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2022

Reading Transference: Psychoanalysis and Translation

Potente, Paula Candela

Princeton, NJ : Princeton University

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READING TRANSFERENCE: PSYCHOANALYSIS AND TRANSLATION

Paula Candela Potente

A DISSERTATION

PRESENTED TO THE FACULTY

OF PRINCETON UNIVERSITY

IN CANDIDACY FOR THE DEGREE

OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

RECOMMENDED FOR ACCEPTANCE BY

THE DEPARTMENT OF

COMPARATIVE LITERATURE

Advisers: Ben Conisbee Baer, Andrew Cole, Alenka Zupančič

May 2022

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Abstract

This dissertation presents an articulation between the psychoanalytic concept of transference and what I propose to understand as the translation of concepts, drawing on Sigmund Freud's and Jacques Lacan's understanding of transference in neurosis and psychosis, as well as on the work of three different analysts that have addressed the translatability of psychoanalysis in different ways: Moustapha Safouan (Egypt-France, 1921-2020), Girindrasekhar Bose (India, 1887-1953), and Marie Langer (Austria-Argentina, 1920-1987). I argue that the concept of transference provides a novel perspective to understand the changes that concepts undergo in their transnational circulation and throughout historical periods. As the concept that defines the relationship between analyst and analysand in the psychoanalytic setting, transference is always situated in specific relationships but, at the same time, the formulation and understanding of the concept of transference requires a perception of how a relationship is being structured, which exceeds the contingent character of any given relationship. These structural aspects, while non-contingent themselves, can only be understood through the contingent relationship in which they are manifesting in the present.

I analyze the relationship between transference and fiction in order to understand the characteristics of the knowledge that is formed in the analytic situation, and how it is the artificial character of transference that reveals its truth in analysis. Through an examination of transference in relation to psychosis, I argue that a form of transference is present in the process of reading and writing, and explore the limits of the Freudian understanding of transference. The Lacanian theory of psychosis and transference offers a different perspective on transference and fiction, and it is in this context that I argue for a conceptual kind of translation, in this case from neurosis to psychosis. This translation within European psychoanalysis opens up the question of translation across geographies and historical periods. The work of Moustapha Safouan presents a reflection on the universality of the Oedipus complex, and in this framework, I examine the particular kind of translation of this concept in the work of Girindrasekhar Bose. Finally, I explore the work of Marie Langer, who carried out several translations in her psychoanalytic practice and developed a critique of neutrality that emphasizes the fact that ideology always enters the analytic setting.

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Acknowledgments

First and foremost, I want to thank my advisers—I have become a better reader, writer, and thinker thanks to them. Ben Conisbee Baer helped me both go a step further in refining my questions and making my readings more nuanced, and take a step back to define the stakes of my arguments. His support and encouragement have accompanied me since the very beginning of this project. Andrew Cole often insisted on the importance of transmitting complexity through simplicity and always reminded me that what I had to do, after all, was tell a story. Alenka Zupančič's guidance was fundamental in helping me develop a better understanding of psychoanalysis, and I thank her for her generosity in advising me and for teaching me that thinking often involves inventing the right problems.

Writing a dissertation was an exhausting and seemingly interminable process. Rather than the linear trajectory between a point of departure and a point of arrival that I had imagined, it proved to be more similar to being stuck in a room with the task of rearranging a staggering amount of unwieldy furniture. I cannot imagine having done it without my friends and colleagues in Princeton and beyond. It is thanks to their support, intelligence, insights, company, and jokes that this dissertation was possible: Paresh Chandra, Sabrina Grimberg, Mari Jarris, Elias Kleinbock, Sabrina Morán, Juan Diego Pérez, Yaul Perez-Stable Husni, Paulina Pineda, Renata Prati, Elisa Purschke, Aliya Ram, Marie Sanazaro, Andreas Strasser, Grega Ulen. Special thanks to Paresh, Juan Diego, and Andreas, who have been constant interlocutors over the years, and to Renata, who supported me from afar and helped me access some of the work by Marie Langer. I also want to thank Gavin Arnall for his support upon my arrival at Princeton and for inspiring me to think about translation in a conceptual way and with a transnational perspective, and Cate Reilly for her advice as I began to think about a dissertation project and for encouraging me to work on psychoanalysis.

There were many faculty members at Princeton who inspired and supported me at different points in the past years: Claudia Brodsky, Peter Brooks, Zahid Chaudhary, Brigid Doherty, Susana Draper, Katja Guenther, Daniel Heller-Roazen. Claudia Brodsky introduced me to Freud and offered support both as a professor and as Director of Graduate Studies. Zahid Chaudhary's comments on my chapter on translation were fundamental to bring the fourth chapter to its current form. Katja Guenther advised me in the early stages of the project, introduced me to the international history of psychoanalysis, and helped me formulate my research questions early on.

I also want to mention professors and scholars beyond Princeton with whom I had conversations about the project, and who influenced the way in which I thought about psychoanalysis. Isabelle Alfandary and Paola Mieli generously offered feedback in the early stages of the dissertation writing. And very special thanks to Moira Fradinger for her constant support, generosity, and for hours of conversation.

I would like to thank the Department of Comparative Literature for their support. In particular, I am grateful to the professors who served as Directors of Graduate Studies during my years in the program, Ben Conisbee Baer, Claudia Brodsky, and Marina Brownlee, and to Valerie Kanka for her help with program requirements and the organization of events.

Finally, I want to thank my parents, Alejandra Barreda and Gustavo Potente, and my brother, Martín Potente, for their support and curiosity. And thanks to my partner, Pablo Warnes, whose grounding perspective, sense of humor, and loving support are a constant company.

Prior Publication and Presentations

These chapters were written and revised between 2019 and 2022. Some of the material was presented in conferences and departmental events, or published:

- An early version of Chapter One was presented at the Comparative Literature Writing and Dissertation Colloquium (October 2019);

- Material from Chapter Two was planned to be presented at the canceled *ACLA Annual Meeting 2020* (March 2020);

- Material from Chapter Four was workshopped in the seminar of the Princeton Institute for International and Regional Studies and presented at the conference *Traveling Forms: Global German Studies*, 29th Annual Berkeley Interdisciplinary German Studies Conference (February 2021);

- An early version of Chapter Four was workshopped in the Department of Comparative Literature Works-in-Progress series (April 2021) and published in *TRANSIT: A Journal of Travel, Migration, and Multiculturalism in the German-speaking World* under the title "Translation Terminable and Interminable: Psychoanalysis Between Vienna and Calcutta" (May 2021).

These chapters greatly benefitted from the discussions following these presentations, as well as comments from professors and colleagues.

Introduction

Concepts are strange creatures. They can only be formulated or, to borrow the German word, *begreifen*, grasped, in the contingency of history, and yet they are often considered abstract entities able to explain contingencies that they have never encountered. Friedrich Nietzsche was particularly outraged by what he considered the lack of historical sense in philosophers. According to him, philosophers omit, and even negate, the historicity of concepts, ripping them from their contingent origin. Philosophers, as Nietzsche claims, "glauben einer Sache eine E h r e anzuthun, wenn sie dieselbe enthistorisiren, sub specie aeterni, — wenn sie aus ihr eine Mumie machen. Alles, was Philosophen seit Jahrtausenden gehandhabt haben, waren Begriffs-Mumien; es kam nichts Wirkliches lebendig aus ihren Händen"[1] ["think that they are showing *respect* for something when they dehistoricize it, *sub specie aeterni*, – when they turn it into a mummy. For thousands of years, philosophers have been using only mummified concepts; nothing real makes it through their hands alive"].[2] The eternal character of concepts, as Nietzsche suggests, is itself a contingent practice rather than the nature of conceptuality, and this practice has been perpetuated by philosophers across time.

This dissertation emerged from a fascination for the contingency of concepts and for the practices that seek to erase it. In its constant confrontation between theory and praxis, psychoanalysis, much like Marxism, had a structural need to account for the contingency of their concepts. Psychoanalytic theory is constantly put to the test by practice, and, at the same time, the practice of psychoanalysis demands new things of theory, causing it to transform. The

[1] Nietzsche, "Nietzsche Source, Digital Critical Edition."
[2] Nietzsche, *The Anti-Christ, Ecce Homo, Twilight of the Idols, and Other Writings*, 167.

international circulation of psychoanalysis and its transformation throughout time offered newer and more diverse contingencies for it to grapple with.

One of the most important concepts in psychoanalysis, transference provides a unique way of accounting for contingency. Transference defines the very particular kind of relationship between analyst and analysand. It explains how a patient associates the analyst with representations from her past (a parent, for example), such that something about the past is actualized in the present. In the transferential relationship between analyst and analysand, the concepts of psychoanalysis function through the contingency of the analytic situation, which is different in every case. There is no archetypical and eternal non-contingent patient to whom psychoanalysis can resort in order to formulate psychoanalytic concepts. Even more, the very formulation of the concept of transference can only take place through contingency, since it is in clinical practice that it can be elaborated. It requires a kind of conceptualization that involves understanding the way in which experience itself is being structured. Psychoanalysis was able to identify a concept that drives and informs bipersonal interaction, and which follows a very simple idea about knowledge: that the way in which we understand and interact with the present is based on an actualization of past experience.

In its elaboration of theory based on clinical practice, then, psychoanalysis implies the impossibility of a mummified or neutralized conceptuality, which brings us to the question of translation. Because there are no neutral concepts and there is no erasing of contingency, psychoanalytic concepts can only persist throughout time and travel across geographies through translation. Concepts can only be formed in contingent situations, and their transformation involves a negotiation with new kinds of contingency. They are not empty forms that can be filled with different kinds of content—concepts themselves are contingent constructions.

However, acknowledging the role of contingency in the formation of concepts does not reduce them to it. Pure contingency does not allow for conceptuality in the first place—conceptualizing, that is, *begreifen*, involves grasping together a series of elements that are not necessarily gathered together by themselves. It involves ignoring or forgetting certain differences between the objects or phenomena that are being conceptualized. A world of pure contingency would be the world of Jorge Luis Borges's character Funes the memorious:

> Funes no sólo recordaba cada hoja de cada árbol, de cada monte, sino cada una de las veces que la había percibido o imaginado. (…) Éste [Funes], no lo olvidemos, era casi incapaz de ideas generales, platónicas. No sólo le costaba comprender que el símbolo genérico *perro* abarcara tantos individuos dispares de diversos tamaños y diversa forma; le molestaba que el perro de las tres y catorce (visto de perfil) tuviera el mismo nombre que el perro de las tres y cuarto (visto de frente). Su propia cara en el espejo, sus propias manos, lo sorprendían cada vez.[3]
>
> [Funes not only remembered every leaf on every tree of every wood, but even every one of the times he had perceived or imagined it. (…) He was, let us not forget, almost incapable of general, platonic ideas. It was not only difficult for him to understand that the generic term *dog* embraced so many unlike specimens of differing sizes and different forms; he was disturbed by the fact that a dog at three-fourteen (seen in profile) should have the same name as the dog at three-fifteen (seen from the front). His own face in the mirror, his own hands, surprised him on every occasion.][4]

For Funes, every element of experience is only able to be comprehended—if there is indeed any comprehension at all—in its absolute uniqueness. The perception of an object creates multiple memories from its different perspectives in space and its existence in different moments in time. Because every memory only exists in its radical contingency, conceptualization is impossible. There is no grasping that can accommodate the infinite uniqueness of these memories.

Pure contingency, then, makes conceptuality impossible. Even more, failing to acknowledge this impossibility would lead to a radical relativism in which there can be no

[3] Borges, *Ficciones*, 1992, 130.
[4] Borges, *Ficciones*, 2009, 114.

knowledge but within the strict limits of those specific contingent situations. If the dog at three-fourteen seen in profile is not the same dog observed from a different angle one minute later, the only way in which the dog can be understood is in the specific conditions in which it is remembered. Likewise, when analyzing a historical event, that event could only be understood in the particular circumstances in which it took place, therefore making any examination that goes beyond that absolute relativism an erroneous one. Louis Althusser spoke against the idea of relativism with regard to history by arguing that Marxism is not a historicism:

> Si le marxisme apporte bel et bien des principes scientifiques pour la connaissance de l'histoire, il ne peut être un historicisme, c'est-à-dire un relativisme philosophique dans le domaine de la connaissance de l'histoire – ce qui lui interdirait toute valeur scientifique, donc objective, donc théoriquement indépendante des temps et des circonstances temporelles. Dans mes essais, j'avais cité Spinoza : le concept de chien n'aboie pas (…), et j'avais ajouté : la connaissance du sucre n'est pas sucrée, la connaissance de l'histoire n'est pas historique.[5]
>
> [If Marxism well and truly provides scientific principles for the knowledge of history, it cannot be a historicism, that is to say, a philosophical relativism in the field of the knowledge of history – something that would deny it all scientific and, therefore, objective value, and therefore all value theoretically independent of time and temporal circumstances. In my essays, I cited Spinoza – the concept of a dog does not bark (…) – and added that the knowledge of sugar is not sweet, the knowledge of history is not historical.][6]

In an absolute philosophical relativism, every historical event is reduced to its unique character and it becomes illegible from any other historical moment—only its own historical context can render it legible and even meaningful. If the knowledge of history beyond particular historical conditions is to be possible, then the knowledge of history must exceed the contingency of what it seeks to understand.

