Advisory in the Middle of the Korea–Japan Treaty Negotiation

During the treaty negotiation between Korea and Japan in 1876, Kang Wi was deeply involved in the negotiation process, even without an official title being given to him. At the reception banquet, Kang sat in the banquet along with other Korean delegates as a personal attendant of Sin Hŏn, a high military official, the minister of reception, and de facto plenipotentiary minister of the Korean delegation. For his exceptional literary skill and extensive knowledge of foreign affairs, Kang was indispensable to the

¹⁴³ "Jinha kyŏm saŭn tongji haeng sŏjanggalwan Yi hoegu kyŏnmun sagŏn," in *Tongmun hwigo: Pop'yŏn sok* comp. Northeast Asian History Foundation (Seoul: Tongbuk'a yŏksa chedan, 2018), http://contents.nahf.or.kr/item/item.do?levelId=dh.d_0192_0010_1520.

negotiation process. Kang Wi attended the official reception and wrote the correspondence between the Korean and Japanese delegates¹⁴⁴ and the Korean delegate's report to Second State Councilor Pak Kyusu.¹⁴⁵

More significantly, it was not only the presence of Kang Wi at the Korea–Japan treaty negotiation that connected the results of the traditional Qing envoy missions to the new diplomatic relations with Japan; importantly, it was Kang's vocation as a record keeper of Korea's diplomatic missions that continued during the Korea–Japan treaty negotiation in 1876; Kang Wi kept a record of the activities and events of the treaty negotiation in detail, noting them as valuable "historical sources" (*saryo*).¹⁴⁶ However, Kang Wi lost his notes and rewrote a short version of them based on his memory and titled it, *Miscellaneous Records of the Kanghwa Mission* (*Simhaeng chapki*).¹⁴⁷ Even though *Miscellaneous Records of the Kanghwa Mission* was written after the negotiation treaty, it mostly matches Sin Hon's *Diary of the Kanghwa Mission* (*Simhaeng ilgi*) in terms of factual issues, and it reflects Kang Wi's opinion on the critical moments of negotiation.

What is striking about *Miscellaneous Records of the Kanghwa Mission* is its

¹⁴⁴ "Tae Sin Hŏn Widang yŏ Samsan sŏ" [A letter to Moriyama on behalf of Sin Hŏn], "Tap ilbon sa sŏ" [A reply to Japanese delegates] in *Kohwandang jip* cited in Chu Sŭngt'aek, "Kang Wi ūi kaehwa sasang kwa oegyo hwaldong," *Han'guk munhwa* 12 (1991): 123–171.

¹⁴⁵ "Tae Sin Taegwan sang hwanjae Pak sangguk" [Letter to Pak Kyusu on behalf of Sin Hŏn] *Kohwandang su ch'o mun go* in *DB of Korean Classics*, http://db.itkc.or.kr/inLink?DCI=ITKC_MO_0641A_0280_040_0020_2009_A318_XML.

¹⁴⁶ Kang Wi, *Simhaeng chapki*, reprinted in Sin Hŏn, and Kim Chonghak, *Simhaeng ilgi: Chosŏn i kirok han Kanghwado choyak* (Seoul: P'urŭn Yŏksa, 2010), 503.

¹⁴⁷ *Miscellaneous Records of the Kanghwa Mission* (*Simhaeng chapki*) is not included in *Kohwandang su ch'o go*, which was first published in 1885 and 1889. Yi Kŏnch'ang, who compiled Kang Wi's posthumous literary collection, left out many of Kang Wi's works. However, in 1935, a descendent of Kang Wi transcribed Kang Wi's work, including what was left out before and titled it *Kohwandang jip*. *Miscellaneous Records of the Kanghwa Mission* are included in *Kohwandang jip*. For bibliographical information, see Chu Sŭngt'aek, "Kang Wi ūi chŏsul kwa Kohwandang jip ūi saryojŏk kach'i," *Kyujanggak* 14 (1991): 93–120.

similarity with his *Notes of Conversation during Travel to North* and *Sequel Notes of Conversation during Travel to North*. When Kang Wi expresses his opinion on the appropriateness of the new treaty with Japan, Kang often quotes Qing officials' opinions that he heard during the 1873 and 1874 envoy missions. Comparing the quotations that match in the texts in *Notes of Conversation during Travel to North* and *Sequel Notes of Conversation during Travel to North*, it is obvious that these quotations near perfectly match with those transcribed in the brush talk dialogues. For example, when Kang Wi comments on Japanese delegates openly sharing the secret of their advanced military technology adopted from Western countries to boost their military power, Kang Wi writes in *Miscellaneous Records of the Kanghwa Mission* that, "once Zhang Shizun said barbarians don't make their own secrete and enjoy informing others: [such behavior] nearly coincide with [that of Japanese], how strange that is!"¹⁴⁸ Indeed, Zhang Shizun commented on the Westerners' efforts to teach their language and technology to Chinese at the brush talks.¹⁴⁹ Comparing both the 1873 and 1874 brush talks and the notes from the treaty negotiation, it is evident that Kang Wi realized that Japan was now Westernized not only in its technology, but also in its behavior. At least in this respect, Japan successfully emulated Western countries. Kang Wi mentions the name of Qing officials and their opinions five more times in *Miscellaneous Records of the Kanghwa Mission*, and in every case, the original text or context can be traced back to the brush talks. The information gathered from the Qing envoy mission was integrated into the Korea–Japan treaty negotiation. In Kang Wi's *Miscellaneous Records of the Kanghwa*

¹⁴⁸ In the Chinese text, “夷不自秘，樂以告人，大率脗合，其亦異哉。” Kang Wi, *Simhaeng chapki*, reprinted in Sin Hŏn, and Kim Chonghak, *Simhaeng ilgi: Chosŏn i kirok han Kanghwado choyak* (Seoul: P'urŭn yŏksa, 2010), 507.

¹⁴⁹ In the original Chinese text, “夷不自秘，樂以示人” Kang Wi, *KW*, vol. 2, 828–829.

Mission, the Qing officials were sitting behind the negotiation table as one of most reliable advisors of Korean delegates in their decision-making process.

Conclusion

In this chapter, the cultural interactions between Chosŏn envoys and Qing officials and these discussions' influence on Chosŏn Korea's decision to open its country to trade with Japan, which later became a model for adopting Western civilization for many Korean people, has been highlighted. The envoy missions, recognized as a ritual of traditional Sino-Korean relations, played a significant role in Korea's transition to a regional new order in East Asia, along with the advancement of Western influence in Korea. Of course, these changes were not as dramatic as the changes the Japanese people experienced.

The Chosŏn elites were already under the influence of Western imperialism before 1876, and the Chosŏn people had already heard about Western imperialism at this time. Chosŏn Korea also had military contact with Westerners and received advice from Chinese officials regarding how to proceed. This chapter addresses the point that the domestic condition in Korea played a significant role in determining what kind of impact the influence of the Chinese had in Korea. As we will also see in the next chapter, the change in the Korean government's attitude was one critical reason behind the intellectual shift in Korea. In the next chapter, the new media, which became the prominent method of transmitting new information to the Korean peninsula, is discussed. The transmission of books, mostly Chinese translation of Western (and Japanese) books, allowed for the scope of change to be more massive than ever before.

Conventionally the 'treaty diplomacy' had replaced the 'tributary diplomacy'

between Qing China and Chosŏn Korea. The intertextual relation between what has been considered as separate diplomatic agents and texts, however, shows strong connection and legacy of the tributary relation in in Korea's trajectory after 1876. In 1882, the Korean envoys to Japan returned to Korea with *Korea Strategy* (Ch. *Chaoxian celüe*, K. *Chosŏn ch'aeng'nyak*) policy proposal for Korea's diplomatic relation written by Qing diplomat Huang Zhunxian (1848-1905) to influence Korea's diplomatic and security policy-making favorable to the Qing dynasty.¹⁵⁰ In many ways, the basic outline of *Korea Strategy* was in fact already discussed in the brush talk in the 1870s, circulated in Korea and shared by those who had access to the content of brush talk.

Despite Kojong's active role in its search for new diplomacy with the new world and envoys' information gathering, the Qing Modern Imperialism played significant role in distorted its trajectory. Qing Modern Imperialism legitimized its presence over Korea with tropes of traditional tributary relation.¹⁵¹ The memory of friendship and cultural bond between the Chosŏn envoys and the Qing officials could not compete with the punitive presence of Yuan Shikai's regency in Korea (1882-1894). From this gap, a new mode of defining Korea's relation with China was made: China was no longer a foreign advisor, but a foreign intruder against the interest of the Korean nation. Such negative view on the tributary relation supported the Japan's claim epistemologically for their role in giving autonomy and independence to Korea.

¹⁵⁰ Recent discussion of Qing government's effort to transform conceptual boundaries of tributary ideas in relation to Choson Korea can be found in Hyun-ho Joo, "Between Culturalism and Nationalism: Late Qing Chinese Media's Representation of Choson Korea," Ph. D. Dissertation, University of Chicago, 2010, 78-137.

¹⁵¹ Kirk Larsen, *Tradition, Treaties, and Trade: Qing Imperialism and Chosŏn Korea, 1850-1910* (Cambridge: Harvard University Asia Center, 2008).

Chapter 2

Decentralizing China: Reading Chinese books in Korea, 1882–1910*

Introduction

The traditional political and economic networks in East Asia faced a transformative moment in the late nineteenth century. After the Second Opium War (1856–1860), Qing China opened treaty ports to Westerners and rapidly absorbed new knowledge from the West via the Self-Strengthening Movement (1861–1895).¹⁵² In Japan, the Tokugawa Shogunate (1603–1868) collapsed after the shock of Commodore Matthew Perry’s arrival in 1853, and the new Meiji government spurred modernization. Although Korea’s open trade with Westerners started much later, beginning in the 1880s, Korea had already faced the tide of change through its traditional trade network with Qing China and Japan. When Japan defeated Qing China in the Sino-Japanese War (1894–1895), many radical reformers in Korea regarded Western culture as superior and valued technology over the Confucian cultural heritage that ruined China and Korea. These reformers began to openly question the validity of “old” Sino-centric tributary relations with China, which no longer seemed like the “Middle Kingdom” of the world. Instead, Western countries and Westernized Japan became the model of civilization in the

* An earlier version of this chapter was presented at the “World Congress of Korean Studies” held at the University of Pennsylvania, September 13, 2016. After significant revision, it was presented again at the International Korean Humanities Conference held at Nanjing University, November 2017 (in Korean).

¹⁵² Ting-yee Kuo and Kwang-Ching Liu, “Self-Strengthening: the pursuit of Western technology,” in the *Cambridge History of China*, vol. 10, ed. John K. Fairbank (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), 491–542.

minds of radical Korean reformers.¹⁵³ In 1895, Japan began to extend its influence over Korea, implementing political and economic change. By 1910, Japan's mission was to colonize Korea. With little distinction between the modernization discourse and colonialism discourse, many Korean reformers had to face the dilemma of dealing with the very power that encroached upon their sovereignty.¹⁵⁴ That is, the Korean discourse of "civilization and enlightenment" was deeply interconnected with the Japanese colonial discourse on Korea; nationalist discourse was barely distinguishable from Japanese colonial discourse because both followed the rubric of "enlightenment" and having a "strong nation."

This chapter continues the discussion of how Korea's regional network with China influenced Korean modernity. Although information flowed continuously from China to Korea, it ironically stimulated a vivid intellectual rupture between traditional sinocentric knowledge and modern Western knowledge. That is, books produced in China stimulated the collapse of predominantly Sinocentric knowledge in Korea society. sinographic books in this context not only refer to books written by Chinese authors, but also books originally written or published by a foreign author that was later translated into Chinese and published in China. Compared with books written in other languages, Korean readers found that books written in sinographic writing system was much more readable and regarded books published in China as more appealing and as having more credibility. These sinographic books flourished because of the collaborative works of Western and Chinese publishers in Chinese treaty ports, especially in Shanghai. And

¹⁵³ Andre Schmid, *Korea Between Empires, 1895-1919* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002).

¹⁵⁴ Andre Schmid, *Korea Between Empires, 1895-1919*, 142.

through a broad survey of books that existed Korea between 1880 and 1910, sinographic books from China comprised the majority of the book titles that circulated in Korea during this decisive juncture in Korean history when Korean people began to search for new knowledge.

By examining the history of modern print culture, the book trade, and translation in East Asia, this chapter argues that the transformation of Korean culture from 1880 to 1910 cannot be fully understood without considering the regional knowledge network that was inseparable from Korean society. By doing so, in this chapter, I address how intellectual change in early twentieth-century Korea is connected to the change in the material culture of book trade and circulation.

Dissemination of Knowledge from the West in Late Imperial China and Chosŏn Korea

Since the first century, books from China have influenced Korean culture and society, including ones related to Confucianism and Buddhism. The bureaucratic system of the state was constructed upon the ancient system established by the sage-kings of the Three Dynasties, and the civil examination system educated and trained literati elites who filled government positions with Confucian learning.

Of course, it was not only Confucianism that dominated the intellectual and cultural activities in Korea; a myriad of intellectual and religious traditions from China inspired the philosophical and cultural developments in Korea. Even in China, Confucian learning did not entirely eclipse other teachings, especially the teachings of Western Jesuit missionaries, which had been occurring since the sixteenth century. The Chinese literati successfully studied Western science under the slogan of investigating things and

extending knowledge (k. *kyŏkmul ch'iji*).¹⁵⁵ Under different political and social circumstances, despite numerous brutal purges of missionaries and Korean converts who were put to the stake for heresy, Western learning in Chosŏn Korea was still considered an object of study and curiosity for Korean literati, as well as for their counterparts in China.¹⁵⁶

The Advance of Western Imperialism and the Rise of Modern Print Culture in Shanghai

The Qing government ended the First Opium War by signing the Treaty of Nanjing (1842). Through the treaty, the islands of Hong Kong became Britain's perpetuity, and five treaty ports were established along the southeastern Chinese coastline. Qing China's defeat in the Second Opium War made it easier for Western imperialism to freely infiltrate China's society and economy. Although the newly opened treaty ports became symbols of imperial exploitation, they also served as a gateway for intellectual and cultural exchange between China and Western countries.

Among other open-treaty ports in China, Shanghai became the center of modern print culture in China. Shanghai had a geographical advantage in its location at the mouth of the Yangzi River, and it had well-established legal protection for missionaries and merchants. The London Missionary Society Press (Ch. *Mohai shuguan*), one of the oldest and most influential Western translation offices established in China, moved to Shanghai from Ningbo in 1860. It produced 150,000 copies of the Chinese Bible and 171 religious

¹⁵⁵ Benjamin Elman, *On Their Own Terms: Science in China, 1550-1900*, 281–351.

¹⁵⁶ Im Chongt'ae, *17, 18-segi Chungguk kwa Chosŏn ūi sŏgu chirihak ihae: chigu wa tasŏt taeryuk ūi uhwa* (P'aju: Ch'angbi, 2012).

and scientific books.¹⁵⁷ The translation projects of the London Missionary Society Press impressed Guo Songtao (1818–1891), a scholar-official and one of the leaders of the Self-Strengthening Movement (Ch. *Yangwu yundong*) in the late Qing.¹⁵⁸ The Qing began to build arsenals and shipyards to make modern firearms and naval vessels to strengthen their defenses against Western invasion via the Chinese coastal line. In 1867, the Translation College of the Jiangnan Arsenal (Ch. *Jiangnan jiqi zhizhaoju*) was established, which translated 160 Western books related to science, technology, current affairs of the Western world, and military weapons and tactics.¹⁵⁹ The Translation College of the Jiangnan Arsenal hired both Western and Chinese professionals, and one of them was John Fryer (1839–1928).¹⁶⁰ Through the Translation College, John Fryer published 158 titles. John Fryer and other Westerners translated books with the aid of Chinese assistants; here, the Westerners would translate the books first with their rudimentary Chinese language skills, and the assistants would point out incomprehensible passages and translate them correctly.¹⁶¹ This method was widely accepted because of the lack of skilled bi-lingual translators and the lack of systemic knowledge of translation.

In 1887, a group of American missionaries, Young J. Allen (1836–1907), William Martin (1827–1916), and Timothy Richard (1845–1919), established the Society for the

¹⁵⁷ Ryū Kenki, *Mato Shanhai: Nihon chishikijin no kindai taiken* (Tokyo: Kodansha, 2000), 76-77.

¹⁵⁸ Ryū Kenki, *Mato Shanhai: Nihon chishikijin no kindai taiken*, 89-90.

¹⁵⁹ Xiong Yuezhi, *Xixue Dongjian yu wanqing shehui* (Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 1994), 500.

¹⁶⁰ Adrian Arthur Bennett, *John Fryer: The Introduction of Western Science and Technology Into Nineteenth-Century China* (Cambridge: East Asian Research Center, Harvard University, 1967). The complete list of John Fryer's translation is found from 82–102.

¹⁶¹ Adrian Arthur Bennett, *John Fryer: The Introduction of Western Science and Technology Into Nineteenth-Century China* (Cambridge: East Asian Research Center, Harvard University, 1967), 29.

Diffusion of Christian and General Knowledge among the Chinese (Ch. *Guangxuehui* hereafter SDK) in Shanghai. Allen also worked as a translator at the Translation College before he worked in the SDK. The SDK published at least 176 books before 1900. Among the published books was the *New Summarized History of the Western Countries* (Ch. *Taixi xinshi lanyao*, K. *T'aesŏ sinsa namyo* 1895), translated by Richard Timothy in 1895. The original version of this text was Robert Mackenzie's *The 19th Century: A History* (1880). Because of its up-to-date information on the Western world, more than 30,000 copies were sold from SDK.¹⁶² The Chosŏn government quickly reprinted it in 1897, and at the same time, the Chosŏn government translated it into Korean to use as a school textbook.

In addition to the efforts of missionaries and the government, thanks to the growing book market in China, the book publishing industry flourished. Commercial Press (*Shangwu yinshuguan*) was established in 1897, and in 1902, Civilization Press (*Wenming shuju*, later *Zhonghua shuju*) opened. These presses began as publishers and distributors of textbooks that were used in newly established schools, but they later expanded into various genres. Along with the Commercial Press and Civilization Press, numerous other presses began to emerge in Shanghai in the late nineteenth century. Xiong Yuezhi, a renowned historian of Shanghai's modern history, estimated that about seventy-seven percent of all Western titles translated into Chinese were produced in Shanghai.¹⁶³

¹⁶² Xiong Yuezhi et al., *Shanghai Tongshi* (Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 1999), vol. 6, 150–167.

¹⁶³ Xiong, *Xixue Dongjian yu wanqing shehui*, 667–669.

The Circulation of Modern Chinese Books in East Asia and its Impact

Western books published in Shanghai not only influenced China, but also other countries in East Asia. Russia's southward advance toward Sakhalin and the U.S. approach toward Japan via the Pacific Ocean agitated Japan, which soon turned into a demand for the secrets of Western military strength and national wealth. The Japanese translated Western books by themselves, but they did not ignore the existing body of Western books translated into Chinese. Like Korea, Japan had also imported a large sum of Western books translated in sinographic language.¹⁶⁴ And the books published in modern Shanghai continued flowing into Japan and being reprinted from 1850 to 1870.¹⁶⁵

This phenomenon was witnessed by Korean envoys in Japan. In 1876, Korea signed its first modern international treaty with Japan. That same year, the Chosŏn government dispatched a delegation to Japan to observe and learn what the Japanese were doing. Kim Kisu (1832–?), the representative of the Korean delegation, witnessed and reported the translation process in Japan in the 1870s.

...Cutting woodblock have no leisure time to rest all day. The work is so ingenious and quick, so even if the pile of books reaches the ceiling, it is done in a single day. Because Chinese books are reprinted immediately as soon as they arrive, if one wants to get a book, there is no need to go to the bookstores in Beijing. Hence, the reprinted [ones] are neatly printed on sturdy papers, so at

¹⁶⁴ Peter Kornicki, *The Book in Japan: A Cultural History From the Beginning to the Nineteenth Century* (Leiden: Brill, 1997).

¹⁶⁵ Ryū Kenki, *Mato Shanhai: Nihon chishikijin no kindai taiken*, 94–101.

some point these [reprinted] are rather superior [than the Chinese one].¹⁶⁶

Beijing was no longer a matchless political and cultural center. When Kim left his record of the politics, economy, culture, and social conditions in Meiji Japan, he was surprised by how the Japanese had been importing books from China since medieval times. After Japan began to have exchanges with Western countries, it put away the old classics and cherished only crafts of national prosperity and military power; even so, the Japanese continued to import books from China because even the books about Western technology and theories were first translated and published in Chinese by the translators in Shanghai. Whether for the pursuit of classical learning or “new learning,” the flow of books from China to Japan continued. And it was not only Japan, but also Korea, that benefitted from the Shanghai book culture of the late nineteenth century.

Defending the Country with Western Science and Technology Books: 1880–1890

The news of China and Japan opening their ports to Westerners spread to Korea, and a similar attempt to breach the coastline of Korea by French (1866) and U.S. naval fleets (1871) signaled a pending crisis. There was a strong need to solve problems inside and outside of Korea because nineteenth century Korea faced various internal crises: First, in the political realm, a few powerful consort clan monopolized the political power, which resulted in a tremendous disturbance to the state governance. At the social level, there were numerous riots and peasant rebellions occurring in multiple regions, which mainly resulted from the economic hardships that Korea experienced during the

¹⁶⁶ Kim Kisu, “*Haksul ch’il ch’ik*” [seven norms on learning and skills], in *Susinsa kirok*, ed. Kuksa p’yŏnch’an wiwŏnhoe (Seoul: T’amgudang, 1971), 77–78.

nineteenth century. There was high inflation caused by the depletion of the land and a subsequent decrease in productivity, which was followed by the collapse of local markets.¹⁶⁷

To face the increased military threat from the outside, the Chosŏn government sent envoys to China and Japan to learn what their neighbors were doing. As King Kojong became aware of the increasing threat of foreign invasion, he began to make the necessary preparations. He ordered the reorganization of the books in Kyujanggak, a royal library located inside the Ch'angdŏk Palace. After he moved to the newly built Kyŏngbŏk Palace, he moved books from Kyujanggak to Chib'okjae, his royal office in the Kyŏngbŏk Palace. He ordered an additional collection of Chinese translations of Western books.¹⁶⁸ In 1881, Kim Yunsik (1835–1922), along with a group of engineers, was sent to the Qing to learn new technology. Kim and his attendants visited the military arsenals in Tianjin and Shanghai. When Kim returned, he brought sixty-seven books about Western science and technology, including books on physics, chemistry, mathematics, astronomy, mechanics, ship building, defense strategy, and current affairs in the Western world.¹⁶⁹ Some of the books were unidentifiable, but among the sixty-

¹⁶⁷ Yi Yŏnghun et al., *Suryang kyŏngjesa ro tasi pon Chosŏn hugi* (Seoul: Seoul taehakkyo ch'ulp'anbu, 2004).

¹⁶⁸ *Naegak changsŏ huip'yŏn* (Collected Bibliography of Palace Library) is the newly created catalogue of the royal library reflecting Kojong's effort of importing books from China. In *Naegak changso huipyon*, there are two appendixes attached: "Sin naeha sŏmok" and "Ch'un'andang sŏmok." These are the catalogues of newly collected Chinese books between 1882 and 1887 outside the existing palace library collection. Yi T'aejin, "1880 nyŏndae Kojong ŭi kaehwa rŭl wihan sin tosŏ kuip saŏp," in *Kojong sidae ŭi chaejom-yŏng* (Seoul: T'aeaksa, 2000), 279–305.

¹⁶⁹ Kim Yunsik listed the books he brought from China in his diary, *Ŭmch'ŏngsa* (Records of the Rain or Fine Days), on June 11 and November 24, 1882. The total number of titles is seventy-three, but if we ignore the titles that appear twice, the total number is sixty-seven. Kim Yunsik, *Ŭmch'ŏngsa* in *Han'guksa DB (DB of Korean History)*, comp. National Institute of Korean History (Kwach'ŏn: Kuksa p'yŏnch'an wiwŏnhoe),

seven titles, thirty-nine were the works of John Fryer and came from the Translation College of the Jiangnan Arsenal in Shanghai.

The imported sinographic books were not only needed inside the government, but they were also introduced to a wider range of people through Korean newspapers. In 1882, with the aid of Fukuzawa Yukichi (1835–1901)—the most influential intellectual and prolific writer who founded newspaper company as a vehicle of transmitting his political ideas to the public—the Chosŏn government established its first modern printing house. The Chosŏn invited Japanese printing technicians, including Inoue Kakugoro (1860–1938), and asked them to bring a modern printing machine from Japan. The following year, the government established the Bureau of Spreading Words (*Pangmun guk*) and began to publish *Seoul Ten-Days Reports* (*Hansŏng sunbo*), the first modern newspaper in Korea. The publication of *Seoul Ten-Days Reports* was halted because of the political turbulence during the Kapsin Coup (1884), but printing soon resumed as *Seoul Weekly Reports* (*Hansŏng jubo*) from 1886 onward.

The newspaper not only delivered daily reports inside and outside of the country, but also published knowledge about Western science and technology, which came from Western newspapers and books translated in Chinese. *Seoul Ten-Days Reports* was broadly divided into two sections: domestic news and foreign news. Through the foreign news section, the Chosŏn government spread news about recent world affairs and scientific knowledge to the people. Although the printing technology and engineers were transferred from Meiji Japan, the content of the newspaper was derived primarily from Chinese media. In her study analyzing articles in the foreign news section, historian Han

http://db.history.go.kr/id/sa_007_0020_0020_0010_0010;
http://db.history.go.kr/id/sa_007_0020_0020_0010_0070.

Poram found that a majority of foreign news was cited from Chinese newspapers.¹⁷⁰

Although the first Korean newspaper emerged with Japan's aid, the content of the newspaper was mainly derived from Chinese print media. In addition to collecting foreign newspapers, the Bureau of Spreading Words imported Western books to introduce them in the newspaper. In 1886, the bureau received Western books from Herman Budler, a German diplomat who was the acting consul general in Seoul. He imported books via Behn, Meyer & Co (Korean branch name was *Sech'ang yanghaeng*),¹⁷¹ a shipping company that had branches in China and Korea. Twenty-five book and magazine titles were on the import list; among them, fifteen were titles published in Shanghai, and one was from Beijing.

Despite these early attempts to introduce new knowledge to defend the country against external threats and internal crises, these efforts did not result in a significant change in the Chosŏn government or society. As historian Kim Yŏnhŭi addresses in her research on the sinographic translation of Western scientific books in the 1880s, these early efforts to introduce Western knowledge to Korea via books from Shanghai did not last long because of the political turbulence and diplomatic crisis that the Kapsin Coup (1884) caused,¹⁷² where a number of young officials from powerful families attempted to establish a reformed government modeled on the Westernization of the Meiji government. The failure of the coup resulted in the collapse of the existing body of

¹⁷⁰ Han Poram, "1880 Nyŏndae Chosŏn chŏngbu ūi kaehwa chŏngchaek ūl wihan kukche chŏngbo sujip: Hansŏng sunbo ūi kwallyŏn kisa punsŏk," *Chindan hakpo* 100 (2005): 109–164. The table of the list of cited foreign newspapers is on pages 117 to 120.

¹⁷¹ Asea munje yŏn'guso, ed., *Ku Han'guk oegyo munsŏ* [Diplomatic Records of old Korea] (Seoul: Koryŏ taehakkyo ch'ulp'anbu, 1965), vol. 15, 166–167.

¹⁷² Kim Yŏnhŭi, "1880 Nyŏndae sujipto Han'yŏk kisulsŏ ūi ihae: Kyujanggak Han'gukhak yŏn'guwŏn sojangbon ūl chungsim ūro," *Han'guk kwahaksa hakhoeji* 38, no. 1 (2016): 71–119.

reformative officials in the Chosŏn government, and it halted activities related to Westernization, including efforts to modernize military weapons. Furthermore, the government could not openly embrace imported books containing Western knowledge from Shanghai as it had before.

Educating Korean People with Sinographic Textbooks: 1890–1900

In 1894, the Chosŏn government initiated the Kabo reform, which adopted a Western political and bureaucratic system. The affairs of the royal house were separated from state affairs, the judicature was separated from the administrative power, and the traditional civil examination system was abolished. All the barriers that prohibited lowborn people from becoming high officials were lifted. Education using modern Western knowledge became the key to obtaining high status, and a new demand for books emerged. The government established public schools and foreign language schools equipped with new curriculums. The Bureau of Education (*hakpu*) was the core organ of this educational reformation.¹⁷³

The Bureau of Education also published textbooks for those public schools, but at the beginning, the bureau did not have the ability to accommodate these changes and new demands. With limited technology and a lack of professional book editors and translators, Korea was not able to produce nearly enough textbooks, so at first, the Bureau of Education used textbooks imported directly from China and translated them into the mixed Korean-Sinitic style (*kukhanmun che*) or vernacular Korean (*ŏnmun*). Thus, people without training in classical Chinese could also read and use them.

¹⁷³ Kyung Moon Hwang, *Rationalizing Korea: The Rise of the Modern State, 1894-1945* (Oakland: University of California Press, 2016), 171.

The Chosŏn government used Western books translated into Chinese as supplements for school textbooks, which is clear in the case of Richard Timothy's *Taixi xinshi*; *Taixi xinshi* came out in 1895 in Shanghai, and two years later, the Bureau of Education reprinted it in Korea, and the version translated into Korean came out at the same time. Because it was one of the most popular textbooks at the time, *Taixi xinshi* also had a list of suggested textbooks on the back cover so that readers could continue their studies. As literary historian Hŏ Chaeyŏng pointed out, two booklists are attached to the back of *Taixi xinshi*: one is the list of titles that the Bureau of Education published, and the other features the titles published by the SDK, a translation office that American missionaries in Shanghai. Although the Bureau of Education only listed twenty-one titles, the SDK provided forty-four titles. That is, although Korea began to produce textbooks on its own, a large portion of curriculum of the school system yet heavily relied on textbooks from China, mostly published by the SDK.¹⁷⁴

Tongnip sinmun (the Independence), the first exclusive Korean-language newspaper, which was established in 1896, also introduced the SDK to Korean people through advertising the books they translated and published. In an 1899 article, *Tongnip sinmun* introduced the purpose of the establishment and important personnel in the SDK, as well as their famous books, the financial budget of the publication projects, the quantity of published books, and its social and cultural influence in Qing China. The article asserted that the SDK and its publishing activities were the driving force of the Self-Strengthening Movement in Qing society and urged that more books from the SDK

¹⁷⁴ Hŏ Chaeyŏng, "Kwanghakhoe sŏmok kwa T'aesŏ sinsa lamyŏ rŭl t'onghae pon kŭndae chisik suyong kwa ŭimi," *Toksŏ yŏn'gu* 35 (2015): 229–252.

be introduced to Korea.¹⁷⁵

The impact of the SDK's publications can be understood by examining the cases of Syngman Rhee (1875–1965) and Kim Ku (1876–1949), who became the most influential politicians in twentieth-century Korea.¹⁷⁶ In 1899, Syngman Rhee was arrested and imprisoned in the capital jail under suspicion that he was involved in plotting the assassination of the Kojong Emperor.¹⁷⁷ During his imprisonment (1899–1904), Syngman Rhee could not continue his active political movements, but thanks to Western missionaries who supported Rhee, he spent most of his time in jail reading and translating books that Western missionaries brought him. During this time, Syngman Rhee converted to Christianity and actively absorbed new knowledge from the West. Syngman Rhee made a small reading room inside of the jail where he shared books with other political prisoners. Rhee kept a log of books and magazines he read in the prison; among them were the *New Summarized History of the Western Countries* (Ch. *Taixi xinshi lanyao*, K. *T'aesŏ sinsa namyo*; hereafter *Taixi xinshi*) and *The Full Account of the Sino-Japanese War* (Ch. *Zhongdong zhanji benmo*, K. *Chungdong chŏn'gi ponmal*; hereafter *Zhongdong zhanji*),¹⁷⁸ two of the most widely read books about recent world history and international

¹⁷⁵ *The Independence (Tongnip sinmun)*, February 6, 1899.

¹⁷⁶ Syngman Rhee became the first president (1919–1925) of the Korean Provisional Government (1919–1948), a Korean exile government established at Shanghai during the Japanese occupation period (1910–1945). After the liberation of Korea (1945), Syngman Rhee became the first president (1948–60) of the South Korean Government (1948–). Kim Ku became the president (1940–1948) of the KPG leading the independence movement during World War II.

¹⁷⁷ In 1897, King Kojong claimed himself as emperor and changed the name of the country from the Chosŏn Kingdom (*Tae Chosŏn guk*) to the Korean Empire (*Taehan cheguk*) and initiated reform projects to modernize the country and strengthen his sovereign power. For details of the Kojong Emperor's reform policies during the Korean Empire period (1896–1910), see Kim Tongno, John B. Duncan, and Kim Tohyŏng eds., *Reform and Modernity in the Taehan Empire* (Seoul: Jimoondang, 2006); Sŏ Yŏnghŭi, *Taehan cheguk chŏngch'isa yŏn'gu*. (Seoul: Sŏul taehakkyo ch'ulp'anbu, 2003).

¹⁷⁸ Young Ick Lew [Yu Yŏng'ik], "Unam Yi Sŭngman ŭi okjung chapki paengmi," *Inmun kwahak* 80 (1990): 15–69.

relations.

Through reading Chinese translations of Western books, Kim Ku experienced an intellectual shift. Kim Ku was in jail for murdering a Japanese samurai who he believed to be the leader of the assassination of Queen Myōngsōng (1851–1895). In his autobiography, Kim Ku wrote that he had been a foolish man who had looked down on Westerners as barbarians until he read *Taixi xinshi*, saying:

I have believed the old people saying, “a ray of light only left with us; everybody else in the world are barbarians with tangled hairs and strange costumes.” Just by reading *Taixi xinshi*, one can realize the pale-eyed, big nose, and ape-like barbarians have in fact a good law for founding country and governing people. The corrupt officials in our country, wearing proper attires and being dressed up like hermits, drew nothing but ridicule.¹⁷⁹

Influenced by Chinese books and other radical reformers who were prisoned in the same jail, Kim Ku changed his view on Western countries and began to regard them as truly civilized societies; he also started to believe that the corrupt Korean officials were hypocrites who exploited their own people. Reading Western history through Chinese books made people like Kim Ku change what he thought made people civilized versus being barbarians.

Syngman Rhee recognized the enlightening value of *Zhongdong zhanji* (1896), which was written by an American missionary, Young Allen, with the aid of Cai Erkang

¹⁷⁹ Kim Ku and Kim Hakmin, *Chōngbon Paekbom ilgi*, vol. 1 (Seoul: Hakminsa, 1997), 31.

(1852–1920), a Chinese translator. Syngman Rhee obtained this book via Henry G. Appenzeller (1858–1902), an American missionary who established Paichai College (K. *Paejae hakdang*). Appenzeller was Syngman Rhee’s teacher when he studied at Paichai College, and after Rhee was imprisoned, Appenzeller led a campaign to save Syngman Rhee’s life. Appenzeller provided English and sinographic books from Shanghai to help Syngman Rhee continue studying this new knowledge.¹⁸⁰

Zhongdong zhanji was very appealing to Chinese and Korean readers; the first three thousand copies sold out immediately. Because of its popularity, Young Allen continued writing the sequels to *Zhongdong zhanji* in 1897 and 1899, which first came out as eight reels (Ch. *juan*, K. *kwŏn*) in 1896 and then in four reels of sequels in 1897 and four more in 1900. Overall, more than twenty thousand copies were sold in total.¹⁸¹ Young Allen included various materials, such as the full version of the Meiji Emperor’s declaration of war, telegrams among neighboring countries, as well as between the Chinese and Japanese governments, full versions of the treaties, memoirs by Qing officials, and breaking news and editorials from newspapers in various languages, including in Chinese, Japanese, and English.

Korean intellectuals also showed great interest in *Zhongdong zhanji*. Yun Ch’iho (1864–1945), who worked at the Anglo-Chinese College as an English teacher, helped prepare the manuscript by translating English newspapers into sinographic language.¹⁸²

¹⁸⁰ Young Ick Lew [Yu Yŏng’ik], *The Making of the First Korean President: Syngman Rhee’s Quest for Independence, 1875-1948* (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2014), 14.

¹⁸¹ “Guangxuehui huibao” *Chuban shiliao* 27, no. 1 (1992), 44–65.

¹⁸² Yun Ch’iho was a young scholar-official in the Chosŏn government. After the failure of the Kapsin Coup (1884), Yun escaped to Shanghai to avoid an arrest order as one of the masterminds of the coup. During his exile in Shanghai, Yun went to the Anglo-Chinese College (*Zhongxi shuyuan*), the first missionary school in Shanghai, to receive Western style education. After finishing a degree at the Anglo-Chinese College, Yun studied abroad in Vanderbilt University at

Immediately after publication in Shanghai, *Zhongdong zhanji* was imported to Korea, and Hyŏn Ch'ae (1856–1925) translated it into the mixed Korean-Chinese language and published it in 1899. In addition to Hyŏn Ch'ae's translation, while in prison, Syngman Rhee also translated *Zhongdong zhanji* into the Korean language, aiming to reach readers who could not read the mixed Korean-Chinese version. Syngman Rhee kept the manuscript of his translation and later published it in Hawaii in 1917.¹⁸³ Before discussing the adoption of Chinese books on Korean soil, regarding the case of Syngman Rhee's translation of *Zhongdong zhanji*, it is important to address the motivation of the original author, Young Allen, and compare Allen's motivation with that of Syngman Rhee.

Young Allen wanted Chinese people to realize that Japan had defeated China because of their passionate interest in learning about advanced Western civilization. His intention was evident when he attempted to include Mori Arinori's (1847–1889) *Education in Japan* (1873) in the second print of *Zhongdong zhanji* in 1897.¹⁸⁴ *Education*

Nashville, Tennessee from 1888 to continue his higher education in the U.S. After graduating from Vanderbilt in 1891, Yun went to Oxford College of Emory University in Georgia and graduated with a master's degree in English. After finishing his studies in 1893, Yun went back to Shanghai and worked at his alma mater until he finally returned to Korea in 1895. Yun Ch'ih'o's translation of "Japanese Declaration of War" appears in *juan 4*. Young John Allen, Cai Erkang, *Zhongdong zhanji benmo, juan 4* (Shanghai: Guangxuehui, 1896); Han Xiao and Niu Linjie, "Chungdong ch'ŏn'gi ŭi Han'guk jŏk suyong," *Tongyang hanmunhak* 60 (2014): 199–333.

¹⁸³ O Yongsŏp, "Yi Sŭngman ŭi Ch'ŏng'il ch'ŏn'gi pŏnyŏk kanhaeng kwa chaju tongnip ron," *Han'guk sahaksabo* 22 (2010): 177–216.

¹⁸⁴ Mori Arinori (1847–1889) is the first minister of education (1886–1889) and known as the "architect" of the Meiji Constitution and Japanese modern education. Mori went to Britain in 1865 to study abroad; he traveled to many countries in the Eurasian continent and America before returning to Japan. Back in Japan, Mori established his private academy (later Hitotsubashi University) in Tokyo. Mori served as the minister of education (1886–1889) and initiated education reforms. Under his administration, Japan adopted the Western education system, which included six years of compulsory schooling for everyone and established high schools dedicated for training elites. Under his reform, the Ministry of Education took greater control over school curriculum. He emphasized the continuation of traditional Confucian ethics as a means of promoting morality and national loyalty in the lower schools but allowing some intellectual freedom in the higher education. Because of his radical policy, he was assassinated by opponents in 1889.

in Japan is a collection of advisory proposals of education policy for Japan written by the Office of the Commissioner of Education and other high-ranking U.S. officials, such as Theodore Roosevelt (1858–1919), who later became the 26th President of the United States of America.¹⁸⁵ The Office of the Commissioner of Education wrote *On Education in the United States*, which summarized the history of education policy in the U.S. and histories of major universities in America and their core curriculums.

The Japanese translation of *Education in Japan* came out in 1874 (Japanese title: *Nihon kyōiku saku*), and it became an excellent guide for Westernized educational reformation in Japan. Young Allen believed that Japan's radical approach to Westernizing their education system was the secret of Japan's successful modernization compared with the moderate changes in the Qing government that he regarded as failures. Young Allen thought that China was defeated in the war despite its overwhelming resources and population advantage over Japan because China lacked a proper modern education system in which to train Chinese people with skills and morals to protect their own rights and property. In hopes that China could emulate Japan's rapid adoption of Western civilization, Allen translated the original English version of *Education in Japan* into sinographic language with the aid of Chinese translator Ren Tingxu and Cai Erkang. The sinographic version came out in 1896 as a separate book with a slightly different title: *Wenxue xingguoce* (*Developing the Nation through Education*). And in 1897, with the anticipation that more Chinese people would read *Wenxue xingguoce*, the SDK published the second edition of *Zhongdong zhanji*, including *Wenxue xingguoce* as an appendix attached to the end of the 14 reel (K. *kwŏn*). *Wenxue xingguoce* was, however,

¹⁸⁵ Mori Arinori, *Education in Japan: A Series of Letters Addressed by Prominent Americans to Arinori Mori* (New York: D. Appleton, 1873).

not included in the second print of *Zhongdong zhanji* because of censorship by the Qing government.¹⁸⁶ There was a section introducing Christian education in America, and this content was against the Qing's law of publication.¹⁸⁷

Historian Kim Sojŏng addresses that Allen and his Chinese translators strategically domesticated *Education in Japan* in the Chinese context by modifying the content, adding new meanings, adapting it to the Chinese literary style, incorporating the Chinese world view, and coining new words from various Confucian terminologies to make it familiar to Chinese readers. However, the domestication strategy may have had a wider impact in East Asia, including on Korean readers. Although Allen's hope was squashed by the intervention of the Qing, a young Korean radical, Syngman Rhee, understood Allen's intention to spread *Education in Japan* throughout East Asia.

American missionaries had a hand in delivering Allen's Chinese version of *Education in Japan* to Syngman Rhee, and Rhee copied the whole text in his prison diary. Because Syngman Rhee did not leave any evidence that he read the English version, it is possible that Syngman Rhee's understanding of the American education system was defined by the Chinese version of *Education in Japan*, which was revised. Allen and his Chinese translators addressed the moral superiority of Christian civilization over Confucian civilization, emphasized gender equality in the U.S., and added criticism of the suffering of women in Chinese society.¹⁸⁸ Although everything has both good and bad, Allen did not want the readers to notice the dark side of American society: the

¹⁸⁶ The table of content page indicates that there is a section on *Developing the Nation through Education* as an appendix; but the actual content of this section is omitted.

¹⁸⁷ Kim Sojŏng, "Miguk kaesin'gyo sŏn'gyosa ŭi Chunggukhwa pŏnyŏk chŏllyak: Education in Japan esŏ 'Wenhua xingguoce' ŭroŭi chŏnbyŏn," *Chungguk yŏn'gu* 49 (2010): 3–28.

¹⁸⁸ Kim Sojŏng, "Miguk kaesin'gyo sŏn'gyosa ŭi Chunggukhwa pŏnyŏk chŏllyak: Education in Japan esŏ 'Wenhua xingguoce' ŭroŭi chŏnbyŏn," 13.

history of Black slavery in America. Allen omitted the section describing the history of education of African Americans in the U.S. in his Chinese version.¹⁸⁹ The English version of *Education in Japan* discusses the education of African American people, which started after 1863 when the slavery system was abolished. Because of this, the discussion of African American education remained at a very preliminary level, and even when Allen was translating it in the 1890s, African American education was unequal to the education that White people received.

In all, Chinese readers and Syngman Rhee learned to see the inferiority of their own traditions and culture and developed a sense that Western civilization was morally superior. The American education system that Chinese readers and Syngman Rhee learned about from the books published by missionaries in Shanghai was an idealized version of the truth that exaggerated its moral superiority. Even though Syngman Rhee never visited the U.S., the experience of reading and copying the Chinese version of *Education in Japan* convinced Rhee that he had a firm grasp on the U.S. education system, which encouraged him to worship its superiority and later led him to pursuing higher education in the U.S.¹⁹⁰

Learning Japanese Empire through Chinese Books: 1900–1910

The book market in Korea began to flourish during the first decade of the 1900s.

¹⁸⁹ On the contrary, the Japanese translation kept the section on African American education.

¹⁹⁰ After being released from prison, Rhee was dispatched to the U.S. as the Kojong Emperor's special delegate to persuade the U.S. to intervene against Japan's colonization of Korea; this intercession attempt failed. After the mission was aborted, Rhee remained in the U.S. and studied at George Washington University, Harvard University for a master's degree, and Princeton University for his Ph.D. For more on Rhee's mission to the U.S. and his education, see Yu Yŏng'ik, *The Making of the First Korean President*, 18–40; Chŏng Pyŏngjun, *Unam Yi Sŭngman yŏn'gu* (Seoul: Yŏksa pip'yŏngsa, 2005).

Since the introduction of the general education system after the Kabo reform in 1895, the number of literate individuals increased dramatically. Private schools were also established in the 1880s, and after 1905, the number of private schools increased; the number of private schools that received certification from the government reached 2,250,¹⁹¹ and these schools increased the number of literate readers in the entire population. A new market for textbooks also emerged in this period. However, bookstores in the 1890s were mostly street vendors, and most of the bookstores also served as chandleries or paper shops. Although books were high-value products, the market was not yet large enough to gain enough profit. Separate and professional bookstores with larger capital only began to appear after 1905.¹⁹² Another reason for the small book market was that there were not enough Korean publishing companies to meet the market's needs. The first private book printing shop with modern printing facilities in Korea was founded in 1884, but it ceased publishing in the 1890s, and private publishing companies began to flourish only after 1900.¹⁹³

The 1905 Japan-Korea protectorate treaty had a significant impact on the rise of the book market in Korea. The education boom represented by the increased number of private schools in Korea shows the national reaction toward overcoming this national crisis through education. Although nationalistic newspapers advocated education to foster

¹⁹¹ Kim Ponghŭi, *Han'guk kaehwagi sŏjŏk munhwa yŏn'gu* (Seoul: Ihwa yŏja taehakkyo ch'ulp'anbu, 1999), 21–22.

¹⁹² Maurice Courant, a French diplomat and the author of *Bibliographie Coréenne; Tableau Littéraire de la Corée, Contenant la Nomenclature des Ouvrages Publiés Dans ce Pays Jusqu'en 1890 Ainsi que la Description et L'analyse Détaillées des Principaux d'entre ces Ouvrages*, stayed in Korea from 1890 to 1892 and left notes on the bookstores he had visited. The bookstores were all gathered in the city center and were located on the broad street between Chonggak and the capital's southern gate. In Yi Minhŭi, *Paek Tuyong kwa Hannam sŏrim yŏn'gu* (Seoul: Yŏngnak, 2013), 119–120.

¹⁹³ Kim Ponghŭi, *Han'guk kaehwagi sŏjŏk munhwa yŏn'gu*, 36–37.

national strength and prosperity, even those who did not buy into the nationalist rhetoric found their own ways of surviving after the state's collapse when nothing was left on which to rely. In addition to increasing number of schools, new type of academic societies and educational organizations emerged after 1905. These included the Korean Self-Strengthening Society (K. *Taehan chaganghoe*, established in 1906), the Northwest Academic Society (K. *Söbuk hakhoe*, 1908), and the Metropolitan Society for Promoting Education (K. *Kiho hŭnghakhoe*, 1908). The increase in literacy and demand for books were also reflected in newspaper articles. On October 12, *Taehan maeil sinbo* (*Korea Daily News*) published an article entitled "Books are the Compass to Develop People's Wisdom," asserting that books are the foundation of developing the knowledge to create a strong nation and stating the following:

As investigating the situation of the nations of world, their enlightened, wealthy, and powerful nationals all have enthusiastic patriotic spirit, and regard national affairs as their own, being active and forward looking as their prime object. If their nation's power is one step behind other nations, then all people make a duty, which is altruism. [Their] knowledge is enlightened, so they acknowledge state affairs as their own work.¹⁹⁴

Sin Ch'aeho (1880-1936), a famous nationalist writer, also contended that books are the basis of nation-building. The promotion of book publication was inseparable from the self-strengthening movement in Korea; on a different day in the same newspaper, he

¹⁹⁴ "Söjok i wi kaebal minji ji jinam", *Korea Daily News (Taehan maeil sinbo)*, October 12, 1905, cited in Kim Ponghŭ, *Han'guk kaehwagi söjök munhwa yŏn'gu*, 18.

notes:

Book is a womb produces country's public feeling, custom, politics, industry, culture, and military power. [Book is] also a photo album of a lineage of sages, heroes, ancients, patriots, and gallants. If there is no book, there will be no nation.¹⁹⁵

The explosive demand for books and the increase in readers were accompanied by the flourishing numbers of new bookstores. According to bibliographer Yi Minhŭi's extensive research on the names of bookstores that began to appear in modern Korea, between the late nineteenth century and 1910, at least 140 bookstore names appeared. Although seventy-five of them can be traced to their foundation dates, the sixty-five remaining bookstores did not have founding dates. Among the seventy-five bookstores with known dates, seventy-four were established between 1900 and 1910.¹⁹⁶

Because of the shortage of printing facilities needed to fulfill the need for textbooks and the demand for new learning in Korea, many textbooks and other books were still imported from China or Japan. Thus, an article appeared in the *Imperial Gazetteer*, complaining about the current situation and the lack of good books, as follows:

When you look at bookstores, there are nothing but books written in sinographic

¹⁹⁵ "Kusŏ kanhaeng ron sŏjŏk ch'ulp'an'ga chessi ege koham", *Korea Daily News*, December 18, 1908, cited in Yi Minhŭi, *Paek Tuyong kwa Hannam sŏrim yŏn'gu*, "Acknowledgement."

¹⁹⁶ Yi Minhŭi, *Paek Tuyong kwa Hannam sŏrim yŏn'gu*, 123–129.

language books (*Han'mun ch'aekja*) imported from Shanghai. Those books only can be read by people who knows the literary principle of sinographic language (*Han'mun munli*). Moreover, all books are crude and outdated except a few number of books. There is nothing worth to read. When it comes to books written in Japanese, occasionally people went abroad to get good books. And when it comes to Japanese books, occasionally because of those pioneers who went abroad to get good books. But how many people know the basic grammar of Japanese language? Even though the Bureau of Education produced some translations, they are nothing but old-fashioned and negligible ones, such as Okamoto Kansuke's *Man'guksa* (*History of All Nations*), coarse and rough writings, such as *T'aeso shinsa* (Ch. *Taixi xinshi*) by Im Lakji (Young Allen), and so on. Alas! After several decades of reformation, undertaking the development of people's knowledge came only this far. What a shame! What a pity!¹⁹⁷

At the end, the article urges the government and schools to establish more translation offices and produce more books. Compared with the books that recently came from Shanghai, the author of the article found that the only available translations of world history were all outdated. Numerous nations had been colonized or disappeared from the world map after Okamoto Kansuke's (1839–1904) *History of All Nations* (J. *Bankoku rekishi*, 1879) was written, and Young Allen's *Taixi xinshi* (1894) was no longer “new” and needed to be updated by incorporating the past ten years of world history. At least the author acknowledges the need for more translated books instead of relying on the quality

¹⁹⁷ “Oejök yökch’ul ūi p’ilyo,” *Imperial Gazeteer*, June 28, 1907, cited in Kim Ponghŭ, *Han’guk kaehwagi sŏjök munhwa yŏn’gu*, 129.

of the books imported from China. According to the author, this imbalance of knowledge was obvious, and for him and for the sake of spreading knowledge, more books needed to be translated into Korean to make them readable for Koreans who did not know how to read sinographic language.

The dominance of sinographic books in the Korean book market continued in the 1900s. According to an advertisement by Taedong sŏgwan, a bookseller in P'yŏngyang in Northwest Korea, they were selling about 3,200 books imported from Shanghai, but the list only had 396 titles (See Appendix).¹⁹⁸ The books were organized under seventeen categories: elementary, advanced elementary, middle school, high school, history, geography, politics and legal studies, sociology, philosophy, economic studies, agricultural studies, business, industry, medicine, military science, and biographies. By examining the names of the categories, it is evident that the category structure itself adopted a new educational system as a foundation of the learning structure. It divided educational subjects and levels based on the learners' ages and learning experiences. There is no doubt that such a system was first introduced in Meiji Japan and that it influenced the academic map, which we can see from the book leaflet.¹⁹⁹

Sinographic books sold by Taedong sŏgwan were largely published by major Chinese publishers in Shanghai: The Expanding Knowledge Press and the Civilization Press. Publishers in Shanghai after the Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895) showed great interest in Japan as a model of reformation. The Expanding Knowledge Press

¹⁹⁸ "P'yŏngyang Taedong sogwan chuin ko," *Imperial Gazetteer* June 1, 1906, cited in Kim Ponghŭ, *Han'guk kaehwagi sŏjŏk munhwa yŏn'gu*, 292.

¹⁹⁹ The list of book titles of the Great Harmony Bookstore (*Taedong sŏgwan*) was in the advertisement section of the *Imperial Gazetteer* (*Hwangsŏng sinmun*) on June 1, 8, and 16, 1906, and in the *Korea Daily News* (*Taehan maeil sinbo*) on June 5, 10, and 13, cited in Kim Ponghŭi, *Han'guk kaehwagi sŏjŏk munhwa yŏn'gu*, 291–299.

(Ch. *Guangzhi shuju*, Ko. *Gwangji sŏguk*) was established in 1901 in Shanghai. Although the Expanding Knowledge Press had a separate executive director, Liang Qichao was in fact the head of the press.²⁰⁰ Some of Liang's early works were published here, but most of the books published were translated books that Japanese authors had written or translated. Many of the translators were also staying in Japan, just as Liang, including Mai Zhonghua (1876–1955), Mai Dinghua (?–?),²⁰¹ and Zhao Bizhen (1873–1956). Most of these translators were students of Kang Youwei.²⁰² After their failure to promote reformation within the Qing government, Kang Youwei and Liang Qichao went to Japan in exile. They continued their task of enlightening Chinese people via the media by publishing Chinese newspapers in Japan and also by establishing the Expanding Knowledge Press company in Shanghai to continue to influence Chinese people in the mainland through their publications.

Along with the Expanding Knowledge Press, the Civilization Press (Ch. *Wenming shuju*, K. *Munmyŏng sŏguk*), which was established in 1902, translated many Japanese textbooks into Chinese. The Qing government ordered that Civilization Press would be the major publisher for elementary school textbooks, and a large portion of these

²⁰⁰ Liang Qichao was one of the co-founders of the Expanding Knowledge Press with the financial aid he drew from overseas Chinese people. Moreover, Liang owned one-third of the total stock of the press. The chief executive officer was Huang Xiezhi, the editor-in-chief was He Chengri, and the publisher was Feng Jingruo. The Expanding Knowledge Press published more than 200 kinds of books until 1915. Wu Yuhao, “Guangzhi shuju yanjiu” (MA thesis, Fudan University, 2010); Zhang Fengyuan, “Guangzhi shuju (1901-1915): Weixin pai wenhua shiye jigou zhi yi” *Zhongyang yanjiuyuan jindaishi yanjiusuo jikan* 2 (1971): 397–415.

²⁰¹ Mai Zhonghua and Mai Zhenghua were brothers. Their elder brother was Mai Menghua (1874–1915) was one of the earliest student of Kang Youwei from the 1890s and went to Japan. Mai Zhonghua (1876–1958) was Kang's son-in-law, marrying his daughter Kang Tongwei (1879–1974), a renowned female writer in modern China. Xu Liming, “Chungguk ūl maegae ro han aeguk kyemong sŏsa yŏn'gu,” (Ph.D. dissertation, Inha University, 2010), 31–32.

²⁰² Xiong Yuezhi, *Xixue dongjian yu wanqing shehui*, 643-5; Rebecca Karl, *Staging the World: Chinese Nationalism At the Turn of the Twentieth Century* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2002), 274n7.

elementary books were exported to Korea.²⁰³ Many of the Civilization Press books imported to Korea were also Japanese books, and many of those textbooks were also translated works that had originated from Japan.

Unlike books imported from the Translation College of the Jiangnan Arsenal in the 1880s, in the 1900s, there were very few books related to science in the booksellers' lists of imported books. Instead, many books fell under the categories of social and political theory, history, and philosophy. Among the 396 books that booksellers advertised in newspapers, the bibliographical information of ninety-eight books were identified: among those ninety-eight books, thirty-four books (thirty-five percent) were published by the Expanding Knowledge Press, and twenty-eight (twenty-nine percent) books were from the Civilization Press. These two publishers were the major source of imported books in Korea, and in fact, the majority of the books published by the Expanding Knowledge Press and the Civilization Press were either Chinese translations of original Japanese books or double translations of Western books. For example, in the case of the Chinese translation of Antonin Debidour's (1847–1917) *Histoire diplomatique de l'Europe depuis l'ouverture du Congrès de Vienne jusqu'à la fermeture du Congrès de Berlin* (E. Diplomatic history of Europe since the opening of the Congress of Vienna until the closure of the Berlin Congress, 1891), it was a double translation of the original French version: first, it was translated into Japanese by Sakai Yuzaburo (?–1900) and published in 1899²⁰⁴ by Tokyo College (J. *Tokyo senmon gakkō*).²⁰⁵ The

²⁰³ Xiong Yuezhi, *Xixue dongjian yu wanqing shehui*, 645.

²⁰⁴ Antonin Debidour, *Konsei oshu gaikoshi*, trans. Sakai Yuzaburo (Tokyo: Tokyo senmon gakko shuppanbu, 1899).

²⁰⁵ Okuma Shigenobu (1838–1922) established Tokyo College with the Departments of Political Science, Law, English, and Physical Science in 1882. Later, Tokyo College changed its name to Waseda University in 1892.

Chinese version was published by the Expanding Knowledge Press in 1905 after being translated by Mai Dinghua.²⁰⁶

Kang Youwei, Liang Qichao, and the Expanding Knowledge Press: Implanting Japanese Books to the Sinographic World

Radical sinographic writers, books, and publishers in Shanghai began to overthrow existing knowledge system in East Asia as obsolete, outdated, and useless. Both Kang Youwei and Liang Qichao encouraged the Chinese to read Japanese books, and the Expanding Knowledge Press was their way to ensure that Chinese people would read Japanese books. Because of their popularity and fame in Korea, books from the Expanding Knowledge Press aroused more of an echo in Korean society. Before establishing a professional translation office, Kang published the *Catalog of Japanese Translated Books* (Ch. *Riben shumu zhi*) in 1898. The *Catalog of Japanese Translated Books* categorized Western books that were translated by the Japanese under fifteen categories and included detailed bibliographic information, such as the title, volume number, author, and price of the book, with his own notes and comments attached to each book.²⁰⁷

Liang also expressed his opinion regarding the advantage of learning Japanese. On April 1, 1899, Liang published an editorial essay in *Voices of Remonstrance* (Ch. *Qingyi bao*) entitled “The Advantage of Learning Japanese.” In the essay, Liang addressed how the current Western books translated into Chinese too heavily concentrated on certain topics, such as military science and technology, while the

²⁰⁶ Antonin Debidour, *Jinshi ouzhou waijiaoshi*, trans. Mai Dinghua (Shanghai: Guangzhi shuju, 1905).

²⁰⁷ Xiong Yuezhi, *Xixue Dongjian yu wanqing shehui*, 645.

Japanese translated Western books from all fields, including politics, economics, and philosophy. Learning the Japanese language was even better than learning English directly because for Chinese people, it would take five to six years to master English but only a few months to master the Japanese language.²⁰⁸

Korean society received Liang Qichao's writings with particular interest. Although newspapers and booksellers cherished Liang's works, not everyone in Korea was happy with Liang. People quickly realized the usefulness of Liang's work for buttressing their efforts to promote new learning. However, Confucian scholar Cho Kŭngsŏp (1873–1933) from the Kyŏngsang Province openly criticized Liang and his work. Although Cho still believed in the need to hold onto traditional learning principles (K. *tohak*), he actively compared the different theories from the East and the West, which were compiled in his *Difficulty of Words* (K. *Kon'ŏn*, 1910). Cho criticized Liang for his “faddish sophistry” (K. *kokhak ase*) and how he was overwhelmed by Western civilization and losing his basic knowledge from the ancient sage-kings, possibly because Liang enticed Korean youth with his splendid writing style. In fact, Liang's exquisite piece of writing had strong appeal to Korean readers. Cho Kŭngsŏp could not deny that there was a number of Koreans who admired Liang, again why Cho was most likely so concerned about the influence of what he saw as distorted ideas.²⁰⁹

The intellectual and cultural shift characterized by seeking knowledge and wisdom from Japan was indeed a tremendous change, but it is evident that China was

²⁰⁸ “Chŏngguk chisa ka Ilbonmun ŭl sŏnhak nonsŏl ŭl yakki hanora ch'o ch'ŏng'uibŏ”, *Imperial Gazetteer*, April 29, 1899.

²⁰⁹ Cho Kŭngsŏp “Tok ŭmbingsil munjip,” *Amsŏjip* in *Han'guk kojŏn chonghap DB (DB of Korean Classics)*, comp. Institute for the Translation of Korean Classics (Seoul: Han'guk kojŏn pŏnyŏgwŏn, 2000–), http://db.itkc.or.kr/inLink?DCI=ITKC_MO_0663A_0160_010_0070_2009_A350_XML.

continuously a source of these books. Before 1905, when the Japanese Residency-General of Korea forced the Japanese language to be included in the school curriculum, direct access to Japanese language materials were limited, and without proper training in a foreign language, the best source for “new learning” was still the sinographic language.

Chinese Accommodation of Modernization: The Case of Thirty Years of History of Japanese Reformation in Korean Newspapers

Books mediated by Chinese translators did not always preserve the original text. Sometimes, a part of the book was transfigured. Among the book titles imported from the Expanding Knowledge Press, the *Thirty Years History of Japanese Reformation* (Ch. *Riben weixin sanshinian shi*, 1903) demonstrates how the Japanese text was reinterpreted by a Chinese translator and set in a Korean context. By tracing how translation changes the original meaning of the text, we are able to understand how Koreans familiarized themselves with Japan as a model with the aid of the Chinese interpretation of the history of the Meiji Restoration, which ultimately transformed the image of Japan from a potential adversary to a model country.

The original text consisted of a series of essays that appeared in the *Sun* (J. *Taiyo*) in 1898, a Japanese literary criticism magazine that Hakubunkan²¹⁰ published.²¹¹ Those essays were written to celebrate the thirty-year anniversary of the Meiji Restoration. Hakubunkan published them in a separate book in the same year, which was translated by a Chinese translator, Luo Xiaogao, a Chinese student at Waseda University majoring in

²¹⁰ Hakubunkan is a modern Japanese publishing company founded in 1887.

²¹¹ Tarumoto Teruo, “Ryō keichō no tanehon: Zasshi Taiyō no baai,” *Shomatsu shosetsu kara* 50 (July 1998), cited in Lee Yeaan, “Taehan chegukki yusin ūi chōngch’ihak: Kaenyōm ūi ch’ihwan kwa ilbon yusin 30 nyōnsa,” *Kaenyōm kwa sotong* 14, no. 12 (2014): 61–94.

economics and an admirer of Kang Youwei.²¹² Luo worked as an editor of *Qingyi bao* and *Xinmin congbao*, Chinese magazines that Liang led. The Chinese translation came out in 1903 by the Expanding Knowledge Press. In Korea, it did not appear as a printed book, but rather, eight of the twelve chapters were introduced in the *Imperial Gazetteer*.

Table 4. Comparison Among Japanese, Chinese, Korean Versions of the *Thirty Years History of Japanese Reformation*

Chapter	箕都三十年 (1898)†	日本維新三十年史 (1903)††	日本維新三十年史 (1906) †††
1	Comprehensive survey (總論)	History of Academy and Ideology (學術思想史)	Academy (學術)
2	Politics (政治)	Politics (政治)	Politics (政治)
3	Military (軍事)	Military (軍事)	Military (軍事)
4	Diplomacy (外交)	Diplomacy (外交)	Diplomacy (外交)
5	Finance (財政)	Finance (財政)	Finance (財政)
6	Jurisdiction (司法)	Jurisdiction (司法)	Jurisdiction (司法)
7	Religion (宗教)	Religion (宗教)	Religion (宗教)
8	Education (教育)	Education (教育)	Education (教育)
9	Literature (文學)	Literature (文學)	n/a
10	Transportation (交通)	Transportation (交通)	n/a
11	Industry (産業)	Industry (産業)	n/a
12	Society (社會)	Society (社會)	n/a

†Hakubunkan. *Tento sanjūnen: Meiji sanjūnenshi Meiji sanjūnenkan kokusei ichiran*.

Tokyo: Hakubunkan, 1898.

†† *Riben weixin sanshinianshi*. Translated by Luo Xiaogao. Shanghai: Guangzhi shuju, 1903.

††† “Ilbon Yusin 30 Nyōnsa.” *Imperial Gazetteer* April 30 to December 26, 1906.

²¹² Hō, Chaeyōng, “Chisik suyong ch’awōn esō pon Hwangsōng sinmun ilbon yusin 30 nyōnsa yōksul kwachōng kwa kŭ ūimi,” *Hanminjok ōmunhak* 70 (2015): 139–165.

The title of the first chapter of the Japanese version of the *Thirty Years History of Japanese Reformation* is “Comprehensive survey” (J. *sōron*). The Chinese version changed it into “History of Academy and Ideology” (Ch. *Xueshu sixiangshi*). And in Korean, the Chinese title was shortened into “Academy” (K. *haksul*). The Chinese translation changed not only the title of the first chapter, but also all the content of the first chapter, and the motivation for the change became clearer in the Korean version.

In the original Japanese version, “Japanese Ideology” is discussed, the origin of which could be traced back to the political reformation first initiated in 1876. The original Japanese version regarded the academic change and the ideological goal as a historical outcome first sparked by political upheaval. What the Chinese translation tried to theorize from the historical chronology toward reformation was a set of systemic knowledge that can be studied, analyzed, and finally applied to other specific historical conditions. Although the content of the first chapter in the Korean version is a direct translation of the Chinese version, the Korean version of the title deleted “history” and “ideology” to represent the Japanese “academy” as a concrete theory or a program, removing its specific history. Historian Lee Yeaan address that this is the point when the traditional concept of “restoration” (J. *ishin* Ch. *weixin* K. *yusin*) was neglected, and at last, “the Meiji Restoration is elevated from a specific historical event to universal civilization process.”²¹³ In her conclusion, Lee states that through this process, the discourse of “restoration” during the Korean Empire period was deeply connected to the experience of the Meiji Restoration, with a strong emphasis on nationalism, patriotism,

²¹³ Lee Yeaan, “Taehan chegukki yusin ūi chōngch’ihak: Kaenyōm ūi ch’ihwan kwa ilbon yusin 30 nyōnsa,” *Kaenyōm kwa sot’ong* 14, no. 12 (2014): 79–80.

morality, and education, but the discourse alienated the ideas of the fundamental political reform.²¹⁴

Although the other chapters of the three versions were not significantly different, a drastic change appeared in the first chapter, showing how the Chinese translation tried to lead readers to use this text as an engagement in new learning (Ch. *xinxue*, K. *sinhak*) and model the patriotism that the Japanese people had. The political and social changes that accumulated during the thirty years were compressed into a single chunk of Japanese Ideology that was used as a model of modernization for late followers, such as China and Korea.

Conclusion

The Japanese annexation of Korea marked the end of the popularity of Chinese books in Korea because the colonial authority regarded such books as a threat to their effort in stabilizing colonial order in Korea. In 1910, the Japanese colonial authority in Korea banned the circulation of the sinographic writings by Liang Qichao, such as the *Icedrinker's Studio* (Ch. *Yinbingshi wenji* K. *Ŭmbingsil munjip*), the collection of Liang Qichao's literary works. Although this was the only "foreign book" banned by the colonial authority, most other banned books were in fact Korean translations of sinographic books imported from Shanghai.²¹⁵ Still, the growing book market allowed for the publication of more books in Korea. Vernacular Korean gained popularity and authority after obtaining the honorable title of the "national script," (*kungmun*), even

²¹⁴ Lee Yeaan, "Taehan chegukki yusin ūi chŏngch'ihak: Kaenyŏm ūi ch'ihwan kwa ilbon yusin 30 nyŏnsa," *Kaenyŏm kwa sot'ong* 14, no. 12 (2014): 88–89.

²¹⁵ *Kanpo*, 1910. 11, 19. cited in Kyung Moon Hwang, *Rationalizing Korea: The Rise of the Modern State, 1894-1945* (Oakland: University of California Press, 2016), 320n35.

during the Japanese colonial period,²¹⁶ which led Korean nationalists to label the use of sinographic language as sign of toadyism (*sadae chuŭi*), a fetish on Chinese culture. On the other hand, the introduction of the Japanese language as part of elementary education during the colonial era contributed to the spread of Japanese print media as a dominant method of information gathering. Such public education allowed Korean people to access Japanese language materials without the aid of sinographic translations.

Modern Chinese print culture and the translation project in Shanghai were the main sources of new learning for Koreans from the late nineteenth century until 1910. The modern Chinese print culture developed into a new cultural network that reconnected the old regional network into new terms. The shared sinographic literary style, as well as the shared concern of the survival of the nation, constituted the extensive circulation of sinographic books in the beginning of twentieth century. Many Korean nationalists who emerged after this period were in fact translators of Chinese books and editors of Korean publishing enterprises, which heavily relied on translating sinographic books into vernacular language. Those experiences enabled Korean anticolonial writers, such as Pak Ŭnsik (1859–1925) and Cho Soang (1887–1958), to seek their intellectual and cultural alliances with Chinese nationalism: choosing Shanghai as their main stage for deploying cultural nationalism was not far from the undeniable influence of modern print culture in Shanghai, which I continue to discuss in the next two chapters.

²¹⁶ Contrary to the popular belief that Japanese colonialism continuously suppressed the usage of Korean script, Yi Hyeryŏng argues that in fact, the colonial state power played a significant role in standardizing the orthography of Korean script, which enabled nationwide usage of Korean script in Korea; on the other hand, Yi Hyeryŏng points out that paradoxically, it also gave the colonial state the power to more easily penetrate into the everyday linguistic life of Korean people and control it. Yi Hyeryŏng, “Han’gŭl undong kwa kŭndae midiŏ,” *Taedong munhwa yŏn’gu* 47 (2004): 249–290.

Although the material and social impacts of sinographic books from China continued to dominate Korean society until 1910, the intellectual and cultural influence of sinographic books significantly faded away because the content of Chinese books advocated the Western (or Japanese) culture as the model of modernity. As we saw in the case of Yun Ch'ihŏ and Syngman Rhee, the first generation of Korean students in America, their intellectual leap and decision to travel to a new world cannot be understood without understanding the modern print culture in Shanghai and its role in cultural exchange, which was not just mediated between the minds of those young radicals and their new models of civility. In other words, the import of books from China led to the dominance of Western and Japanese influence over Korea's modern culture.

Sinographic books educated Korean people with the superiority of foreign culture; in response, sinographic books were source of Korea's nationalistic claim for sovereignty in new terms. On the one hand, this was a common cultural experience, and on the other hand, it also served as a pretext for most Korean people to accept Japan's colonization of Korea as their fate based on their new belief in the superiority of the Western civilization of Japan as a new role model for East Asian people.