[5] Althusser, *Écrits Sur l'histoire*, 95–96.
[6] Althusser, *History and Imperialism*, 42–43.

Introduction

The possibility of translation presupposes a legibility beyond contingent contexts. If there were an incommensurability between such contexts, concepts would simply be untranslatable,[7] and everything would be reduced to its historical uniqueness. In order to understand the impossibility of a neutralized conceptuality, it is necessary to reckon with the aspects that allow for translation to be possible in the first place. In this work, I look at instances in which psychoanalysis was translated and argue for the necessary character of translation. The translatability of psychoanalysis points to the fact that concepts are neither still and mummified, nor is there only pure contingency to the extent that nothing can be conceptualized—the concept of dog does not bark.

This dissertation seeks to examine the nature of the kind of translation that takes place in the transformation of psychoanalytic concepts. The clinical aspect of psychoanalysis makes its translation inevitable, and that translation is itself a process needs to be understood, as I claim, with the tools of psychoanalysis. And because I stress the crucial role of contingency in the formation and transformation of concepts, I have grounded my theoretical analysis in the life and work of three different psychoanalysts from different parts of the world: Moustapha Safouan (1921-2020), who was born in Alexandria, Egypt and developed his psychoanalytic practice in Paris, France, where he was supervised by Jacques Lacan; Girindrasekhar Bose (1887-1953), born in the north of Bihar in India, who founded the Indian Psychoanalytic Association in Calcutta and had a letter exchange with Sigmund Freud; and Marie Langer (1920-1987), who was from Vienna, Austria, became a prominent psychoanalyst in Buenos Aires, Argentina, and published the first book on psychoanalysis and women in Spanish. Working with the specific

[7] The idea of untranslatability as presented by Barbara Cassin in the *Vocabulaire Européen des Philosophies: Dictionnaire des intraduisibles* [*Dictionary of Untranslatables: A Philosophical Lexicon*] does not point to the idea of incommensurability between languages, but rather to the interminability of the task of translation.

projects of different analysts allows for an examination that in itself puts into practice my own argument.

I have chosen these cases because each of them, in its own way, addresses what I understand as the question of the translatability of psychoanalysis. Because Safouan was Egyptian and did his psychoanalytic training in France, he lived and worked between languages. He knew classical Arabic because of his education, but he had a strong position against the lack of translation into Egyptian demotic, which led him to translate Shakespeare's *Othello* into Egyptian Arabic. He also translated Freud's *The Interpretation of Dreams* into classical Arabic and wrote about the universality of the Oedipus complex, which implicitly addresses the question of the translatability of this concept in the transnational circulation of psychoanalysis. Bose, as an upper-class and upper-caste Hindu professional from Calcutta, was well acquainted with the British in India, which put him in a position of privilege that many Indians did not have (such as Muslims and lower-caste Hindus). He both inhabited this Western sphere and tried to theoretically and clinically account for the differences he noticed between his European and Indian patients; based on these observations, he proposed a different interpretation of the Oedipus complex. Finally, Langer also had a hybrid character of sorts, on the one hand as an Austrian upper-class woman, on the other hand as Marxist Jew. The rise of fascism in Europe took her to Argentina, where once again she had a mixed status: she was a European woman who had studied in the Wiener Vereinigung, but also a foreigner who for many years was unable to validate her physician's diploma and the only woman among the founders of the Argentine Psychoanalytic Association. She sought to reconcile psychoanalysis with her observations on women (and her own experience as a woman), as well as with Marxism. These three analysts

worked in-between languages and at the overlay of several social and cultural contexts, and their work sought at every turn negotiate between these different spheres.

I begin in the first chapter by analyzing Jacques Lacan's theory of transference and its fundamental role in the analytic situation. I take Lacan as my starting point because he understands transference as a phenomenon that is inevitably connected with fiction, since in the analytic setting, the analysand fabricates something in her transferential relationship with the analyst. This is the framework from which I examine Freud's different formulations of the concept of transference in his early work on hysteria, in *The Interpretation of Dreams*, and later in the Dora case and the papers on technique. The element of fiction and artificiality is—although less explicitly—in Freud as well, and I argue that it is the question of fiction that provides an explanation for how the concept of transference itself might have been conceptualized. There is, in the conceptualization of transference, a circular character which is connected to the philosophical question of the beginning. And in fact, the concept of transference itself, as that with which an analysis begins, has also a crucial role in the beginning of psychoanalysis as a discipline. Through the analysis of the different formulations of transference in Freud's thought, I argue that the temporality in which transference is conceptualized is *nachträglich*.

In the second chapter, I continue my examination of transference in Freud, this time focusing on the treatment of psychoses, or rather, the impossibility of their treatment. Freud claimed that psychoses, which he called "narcissistic neuroses," could not be treated by psychoanalysis because psychotic patients had no capacity for transference. However, Freud devoted a case history to the German judge Daniel Paul Schreber, who suffered from paranoia. Rather than based on a treatment, this case is based on a reading of Schreber's own memoirs. While transference is not possible in this case in its strict clinical understanding—not only

because the affection in question is psychosis, but also because there is no treatment and therefore no bipersonal interaction—there are transferential elements in Freud's analysis of Schreber, based on which I argue that there is a literary kind of transference at play. This analysis allows me to provide a more thorough understanding of transference in Freudian psychoanalysis, as well as to point to an instance in which it might be surreptitiously present.

In the third chapter, my inquiry on the question of transference in psychosis turns back to Lacan. If psychosis was illegible for Freud, Lacan rendered it legible. I focus on the Lacanian understanding of psychosis and the possibility of its psychoanalytic treatment, considering transference in psychosis in its clinical functioning. Lacan played a fundamental role in the development of a psychoanalytic treatment of psychosis, and according to him, it is necessary for analysts to do certain "maneuvers of transference" to treat psychotic patients. I examine the conceptual shift that made transference possible in the treatment of psychotics and contend that the reason why Freud considered psychotics to be incapable of transference is that he failed to translate transference from the realm of neuroses to that of psychoses. Unlike Freud, Lacan translated transference to the treatment of psychosis, and it is this notion of conceptual translation that is the focus of the following chapters. I take the shift that made it possible for psychoanalysis to treat psychoses as a framework to understand the conceptual process of translation that I propose.

In the fourth chapter, I look at the question of translation starting with Freud's own use of the term. He often used translation as a metaphor to explain processes conceptualized by psychoanalysis, such as the process of turning unconscious content into consciousness. I propose a notion of translation as a metaphor to understand the conceptual changes that psychoanalysis undergoes when it travels. In this context, I examine the work of Moustapha

Safouan and Girindrasekhar Bose. Safouan, who like Freud translated several texts, wrote about the process of translation generally and based on his own practice as a translator, and his analysis of the universality of the Oedipus complex provides a compelling conceptual framework to understand how such a concept might get translated from Freud's idiosyncratic interpretation of the Greek myth in fin-de-siècle Vienna to Bose's clinical practice in Calcutta in the first decades of the twentieth century. Bose's work not only provides an example of how psychoanalysis itself can be translated when it is practiced in a place fundamentally different from Vienna, but he also offers his own interpretation of the Oedipus complex. Regarding Bose's translation of psychoanalysis, his correspondence with Freud illuminates how the transferential process of translation takes place. My argument is that the traveling of psychoanalysis requires translation, and that such translation consists in a transferential process—the reason that translation is possible in the first place is delineated by Safouan's understanding of the universality of the Oedipus complex.

In the fifth and last chapter, I address the question of translation focusing on the problems of ideology and neutrality in the work of Marie Langer, whose life and work themselves exemplify the various instances of translation that psychoanalysis as a practice can undergo. Langer's work is itself a translation of psychoanalysis from male to female, from Europe to Latin America, from German to Spanish, from individuals to groups. In this sense, she rewrites psychoanalysis based on her own position and personal history. In her critique of neutrality, Langer denounces not only the degree to which institutionalized psychoanalysis denies politics, but also contends that the notion of the neutrality of the analyst—understood as the conviction that no politics can enter or play a part in the analytic setting—reveals a conservative ideology. Although the analyst should be neutral insofar as she should not "play the

patient's game," as it is often expressed, Langer claims that the influence of values and beliefs in the analytic setting inevitably takes part in the course of treatment and in how the cure is understood. While ideology is always interwoven in the history of concepts, it is often made invisible—a gesture that, among other things, creates the illusion that concepts need no translation.

Throughout the dissertation, I analyze the concept of transference to understand how psychoanalysis is translated, and what that translation entails. By focusing on the categories of fiction, reading, legibility in my analysis of transference, I provide a literary framework to understand the changes that psychoanalysis undergoes throughout history and in its transnational circulation through the notion of translation. While my focus is on psychoanalytic concepts and the changes they undergo when they confront new contingencies, I believe that transference reveals fundamental aspects about conceptuality and the role of contingency in the formation and transformation of concepts beyond psychoanalysis.

Chapter One | In the Beginning was Fiction

Au commencement de la psychanalyse est le transfert.
Jacques Lacan, *Autres Écrits*[8]

For Freud as much as for Lacan, it is not only on the couch that transference can be found. Psychoanalysis offers a setting for transference to be analyzed, but it does not produce it. Transference is not only the phenomenon that defines how the analysand redirects elements of her past onto the psychoanalyst in the analytic situation—therefore actualizing those elements in the present—but this complex series of projections actually informs all relationships. The ubiquity of transference is emphasized by Freud when he claims that transference is not created by analysis. In fact, "[s]ie ist ein allgemein menschliches Phänomen, entscheidet über den Erfolg bei jeder ärztlichen Beeinflussung, ja sie beherrscht überhaupt die Beziehungen einer Person zu ihrer menschlichen Umwelt"[9] ["[i]t is a universal phenomenon of the human mind, it decides the success of all medical influence, and in fact dominates the whole of each person's relations to his human environment"].[10] Likewise, Lacan considers transference to be an essential phenomenon that is connected to the very essence of human desire and thus human relationships.[11] Because the relationship with the analyst is shaped by previous relationships that the analysand had throughout her personal history, it is not difficult to see that transference is in fact everywhere. A typical example is how the relationship with teachers and other figures of authority can be informed by the relationship with one's own parents.

[8] Lacan, *Autres Écrits*, 247. "In the beginning of psychoanalysis is transference" (my translation).
[9] Freud, *Gesammelte Werke*, 14: Werke aus den Jahren 1925–1931:68.
[10] Freud, *Standard Edition*, 1959, XX (1925-1926): An Autobiographical Study, Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety, The Question of Lay Analysis and Other Work:42.
[11] Lacan, *Séminaire XI*, 257.

Transference, in this sense, is always already there.[12] But because it is already there, and despite the fact that there can be no psychoanalysis without it, transference can easily go unnoticed—a difficulty that is in fact present in the very formulation of this concept, namely in Freud's work. Although psychoanalysis does not create transference, it developed a way to isolate it and interpret it. But uncovering transference in the first place presented difficulties.

Before turning to Freud, I begin this chapter by explaining the centrality of transference in the analytic setting according to Lacan and the role of fiction in his understanding of this concept. I take Lacan's understanding of transference and fiction as my framework to then analyze the different ways in which transference was formulated in Freud's work. I draw attention to the fact that the element of fiction is present, although less explicitly, in Freud's conceptualization of transference, which is the focus of the following sections. Through an analysis of the status of transference in the foundation of psychoanalysis as a discipline, I address the philosophical question of the beginning. Transference was formulated in different ways by Freud, and I trace these various definitions and understandings of this phenomenon, which leads me to the question of how transference was in fact identified as a phenomenon and then formulated as a concept. I argue that both transference and the history of its conceptualization in Freud show that the temporality in which transference is formulated as a concept is *nachträglich*. This temporality is one of actualization, of something from the past that

[12] Melanie Klein explains this in the context of her theory of object relations by pointing out that transferences originate in the same processes in which a baby relates to the objects around her. She explains that all mental processes, instinctual urges, and anxiety situations involve objects, either external or internal, which means that object-relations have a fundamental role in emotional life. In addition, love and hatred, phantasies, anxieties and defenses are already operating when object-relations form, and are indivisibly related to them. (Klein, *Envy and Gratitude*, 53.) The transferences that are formed in these early stages of development are structurally fundamental to how transferences manifest later, and it is precisely this that the analyst must investigate.

manifests in the present, rather than a temporality that implies an origin that is to be found in the past.