Chapter 3

Misery Loves Company: Epics of An Chunggŭn and Korean Exile Writers in Shanghai China, 1910–1925*

Introduction: An Chunggŭn and the Korean Nationalist Literature in Exile

On October 26, 1909, a Korean patriot named An Chunggŭn (1879–1910) shot Itō Hirobumi (1841–1909), the great statesmen of Meiji Japan. After Japan defeated China in 1895 and Russia in 1905, no other imperial powers could challenge Japan's colonization of Korea. Japan made Korea her protectorate, and Itō Hirobumi was the first overseer of this new protectorate. In 1909, Itō Hirobumi planned to visit Harbin city in northeast China to discuss the Manchu problem with other foreign officials. An Chunggŭn heard the news of Itō Hirobumi's upcoming visit to Harbin, and with his comrades, An Chunggŭn plotted the assassination of Itō Hirobumi. When the train arrived at Harbin station, An Chunggŭn was waiting on the platform for Itō Hirobumi. Even though An Chunggŭn had never met Itō Hirobumi in person before, he knew what Itō looked like because of the newspaper article on Itō, where his photo was prominently displayed. An Chunggŭn pulled out his gun and shot Itō. The bullets hit Itō's chest, and Itō collapsed, dying shortly thereafter. An was arrested on the spot and housed in Lushun prison. The Japanese court put him on trial not long after. It only took four months to sentence An to death, which was a hasty judgement considering the gravity of the matter and the

* Earlier version of this chapter was presented with a different title: "Universalized National Hero: Biographies of An Chung-gŭn and Sinographic Nationalism in the 1910s" at the Association for Asian Studies 2017 Annual Meeting in Toronto, March 2017.

seriousness of the sentence. The sentence was executed on March 26, 1910. In the same year, on August 29, Korea signed the annexation treaty with Japan. Until it was liberated in 1945, the country of Korea no longer existed.

The news of the deaths of one of Japan's great statesman and the Korean patriot who plotted the assassination shocked the world. Approximately 90,000 telegrams were exchanged from October 26 to November 4 concerning Itō's death.²¹⁷ Until An's death in 1910, Japanese, Chinese, Russian, and American news media delivered up-to-date information of An's trial. The death of An Chunggŭn was one kind of end, but it was a new beginning for the literary history of his life. Even though An's action did not stop Japan's colonization of Korea, An's personal life symbolized the history of the fall of his country, and the story was continuously produced in China, even after An's death. The story of the Korean patriot and his anticolonial struggle continued to flourish in China in many forms—biographies, play scripts, and films.²¹⁸ For example, the Evolutionary Theatre Group (進化團), founded in 1910 and one of the most famous modern Chinese theatre groups, presented the play "An Chunggŭn Kills Itō" (安重根刺伊藤) in more than ten cities, including Shanghai, Nanjing, and Tianjin. After watching this play, Sun Yat-sen credited the Evolutionary Theatre Group as a "school" for its educational message.²¹⁹

This chapter traces the early phase of the journey of An Chunggŭn's story in the

²¹⁷ Cho Kwang, "An Chunggŭn yŏn'gu ŭi hyŏnhwang kwa kwaje," *Han'guk kŭnhyŏndaesa yŏn'gu* 12 (March 2000): 182.

²¹⁸ Wang Yuanzhou offers a broad survey of the image of An Chunggŭn in modern Chinese literature. Wang Yuanzhou, "Three images of An Chunggŭn in Chinese narratives," in *Peace In the East: An Chunggŭn's Vision for Asia In the Age of Japanese Imperialism* eds. Yi T'aejin, Eugene Y. Park, and Kirk W. Larsen (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2017), 131–159.

²¹⁹ Mun Chŏngjin, "Chungguk Kŭndae sosŏl kwa An Chunggŭn," in An Chunggŭn ŭisa kinyŏm saŏphoe ed., *An Chunggŭn yŏn'gu ŭi kich'o* (Seoul: Kyŏngin Munhwasa, 2009), 467–498.

1910s, looking at Shanghai as the center stage where the story played out. Of course, it should have been Korean people who most welcomed the news of An Chunggŭn's anticolonial struggle and desired to hear more about it, but the Japanese colonization of Korea in 1910 put violent suppression on any public expression of Korean nationalism in Korean peninsula under the colonial authority.²²⁰ Japanese, Russian, and English news media were all critical of An Chunggŭn. Foreign news media reported the event with more sympathy to the loss of a Japanese statesman rather than the deed of a Korean patriot.²²¹ On the contrary, the first versions of An Chunggŭn's biographies was written by Korean exile writers in Shanghai, a modern treaty port in China.²²² a Korean exile writer Kim T'aeg'yŏng (1850–1927) wrote An Chunggŭn's biography and published it first in 1912, before going on to publish other versions in 1916 and 1925.²²³ Besides Kim T'aeg'yŏng, there was another Korean exile, Pak Ŭnsik (1859–1925), who published a biography on An Chunggŭn in 1912 and another version in 1914.

These Korean exile writers continuously revised and rewrote the same story but in a different way, which leads us to question the historical and social context that brought about the popularity of a Korean patriot in modern Chinese print media. The image of a

²²⁰ Korean newspapers owned by the Japanese immediately reported the news and criticized An Chunggŭn's crime and asked the Korean emperor to resign to take responsibility for the assassination. Korean news media treated the news with grief and condolence regarding the death of Itō Hirobumi, and they did not deliver nationalistic sentiments publicly. *Taehan maeil sinbo*, one of the most nationalistic newspapers before Japan's colonization of Korea, continued to report the process of the trial of An Chunggŭn without showing any sympathy to him. For detailed coverage of news media, see Sin Ŭnyong, "An Chunggŭn ŭigŏ e taehan kungnae ŭi insik," *Han'guk kŭnhyŏndaesa yŏn'gu* 33 (2005): 12–18.

²²¹ See An Chunggŭn ŭisa kinyŏm saŏphoe, *An Chunggŭn yŏn'gu ŭi kich'o* (Seoul: Kyŏng'in Munhwasa, 2009).

²²² For a detailed list of the publication of An Chunggŭn biographies between 1910–1920, see Yun Pyŏngsŏk, "An Chunggŭn ŭisa chŏn'gi ŭi chonghapjŏk kŏmto," *Han'guk kŭnhyŏndaesa yŏn'gu* 9 (1998): 104–144.

²²³ Ch'oe Yŏng'ok, "Kim T'aeg'yŏng ŭi An Chunggŭn hyŏngsanghwa kŏmto" *Tongyang hanmun hakhoe* 35 (2018): 363–392.

Korean patriot continues to serve as a model patriot, contributing to China's struggle to establish a modern nation-state. This was only done, I argue, by the strenuous effort of the Korean exile writers to refashion the narrative of a Korean patriot as a universalized form for foreign readers and claim the legitimacy of Korea's anticolonial struggle, which they constantly developed in their writing of biography. Both Kim T'aeg'yŏng and Pak Ŭnsik emphasized the cultural and historical commonality between the Chinese and Korean people, and they tried to contextualize Korea's anticolonialism in the political context of Chinese society, especially in accordance with the Han Chinese revolutionary nationalism that emerged in the 1910s.

The story of An Chunggŭn was revived in the 21st century in the midst of China's effort to mobilize the nation in support of its rise. In January 19, 2014, the An Chunggŭn Memorial Museum was opened in Harbin railway station, where An Chunggŭn killed Itō Hirobumi. With an investment by the Harbin municipal and railway bureau, the memorial museum was built inside a crowded public space to tell the story of modern hero who fought against foreign invasion; the initial plan was suggested by South Korean President Park Geun-hye at the summit meeting with Xi Jinping, the president of the People's Republic of China, and both governments collaborated to construct this historic exhibition together. Soon after it opened, Yoshihide Suga, the Japanese government's Chief Cabinet Secretary, stated the opening of the museum pays tribute to "a terrorist who was sentenced to death for murdering Itō Hirobumi, our first prime minister."²²⁴ With ongoing the territorial dispute in the South China Sea between Japan and China, by

²²⁴ "China opens memorial honoring Korean independence activist," *The Diplomat*, January 22, 2014, <https://thediplomat.com/2014/01/china-opens-memorial-honoring-korean-independence-activist/>

representing the story of a Korean patriot, the Korean and Chinese governments boycotted the Japanese prime minister's recent visit of the Yaskuni Shrine, where convicted war criminals were canonized. In addition to this, the effort of the Chinese government was in line with its desire to acquire moral authority by emphasizing the history of Chinese support of anticolonialism in Asia. With the current trend of the "rise of China" in global politics and the economy, these efforts of representing an anticolonial hero in a neighboring country fit into the grand plan to make China the leader of Asia in the age of globalization, here using a strategy of historical legitimacy. The complexity of international politics in East Asia enables a reexamination of the relationship between text and society in early twentieth-century East Asia as its historical precedent.

The goal of this chapter is neither to suggest neither literary representation rightfully serves the goal of contemporary Chinese global politics, nor is it to verify "historical objectivity" in the biographic writings of Korean exiles. Instead, by analyzing the intertextuality between Korean and Chinese national discourse in the literature on An Chunggŭn, this chapter aims to present a nuanced understanding of the representation of nationalism in China and Korea. Nationalism in general has been commonly understood as exclusive xenophobic ideology. In his book, *Nationalist Thoughts and the Colonial World*, Partha Chatterjee claims that the criticism of imperialism by colonial nationalists always rested on an imperialistic rationale, thereby undermining the nationalists' anticolonial claims. Chatterjee addresses this cultural dichotomy in nationalist ideology—acknowledging that the material superiority of Western culture in response to the exclusive spiritual superiority of the native culture is common in nationalist literature.²²⁵

²²⁵ Partha Chatterjee, *Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World: A Derivative Discourse*, 11–16.

In addition to this, I highlight the cultural interactions between Korea and China, as well as Korea and the West. Korean exile writers successfully obtained popularity among Chinese readers because they presented Korean nationalism using the shared memory of an international patriot. The writing and rewriting of the epic of An Chunggŭn successfully addresses its cosmopolitan value shared between Korean writers and Chinese readers.

By doing so, this chapter aims to contribute to the ongoing discussion of the necessity of having a “double peripheral perspective” in investigating East Asian history and contemporary society. Paek Yŏngsŏ and Pae Kyŏngha address the “double peripheral perspective,” which means a sharing of historical experiences but not the subject of history. On the one hand, a “double peripheral perspective” means acknowledging East Asian people who were marginalized because of Western-centered modernization, but on the other hand, it underscores the hierarchical structure that also stratified people inside East Asia.²²⁶ A “double peripheral perspective” allows us to highlight the twofold problem of Korean nationalism in China: on the one hand, it was a struggle against Japanese colonialism, but on the other hand, it was a struggle against Chinese colonialism.

Korean exile writers such as Kim T’aeg’yŏng and Pak Ŭnsik and their literary activities in China also best exemplify a twofold peripheral position in East Asia. As I discussed in the previous chapter, Korean writers were at the end of the chain when it came to transmitting the literary skills of modern nationalism. The previous two chapters

²²⁶ Paek Yongsŏ, *Haeksim hyŏnjang esŏ Tong Asia rŭl tasi mutta: kongsaeng sahoe rŭl wihan silch’ŏn kwaje* (P’aju: Ch’angbi, 2013), 15–33; Pae Kyŏngha, *Ssunwŏn kwa Han’guk: Chunghwajuŭi wa sadaejuŭi ŭi kyoch’a* (P’aju: Hanul, 2007), 17–23.

discussed how the envoy missions and book transmission contributed to Korea's path toward embracing Japan as the new hegemonic center of modern knowledge. The Japanese colonization of Korea was inseparable from the role of envoy missions and book transmission, which contributed to Korea's change of attitude toward Japan. However, Chinese officials and sinographic books from China were still reliable authorities and sources of information that contributed to cultural transformation in twentieth-century Korea.

The history of Korean modern literature has regarded the biographies of An Chunggŭn by Kim and Pak as the exemplars of Korean nationalism. Cho Tong'il compared Kim T'aeg'yŏng's An Chunggŭn biography to that of Pak Ŭnsik, saying that Kim portrayed An Chunggŭn as "patriotic Confucian literati" (K. *aeguk hanun sŏnbi*) while Pak Ŭnsik tried to highlight a national hero protecting his national territory and history.²²⁷ That is, considering time as a transition, Kim T'aeg'yŏng represented the traditional Confucian gentlemen while Pak Ŭnsik tried to construct a modern hero. Han Sijun, another historian of Korean modern nationalism, is a rare scholar who acknowledges how deeply the Chinese intellectuals were involved in the production of An's biography.²²⁸

My study is not the first analysis of Korean exile writers in Chinese media in Anglo-American scholarship. Andre Schmid introduces Kim and Pak as nationalist writers, focusing on their earlier careers as nationalistic enlightenment thinkers, which leaves space for further investigations of how their later careers in China contributed to

²²⁷ Cho Tong'il, *Han'guk munhak t'ongsa*, vol. 4 (Seoul: Chisik sanŏpsa, 1982), 305.

²²⁸ Han Sijun, "Chungguk'in i pon An Chunggŭn: Pak Ŭnsik kwa Chŏng Wŏn ŭi An Chunggŭn chŏn ŭl chungsim ŭro," *Ch'ungbuk sahak* 11 (2000): 493–506.

their literary activities.²²⁹ Contrary to this, Vladimir Tikhonov focuses on Pak's later activities as an exile in China: regarding Pak as a China watcher, Vladimir Tikhonov develops a comprehensive analysis of Korean exiles in China and their political views of China. By doing so, he examines how Koreans viewed Chinese people and how this relates to the development of Korea's modern identity.²³⁰ However, despite its peculiar popularity, scholars have paid little attention to the historical meaning of the multiple editions of the biographies on An Chunggŭn written by Kim and Pak. There is a recent study of An Chunggŭn in Anglo-American scholarship conducted by Korean, American, Japanese, and Chinese scholars.²³¹ Meanwhile, new materials have been discovered in recent years, but there has been no overview that compares the different editions under a comprehensive consideration using the sociopolitical conditions in the republican era China.

Although the previous chapter discussed the social impact of imported Chinese books in the 1900s, focusing on the unilateral flow of information and its cultural consequence in Korean society, here, I narrow the focus to the journey of a Korean patriot's biography in East Asia. What the existing narratives on the cultural history of

²²⁹ Andre Schmid's discussion of Pak Ŭnsik's writing is an exemplar of the spirituality and territoriality of Korean modern nationalism, see Andre Schmid, *Korea Between Empires, 1895-1919*, 140–42, 192, 236.

²³⁰ Tikhonov addressed that the Korean intellectuals' quest for Sino-Korean solidarity did not seem to influence colonial Korea's mainstream literature to any significant degree, as far as its treatment of the Chinese was concerned. Whereas the Chinese revolution seemed beneficial to Korea, the Chinese diaspora in Korea was regarded as a national problem. Tikhonov concludes that China was often stereotyped and "otherized," in a sense how Edward discusses the formation of national identity in contrast to foreign culture. The commercial rivalry between Korean and Chinese entrepreneurship and the Manchurian Koreans problem in China both show this. Vladimir Tikhonov, *Modern Korea and Its Others: Perceptions of the Neighbouring Countries and Korean Modernity* (Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2016), 126–130.

²³¹ Yi T'aejin, Eugene Y. Park, and Kirk W. Larsen ed., *Peace in the East: An Chunggŭn's Vision for Asia in the Age of Japanese Imperialism* (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2017).

modern East Asia have neglected is that this chain of knowledge was also bilateral in East Asia. Literary nationalism served as a wire for Korean writers to broadcast Korean nationalist discourse in the common language of “writing in service of the nation” (K. *munjang poguk* 文章報國). Biographical narratives on foreign figures in twentieth-century East Asia served as a mirror that reflected the past and future of their own nation. For nationalist intellectuals, the foreign history and biographies of foreign nationals were the most concrete evidence to teach the universal law of a nation’s rise and fall, prosperity, and demise. If the history of the Sino-Japanese War was a historical lesson for the Korean people, the history of Japan’s annexation of Korea (1910) was a warning message for Chinese people.

Kim T’aeg’yŏng was a close friend of Yi Kŏnch’ang (1852–1898), who went to Beijing as the secretary of the tributary mission to Qing China (1636–1912) in 1874. Their social careers cannot be separated from the nationalistic inspiration they absorbed from their immense reading of books written, translated, and edited by the Chinese reformists, who also heavily relied on new knowledge from Japan and Western countries. Through his personal ties with Yi Kŏnch’ang, Kim was able to receive the most recent news about the changing state of international affairs, which prepared him for his career in the Chosŏn government. Kim was also the one who contributed to the birth of the first Korean “national history” textbook. Meanwhile, Pak Ŭnsik was at the forefront of disseminating “national education” as the lecturer of Korea’s first teacher’s college.

This chain of knowledge placed the Korean people in the margin in the late nineteenth century until 1910, serving as a cultural and intellectual justification of Japan’s colonization of Korea in the name of “enlightenment.” Alexis Dudden, a

historian of modern and contemporary East Asian relations, examines in *Japan's Colonization of Korea* the legal and international discourse that legitimized Japan's 1905 protectorate treaty with Korea, a common practice employed by Western powers to legalize their colonial dominance over non-Western countries.²³² Studying the event of the Kojong Emperor's secret emissary at the Second International Conference on Peace at The Hague in 1907 and its failure to gain international recognition vividly demonstrates how Japanese colonial power successfully defined Korea's own sovereignty as "illegal" by using international law and legal discourse, which also legitimized the colonization of the non-Western world by the Western imperial powers.

The current chapter will first delve into the political history of East Asia in the 1910s, focusing on the process of establishing a republican government in China, the first republican system among East Asian countries. This helped Korean exiles envision China as the future of Korea. The newly established republican government, contrary to the expectation of the Korean exiles, was not strong enough to create a unified China that Korea could rely on, and it did not last long enough to establish meaningful relations between Chinese and Korean nationalists. Moreover, the combination of Han Chinese racial nationalism with traditional sinocentrism led to Chinese revolutionaries seeing Korea as former subordinates rather than equal partners. In such political uncertainty and hierarchy, Kim T'aegy'ŏng and Pak Ŭnsik deployed their literary skills to "write in service of the nation," which is examined next. I will address that the editing and revising of the biography of An Chunggŭn reveals a fierce contest between Korean and Chinese nationalism, which is shown in the process of editing and republishing. This chapter

²³² Alexis Dudden, *Japan's Colonization of Korea: Discourse and Power* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2005).

follows the trajectory of the text after it left the hands of Kim T'aegy'ŏng and Pak Ŭnsik, showing how An Chunggŭn's biography was received in modern Chinese literature.

I will first start with the lives of the two Korean authors Kim T'aegy'ŏng and Pak Ŭnsik and show how their writing practices were the results of a government-oriented reform movement in Korea that started during the Kabo Reformation (1894–1895). Then, I will move to discussing how Japanese colonization affected their lives and writings in terms of discontinuity and certain aspects of continuity that are shown in the next section. After that, by tracing their processes of writing, editing, and republishing their biographies of An Chunggŭn, I will discuss how Kim T'aeg'yŏng and Pak Ŭnsik tried to construct An Chunggŭn's life using universal values that would appeal to Chinese readers. Finally, I will discuss how the story of this Korean national hero was refashioned in Chinese print media and assess its cultural and political implications in China's early republican era.

The Ambiguous Legacy of the 1911 Chinese Revolution and the Rise of Nationalistic Modern Chinese Literature

In 1910, Korea became a colony of the Japanese Empire and was put under strict control and exploited. Kim and Pak—who opposed colonial rule—fled to China in search for hope, but during that time, China was also struggling against both internal and external threats. Chinese revolutionaries—such as Sun Yat-sen and Zhang Binglin (1868–1936), who were members of *Tongmenghui*, blamed the Manchu dynasty for the national crisis and dreamed of constructing a new sovereign power established on a constitutional system that would represent the voice of the Han Chinese people—succeeded in overthrowing the Manchu monarch.

The establishment of the Republic of China in 1911 was indeed the accomplishment the Chinese revolutionaries dreamed of; however, it was an unstable outcome of a compromise between the imperial government in Beijing and the revolutionary forces centered in Nanjing.²³³ The first republic in China did not rise from the bloodshed of a total civil war; it was the result of negotiations between the Qing government and the revolutionary army. The newly established modern armies in the provinces militarized the revolutionary ideology into a substantial material force large enough to challenge the old regime. The provisional constitution the revolutionaries upheld was honored by the new government, and the goals of the republican revolutionaries—overthrowing the Manchu dynasty and establishing a new government based on the Western republican system—was achieved in 1912; however, it was Yuan Shikai (1859–1916), former imperial officer who served the Manchu empire, who became the first president of this transitional government. The revolutionaries’ goal of “restoring the Chinese sovereignty by the Han Chinese people” could not have been achieved only by having the Manchu emperor abdicate the throne; this ultimate goal of restoring the nation’s prosperity also could not have been fulfilled without the existence of a strong government that could protect the sovereignty of the Han Chinese people. Hence, from outside, there was an urgent need of a strong Chinese government that could protect the Chinese people from the Westerners’ and Japanese imperial power’s political interventions and economic exploitation. From inside, Tibet and Mongolia sought to separate themselves from the control of the central government, which was considered a

²³³ Ernest P. Young, “Politics in the aftermath of revolution: The era of Yuan Shih-k’ai, 1912–16,” *The Cambridge History of China* vol. 12, ed. John K. Fairbank (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 208–55.

significant challenge to “the unity of the Chinese nation” and its national prosperity. Therefore, under nationalistic terms, even the Chinese revolutionaries acknowledged the danger of the abrupt change they wished to bring. The new legislative, which promulgated the new constitution as the backbone of the republic, represented mostly the local elites in the provinces, with the revolutionaries holding only a small number of seats.

This relative stability did not last long. The first republic government was short lived: President Yuan declared himself the emperor and dispersed the legislature. In addition, encountering Japan’s 21 Demands, Yuan’s government decided to accept Japan’s unilateral terms, which significantly damaged the legitimacy of the new republican government. In the midst of the chaos, provincial authorities that had emerged mostly from the newly formed modern army weakened the central government’s ability to control its lesser administrative units, and the increased provincial revenue under the new constitution made it possible for local governments to maintain a certain degree of self-autonomy. When Yuan Shikai resigned from the throne and warlords rose from all over China, the Chinese revolution failed its mission to unify the Chinese nation.

With this political chaos and without a legitimate central authority, writers used literature as a tool to address their subjective view of the Chinese people as the victims of the socio-political unrest. Moreover, traditional literature was blamed for China being afflicted with a psychological disease that doomed the fate of the Chinese nation.²³⁴ To cure this disease, Chinese revolutionaries collected the stories of national martyrs who

²³⁴ Leo Ou-Fan Lee, “Literary trends I: the quest for modernity, 1895-1927,” *The Cambridge History of China* vol. 12, ed. John K. Fairbank (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 451–504.

sacrificed themselves for the greater cause, and Pak's biography of An Chunggŭn was thought to be a great source with which to arouse the attention of the Chinese people.

Among other radical writers, Liang Qichao (1873–1929) believed that biographical novels was crucial in realizing his political reprogramming of China. As an observer of Meiji Restoration, Liang Qichao regarded the popularity biographical novel—a mixture of entertainment with enlightenment, a playful yet powerful genre of writing—in Meiji Japan as the secret to the success of Japanese modernization.²³⁵ In his article “Three Conveniences to Spread the Civilization,” Liang Qichao quoted the words of Inukai Tsuyoshi (1855–1932), a famous Japanese politician, to explain how the new civilization was propagated to the Japanese people.²³⁶ Inukai Tsuyoshi pointed out three things—schools, newspapers, and public speeches—that facilitated the spread of the Japanese civilization among the common people. However, Liang wanted to add one more thing that he found very important for understanding the civilizing process in Japan: the role of political novels.

Liang paid significant attention to the role of biographers. He listed all the famous novels that changed the Japanese people and found that some of those novels were about fictional characters or based on the true stories of historical figures, such as former British Prime Minister Benjamin Disraeli. Some novels were translations of Western novels, as in the case of *The Public Life of Lord Beaconsfield* (1873), and others were creations of Japanese authors. Yet Liang points out in his writings that, “all the authors

²³⁵ Hiroko Willcock, “Japanese Modernization and the Emergence of New Fiction in Early Twentieth Century China: A Study of Liang Qichao,” *Modern Asian Studies* 29 (October 1995): 817–840.

²³⁶ Liang Qichao, *Yinbingshi ziyoushu* (Yangzhou: Jiangsu guangling guji keyinshe, 1990 reprint), 6–8.

were prominent political analysts of the time.”²³⁷ Also, Liang noted that the authors spoke their political arguments through the characters in their novels and let the readers relate with not only the characters, but also with what the characters said on behalf of the author. Korean society received Liang Qichao’s writings with particular interest. Because of its popularity and nationalistic tone, when Japan annexed Korea in 1910, the Japanese colonial authority immediately banned the publication and circulation of Liang Qichao’s work in Korea.

The problem for Korean exiles in China, such as Pak, was that colonial desire had instigated the history of China’s suzerainty over Korea. Regaining control of Korea was not only a matter of national pride for China, but also an urgent need to promote China into the category of “colonizer.” Intellectuals discussed the necessity of restoring Korea’s suzerain relationship with China. Zhang Binglin, a renowned Qing scholar and revolutionary leader responsible for overthrowing the Manchu regime in China, writes in his essay “Explaining the *Republic of China*” (1907) that recovering the sovereignty of the Han Chinese people was a fundamental principle of the new Chinese republic. Zhang Binglin contended that the border regions in China inhabited by Koreans, Vietnamese, Tibetans, and Muslims should be under the sovereignty of the Han Chinese and that non-Han Chinese people should be denied political rights.²³⁸ In his essay, Zhang says that China needed to transform its relationship with Korea into a more suzerain one, a subjugation under *modern* international law. For Zhang, the new Chinese state could only exist by maintaining jurisdiction over Korea. Its colonization was a dream for imperialists in Japan,

²³⁷ Liang Qichao, *Yinbingshi ziyoushu* (Yangzhou: Jiangsu guangling guji keyinshe, 1990 reprint), 6–8.

²³⁸ Zhang Binglin, “Zhonghua minguo jie” (Explaining the “Republic of China”), *Minbao*, no.15, Tokyo, 1907.

as well as Chinese intellectuals searching for a way to create a modern nation-state.

Zhang's claims regarding Korea were echoed in his memorial to An Chunggŭn after An's execution in 1910. In his memorial, Zhang praised the gallantry of this Korean patriot but began by explaining the reasons for Korea's colonization from a Chinese perspective. Zhang stated that Korea had been a tributary state of China, a relationship that was sustained peacefully until the barbarians [Japan] wrested Korea from China's influence. He claimed that it was Korea's reckless misbehavior that led to its colonization. If Korea had remained under Chinese authority, both countries would have survived. Because Zhang's argument regarding Korea's colonization was, on the surface, contradictory to the intentions of An's biography, when his eulogy was published again in Pak Ŭnsik's Biography of An Chunggŭn, Zhang's explicit statement of regarding Korea as tributary state of China was deleted.²³⁹ In the context of Korea's anti-colonial struggle, Zhang's statement could not stand along with Pak Ŭnsik's claim for regaining Korea's sovereignty from foreign colonizer.

The Changing Locality of Korean Nationalist Literature

One of the distinctive features of the Korean nationalist movement in Shanghai when compared with other Korean nationalist movements in North America, Russia, or Manchuria is its active participation in press and publishing activities. Korean nationalists in Shanghai modeled their independence movement on Chinese revolutionaries, who built their influence via publication.

For Kim T'aegy'ŏng and Pak Ŭnsik, Shanghai functioned as a cultural "counter-

²³⁹ Zhang Binglin, "An Jun bei," in Pak Ŭnsik, *Paegam Pak Ŭnsik chŏnjip*, vol. 3 (Seoul: Tongbang Mido, 2002; hereafter *PPC*), 37–40.

zone” for modern colonialism²⁴⁰ and was the ideal space for them to speak of the legitimacy of Korean independence, which was in line with the cosmopolitanism that surround the city. China’s strong interest in An Chunggŭn was a chance to speak of the necessity of the anti-imperial struggle. On the other hand, it was also the vanguard of colonialism that they struggled against for the rest of their lives. By regarding Shanghai as a counter-zone, I explore the ambivalence of Pak Ŭnsik’s nationalistic tendencies in this counter-zone, which defined the Korean exile writers in terms of both their colonialism and anticolonialism.

Both Kim T’aegy’ŏng and Pak Ŭnsik regarded sinographic language as an invaluable cultural heritage that should be preserved to transmit the historical and cultural identity of the people in Korea. For Pak, Kim T’aegy’ŏng was an intellectual mentor with whom he could share such a concern:

...Our history has to get here by surviving nearly four thousand years. However, we haven’t had our script (*munja* 文字), and so it [our history] did not travel far. As a result, the history of a courteous people disappeared. What a sight, and what a pity! If some fine writer like Han or Ou had written it, it would have been an illustrious work in the world. Recently, there is a drive to abolish the script, which is infuriating. Such is the way of destroying and eliminating things that should

²⁴⁰ I borrowed and used the word “counterzone” in the context how Yue Meng explains multiple subject positions and their cultural identities in Shanghai because of its paradoxical location as “center of the Asian cosmopolitanism” and “semicolonial periphery” in her book *Shanghai and the Edges of Empires* (2006).

surely be passed down...²⁴¹

Pak was not saying that sinographic language was superior to vernacular Korean script or that people should keep using it exclusively without vernacular Korean script. However, Pak insisted that sinographic language had its value, especially for students who had to learn their own history to nurture their national identity. Pak's belief in the role of sinographic language was reflected in his publishing activity. In 1910, when the country was about to be colonized by the Japanese Empire, Pak published the *Advanced Reader of Sinographic Language* (kr. *Kodŭng hanmun tokbon*, 1910), a textbook for learning sinographic language. Using a range of excerpts that he included in the textbook, we can draw a more comprehensive picture of Pak's understanding of the boundaries in a sinographic language that was not limited to traditional texts, but that also included writings from reform-minded officials and intellectuals as part of the repository of sinographic language at a time when Korea was facing annihilation.

Kim T'aeg'yŏng and the Preservation of National History and Culture

Kim T'aeg'yŏng and Pak Ŭnsik started their careers under the strong influence of newly imported Chinese books. From the Kabo Reformation in 1895 until Japan's annexation of Korea in 1910, it was a time when modern education was in its infancy in Korea. The year 1895 marked the end of the civil examination. Confucian classical teachings were no longer the core knowledge for a ladder of success, modernizing the country. Although the newly established schools in Korea modeled those of Meiji Japan, the school curriculums were filled with Chinese textbooks and their translations. As a

²⁴¹ Pak Ŭnsik, "Yŏ Kim ch'anggang sŏ," in Pak Ŭnsik, *PPC*, vol. 2, 337–339.

textbook editor, Kim T'aeg'yŏng was one of the few Koreans who had a wide scope of access to the modern textbooks published and printed in China. Pak Ŭnsik brought Chinese textbooks to the classroom, one designed to educate future teachers of Korea. Outside the classroom, Pak Ŭnsik was an editor of the most prestigious newspaper in Seoul, and Pak used his position to disseminate the knowledge he read from sinographic books.

During the Kabo Reformation (1894–1895), the existing bureaucratic system was replaced by a new system. The Ministry of Rite—which had taken charge of state rituals, education, and diplomacy—was abolished, and the Ministry of Education (*Hangmu amun*, later *Hangmubu*) was established; this occurred under strong influence from the Japanese government during the first Sino-Japanese War (1894–1895) with the presence of Japanese military troops stationed on the Korean Peninsula. In 1895, King Kojong issued a general pronouncement (*kyoyuk chosŏ*) declaring that education is “the basis of the nation.” It also stated that “new learning” would center on the curriculum and replace the previous dominance of Confucian learning.²⁴² The new Ministry of Education launched a modern reformation to achieve two main goals: expand public education and establish professional schools that would replace the traditional civil examination system for recruiting bureaucrats. The new educational reform was meant to enlighten the common people and make them serve the monarch²⁴³ and found its legitimacy in the old Confucian classics, which state that “commoners are truly the basis of the country.”²⁴⁴ As

²⁴² Kyung Moon Hwang, *Rationalizing Korea: The Rise of the Modern State, 1894-1945* (Oakland: University of California Press, 2016), 170–173.

²⁴³ Wang Hyŏnjong, *Han 'guk kŭndae kukka ŭi hyŏngsŏng kwa Kabo kaehyŏk* (Seoul: Yŏksa pip'yŏngsa, 2003), 308.

²⁴⁴ Wang Hyŏnjong, *Han 'guk kŭndae kukka ŭi hyŏngsŏng kwa Kabo kaehyŏk* (Seoul: Yŏksa pip'yŏngsa, 2003), 307.

for educating diligent and loyal national subjects, textbooks on moral cultivation and national history were the key factors to spread this idea through the education system.

Kim T'aeg'yŏng started his career amid the educational reform in late Chosŏn Korea. He was born in Kaesŏng, the old capital city of the Koryŏ dynasty (918–1392). Kim was a descendant of a Koryŏ official who decided to remain in Kaesŏng and refused to serve the new Chosŏn dynasty, keeping his loyalty to the Koryŏ. This shaped Kim's unique cultural identity: he was an exile his entire life. Kaesŏng was the cultural stronghold of Koryŏ exiles. When Korea was later annexed, Kim refused to remain under colonial rule and fled to Nantong, China. This led Kim T'aeg'yŏng to regard himself as a final remnant preserving the spirit and culture of his fallen country.²⁴⁵

Kim T'aeg'yŏng passed the lower civil examination at the age of 17 and was famous for his literary skills, which was also true of his close friends Kim Yunsik (1835–1922), Yi Kŏnch'ang, and Hwang Hyŏn. In 1882, Kim encountered Chinese troops who were stationed in Inchon, and among them, there was a Chinese officer named Zhang Jian (1853–1926), who became a member of the Hanlin Academy in Qing China and later became a modern industrialist in Nantong. When the Qing government dispatched troops to Korea in 1882, Zhang came to Seoul and met Kim. The connection between Kim and Zhang made Kim to move to Nanjing in 1905 and live there under Zhang's patronage. In 1891, Kim passed the higher civil examination and was appointed the history compiler in the State Council in 1894. As an outstanding writer, his excellent skill with literature made him the natural choice for the position.²⁴⁶ Before the Kabo Reform, history compilation was

²⁴⁵ Kwak Misŏn, *Kim T'aeg'yŏng ūi Chungguk mangmyŏng sigi munhak hwaltong yŏn'gu* (Seoul: Pogosa, 2013).

²⁴⁶ Ch'oe Hyeju, "Ch'anggang Kim T'aeg'yŏng yŏn'gu," *Han'guksa yŏn'gu* 35 (1981): 89–124.

managed by the Hall of the Annals (*Shillok chŏng*) under the direct supervision of the State Council, and the purpose of history compilation was to give an example of a benevolent ruler to the postgeneration kings. Soon after the State Council was abolished, Kim became the executive secretary of the Bureau of History Compilation of the Privy Council in 1895 and a staff member of the Office of the Special Counselor. With this, history became an essential way to educate people about the state. In 1905, Kim became the editor of the Ministry of Education and managed the writing of history textbooks.²⁴⁷

In 1905, Korea signed the Protectorate Treaty with Japan. After hearing the news of the Protectorate Treaty, Kim T'aeg'yŏng decided to leave his home country and go to China as a refugee. Zhang Jian invited Kim to work at the publishing company in Nantong. Nantong was a "model city (*mofan shi*)" in modern China, and Zhang was one of the leading elites in Nantong.²⁴⁸ Zhang Jian conducted the industrial and educational reformation of the Nantong city, and Kim worked in the publishing company, editing textbooks for new schools in the region.

Pak Ŭnsik and the Question of Restoring National Right

Pak's career and fame as a public writer was also deeply entangled with the educational reform. Pak has been regarded as one of the most important intellectual figures in modern Korean history, especially when it comes to understanding the development of nationalist thought. His training as a Confucian scholar, which buttressed his reform and nationalism movements, his political position among Korean nationalists,

²⁴⁷ Ch'oe Hyeju, "Ch'anggang Kim T'aeg'yŏng yŏn'gu," *Han'guksa yŏn'gu* 35 (1981), 93

²⁴⁸ Qin Shao, *Culturing Modernity: The Nantong Model, 1890-1930* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004); Samuel Chu, *Reformer in Modern China, Chang Chien, 1853-1926* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1965).

and his relationship with Chinese figures have led scholars to study him in detail. Pak was a journalist, historian, reformer, and the second president of the KPG in Shanghai from 1924 to 1925.²⁴⁹ In his early days, Pak studied the four books of Confucian learning and followed Zhu Xi's teaching (朱子學). But Pak's thinking transformed in the 1890s, and he advocated for the reformation of Confucianism. Faced with a rapidly changing society because of the introduction of foreign trade ports, Pak realized the limits of Zhu Xi's teachings and began searching for new ways to strengthen Korea.²⁵⁰

In 1900, Pak was appointed to be a lecturer at the National Teachers College in Seoul.²⁵¹ At the time, Pak wrote an important proposal: "New Theory on Statues of School." In this piece, he addresses the educational reform, which was a projection of Chinese reformer Liang Qichao's program. Pak Ŭnsik actively participated in the intellectual and social life in Korea before the annexation by Japan and was also newspaper editor at the *Capital Gazetteer* (*Hwangsŏng sinmun*) and the *Korea Daily News* (*Taehan maeil sinbo*), which, at the time, were among the most popular newspapers in Korea. In academic journals, he wrote numerous articles to awaken readers to the importance of social and educational reform, especially those focused on sharing reform ideas and policies, such as the *Northwestern Educational Association Monthly* (*Sŏbuk hakhoe wŏlbo*), and the *Korea Self-Strengthening Society Monthly* (*Taehan chaganghoe wŏlbo*). However, with the Treaty of Korea–Japan in 1907, the interference of the Japanese Council on press activity increased. Below Pak's public activity, he was a

²⁴⁹ Sin Yongha, "Pak Ŭnsik ŭi kyoyuk kuguk sasang e taehayŏ," *Han'guk hakpo* 1 (1975): 57–87.

²⁵⁰ For a detailed study of Pak's project of "self-strengthening," see No Kwanbŏm, "Taehan chegukki Pak Ŭnsik kwa Chang Chiyŏn ŭi chagang sasang yŏngu" (Ph.D dissertation, Seoul National University, 2007).

²⁵¹ Kim T'aeung, "Kŭndae kaehyŏkki ilche kangjŏmgi ch'ogi paegam Pak Ŭnsik ŭi sabŏm kyŏyuk hwaldong kwa kyojae p'yŏnch'an," *Kyoyuk yŏn'gu wa silch'ŏn* 81 (July 2015): 59.

member of the Korean New People's Association (*Sinminhoe*), a secret organization founded in 1907 that aimed to recover Korea's national rights, which had about 800 members nationwide, mostly consisting of reform-minded elites. In the group, there was An Ch'angho, Yang Kit'ak, Chŏn Tŏkki, Yi Tonghwi, Yi Kap, Yu Tongnyŏl, No Paeknin, Yi Sŏnghun, Yi Hoeyŏng, Yi Sangjae, Yun Ch'ihŏ, Kim Ku, Sin Ch'aeho.²⁵² Japan's annexation of Korea in 1910 restricted the Koreans' Self-Strengthening Movement. Newspapers that propagated self-strengthening movements or Korea's independence were shut down. Japanese police announced that they had unveiled a plot trying to assassinate the Governor-General of Korea and accused the Korean New People's Association as being the ringleader. Many of the members of the Korean New People's Association were arrested; some committed suicide or were tortured to death, and others transformed themselves into advocates of Japan's colonial modernization while others chose to leave the country to continue their efforts.

After Korea was annexed by Japan, Pak also left Korea and traveled to far eastern Russia, Manchuria, Hong Kong, Beijing, and Shanghai.²⁵³ Japan's colonization of Korea made his political thoughts more radical. Until 1919, Manchuria was the base of Korean militant activist against Japan. The Korean guerilla forces continued to disturb Japanese colonial authorities' efforts to stabilize the borderland between China and Korea, which now was under Japan's control. Adding on to this, Korean people were influenced by Bolshevik socialism directly through their contact with Russians in far eastern Russia. Yi Tonghwi (1873–1935), the most prominent Korean patriot and military leader in the area,

²⁵² Sin Yongha and N. M. Pankaj, *Formation and Development of Modern Korean Nationalism* (Seoul: Daekwang munwhasa, 1989), 287–290.

²⁵³ “Yŏnbo,” in Tan'guk taehakkyo pusŏl tongyanghak yŏn'guso ed., *Pak Ŭnsik chŏnsŏ* (Seoul: Tan'guk taehakkyo pusŏl tongyanghak yŏn'guso, 1975), vol. 3, 295–304.

formed *Hanin Sahoedang* (the Korean People's Socialist Party) and became the chairman. With Yi Tonghwi, Pak Ŭnsik organized the Korean Revolutionary Corps (*Koryŏ Hyŏngmyŏng dang*) as the organ of the military operations against Japanese imperialism.²⁵⁴

Facing Korea's tragic fate and seeing the same threat facing China, Pak wished to appeal to the people outside of Korea to gain international sympathy and win back the independence of Korea and China. Pak moved to many different cities in China, including Beijing, Tianjin, Nanjing, Hong Kong, and Shanghai while planning and writing drafts of Korea's history. Pak continued to be a writer in China, working as a journalist for newspapers and magazines, becoming more sensitive to the current issues in both China and Korea. In 1913, he participated in the publication of *Xiangjiang* in Hong Kong, a magazine that promoted radical reformation in China. At the recommendation of Kang Youwei, Pak took a job at the Affairs of State Daily (國是報, *Guoshi Bao*) after his return to Shanghai.²⁵⁵

Pak Ŭnsik's first biography of An Chunggŭn was published in the *Bulletin of the Republic* (*Minguo huibao*), a bi-monthly magazine published by Chinese revolutionaries in Shanghai. Pak's biography was included in the historical biographies section (*shizhuan* 史傳), which presented ample biographies of national martyrs. An Chunggŭn had already been presented as an international hero who deserved respect from the Chinese people, obvious because of the story's placement between other Chinese biographies. Before An Chunggŭn's story was Sun Yat-sen's biography, the leader of the Chinese

²⁵⁴ Robert Scalapino and Chong-Sik Lee, *Communism in Korea* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972), 6–7.

²⁵⁵ "Yŏnbo," in *Pak Ŭnsik chŏnsŏ*, vol. 3, 300.

revolutionaries, and after An Chunggŭn's story was a biography of Zhang Zhongrui (1879–1911), who was one of the eleven martyrs who died in the Henan Province during the 1911 Uprising.²⁵⁶

After the collapse of his country, Pak's immediate goal was to bring Korea back into the hearts and minds of his readers in China and Korea. In 1914, the *Biography of An Chunggŭn* was published as a separate volume. At the end of this book, there is an advertisement of a forthcoming book by the same author, appealing to the reader that, “our people should carry each in their hands and regard it [*Painful History of Korea*] as a mirror.”²⁵⁷

In 1915, Pak published *Painful History of Korea* (*Han'guk t'ongsa*). In the introduction of *Painful History of Korea*, he used examples such as Norway, Canada, Hungary, Egypt, and Vietnam to put Korea's situation in a comparative perspective.²⁵⁸ The first page of the *Painful History of Korea* outlines a project called “Contemporary History of Countries Across the World” by the Great Unity Editing and Translation Company (*Datong bianyiju* 大同編譯局). The outline is divided into two subcategories, giving a powerful image of the world sorted by international status: one for “Recent Histories of Strong Nations” (強國近史), including Britain, Germany, France, Russia, Austria, Italy, and Japan, and one titled “Recent Histories of Ruined Nations” (亡國近史) that includes Vietnam, Korea, Burma, India, Poland, and the Jewish people. We don't know if there were actual publications of the whole series.

²⁵⁶ “Sanhan Cammouzhongzhang Anzhonggen zhuan,” *Minguo huibao* 1 (1913): 3–8.

²⁵⁷ Changhai laofang shi [Pak Ŭnsik], *An Chonggen zhuan* (Shanghai: Datong pinjiju, 1914), reprinted in *PPC*, vol. 3, 29–130.

²⁵⁸ Pak, *PPC*, vol. 1, 123.

Then, where is China in this era of domination? On the first page of *Painful History of Korea*, China's position and historical direction was still undecided, but it would soon become clear whether the country would join the league of "Strong Nations" (Ch. *qiangguo* K. *kangguk*) or the league of "Ruined Nations" (Ch. *wangguo* K. *mangguk*). It was the clear intention of the book was to put the readers of China into this ambivalence, an artful device to instigate the readers to want to become one of the "Strong Nations" while warning them of the fate that the "Ruined Nations" were suffering now. For Koreans, this was the historicity of the colonial world order Korea could not escape from. Such discursive devices present only two historical paths that China could follow: either being a colonizer or a colonized.

Pak stressed the importance of preserving the national spirit (K. *kukhon* Ch. *guohun*) to rescue and transform Korea into a strong nation. On the other hand, he also realized that such internal efforts of promoting patriotism were difficult to bring to fruition in an international environment that defined the very legitimacy of Korea as a modern nation-state. Pak recognized that colonization was not limited to the relations between Korea and Japan, and he understood that the situation was deeply tied to regional changes in politics. Because of this, Pak endeavored to describe Japan's modernization and China's struggle to overcome Western intervention as a possible common thread that could weave Korea into the global narrative.

With other independence activists, Pak published the "Manifesto of Solidarity toward Great Harmony" (*Taedong tan'gyŏl sŏn'ŏn*), where he claims the sovereignty of the Korean people and also that Japan's annexation treaty was invalid, thus requesting the establishment of an autonomous government by the Korean people. Right after the March

First Movement in 1919, the Korean independent movement activists gathered in Shanghai and established the Korean Provisional Government. Pak continued to work in the KPG as the history compiler with Yi Kwangsu (1892–1950) and published the *Bloody History of Korean Independence Movement* (K. *Han'guk tongnip undong chi hyölsa*, 1921).

In 1921, Pak Ŭnsik participated in the publication of *All Four Classes Newspaper* (*Simin bao* 四民報), a newspaper published by the Confucian Religion Society (Ch. *Kongjiaohui* 孔教會), an organization led by Kang Youwei, who pursued the restoration of Confucianism as a modern religion. *All Four Classes Newspaper* was a popular newspaper that printed 30,000 copies a day and was as popular as *Shenbao* (申報) or *Xinwen Bao* (新聞報), the two most popular newspapers in Shanghai at the time.²⁵⁹ Pak's job description was "translator," which in fact was his more than ten-year job since he began translating Chinese books into Korean.²⁶⁰ Pak's keen sense of transmitting meanings from one language to another made him well suited for the editorial job.

Recasting Korean Nationalism: Analysis of a Different Edition of the An Chunggŭn Biography

The conventional method of intellectual history focuses on a single historical person's writing in a linear perspective, which limits the interpretation of a text based on the writer's given ideological position and level of knowledge. Although I do not ignore

²⁵⁹ For a detailed study of Pak Ŭnsik's social network in China and its relevance to his publishing activities, see Pae Kyöngghan, *Ssunwön kwa Han'guk: Chunghwajuŭi wa sadaejuŭi ŭi kyoch'a* (P'aju: Han'ul, 2007), 157–191.

²⁶⁰ Xu Liming, "Chungguk ŭl maegae ro han aeguk kyemong sösa yön'gu" (Ph.D dissertation, Inha University, 2010).

the author's persistence in his or her effort to maintain consistency of his or her thought, in a time of abrupt political change, however, this method may be inadequate. Contrary to the conventional belief of the accordance between an author and his or her writings, I believe that the context of the text should be investigated in even broader terms than the author's own life. The analysis of a text cannot be separated from the understanding of the historical juncture when the text was made and read.

Although the previous chapter investigated the mass distribution of books and the broad social implication of this, in this chapter and the following one, I focus on examining the interactions between writers and readers. Although the cultural interactions were more or less unilateral, this time we see a bilateral relation. The scope of investigation should include the readers that contributed to the shaping of the text. And for this process, different kinds of nationalism can coexist within a text through the process of revision.

Literary historian Ch'oe Yŏng'ok first paid attention to the comparative analysis of Kim T'aeg'yŏng's multiple versions of the *Biography of An Chunggŭn* to understand Kim T'aeg'yŏng's personal motives and publishing practices. In addition to these personal motives, it is important to map out the intellectual exchange through a broader window of the political culture in republican China. I regard Ch'oe's approach—tracing the journey of a text through the change of time—crucial in understanding the history that the texts stop and pass by. Instead of focusing on the author, I regard the journey as extending beyond the author's own experiences and reaching into a society where the text is consumed, revised, and criticized. The process of this intertextual relation is the key that connects the writer and reader in the context of their historical time. The intertextual

study help to reconstruct the journey of the text, which is crucial in understanding cultural history of Sino-Korean relation.

Universal Hero Preserving the Confucian Moral Integrity

Kim T'aeg'yŏng wrote *An Chunggŭn chŏn* (*Biography of An Chunggŭn*) and published it in *Ch'anggang go* (1912),²⁶¹ a collection of his personal literary works. During his lifetime, Kim published his collection of writings multiple times to refine his collection by adding continuous revisions. He was a scholar of writing, and his occupation as an editor in a modern printing house in Nantong made it easier for him to refine his writings.²⁶²

At first, Kim was able to collect information from Chinese news media. Literary historian Kim Chongch'ŏl investigates how Kim T'aeg'yŏng heavily relied on *Shenbao* articles on An Chunggŭn's trial as a source material for writing the biography.²⁶³ As Kim Chongch'ŏl highlights, for Kim T'aeg'yŏng Korea was a holy land in that it nurtured Korea's Confucian civilization and also gave birth to a man of moral integrity. In the new edition of An's biography in 1916, Kim refined the coherence of the universal value he tried to project onto An Chunggŭn's life: moral integrity (*chŏl*). At the end of the biography, where Kim T'aeg'yŏng presented his personal voice to offer his view on An's life, Kim praised An, who "established the world's greatest preeminent moral integrity."²⁶⁴ The most obvious changes from 1912 version to 1916 were to tell the

²⁶¹ Kim T'aeg'yŏng wrote the biography in 1910, but I use the publication date, which was 1912.

²⁶² Ch'oe Yŏngok, "Kim T'aeg-yŏng ŭi An Chung-gŭn hyŏngsanghwa kŏmto," 369–370.

²⁶³ Kim Chongch'ŏl, "Kim T'aeg'yŏng ŭi An Chunggŭn chŏn ipjŏn kwa sanghae," *Hanjung inmunhak yŏn'gu* 41 (2013): 23–55.

²⁶⁴ Kim T'aeg'yŏng, *An Chunggŭn chŏn*, in *Ch'anggang go*, f. 11 (Nantong: Hanmolin yinshuguan, 1912), 13–16.

readers about the genealogy of the moral integrity behind An's constancy to firmly uphold his fidelity to his country, as well as the nonchalant character he showed staunchly until the end of his life. Kim discussed that Haeju County—An's hometown—was a propitious site where Koreans flourished throughout Confucian civilization.²⁶⁵ Kim also pointed out that Ch'oe Ch'ung (984–1068), a renowned Confucian scholar official, was from Haeju. Kim introduces Ch'oe Ch'ung as the “Confucius in the eastern country (Haedong kongja)” who represented the Confucian civilization that flourished in the sacred land of Haeju. Kim suggested that An Chunggŭn's actions should be seen in the same light. To clarify this genealogy of moral integrity, Kim moved the description of Ch'oe Ch'ung—which was originally included as part of his commentary on An's life—to the very beginning of the biography. By doing so, Kim expressed his pride in his home country, which had produced such a noble lineage of people who pursued Confucian values even outside of China, where the real Confucius lived and taught his people.

To provide this genealogy of Confucian nobility, Kim eliminated unnecessary descriptions of An Chunggŭn's life and made sure this noble life did not come from a foreign religion but that it was instead an expression of universal Confucian values, which originated from the Chinese civilization but was nurtured within Korea's native culture throughout history. In the 1916 edition, Kim omitted the parts regarding An's life as a Catholic.²⁶⁶ In the 1912 version, Kim tried to explain that an increased number of people only depended on Western learning for security, not because they truly believed in foreign religions. Kim explained that the social chaos caused by government corruption

²⁶⁵ Kim T'aeg'yŏng, *An Chunggŭn chŏn*, 12.

²⁶⁶ Ch'oe Yŏng'ok, “Kim T'aeg'yŏng ŭi An Chunggŭn hyŏngsanghwa kŏmto,” 369.

and plunder by the Japanese had led people to run to Western powers.²⁶⁷ However, in the 1916 version, Kim deleted the whole section where he discussed An's relation with Catholicism. Thus, in the 1916 version, the heroic value of An was his moral integrity, which was central to the Confucian worldview.

Transnational Locality of Korean Nationalism

Another significant change was adding the episode of An's travel to China in 1905 when he searched for Chinese patriots who could help with An's save-the-nation mission. Kim T'aeg'yŏng had a chance to read Pak Ŭnsik's *Biography of An Chunggŭn* (Ch. *An Zhonggen zhuan*, 1914) after it was published, and this helped Kim correct factual errors he had in his 1912 version.²⁶⁸ Besides correcting errors, what Kim newly adopted from Pak's *Biography of An Chunggŭn* was the part involving An Chunggŭn's interest in getting political support from the Chinese people. This episode ends with An's return to Korea with little success, mostly because of his father's funeral. However, Kim tries to show An's continuous efforts to gain support from China through his residence in Chŭngnamp'o, one of the open treaty ports established in the late nineteenth century and a gateway that connected the northwest provinces with China by sea.²⁶⁹ By emphasizing the fact that An had lived in the hub between China and Korea, both Pak and Kim shed light on An's farsighted effort to gain support from the Chinese, who Pak and Kim thought to be Korea's only hope, telling the Chinese readers how desperate An Chunggŭn had been, as the authors too had become.

²⁶⁷ Kim T'aeg'yŏng, *An Chunggŭn chŏn*, in *Sohodang jip* f. 9 (Nantong: Hanmolin yinshuguan, 1916), 21–26.

²⁶⁸ Kim T'aeg'yŏng, *An Chunggŭn chŏn*, in *Sohodang jip* f. 9 (Nantong: Hanmolin yinshuguan, 1916), 21–26.

²⁶⁹ Kim T'aeg'yŏng, *An Chunggŭn chŏn*, 21–26.

Pak Ŭnsik's An Chunggŭn Biography: Collective Voice of Chinese and Korean Patriots (1913, 1914)

The idea of using biographic narratives to enlighten readers made Korean reformists, including Pak Ŭnsik, write biographies during the Korean Empire period (1897–1910). Pak Ŭnsik published *The Foundation of Switzerland* (*Sŏsa kŏnkukji*) a novel based on the story of the life of William Tell in 1907. Pak's biographic novel of the founding father of Switzerland was in fact not Pak's original work; he had read a Chinese translation of the original novel and translated it into *Kukhanmun che*—a mix of sinographic language and vernacular Korean script, which was the most popular writing style at the time. Pak translated the main body of the text with minimal changes, but he completely rewrote the preface to highlight his motivation for translating the novel for Korean readers.

In the preface of *The Foundation of Switzerland*, Pak states that the novel deeply touches on people's emotions, and it reflects the status of public morals.²⁷⁰ That is, one can tell the cultural status of people by looking at the most popular novels at the time. Pak lamented that in his eyes, there were only folk novels that dissipated the minds of people, corrupted customs, and damaged politics and civilization. When Pak was pained to write a novel to raise people's patriotism, he read Chinese version of *The Foundation of Switzerland* and believed that its readers would develop patriotism and a passionate mind to save the other people in their country through whatever means necessary. After this—in the magazine *Western Friends* (*Sŏu*), an academic journal published and read by people in the northwestern region of Korea—Pak continuously published biographies of

²⁷⁰ Pak Ŭnsik, "Sŏsa kŏnkukji," reprinted in *Yŏksa chŏn'gi sosŏl* vol. 6 ed. Kim Yunsik (Seoul: Asea Munhwasa, 1979), 193–297.

Korean generals and patriots who sacrificed themselves to save Korea.²⁷¹ Pak's writing of biographic narratives came about because of his contact with Chinese biographic novels; later, when Pak went to China in exile, these biographic novels became a tool to transmit his political desire to the Chinese people, especially through the actions and words of An Chunggŭn.

Pak Ŭnsik's first version of An Chunggŭn biography came out with a long title: *Biography of the Advisory Lieutenant General of Korea* (K. *Samhan ch'ammojungjang An Chunggŭn chŏn Ch. Sanhan cammou zhongzhang An Zhonggen zhuan*), which used An Chunggŭn's earlier experience enlisted as a Korean voluntary army soldier against the Japanese army. As the title implies, the main intention of this title was to refute the ongoing criticism of An Chunggŭn that framed him as a "terrorist" who tried to disturb the existing political order. Contrary to this, Pak Ŭnsik showed An Chunggŭn as a general of a resistance army in war against foreign invaders.

Biography of the Advisory Lieutenant General of Korea was published in the first issue of *Bulletin of the Republic* (*Minguo Huibao*), a Chinese magazine published by Chinese revolutionaries, in 1913. In this magazine, An Chunggŭn had already been presented as a transnational hero who deserved respect from the Chinese people. In the introduction of *Biography of the Advisory Lieutenant General of Korea*, Pak writes that his motivation for writing the biography was the demand from Chinese people he met during his exile:

²⁷¹ No Kwanpŏm, "Taehan chegukki Pak Ŭnsik kwa Chang Chiyŏn ŭi chagang sasang yŏngu," (Ph.D dissertation, Seoul National University, 2007), 61–66.

Since I came [to China] officials, gentries, students, farmers, and merchants all asked me about An Chunggŭn's action. If we, as Korean people, cannot tell about his history, then how can one say there is good heart? ... thus, I wrote this to respond to the wishes of the whole people.²⁷²

The second version of Pak Ŭnsik's biography of An Chunggŭn was published in 1914. In the second version, Pak Ŭnsik tried to make An Chunggŭn's biography into a separate book, and this time, it was published as a separate book by Datong Publishing House.²⁷³ It was now titled *An Zhonggen zhuan* (1914), abandoning the previous title, which was somewhat controversial among the Chinese people who lacked an understanding of recent Korean history. Compared with the previous version published in 1913, in the 1914 version Pak greatly expanded the biography and also tried to expand the political implications of the book to obtain support for the legitimacy of the anticolonial struggle among Korean people, including him, and the cause of independence for Korea.

The major changes in this version can be summarized into four major parts: 1) As a book, not only did Pak include his own story, but he also collected a large number of paratexts: forwards, afterwards, calligraphy, photos, and eulogies, mostly from Chinese writers, including some famous intellectuals such as Liang Qichao and Zhang Binglin. These writers, together with An, also represented the Chinese patriots who were concerned about the future of their nation. 2) In the greatly expanded volume, Pak added historical context to highlight Itō Hirobumi's role and responsibility in the Japanese

²⁷² "Sanhan cammou zhongzhang Anzhonggen zhuan," 3.

²⁷³ *An Zhonggen zhuan* in Pak Ŭnsik, *PPC*, vol. 2, 29–131.

colonial expansion over Korea, unveiling his inhumane actions that made the people of Korea suffer. 3) As Kim later copied, in this new edition, Pak emphasized the close connection between China and Korea and portrayed the two countries as sharing a common destiny. 4) Finally, Pak expanded the details about the lives of other Korean patriots, who he briefly described in 1913 version, to enlarge his story from a biography of a single person to a larger sketch prosopography of a group of Korean patriots who shared the same concerns as An Chunggŭn and who struggled together.

Putting Itō as the Object of Wrath from the Colonized Koreans

Pak tried combine the biography with the history of Korea. In the second version, *An Zhonggen zhuan*, the emphasis was transitioning from An Chunggŭn as person out for personal revenge to a Korean nationalist who was struggling against Japan's imperialist expansion. The main body of the *Biography of the Advisory Lieutenant General of Korea* had ten chapters in total, but in *An Zhonggen zhuan*, the main body was expanded to twenty-eight chapters. No chapter in *Biography of the Advisory Lieutenant General of Korea* talked about Itō Hirobumi before Pak mentioning him in the chapter "Itō Travel to Harbin," but in *An Zhonggen zhuan*, Pak added new chapters such as "Japan's Management of Korea and Itō Imposes the Protectorate Treaty," "Itō Threatens King Kojong to Step Down and Sign the Seven-Point Demand," "Itō Abolishes the Ministry of War and Usurps the Judicial Power," and "Itō Makes an Inspection of Manchuria." Although Itō acts as the main protagonist of Japanese colonization of Korea, many of the Japanese colonial policy listed in An Chunggŭn was beyond Itō Hitobumi's personal actions. Given Japan's authority to control Korea's internal affairs, Itō Hirobumi's position was much more nuanced. Unlike the common belief that places Itō as the

ringleader of colonizing Korea, he was initially against the radical annexation proposed by Yamagata Aritomo (1838–1922), advocating instead that Korea should remain as a protectorate and that Japan’s intervention should be limited to “help Koreans self-rule.”²⁷⁴ Nonetheless, Pak attributed the responsibility of Korea’s ruination solely on Itō Hirobumi.

Bonding Sino-Korean Nationalism

In his forward, a Chinese writer with the penname Zhou Hao responds after reading the manuscript of Pak’s *An Zhonggen zhuan*, saying, “after that, I realize that Mr. An shot Itō, not only to revenge for his fatherland, but also to slaughter a public enemy of world peace: he is a meritorious figure of the world as well as East Asia.”²⁷⁵

Pak wanted to include stories about the Chinese and Koreans because they had to stand together against colonialism. Among the added text and in chapter five, what is most interesting is the story of Pan Zongli (1866–1905). Although Pan Zongli had nothing to do with An Chunggŭn, Pan Zongli was a character who greatly sympathized with Korea’s colonial fate and who had apprehension over his home country’s similar trajectory in the near future, so Pak decided to include the story of Pan’s suicide as a part of the *Biography of An Chunggŭn*.

Pan Zongli, a Chinese student from Tianjin studying in Meiji Japan during the late Qing dynasty, was returning to his native country in 1905 to devote himself to the

²⁷⁴ Peter Duus points out that the nationwide uprising of anticolonial guerillas and Itō’s failure to establish a pro-Japanese partner in the Korean government and society led him passively to abandon his position against Japan’s complete annexation of Korea. See Peter Duus, *The Abacus and the Sword: The Japanese Penetration of Korea, 1895-1910* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995), 203–241.

²⁷⁵ Zhou Hao, “Forward,” in *PPC*, vol. 2, 58.

modernization movements in China. After the Protectorate Treaty was signed between Japan and Korea in 1905, the future of Korea's independence and sovereignty immediately fell under scrutiny. During a stop at Inchŏn, a Korean treaty port near Seoul, Pan heard the news that his nation was now doomed to become a protectorate, meaning that its sovereignty and independence were lost. He also learned about the tragic suicide of Min Yŏnghwan (1861–1905), a Korean high official who killed himself in protest of the Protectorate Treaty. Prior to jumping into the Yellow Sea on December 9th, 1905, Pan wrote a proposal consisting of fourteen articles about the current issues facing the Chinese government. Pan lamented, “Japan made a promise to protect China and Korea. I see now that it was only I who believed this wholeheartedly! If the lips are gone and the teeth begin to shiver, the country will be in danger! If we lose now and do not recover, how can our future remain safe?”²⁷⁶ After Pan drowned himself in the sea, the governor of Zhili Province, Pan’s hometown, mourned him and reported the event to Prime Minister Yuan Shikai.

Pak called for another Pan Zongli, a martyr from both Korea and China who could be a warning to both their people. Pak pushed the readers to be like Pan, who became an urgent reminder to his own people, and like Pak himself, who lived his entire life as an educator, reformer, and leader of overseas Korean communities.

In his forward to Pak’s *An Zhonggen zhuan*, Luo Nanshan made it clear that the episode of Pan Zongli truly represented the close historical relation between China and Korea. Luo used the Sino-Korean alliance, which fought against Hideyoshi’s invasion as an example. Luo added that it is natural to have sympathy for neighbors when they are in

²⁷⁶ PPC, vol. 2, 74.

trouble and to shed blood to repay each other's benignity.²⁷⁷

Transforming the Biography to a Prosopography of National Patriots

The last part of *An Zhonggen zhuan* was expanded to include more detailed information about other Korean martyrs, especially the conspirator U Töksun and other Korean patriots, including Yi Chaemyōng, An Myōnggŭn, and Kim Chōng'ik, which made the end of *An Zhonggen zhuan* a prosopography of Korean patriots. Pak used the fame of *An Zhonggen zhuan*, but he did not want his readers to think that An Chunggŭn was the only person who had fought against Japanese colonialism. For him, it was important to bring the story back to the national problem—collective resistance against Japanese imperialism. Of course, the biographies of these four Koreans were very short compared to An Chunggŭn's story, but for Pak, it was enough to show that there were people in Korea who could shout out just as An Chunggŭn had. Pak wanted to show that it was not just a single person, but rather an army of Koreans, marching toward national independence. The transformation of the biography into a national prosopography is important to note because this approach was directly reflected in later Chinese narratives on An Chunggŭn—either they sympathized with the Korean assassins or did not.

Emulating Korean Exile Writer: An Chunggŭn in The Fuh-tan Journal

On some occasions, Pak's *An Zhonggen zhuan* (1914) was republished without changes being made. *The Fuh-tan Journal*, an illustrated student magazine published by the students of Fudan College, included half of Pak Ũnsik's *An Zhonggen zhuan* in its first issue, which was published in December 1915. *The Fuh-tan Journal* was a bi-annual

²⁷⁷ Luo, "Forward," *PPC*, vol. 2, 56–58.

magazine, and the editors selected articles that they received from students and alumni. Even though Pak Ŭnsik had no affiliation with Fudan College, because of An Chunggŭn's significant message, which directly spoke to Chinese people, the editor of *The Fuh-tan Journal* included the work as part of the college's students' writings. It seems that the editor did not have enough pages to include the whole portion of *An Zhonggen zhuan* —the magazine does not include paratexts, and it abruptly ends at chapter six, omitting the description of Yuan Shikai's appearance in the Pan Zhongli part. In chapter six, Pak Ŭnsik provides his acute criticism of Itō Hirobumi, who imposed the Protectorate Treaty on the Korean emperor, as well as the story of the death of Pan Zongli, a drowned Chinese hero. Also, it does not include the story of An's assassination of Itō, supposedly the most famous and important event to be discussed. It is possible that the editor of the journal wished to continue the latter half in the next issue, but this did not happen. But when we look at the portion of *An Zhonggen zhuan* published in *The Fuh-tan Journal*, there was no effort to edit the content. This may imply that everything written by Pak was acceptable to Chinese readers.

We don't see any comments or postscript left by the editors of the journal, but omitting Yuan Shikai from the original text shows that the editor was a strong supporter of the spirit of republicanism during the 1911 Chinese Revolution. In 1915, Yuan Shikai claimed himself as the new Chinese emperor, which ended with a tantamount reaction and his resignation from the throne. When Pak's book was published 1914, it was the same year when Yuan Shikai accepted the 21 Demands from Japan, and the next year, Yuan became the emperor. It would be too much to discuss the historical view of Yuan Shikai's role and his popularity during this time, but there are many ways to interpret

Yuan Shikai not only as a symbol of Chinese consensus, but as a selfish individual who betrayed his country by being subservient to a neighboring country and by trying to become an emperor and claim the country as his. When the editors read Pak's book, they clearly noticed the inappropriateness of adding Yuan Shikai's voice in terms of discussing nationalism, so it seems that after reviewing Pak's text, the editor deleted this part without hesitation.

“Mr. An Shot the Wrong Person”: Chinese Narratives on An Chunggŭn

Despite Pak's hope, not everyone believed An was a true world hero. Two biographies of An Chunggŭn written by Chinese authors have been discovered: one is Zheng Yuan's *An Zhonggen* (ca. 1920), and the other is Ye Tianni's *An Zhonggen Zhuan* (ca. 1920).²⁷⁸ These two biographies reflect the great interest of the Chinese people in An Chunggŭn and their effort to appropriate Korean nationalist discourse and make it fit the Chinese agenda. As Pak tried to show a collection of positive opinions of An Chunggŭn in his book, and Zheng Yuan and Ye Tianni both used the same technique as Pak but went in a different direction. Nonetheless, what is striking about the Chinese narratives of An Chunggŭn is their appropriation of Pak

In Zheng Yuan's *An Zhonggen*, An Chunggŭn is described as a failure who did not save his country from being a colony; he was shown as a fool who facilitated the colonization by causing such unforgettable trouble to the Japanese people. In other words, Zheng Yuan legitimized the Japanese colonial discourse in *An Zhonggen*.

²⁷⁸ Zheng Yuan's *An Zhonggen* was discovered by Professor Han Si-jun, but the copy he found was missing its colophon. So the exact date of the publication is unknown. One material in *An Zhonggen* was cited from a magazine published in 1920, so we may assume that it was published at least after 1920. Han Sijun, “Chungguk'in i pon An Chunggŭn: Pak Ŭnsik kwa Chŏng Wŏn ŭi An Chunggŭn chŏn ŭl chungsim ŭro,” *Ch'ungbuk sahak* 11 (2000): 493-506.

However, Zheng Yuan used the same style to offer information about An Chunggŭn, but here creating a discourse that would guide readers' evaluations of An Chunggŭn and offer specific lessons for the people of China. Zheng relied on other sources to collect paratexts and basic information about the life of An Chunggŭn. Hence, the content in *An Zhonggen* is very different from what Pak wrote. However, there are identical forwards in Pak's work and Zheng's work.

The Chinese writers blamed An Chunggŭn for killing the wrong enemy. If the Korean people had fought against Itō and Japanese colonialism as one body, then Korea would not have been colonized; the Chinese writers thought that Korea had become Japan's colony because the people were divided and because some Koreans were actively collaborating with the colonial power for their own interest. In Zheng Yuan's introduction to *An Zhonggen*, Zheng says, "Mr. An should have killed the internal enemies instead of killing the Japanese prime minister" because the fall of Korea was not the fault of the Japanese. In the introduction, Zheng Yuan writes, "thus Korea was not ruined by Itō but ruined by people such as Yi Wanyong and Yi Yonggu."²⁷⁹ Yi Wanyong (1858–1926) was the prime minister of the Korean Empire and was blamed for Japan's annexation of Korea, some saying he was an active supporter of it from inside the Korean government. Yi Yonggu (1868–1912) was the president of Ilchinhoe, a nationwide pro-Japanese organization that openly insisted on Japan's annexation of Korea. With their position during the annexation process, Yi Wanyong and Yi Yonggu were regarded as national traitors and collaborators of Japanese colonialism.