The Falsest Situation

Lacan devoted an entire seminar to the question of transference, where he explains its relationship with love and fiction. And he begins no less than with the question of the beginning, which he addresses in the following terms: "Au commencement de l'expérience analytique, rappelons-le, fut l'amour. (…) C'est un commencement épais, un commencement confus. C'est un commencement non de création, mais de formation"[13] ["In the beginning of analytic practice was, let us recall, love. (…) It was a dense, jumbled beginning. A beginning not of creation but rather of training"].[14] He evokes the formula "In the beginning was the Verb," in order to differentiate this from his topic of interest, which is the "most opaque" term that is transference.[15] Unlike the passage from nothing to something of the creation ex nihilo ("un commencement de création"), where the origin can be clearly identified as such, the formation on which Lacan focuses ("un commencement de formation") is more difficult to retrace, its history more difficult to reconstruct, and cannot be explained through the identification of an unequivocal moment of birth.

In the beginning of analytic experience was love, as Lacan claims.[16] But there is a specific kind of love that takes place in analysis. He describes the analytic setting as irreducible to what

[13] Lacan, *Séminaire VIII*, 12–13.
[14] Lacan, *Seminar 8*, 4. The English translation often includes some of the French terms in square brackets, which I have removed here and in other passages below, as I quote the original text next to the translation.
[15] Lacan, *Séminaire VIII*, 12.
[16] The centrality of love as a defining element of transference characterizes the Lacanian theory of transference, distinguishing it from previous accounts of this concept. Freud devoted an essay to the question of transference-love, but this constitutes a specific kind of transference, rather than being a

we usually understand by a situation; it is, in fact, the falsest situation that can be, "la situation la plus fausse qui soit."[17] This falsehood is explained by the fundamental difference between the kind of love that is present in analysis and the one that exists outside analysis. And the presence of love in analysis, as Lacan explains, is paradoxical. On the one hand, the position of love in society is precarious, threatened, clandestine, and yet, on the other hand, love is present in the analytic setting, which is "le cadre le plus protégé de tous"[18] ["in the most protected context of all"].[19] Analysis imbricates the precarious character of love (that is, of what love is outside analysis) with the protected character of the analytic framework.

Lacan points to the peculiarity of the analytic situation, and of the relationship between analyst and analysand in such situation, by explaining the following:

> Rompant avec la tradition qui consiste à abstraire, à neutraliser, et à vider de tout son sens ce qui peut être en cause dans le fond de la relation analytique, j'entends partir de l'extrême de ce que suppose le fait de s'isoler avec un autre pour lui apprendre quoi? — ce qui lui manque.[20]
>
> [Breaking with the tradition that consists in abstracting from, neutralizing, and emptying of all its meaning what may be involved in the foundations of the analytic relationship, I intend to use an extreme question as my springboard: what is presupposed by the fact of isolating oneself with another in order to teach him what he is lacking?][21]

In analysis, one isolates oneself along with another, which is for Lacan based on the presupposition that what the analyst teaches the analysand is what she lacks. The transferential relationship that is established in the analytic setting prevents the setting from being empty and

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defining trait of transference itself. See "Observations on Transference-Love" in Freud, *Standard Edition*, 1966.

[17] Lacan, *Séminaire VIII*, 25.
[18] Lacan, 25.
[19] Lacan, *Seminar 8*, 15.
[20] Lacan, *Séminaire VIII*, 25.
[21] Lacan, *Seminar 8*, 15.

abstract. Analysis is not founded on a neutralized blank slate, but rather on a lack that already exists and about which the analysand has to learn.

For Lacan, the analyst must teach the patient how to love. Because of the very nature of transference, it is through learning how to love that the analysand discovers what she is lacking, and it is only insofar as she is loving that she can learn about this lack.[22] Lacan associates transference to a kind of love that is specific to analysis, which informs the relationship between analyst and analysand, and the position of love in analysis is, as he explains, paradoxical. The analytic relationship is one where there needs to be love in order for there to be transference, but the context of this love is a false situation, an artificial one. In order to fulfill its role in analysis, this love can only be authentic insofar as it is artificial. This pseudo-love, so to speak, reflects the nature of the analytic setting, which Lacan describes as a "pseudo-situation."[23]

Lacan describes transference in terms that follow Freud's account of this concept, as he defines it as a reproduction of something that belongs to the past, and which is in act in the present: "La présence du passé, donc, telle est la réalité du transfert"[24] ["The reality of transference is thus the presence of the past"].[25] This presence, as Lacan explains, is more than a presence, "c'est une presence en acte"[26] ["it is a presence in action"],[27] it is a reproduction or reenactment. Transference is defined by the coming to the present of something from the past, but it does not appear simply as a reference to the past but is instead reproducing it such that it is in action in the present. This fact leads Lacan to claim that, if this reproduction is a

[22] Lacan, *Séminaire VIII*, 25.
[23] Lacan, 237.
[24] Lacan, 211.
[25] Lacan, *Seminar 8*, 174.
[26] Lacan, *Séminaire VIII*, 211.
[27] Lacan, *Seminar 8*, 174.

reproduction in action, then the manifestation of transference involves an element of creation.[28] With this remark, Lacan points to a certain character of construction and artifice implied in transference, and in fact proceeds to explicitly connect it to the notion of fiction:

> Et aussi bien nous arrivons ici au point où le transfert apparaît comme, à proprement parler, une source de fiction. Dans le transfert, le sujet fabrique, construit quelque chose. Et dès lors, il n'est pas possible, me semble-t-il, de ne pas intégrer tout de suite à la fonction du transfert le terme de fiction. D'abord, quelle est la nature de cette fiction ? D'autre part, qu'en est l'objet ? Et s'il s'agit de fiction, qu'est-ce qu'on feint ? Et puisqu'il s'agit de feindre, pour qui ?[29]
>
> [We also arrive here at the point at which transference, strictly speaking, appears to be a source of fiction. In transference, the subject fabricates or constructs something. Thus it is impossible, it seems to me, not to immediately include the term "fiction" in the function of transference. What is the nature of this fiction? And, second, what is its object(ive)? And if fiction is involved, what is being feigned? And since it is a matter of feigning, feigning for whom?][30]

Lacan's passage does not arrive at fiction in the form of a definitive conclusion, but rather in the form of a speculative statement. He does not simply declare that transference is a source of fiction but explains that it "appears" [*apparaît*] as such. In a way, transference in psychoanalysis cannot escape the realm of appearance insofar as it is considered within the frame of the analytic setting. In this setting, the only possible positions are the analyst's and the analysand's. Because there are only these two possible perspectives, there is no outside standpoint in the analytic setting, there is no "objective" position (one where transference is not at work) from which to observe transference. The analysand's discourse can only be interpreted directly by the analyst, and the analyst can only present her interpretations to the analysand; the is no third perspective. Lacan's presentation of transference as a source of fiction structurally belongs to the analytic setting because it can only "appear" in it to those who take part in the analytic situation.

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[28] Lacan, *Séminaire VIII*, 211.
[29] Lacan, 212.
[30] Lacan, *Seminar 8*, 174–75.

Moreover, these conclusions are formulated as questions rather than claims—Lacan does not present a definitive understanding of what these fictions are or what the framework in which they appear as fictitious is ("quelle est la nature de cette fiction ?"), what the object of this fiction is ("qu'en est l'objet ?"), or what the audience for this pretending might be ("pour qui ?"). Because there is no external standpoint, transference cannot be declared to have a defined object and a defined audience, since all the elements involved in it are internal to the frame of reference of the analytic setting and can only be understood therein. The question "pour qui ?" is directly addressed by Lacan immediately after:

> Si l'on ne répond pas tout de suite *pour la personne à qui l'on s'adresse*, c'est parce que l'on ne peut pas ajouter *le sachant*. C'est parce que l'on est d'ores et déjà éloigné, par le phénomène, de toute hypothèse de ce que l'on peut appeler massivement par le nom de simulation. (…) Tout ce que nous savons de l'inconscient dès le départ, à partir du rêve, nous indique qu'il y a des phénomènes psychiques qui se produisent, se développent, se construisent, pour être entendus, donc justement pour cet Autre qui est là même si on ne le sait pas. Même si on ne sait pas qu'ils sont là pour être entendus, ils sont là pour être entendus, et pour être entendus par un Autre.[31]
>
> [If we don't immediately answer by saying "for the person one is addressing," it is because we cannot add "knowing full well that one is doing so." It is because we have already distanced ourselves, due to the phenomenon, from any hypothesis of what we might globally term "simulation." (…) Everything that we know of the unconscious right from the outset, on the basis of dreams, leads us to the conclusion that there are psychical phenomena which occur, develop, and are constructed in order to be heard – which occur, develop, and are constructed for the Other who is there even if one does not know it. Even if one is not aware that they are there in order to be heard, they are there in order to be heard, and by an Other to boot.][32]

There is no intention in transference, no clear knowledge that any fiction is being created, and in that sense, nothing is really being simulated. What explains transference is rather the very nature of the unconscious, whose constructions are there to be heard and understood [*entendus*] by an Other. Regardless of the awareness of that Other that is there to hear those constructions, it is

[31] Lacan, *Séminaire VIII*, 212.
[32] Lacan, *Seminar 8*, 175.

always there from the start. Juan Pablo Lucchelli clearly expresses this point when he claims: "Si transfert il y a, c'est parce que je « transfère », malgré moi, sur la personne du thérapeute, des représentations qui étaient déjà là, en moi, avant de connaître ce thérapeute" ["If there is transference, it is because I, despite myself, 'transfer' onto the person of the therapist representations that were already there, within me, before meeting that therapist"].[33] The representations that were already there get transferred onto the analyst without the analysand's knowledge or intention.

The fictitious character of transference, then, does not have to do with conscious and intentional creation but rather with the nature of the unconscious and the Other that is presupposed in its constructions. From this point, Lacan stresses the importance of understanding the phenomenon of transference as one which is manifested in the relationship with someone with whom one speaks. Because this manifestation in the presence of the other is constitutive of transference, as Lacan points out, this phenomenon cannot be reduced to the mere repetition that constitutes the very existence of the unconscious.[34] While the unconscious manifests itself in various kinds of repetitions (slips of the tongue, dreams, jokes, etc.), the kind of repetition involved in transference is one that requires an other to whom one speaks, it cannot manifest but in that bipersonal dimension.

To return to the question of the falsehood of the analytic situation, Lacan pointed out there is a learning process in analysis, in which the analysand learns about a lack, and this learning takes place in the pseudo-situation of analysis. At this point, it is important to clarify the difference with a non-analytic situation:

[33] Lucchelli, *Le transfert de Freud à Lacan*, 27 (my translation).
[34] Lucchelli, 212.

> l'analyste joue son rôle transférentiel précisément dans la mesure où il est pour le malade ce qu'il n'est pas sur le plan de ce que l'on peut appeler la réalité. C'est ce qui nous permet de juger de l'angle de déviation du transfert, de faire apercevoir au malade à quel point il est loin du réel, à cause de ce qu'il produit de fictif à l'aide du transfert.[35]
>
> the analyst plays his transferential role precisely to the degree to which he is, for his patient, what he is not at the level of what one might call "reality." This is what allows us to gauge transference's angle of deviation and to bring the patient to realize how far he is from reality, owing to the fiction he produces with the help of transference.[36]

In this context, the term "reality" merely refers to non-analytic situations, and Lacan points out that this difference marks the role of the analyst in her transferential relationship with the analysand. In analysis, the analysand does not relate to the analyst as a person in a non-analytic situation, and it is the artificiality of this relationship that allows for the production of the fictions of transference. Those fictions that the analysand produces mark the distance with "reality" such that understanding the particular character of those fictions of transference ("juger de l'angle de déviation du transfert") and that distance with non-analytic situations is what makes it possible to see the truth in those fictions. As an example, if I relate to my analyst in ways that actualize my relationship with my mother, it is by understanding the fictitious character of this way of relating to my analyst (which is distanced from my relationship with my mother in "reality") that I see the truth of the transferences: understanding this filial way of relating to my analyst allows me to learn something about my relationship with my mother. In this way, the fictions of transference are the truth of analysis. It is because my analyst is not my mother and because analysis is a pseudo-situation (and not "reality") that it is possible for me to learn this.[37]

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[35] Lacan, *Séminaire VIII*, 373.
[36] Lacan, *Seminar 8*, 314.
[37] The use of the term "reality" in this context seems to only be relevant to underscore the distinction between the analytic situation and a regular situation. One could say that in the relationship with a teacher, for example, there are transferences, and therefore fiction, and yet this happens outside an analytic situation. In such a case, the term "reality" would have no use.

Lacan often claims that truth has the structure of fiction, which delineates a notion of fiction that, as is well known, is not associated with falsehood and deception. On the contrary, fiction is a way in which the truth manifests, a truth which has a specific meaning in the context of analysis. In a different text, Lacan explains the following: "[La vérité] a une structure de fiction parce qu'elle passe par le langage et que le langage a une structure de fiction" ["[Truth] has the structure of fiction because it goes through language, and language has the structure of fiction"].[38] The structure of fiction, in this sense, is not exclusive to truth, but extends to language more generally. Analysis takes place in language (which has the structure of fiction) and it is driven by transference, which is itself a source of fiction. Fiction, in this way, is the manifestation of truth in the analytic situation.

Although this relationship between transference and fiction that Lacan traces is not explicitly present in Freud, there are certain elements that point to it. I now turn to Freud's formulations of transference in order to examine the presence of fiction in them, as well as to understand the status of transference in the foundation of the discipline of psychoanalysis.

Self-analysis and the Beginning

Die Traumdeutung [*The Interpretation of Dreams*] is usually considered the foundational work of psychoanalysis. But curiously, this discipline begins with a self-analysis; it is a work in which the author is the subject and object of analysis, which is evidently in contrast with psychoanalytic practice, which requires a relationship with another person. Freud's decision to engage in a self-analysis stems from the difficulties inherent to the material that he examines. He explains that part of the difficulty lies in the fact that there is no secure foundation on which further

[38] Lacan, "Conférences et Entretiens Dans Des Universités Nord-Américaines," 35 (my translation).

investigations might be developed. Instead of building upon the work of other authors, "jeder neue Autor faßt die nämlichen Probleme von neuem und wie vom Ursprung her wieder an"[39] ["each new writer examines the same problems afresh and begins again, as it were, from the beginning"].[40]

In order to present his scientific technique of dream interpretation, Freud explains that he had to decide whether to analyze the dreams of his patients or his own. But his patient's dreams were affected by the added presence of neurosis, which introduced a complication and prevented his science of dreams to be generalizable rather than tied to specific neuroses. This fact led Freud to choose his own dreams, a decision that he did not make without reserve:

> Mit der Mitteilung meiner eigenen Träume aber erwies sich als untrennbar verbunden, daß ich von den Intimitäten meines psychischen Lebens fremden Einblicken mehr eröffnete, als mir lieb sein konnte und als sonst einem Autor, der nicht Poet, sondern Naturforscher ist, zur Aufgabe fällt. Das war peinlich aber unvermeidlich; ich habe mich also darein gefügt, um nicht auf die Beweisführung für meine psychologischen Ergebnisse überhaupt verzichten zu müssen.[41]
>
> [But if I was to report my own dreams, it inevitably followed that I should have to reveal to the public gaze more of the intimacies of my mental life than I liked, or than is normally necessary for any writer who is a man of science and not a poet. Such was the painful but unavoidable necessity; and I have submitted to it rather than totally abandon the possibility of giving the evidence for my psychological findings.][42]

In order to have an object of analysis that would not be affected by neurosis, but that would at the same time allow for the presentation of his conclusions on the nature of dreams, Freud chooses his own dreams, those of an "ungefähr normalen Person"[43] ["approximately normal person"],[44] as he claims later. He thus constitutes himself as both the analyzing subject and the

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[39] Freud, *Gesammelte Werke*, 2/3: Die Traumdeutung, Über den Traum:5.
[40] Freud, *The Interpretation of Dreams*, 39.
[41] Freud, *Gesammelte Werke*, 2/3: Die Traumdeutung, Über den Traum:viii.
[42] Freud, *The Interpretation of Dreams*, xxiii–xxiv.
[43] Freud, *Gesammelte Werke*, 2/3: Die Traumdeutung, Über den Traum:109.
[44] Freud, *The Interpretation of Dreams*, 130.

analyzed object. Freud is, on the one hand, the founder of psychoanalysis and the author of an advance in the knowledge of dreams; his theories challenge both previous scientific accounts of dreams and lay opinions. On the other hand, he is a man of science that must subject his scientific endeavor to an analysis of his own mental life and a presentation of personal intimacies, what he identifies as the jurisdiction of poets.

In order to avoid the mediations that would imply the relationship with patients, their specific neuroses and how these would inform both dreams and their analysis, Freud chooses his own dreams, since these belong to an "approximately normal person." Because he only needs to deal with himself instead of a patient, and because the object of analysis (his own dreams) is not of a neurotic nature (at least according to his own judgment), there do not seem to be any mediations. Dealing with his own dreams neither calls for a distinction between what pertains to "normal" dreams and what corresponds to its neurotic elements, nor for a mediating translation between one and the other. In this sense, Freud sees himself as an immediate beginning. Even more, I would argue that he finds in himself a unity between immediacy (an analysis without transference) and mediation (Freud, the analyzing subject, chooses an object of analysis, which is his own dreams).

Freud himself points to the immediate and mediated character of himself as the beginning of psychoanalysis with the contraposition he makes between man of science and poet. On the one hand, the man of science has a mediated relationship with his object of analysis; he is external to this object, and precisely this distance is what can grant objectivity to his analysis. On the other hand, there is a certain immediacy between the poet and his subject matter. Freud wants to write a book on the science of dreams but, at the same time, seems to be forced to enter the realm of poets by revealing his own intimacies. He therefore needs to borrow elements

both from the mediated relationship of the man of science with his object of analysis and from the immediacy of the poet and his poetry.

I borrow the terms of immediacy and mediation to talk about the question of the beginning in psychoanalysis from Hegel's *Wissenschaft der Logik* [*The Science of Logic*]. In the first book, Hegel addresses the question of the beginning of philosophy and claims that it must be either something mediated or something immediate, "und es ist leicht zu zeigen, daß er weder das eine noch das andere sein könne; somit findet die eine oder die andere Weise des Anfangens ihre Widerlegung"[45] ["and it is easy to show that it can be neither the one nor the other; so either way of beginning runs into contradiction"].[46] He explains that the beginning must not presuppose anything, not be mediated by anything; it has to be the very ground for the entire science rather than having a ground on which to be based, which is why it needs to be immediate, or immediacy itself.[47] However, because science involves a progression that is at once a retreat to the ground, and the return to the ground is, at the same time, a result of that progression, science is a circle.[48] The fact that there is a retreat to the ground on which the beginning is made points to a dependency, which in turn implies a mediation. Only with complete independence would there be absolute immediacy, so the fact that the beginning depends on a ground makes it no longer immediate and abstract but rather mediated. The beginning of philosophy for Hegel is paradoxical in that it is both mediated and immediate: it begins by having already begun.

[45] Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik*, 65.
[46] Hegel, *The Science of Logic*, 45.
[47] Hegel, 48.
[48] Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik*, 70.

Just like Hegel established the foundations of philosophy with a paradoxical beginning, Freud founds psychoanalysis with an analogous one, given the immediacy of his self-analysis and the mediation in his taking himself as the object of study. Curiously, the fundamental character of self-analysis in *Die Traumdeutung* means that transference, one of the most important concepts of psychoanalysis, is absent from its foundational work, missing from the beginning of the discipline itself. What is the story of transference and its diverse conceptual formulations?

From False Connections to New Editions

Transference, understood in the way that would be developed later by Freud and by many other psychoanalysts, is absent from *Die Traumdeutung*. However, it does appear with a peculiar formulation that differs from both previous and later writings. As regards previous writings, there is a preliminary formulation of the concept of transference in Freud's and Josef Breuer's *Studien über Hysterie* [*Studies on Hysteria*]. In the final section, authored by Freud alone, he addresses questions of analytic technique, and it is in this context that he considers different instances of how the relationship between patient and physician can be disturbed—one of them being the transference of distressing ideas that arise in treatment onto the physician. "Dies ist häufig, ja in manchen Analysen ein regelmäßiges Vorkommnis. Die Übertragung auf den Arzt geschieht durch falsche Verknüpfung"[49] ["This is a frequent, and indeed in some analyses a regular, occurrence. Transference onto the physician takes place through a *false connection*"].[50] He then provides an example of a patient who had had a wish to be kissed by a man to whom she was talking on one occasion, and in treatment transferred that wish onto Freud. Her desire to be

[49] Freud, *Gesammelte Werke*, 1: Werke aus den Jahren 1892–1899:308–9.
[50] Breuer and Freud, *Studies on Hysteria*, 302.

kissed by Freud greatly disturbed her, but once Freud realized this, he was able to unbind this, and the treatment proceeded further, leading to the recollection of the original appearance of this wish. Freud recounts what happened in the following way:

> der nun vorhandene Wunsch wurde durch den im Bewußtsein herrschenden Assoziationszwang mit meiner Person verknüpft, welche ja die Kranke beschäftigen darf, und bei dieser Mésalliance—die ich falsche Verknüpfung heiße—wacht derselbe Affekt auf, der seinerzeit die Kranke zur Verweisung dieses unerlaubten Wunsches gedrängt hat. Nun ich das einmal erfahren habe, kann ich von jeder ähnlichen Inanspruchnahme meiner Person voraussetzen, es sei wieder eine Übertragung und falsche Verknüpfung vorgefallen. Die Kranke fällt merkwürdigerweise der Täuschung jedes neue Mal zum Opfer.[51]
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> [The wish which was present was then, owing to the compulsion to associate which was dominant in her consciousness, linked to my person, with which the patient was legitimately concerned; and as the result of this *mésalliance*—which I describe as a 'false connection'[52]—the same affect was provoked which had forced the patient long before to repudiate this forbidden wish. Since I have discovered this, I have been able, whenever I have been similarly involved personally, to presume that a transference and a false connection have once more taken place. Strangely enough, the patient is deceived afresh every time this is repeated.][53]

Transference, in this preliminary formulation, is an error that needs to be corrected, an "obstacle" that needs to be removed, as Freud explains. It is also the result of a compulsion to associate [*Assoziationzwang*],[54] which greatly differs from the status transference has in Freud's later formulations. Transference is always already there, rather than the result of a compulsion. How the analyst might take part in this false connection, or more specifically whether there

[51] Freud, *Gesammelte Werke*, 1: Werke aus den Jahren 1892–1899:309.
[52] The use of the word "*mésalliance*" does not only point to a false connection, but to the inferior position of one of the two people whose marriage the "*mésalliance*" describes. Whether the inferior position is occupied by Freud or by the spectral presence of the man originally associated with the wish is not quite clear.
[53] Breuer and Freud, *Studies on Hysteria*, 303.
[54] The term *Assoziationzwang* is only used by Freud in early works, namely in *Studies on Hysteria* and the *Project for a Scientific Psychology*.

might be countertransference, is not addressed, and neither does transference have the role it would have later in psychoanalytic thought and practice.

This first formulation of the concept of transference, as George Makari explains, resulted from the influence of certain notions associated with hypnosis. More specifically, Freud was influenced by Charcot's idea of auto-suggestion, which is an internal suggestion generated by the subject.[55] Makari states that "[f]or Freud, suggestibility was the result of an internal process of disassociation, which makes the subject prey to illusions and self-deceptions."[56] Freud would later abandon this hypnotic terminology, replacing it by the term "false connection," which for Makari is a "conceptual descendant" of Charcot's notion. The *mésalliance* between analyst and analysand became one specific kind of false connection.[57]

The origin of false connections in auto-suggestibility delineates a notion of transference that is very different from the concept that would be formulated in Dora's case history, as well as in later technical writings, both of which were written after *Die Traumdeutung*. First, this familiarity with auto-suggestibility describes a self-deception that originates in the patient, and which operates in relation to the analyst, without suggesting possible self-deceptions on the side of the latter (in other words, without countertransference). As opposed to this, when Freud explains the failure of Dora's treatment due to his own inability to detect transferences, he revises the whole case history in light of this concept and tries to understand his own position with regard to Dora's transferences and his role in the analysis. Transference allows for an interpretation of the whole case history and its development that is different from false connections, which are an isolated moment of resistance that needs to be addressed as such.

[55] Makari, "A History of Freud's First Concept of Transference," 418.
[56] Makari, 429.
[57] Makari, 428–29.

This isolated moment, however, could take place multiple times—"strangely enough," to borrow Freud's words of astonishment, deceiving the patient afresh again and again.[58]

Second, the difference between the metaphors for transference in this first formulation and those in the most complete formulation of transference in *Bruchstück einer Hysterie-Analyse* [*Fragment of an Analysis of a Case of Hysteria*] (Dora's case history) also bring to the fore fundamental differences between both concepts.[59] While in *Studien über Hysterie* transference is explained through falsehood and a "misguided alliance," a marriage "tainted" by the inferior character of one of the persons involved therein, the Dora case introduces a notion of transference that is characterized as "Neuauflagen, Nachbildungen von den Regungen und Phantasien"[60] ["new editions or facsimiles of the tendencies and phantasies"].[61] Rather than through falsehood and misguidedness, transferences are, in the more elaborate formulation that Freud offers in this case history, explained through newness and imitation.[62]

Despite the fact that these two notions of transference seem to have some degree of continuity, the publication of *Die Traumdeutung* lies in the middle, interrupting this continuity, as Freud introduces yet another notion of transference that bears little resemblance to the two that have been mentioned above. (We will return to these "new editions or facsimiles" below.) He introduces a notion of transference in the context of a discussion about the role of the day's residues in dreams, that is, the elements of the day that are remembered after the day is over and appear in dreams. In this context, transference is a necessary process involved in the formation of dreams, and it takes place within one individual rather than in a bipersonal situation. It is, as

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[58] Breuer and Freud, *Studies on Hysteria*, 303.
[59] See Freud, *The Interpretation of Dreams*, 221.
[60] Freud, *Gesammelte Werke*, 5: Werke aus den Jahren 1904–1905:279.
[61] Freud, *Dora*, 106.
[62] I will further develop the concept of transference formulated in Dora's case in the following section.