The Chinese government signed the 21 Demands Treaty with Japan in 1915,

²⁷⁹ Zheng Yuan, *An Zhonggen* in Yun Pyōngsōk, *An Chung-gŭn yŏn'gu: Haŏlbin ŭigŏ 100-Chunyŏn ŭi sŏngch'al* (Seoul: Kukhak Charyowŏn, 2011), 530–555.

which infuriated Chinese intellectuals. The blame was mainly leveled at the high officials who did not represent the voice of the Chinese people and who only worked for their own private interests. In Zheng Yue's afterward, Zheng says:

When we look at China, we had problems like Taiwan and complicated border problems, and now a few people are flattering strong neighboring countries in fear. Like rat and fox, [they] abuse and exploit common people to let them wither, and there are ceaseless internal fights, which let foreign troubles make the most of the chances. However, regardless of the nation's fate, they don't relinquish their right and defend it to the last, which makes no difference to the national traitors such as Yi Wanyong and Yi Yonggu in Korea. There can be neither public opinion, nor administrative power, nor state law that can treat those traitors. Only there will be patriotic martyrs and their blood shedding sacrifice which can chasten those heinous and stubborn people for a while ... If An [Chunggŭn] was born in China... he would have shed his fist and blood to punish Yi Wanyong and Yi Yonggu, who caused more trouble than Itō from outside.

Other commentators tried to find historical predecessors to support his claim. In Tao Yi's afterward, he tells the readers that An Chunggŭn's action of assassinating the outside enemy was worse than killing the traitors inside his country. Tao Yi commented that An Chunggŭn was less than Shi Quan (?–1150), who attempted to assassinate Qin Hui (1090–1155), a prime minister in the Song period who was blamed for the humiliating negotiations with the Jurchens. An correctly exhausted the fury of the Korean

people against the imperialists, but he failed to save his country. Meanwhile, Shi Quan had aimed his dagger at an enemy within the country. In that sense, Yi Chaemyŏng and An Myŏnggŭn were better models during the nationalist era by “not regarding the foreign enemy outside as foe, but regarding internal treacherous subjects as the target.” Tao thought that he could understand the Jin dynasty’s strategy of using Qin Hui as a conspirator, but he could not bear Qin Hui complying with his enemies—that is, subjugating the national interest to his personal interest. In the end, Tao Yi says that, “what pleasures me was [Zheng Yuan’s] introduction, and his tone was the same as mine.”²⁸⁰ By including a forward from someone who has similar views, as Pak did, Zheng Yuan tried to create a consensus among the readers as well.

In Ye Tianni’s *An Zhonggen zhuan* (ca. 1920s),²⁸¹ it was clearer that Ye Tianni had rephrased Pak’s work and reflected on Pak’s motivations in *An Zhonggen zhuan*. Ye Tianni did not miss Pak’s emphasis on the historical significance of Sino-Korean relations and An’s efforts to gain support from China. In the chapter “An Chunggŭn’s Travel,” Ye extrapolates from An Chunggŭn’s visit to China by providing more detailed explanations. Although there is no clear reasoning behind An Chunggŭn’s decision to go to China in Pak’s version, Ye added a conversation between An and his father in which An explains why he had to gain support from China. Here, Ye claims that China is the center of universal values, saying that China had been the suzerain state of Korea, and because of the proximity between China and Korea, the fall of the feudal domain would

²⁸⁰ Tao Yi, “afterward,” Yun Pyŏngsŏk, *An Chunggŭn yŏn’gu: Haŏlbin ŭigŏ 100-Chunyŏn ŭi sŏngch’al* (Seoul: Kukhak Charyowŏn, 2011), 533.

²⁸¹ Ye Tianni’s *An Zhonggen Zhuan* was discovered from Shanghai Library by Professor Sun Kezhi, a historian in Fudan University, and it was first reported in 2009. It is photocopied in Yun Pyŏngsŏk ed. *I-Segi man e ponŭn hŭigwi han An Chung-gŭn chŏn’gi* (Seoul: Kukhak Charyowŏn, 2011), 203–286.

disrupt the peace in East Asia. Thus, it was necessary for China to act and protect the peace. This part was not in either of Pak's works, and the tone of this episode cannot be regarded as a voice of a Korean patriot. Meanwhile, Ye also added what An could gain from China. Specifically, Ye added that An had traveled to many cities and beautiful scenic spots within China, which made him gain a magnanimous spirit that he could not experience in a small country like Korea. Ye Tianni praised An for his universalism, which was reflected in his travel to China. Although An was unable to find Chinese patriots who would support him, this event made it clear to Ye that "his [An's] original hope was to protect China and keep peace in East Asia." In the conclusion, Ye writes:

He [Mr. An] took universalism (*shijie zhuyi*) as his goal... Because the pivot of the world competition is toward East Asia, in order to preserve the world piece, we must preserve the peace in East Asia. And China lies in the center of global competition.

The Sino-Korean relation is like the relation between hands and feet, head and eyes. Korea is ruined; thus China became riskier. China can exist because of Korea, and by preserving China, Korea can also be preserved. Japan was desperate to take over China, which led to conflicts among global powers. The crime to disrupt East Asia originally belonged to Japan.²⁸²

It seems that Ye found the story of the Korean patriots who had executed national

²⁸² Ye Tianni, "conclusion" in Yun Pyŏng-sŏk ed. *I-Segi man e ponŭn hŭigwi han An Chung-gŭn chŏn'gi*, 220–226.

traitors as the most valuable to be rewritten. In addition to including Pak's short biographies of U Töksun, An Myönggŭn, Yi Chaemyöng, and Kim Chöng'ik, Ye Tianni also included a biography of Yi Chun (1859–1907), which was not in Pak's writings. Like Pak, Ye Tianni dedicated a later part of his book to include paratexts, such as the eulogy written by Kim T'aeg'yöng and poems written by Chinese writers such as Huang Jigang (1886–1935). Overall, although the contents of later Chinese versions of the An Chunggŭn narrative significantly differed from the original Korean versions, Chinese writers found Pak Ŭnsik's prosopographical approach to national heroes and villains useful in their own effort to mobilize patriotism among Chinese people.

Conclusion

Although the Chinese people paid great attention to An Chunggŭn's story, this interest did not develop into the next stage that the Korean nationalists had desperately hoped for: Chinese support of the independence movement of Korea. Pak portrayed An Chunggŭn as a universal hero who beseeched China for help in waging war against the inhumane crimes of the Japanese imperialists. However, for some of the Chinese revolutionaries, An Chunggŭn was a man of merciless temper who facilitated the colonization of his own country, which reflected a colonial worldview that had legitimized Japan's colonization of Korea. These Chinese writers drew a line between China, which still had hope, and Korea, which had already been colonized because of the errors of its ways. However, in the 1930s, when Japanese imperial expansion had developed into military conflict with China, the nationalist discourse among the Chinese and Korean people came closer to leaping to the next level.

The advance of colonialism in East Asia in the twentieth century brought the

region closer than ever before, including in the circulation of information and concerns of the nation's colonial fate in East Asia. The ways in which Chinese reformers used Kim T'aeg'yŏng's and Pak Ŭnsik's writings to fuel national sentiment among people and educate them were adopted in the writings and publications of Korean reformers. When Korea was colonized by Japan in 1910, the Japanese colonial authority suppressed any Korean nationalist discourse that contradicted the Japanese colonial discourse. However, outside of the Japanese sphere of influence, Pak Ŭnsik and Kim T'aeg'yŏng could gain sympathy from Chinese people through their writings and publications during their exile in China. If their writings had only been aimed at Korean people before the colonization, their life as political exiles in China, which was projected in their own portraits of An Chunggŭn, would have been rearticulated to emphasize the universal values represented in An Chunggŭn biographies.

Pak Ŭnsik died in 1925, right after he resigned from the position of president of the KPG. The upcoming years marked what can be considered the dismantling of the KPG. This came about because of internal rivalry among Korean nationalists, but also because of the introduction of new ideologies—socialism and anarchism were decisive ideas for some Korean nationalists. What cannot be ignored was the arrival of the age of warlords, which also split the capacity of Chinese support of the Korean national independence movement. Korean nationalists now had various Chinese people they had to rely on, which was literally impossible. The effort to obtain the approval of the Guangdong nationalist government by Sin Kyusik—another Korean nationalist in exile and the KPG's Minister of Justice—turned out to be on an unsuccessful mission. First of all, the Guangdong government could not make sure of its support of the Korean

government, which was also divided.²⁸³ Second, it was also impossible for the Guangdong Guomindang government to make such a claim. Therefore, without a consolidated effort to unify the will of Chinese people, the future of Korean exile activities in China came into question.

However, in the 1930s, which the next chapter will discuss, we also see the revival of nationalist writings of history and historical figures as a means to reassert the legitimacy of the independence of Korea, a great example of this being Cho Soang (1887–1958), who also published Korean history and the biographies of Korean national heroes. In the next chapter, I focus on Cho Soang—a famous nationalist thinker of modern Korea whose work and influence cannot be neglected—to show the continuity of Korean nationalist thinkers’ efforts to communicate with Chinese intellectuals in their search for Korean modernity and how this developed into the next level of a binding history to reality in a stronger way.

Most attempts to resolve the historical disputes in contemporary northeast Asia have failed because they regard the problem as the question of *what* is true, centered on the quest for historical objectivity, while what is important for the reconciliation of the historical dispute is giving consideration to *who*.²⁸⁴ In a similar vein, what may have made the story of An Chunggŭn travel afar in modern Chinese literature cannot be understood without the Korean exile writers and their agency in their writing and revising of the biography of Korean martyr, and this attitude is also what we should consider in the matter of historical disputes in contemporary northeast Asia.

²⁸³ Pae Kyonghan, *Ssunwŏn kwa Han’guk: Chunghwajuŭi wa sadaejuŭi ŭi kyoch’a* (P’ajui: Hanul, 2007).

²⁸⁴ Baogang He and David Hundt, “A deliberative approach to northeast Asia’s contested history,” *Japanese Journal of Political Science* 13 (2012): 37–58.

Chapter 4

“Fish and the Fish Trap”: Cho Soang and the Korean National Movement in China, 1930–1945*

Fishing-stakes are employed to catch fish;
but when the fish are got, the men forget the stakes.
Snares are employed to catch hares;
but when the hares are got, men forget the snares.
Words are employed to convey ideas;
but when the ideas are apprehended, men forget the words.
Fain would I talk with such a man who has forgot the words! ²⁸⁵

On February 12th, 1942, Clarence E. Gauss (1887–1960), the Ambassador of the United States of America to the Republic of China, sent a telegram from his office at Chongqing, the wartime capital of China during World War II, to the secretary of state in Washington DC.²⁸⁶ The purpose of this telegram was to report a recent visit of Mr. Cho, who called himself the Foreign Minister of the Korean Provisional Government (KPG). During the meeting, Mr. Cho requested financial and military aid from the U.S. and recognition of the KPG as a belligerent body among the Allied Forces. It had been two months after Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor, so Mr. Cho’s purpose was evident: the

* Earlier version of this chapter was presented with a different title: “Sinographic Nationalism: Cho Soang’s Sino-Korean Writing in Republican China” at the “Korea with Empire Conference” held at the University of Pennsylvania, April 2016.

²⁸⁵ “The Writings of Chuang Tzu”, trans. James Legge, 1891, in Donald Sturgeon, *Chinese Text Project*, <https://ctext.org/dictionary.pl?if=en&id=2956>; to compare with other translations, see Zhuangzi and Burton Watson, *Zhuangzi: Basic Writings* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003).

²⁸⁶ File No: 895.01/81, translated into Korean as “Taepyöngyang chönjenggi chunggyöng chuje mi taesagwan üi pogo mun’gön” in *Taehan min’guk imsi chöngbu charyojip 26: miguk üi insik*, ed. Kuksa p’yöngch’an wiwönhoe, vol. 26 (Kwach’ön: Kuksa p’yöngch’an wiwönhoe, 2008), http://db.history.go.kr/id/ij_026_0010_00040.

recognition of the KPG as a legitimate belligerent body among the Allied Forces so that Korea could gain a voice and take part in the postwar reconstruction plan after the end of the war.

Gauss noticed that Mr. Cho spoke English quite well, but when Gauss asked more about the current political status of the KPG, Mr. Cho gave an ambiguous answer. Except for his argument that, “the Provisional Government is the representative organization of Korean independence activist,” Mr. Cho did not clearly state the relation between the Korean Provisional Government and other active Korean military organizations in Manchuria or even its relationship with the Chinese GMD government.

Gauss asked Mr. Cho if he could provide a report that included valid information regarding the political stature of the Korean Provisional Government; Gauss reported that Mr. Cho agreed and later sent a report explaining the history of the KPG and its relationship with other Korean organizations and other nations among the Allied Forces. But what maybe stands out the most is what Mr. Cho included as a part of the report—profiles of the key figures in the KPG, including himself, Cho Soang (1887–1958).

Cho Soang was a Korean nationalist intellectual who was better known as the founder of the “Three Equality System” (*Samgyun chedo* 三均制度) ideology, which later became the ideological basis of the constitution of the postliberation government in South Korea. In his profile, Cho Soang described his political career: he became a nationalist after finishing his education and, in his profile, also introduced his two “famous” publications: one was *Collection of Glorious Names on Posterity* (Ch. *Yifang ji*, K. *Yubang jip*)—a prosopography of Korean national independent fighters—and the other was the *Korean Literary World* (Ch. *Hanguo wenyuan*, K. *Han ’guk munwon*)—a

compendium of Korean traditional literature, both of which were published in Chinese in the early 1930s.

In his introduction to the *Korean Literary World*, Cho Soang addresses the literary works he collected in *Korean Literary World* and how they contain the essence of the politics, culture, and customs of Korea, which was under the threat of extinction because of the fierce cultural assimilation policy under Japanese colonial rule (1910–1945). At the end of the preface, Cho indicates his motivation was to preserve and transmit the Korean cultural spirit because, “the men forget the fishing-stake; yet the fish should not be,”²⁸⁷ an allegory from ancient Chinese classics.²⁸⁸ Although the Korean nation was at the time ruined and formless under foreign rule, the cultural spirit of the Korean civilization was said to transcend time and space and still remained inside its traditional literary works. Therefore, by writing *Korean Literary World* and presenting it to Chinese-reading foreigners, Cho Soang tried to address the legitimacy of Korean independence using a historical claim.

Cho Soang’s *Korean Literary World* is important for understanding Cho’s historical consciousness and seeing how Chinese intellectuals rearticulated such a nationalist construction of history. Here, it is not an invented tradition, but rather an appropriation of philological legacy of early modernity in eighteenth-century scholarly interaction between Qing China and Chosŏn Korea. Based on an eighteenth-century encyclopedic historical work in Korea, Cho gathered poems and writings by Koreans

²⁸⁷ Cho Soang, “Hanguo wenyuan xu,” in *Han’guk munwŏn* (Seoul: Asea Munhwasa, 1994 reprint; hereafter *HM*).

²⁸⁸ “The Writings of Chuang Tzu”, trans. James Legge, 1891, in Donald Sturgeon, *Chinese Text Project*, <https://ctext.org/dictionary.pl?if=en&id=2956>; to compare with other translations, see Zhuangzi and Burton Watson, *Zhuangzi: Basic Writings* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003).

dating back to ancient times and through the twentieth century, presenting them as a part of Korea's unique, glorious past.

Literary historian Hwang Hodök expanded the study of Cho Soang's thought beyond the scope of Korean nationalism, incorporating it into a new realm of the intellectual flow and exchange in modern East Asia and articulating nationalist thought by investigating Cho Soang's intersection with different ideologies and languages. By studying various forms of political oath—declarations of independence, statements by the exile government, and the platform for the postcolonial government—that Cho had written, Hwang argues that Cho took a representative role in the complex formulation of the Korean nation-building project in the 1930s. That is, by articulating the relation between ideology and language, Cho aimed to fulfil the justification and legitimization of the Korean independence movement, which centered on the Korean exile government in China. Hwang highlights Cho's multilingual nature of Cho's writings in Korean, Japanese, Chinese, and English and addresses how Cho appropriated the sinographic context and European context in his nationalistic claim toward different political and linguistic readers.²⁸⁹

In this chapter, I analyze Cho Soang's representation of Korean history and culture in his work the *Korean Literary World* to understand Cho Soang's ideology of Korean nationalism from 1930 to 1945. For Cho Soang, Korean history was the center of Korean nationalism.²⁹⁰ That is, he presented his political vision through his interpretation

²⁸⁹ Hwang Hodök, "Chöngch'e wa munch'e, taehan min'guk imsi chöngbu üi öñ'ö chöngch'ihak kwa Cho Soang," *Sarim* 45 (2013): 31–67.

²⁹⁰ Cho Tonggöl, *Usa Cho Tonggöl chonjip*, vol. 8 (Seoul: Yoksa konggan, 2010); Hwang Hodök, "Chöngch'e wa munch'e, taehan min'guk imsi chöngbu üi öñ'ö chöngch'ihak kwa Cho Soang – hanmunja üi maengse, Cho Soang üi sön'ön söngmyöng kangnyöng chipp'il kwa Han'guk munwön üi chungsim üro," *Sarim* 45 (2013): 31–67; Han Sijun, "Cho Soang üi yöksa insik"

of history. Although the history itself is a chronology of unchanging facts, his changing vision of a postlibertarian Korea deeply influenced his understanding of Korean history and how history should be read “in a nationalist way.” And I argue that Cho Soang’s historical understanding of Korea cannot be separated from the strong intertextual relation between Korean nationalism and Chinese nationalism. On the eve of Japanese imperialist expansion in China, Korean nationalist discourse took its own creative form, one in dialogue with Chinese nationalism. That is, despite the undeniable fact that modern nationalism in East Asia cannot be dissociated from its Western origin, the historical authenticity and legitimacy of Korean independence addressed by Korean nationalism in the 1930s was a result of a didactic interaction with Chinese nationalism. My project continues the study of the nationalist dilemma in Korean national discourse through an analysis of the intellectual interactions between Korea and China.

The first part of this chapter traces the political history of the Korean nationalist movement in China and the new challenges it faced in the 1930s, which were the primary motivations for Cho to write about Korea’s past. In addition to the nationalists’ ideological struggle against socialism, Japan’s expansion into Manchuria and the establishment of the Manchukuo seriously questioned the political position of Korean residents in China, as well as Korean nationalism itself. The second part of this chapter analyzes the *Korean Literary World* and its textual legitimacy. Confronted with the crisis of Korean nationalism, Cho Soang transformed textual authenticity to textual legitimacy with the *Korean Literary World* (Ch. *Hanguo wenyuan*, K. *Han’guk munwŏn*). As a diplomat of the Korean exile government and ideologue of the Korean independence

Han’guksa yŏngu 55, no. 12 (1986): 83–126.

party, Cho relied on the authenticity of Korea's past distilled through evidential studies in the eighteenth century to find evidence of Korea's true national identity as a way to reclaim Korea's rightful place in the modern colonizing world. Although the textual criticism enabled Cho to create an anthology of Korea's genuine voice from the past, the sinocentric worldview embedded in the source troubled twentieth-century Korean nationalists.

The third part of this chapter examines Cho's Sino-Korean nationalism in the *Korean Literary World* and its reception in the Chinese discourse. By excavating and refining the genealogy of Sino-Korean relations, Cho was able to present an image of the alliance of Korea and China that could be accomplished through nationalistic resonance.

Cho Soang's Encounter with Modern Nationalism

Cho Soang was born into a yangban family in 1887,²⁹¹ and later, in 1902, Cho entered the Sungkyunkwan Academy, which was the highest educational institution in the Chosŏn period and designed to train civil bureaucrat candidates. After the Kabo reform (1895), Sungkyunkwan combined traditional with Western education. Students at Sungkyunkwan studied Confucian classical canons and literary writing, as well as

²⁹¹ His short autobiography written in 1945 is in his posthumous literary collection, *Soang sŏnsaeng munjip*. This briefly touches on his early years in Korea; study at Tokyo; exile in Shanghai; independence movement in northeast China; travel in Europe as the delegate of Korean independence movement; his activities back in China as the foreign minister of KPG; and writing and publication activities. After liberation in 1945, Cho return to Korea and was interviewed by the Korean magazine *Samch'olli*, which was published on July 1, 1948. Both are reprinted in Cho Soang, *Soang sŏnsaeng munjip*, vol. 2 (Seoul: Hwaetpalsa, 1979 hereafter *SS*), 156–158, 166–168. For historical details of Cho Soang's life and ideology, see Hong Sŏnhuŭi, *Cho Soang ŭi samgyunjuŭi yŏn'gu* (Seoul: Buk'o, 2014); Kim Kisŭng, *Cho Soang i kkumkkun segye: yuksŏnggyo esŏ samgyunjuŭi kkaji* (Seoul: Chiyŏngsa, 2003); Kang Man'gil, *Cho Soang* (Seoul: Han'gilsa, 1982).

Western history, geography, and mathematics. Cho Soang's interest in Western education started with his older brother Cho Yongha (1882–1939), who was a diplomat at the Korean Consulate in Germany. Cho Yongha introduced his brother to the *Biography of Sun Yat-sen* (1866–1925), a story of the leading figure of the Chinese constitutional movement and the first provisional president of the newly formed Republic of China. Sun Yat-sen's revolutionary life greatly inspired Cho Soang and made him dream of pursuing a Western education in Japan like Sun Yat-sen did. Before completing his studies at Sungkyunkwan, Cho applied for a royal scholarship to study at Japan, and he became one of the first generation of Korean students to study in Japan (1904–1912).²⁹²

Around the time when Cho was learning about modern Western education in Japan, Japan obtained international recognition of its exclusive dominion over Korea. When Cho Soang studied at Tokyo First Middle School (*Tokyo furitsu daiichi chūgakkō*), the Korean Empire became Japan's protectorate (1905). Before the shock of the news of the protectorate treaty could disappear, a Japanese local newspaper's interview with the principal of Tokyo First Middle School enraged the Korean students, including Cho Soang. In the interview, the principal of Cho Soang's school evaluated that the academic achievement level of Korean adults did not reach that of Japanese children. All the Korean students boycotted classes after the principal's speech, and they were expelled from school. However, Cho Soang was coerced to return to school because of orders from the Korean government. The same year, Cho Soang graduated from Tokyo First Middle School and went to Meiji University, where he majored in legal studies.²⁹³ Although Cho Soang was negative about Japan's colonization of Korea, reading history

²⁹² Kim Kisŭng, *Cho Soang i kkumkkun segye: yuksŏnggyo esŏ samgyunjuŭi kkaji*, 21–27.

²⁹³ Kim Kisŭng, *Cho Soang i kkumkkun segye: yuksŏnggyo esŏ samgyunjuŭi kkaji*, 27–36.

made Soang perceive it as a historical consequence that came about because of the internal problems in Korea.²⁹⁴

Cho Soang's studying in Japan was important not only because of the Westernized education he received, but also because of the intellectual network he developed with the Chinese students in Japan. What greatly impressed the Korean students there, including Cho Soang, was the constitutionalism movement led by radical Chinese students. As royal scholarship students, it was difficult for Cho Soang to openly advocate for constitutionalism because it was against the government system in Korea. Even so, the Korean student magazines in Japan often published articles on the introduction of constitutional governments in Western countries and the ongoing constitutional movement in China.²⁹⁵ During his stay at Tokyo, Cho Soang associated with Dai Jitao (1891–1949),²⁹⁶ who later became the ideologue of the Chinese Guomindang (hereafter GMD) government. Cho Soang often went to Chinese student meetings to see their passionate discussion of Chinese nationalism, which greatly impressed him. During his study in Japan, Cho Soang became the leader of Korean student organizations in Tokyo and the editor of *Encouraging Study in Korea* (K. *Taehan hŭnghakpo*). In *Encouraging Study in Korea*, Cho Soang urged fellow Korean students to learn the political thoughts of Chinese students and their fervent activities to promote their radical ideas back in China.²⁹⁷

The political thoughts of the Chinese students in Japan influenced Cho Soang,

²⁹⁴ Han Sijun, "Cho Soang ŭi yŏksa insik," *Han'guksa yŏngu* 55, no. 12 (1986): 94–97.

²⁹⁵ Pae Kyŏnghwan, *Ssunwŏn kwa Han'guk: Chunghwajuŭi wa sadaejuŭi ŭi kyoch'a* (P'aju: Hanul, 2007), 27–39.

²⁹⁶ Cho Soang kept writing his diary during his stay in Japan (1904–1912). Cho Soang met Dai Jitao on November 19, 1908.

²⁹⁷ "Hoewŏn chegun," *Taehan hŭnghakpo* 7 (1909) cited in Cho Soang, *SS*, vol. 2, 220–226.

especially when it came to their active publication of student magazines and books. Being so interested in these publications, Cho Soang kept a record of the books he read; in 1906, Cho Soang read *Meiji issin shoshi*.²⁹⁸ It is highly possible that what Cho read was in fact the *New Short History of Meiji Restoration* (J. *Meiji issin sinshōshi*, Ch. *Mingzhi weixin xinxiaoshi*), which was published by the Chinese Students Association (Ch. *Qingguo liuxuesheng hui*) in January 1906.²⁹⁹ It was a summary of Professor Nomura's lecture at Hōsei University and his writings. The book discusses the recent history of Japan since the Meiji Restoration and goes over several topics—the development of diplomacy, war, treaties, administration, military affairs, finance, academy, transportation, agriculture and industry, customs, and local self-government. The *New Short History of Meiji Restoration* has a forward written by a Korean student, “Mr. Hong,”³⁰⁰ which indicates a close interaction between the Chinese and Korean students in Japan; Mr. Hong praises the book, which “even a countryside scholar can finish over a night and realize the cause of varied fortunes of races and countries.” Mr. Hong added that the principle of causality revealed in this book stacks up to the insights of the great scholar Liang Qichao. At the end of the introduction, Mr. Hong urges the readers in East Asia to be aware of Korea's miserable situation and unbearable pain.³⁰¹

What one can see from the collaboration between Chinese and Korean students and their active exchange of political thought, which began to emerge in the early twentieth century, is how this made Cho Soang continue to pursue an intellectual alliance

²⁹⁸ Kim Kisŭng, *Cho Soang i kkumkkun segye: yuksŏnggyo esŏ samgyunjuŭi kkaji*, 324.

²⁹⁹ Xiao Hongdiao, *Nihon Meiji ishin shoshi* (Tokyo: Shinkoku ryugaku kaikan, 1906).

³⁰⁰ The Korean student's penname is “Hong Ch'ang,” while the rest of his biographic information is obscure. Mr. Hong Chang may be Hong Myŏnghŭi (1888–?), a very famous Korean socialist and novelist because his study in Japan overlaps with the publication of this book.

³⁰¹ “Xu,” in Xiao Hongdiao, *Nihon Meiji ishin shoshi*, 1–2.

with the Chinese radicals who would later become the central members of the Chinese GMD party, further making Cho Soang use his network as a basis of diplomatic activities as the representative of the KPG. In sum, Cho Soang's interactions with Chinese students in Japan and their common political vision was crucial to his future role in the diplomatic channel of a Korean exile government, one that could appeal to Korea's national sovereignty and request for national independence to foreign powers, including China.

Cho returned to Korea in 1912 after graduating from Meiji University and worked as a teacher, but soon, he went to Shanghai—the emerging center of overseas Korean nationalist movement—to participate in the Korean independence movement. With other independence activists, including Pak Ŭnsik, Cho wrote the “Manifesto of Solidarity toward Great Harmony” (K. *Taedong tangyŏl sŏnŏn*) in 1915, which claimed the sovereignty of the Korean people. The manifesto rejects Korea's signature of the Japan–Korean Annex Treaty in 1910, and it addresses the idea that when the Sunjong Emperor (r. 1907–1910) abandoned his sovereignty, the sovereignty of Korea was not transferred to Japan, but rather to the Korean people: that is, the year 1910 did not mark the beginning of Japanese colonial rule, but rather, it was the end of the monarchy in Korean history and the beginning of a democratic republic by the Korean people.

Disruption and Collapse of Korean Nationalism in the 1920s

After the end of World War I (1914–1918), Korean activists in Shanghai anchored their hopes on Wilsonian nationalism to establish a humanitarian international organization that would keep peace among nations and prevent the breakout of international war. And the KPG in Shanghai was the preparatory organization that would participate in the reconstruction of the postwar world order. Since the March 1st

movement in 1919, Korean nationalism consolidated in Shanghai and constructed the KPG, a political center against Japanese colonialism that wanted the liberation of Korea. However, in the international meetings, such as the Paris Peace Conference in 1919 and the Washington Conference in 1921–1922, the focus of the international agreement was to keep the balance among the Great Powers, and the colonial problem was not the main issue. Korean nationalists sought support from Sun Yat-sen, but Sun Yat-sen's lukewarm attitude was disappointing.³⁰² The disclosure of these events, such as President Syngman Rhee's (1875–1965) attempt to submit his petition to American President Woodrow Wilson to liberate Korea under the control of the League of Nations, led Korean nationalists to question his leadership and finally oust him.

Another cause of the KPG's collapse was the participants' conflicting agendas for the independence movement. The diplomatic channel that appealed to international powers regarding the atrocity of Japanese imperialism often conflicted with the plan of a military struggle, which demanded the immediate mobilization of a national resistance army to battle the Japanese colonial regime. Moreover, the rise of the Soviet Union after the Russian Revolution in 1917 drew the attention of many of Korean nationalists, including Prime Minister Yi (1873–1935), who was the leader of the Korean People's Socialist Party (*Han'in sahoedang*).³⁰³ His plan for the independence movement often conflicted with other groups in the KPG, and Yi Tonghŭi's scandal of embezzling the money that the KPG had to receive from the Soviet Union seriously damaged the

³⁰² For Sun Yat-sen's attitude toward the KPG, see Pae Kyŏngha, *Ssunwŏn kwa Han'guk: Chunghwajuŭi wa sadaejjuŭi ūi kyoch'a* (P'aju: Hanul, 2007), 68–103.

³⁰³ For the history of the Soviet Union regarding Korean exiles in Siberia and northeast China and their role in the KPG in the 1910–1920s, see Robert Scalapino and Chongsik Lee, *Communism in Korea*, vol. 1 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972), 3–51.

legitimacy of his position in the KPG. Overall, the widespread skepticism of efforts to draw international attention to the suffering of the Korean people under Japanese colonial rule gradually eroded the solidarity in the KPG. After 1925, the KPG faced a collapse. After a debate in the Korean National Congress, the KPG was dismantled and no longer served as the face of the nationalist movement.³⁰⁴

In addition, the change of Japan's colonial policy toward Korea contributed to the destruction of the KPG. After facing international criticism regarding Japan's misbehavior in Korea, the Japanese colonial government began to advertise their new "cultural rule" (*Bunka tōchi*) that emphasized their significant effort to modify their colonial policy and make it friendlier toward the Korean people. The release of regulations in the cultural and social space in colonial Korea allowed the Korean people to pursue non-political activities, which also allowed the colonial elites to engage in public activities in colonial Korea.³⁰⁵ This also significantly dismantled the solidarity of the Korean nationalists in Shanghai and led to some members abandoning their anticolonial movement and return to Korea.

"Cat's Paw of Japanese Imperialism": Wanbaoshan Incident and the Korean Problem in Northeast China

The 1930s marked a turning point for the Korean nationalist movement in China. As political scientist Chŏng-Sik Lee correctly notes in his study of Korean nationalist politics in China, the imperialist expansion of Japan into Manchuria at the beginning of

³⁰⁴ Chongsik Lee, *The Politics of Korean Nationalism* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1965), 129–179.

³⁰⁵ Michael Robinson, *Cultural Nationalism in Colonial Korea, 1920-1925* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1988).

the 1930s affected the Korean nationalists in China “both favorably and adversely.”³⁰⁶

Although the Japanese occupation of Manchuria and the establishment of Manchukuo in 1932 exposed how Korean nationalists were under continuous attack from Japan, the expansion of Japanese influence in northeast China aroused strong antagonism from the Chinese and Korean nationalists who wanted to use this chance to make a potential ally.

Making a political claim of the unique Korean national consciousness through a historical investigation also reflects the increasing number of Koreans who are flourishing in China under the protection of Japanese authority, especially within northeast China, which is also known as the Manchuria and Jiandao (K. *Kando*) area. The Wanbaoshan incident in 1931 fueled mistrust, and the Koreans in China were regarded as the “cat’s paw of Japanese Imperialism.”³⁰⁷ On April 13, 1931, Korean settlers in Jiandao built an irrigation channel that interfered with the land cultivated by Chinese peasants. The Chinese peasants appealed to Chinese authorities. Chinese police officers arrived at the site in response while the Japanese police were already there, claiming their duty to “protect Korean settlers.” On July 2 and 3, similar disturbances occurred again, but in fact, there were no “serious casualties on both sides,” according to one official report.³⁰⁸

But the rumor that was manipulated by the Japanese authorities marked the headlines of the Korean newspapers back in Korea, which reported rumors of Chinese peasants were killing and injuring innocent Korean peasants. In the port of Inchŏn, the

³⁰⁶ Chong-Sik Lee, *The Politics of Korean Nationalism* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1963), 181.

³⁰⁷ Whitewall Wang, *Wanbaoshan Incident and the Anti-Chinese Riots in Korea* (Nanking [Nanjing]: International Relations Committee, 1931), 5.

³⁰⁸ Whitewall Wang, *Wanbaoshan Incident and the Anti-Chinese Riots in Korea*, 5.

Korean people began to attack and destroy Chinese-owned restaurants and shops.³⁰⁹

Sixteen anti-Chinese riots occurred in many places across Korea wherever Koreans could find Chinese people. According to the report by the ambassador to Japan, about 119 Chinese were killed, 370 Chinese were wounded, and eighty-two went missing. The property damage totaled 2,752,000 yen, and more than sixty Chinese shops were destroyed and looted. Different reports give different numbers of the casualties because the investigation was ongoing as the riots continued.³¹⁰

The Wanbaoshan incident addressed the “Korea problem” for the Chinese people because the Koreans were now regarded as a risk factor for maintaining Chinese sovereignty in northeast China. Nonetheless, simply expelling all Koreans in northeast China was not a clean solution; an article titled “The Complexity of Japanese-Russian-Korean residents in the Eastern Three Provinces” appeared in *Eastern Miscellany* (*Dongfang zazhi*) and elaborated on the Chinese dilemma of the Korean immigrants in northeast China. Despite its title, the article addresses why the problems of Korean people in northeast China would be a difficult thing to solve. Although Korean immigrants raised trouble in the area, it was also the Korean people and their labor power that significantly boosted the agricultural productivity in the area, and their contribution to the national economy was hard to ignore. In other words, China needed the Korean people.³¹¹ Although there was disagreement in their views of the political nature of Korean residents, news media generally agreed regarding the contribution of the rice

³⁰⁹ “Zhungguk nongmin ūi p’okkō manbosan suro p’agwe,” *Tonga ilbo*, July 4, 1931, in *Han’guksa DB (DB of Korean History)*, comp. National Institute of Korean History (Kwach’ŏn: Kuksa p’yŏnch’an wiwŏnhoe), http://db.history.go.kr/id/npda_1931_07_04_v0002_0200.

³¹⁰ Whitewall Wang, *Wanbaoshan Incident and the Anti-Chinese Riots in Korea*, 16–45.

³¹¹ “Dong sansheng ri-e-hanqiao wenti de fuza,” *Dongfang zazhi* 27, no. 15 (1931): 5–8.

paddy technology that the Koreans introduced to northeast China, highlighting the high productivity of Korean farmers in the region.

As a solution, this article suggests implementing a radical assimilation policy for the Korean population in northeast China. To keep the economic prosperity and enhance security in the region, the article suggests mixed marriage between the Chinese and Korean people and prohibiting the education of Korean culture, language, and history. The article posits that Korean national identity, which only causes unnecessary conflict with Chinese people, should be erased to keep the peace.