Freud explains, the process by which an unconscious idea can affect the preconscious. In order for the unconscious idea to enter the preconscious, the intensity of an idea that is already in the preconscious has to be transferred onto the unconscious idea. That unconscious (or repressed) idea is then "covered," as Freud explains, by this added intensity, and it is this cover which allows it to access the preconscious.[63] Freud illustrates this process with the following analogy:

> Man verzeihe mir die Neigung zu Gleichnissen aus dem täglichen Leben, aber ich bin versucht zu sagen, die Verhältnisse liegen für die verdrängte Vorstellung ähnlich wie in unserem Vaterlande für den amerikanischen Zahnarzt, der seine Praxis nicht ausüben darf, wenn er sich nicht eines *rite* promovierten Doktors der Medizin als Aushängeschild und Deckung vor dem Gesetz bedient.[64]
>
> [I hope I may be forgiven for drawing analogies from everyday life, but I am tempted to say that the position of a repressed idea resembles that of an American dentist in this country: he is not allowed to set up in practice unless he can make use of a legally qualified medical practitioner to serve as a stalking-horse and to act as a 'cover' in the eyes of the law.][65]

In Freud's analogy, the American dentist is only able to practice his profession in Austria ("our fatherland") thanks to the cover of a practitioner that is legally allowed to work. The legal status of the Austrian dentist is transferred onto the American dentist—not because the American dentist suddenly receives a permission to work in Austria or appears as if he had it, but because the Austrian dentist acts as a figurehead, which allows the American dentist to go unnoticed. Following this analogy, an unconscious idea does not have the right to enter the preconscious unless it can slip into it with the disguise, so to speak, of a preconscious idea.

This notion of transference and the one that Freud would develop later have fundamental points of discontinuity and continuity. On the one hand, transference would eventually be related to the development of the treatment and a central aspect of the way in

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[63] Freud, *The Interpretation of Dreams*, 562.
[64] Freud, *Gesammelte Werke*, 2/3: Die Traumdeutung, Über den Traum:568.
[65] Freud, *The Interpretation of Dreams*, 562–63; Freud, *Die Traumdeutung*, 2:536.

which analyst and analysand relate to one another, while in *Die Traumdeutung*, transference is a process internal to the psyche. Just as Freud begins the foundation of psychoanalysis with himself, transference appears, in this foundational work, as taking place also within the individual. On the other hand, there is in both cases a certain kind of pretense, as it were, which evokes the falsehood of false connections. If, in *Die Traumdeutung*, what is transferred is the intensity of an idea so that it might be able to access the preconscious—precisely because it is "covered," as Freud explains, by this intensity—what makes that idea able to enter the preconscious (just as the American dentist being able to enter Austria) is its disguise. It is because of that disguise that, one could say, that the preconscious can "recognize" that unconscious idea as belonging to it. In later formulations, the analyst appears to the patient with a certain kind of disguise, one could say, that bears resemblance to a person of the patient's past—which allows for the analysand to "recognize" the analyst, as it were. The analyst can then relate to analysand, and therefore start a treatment, due to the cover that is provided by transference. The analysand sees in the analyst a familiarity that does not quite belong to the person of the analyst, but that is being transferred to her, that acts as a cover that makes her familiar and recognizable. The analyst is "modified" by this transference as regards her relationship with the analysand just as an unconscious idea was being modified by the transference of the intensity of a preconscious idea. While the notion of transference in *Die Traumdeutung* is, in this way, fundamentally different from how transference was formulated afterwards (as well as beforehand), there are some aspects that make them conceptually similar.

Transference—as it was conceptualized from Dora's case onward—could not have been formulated in *Die Traumdeutung* because of the centrality of self-analysis, since this is one of the instances in which transference is, by definition, impossible. In fact, it might be meaningful that

there is no transference in this foundational work of psychoanalysis, despite the fact that it became a central concept in psychoanalytic thought and technique later. In this way, there would seem to be more continuity between the concept of false connections and transference as it was conceptualized in Dora's case history, even though the foundational work of psychoanalysis was published in the middle. This fact, however, does not deny the importance of the continuity between *Die Traumdeutung* and Dora's case—in fact, Freud himself considered this case history a continuation of *Die Traumdeutung*, as he shows there "wie sich die Traumdeutung in die Behandlungsgeschichte einflicht und wie mit deren Hilfe die Ausfüllung der Amnesien und die Aufklärung der Symptome gewonnen werden kann"[66] ["how dream-interpretation is woven into the history of a treatment and how it can become the means of filling in amnesias and elucidating symptoms"].[67] But while there is continuity with regard to the theory of dream interpretation, the same cannot be said about the conceptualization of transference in these two works.

Before delving into Dora's case, I want to note that while transference is mostly absent in *Die Traumdeutung*, one could argue for its muted presence through Freud's relationship with Wilhelm Fliess. As it is widely known, Freud and Fliess had a close friendship that is documented in their letter exchange between 1887 and 1904—with most letters from Freud starting with "Teurer Wilhelm!" ["Dear Wilhelm!"]. Freud often sent Fliess manuscripts of his writings and received comments on them. Jeffrey Moussaieff Masson, who translated and edited the letters, highlights the fact that their relationship, as many have pointed out, was one of

[66] Freud, *Gesammelte Werke*, 5: Werke aus den Jahren 1904–1905:167.
[67] Freud, *Dora*, 4–5. Isabelle Alfandary stresses the connection between *The Interpretation of Dreams* and Dora's case, and claims that dream and transference are in fact the obverse and reverse of the same coin. ("Psychoanalysis with or Without Transference," 6.)

transference, and "a necessary forerunner of Freud's own self-analysis."[68] In the letters, Freud informs Fliess of his self-analysis, which would sometimes progress and sometimes be at a standstill. One of the letters ends with the following remark: "Meine Selbstanalyse bleibt unterbrochen. Ich habe eingesehen, warum. Ich kann mich nur selbst analysieren mit den objektiv gewonnenen Kenntnissen (wie ein Fremder), eigentliche Selbstanalyse ist unmöglich, sonst gäbe es keine Krankheit"[69] ["My self-analysis remains interrupted. I have realized why I can analyze myself only with the help of knowledge obtained objectively (like an outsider). True self-analysis is impossible; otherwise there would be no [neurotic] illness"].[70] Freud notes that something foreign is necessary for his self-analysis to progress. A "true" self-analysis would be impossible because it would lack this foreign element that allows for analysis itself.

And in fact, one could think of the analyst exactly as a foreign person through whom learning in analysis is possible. If this is true, however, Lacan notes that there is a particular quality that this "foreigner" (the analyst) must have: the presupposition of knowledge. Lacan claims that there is transference the moment there is a subject supposed to know [*sujet supposé savoir*].[71] And what was Fliess for Freud if not a subject supposed to know? In one of the letters during the years in which Freud was writing *Die Traumdeutung*, he writes to Fliess: "Teurer Wilhelm! / Du wirst darauf gefaßt sein, daß ich Dir heute von Deinem Urteil über mein Traummanuskript schreibe, welches mir eigen guten Tag verschafft hat"[72] ["Dear Wilhelm, / You will not be surprised if I write to you today about your evaluation of my dream manuscript,

[68] Masson in Freud and Fliess, *The Complete Letters of Sigmund Freud to Wilhelm Fliess*, 2.
[69] Freud and Fliess, *Briefe an Wilhelm Fliess, 1887-1904*, 305.
[70] Freud and Fliess, *The Complete Letters of Sigmund Freud to Wilhelm Fliess*, 281; the clarification "[neurotic]" was added by Masson.
[71] Lacan, *Séminaire XI*, 258.
[72] Freud and Fliess, *Briefe an Wilhelm Fliess, 1887-1904*, 332.

which made my day"].[73] While it was neither within the analytic setting not in the very pages of *Die Traumdeutung*, transference was secretly present in it all along.

Although transference, then, is only present in *Die Traumdeutung* in these surreptitious ways—through a different conceptualization and in the exchange with Fliess—it was only thoroughly formulated in the Dora case. After opening the postscript with some general observations about the presentation of the material in this case history and about its conclusions, Freud pauses and points out that he needs to go back to make the matter intelligible—and it is then that he introduces the concept of transference. Not only does he formulate this concept in this section, but he also devotes a large part of it to explain how Dora's treatment failed. In this case history, and more specifically through the failure of this treatment, transference receives, for the first time, a more complete formulation that underscores its structural importance as a central aspect of analysis. In fact, not only is this a more complete formulation of the concept of transference, and one that would be the basis for later understandings of transference, but also Freud seems to present it as a concept that appears in analysis for the first time, and not one that had been preliminarily defined or even sketched in previous writings, as we have seen.

While the notion of false connections had a great resemblance with transference as it was conceptualized in Dora's case history, and despite the fact that it had received another formulation in *Die Traumdeutung*, Freud does not detect transference in time. It was necessary for the treatment of Dora to fail in order for him to detect the presence of transference and finally offer a formulation of this concept that he would further develop in later works. Even though he had already written about the notion of false connections, Freud failed to see that

[73] Freud and Fliess, *The Complete Letters of Sigmund Freud to Wilhelm Fliess*, 304.

transference was a play in Dora's treatment. Strangely enough, he was deceived afresh by its new appearance.

The *Nachträglichkeit* of Transference

As I mentioned before, Freud addresses the technical aspects of Dora's case history in the postscript. He had decided to leave aside these technical aspects in the rest of the study, claiming that they demanded an exposition of their own, separate from the rest of the case.[74] Freud is very explicit in his recognition of the failure of Dora's treatment, how he did not master transference in good time, and how her analysis must be understood in light of the concept of transference.[75] When Freud introduces transferences, he defines them in the following way:

> Was sind die Übertragungen? Es sind Neuauflagen, Nachbildungen von den Regungen und Phantasien, die während des Vordringens der Analyse erweckt und bewußt gemacht werden sollen, mit einer für die Gattung charakteristischen Ersetzung einer früheren Person durch die Person des Arztes. Um es anders zu sagen: eine ganze Reihe früherer psychischer Erlebnisse wird nicht als vergangen, sondern als aktuelle Beziehung zur Person des Arztes wieder lebendig.[76]
>
> [What are transferences? They are new editions or facsimiles of the tendencies and phantasies which are aroused and made conscious during the progress of the analysis; but they have this peculiarity, which is characteristic for their species, that they replace some earlier person by the person of the physician. To put it another way: a whole series of psychological experiences are revived, not as belonging to the past, but as applying to the person of the physician at the present moment.][77]

As was noted in the last section, the metaphors for transference are the new editions (or reprints) and facsimiles, which have to do with copying and revision rather than with the falsehood of false connections. The analyst awakens certain past experiences in the patient, and

[74] Freud, *Dora*, 103.
[75] Freud, 108.
[76] Freud, *Gesammelte Werke*, 5: Werke aus den Jahren 1904–1905:279–80.
[77] Freud, *Dora*, 106.

thus becomes a "new edition" or a "reprint," a reproduction of those experiences—the question of reproduction and transference in action that Lacan points out is present here already. This character of facsimile, however, can only be analyzed in hindsight, since in analysis, the past experiences that are awakened appear as actualized in the analyst in the present. The treatment develops through these facsimiles, and it is the task of the analyst to become aware of them.

The epistemic operations that allow the psychoanalyst to analyze transferences, however, are not without ambiguities; as Freud explains:

> Das Deuten der Träume, das Extrahieren der unbewußten Gedanken und Erinnerungen aus den Einfällen des Kranken und ähnliche Übersetzungskünste sind leicht zu erlernen; dabei liefert immer der Kranke selbst den Text. Die Übertragung allein muß man fast selbständig erraten, auf geringfügige Anhaltspunkte hin und ohne sich der Willkür schuldig zu machen.[78]
>
> [It is easy to learn how to interpret dreams, to extract from the patient's associations his unconscious thoughts and memories, and to practice similar explanatory arts: for these the patient himself will always provide the text. Transference is the one thing the presence of which has to be detected almost without assistance and with only the slightest clues to go upon while at the same time the risk of making arbitrary inferences has to be avoided.][79]

Although both dreams and transferences require the analyst to extract unconscious thoughts, the interpretation of dreams has a textual base, it has the narration of the patient as a concrete object of analysis. Freud explains that the interpretation of dreams involves certain "arts of translation" [*Übersetzungskünste*] on this textual base that is the narration of dreams.[80] Transferences, on the other hand, require an "independent guessing," as Freud explains, since, rather than a text, there are only subtle clues that have to be detected, which require the analyst to constantly conjecture about her own relationship with the experiences that the analysand

[78] Freud, *Gesammelte Werke*, 5: Werke aus den Jahren 1904–1905:280.
[79] Freud, *Dora*, 107.
[80] I will return to the question of translation in the interpretation of dreams in the fourth chapter.

narrates. Rather than interpreting, as in the case of dreams, transference must be guessed, which makes the task more uncertain and one where knowledge is perhaps never fully constituted.[81] The question of guessing points to the absence of origin that takes place in transference: the fictions of transference, to return to Lacan's terms, take place as an actualization. They exist insofar as they take place in the present (even if that present is the presence of the past), and in this sense, the origin of transferences is never there to be interpreted, transference is only there to be guessed.

Freud points out that "[d]ie psychoanalytische Kur schafft die Übertragung nicht, sie deckt sie bloß, wie anderes im Seelenleben Verborgene, auf"[82] ["[p]sychoanalytic treatment does not create transferences, it merely brings them to light, like so many other hidden psychical factors"].[83] He further explained in later essays the relationship between transference and the psychoanalytic setting. In "Zur Einleitung der Behandlung" ["On Beginning the Treatment"], Freud refers to the space of analysis, in which he asks the patient to lie on the couch while he sits behind him. This situation involves a "gewisses Zeremoniell"[84] ["certain ceremonial"][85] in the way that the space functions. Freud justifies this procedure by explaining that "die Absicht und den Erfolg hat, die unmerkliche Vermengung der Übertragung mit den Einfällen des Patienten zu verhüten, die Übertragung zu isolieren und sie zur Zeit als Widerstand scharf

[81] I became aware of Freud's use of the term *erraten* thanks to Isabelle Alfandary's lecture on "Psychoanalysis with or without transference," delivered on June 24th, 2019 at Northwestern University. In this lecture, she dwells on the difference between *erraten* and *deuten*, between guessing and interpretation. ("Psychoanalysis with or Without Transference," 9.)
[82] Freud, *Gesammelte Werke*, 5: Werke aus den Jahren 1904–1905:281.
[83] Freud, *Dora*, 108.
[84] Freud, *Gesammelte Werke*, 8: Werke aus den Jahren 1909-1913:467.
[85] Freud, *Standard Edition*, 1966, XII (1911-1913): The Case of Schreber, Papers on Technique and Other Works:133.

umschrieben hervortreten zu lassen"[86] ["its purpose and result are to prevent the transference from mingling with the patient's associations imperceptibly, to isolate the transference and to allow it to come forward in due course sharply defined as a resistance"].[87] Psychoanalytic treatment brings transference to light, and it does so by isolating it. Freud claims in "Zur Dynamik der Übertragung" ["The Dynamics of Transference"] that transference emerges during psychoanalysis with as much intensity as it does outside of it.[88] In other words, transference is not exclusive to the analytic setting, it exists outside of analysis to the same extent. All relationships are informed by transference, not only the relationship between analyst and analysand. But it is not enough to identify transference; rather, it is necessary to isolate it so that it can be analyzed as such in treatment.

Transference is not the only factor that manifests itself in analysis as well as outside analysis, but it is one that, in order to be analyzed, needs to develop through the analyst. Dreams, slips of the tongue, jokes, etc., emerge in treatment *for* the analyst—rather than *through* her—as they come up in the context of a specific transferential relationship. Transference, on the contrary, belongs to the very relationship between analyst and analysand, which means that the analyst does not only have the task of interpreting the patient's material as an external observer, but needs to consider herself in the development of the analysis.

When Freud revises the case history in light of transference, he proceeds to understand his own position in the transferential relationship in different moments of the treatment. He explains how Dora replaced him with her father at first, as she would constantly compare them,

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[86] Freud, *Gesammelte Werke*, 8: Werke aus den Jahren 1909-1913:467.
[87] Freud, *Standard Edition*, 1966, XII (1911-1913): The Case of Schreber, Papers on Technique and Other Works:134.
[88] Freud, XII (1911-1913): The Case of Schreber, Papers on Technique and Other Works:101.

making sure Freud was not behaving like her father. After Dora's first dream, the transference was no longer onto Dora's father but onto Herr K, the man who was married to her father's mistress and who had made advances to her. Freud then writes what he would have said to Dora, had he detected the transferences in time:

> …hätte ich (…) ihr vorhalten sollen: "Jetzt haben Sie eine Übertragung von Herrn K. auf mich gemacht. Haben Sie etwas bemerkt, was Sie auf böse Absichten schließen läßt, die denen des Herrn K. (direkt oder in irgend einer Sublimierung) ähnlich sind, oder ist Ihnen etwas an mir aufgefallen oder von mir bekannt geworden, was Ihre Zuneigung erzwingt, wie ehemals bei Herrn K.?" Dann hätte sich ihre Aufmerksamkeit auf irgend ein Detail aus unserem Verkehre, an meiner Person oder an meinen Verhältnissen gerichtet, hinter dem etwas Analoges, aber ungleich Wichtigeres, das Herrn K. betraf, sich verborgen hielt, und durch die Lösung dieser Übertragung hätte die Analyse den Zugang zu neuem, wahrscheinlich tatsächlichem Material der Erinnerung gewonnen. Ich überhörte aber diese erste Warnung, meinte, es sei reichlich Zeit, da sich andere Stufen der Übertragung nicht einstellten und das Material für die Analyse noch nicht versiegte.[89]
>
> ["Now," I ought to have said to her, "it is from Herr K. that you have made a transference on to me. Have you noticed anything that leads you to suspect me of evil intentions similar (whether openly or in some sublimated form) to Herr K.'s? Or have you been struck by anything about me or got to know anything about me which has caught your fancy, as happened previously with Herr K.?" Her attention would then have turned to some detail in our relations, or in my person or circumstances, behind which there lay concealed something analogous but immeasurably more important concerning Herr K. And when this transference had been cleared up, the analysis would have obtained access to new memories, dealing, probably, with actual events. But I was deaf to this first note of warning, thinking I had ample time before me, since no further stages of transference developed and the material for the analysis had not yet run dry.][90]

According to Freud, had he detected transferences in due time, he would have been able to turn to actual or real [*tatsächlich*] material, which suggests that transferences are, to a certain extent, assigned the status of illusory constructions. Clearing up these constructions would have allowed for actual material to come to the fore in the treatment. Freud did not attend to these clues, but instead tried to exhaust the material that was manifestly being brought to him by the patient.

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[89] Freud, *Gesammelte Werke*, 5: Werke aus den Jahren 1904–1905:282–83.
[90] Freud, *Dora*, 109.

In the passage, Freud creates a hypothetical scenario in which he would have detected the clues that Dora's discourse was laying out. He not only formulates what he would have said to Dora in this hypothetical course of the treatment, but also describes how she would have reacted, as well as how the treatment would have developed. In this way, Freud hypothetically undoes the failure of the treatment by counterfactually outlining how it could have been a successful one. He is able to rewrite the case history only after the formulation of the concept of transference.

Because Freud did not detect transferences in time and did only identify them and acknowledge their importance in the treatment after Dora left, he revisits the whole treatment in light of this concept, and retrospectively detects the clues that he had not noticed. It is only after having formulated what transference is that he can trace all its signs, and therefore the warnings that Dora gave him about her departure. The case history, and properly his failure, became readable from the standpoint of the concept of transference once this concept was formulated. It is then only belatedly that the treatment (and its failure) can be understood, and in this sense, the concept of transference is *nachträglich*. Only after being formulated, the instances that needed the concept of transference in order to be understood become intelligible and can be recognized as such.

Because of this *Nachträglichkeit*, transference can only be understood as a concept and a technical aspect of analysis in light of transference itself, considered as a structural aspect of the relationship between analyst and analysand. In other words, transference involves a certain circularity. Lacan has addressed this circularity by pointing to the position of transference as the support of speech:

> Le phénomène de transfert est lui-même placé en position de soutien de l'action de la parole. En effet, en même temps que l'on découvre le transfert, l'on découvre que si la

> parole porte comme elle a porté jusque-là avant que l'on s'en aperçoive, c'est parce qu'il y a là le transfert.[91]
>
> [The phenomenon of transference is itself positioned in such a way as to sustain the action of speech. In effect, at the same time at which transference was discovered, it was discovered that if speech hits home, as it always had before this was noticed, it is because transference is involved in it"].[92]

To explain it in Kantian terms, the condition of possibility to perceive transference is the fact that transference itself was already there. Because transference sustains the act of speech, the fact that transference may be perceived presupposes the presence of transference already. The discovery of transference consists in the acknowledgment, as it were, of a continued presence which had gone unnoticed up to that point. According to Lacan, in normal conditions of analysis,[93] transference is interpreted on the basis of and with the instrument of transference itself.[94]

We have seen in Freud how transference was formulated in his work and the connection between transference and disguise, illusion, falsehood. In a certain way, these terms anticipate the relationship that Lacan establishes between transference and fiction. This illusory character of transferences, the disguise, and the falsehood point to a distance between the analytic setting and a regular situation, underscoring the artificiality of the analytic situation. But because there is a distance with what we might mundanely call "reality" (to follow Lacan's own use of this term in the passage above), because of the artificiality of the analytic situation, it is possible for the truth of analysis to emerge. In other words, it is fiction that makes truth possible.

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[91] Lacan, *Séminaire VIII*, 210.
[92] Lacan, *Seminar 8*, 173.
[93] Lacan clarifies that these normal conditions are those of neuroses, which are the conditions in which Freud formulates the concept of transference. As we will see in the third chapter, transference in the treatment of psychosis takes a different form.
[94] Lacan, *Séminaire VIII*, 210.

Transference escaped conceptualization for Freud several times—being formulated and then forgotten in *Studien über Hysterie*, redirected into the internal processes of the psyche in *Die Traumdeutung*, undetected during Dora's treatment. One could say that it is always the case with concepts (*Begriffe*) that they can only be grasped (*begreifen*) once they are already there to be grasped; there is no such thing as an empty formulation of a concept that does not exist already there for it to be formulated. But the particularity of transference is that because it is always already there, conceptualizing it requires a peculiar perception of reality, one that can perceive the way in which a relationship functions as fictional, as actualizing something that goes beyond the person of the analyst and does not correspond to her. The perception of transference is one that needs to see that the actuality of the present through the possibility of its fictitious character, it requires the kind of perception that can see the artificiality of the way in which experience is being shaped. By turning the reality of analysis into fiction, it is possible to not only detect transference, but also conceptualize it. It is for this reason that in psychoanalysis, and due to the centrality of transference in it, in the beginning was fiction.

Chapter Two | Transference between the Lines

Even though Freud pointed in his writings to the ubiquity of transference, there were certain cases that he considered not to be treatable by psychoanalysis because transference was not possible. While neurotics would always transfer certain traits of past relationships onto the analyst, there were specific cases in which patients could not establish a transferential relationship with her—not as a result of hostility, but of indifference. The presence of transference not only made psychoanalytic treatment possible, but also shaped, in turn, the very domain of psychoanalytic technique. Because psychosis, for Freud, precludes transference, it is consequently excluded from the realm of psychoanalytic treatment.

Freud did not devote much of his work to psychosis, but he did write a case history about a psychotic patient: Daniel Paul Schreber—even if he was not his own patient. This case history differs from all others in Freud's work due to the fact that it consists in a reading of Schreber's autobiographical text, rather than an account of a treatment. There was, then, no transference not only because Freudian psychoanalysis claimed that psychotic patients were indifferent to the analyst, but also because it is not based on the development of a psychoanalytic treatment. Freud, in fact, never met Schreber. But despite this absence of transference in its strict sense, it is possible to find a different kind of transference—one that, precisely, takes place in the reading and writing of texts.

In this chapter, I analyze Freud's understanding of psychosis and the conditions that made transference impossible in these cases. I offer a reading of Schreber's own *Denkwürdigkeiten eines Nervenkranken* [*Memoirs of my Nervous Illness*] and examine Freud's reading of Schreber's memoirs. Through an analysis of the nature of this case history and the transferential aspects of Freud's presentation of Schreber's case, I address the transference that exists in reading and

writing. Much like the way in which transference was surreptitiously present in *Die Traumdeutung*, as we saw in the previous chapter, transference is also present in this case history, despite its strict impossibility from Freud's perspective. Acknowledging its presence, however, requires identifying aspects of transference outside the way in which it usually manifests. Understanding the reasons why Freudian psychoanalysis could not treat psychoses and the different kind of transference that, as I claim, is at play in Freud's analysis of Schreber reveal the manner in which the Freudian concept of transference functions and what its limits are. This analysis will be important to contrast with the Lacanian perspective, to which the third chapter is devoted.