The Korean nationalists in China, especially those who kept receiving financial support from the Korean immigrants in northeast China, took the issue of conflict between the Korean and Chinese people in northeast China seriously. The large Korean population in Manchuria was crucial for the independence movement because they mobilized guerilla fighters and financially supported the Korean nationalists. Right after the Wanbaoshan incident, Korean nationalists gathered almost every day to prepare counteractions.³¹² After multiple meetings, on July 10, the leading members of the KPG—Kim Ku, Kim Chŏl, Li Tong'nyŏng, Yi Siyŏng, An Ch'angho, Cho Wan'gu, and Cho Soang—issued a joint statement titled “Statement about the miserable incident of overseas Chinese in Korea” (*Hanguo huaqiao can anxuan*),³¹³ which was written in sinographic language and published in Shanghai. In this statement, the KPG express their

³¹² “Memorandum on the KPG in Shanghai,” January 20, 1932, in *Han'guk tongnip undongsa charyŏ*, vol. 20, in *Han'guksa DB (DB of Korean History)*, comp. National Institute of Korean History (Kwach'ŏn: Kuksa p'yŏnch'an wiwŏnhoe), http://db.history.go.kr/id/kd_020_0020_0070.

³¹³ “Report on Korean manifesto in Chinese language re[arding] Korean riots,” July 19, 1931, in *Han'guk tongnip undongsa charyŏ*, vol. 20, in *Han'guksa DB (DB of Korean History)*, comp. National Institute of Korean History (Kwach'ŏn: Kuksa p'yŏnch'an wiwŏnhoe), http://db.history.go.kr/id/kd_020_0020_0060.

deepest regret for the killed and injured Chinese during the recent riots in Korea.³¹⁴ With the statement, a pamphlet titled *The Problems of Korean Residents in the Three Eastern Provinces* (*Dong sansheng hanqiao wenti*) was sent to the Chinese government in Nanjing and to their high officials, appealing that the Korean immigrants were also victims of the manipulation of the imperial Japanese, and because of that the Chinese should ally with the Koreans to expel Japanese imperialism and prevent a tragedy like Wanbaoshan from happening again.

In addition to this manifesto, Cho organized an international group of revolutionaries in Shanghai, including the Vietnamese Nationalist Party and Indian Youth Group, to issue a joint multinational manifesto. Cho Soang's international manifesto was printed in the *China Times* and other local newspapers.³¹⁵ This joint statement shows great sympathy for the sufferings of the Chinese in Korea, blaming their plight on the "imperialists" and plotting an international protest. The manifesto demands that Chinese authorities, being the only savior of the weak, oppressed races of Asia, act to settle the incident, which would prevent other imperial powers, such as the French and British, from doing the same thing to Korea as they did to the Vietnamese and Indians.

The Wanbaoshan incident raised the issue of the survival of Korean identity among Korean immigrants in China, and the "renaissance" of Chinese traditional culture

³¹⁴ "Hanguo huaqiao can anxuan" July 10, 1931, in *Han'guk tongnip undongsa charyŏ*, vol. 20, in *Han'guksa DB (DB of Korean History)*, comp. National Institute of Korean History (Kwach'ŏn: Kuksa p'yŏnch'an wiwŏnhoe), http://db.history.go.kr/id/kd_020_0020_0060.

³¹⁵ "Indian, Annamite and Korean appeal regarding Japanese intrigue," July 16, 1931, in *Han'guk tongnip undongsa charyŏ*, vol. 20, in *Han'guksa DB (DB of Korean History)*, comp. National Institute of Korean History (Kwach'ŏn: Kuksa p'yŏnch'an wiwŏnhoe), http://db.history.go.kr/id/kd_020_0020_0060.

in the Nanjing decade (1928–1937)³¹⁶ offered a solution for Korean nationalism to reconstruct its ideological foundation in a somewhat similar fashion to the intellectual trends in China.

Historical Education as Means of National Movement

After Sun Yat-sen passed away in 1925, Chiang Kai-shek (1887–1975), took control of the GMD and continued the “Northern Expedition,” a military campaign against warlords and the Beijing government. Under the direction of the GMD, the Chinese communist party collaborated with the Chinese nationalists from 1923 until the alliance was broken in 1927. In his fear of the growing influence of communism inside the party and government, Chiang Kai-shek broke his alliance with the Soviet Union and the Chinese Communist Party. On April 12, with the support of a conservatism group in the GMD, Chiang ordered his group to wipe out the Chinese communists in GMD, which is known as the Shanghai Massacre (1927). To suppress the spread of communist ideology in the population, through the New Life Movement, Chiang Kai-shek instead promoted the traditional Chinese culture as the center of Chinese nationalist discourse. “We must inherit our five thousand-year-old culture and make it a guide in human progress”³¹⁷ was the slogan that Chiang Kai-shek used, which we will later see how strikingly it resembles Cho Soang’s nationalist ideology.

The New Life Movement represented the state-driven nationwide reorientation program initiated in 1934, but its ideological concern germinated in 1931, the year when

³¹⁶ Arif Dirlik, “The ideological foundations of the New Life Movement: A study in counterrevolution,” *Journal of Asian Studies* 34, no. 4 (1975): 945–980.

³¹⁷ Chiang Kai-shek, “Reform of the Kuomintang,” cited in Mary Wright, “From Revolution to Restoration: Transformation of Kuomintang Ideology,” *Far Eastern Quarterly* 525 (1955): 524–525.

the celebration of the birthday of Confucius was reinstitutionalized since the fall of the Qing dynasty. Confucius and his teachings were the main target of the criticism of Chinese radicals because it was the symbol of the traditional culture that ruined bureaucracy of imperial China and the minds of the Chinese people. In his magazine *New Youth* (*Xin qingnian*), Chen Duxiu (1879–1942), one of the founders of the Chinese Communist Party, asserts that Mr. Confucius should be replaced with Mr. Science and Mr. Democracy.³¹⁸

Nationalist intellectuals in 1930 thought it was time for the GMD government to “correct” what those radicals have spoken. In fact, the reevaluation of the traditional was not only a government-led campaign. Cai Yuanpei (1868–1940), the president of the Academia Sinica and education reformer, submitted a proposal to build a the National Palace Museum, which was completed in 1933. The transformation of the nationalist ideology could not have thrived without this intellectual support. In 1930, when the fervor of the May Fourth Movement had lessened in China, a group of Chinese intellectuals began to doubt the practicality of copying Western civilization. As a result, they searched for a different path toward modernity and rethought their own historical path and tradition. Under this circumstance, it was crucial for Korean nationalists to keep up with the change.

History and Revolution: Constructing a Dialectical Path for the Emancipation of the Korean Peninsula

Cho Soang regarded national history as the center of Korean nationalism, as Chiang Kai-shek had asserted. Cho made an ideology of Korean nationalism and named

³¹⁸ Chen Duxiu, “Xin qingnian zuian zhi dabianshu,” *Xin Qingnian* 6, no. 1 (1919), 10–11.

it the “Three Equality System” (*Samgyun chedo*), addressing the political, economic, and educational equality of the Korean nation. Cho claimed that his system was modeled on the five-thousand-year history of Korean national sovereignty and the uniqueness of Korean history that had continued to sustain the country. To Cho, political and historical thoughts were not far apart. Part of Cho Soang’s political movement was to organize a Korean party that could persuade both international and domestic people to join the Korean nationalist movement. And to do this, the study of history was crucial in legitimizing his nationalist ideology and revolutionary strategy. In his essay, “Outline of the Land System in Korean History,” Cho connects the historical land system to egalitarian revolutionary ideas.

Cho did not totally reject the socialist strategy for struggle and the movement’s ideology. In his essay, “Current Situation of Korea and its Revolutionary Trend” (*Hanguo zhi xianzhuang ji qi geming qushi*), Cho defines the two axes of revolutionary forces in contemporary Korea: national consciousness and class consciousness; Cho also defines national consciousness as “a product of five thousand years of history” and class-consciousness as “a torrent of new global ideology.”³¹⁹ Both forms of consciousness could be weapons used by the Korean people to resist colonial domination. Cho thought that given Korea’s situation, national consciousness was more important than class consciousness and that under Japanese occupation, all Korean people belonged to a suppressed class. After assessing Japanese empire’s recent charge of Korean criminals by

³¹⁹ Cho Soang’s essay was published between 1930 and 1931 as a series of article in the Chinese magazine *Current Affairs Monthly* (*Shishi yuebao*), which was published in Nanjing, Hankou, and Chongqing. The article was later republished in *Soang jip* (1932), Cho’s collection of his own literary works; reprinted in Cho Soang, *SS*, vol. 1, 39–82.

the Maintenance of Public Order Act, Cho points out that the charges against the independence party were more severe than those against the socialist organization, concluding that the influence of national conscious in Korea was more powerful than that of class consciousness. Nonetheless, such evidence was not sufficient for Cho to convince his readers to firmly understand that the nationalism movement would have a greater influence than that of a socialist movement in Korea. Here, the Korean voice was reinvented by Cho to become a tool for his effort to create a cultural space for negotiation with Chinese nationalists.

The Making of the *Korean Literary World*: Constructing the Authenticity of Korean Cultural Identity and Nationalist Resistance Against Colonialism

The *Korean Literary World* is divided into two volumes (*pian*). The first volume is titled “literary compositions” (*wen*) and contains 144 pieces of writing. The second volume is titled “poetry” (*shi*) and has 399 poems. The two volumes are divided into nine reels (*Ch. juan K. kwŏn*).³²⁰ The author proudly writes that the book is about 100,000 words and features literary works from the Puyŏ, Mahan, Koguryŏ, Parhae, Paekjae, Later Paekjae, Silla, Koryŏ, and Chosŏn.

In the preface, Cho starts with an anecdote of his discovery of Korean artifacts scattered in foreign countries, as follows:

³²⁰ The introduction given in the 1993 reprint provides incorrect information of the total writings and poems in the *Korean Literary World*. The total number of writings are in fact 144, and there are 399 poems. I assume that is a miscalculation because I counted 144 writings and 399 poems. This discrepancy is because of an error in the table of contents that did not accurately list all the writings and poems included in the book. Cho Hangnae, “Introduction,” in Cho Soang, *Han'guk munwŏn* (Seoul: AseaMunhwasa, 1994), ix–xv.

When I was at London British Museum, I saw the *Record of Three Confucian Cardinal Guides* printed by Koreans, which had been regarded as the second in the world history of printing.³²¹ When I went to Paris, I saw the *Tale of Chunhyang* in French translation, which was a valuable literature.³²² When I came to Shanghai, I saw the inscription on the Stele of the Greatest King, which the most precious one among ancient epigraph.³²³ When I was studying over the Eastern Sea, I saw the original body of the Stele Commemorating the Great Victory at Immyŏng, which was great footprint in the international war history.³²⁴ The Koreans made all these four objects, but how come (these) were abandoned and not looked after, all alone, became the treasures of foreign people?³²⁵

Seeing national artifacts in a foreign country was a humiliating experience, compelling him to want to preserve the Korean cultural heritage. By collecting historical sources that showcase the genuine voice of the Korean people, Cho wanted to claim the long history of the Korean people and their glorious civilization, which was represented

³²¹ In his “history of type-founding in Korea,” Cho writes in more detail about the *Record of Three Confucian Cardinal Guides* he saw in the British Museum. “I saw the [*Record of Three Confucian Cardinal Guides*] a bilingual explanatory of illustrations in Korean and sinographic languages. An English note said, “the second oldest typography in the world.”

³²² *Tale of Chunhyang* is a famous Korean folktale that became popular starting in the nineteenth century. It is love story that goes beyond social discrimination and barrier among different statuses.

³²³ It refers to the Stele of King Kwanggat’o, which was erected by his son King Changsu (394–491).

³²⁴ The Stele of Commemorating the Great Victory at Immyŏng (Immyŏng Chŏnch’ŏpbi 臨溟戰捷碑), which is also known as the Stele of Commemorating the Great Victory at Northern Gate (Pukkwan taech’ŏpbi 北關大捷碑). The stele was erected in 1709 in Immyŏng, now a subdistrict of Kimch’ek city, Northern Hamgyŏng Province, DPRK. The stele was moved to Japan in 1904 and remained there until it was returned to Korea in 2005.

³²⁵ Cho Soang, *HM*, 1–2.

in their splendid poems and writings:

The fine writings and beautiful phrases in two thousand years are mostly included in here: arduous footsteps of the dynastic foundations, remarkable ministers and renowned commanders who denied themselves place themselves in the service of their country, indignant writings of loyalist and martyrs, the great virtues of the recluses, masterpieces of charming and talented, renowned beauties and gurus. [These are] all threaded together, as looking at there [real] face and eyes, which are glowing in their writings, as part of the glory of the literary world of the Korean people. Not only the splendid, but the real substances also exist. In addition, the outline of the gain and losses in the state affairs, the history of national interchange, and the changes in the writing style and the divergence and continuation of literary trend can be observed here.³²⁶

The collection of the traces of the Korean people who Cho presents in the *Korean Literary World* was itself historical evidence that could support his ultimate goal: creating the historical legitimacy of Korea's place in the world.

The third main idea Cho addresses in the preface is the superiority of Chinese characters and the Chinese writing system. Cho contends that the Chinese language is one-third of the world's literature because the Chinese consist of so much of the world's population. And he addresses how difficult it is to master Chinese characters and the Chinese writing system. However, by talking about Chinese writing, what Cho really

³²⁶ Cho Soang, *HM*, 3–4.

wants to stress is the outstanding works by Koreans that are written in Chinese. Cho continues,

“Koreans were good at Chinese writing in any genre: state credentials, literature, historical records, and epigraphs. Entire writings used Chinese script and were able to develop its culture . . . and their Chinese writings are valor and splendor, far above Japanese, Vietnamese, Turkish, Tibetans, Manchus, and Mongols.”³²⁷

Cho quotes a Russian friend who compares the difficulty of Chinese to Greek and Latin, and much like how Greek and Latin influenced world culture, Cho shows the contributions that Koreans made through Chinese writing: “By looking at Korean literature written in Chinese, Koreans' contribution and credit looms large in world culture.”³²⁸

Cho does not downplay the value of the Korean writing system at the price of praising the sinographic writing system; he did not want to go beyond the rhetoric of cultural similarities between the Korean and Chinese civilizations. Before listing the outstanding works of Koreans, Cho briefly touches on the history of Korea's own scripts, *Idu*,³²⁹ which was invented by, Sölch'ong (658–?), an official of the Silla dynasty (57 BCE–935 CE), and then the Korean script created by the Great King Sejong (r.1418–1450) in 1443. After mentioning this, Cho quickly moves the topic away the excellency of Korea's tradition of using the sinographic writing system. It is striking that quite

³²⁷ Cho Soang, *HM*, 1–4.

³²⁸ Cho Soang, *HM*, 1–4.

³²⁹ Writing system used in Korea borrowing the sounds and meanings of Chinese characters.

contrary to our assumption and expectation from a Korean nationalist like Cho, he in fact does not go further because the materials he presents in the book have little to do with the valorization of the Korean language. It was enough for Cho to say that Koreans, like all other nations, had their own vernacular script. Here, Cho cautiously regards his Chinese readers and their reception of the book.

The last significant contribution of Cho through his publication of the *Korean Literary World* was that he introduced the text with punctuation marks. However, the practice of adding punctuation marks was not totally new in the Chinese writing system. By adding punctuation marks, Cho clarifies the grammatical structure of the source materials so that Chinese readers could understand the text without having a detailed knowledge of the context.

Sinographic Poems in the *Korean Literary World*: Copying the Proto-National Literature from the Past

How did Cho Soang gather the materials for the *Korean Literary World* while staying in China? He is proud to say in his preface that he found “hundreds of different books” for his project, despite the aforementioned difficulty. Cho provides reference to most of the works cited in the *Korean Literary World*. By counting the references, he identifies at least forty different sources that range from pre-Han texts to a book published in the early twentieth century.

But did he really *see* all those references? Cho saw “hundreds of different books” that were cited in the *Continuous History of Korea*, another literary collection compiled much earlier by Han Ch’iyun (1765–1814), a late eighteen-century Korean philologist. Cho Soang copies these sources without mentioning this important reference. When it

comes to where Cho Soang took much of his inspiration, Han Ch'iyun's scholarly aim and his research methods were influenced by Qing evidential scholarship.³³⁰ Kim Chŏnghŭi (1786–1756), an evidential scholar famous for his studies on epigraphy and calligraphy, later wrote Han's biography of Ch'iyun and praises him “as magnificent as Wang Baihou (aka. Yinglin), as precise as Gu Tinglin (aka. Yanwu).”³³¹ In his study of the evidential scholarship in late Imperial China, Benjamin Elman emphasizes the influence of Qing *kaozheng* scholars, whose scholarship spread from China into both Korea and Japan. Han Ch'iyun's work was deeply influenced by Qing evidential studies in eighteen-century Korea.³³²

In his *Continuous History of Korea*, Han Ch'iyun includes textual materials of every bibliographical category as historical materials, even books that were later revealed to be forgeries. At the beginning of the book, Han presents the list of Chinese and Japanese books he is using. According to Han's record, he referred to 545 books; 521 were Chinese books, and the remaining twenty-four were Japanese. Because of Han Ch'iyun's negligence regarding native Korean references and their fascination with foreign, especially Chinese, references, historian Han Yong'u evaluates Han Ch'iyun's the *Continuous History of Korea* as lacking awareness of its own cultural identity.³³³

For Cho Soang, however, the *Continuous History of Korea* was a perfect source to address the authenticity of Korea to his Chinese readers, who were already familiar with

³³⁰ Yi Taejin suggested that the great quantity of treaties in *Continuous History of Korea* is, in fact, modeled on *Comprehensive Records* (通志 Tongzhi, 1161), a Song period encyclopedic book. Yi T'aejin, “Haedong yŏksa ŭi haksulsa jŏk kŏmto,” *Chindan hakpo* 53 (1982): 231–242.

³³¹ Kim Chŏnghŭi, “Okyudang han'gong hengjang,” cited in Hwang Wŏn'gu, “Han Ch'iyun ŭi sahak sasang: Haedong yŏksa rŭl chungsim ŭro,” *Inmun kwahak* 7 (1962): 339–361.

³³² Benjamin Elman, *From Philosophy to Philology: Intellectual and Social Aspects of Change in Late Imperial China*, 266.

³³³ Han Yŏng'u, “Haedong yŏksa ŭi yŏn'gu,” *Han'guk hakpo* 11 (1985): 188.

the Chinese references throughout *Continuous History of Korea*, making educated Chinese people read *Korean Literary World* without questioning the validity of sources.

The order of the items in the *Korean Literary World* is very similar to the *Continuous History of Korea*. The first nine poems in the *Korean Literary World* are in the same order as in the *Continuous History of Korea*. Although there is a minor difference in the titles and sequencing, nine of the ten poems are identical. “Song of the Barley Sprout” (*Maeksuga*) is not included in Cho’s book because the source indicates that this poem was written by Kija (Ch. *Jizi*), a mystic figure who was an official of the last king of the Shang dynasty and who came to Korea and established the first state in Korean history. As we will see frequently, Cho intentionally omits this poem because it could provoke the Chinese and make them think of Korea as a part of China. Instead of “Song of the Barley Sprout,” Cho inserts another Koguryŏ poem, “Thinking of Nanhŭi.” There are some differences between the titles, but the poems are the same. This pattern appears throughout Cho’s book. Beyond these nine identical poems, 298 works are directly taken from the *Continuous History of Korea* with only minimal changes.

Table 5. Comparison the Order of the “Treatise of Poems of Our Country” in the *Continuous History of Korea (Haedong yŏksa)* and “Poems” in the *Korean Literary World (Han ’guk mun ’wŏn)*

	Continuous History of Korea	Korean Literary World
1	麥秀歌	箜篌引
2	箜篌引	憶雉詩
3	人蓼讚	人蓼讚
4	詠孤石	檄隋將于仲文詩*
5	遺于仲文詩*	詠孤石
6	太平頌	太平頌
7	憤怨詩**	獄中詩**
8	返俗謠	返俗謠
9	送童子下山	送童子下山
10	過海聯句	過海聯句

Han Ch’iyun, *Haedong yŏksa* 海東繹史 (Seoul: Chosŏn Kwangmunhoe, reprint), 1912, 95–97.

Cho Soang, *Han ’guk mun ’wŏn* 韓國文苑 (Seoul: Asea Munhwasa, 1994, reprint), 181–184.

*The poem titled 檄隋將于仲文詩 is identical to that of 遺于仲文詩 in the *Continuous History of Korea*.

** The poem titled 獄中詩 is identical to that of 憤怨詩 in the *Continuous History of Korea*.

Among the 543 pieces cited in the *Korean Literary World*, 307 items are identical to the items included in the *Continuous History of Korea*, meaning about fifty-six percent of the works were copied from Han's *Continuous History of Korea*, mainly poems in the "Treaties of Literature and Art" section.³³⁴

The third piece of evidence that suggests Cho's book is following the order of items in Han's book is that the items are arranged in chronological order, from the oldest to the most recent. However, the last pages of Han's poem section are reserved for Chosŏn female writers, such as Yi Suk'wŏn, Ho Hansŏrhŏn, Tŏkkae, and Unhye, who were all born around the sixteenth century. Because of this gender division, Han put these sixteenth-century female writers after seventeenth-century male writers in the *Continuous History of Korea*, distorting the chronological order. Cho did this as well.

The fourth piece of evidence is the similarity between the comments on identical items. As a rigid philologist, Han Ch'iyun leaves the various comments around the works of which he found different versions. Han refers to multiple sources for a single poem, such as with Hŏ Nansŏrhŏn's (1563–1589) "Song of Four Seasons." Han found poems under the same title from the *Collection of Poetry from Successive Reigns* (*Liechaoshiji*)³³⁵ and the *Collection of Hŏ Nansŏrhŏn* (*Nansŏl jip*), but he must have realized that these two poems are very different, even though they share the same title. So next to the title, Han comments, "These poems are distinctively different, so it is

³³⁴ The treaties in *Continuous History of Korea* consist of the following subsections: celestial calendars; rites; music; military affairs; punishments; foods and goods; products; social customs; palace and buildings; official titles and surnames, Buddhism; exchange of envoys; and literature and art. Cho Soang cited works mostly from the treaties of "exchange of envoys" and "literature and art."

³³⁵ *Collection of Poetry from Successive Reigns* (*Liechao shiji*) was an anthology of poetry with biographies of authors. It was written by Qian Qianyi (1582–1664), a great scholar and poet during the Ming period.

suspicious [that one may be a forgery].”³³⁶ Following Han’s comment on the poem, Cho also leaves a note below the title of the poem in question: “There are some differences between these poems and those in *Nansöl jip*—*Continuous History of Korea*.”³³⁷ Cho does not want to cast any doubt in the readers’ minds about the authenticity of the works included in his book, so he omits the word “distinctively” to keep readers from suspecting this work as being a forgery.

Cho did not merely imitate the *Continuous History of Korea*. Instead, what we can see from Cho’s words in the preface and his original intervention in the text is how Cho constructs this text as a medium for addressing the historical authenticity of Korea, which did not exist in the texts Cho cites. The task of finding authentic sources for the Korean classics did not end when Cho published the *Korean Literary World*. Even after publishing his work in China, Cho continued to find repositories of Korean historical sources in other places in China. After Cho moved to Hangzhou in 1932, he visited the Zhejiang Library and made a list of Korean rare books stored there.³³⁸ Established in the 1900s, the Zhejiang Library was one of the biggest provincial libraries at that time, and there, Cho found books about Korean history, anthologies, maps, and civil examinations, as well as encyclopedias, all of which were written in and imported from Korea. But these findings did not transform into another Korean anthology because of the financial difficulties and aggravation of the Sino-Japanese conflict, which no longer allowed the publication of books in Shanghai related to Korean history after Japan’s dominance over

³³⁶ Han, Ch’iyun, *Haedong yŏksa* 海東繹史 [Continuous history of Korea] (Seoul: Chosŏn Kwangmunhoe, 1912), 150.

³³⁷ Cho Soang, *HM*, 309.

³³⁸ Cho Soang, “Zhejiang tushuguan wenhua zhanlanhui zhong benguo gushu zhenben.” *Chen’guang* 1 (1934): 19–20. A Korean translation of the article is available in Cho Soang, *SS*, vol. 1, 368–370.

the city.

Nationalistic Appropriation of the Past

Cho tried to construct a genuine voice for the Korean people, one that expressed the pure and unified national identity that he imagined; he even manipulated the true meaning of the sources to do this. On the surface, we can say that the *Korean Literary World* proves its authenticity by aggressively implementing the work of eighteenth-century evidential scholarship. However, Cho did not see textual criticism in the eighteenth century as the only way to legitimize his nationalistic imaginings of Korea's past. Beyond the beautiful poems and writings, Cho includes stories of national heroes who defended Korea from foreign invaders and martyrs who sacrificed themselves to save the country.

Embroidering the Historical Record

Cho wanted to let readers know about the history of the friendly relationship between Korea and China, but he also wanted to limit its meaning. He did not want readers to see any phrase that might imply an unequal relationship. The letter from Silla King Munmu to Tang General Xue Renhui in the writing section of the *Korean Literary World* shows how Cho imagined the ideal Sino-Korean relationship and how he arranged the sources based on this vision. After the Silla–Tang allied force defeated Paekche and Koguryŏ in the late seventh century, both the Silla and Tang wanted to take exclusive control of the newly liberated territory of Paekche and Koguryŏ. As the conflict came to a head, Tang Taizhong dispatched General Xue Renhui and his army to Silla to take revenge for the Silla's recent attack on a Tang army in old Paekche territory. Before Xue attacked Silla, he sent a letter to demand Silla surrender before the physical conflict. Xue

disparaged the King of Silla for “showing disloyalty by betraying the emperor’s will and showing unfiliality towards King Munmu’s father who had sincerely followed the Tang emperor’s order.”³³⁹

Within this context, Cho includes King Munmu’s response, written by Imgangsū, the king’s secretary, as evidence of a Korean ruler persuasively claiming the autonomy of Korea against China’s desire to control it. The king’s letter insists that it was China’s promise that “pacifies Silla from the invasion of her two neighbors. And it is not the Chinese emperor’s intention to acquire additional land, nor possession of treasures and peoples.” King Munmu leveled an accusation at Tang Taizhong for his ambiguous direction to Silla, one that left Silla in great danger and appealed to the Tang emperor for the false accusations made by the Paekche people.

The letter reminds readers of the friendly relations between the Tang and Silla while claiming that the Tang army, which was besieged in the old Paekche territory by Paekche resistance forces, was saved by Silla at the expense of Silla lives. “For four years,” the letter continues, “Ku Renyuan and his army, while they were born in Han China, their flesh and blood were Silla.” Against the common foe, there was no meaningful division between the two nations. Like the Korean nationalists who gained their subsistence through Chinese support, Cho wanted to stress the historical roots of special bond in Sino-Korean relation.

The idealized Sino-Korean relationship that Cho imagined was challenged by the source itself. Although the letter contains many examples that show Silla’s continuous

³³⁹ 07/26/668, *Samguksagi*, in *Han’guksa DB (DB of Korean History)*, comp. National Institute of Korean History (Kwach’ŏn: Kuksa p’yŏnch’an wiwŏnhoe), http://db.history.go.kr/id/sg_007_0020_0090.

affinity for Tang China, some expressions are unacceptable, especially those that imply an unequal relationship between China and Korea. Cho was reluctant to leave those parts untouched, so he censors them. In the original source, King Munmu of Silla emphasizes the inseparable relation between the Silla and Tang. King Munmu states, “Silla is a part of your country and cannot be separated into two countries. Our wish is to be one family and without affliction for long years ahead.” Because the phrase “a part of your country” had an unacceptable meaning, Cho deletes it.³⁴⁰ The direct expression of Korea’s subordinate status not only troubled Cho, but also became a hot potato for English translators in the twenty-first century.³⁴¹

Cho also intentionally omits the last part of the letter, the signature of the Silla king, because the Tang emperor endowed the Silla king the official title of King Munmu.³⁴² It says, “Submitted by Kim Pömmín, Area Commander-in-Chief of Kyerim (Silla) Prefecture, Grand General of the Left [Militant] (sic) Guard, Commander Unequaled in Honor, Supreme Pillar of State, King of Silla.”³⁴³ Because Silla claimed itself as a Chinese prefecture, Cho could not bear to add it to the *Korean Literary World*, so the book does not include this part.

Excavating Patriotism from the Past: Highlighting Korean Resistance Against

³⁴⁰ Cho Soang, *HM*, 39.

³⁴¹ The English translation has additional expressions in brackets to provide nuance to the phrase and to avoid a direct translation of this problematic issue. “Silla [being] an inseparable ally is [like] (sic) a part of your country [Tang] and cannot be separated into two countries.” Kim Pusik, Edward J. Shultz, and Hugh H. W. Kang, *The Silla Annals of the Samguk Sagi* (Kyōngki-do, Sōngnam: Academy of Korean Studies Press, 2012), 230.

³⁴² 07/04/660, *Samguksagi*, in *Han’guksa DB (DB of Korean History)*, comp. National Institute of Korean History (Kwach’ōn: Kuksa p’yōnch’an wiwōnhoe), http://db.history.go.kr/id/sg_006_0020_0360

³⁴³ 07/26/668, *Samguksagi*, in *Han’guksa DB (DB of Korean History)*, comp. National Institute of Korean History (Kwach’ōn: Kuksa p’yōnch’an wiwōnhoe).

Japanese Invasion

What can we see from the other half of Cho's book, the part that is not from the *Continuous History of Korea*? Cho found that the *Continuous History of Korea* was not enough to show how Koreans stayed loyal to their country and resisted foreign rule. To challenge the popular image of Koreans as puppets of foreign imperial expansion, Cho needed to find more references. The writings and poems that Cho collected focus on loyalty to their lord and Korea's struggle against foreign invasion, particularly from Japan and Manchuria.

Among the 243 works that did not come from the *Continuous History of Korea*, there are thirty poems and other writings that focus on anti-Japanese and anti-Manchurian resistance. These works appear to want to eliminate Japanese pirates and fight against the Manchus. The writings come from famous generals (including Admiral Yi Sunsin) and militia leaders. They include a condolence from the Ming emperor to a Korean general who died during the war against the Manchu invaders.

Cho includes five poems written by Admiral Yi Sunsin (1547–1598), a national hero famous for his victories against Toyotomi Hideyoshi's naval force during Hideyoshi's Invasion of Korea (1592–1598). Cho adds a brief note next to the poem: "During the Imjin [War], he was the naval commander and destroyed Japanese pirates. He built turtle ships, which made him the inventor of the ironclad battleship."³⁴⁴ Alongside Admiral Yi, Cho also includes writings and poems by Cho Hŏn (1544–1592) and Kwak Cheu (1552–1617), famous generals of the Righteous Army (*ũibyong*). Cho Soang includes Cho Hŏn's manifesto to persuade other Koreans to participate in the

³⁴⁴ "Mujae," *HM*, 257.

Righteous Army and eradicate Japanese pirates.³⁴⁵ Kwak Cheu accomplished great victories against Hideyoshi's army through guerilla warfare and was nominated to be a government official; however, Kwak refused to hold a government position as a protest against the factionalism in the court that ruined the government administration.³⁴⁶ Cho Soang includes Kwak's letter to King Sŏnjo (r.1567-1608) that he fought the war not because of his will to obtain an official title in the government, but to protect the dynasty with true loyalty.

Assessing the Historical Impact of the Rise of Japan in East Asia

Another example of writing about the anti-Japanese resistance in Cho's anthology is the "Stele of Great Victory at Immyŏng." It is a great example where Cho shows readers Korea's resistance against foreign invasion. It was Cho who first discovered the stele in Tokyo in 1909; he introduces the inscription in *Taehan hunghakpo*, a famous magazine published by the Korean Association of Promoting Learning (*Taehan hunghakhoe*), under the penname of *Sohaesaeng*.

The short version of the story written in the stele is as follows: During Hideyoshi's Invasion of Korea (1592–1598), King Sŏnjo sent Prince Imhae and Prince Sunhwa to the Hamgyŏng Province to mobilize forces for Korea's defense. However, a petty official of Hoeryŏng County of the Hamgyŏng Province named Kuk Kyŏng'in (?–1592) rose in rebellion and captured the two princes, handing them over to the enemy general Kato Kiyomasa (1562–1611). For this service, Kuk, along with his uncle Kuk Sep'il (?–1592), received the official title from Kato to govern the area. Enraged by such

³⁴⁵ "Towaekyŏk," *HM*, 155.

³⁴⁶ "Sang sŏnjo so," *HM*, 160–162.

a treacherous act, a local literatus, Yi Pungsu (1548–1593), mobilized a militia. There was a local military official named Chŏng Munbu (1565–1624) who was hiding inside the mountain, and after hearing the news about a militia being organized, Chŏng came out and became the commander general of the militia. Meanwhile, making use of the disturbance, the Jurchen (Manchus) invaded the Hamgyŏng Province. The militia, disguising themselves as a voluntary reinforcement to protect Kuk's jurisdiction from northern barbarians, snuck into the seat of Kuk's office and then killed Kuk and reclaimed the county. When Kato came to suppress the militia, being elated with victory, Kato and his army were not prepared and were defeated miserably by the militia's fierce attack at Immyŏng.³⁴⁷ The militia's resistance in the northwestern region put the brakes on Hideyoshi's right wing. Despite their astounding contribution, the Chosŏn heroes of the battle of Immyŏng were not properly acknowledged until the local residents of the Hamgyŏng Province sent a petition to the central government to acknowledge them. After this, the stele was erected in 1709, forty years after the event.³⁴⁸

Cho thought that it was a valuable source because the story not only complimented the Righteous Army's efforts against the Japanese and local collaborators, but also engaged with many aspects of the war, and the stele also served as an example of a plundered national artifact that made Cho realize his duty to reclaim Korea's national history.³⁴⁹ Hamgyŏng Province was the borderland in the northeast, and its main task was to defend the country and regulate the invasions of the northern tribes, especially the Manchus, who were the forefathers of the Qing Empire. The story written on the stele

³⁴⁷ Immyŏng is now a subdistrict of the city of Kimch'ek, northern Hamgyŏng Province, DPRK.

³⁴⁸ Cho Soang indicates that he cited from Pak Ŭnsik's *Painful History of Korea* (*Han'guk t'ongsa*). Cho Soang, *HM*, 151–154.

³⁴⁹ *HM*, 1.

shows how Hideyoshi's Invasion of Korea affected the rise of the Manchus.³⁵⁰

Honoring the Sino-Korean Alliance: The Battle of Sarhu (1619) and Kim Ŭng'ha

Cho Soang also wanted to include stories about the Chinese and Koreans when they fought together against foreign invasion. To reconstruct the image of the Korean people's being aligned with the Han Chinese, Cho includes two writings related to General Kim Ŭng'ha (1580–1619), the best example of the Sino-Korean alliance. Cho cites an epitaph about Kim Ŭng'ha written by Song Siyöl (1607–1689), an influential Confucian scholar in Korea, and a eulogy given by the Ming Wanli Emperor in the *Korean Literary World*.³⁵¹ Kim Ŭng'ha was a Korean general who died during the Chosŏn army's expedition to northeast China with the Ming army to engage in battle with the Manchus. The Ming–Chosŏn allied army defeated the Japanese, but Kim Ŭng'ha died in battle. Kim's epitaph magnifies the valor of Kim right before his death:

“[Although his] sword was broken, and his hand was empty, he fought courageously, but finally died from a spear thrown by enemy . . . the Barbarians (*lu*) were ordered to bury the corpses of both sides, but only general [Kim]'s body did not decay, and the broken grip of [his] sword was yet in his hand.”³⁵²

In the funeral oration by the Wanli Emperor, he writes that he was deeply touched by Kim's righteousness, so he appointed him posthumously as the Earl of Liaodong and

³⁵⁰ Han Myŏnggi et al., *Imjin waeran kwa tong asia segye ŭi pyŏndong* (Seoul: Kyŏngin munhwasa, 2010).

³⁵¹ “Kim Ŭng'ha pimun,” “Pu myŏngshinjong che kimjanggun mun,” in *HM*, 156–158.