The Impossibility of Transference

Across various works and lectures, Freud pointed out a fundamental difference between two groups of affections: the neuroses and the paraphrenias,[95] later denominated as psychoses. Freud's views on the difference between neurosis and psychosis changed throughout his work, from his early "Manuskript H" ["Draft H"] on paranoia found in his correspondence with Fliess (1895), through his reading of Daniel Paul Schreber's memoirs (1911), to his last word on psychoses in his essay "Fetischismus" ["Fetishism"] (1927),[96] where he goes back on the distinction between neuroses and psychoses that he had developed in "Neurose und Psychose" ["Neurosis and Psychosis"] (1924) and "Der Realitätsverlust bei Neurose und Psychose" ["The

[95] Laplanche and Pontalis point out that Freud did not take the term "paraphrenia" as Emil Kraepelin originally conceived it, and he himself understood it in different ways throughout his work. In his essay on narcissism, Freud uses the term paraphrenia to designate schizophrenia and paranoia, but he later abandons this terminology, under the influence of Bleuler. (*The Language of Psycho-Analysis*, 300.) I will not focus here on Freud's terminological shifts, but rather on the fact that the narcissistic neuroses or psychoses—regardless of the specific term that designates them—have an inability for transference.
[96] For an account of the different stages of development of the notion of psychosis in Freud's work, see Laplanche and Pontalis 370–71.

Loss of Reality in Neurosis and Psychosis"] (1924). But among the many differences between these affections, a distinctive trait that differentiates them is the presence and absence of transference.

Freud's nosology changed throughout his work, but an early classification opposes transference neuroses (hysteria, anxiety hysteria, and obsessional neurosis), that is, the neuroses where transference arises and which are therefore treatable by psychoanalysis, to narcissistic neuroses,[97] which Freud called paraphrenias[98] (which broadly included paranoia and schizophrenia).[99] Paraphrenic patients were not considered treatable by psychoanalysis due to their inability to establish a transferential relationship with the analyst.

This assessment of paraphrenic patients informs Freud's very definition of psychoanalysis and what it could treat. In his *Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Psychoanalyse* [*Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis*] (1915-1917), Freud starts by expressing that he must not

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[97] In a footnote to one of his technical papers, Freud points out that he would follow Jung in contrasting transference neuroses (hysteria and obsessional neurosis) with "introversion neurosis" (that is, paraphrenic affections), if it were not for the fact that such a usage would greatly limit the meaning of "introversion." (*Standard Edition*, 1966, XII (1911-1913): The Case of Schreber, Papers on Technique and Other Works:125.) This seems to suggest that the distinction between two different kind of neuroses—ones characterized by the presence of transference and others by its impossibility—as well as the fact that neuroses that are not transferential are related to the withdrawal of the libido upon the ego, were originally conceived by Jung.

[98] Laplanche and Pontalis point out that in later texts, Freud uses the category of narcissistic neuroses to designate melancholic conditions, whose treatment differs both from transference neuroses and from psychoses. (*The Language of Psycho-Analysis*, 258.) I will consider here Freud's previous understanding of narcissistic neuroses as synonymous with the psychoses, since my interest is in the presence of absence of transference in these different affections, rather than in the different treatment that a melancholic condition would receive in contrast to transference and narcissistic neuroses.

[99] In "Zur Einführung des Narzissmus" ["On Narcissism: An Introduction"], Freud uses the term paraphrenia to broadly designate both schizophrenia and paranoia, even though this designation did not remain constant in his work. However, in that same essay, he also refers to dementia praecox (schizophrenia) as "eigentliche Paraphrenie" ["paraphrenia proper"], suggesting a greater affinity between the categories of schizophrenia and paraphrenic affections, than between the categories of the latter and paranoia (see Freud, *Gesammelte Werke*, 10: Werke aus den Jahren 1913-1917:153; Freud, *Standard Edition*, 1957, XIV (1914-1916): On the History of the Psycho-Analytic Movement, Papers on Metapsychology and Other Works:86.)

assume any knowledge from his audience—since he is offering an introductory course—but that he does assume one thing: that they know "die Psychoanalyse sei ein Verfahren, wie man nervös Kranke ärztlich behandelt"[100] ["that psycho-analysis is a procedure for the medical treatment of neurotic patients"].[101] Paul Roazen points out that in Freud's time, neurosis included a wider range of problems than it would include today, but even with that consideration, the fact that psychoanalysis was designed to cure neurosis meant that the most disturbed patients were excluded.[102]

The untreatable status of paraphrenias reappears in other writings. In one of his technical papers dedicated to transference, Freud talks about the difference between positive and negative transference, and claims: "Wo die Übertragungsfähigkeit im wesentlichen negativ geworden ist, wie bei den Paranoiden, da hört die Möglichkeit der Beeinflussung und der Heilung auf"[103] ["Where the capacity for transference has become essentially limited to a negative one, as is the case with paranoiacs, there ceases to be any possibility of influence or cure"].[104] Because of this impossibility of influence or cure, Freud would initially take patients for a short period of one to two weeks in order to decide whether that patient was suitable for psychoanalytic treatment. He explains this procedure in a technical paper titled "Zur Einleitung der Behandlung" ["On beginning the treatment"] (1913). The diagnostic reasons that he lays out for beginning the treatment with this provisional period are the following:

> Oft genug, wenn man eine Neurose mit hysterischen oder Zwangssymptomen vor sich hat, von nicht exzessiver Ausprägung und von kürzerem Bestande, also gerade solche Formen, die man als günstig für die Behandlung ansehen wollte, muß man dem Zweifel

[100] Freud, *Gesammelte Werke*, 11: Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Psychoanalyse:7.
[101] Freud, *Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis*, 17.
[102] Roazen, *Brother Animal*, 30.
[103] Freud, *Gesammelte Werke*, 8: Werke aus den Jahren 1909-1913:373.
[104] Freud, *Standard Edition*, 1966, XII (1911-1913): The Case of Schreber, Papers on Technique and Other Works:107.

> Raum geben, ob der Fall nicht einem Vorstadium einer sogenannten Dementia praecox (Schizophrenie nach Bleuler, Paraphrenie nach meinem Vorschlage) entspricht und nach kürzerer oder längerer Zeit ein ausgesprochenes Bild dieser Affektion zeigen wird. (…) Er [der Psychoanalitiker] kann sein Heilungsversprechen nicht halten, wenn der Kranke nicht an Hysterie oder Zwangsneurose, sondern an Paraphrenie leidet (…).[105]
>
> [Often enough, when one sees a neurosis with hysterical or obsessional symptoms, which is not excessively marked and has not been in existence for long—just the type of case, that is, that one would regard as suitable for treatment—one has to reckon with the possibility that it may be a preliminary stage of what is known as dementia praecox ('schizophrenia', in Bleuler's terminology; 'paraphrenia', as I have proposed to call it), and that sooner or later it will show a well-marked picture of that affection. (…) He [the psychoanalyst] cannot fulfill his promise of cure of the patient is suffering, not from hysteria or obsessional neurosis, but from paraphrenia (…).][106]

In order to assess whether the patient can be treated by psychoanalysis, Freud gathers clues that indicate whether her affection might not be a neurotic one, but instead a paraphrenic one. The promise of cure cannot be fulfilled when a patient suffers from paraphrenias (that is, psychoses), as these are in a blind spot of Freudian psychoanalytic technique.

In his essay on narcissism, Freud addresses the question of paraphrenias directly, revealing the rationale behind the term "narcissistic neuroses." He explains the ways in which paraphrenics and neurotics, respectively, turn away from the outer world, and points to the connection between paraphrenias and narcissism. Freud points out that neurotics, although they abandon their relation to reality, still retain their erotic relations to both persons and things, as they retain these in fantasy. But paraphrenics, on the contrary, have radically withdrawn their libido from persons and things in the world, and (unlike neurotics) have not replaced them with imaginary objects. Freud explains that when this substitution with imaginary objects does in fact

[105] Freud, *Gesammelte Werke*, 8: Werke aus den Jahren 1909-1913:455–56.
[106] Freud, *Standard Edition*, 1966, XII (1911-1913): The Case of Schreber, Papers on Technique and Other Works:124.

happen, it is part of an effort towards recovery, an attempt to lead the libido back to real objects. Hallucinations are one example of this effort.[107]

While withdrawing their libido from reality, then, neurotics retain their persons and objects in fantasy, which is what allows for transference with an analyst to be established. And because paraphrenics withdraw their libido from everything in the world and do not replace those objects with imaginary ones, a transferential relationship with an analyst is, from this Freudian perspective, impossible. Imaginary objects, then, make transference possible; the fact that neurotics retain objects in their imagination implies a connection to reality that paraphrenics do not have.

The inability for transference that Freud finds in paraphrenics explains the lack of development that psychosis has in Freudian thought,[108] as well as the absence of case histories of psychotic patients. There is, as I mentioned, an exception to this: the Schreber case. This case did analyze the nervous illness of a paranoiac but, as Freud explains in the introduction to the case, it did not result from a psychoanalytic treatment, but from a psychoanalytic reading.

From Cosmology to Personal Fortunes

The Schreber case is meaningfully different from all other case histories. In the very beginning of the case history, Freud explicitly clarifies that he never met Schreber.[109] Rather than

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[107] Freud, *Papers on Metapsychology*, 42.

[108] Whenever Freud addressed the question of psychoses, he focused on paranoia and barely on what is considered schizophrenia (which he called paraphrenia or paraphrenia proper).

[109] It should be pointed out, however, that Freud did consider visiting Schreber. As he tells Jung in a letter: "I share your enthusiasm for Schreber; it is a kind of revelation. (…) After another reading I may be able to resolve all the intriguing fantasies; I didn't quite succeed the first time. Since the man is still alive, I was thinking of asking him for certain information (e.g., when he got married) and for permission to work on his story. But perhaps that would be risky. What do you think? –" (Freud and Jung, *The Freud/Jung Letters*, 358.)

a case that recounts the development of a treatment conducted by Freud, as I mentioned, the Schreber case is a reading of the autobiographical text written by Daniel Paul Schreber himself.[110] Published as *Psychoanalytische Bemerkungen über einen Autobiographisch Beschriebenen Fall von Paranoia (Dementia Paranoides)* [*Psychoanalytic Notes upon an Autobiographical Account of a Case of Paranoia (Dementia Paranoides)*] in 1911, Freud's case history presents an analysis of Schreber's *Denkwürdigkeiten eines Nervenkranken* (1903). In the introduction, Freud does not only explain that he is analyzing Schreber's *Denkwürdigkeiten*, but even invites the reader to read the memoirs "wenigstens durch einmalige Lektüre"[111] ["at least once beforehand"].[112] Following Freud's advice, I will offer an initial reading of Schreber's autobiographical text before delving into Freud's reading of Schreber's memoirs in the following section.

Schreber was a lawyer and a judge who, according to his memoirs, had two major crises,[113] one in 1884—at the age of 42—from which he recovered well a year later, and another in 1893—at the age of 51—which led him to spend nine years in the hospital.[114] He wrote his memoirs during this second nervous illness, between the years 1897 and 1900, and published them in 1903, after his recovery. Historians note that Schreber had a third crisis in 1907—at the

[110] Lothane points out that the analysis that Freud carries out is not a clinical one, but "an exercise in applied psychoanalysis," which is the hermeneutical method that he had used in other essays, such as the one devoted to Leonardo Da Vinci. As Lothane explains, the goal of this hermeneutic method is to identify and decode universal symbols and certain assumptions and generalizations (Lothane, "Schreber, Freud, Flechsig, and Weber Revisited," 207.)
[111] Freud, *Gesammelte Werke*, 8: Werke aus den Jahren 1909-1913:242.
[112] Freud, *Three Case Histories*, 85.
[113] Schreber referred to these crises as "nervous breakdowns," since his own diagnosis of his illness—as Lothane points out—was that he was a *Nervenkranker*, rather than a *Geisteskranker*, a distinction that he may have borrowed from his doctor Flechsig (Lothane, "Schreber, Freud, Flechsig, and Weber Revisited," 222.
[114] Schreber, *Memoirs*, 44.

age of 65— in the context of his mother's death and his wife's stroke, which lasted until his death three years later.[115]

Schreber's presentation of his own illness is remarkably systematic. He devotes the first pages to very general topics, such as theology and the theory of the soul, and introduces terms and concepts that are central to his subsequent development, like the idea of the "purification of souls" and the "state of Blessedness." The figure of God plays a central role throughout Schreber's account, and he honors this centrality by devoting the beginning of his memoirs to theological considerations, as well as by making God the elucidative principle of what follows, which are no less than his personal experiences. Schreber organized his ideas in a thematic way, and as the memoirs get into the particularities of his "*eigenen persönlichen Schicksale*"[116] ["*personal* fortunes"],[117] it becomes clear that this text is the result of a plan that went through several stages. He announces in the first chapters what he will say in subsequent ones, and he refers to previous moments of the memoirs in later chapters, as if his illness were an archive whose materials needed arrangement.