³⁵² “Kim Ŭng'ha pimun,” “Pu myŏngshinjong che kimjanggun mun,” in *HM*, 158.

sent his emissary to the gate of Longwan to conduct a memorial funeral. At the end of the funeral oration, Cho adds a postscript to reemphasize his intention in introducing the story of Kim Ŭng'ha:

As I read from other books, [the] Qing had risen from ashes of the two devastated countries with this new momentum. In order to advance to the Central Plain in the future, first of all [Qing] attacked Chosŏn to prevent from being harassed at the rear. The two countries (Ming and Chosŏn) banded together to fight against Japan, but the righteousness cannot hold the ring, so [Ming and Chosŏn] again formed allied forces and fought a great battle in Manchuria. Kim Ŭng'ha became the sole spearhead, died for the two countries. It was proper that Wanli commemorated Kim's righteousness.³⁵³

Here, Cho tries to connect the story, with its anti-Manchu discourse, to China's current loss of its northeastern region when Japan established Manchukuo, a revival of the Manchu Empire. It should be noted that Cho Soang referred to the Manchus as the Qing, not as "barbarians" (*yijŏk* or *lo*). As an introductory remark to Song Siyŏl's inscription of Kim, Cho comments, "Kim Ŭng'ha fought the war against the Qing and died," projecting his identification of the Manchu as Qing instead of using the original historical term. It was not because Cho wanted to avoid using a derogatory term, but rather, he wanted to regard the Manchus in the historical text in the same light as the reemergence of the Manchu state in northeast China in 1932. By switching the term, Cho

³⁵³ "Kim Ŭng'ha pimun," "Pu myŏngshinjong che kimjanggun mun," in *HM*, 158.

addresses both the historicity of Manchukuo and the contemporality of the anti-Manchurian war. Cho believed the source was related to international war history, as he notes in the preface.

Just as Hideyoshi agitated for the expansion of the Manchu people in the seventeenth century, Cho thought that Japan's imperialistic expansion toward the Chosŏn was linked to the disruption in Manchuria and the reemergence of the Manchu empire in northeast China. Cho tried to tell readers who the Chinese's real allies and enemies were.

Combining National History with Personality and Family Genealogy

In his book, Cho tries to combine his family genealogy with the history of Korea. Cho took pride in his family because it had a tradition of loyalty and fidelity. In his memorial service to his great-grandfather, Cho states, "The family motto that our Ham'an Cho clan have preserved for thousands of years is to achieve eminence in loyalty and filial duty, and to protect truth and keep one's place with utmost fairness and excellent sincerity."³⁵⁴ By including his ancestor's poem in the *Korean Literary World*, Cho tries to tie his family into the history of Korean loyalty and to their native ruler and country. The *Korean Literary World* introduces ten poems written by subjects in Chosŏn Korea who stayed loyal to the dethroned King Tanjong (1452–1455).³⁵⁵ The loyal subjects included Cho Ryŏ (1420–1480), an ancestor of Cho Soang.

³⁵⁴ Cho Soang, "Chŭngjo tojŏnggong je osipp'al junyŏn kijin," in *SS*, vol. 2, 164.

³⁵⁵ King Sejo, the uncle of King Tanjong, forced Tanjong to resign, and he became the next king in 1455. The next year, it was discovered that six officials—Sŏng Sammun, Ha Wiji, Yu Ŭngbu, Yu Sŏng'wŏn, Pak Pengnyŏn, and Yi Kae—were plotting to kill Sejo and restore Tanjong to the throne. All six were executed. After the seventeenth century, those six officials were commemorated as symbols of great loyalty in Korean history. There were other loyal subjects, including Cho Soang's forefather Cho Ryŏ, who were not executed but resigned from their positions to protest Sejo's immoral usurpation.

The Reception of the Korean Literary World in China

In 1930, when the fervor of the May Fourth Movement had lessened in China, a group of Chinese intellectuals began to doubt the practicality of simply copying Western civilization. As a result, they searched for a different path toward modernity and rethought their own historical paths and traditions. The literature page of *Dadong bao* (*Dagong bao wenxue fukan*), which introduces Cho's *Korean Literary World* to the Chinese people, was a cultural space where national literature was discussed. This literary section tried to link nation and literature to construct a universal category of national literature. The literature page introduced mainly English, French, and German literature, but other foreign literature, including Cho's work, was also mentioned. The literature page in *Dagong bao* was created in 1928, and Wu Mi (1894–1978), a renowned literary critic and advocate of Chinese national literature, was its first main editor.

Wu Mi was a graduate of Harvard University, earning a BA and MA in comparative literature. After he returned to China, he became the professor of Foreign Literature at Qinghua University and Yanqing University. Outside of the academia, he published his ideas in various media outlets, such as newspapers and academic journals, and to further push his ideas, Wu became the chief editor of the literature page of *Dagong bao*, using it to popularize foreign and comparative literature. Wu compiled and published the *Critical Review* (*Xueheng*), an academic magazine, and began to move his scholarly interest toward the promotion of Chinese national literature. Historian Mou Runsun sees Wu as a scholar who tried to cultivate a Chinese national culture and identity. In his preface to the reprinted version of Wu Mi's *Notes on the Poetry of the Empty Pavilion* (*Kongxuan shihua*), Mou says the following:

After May fourth, those who spoke of the new thought and creating a new culture looked [at] tradition [as] vulgar and discarded it . . . Mr. Wu Mi compiled and published *Critical Review* and solely took [a] different path. Along with the literary pages of *Dagong bao*, *Critical Review* was another important channel [in which] Wu articulated his idea of “old wine in a new bottle.”³⁵⁶

The introduction of Cho’s writing should be understood in the context of the Chinese effort to find their path into modernity. On December 5, 1932, the literature page introduced Liang Shuming’s new book, the *Last Phase of the Chinese Self-Help Movement* (1933). In the book, Liang criticizes both the “road to Western modern democracy” and the “road that Russian communism invented,” suggesting the Chinese develop their own national movement in the rural areas.³⁵⁷ Although Liang’s work did not deal with literature, the book was relevant because of the “national movement” Liang addresses. But because this work discusses the lives of Chinese people, it could be introduced as “literature.” However, the literature page had a skeptical view of the bold statements Liang makes in the book, ones that merely imitate the methods of the Western and Japanese scholars.³⁵⁸ The reviewer, Guo Binhe, who studied at Harvard and was a professor of literature at Qinghua University, makes the following harsh comment about the book: it is only a “part of Japanese Shinagaku, and [Orientalist] Sinology,” which

³⁵⁶ Muo Runsun, “xu,” in Wu Mi, *Kongxuan shihua* (Hong Kong: Longmen shudian, 1967).

³⁵⁷ Liang Shuming, “Muci,” *Zhongguo minzu ziji yundong zhi zuihou juewu* (Shanghai: Zhonghua shuju, 1933).

³⁵⁸ Guo Binhe, “Du liangshuming jinzhu zhongguo minzu ziji yundong zhi zuihou juewu,” *Dagong bao*, December 5, 1932.

means Liang's method and scope were not original to China.

The effort to find a genuine national movement in the literary page of *Dagong bao* is reflected in the discussion of foreign literature. On December 19, 1932, a feature article commemorating Norwegian writer Bjørnstjerne Martinius Bjørnson (1832–1910)—the first Norwegian to receive the Nobel Prize in literature in 1903—was published. Reporter Wu Chonghan cited a large portion of Danish literary critic George Brandes' comments on Bjørnson to show how Bjørnson was received not only in his own country, but also by foreigners. Borrowing Brandes' words:

Outside his country, people all know he is a great poet. Regarding Norway, he is more than this. He not only beautifully described his people's life in novels, poetry, and plays, but he went beyond the ordinary people's life of his country. He and his people are in a very close relationship.³⁵⁹

Bjørnson and his work were highly valued because Bjørnson was the national writer of Norway and was connected to his people, describing the ordinary life of Norwegians in various literary forms. The representation of nationality in literary works was one of the most significant criteria for Brandes, and the Chinese newspaper accepted this point of view.

The same expectation can be found in the review of *Korean Literary World*. For Wu Mi, it was necessary for Chinese readers to rethink the value of the Chinese literary tradition. Wu thought that the most important aspect of literature is showing the spirit of a

³⁵⁹ Wu Chonghan, "Bansheng dancheng bainian jinian," *Dagong bao*, December 19, 1932.

nation, and he believed that this was done well in Cho's anthology. Wu Mi praises Cho's book for three reasons. First of all, Cho's book rediscovered the value of Chinese classical literature. Wu says the following:

Alas! Many of our country[']s people neither love their writing system nor do they know the status and influence of our writing system! By reading Mr. Cho's book, it is startling and awakening. This is the first value of [reading] Korean Literary World... We believe that the spirit of Chinese civilization is truly relying on its expression through [Chinese] writing. Chinese writing, a "creation of a genius Chinese," is powerful as well as beautiful. Among other national writing in the world, it is unique, and European and American scholars have already praised of its value. (This newspaper has already discussed it numerous times.)³⁶⁰

Secondly, readers could now acknowledge the deep and unbreakable relation among Korea, China, and Japan via the sinographic writing system. The sinographic writing system and Chinese characters are not only the life script of Chinese people, but also the origin of the languages of many Asian nations. Some may challenge the originality of the Chinese language because of the obvious influence of Sanskrit, but it is as influential as Greek and Hebrew in Western language.

Thirdly, Wu makes a historical analogy by comparing Western civilization and

³⁶⁰ A similar claim is found in Wu Mi's other work, which is the basis for my assumption that Wu Mi is the author of Cho's book review. "The only resource for national revival and the only basis of solidarity of national mass is in writing system of our own. It is thus Chinese writing (Ch. *Hanwen*), a language how we communicate, learn, describe, and explain . . . Chinese and foreign erudites already discussed and listed its convenience and special merits, so [I] am not using those to mention here." Wu Mi, *Kongxuan shihua*, 71.

Chinese civilization. Wu explains the significance of Greek as lingua franca in the ancient Greek world through the historical examples of Athens and Sparta. One example Wu gives is the Second Messenian War (7C BCE), and the other is the Peloponnesian War (415–413 BCE). When those two Greek tribes were losing in the Second Messenian War, Athenians dispatched Tyrtaeus, a great rhapsodist, to the battlefield. Tyrtaeus composed a war song that raised the morale of the Spartan army, which finally led them to victory.

Although the Athenians were allied to the Spartans during the Second Messenian War, they had fought each other in the Peloponnesian War. When the Athenians had a disastrous loss because of their reckless Sicilian expedition, Sparta captured the defeated Athenian army and held them hostage. The Spartan general planned to execute all of them, but suddenly, the Athenian soldiers began to sing one of Euripides's (c. 480–406 BC) painful and touching tragic lyrics of the ruined Trojan women. It moved the heart of the Spartan general, and the prisoners kept their lives and were sent back to their homeland. After introducing these two episodes, Wu concludes,

“Although we do not fully comprehend the nature of sinographic writing between China and Korea, China and Japan, we can acknowledge that the relationship is very deep and difficult to disconnect. It is the second lesson that *Korean Literary World* is giving to people who can read our language.”³⁶¹

³⁶¹ Wu Mi, “Hanguo zhishi zhaosuang pian Hanguo wen yuan,” *Dagong bao*, December 12, 1932.

The allegory that Wu is trying to make is that a patriotic poet like Tyrtaeus from a neighboring country would set fire to the hearts of the lethargic Chinese people to inspire them to support the nation and fight bravely against the enemy. Wu also hoped that the heartbreaking lyrics from the ruined neighbor, like the tragic lyrics of Euripides, would turn the cold-minded Chinese people and give them the strength to restore peace in East Asia by overcoming the current catastrophe caused by Japanese imperialists and opportunistic Korean vanguards.

Wu thought that through the history of Korean literature and Korea's loss of its past glory and its rise and fall, the Chinese could truly realize the urgent matters that they should make an effort to solve. To reinforce this idea, Wu quotes Cho's preface, "Alas, the system of the country can disappear, but the national spirit from the foundation of a nation cannot be extinguished. How bitter and painful are Mr. Cho's words of 'getting the fish and forgetting the trap'?" Here, the civilization of Korea was demolished, and the Korean national spirit was only left in a handful of writings and poems collected by a Korean exile.

Conclusion

In the same page of the review of Cho's book, the newspaper also included two memorial poems written by Chinese writers. One is "The Song of a Korean Patriot" and the other "Reminding the Memories of the Hongkew Bombing." With these poems, the history of Korea's lost glory is juxtaposed with the recent action of Korea's anti-Japanese struggle. The review resonated with Cho's intention to present Korea's past as a history of uninterrupted genealogy of anticolonial war through Silla's war against the Tang army and the Chosŏn's defiance against Japanese and Manchu invasion.

Going back to the beginning of this chapter, we see that the U.S. ambassador in China knew about the factionalism among the Korean organizations in China and Russia and the relatively weak position of the KPG among them. Without a centralized organization that truly represented the Korean people, the U.S. did not want to prompt Soviet Russia and any Korean organization under her influence by hastily complying with the KPG. The answer was clear to the U.S. ambassador: if there was no unified government among the Korean people, the U.S. could not recognize Korea's place in the postwar reconstruction plan. Korea could not be an independent nation.

The gesture of recognizing Korea's legitimacy of national independence eventually came from China. Two months later in March 1943, Sun Ke (1891–1973), the son of Sun Yat-sen and the Chairman of the Chinese Parliament, officially recognized the KPG as the only legitimate government of the Korean people and requested the immediate independence of Korea.³⁶² The discussion of Korea's independence after the end of World War II eventually came out in the Cairo Conference, which was held by the leaders of China, the U.S., and Great Britain, in their plan for making the postwar political order after breaking up the Japanese wartime empire into their original pieces:

...The Three Great Allies are fighting this war to restrain and punish the aggression of Japan. They covet no gain for themselves and have no thought of territorial expansion. It is their purpose that Japan shall be stripped of all the islands in the Pacific which she has seized or occupied since the beginning of the

³⁶² “Chungguk Ipbŏpwŏn wŏnjang son kwa ŭi imjŏng sŭng'in palŏn” in *Han'guksa DB (DB of Korean History)*, comp. National Institute of Korean History (Kwach'ŏn: Kuksa p'yŏnch'an wiwŏnhoe), http://db.history.go.kr/item/level.do?levelId=ij_026_0010_00070.

first World War in 1914, and that all the territories Japan has stolen from the Chinese, such as Manchuria, Formosa, and The Pescadores, shall be restored to the Republic of China. Japan will also be expelled from all other territories which she has taken by violence and greed. The aforesaid three great powers, mindful of the enslavement of the people of Korea, are determined that in due course Korea shall become free and independent.

The declaration did not include Korea as a former territory of China, unlike other territories such as Taiwan or Manchuria. However, this gesture does not explain the GMD's postwar plan to shed influence over the Korean peninsula. Even though the GMD did not negotiate with the U.S., it did not wholeheartedly agree with U.S.'s vision for putting Korea under U.S. command.³⁶³

Confronted with the crisis of Korean nationalism, Cho Soang transformed textual authenticity into textual legitimacy in his book the *Korean Literary World*. As a diplomat of the Korean exile government and ideologue of the Korean independence party, Cho relied on the authenticity of Korea's past distilled through the evidential studies of the eighteenth century to find evidence of Korea's true national identity and reclaim Korea's rightful place in the modern, colonizing world. Although this textual criticism enabled Cho to create an anthology of Korea's genuine voice from the past, the Sino-centric worldview embedded in the source troubled twentieth-century Korean nationalists who

³⁶³ For further details of China's Korea question under terms of Sino-U.S. diplomatic negotiations during WWII, see Xiaoyuan Liu, *Recast All Under Heaven: Revolution, War, Diplomacy, and Frontier China in the 20th Century* (New York: Continuum, 2010), 39–62; Xiaoyuan Liu, "Sino-American Diplomacy over Korea during World War II," *The Journal of American-East Asian Relations* 1, no. 2 (1992): 223–64; Ku Daeyeol, "China's Policy toward Korea during World War II: Restoration of Power and the Korean Question," *Korea Journal* 43, no. 4 (2003): 215–239.

were seeking an autonomous historical path for the Korean nation.

By excavating and refining the genealogy of Sino-Korean relations, Cho constructed a history of the Sino-Korean alliance and converted it into the political legitimacy of the anti-imperialistic struggle on the eve of the second Sino-Japanese War (1937–1945). A Chinese local newspaper resonated with Cho's effort to transform national history to a platform of anticolonial war. Arranging the review with the Korean anthology alongside memorial poems of the recent Hongkew Bombing Incident by Korean patriot Yun Ponggil, *Dagong bao* echoed Cho's historic-political writing. The *Korean Literary World* was appropriated in Chinese discourse in a somewhat different way. It mainly functioned as fuel for Chinese national pride and mobilizing an ideology to solve the crisis defined by the GMD and nationalist intellectuals, but it also served as a vehicle to convey the idea of Korea's cultural and political independence to Chinese readers. Writing Korea's history was a response to the need for a solid foundation for nationalist thought and solidarity. Cho's the *Korean Literary World* was clearly pursuing this goal. Nonetheless, the investigation of historical sources is a process of disclosing multiple layers of historiographical strata that hardly fit into the modern foundations of a nationalist mythology.

Conclusion

This chapter will provide a summary of the previous chapters' conclusions, connecting the stories and arguments together into one cohesive thread. The argument in this dissertation revolves around the Chinese influence over Korea's encounter with the modern world and also on the rise of Korean nationalism in the context of the cultural interaction between the Chinese and Korean people. In the conclusion, I suggest how such a historical argument can support the construction of a regional history of East Asia as an approach for examining the political tension in East Asia that has been caused by historical disputes. The current study has produced a method for developing a true regional understanding of regional history. Although I have criticized the Japan–Korea focus in modern Korean historiography, in this chapter provides nuanced understanding of Japan's role in modern Sino-Korean relations. My work demonstrates the significance of these relations in terms of revisiting well-known figures of Korean nationalism in the transnational context, which opens up paths for future research.

Although Chinese media in the early twentieth century was the historical medium of a transnational connection, the technology that exists today grants access to other views via news media, SNS, and automated translation, which has expanded readership beyond the three East Asian countries that have engaged in this historical dispute. Although the historical contexts differ, we can see efforts to create similar patterns, each for distinct purposes. Instead of relying on nationalism, the cultural interaction was directed at providing mutual assistance in creating civil societies in East Asia.

New Wine in Old Bottles

The current study enriches the understanding of Korea's intellectual and cultural transformation in the early twentieth century through the examination of Korea's interactions with China. Sino-Korean relations had a long-lasting influence on Korea's interactions with the West. This research was based on the premise that the Western impact was a major source of Korea's modernization, which began in the late nineteenth century, with an emphasis on China's role in this process. Further, the focus was on examining how this shaped Korea's unique experience of modernity.

Was China a model for Korean modernity? The conclusion derived from this dissertation is that the intellectual and cultural interactions between Korea and China were constantly changing with the historical context, but despite these changes, the interactions consistently played a significant role in Korea's modernity. The existing scholarship on Korean modernity tends to regard the rupture solely as the result of new challenges presented from the outside world, failing to explain the lasting aspects of the culture and society. Contrary to such scholarship, which underscores how Korea's experience differed before and after this period, this dissertation has emphasized how such a new experience was possible for the Korean people in familiar ways—envoy missions and book transmissions—which were considered the old ways.

The first half of this dissertation investigated early Sino-Korean relations before the arrival of Western influences through exchange envoys and the modern print culture in Shanghai, which exerted a strong influence on Korea until 1910. The latter half of the dissertation focused on the interactions between Chinese nationalism and Korean nationalism through a study of the politics in Korean nationalistic historical writing and

its reception in China. The rise of Korean nationalism in the 1910s has been generally understood as a response to Japanese colonialism or Wilsonian liberalism. By examining the writing of Korean exiles from the 1910s to the 1930s, Chapter 3 began with the crucial fact that Korean nationalist writings were written on foreign soil—in China. The chapter highlighted how such locality of Korean exiles and their interactions with Chinese people influenced their expression of transnational anti-imperial discourse in their work on Korean history and biography.

Sino-Korean Relations 1860–1880: A Familiar Path to a New Way and Its Legacy

The perceptions of Korean intellectuals in China contributed directly to Korea's change in attitude toward the West, and indeed the world, pushing perspectives far beyond the traditional tributary system and embracing a broader intellectual curiosity and pursuit. The present study shows that Korea's encounter with the new world and its breakaway from what commonly was known as the "traditional world order" was in fact facilitated by Korean envoys to China and the Western books that were translated into Chinese and transmitted to Korea.

According to the conventional understanding, Korea's encounter with the modern world was a passive response to Japan's gunboat policy of 1875, when Korea modernized under Japanese colonial occupation. In other words, Japan has been considered the vehicle of Korea's interaction with the Western world. This dissertation has brought this conventional approach into question and suggested a nuanced approach to understanding the development of modern Korean nationalism. Instead of considering the Japanese imperial enterprise as a modernizing power, I emphasize that the traditional relationship between Qing China and Chosŏn Korea, especially the tributary missions, as being a

prelude to the transformation of traditional patterns in Korea's foreign relations, which I discussed in Chapter 1. The transformation of Qing China through the Self-Strengthening Movement after the losses in both Opium Wars influenced Chosŏn envoys, King Kojong, and their perception of Western imperial powers and Japan's westernization project in the 1860s and 1870s.

In the nineteenth century, the relationship between Chosŏn Korea and Qing China enabled the entrance of foreign information into Korea. Unlike Qing China, which allowed merchants to trade with Qing at Canton, Korea did not have a trading window with the Western world. Edo Japan had Dejima Island, where Dutch merchants could meet the Japanese, but the Chosŏn did not have such a place. However, this does not mean that Korea was a "hermit kingdom." Through a tributary mission to China and Waegwan (Japan House) at Pusan,³⁶⁴ Korea could trade with the world indirectly and access information beyond the East Asian region. In 1868, when foreign relations were closed between Chosŏn Korea and Meiji Japan, Sino-Korean relations were the only window that Chosŏn Korea had to other countries until 1876, when Korea reopened trade with Japan under new terms. This change cannot be explained without King Kojong's decision, which stemmed from the information that Korean envoys brought back from China.

The end of the nineteenth century marked a radical transformation in Korea's foreign relations, but this did not minimize the significance of its relationship with China. Qing China's change of attitude was a significant factor that facilitated Korea's treaty

³⁶⁴ James Lewis's study of the socioeconomic history of Korea-Japan relations during the Chosŏn period challenges the conventional explanation of Korea's relation with the world only within the Sino-centric world order. See James B. Lewis, *Frontier Contact between Chosŏn Korea and Tokugawa Japan* (London and New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003).

with Japan in 1876 and in 1882 with the U.S.³⁶⁵ And yet the country to which Chosŏn Korea sent its first residential consul in 1884 was Qing China. Despite its later development, the rapid increase in the scale and significance of foreign relations between China and Korea led to the creation of Tianjin, another treaty port where Korea's first foreign office was established.³⁶⁶ Tianjin was also a treaty port where most of the Western consulates were located; therefore, it is possible that this locality was a consideration for placing Korea's first foreign consulate there.

The year 1894 marked the end of Korea's tributary missions to China. Then, in 1910, the official diplomatic relationship between China and Korea was discontinued because Korea became Japan's colony, but this does not mean that Sino-Korean relations were severed entirely. For example, trade between Korea and China continued to develop during the Japanese colonial period, although at a lower level than Korea's trade with Japan. Nevertheless, trade between China and Korea remained the second largest throughout the colonial period.³⁶⁷ Moreover, in the late nineteenth century, China had the largest Korean immigrant community. This Korean immigrant community spread in China and became the social basis for Korean nationalist exiles and the main stage for Korea's anticolonial movement, which was the central theme of Chapters 3 and 4.

What enabled Korea's intellectual transformation during the modern period—leading Korean people to proclaim the superiority of Western knowledge over Confucian

³⁶⁵ Kim Key-hiuk, *The Last Phase of East Asian Order: Korea, Japan, and the Chinese Empire, 1860-1882*; Quan Hexiu, *Kŭndae Han-Chung kwan'gyesa ūi chaejom-yŏng* (Seoul: Hyeon, 2007).

³⁶⁶ For preliminary historical research on the Tianjin Korean Consulate, see Han Ch'ŏlho, "Han'guk kŭndae chujin taewŏn ūi p'agyŏn kwa unyŏng (1883-1894)," *Tonghak yŏn'gu* 23 (2007): 45–78.

³⁶⁷ Song Kyujin, *Ilche ha ūi Chosŏn muyŏk yŏn'gu* (Seoul: Koryŏ taehakkyo minjok munhwa yŏn'guwŏn, 2001).

classical canons—cannot be explained without the spread of new knowledge from the West, which was transmitted to Korea in sinographic textbooks. In previous studies, the drastic change in intellectual discourse in early twentieth-century Korea was also understood as a result of either a Western or Japanese direct influence, downplaying the role of sinographic books, which significantly shaped the nationalist discourse in Korea.

After Japan defeated China in the Sino-Japanese War, many considered Japan as the alternative model while China was the victim of modern imperialism. Korean people also consumed these negative images of China as an obsolete empire directly from Japan and via Chinese radical students, who were critical of the Qing government.³⁶⁸ Even after Japan colonized Korea in 1910, sinographic books from China played an important role in the search for ways of colonial education, as seen in the continuous conflict of the ongoing circulation of sinogra[hic books among Korean people under the Japanese colonial authority.

Shanghai—a modern treaty port in China—was the hub that produced voluminous translations of Western and Japanese books and published textbooks based on newly circulating information. The idea of the “rise” of Japan and “fall” of China was also disseminated to Korea via Chinese books after the Sino-Japanese War (1894–1895). This intellectual shift happened because of the massive circulation of sinographic books in Korea until 1910. In fact, many Korean nationalists who emerged during this period were translators of Chinese books and editors of Korean publishing enterprises, which heavily relied on translations of Chinese books. These social experiences as translators and

³⁶⁸ For Meiji Japan’s construction of the image of Qing China as an old, barbaric, and failed nation, see Benjamin Elman, “The ‘Rise’ of Japan and the ‘Fall’ of China after 1895,” in *The Chinese Chameleon Revisited: From the Jesuits to Zhang Yimou* ed. Zheng Yangwen (Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2013), 143–171.

editors of sinographic books from Shanghai reveals why and how Shanghai became the intellectual and cultural mecca of the Korean nationalist movement during the Japanese colonial period.

It was not a coincidence that Shanghai continued to be the hub for Korean nationalists and their nation-building project during the Japanese colonial period. The translation of Chinese books inspired many Korean nationalists, including Kim T'aeg'yŏng, Pak Ŭnsik, and Cho Soang, as discussed in Chapter 2. When Korea was under Japanese colonial occupation, constructing a national history was a significant endeavor for Korean exiles. Pak Ŭnsik and Cho Soang pursued their political activism via historical writing. Both regarded writing on history as the core of building Korea into a modern nation-state. They tried to distil Korean history as the archetype of Korean nationalist thought in response to the teleology of colonial discourse, which shaped the discourse of Korea's past. They found the legitimacy of anticolonial resistance from Korea's history. Chapters 3 and 4 provided textual analyses of Korean nationalism and how they played central roles in the Korean nationalist movement and in the formation of the Korean nation-state after WWII. It is possible to say that the current South Korean government's history rectification project and its origin can be traced back to the thinking of Korean exiles.

“Two Dreams in One Bed”: Rethinking Korea's Cultural Nationalism in China

Korean nationalist thinkers tried to legitimize Korea's anticolonial struggle through Sino-Korean nationalist dialogue and the political impact of Sino-Korean nationalism on East Asia in the twentieth century. Previous studies on the Korean overseas nationalist movement were centered on roughly two themes: the political and

military struggle against the Japanese colonial authority and the political movements to establish the only legitimate government for the Korean people.³⁶⁹ In this respect, the study of Sino-Korean relations during the Japanese colonial period has been aimed at validating whether the social network of Korean and Chinese nationalists contributed to making the independence of Korea. On the contrary, the current dissertation has examined the cultural aspects of the social network of nationalist Korean writers and Chinese editors and readers in Shanghai; moreover, it has shown the significance of modern nationalistic historiography in Korea and China and their transnational exchange. Chinese reformists who criticized and attacked the Qing government persuaded Koreans to change their perceptions of China and Japan. For example, Pak and Cho were active readers of Chinese texts, which they applied to the Korean context. This made it easy for them to blend in with Chinese intellectuals and take part in the patriotism movement via publications in Korea. Pak and Cho also shared the cultural code used by modern Chinese intellectuals, especially Kang Youwei and Liang Qichao, but their altered view of China and Japan did not mean wholehearted acceptance of Japanese colonial rule over Korea as a civilizing power, which had ultimately led Pak and Cho to flee to China.

The development of modern Korean nationalistic historiography cannot be fully understood as a result of the intellectual interactions between the colonizer and the colonized, which has been the conventional framework for understanding postcolonial writing on history. Because the Korean independence movement relied heavily on Chinese support, Korean nationalistic historiography had to develop a complicated

³⁶⁹ See Chong-Sik Lee, *The Politics of Korean Nationalism*; Institute of Korean Independence Movement Studies ed., *The History of the Korean Independence Movement* (Chŏn'an: The Independence hall of Korea, Institute of Korean independence movement studies, 2014).

interpretation of past Sino-Korean relations. That is, certain aspects of nationalist claims were amplified or silenced as a social product of the interactions between Korean writers and Chinese readers. For example, for Korean nationalists, foreign invasion was not an uncommon topic, especially when addressing a Chinese audience. The narrative of struggle against foreign invasion was a convenient historical departure to create nationalistic discourse. In particular, Koreans often likened Ming China's struggle against Japanese invasion and Manchu conquest to their historical fate and employed such comparisons as a source of historical sympathy to appeal to Chinese readers with anti-Japanese sentiments. Because Korean exiles were asking for help with gaining national independence, their nationalist literature often depicted China as a source of aid and support, even repeating some of the traditional Confucian rhetoric that depicted China as an "older brother."

From the perspective of Chinese intellectuals, such as Sun Yat-sen and many Chinese revolutionaries upon whom Korean nationalists relied, imagined the creation of a full-fledged Chinese modern state through regaining its political hegemony over what had been considered Chinese territory and tributary states, like Korea. Even though China never became a Japanese colony as Korea did, China's status under an unequal treaty with imperial powers, including Japan, enabled the Chinese people to agree with Sun Yat-sen's description of China as a "hyper-colony." In addition to territorial claims of restoring China's traditional empire, the colonial discourse was connected to the Social Darwinism, which upheld the principle of the "survival of the fittest," and somehow, the anticolonial claims were often mixed with imperial desire. This was clearly addressed in mixed, confuting Chinese attitudes toward Korea's anticolonial struggle. On the one

hand, Chinese people supported the cause because they viewed Koreans as victims and sympathized with them. On the other hand, there were assumptions that China's sovereign power could be legitimated only if they could colonize others, including Korea. This was the dilemma which Korean writers who lived in exile confronted in their anticolonial writing—a double layer of colonial discourse.

Little scholarly attention has been paid to Kim T'aeg'yŏng, Pak Ŭnsik, and Cho Soang's transnational network with Korean nationalists and Chinese intellectuals and its significance for his nationalist thought and activities, as well as the fact that his wide readership included a large Chinese audience. I have shown that it was the international interaction that Pak enjoyed in Shanghai that allowed him to shape Korea's colonization as a result of national failure, not solely because of Japanese colonial policy. The analysis of the An Chunggŭn biographies in Chapter 3 revealed how and why such a story gained popularity in China. With a close examination of other authors in the same magazine and others' works that were disseminated in different print media, the context of the text shows an awareness of Chinese people's concerns about their own national problems and imperialism and an attempt to shift such concern toward a dynamic, international, and anticolonial struggle.

Korean Modernity via China: Perspectives and Limits

This dissertation has acknowledged the significance of the Chinese influence and Korea's interactions with China in understanding Korea's modern path, however, this neither minimizes the centrality of the Korean people and their voice nor neglects the impact of Japanese colonialism on Korea. Rather, this research addresses the need to understand the intellectual and cultural transformations in the twentieth century in a more

nuanced way by considering the dialectic and multilateral networks outside the conventional framework, which emphasizes bilateral relations between the Japanese empire and colonial Korea.

Although this research investigated China's influence on Korea's change in attitude toward Western countries in four different modes of intellectual interaction—envoy brush talks (Chapter 1), circulation of Sinographic books in Korea (Chapter 2), biographies of An Chunggŭn in China (Chapter 3), representation of Korean sinographic literature in China (Chapter 4), it did not chart the entire map of cultural and intellectual history of Sino-Korean relation in the period following 1876. Instead of covering the whole period, the focus of the research was on showing how the old ways could transmit new information that would ultimately break the old ways. Accordingly, I limited the variables to a period when there were no new ways of communication.

Therefore, the findings of the current study also suggest avenues for further research on the cultural exchange between Chosŏn Korea and Qing China. In the 1880s, when Qing China began to subsume Chosŏn Korea as a dependent state through a modern international treaty, there was no space for the Korean people to address the rhetoric of the Sino-Korean alliance. The regulation of land and maritime trade between the Qing and Chosŏn in 1882 marked a shift in Qing policy and initiating active interference in Korea. Korea was no longer a buffer against foreign threats or allies; it had become a suzerain that represented the sovereign power under Qing modern imperialism. The regency of Yuan Shikai in Korea from 1884 to 1894 propelled Qing China's interference in Korea's domestic and foreign policies to an unprecedented level. Moreover, Yuan Shikai's regency has been regarded as interfering in Korea's

modernization.³⁷⁰ After Japan's victory over Qing China in the Sino-Japanese War (1894–1895), the Japanese created the self-image of a modern power and depicted the Chinese and Koreans as colonized and uncivilized. These images influenced Koreans to reverse their opinion of Qing China.³⁷¹

Indeed, increasing trade and commerce drastically changed the scope of Korea's interactions with the world. The significance of such change cannot be underestimated. However, the old ways of communication between Korea and China still existed, and Korea's new relations with other countries did not mean the end of old systems. What this dissertation has addressed is a transition—not an abrupt change but rather a process that must be examined from a larger historical scope. Great Korean thinkers cannot be separated from the books they read—namely, sinographic books from China. This study shows that the great thinkers of modern Korea were often in line with the Japanese colonial discourse, which was influenced by the sinographic books they read.

Nonetheless, further investigations into the ways in which colonialists and nationalists diverged should be conducted. The impact of socialism on the Korean nationalist movement and the movement's interaction with Chinese intellectuals remain under-studied. Socialist groups published many magazines as well, which should also be analyzed to understand the interactions between Chinese and Korean socialism and its lasting cultural legacy in cultural diplomacy between the People's Republic of China and

³⁷⁰ Kirk Larsen refutes this conventional way of interpretation the Qing's intervention as a debacle for Korea's modernization. See Kirk Larsen, *Tradition, Treaties, and Trade: Qing Imperialism and Chosŏn Korea, 1850-1910* (Cambridge: Harvard University Asia Center, 2008), 128–163.

³⁷¹ Kyuhyun Kim, "The Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895) - Japanese National Integration and Construction of the Korean 'Other,'" *International Journal of Korean History* 17, no. 1(2012): 1–27.

Democratic People's Republic of Korea during the Cold War era.

The interaction between Chinese and Korean intellectuals initiated the construction of a particular view of the historical relations between China, Japan, and Korea, which can be shared beyond the narratives that are bound to modern national borders. Although scholars have considered the Chinese Northeast History Project as a new endeavor, it is much older, and Korea's response to it is also much older. The historical dispute in East Asia is a modern one³⁷² that can be traced back a century. Therefore, there is a need to build up the regional history within a broader scope of research.

The Politics of Domestic Conditions Shaping the Outside World

This dissertation also points out that the domestic conditions in Korea played a crucial role in determining the scale of Chinese influence. The books imported from China led to the dominance of Japanese influence over the modern culture in Korea. In other words, although the material and social effects of books were maintained, the intellectual and cultural influence of Chinese culture significantly faded because Chinese books advocated for Japanese culture as the model of modernity. Chinese books were a source of intellectual affinity for Japan, as well as a source of Korea's claim for independence.

The difference between Chapters 1 and 2 is the change in the Chosŏn government's attitude toward information gathered from China. During until 1870s, which is the main timeframe covered in Chapter 1, the Chosŏn government in the

³⁷² Baogang He and David Hundt, "A deliberative approach to northeast Asia's contested history," *Japanese Journal of Political Science* 13, no. 1 (2012): 37–58.

nineteenth century was reluctant to accept change, until King Kojong initiated foreign policy change in line with claiming his personal rule. The 1890s was the decisive moment of intellectual and cultural change when, the Chosŏn government started Kabo reformation and introduced new information from China by importing books. Contrary to previous studies maintaining that the spread of Japanese colonialism in Korea was a direct result of the flow of Japanese material culture, the current study reveals the story of sinographic book culture mediating the intellectual shift to Japanese dominance from Chinese dominance over Korean culture. Chapter 2 emphasizes the continuity of the premodern route of book transfer as a significant source of intellectual change in Korea. As stated above, ironically, sinographic books were the source of both intellectual affinity for Japan and Korea's claim for independence. In other words, China served as a window to Korea's encounter with the new era and was the key factor that constructed the basis of such contradictory nationalist discourse and colonial discourse. However, this was always mediated by domestic conditions and other external factors.

Sino-Japanese Relations: An Inverse Proportion to Sino-Korean Relations

An important feature of the history of modern Sino-Korean friendship discourse is the strong political ties between China and Korea. Because of the existence of difficult diplomatic relations, there can be little space to discuss the friendship between them. Specific political conditions, such as a common external threat, brought about the Sino-Korean friendship discourse. In this respect, it is also important to critically deconstruct the historic claim of the Sino-Korean friendship discourse in a close reading of the political context of the time when this discourse was produced.

The Chinese Revolution of 1911, which resulted in the Qing monarchy being

overthrown and the republic being established, transformed Korean exiles into exemplary revolutionaries because many of them participated in the revolution. The insecurity of the Chinese under the newly established republican government influenced Kim T'aeg'y ŏng and Pak Ŭnsik to write a history of Korea as a narrative of overcoming a national crisis that could be shared with both Koreans and Chinese readers in their search for a modern political entity and as a means of confronting the threat of foreign imperialism. Japanese imperialism in China after World War I also affected Chinese patriotism, which enabled Korean exiles to criticize Japanese imperialism. However, the complex intertextual and paratextual history of the writings of Korean exiles that I discussed in Chapters 3 and 4, including the disruption of Yuan Shikai's government and the subsequent era of the decentralization of power in China by warlords, made such political and ideological support short-lived.

Sino-Korean Friendship and Pan-Asianism: Difference and Connections

There is an obvious similarity between the Sino-Korean friendship discourse and Pan-Asianism. It is also possible to draw a connection between the two, not only for their rhetorical similarity, but also regarding the efforts of Korean figures, such as Kang Wi, who was involved in Sino-Korean relations and Japanese–Korean relations. Kang Wi was a member of a tributary mission and participated in the Pan-Asian movement in Japan as a member of the Rising Asia Society (Kōakai) in 1882. It is plausible that there can be no separation of Kang Wi's later career of promoting the Korea–Japan relationship under Pan-Asianism from his discussions with Chinese officials. The Pan-Asian theory aimed at positioning Japan as the leader of this alliance within a racial identity defined by a skin

color that differed from that of Westerners.³⁷³ Although Qing officials advised Chosŏn envoys to sign a treaty with Japan, they did not mean submitting to Japanese rule. After Japan's military occupation of Ryukyu, China's negative attitude toward Japan's true intention behind the rhetoric of Pan-Asianism persisted. Contrary to the Qing officials who were critical of Japan's Pan-Asianism, revolutionaries such as Sun Yat-sen regarded Pan-Asianism as a means of mobilizing international support, especially from Japan, to secure China's sovereignty against Western imperialism. Because of Sun's close connection to Japan and his ambiguous attitude toward Japanese colonialism in Korea, many Koreans lost trust in Chinese revolutionaries.³⁷⁴

Reemergence of a Common Threat and Sino-Korean Friendship Discourse in the 1930s

The next phase of nationalism in the 1930s cannot be understood without considering the reemergence of Japanese imperial expansion in the 1930s. Cho Soang used the Chinese fear of Japanese expansion to reintroduce Sino-Korean mutual nationalism into the Chinese discussion of anti-imperialism. Korean nationalists felt an urgent need to raise concern over Korea's position between China and Japan. The Manchurian Incident in 1931 and Yun Ponggil's bombing of Japanese generals in 1932 created an opportunity for Korean nationalists to boost their popularity. It was also a time

³⁷³ For a discussion of the Japanese root of Pan-Asianism in the 1880s and its impact on East Asia, see Vladimir Tikhonov, "Korea's First Encounters with Pan-Asianism Ideology in the Early 1880s," *The Review of Korean Studies* 5, no. 2 (2002): 195–232; Sven Saaler and Christopher W. A. Szpilman, "Introduction; The Emergence of Pan-Asianism as an Ideal of Asian Identity and Solidarity, 1850–2008," in Sven Saaler, Christopher W. A. Szpilman, *Pan-Asianism: A Documentary History* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2011), 1–42.

³⁷⁴ For discussion on Koreans' critical view on Sun Yat-sen's Asianism in the 1920s, see Tu-ki Min [Min Tugi], "Sun Yat-sen in Korea: Korean view of Sun Yat-sen's idea and activities in 1920s," *Dong'a munhwa* 30 (1992): 225–241, <http://hdl.handle.net/10371/87678>.

when Chinese nationalist thinkers, such as Dai Jitao and Liang Shuming, began to develop a nationalistic discourse, arguing that China should reject the Western model and revisit its own tradition—not as a debacle but as a vehicle of China’s modernity.

Along with the political situation mentioned above, the history of the Sino-Korean alliance against foreign threats became an important theme that legitimized Chinese support for the Korean independence movement and Korea’s participation in the second Sino-Japanese War (1937-1945). Exiled Korean nationalists used history as the ultimate resolution to undertake two tasks. The first was the unification of the Korean nationalist movement under the leadership of the KPG and the second was gaining approval for Korean nationalism as an element of the anti-imperialist struggle in China. This was the peak time when Korean nationalists recast Sino-Korean history from the existing historical source of sinographic literature to claim historical legitimacy of the Sino-Korean mutual friendship. Meanwhile, the spread of different kinds of internationalism—such as socialism and anarchism—also played a significant role in expanding the scope and agenda of an international alliance beyond nationalism. Although the transnational network among socialists and anarchists is beyond the scope of this dissertation,³⁷⁵ it is crucial to understand and combine all movements to better understand the shared rhetoric of the modern Sino-Korean friendship beyond the nation-state narrative.

Japanese colonial expansion during the 1930s provided a crucial context of China’s turn toward the Korean independence movement. During the 1920s, Japanese colonial expansion had had little effect on China. Moreover, the Chinese GMD was

³⁷⁵ Robert A. Scalapino and Chong-sik Lee, *Communism in Korea*; Dongyoun Hwang, *Anarchism in Korea: Independence, Transnationalism, and the Question of National Development, 1919-1984* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2016).

reluctant to support Korean nationalist, because it may interfere the amicable relation between the Chinese GMD government and Japanese government. However, the breakout of the Sino-Japanese War allowed the Chinese GMD to abandon their relation with Japanese government and began to mobilize anti-Japanese sentiment from its population. For this reason, showing support for Korean independence activists and their anticolonial activities gave the Chinese audience what it wanted to see. There was no space for Sino-Korean relations without the threat of Japanese colonial expansion; this external threat was a precondition of cultural and political contact between Korea and China.

Cold War in East Asia: Ideological Reorientation of the Sino-Korean Friendship, 1949–1992

After World War II ended and the Cold War in East Asia began, questions were raised as to the relevance of the Sino-Korean friendship discourse for nation-building. The Chinese Civil War (1949) not only divided the land and people, but also the historical legitimacy of the state. The Korean War (1950–1953) also resulted in two Koreas on the Korean Peninsula. With such an intense ideological division, the central theme of the nation-building discourse was based on an ideological rivalry, not historical legitimacy. Similarly, the emphasis on a shared history did not serve the state discourse that divided the country not by its culture, but rather by its ideological orientation. Therefore, this was a period characterized by the imposition of anticommunism as the central discourse defining Sino-Korean relations. The existence of two Chinese states and two Korean states made it difficult to address cultural bonds, which may also have included ideologically unacceptable counterparts.

After Korea was liberated on August 15, 1945, the U.S. Army occupied the Korean Peninsula and established a military government below the 38th parallel, while the Soviet Army set up a military government in the northern part of the peninsula. Although this contradicted the Cairo Declaration (1943), which promised Korea's immediate independence as part of the dismantling of the Japanese wartime empire, the U.S., Great Britain, and Soviet Russia had reversed the Cairo Declaration at the Yalta Conference (1945) and decided to control occupied territories under trusteeship, intending to protect their existing rights in colonies in Africa and Asia. This allowed Korea's direct contact with the U.S. Meanwhile, the Korean nationalists who returned to Korea after the liberation failed to gain political hegemony in South Korea. Syngman Rhee was elevated to power with the support of the U.S., while Kim Ku, who had led the KPG, returned to Korea, but did not gain political hegemony. Furthermore, Rhee did not like Chiang Kai-shek's China because of its support for Kim Ku.

When Chiang Kai-shek visited Korea in August 1949, he continued to claim there was a Sino-Korean friendship by considering South Korea as the successor of the KPG. In his speech, Chiang said, "The liberation of Korea was inseparable from the Chinese revolution," and "patriots in both countries should well understand that our situations are as similar as one's hands or feet." The ultimate proposal was not for Sino-Korean friendship, however, but for the organization of a Pacific alliance against communism. China was divided into communist China and "free China" (Ch. *Ziyou Zhongguo* K. *Chayu Chungguk*). This clearly drew a line between the anticommunist Chinese that Koreans could associate with and those who followed another cultural code. Therefore, the cultural rhetoric was reduced to anticommunist claims, leaving no space for South

Koreans to address any of the cultural affinity between Korea and China.

While the Chinese GMD conducted secret diplomatic efforts to place Korea under its influence, publicly, there was an interest in raising awareness about Korea, which truly shaped the direction of diplomatic efforts, but at the public discourse level, Chinese thinkers paid close attention to legitimacy and the issues of international norms that caused no conflict with others. The deepening of the cultural understanding of Korea and using such sophisticated understanding as a legitimate claim to become involved in Korean affairs continued until the emergence of “two Chinas”—the two regimes on opposite sides of the Taiwan Strait—and the outbreak of the Korean War (1950–1953). In the context of divided Chinas and Koreas, the heavy emphasis on cultural affinity was too sensitive an issue to delve into. The ideological inclinations of four countries prohibited discussion on the issue until 1992.

Recasting Sino-Korean Relations in the Post-Cold War Era (1992)

While acknowledging the need for further study on the intellectual and cultural interaction between PRC and North Korea from the 1950s to contemporary era, the rest of the chapter discuss the reemergence of cultural bond between PRC and South Korea since the end of the Cold War, especially between the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and South Korea in 1992, when they reopened the window to address the cultural bond and friendship as common goal for national prosperity.

The end of the Cold War marked a new phase in ROK–PRC relations in terms of survival in global competition, which resembled the period about a century before. The increase in cultural and economic exchanges between the PRC and South Korea greatly enhanced their mutually positive perceptions, but these perceptions were blind to the

political issues between the two states. The visit of the PRC's President Xi Jinping to South Korea in 2014 marked the peak of positive relations between the countries. During his lecture at Seoul National University on July 4, Xi emphasized the history of the Sino-Korean friendship by using a Chinese idiom, "*Xiang ru yi mo*" ("When the well dried up, the fish moisturized each other with their saliva")³⁷⁶ and added that "[China and Korea] helped each other even in their most difficult times." He cited historical figures, such as a Ming general during Hideyoshi's invasion of Korea; Kim Ku, the former president of the KPG in China; and Chong Yulsŏng (1914–1976 *ch. Zheng Lücheng*), the composer of the "March of the Chinese People's Liberation Army," the official anthem of the Chinese Liberation Army. In the same year, the An Chunggŭn Memorial Museum opened in Harbin to commemorate the Korean patriot who assassinated the founding father of the modern Japanese state, accusing him of being an imperial invader, which antagonized Japan.³⁷⁷ The PRC used the history of struggle against imperial Japan to address the ongoing PRC–Japan territorial dispute as an extension of historical precedents set by Japanese expansionism against Chinese national interests.

In September 2015, South Korean President Park Geun-hye visited the historic site of the KPG in Huangpu District, Shanghai, which housed the KPG from 1926 until 1932, to celebrate its renovation commemorating the seventieth anniversary of China's victory in the Second Sino-Japanese War (1937–1945) and Korea's liberation from Japanese colonial rule (1910–1945). Former members of the Korean independence

³⁷⁶ "Chinese leader, underlining ties to South Korea, cites Japan as onetime mutual enemy," *New York Times*, July 4, 2014. <https://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/05/world/asia/in-south-korea-chinese-leader-cites-japan-as-onetime-mutual-enemy.html>; Full Korean translation of Xi Jinping's lecture is available at: <http://www.ajunews.com/view/20140807151946465>.

³⁷⁷ "Japan protest over Korean assassin Ahn Jung-geun memorial in China," *BBC News*, January 20, 2014. <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-25808437>.

movement were also in attendance, making it a national ceremony. However, it was also an international ceremony, with Chinese ambassador to South Korea Qiu Guohong and Shanghai Mayor Yang Xiong attending to make the event a symbol of PRC–ROK relations. After the Hongkew bombing occurred, which had been plotted by Kim Ku, the leader of the KPG, the French concession no longer stopped the Japanese from arresting KPG members. However, this incident was also a pretext for the KPG to receive better means of support from Chiang Kai-shek and the Nanjing government. Shanghai was the symbolic place for the Sino-Korean anti-colonial struggle in the past century.

“Shanghai has a historical link with Korea,” said Mayor Yang at the ceremony. He continued by stating that the KPG building in Shanghai had witnessed the solidarity of the two peoples in fighting for freedom from Japanese occupation. Yang said that this site would become a shared memory of the two nations, instill the spirit of patriotism, and build faith in peace in the future. In response, President Park thanked the PRC government for preserving the historic building and shared her hope that this historic site would carry on the patriotic spirit of the Korean independence fighters and inspire national pride in all Korean people.³⁷⁸

However, during the PRC–ROK summit meeting in Hangzhou on September 5, 2016, Chinese President Xi Jinping used the four-character idiom, “Yin shui su yuan” (K. *ŭmsusawŏn* 飲水思源), which means, “When you drink, consider where it comes from.”³⁷⁹ This is from a poem written by the Chinese poet Yu Xin (513–581 BCE). This

³⁷⁸ “Park Geun-hye visits building of ROK government in exile” *Shanghai Daily*, September 5, 2017, <https://www.shine.cn/archive/metro/the-vip-gallery/Park-Geunhye-visits-building-of-ROK-government-in-exile/shdaily.shtml>.

³⁷⁹ “Xi Jīn’p’ing ŭm su sa wŏn wae kkonetna” *Yonhap News*, September 5, 2016. <http://www.yonhapnews.co.kr/bulletin/2016/09/05/0200000000AKR20160905125100014.HTML>

was not the first time this idiom had been used to symbolize Sino-Korean relations. In 1992, when the ROK normalized relations with the PRC, descendants of Korean patriots visited the historic sites where their parents had fought for independence. Kim Shin (1922–2016),³⁸⁰ former air force chief of staff, visited Haiyan, near Hangzhou, and erected a stone with that four-character idiom to commemorate the Sino-Korean rapport that enabled the survival of the KPG and its important agents, especially his father, Kim Ku (1876–1936), the president of the KPG. Min P'ilho (1898–1963), the secretary of the KPG, wrote the book *Diplomatic History of Sino-Korean Diplomacy (Zhonghan waijiao shihua)*, which was published in the midst of World War II.³⁸¹

In July 2016, American and South Korean military officials agreed to deploy the U.S. Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile defense system inside South Korea to counter North Korea's growing threats and its use of ballistic missiles and nuclear tests. The PRC expressed concerns about the THAAD missile defense system's radar, which even included the interior of China in its range. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi stated that the THAAD missile defense system could jeopardize "China's legitimate national security interests."³⁸² It was in that context that Xi expressed

³⁸⁰ Kim Shin was born in Shanghai, China, but after his birth, he was sent to his father's hometown in Hwanghae Province. In 1933, Kim Shin returned to Shanghai with his grandmother and followed his father. With the support from KMT, Kim Shin entered Sichuan Advanced Junior School and entered Kunming Xian University as a philosophy major. Kim entered the Air Force Academy and trained with another Chinese pilot and was later trained in the U.S. for the infiltration operation. After the liberation, Kim Shin came to Korea and became one of the founding members of the Korean military. Kim Shin became the air force chief of staff, and after retirement, he became the minister of transportation and Korean ambassador to the Republic of China. Interestingly, Kim Shin was a member of Yusin Chong'uhoe, the legislative body of Park Chung Hee's dictatorship in the 1970s.

³⁸¹ Sin Kyusik kwa Han-Chung kwan'gye kukche haksul hoeüi ed, *Sin Kyusik, Min P'irho wa Han-Chung kwan'gye* (Seoul: Nanam Ch'ulp'an, 2003).

³⁸² "China cites concerns on U.S. missile defense system in South Korea" *Reuters*, February 25, 2016.

uneasiness about South Korea's decision to go against China's security interests. After the deployment of this missile defense system, the PRC government imposed punitive measures on South Korea; the PRC's retaliatory policy on trade and tourism between PRC and South Korea also marked the low point of Sino-Korean relations as a result of anti-Korean sentiment.³⁸³

The future of Sino-Korean relations is still unclear. It is possible that these relations will continuously change, and this change will also affect how China influences Korea's domestic and foreign policies based on the changing interpretation of the complex past between China and Korea. As Paek Yöngsö suggests, a historical study of Sino-Korean relations and their intellectual and cultural effects should assist in constructing civil society with a long-term perspective on Sino-Korean relations with an emphasis on non-state actors.³⁸⁴ This can involve adopting a regional and transnational approach that will shed light on various historical subjects and their interactions beyond the nation-state level, showing how such cases offer lessons to the emerging civil societies of East Asia.

<https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-china-north-korea/china-cites-concerns-on-u-s-missile-defense-system-in-south-korea-idUSKCN0VY2C9>.

³⁸³ "South Korean stores feel China's wrath as U.S. missile system is deployed" *New York Times*, March 9, 2017. https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/09/world/asia/china-lotte-thaad-south-korea.html?_r=0.

³⁸⁴ The essay "Yöksajök kwanjöm esö pon Han Chung kwankye 25 nyön" (Sino-Korean Relations in the Past 25 Years from a Historical View) is a result of a private contract for research project on behalf of Ministry of the Interior and Safety in South Korea. Although this essay does not directly address the South Korean government's points of view, it does reflect the consensus among current academic discussion that will feed into decision making in South Korea's government. I cite this copyrighted public record from *On-nara chöngch'aek yön'gu* (<http://www.prism.go.kr/>) under the terms and conditions of the regulation of Korea Open Government License (KOGL). Paek Yöngsö, "Yöksajök kwanjöm esö pon Han-Chung kwankye, http://www.prism.go.kr/homepage/theme/retrieveThemeDetail.do?leftMenuLevel=110&cond_br m_super_id=NB000120061201100059686&research_id=1262000-201700008.

Appendix

Taedong sŏgwan's List of Sinographic Books Imported from Shanghai 1906

Book Title 書目	Author/Editor 原著者/編者	Tranlsator 譯者	Location 出板地	Publisher 出版社	Year 年度
國民讀本					
小學讀本			東京	文部省, 博文館	1873, 1903-4
世界讀本	池辺義象 (1864-1923)		東京	弘文館	1902, 1905
普通新智識讀本					
蒙學讀本全書	無錫三等公學堂		上海	文明書局	1906
女子新讀本	楊千里		上海	文明書局	1906
尋常小學讀本			上海	文部省, 博文館	1887, 1905-6
蒙學修身教科書	莊俞		上海	文明書局	1906
蒙學經訓修身教科書	陸基		上海	文明書局	1906
蒙學文法教科書					
蒙學漢文教科書					
文學初階	杜亞泉		上海	商務印書館	1902
蒙學西洋歷史教科書					
蒙學東洋歷史教科書					
蒙學萬國地理教科書					
蒙學生理教科書	丁福保 (1874-1952)		上海	文明書局	1906
蒙學衛生教科書	華循		上海	文明書局	1905
蒙學植物教科書					
蒙學動物教科書	華循		上海	文明書局	1904
蒙學礦物教科書					
蒙學天文教科書	錢承駒		上海	文明書局	1904

蒙學地文教科書			上海	文明書局	1903
蒙學地質教科書	錢承駒		上海	文明書局	1904
蒙學格致教科書	錢承駒		上海	文明書局	1904
蒙學化學教科書					
初等物理教科書					
初等理化學新編					
博物學大意					
蒙學毛筆習畫帖					
蒙學鉛筆習畫帖					
蒙學習字帖各種					
蒙學算術教科書					
蒙學珠算教科書	董瑞椿		上海	文明書局	1903
蒙學體操教科書					
蒙學世界地圖					
高等小學漢文讀本					
高等小學理科教科書					
高等小學西洋歷史教科書					
高等小學地理教科書	張元濟(1867-1959); 謝洪賚		上海	商務印書館	1906
高等小學博物教科書					
高等小學生理教科書					
高等小學衛生教科書					
高等小學遊戲法教科書					
理化學大意					
高等小學幾何學教科書					
高等小學萬國地理教科書					
倫理教科範本	秋山四郎	董瑞椿	上海	文明書局	1906
修身唱歌書					
小學修身教科書 筆算新法					

筆算新法					
高等小學毛筆習畫帖					
小學體操圖					
中學修身教科書					
中學文法教科書					
商業教本					
修學篇		蔣震方	上海	廣智書局	1902
學生讀書法	西川政憲		上海	廣智書局	1902
中等教育倫理學	中島力造	麥鼎華	上海	廣智書局	1902
中等法律學教科書					
中外故事讀本					
普通商業教科書					
習字範本					
中等倫理教科書					
中等世界地理教科書					
中等地理教科書					
東西洋歷史教科書					
最新代數學教科書	武昌中东书社编辑部		武昌		1904
最新實驗化學					
學校遊戲法					
生理學教本					
普通動物學教科書					
新撰博物學教科書					
中等博物教本					
名學教科書		楊蔭杭	上海	文明書局	1903
中學文粹全編					
萬國史綱	元良勇次郎(1858-1912); 家永 豐吉 (1863-1936)	邵希雍	上海	商務印書館	1903

代數學					
平面幾何學					
立體幾何學					
計學					
熱學					
力學					
水學					
氣學					
磁學					
聲學					
靜電學					
動電學					
天文學					
地質學	佐藤傳藏				
地文學					
生理學					
普通礦物學教科書					
植物學教科書					
用器畫教科書					
格致學教科書					
大學堂講義全編					
微積學					
教授法原理					
學校管理法					
小學校實驗管理術					
論理學	元良勇次郎(1858- 1912); 冢永 豐吉 (1863-1936)	麥鼎華	上海	廣智書局	1903
新理教授法					

唱歌教授法					
教育史		徐念茲; 富光年	上海	商務印書館	1906
教育學					
論理學綱要	十时弥		東京	大日本図書	1901
教育心理學	高島平三郎 (1865-1946)		東京	早稻田大学出版部	
各科教授法					
速成師範講義叢錄					
東京留學要覽	孫材		東京	尤泰	
漢文教授法					
新說教授學					
蒙師箴言	方瀏生		上海	商務印書館	1904
德育鑑	梁啓超		上海	廣益書局	1905
國民教育論	浮田和民(1859-1946)	沅樂生	上海	商務印書館	1906
德育及體育	久保田贞则		上海	廣智書局	1903
教育論新史全編					
實心教授法					
統轄學校論					
女子教育說					
家政學	清水文之輔	馮霽譯	上海	廣智書局	1906
家庭學					
心理教育					
精神之教育					
學校衛生學					
百科教授指南					
本國史					
羅馬史	北村三郎	趙必振	上海	廣智書局	
希臘史	北村三郎	趙必振	上海	廣智書局	
埃及史	柴四朗 (1852-1922)		東京		1905

波斯史					
新史學	梁启超		上海	廣智書局?	1902
中國史	北村三郎				
猶太史	北村三郎	趙必振	上海	廣智書局	1903
英國史	須永金三郎 (1866-1923)		上海	廣智書局	1903
印度史	北村三郎	程树德	上海	廣智書局	1903
巴比倫史		趙必振	上海	廣智書局	1902
土耳其史	北村三郎	趙必振	東京	廣智書局	1902
亞刺伯史			東京		1890
日耳曼史	北村三郎		東京	博文館	1890
俄羅斯史	北村三郎		東京		
法蘭西史	坪谷善四郎 (1862-1949)				
中國歷史					
埃及慘狀	原田敬吾		東京	博文堂	1890
支那史要	市村瓚次郎		上海	廣智書局	1902
萬國通史			上海	廣學會	1900
泰西通史					
西史通釋					
歷代史畧		柳詒徵 (1879-)	中國	中新書局	1905
中等東洋史					
中等西洋史					
中東戰紀	Young John Allen (1836-1907); 蔡爾康		上海	廣學會	1896
日俄戰史	岸田太郎				
普奧戰紀					
尼羅海戰史					
飛獵賓戰史					
希臘獨立史	柳井, 綱齋 (1871-1905)		東京	博文館	1896
萬國新歷史	坂本嘉治馬	薛广鐸	上海	益智學社	1903

萬國興亡史	松村介石 (1859-1939)		東京	大宣書局	
世界近世史	松平康國	梁启勋	上海	廣智書局	1903
東洋分國史	大槻如電		東京	内田	1896
歐洲新政史	Wilhelm Muller; John Punnett Peters	東邦協會	東京	八尾書店	1894
西力東侵史	齋藤阿具 (1868-1942)		東京	金港堂書籍	1902
世界進化史					
世界文明史	高山樗牛		東京	博文館	1898, 1900
史學原論	浮田和民 (1859-1946)		東京	東京専門学校	1901
歐洲十九世紀史	Harry Pratt Judson	大内暢三; 麦鼎华	東京	廣智書局	1902, 1905
歐洲列國變法史					
世界女權發達史	Theodore Stanton (1851-1925)	王維祺	上海	文明書局	1905
西洋文明史之沿革					
歐洲列國戰史本末		王樹枏 (1858-1936)	陝西	官運書局	1903
泰西民族文明史					
東西洋倫理學史	木村鷹太郎	范迪吉	東京	金文学社	
歐洲最近政治史					
意大利獨立史	松井广吉	张仁普			
美國獨立戰史	塩川一太郎				
中國近世秘史					
法國革命戰史	澀江保		上海	商務印書館	1904
中國文明小史	田口卯吉		上海	廣智書局	1902
日本維新世年史		羅孝高	上海	廣智書局	1903
日本維新活歷史	阪東宣雄		東京	譯書彙編社	1902
世界地理學	矢津昌永	吳啓孫	東京	丸善	1902
萬國地理志	中村五六	周起凤	上海	廣智書局	1902
最新萬國商業地理志	英嘉植德		上海	廣智書局	1902

沿海長江險要圖說		余宏淦	上海	鴻文書局	
東亞各港口岸志	(日本)陸軍參謀本部		上海	廣智書局	
東亞三國地理	辻武雄? 松本德太郎?		東京		1894, 1900
滿洲地志			東京		
日本政治地理	矢津昌永		東京	丸善	1901
國家學綱領	Johann Caspar Bluntschli (1808-1881)	梁啟超	上海	廣智書局	1902
國家學原理	高田早苗 (1860-1938)	稽鏡	東京	早稻田大学, 善隣 譯書館	1901, 1905
政治學全編					
權利競爭論			東京		1893
警察學全書					
政治學新論	梁啟超		上海	廣智書局	1903
政治原理			東京		
政治一斑	檜前保人	出洋學生	東京		1903
共和政體論	Alfred Joseph Naquet (纳谟尔 布礼)	奧宮健之 (1857- 1911); 罗伯雅	上海	廣智書局	1903
萬國官制志					
萬國憲法志					
憲政論					
歐美政體通覽	上野貞正	出洋學生	上海	商務印書館	1902
歐洲政治史論					
歐洲外交史	Antonin Debidour (德比繻儿, 1847-1917)	酒井雄三郎; 麦鼎华	上海	廣智書局	1905
歐洲文明進化論					
地方自治制					
十九世紀四大家政治學說	梁啟超	梁啟超	上海	廣智書局	1902
十九世紀大勢變遷論					
康南海官制議					

十九世紀末世紀之政治					
議會政黨論					
萬國憲法比較					
萬國國力比較			東京		
美國民政考	勃拉斯	烏程章; 宗元	上海	文明書局	
英國通典					
支那問題			東京	同文館	1902
伯倫知理自治論	Johann Caspar Bluntschli (1808-1881)				
泰西各國政論					
世界三怪物					
國憲汎論					
國際公法大綱					
萬法精理					
憲法要義	高田早苗 (1860-1938)	張肇桐	上海	文明書局	1903
憲法精理					
新法律詞典	張緝光; 徐用錫		上海	京師譯學館	1905
國際法學	今西恒太郎	汪郁年	上海	蒙學報館	1904
國際公法志					
現世界大勢論	梁啟超	梁啟超	上海	廣智書局	1903
近世陸軍					
日本武備教育					
中國之武士道	梁啟超	梁啟超	上海	廣智書局	1904
日本明治法制					
日本監獄法律詳解					
日本學校章程彙編					
德國學校制度					
泰西格言	大野雲潭 (-1877)	高鳳謙	上海	廣雅書局	1,904

國家政府界說					
國際公法精義	林榮		上海	閩学会	1904
社會進化論					
人群進化論				廣雅書局	
族制進化論					
社會主義					
社會學	岸本能武太 (1865-1928)	章太炎	上海	廣智書局	
政教進化論	加藤弘之 (1836-1916)	楊廷棟	上海		
人種誌					
群學肄言,	Herbert Spencer (1820-1903)	嚴復	上海	文明書局	1903
近世社會主義	福井准造	趙必振	上海	廣智書局	1903
婚姻進化論					
社會改良論	島村滿都夫	趙必振	上海	廣智書局	
人種改良論					
哲學領要	Oswald Külpe (科培爾)	下田次郎 (1872-1938); 蔡元培 (1868-1940)	上海	商務印書館	1902
哲學新詮					
未來世界論					
二百年後之吾人	加藤弘之 (1836-1916)	文明書局	上海	文明書局	1902
記憶術					
達爾文天擇篇					
達爾文物種由來	Charles Darwin (1809-1882)	馬君武 (1881-)	上海	文明書局	1906
地球之過去未來	橫山又次郎 (1860-1942)	馮霽	上海	文明編譯印書館局	1902
生物之過去未來	橫山又次郎 (1860-1942)		東京	金港堂	1902
哲學妖怪百談 續哲學妖怪百談					
吳京卿節本天演論			上海	文明書局	1903
天擇物競論					

天演論			上海	商務印書館	1896
道德法律進化之理			東京		
三大哲學家學說					
理學鉤玄	中江兆民	陈鹏	上海	廣智書局	1902
哲學論綱	François-Alfred-Désiré Ligneul	前田長太 (1867-1939)	東京	文海堂	1897
經濟之術					
家庭經濟					
財政四綱					
富強叢書正今					
經濟習考					
經濟精華錄					
經濟學問答					
財政叢書	昌言報館編		上海	會文學社	1903
富強新議					
經濟通論					
富閨學問答					
理財學要領					
歐洲財政學	小林丑三	罗普		廣智書局	상해
國債論					
富國策	Henry Fawcett (1833-1884)	岸田吟香; 汪鳳藻	東京	岸田吟香	1881
各國度支考					
富民策	W. E. Macklin	李玉書	上海	廣學會	1899, 1903
足民策					
農學全書					
農政全書	徐光啟				
農業全書					
農鍾學					

農事私議					
農學芻言					
農務化學問答					
蠶桑精司					
蠶桑要說					
養蠶製絲法					
近世各國農夫之說					
農家之學					
農夫百話					
化學大成					
通商新編					
商務說					
工商理財要術					
通商始末紀					
貿易相關					
通商成案彙編					
商務書					
商業地理					
商務地理志					
商客袖珍					
洋關細則					
藝學通考					
政藝新書					
西學大成	John Allen Young		上海	廣學會	1888
西學十六種					
西學三種					
西學通考	胡兆鸞		上海	上海書局	1901
電報別制					

電報新編					
洋務叢林					
實學篇					
學校衛生學					
胎內教育	伊東琴次郎		上海	廣智書局	1903
男女交際新論					
最近衛生學					
造化新論					
男女育兒新法	慈愛堂主人		東京	金桜堂	1894
處女衛生論	Lyman Beecher Sperry	北島研三	東京	金港堂	1902
肺病問答	石神亨	沙曾詒	上海	文明書局	1894
衛生工事新論					
國民體育論					
種痘學					
育兒與衛生	大橋乙羽 (1869-1901)		東京	博文館, 民友社	1896, 1903
疫病衛生書		侯光迪	上海	文明書局	1905
生殖器書					
簡明生理學			上海	上海商学会	
衛生學問答		丁福保 (1874-1952)	上海	文明書局	
吾妻鏡					
家庭衛生書					
男女殖器病祕書					
男女交合新論			上海	日清書館	
生理衛生學講義		丁福保 (1874-1952)	上海	文明書局	1906
銅人圖					
保全生命論			上海	江南製造局	1901
省身指掌	Henry Dwight Porter (1845-1916)	博恆理	上海	美華書館	

全體闡微					
體學					
生理學					
解剖學					
醫宗必讀	李中梓 (1588-1655)		上海	奎照樓藏板	1883
傷寒審症表	包誠		上海	崇文書局	1871
人體之組織					
中西臟腑合圖					
人身解剖圖					
生理細圖					
診病奇俠					
兵書五種					
養兵秘訣					
鍊兵實記					
鍊兵葛言					
行軍指南					
紀效新書	戚繼光 (1528-1587)		上海	醉經廬	1895
籌洋葛議					
日本武備教育					
兵事手函					
德國軍制					
野外行記					
記言紀行					
庸書內外編					
兵式體操圖					
步兵操典					
袁慰帥兵書					
中國之武士道	梁啓超	梁啓超	上海	廣智書局	

軍人文大全					
中西偉人傳	梁啓超	梁啓超	上海	廣智書局	1903
世界十二女傑	岩崎徂堂; 三上寄風	趙必振	上海	廣智書局	1902
地球一百名人傳					
華盛頓			上海	文明書局	
拿破崙			上海	文明書局	
俾思麥			上海	廣智書局	1902
科倫布					
康南海			上海	廣智書局	
漢尼拔			上海	文明書局	1904
林肯			上海	文明書局	
亞歷山大					
加里波的					
海軍第一偉人					
彼得大帝	佐藤信安	愈愚齋	上海	文明書局	
李鴻章	梁啟超		上海	新民叢報社	1906
伊藤博文					
鄭成功			東京		
湖雪巖			東京		
劉坤一			上海		1903
古今中外人物					
日本維新慷慨士列傳	北村三郎	趙必振	上海	廣智書局	1902
泰西政治家列傳					

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