It is worth pointing out that while the first chapter has the tone of a philosophical treatise on cosmology and theology, Schreber changes the tone towards the end of his memoirs regarding the very ideas that he presented in that first chapter. He explicitly refers to the beginning of his memoirs and points out that he cannot offer a detailed scientific account of that cosmogenic theory, given that he lacks the scientific sources, the health conditions, and the "schärferer Verstand" ["sharp intellect"] that would be necessary to undertake such a colossal

[115] McGlashan, "Psychosis as a Disorder of Reduced Cathectic Capacity," 476–77.
[116] Schreber, *Denkwürdigkeiten*, 25.
[117] Schreber, *Memoirs*, 44.

task.[118] Schreber is explicit about what he believes he can express through his writing and what his experiences can show.

Also in stark contrast with the tone of the beginning of the memoirs, Schreber returns to the idea of the relationship between God and his creation—once again referring to his first chapter—and claims: "Es kann nicht in meiner Absicht liegen, eine eigentliche wissenschaftliche Begründung dieser Grundansschauung zu liefern; ich beabsichtige nickt ein wissenschaftliches Werk über die Entwickelungsgeschichte des Weltalls zu schreiben"[119] ["I cannot be expected to furnish scientific proof of this fundamental idea; I do not intend writing a scientific treatise on the history of the evolution of the universe"].[120] But while Schreber might not intend to present an all-encompassing theory of the universe, he does show an interest in understanding his personal illness in constant reference to a larger framework or entity. Either because the miracles that he experiences are, in his view, emanating from God, or because he challenges psychiatric theory in order to advocate for his own explanation of his illness. There is a constant tug of war between his case history and a general figure of authority, be that God, his doctors, or the theories that are at the basis of these doctors' practice.

Schreber is aware of the limitations of his own account not only regarding his ability to address grand theological and cosmological ideas, but also in relation to the material and psychological conditions in which his memoirs were written. When he talks about the difficulties in writing his memoir, especially at a period that he describes as the "grausigste" ["most gruesome"] but also as his "*heilige Zeit*" ["*holy time*"], he explains that his difficulties were both internal and external. On the one hand, he would often have to rely on memory because of his

[118] Schreber, *Denkwürdigkeiten*, 176; Schreber, *Memoirs*, 217.
[119] Schreber, *Denkwürdigkeiten*, 185.
[120] Schreber, *Memoirs*, 226.

lack of access to writing materials, and, on the other hand, he would not always feel inclined to write, "da ich damals – ob mit Recht oder Unrecht bleibe vorläufig dahingestellt – die ganze Menschheit untergegangen glaubte, also irgend ein Zweck für schriftliche Aufzeichnungen nicht ersichtlich gewesen wäre" ["because at that time—whether rightly or wrongly must for the present remain undecided—I believed the whole of mankind to have perished, so that there was no purpose in writing notes"].[121] Later in his memoirs, he explains that he eventually got access to writing materials and recounts the different kinds of notes that he was able to take at different moments. He started by writing unconnected thoughts or writing entries in a small calendar, and then began keeping regular diaries where he entered all his experiences, all of which was the basis of what ultimately became his *Denkwürdigkeiten*.

The initial presentation of concepts and general reflections in the first two chapters is followed by specific experiences and symptoms in the subsequent chapters. Schreber's narration becomes more chronological, and he goes into great detail about the noises that he heard, the moments of the day in which he had specific feelings, his perception of how his illness developed, specific events that were followed by changes in his symptoms. He even describes the spaces in the different institutions where he was treated and includes floor plans of them. Space and time, then, only appear in the memoirs after the axiomatic presentation of the theological and cosmological framework that contains the temporal and spatial aspects of Schreber's experiences. By starting his memoirs with reflections on the relationship between God and his creation, Schreber establishes from the very start a connection between cosmological and theological elements, on the one hand, and his "personal fortunes," on the other.

[121] Schreber, *Denkwürdigkeiten*, 47–48; Schreber, *Memoirs*, 69–71.

These detailed experiences, indeed, are often presented as connected with the larger context and with explanations beyond the particularity they describe. For instance, Schreber recounts:

> Ich erwog Möglichkeiten, wie die, daß die ganze Flechsig'sche Anstalt oder vielleicht die Stadt Leipzig mit ihr aus der Erde »ausgehoben« und nach irgend einem anderen Weltkörper versetzt worden sei, Möglichkeiten, auf die die Fragen der mit mir redenden Stimme (…). Das Fenster meines Schlafzimmers war in der Nacht mit einem schweren hölzernen Laden versschlossen, sodaß mir der Anblick des nächtlichen Himmels entzogen war. Am Tage sah ich über die Mauern des Anstaltsgartens hinaus nur wenige der unmittelbar anstoßenden Gebäude. (…) Das Pfeifen der Eisenbahnzüge, das mir doch kaum hätte entgehen können, habe ich lange Zeit hindurch niemals vernommen. Nur das Fortbrennen der Gasflammen machte mich in der Annahme einer völligen Isolierung der Flechsig'schen Anstalt wieder irre, da ich danach doch irgend einen Zusammenhang mit der Stadt Leipzig annehmen mußte, wenn ich nicht gerade an die Möglichkeit eines für die Anstalt eigens errichteten Gasometers denken wollte.[122]
>
> [I pondered over such possibilities as that the whole of Flechsig's Asylum or perhaps the city of Leipzig with it had been "dug out" and removed to some other celestial body, all of them possibilities which questions asked by the voices who talked to me seemed to hint at (…). My bedroom window was closed up with a heavy wooden shutter at night so that the sight of the night sky was denied me. In day-time I saw over and beyond the walls of the Asylum only a few of the buildings immediately bordering on it. (…) The whistle of trains, which I could hardly have missed, I did not hear at all for some considerable time. Only the fact that the gaslights continued burning made me doubt whether Flechsig's Asylum was in fact completely isolated, or it forced me to recognize some connection with the city of Leipzig, if I was not to assume that the Asylum had had its own special gasometer built.][123]

The association between specific details of Schreber's experiences and what exceeds them appears, then, in relation to phenomena that transcend lived experience.

The tone of Schreber's account of his experiences is not merely descriptive. True to his training as a lawyer, Schreber's will to convince the reader of the truthfulness of his account by presenting the "evidence" that he has gathered in his memoirs often seems to be the driving force of the memoirs. From the very beginning, Schreber frequently refers to the degree of

[122] Schreber, *Denkwürdigkeiten*, 53–54.
[123] Schreber, *Memoirs*, 77.

"correctness" [*Richtigkeit*] of his statements. The conviction behind his drive to convince his reader of the truthfulness of the evidence that he presents and the correctness of his statements is clearly explained in the first series of postscripts to the *Denkwürdigkeiten*. In these postscripts, he addresses hallucinations and claims: "Die Wissenschaft scheint nach Demjenigen, was ich darüber z.B. bei Kräpelin, Psychiatrie Bd. I, Seite 102 ff. der 6. Auflage lese, für alle Halluzinationen die Existenz eines realen Hintergrundes zu verneinen. Dies ist nach meinem Dafürhalten mindestens in solcher Allgemeinheit entschieden unrichtig"[124] ["Science seems to deny any reality background for hallucinations, judging from what I have read for instance in Kraepelin, PSYCHIATRY, Vol. 1, p. 102 ff., 6th edition. In my opinion this is definitely erroneous, at least if so generalized"].[125] Schreber then proceeds to explain how it might sometimes be the case that hallucinations create impressions of events that do not exist in reality, but his certainty regarding the external cause for his own sensations makes him confident that there must be other cases like his. The fact that Schreber cites Emil Kraepelin in detail, considering the latter's standing in the field of psychiatry at the time, reveals to what extent he wants to convince his reader of the correctness of his statements: his own experiences should be acknowledged by general psychiatric theory. Kraepelin's lack of acknowledgement of what Schreber understands as the reality of hallucinations is, from his perspective, an act of denial on the part of science, rather than an element that can contribute to the explanation of his illness.

Schreber's insistence on confronting specific aspects of his illness with psychiatric theory, his emphasis on the relation between God and his creation, and his description of the specific ways in which he was connected with God could be interpreted as an attempt to

[124] Schreber, *Denkwürdigkeiten*, 224.
[125] Schreber, *Memoirs*, 269.

conceptualize himself. There is a constant reference to the greater framework in which he or his illness could be understood, and an attempt to rationalize his own place in that framework. In the very last pages of his memoirs, Schreber concludes them with the following comparison:

> Wenn ich mir vergegenwärtige, welche Opfer durch Verlust einer ehrenvollen Berufsstellung, durch thatsächliche Auflösung einer glücklichen Ehe, durch Entbehrung aller Lebensgenüsse, durch körperliche Schmerzen, geistige Martern und Schrecknisse völlig unbekannter Art mir auferlegt worden sind, so ergiebt sich für mich das Bild eines Martyriums, das ich in seiner Gesammtheit nur mit dem Kreuzestod Jesu Christi vergleichen kann.[126]
>
> [When I think of my sacrifices through loss of an honorable professional position, a happy marriage practically dissolved, deprived of all the pleasures of life, subjected to bodily pain, mental torture and terrors of a hitherto unknown kind, the picture emerges of a martyrdom which all in all I can only compare with the crucifixion of Jesus Christ.][127]

The interpretations that Schreber presents appear to seek universal coherence, where the miracles that he experiences, God and the cosmos, the changes in his symptoms, his doctors' treatment, and his relationship with them all had specific roles within this all-encompassing totality. All these different elements give meaning to one another, and because of these mutual relationships, an incoherent fact stands out as getting in the way of the totality's coherence. Such is the case when he cites Kraepelin regarding hallucinations—a reference that he includes in the appendix, perhaps looking back at the general meaning of the memoirs.

To go back to Schreber's persuasive tone, it is possible to find this will to present a convincing case from the very beginning. Before the very memoirs, Schreber included an open letter to his first psychiatrist, Paul Flechsig, who treated him during his first nervous illness and the first part of the second one. And in this open letter, Schreber explains:

> Sie werden, wie andere Menschen, geneigt sein, in dieser Annahme zunächst nur eine pathologisch zu beurtheilende Ausgeburt meiner Phantasie zu erblicken; für mich ist eine

[126] Schreber, *Denkwürdigkeiten*, 214–15.
[127] Schreber, *Memoirs*, 258.

> geradezu erdrückende Fülle von Beweisgründen für die Richtigkeit derselben vorhanden, worüber Sie das Nähere aus dem Gesammtinhalt meiner Denkwürdigkeiten entnehmen wollen.[128]
>
> [You like other people may be inclined at first to see nothing but a pathological offspring of my imagination in this; but I have an almost overwhelming amount of proof of its correctness, details of which you will find in the content of my 'Memoirs.'][129]

And indeed, he presents evidence at different points of his memoirs—for example, when after having presented some of the thoughts he had, the voices he heard, and the explanations for some of the terms that guide his narration, he focuses on one specific miracle related to the piano in Flechsig's asylum.[130] He felt the paralysis of his fingers, the diversion of his own fingers to the wrong keys, and even explains that the piano itself was often the object of miracles, which caused some strings to break. In the context of this specific episode, he states that this was one of the few instances that, according to him, "auch für andere Menschen überzeugenden Beweis für die Wirklichkeit der von mir behaupteten Wunder liefern zu können"[131] ["furnishes sufficient proof to convince other people of the reality of the miracles which I maintain happen"].[132]

The open letter to Flechsig foregrounds a fundamental element of the memoirs—as well as of the analyses that the memoirs elicited—which is Schreber's relationship with Flechsig. It is

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128 Schreber, *Denkwürdigkeiten*, VII.
129 Schreber, *Memoirs*, 8.
130 The will to convince the reader and the insistence in coherence should not be understood as Schreber's mere conviction. He presents himself not as the author of the very terms he uses to name his symptoms, but rather as a witness to his own affections. When he introduces the "sogennanten »*Schreckwunder*«" ["so-called *frightening-miracles*"], for example, he specifically clarifies: "»Schreckwunder« - der nicht von mir, sondern von den Stimmen herrührende Ausdruck ist der wenigstens ursprünglich damit beabsichtigten *Wirkung* entlehnt – werden seit Jahren in den verschiedensten Formen in meiner Nähe geübt" (Schreber, *Denkwürdigkeiten*, 182.) ["The term frightening-miracle is not my own but originates from the voices; it indicates the originally intended *effect* of these miracles; they have been practiced near me in many forms for years" (Schreber, *Memoirs*, 223.)]
131 Schreber, *Denkwürdigkeiten*, 124.
132 Schreber, *Memoirs*, 158.

partly in the context of his relationship with his doctors that Schreber attempts to present a convincing case for his own interpretation of his illness. In this open letter, which was sent to Flechsig along with a copy of the memoirs, Schreber attempts to provide some context to some of the experiences he presents in the memoirs, and even points to the impact that Flechsig had in his treatment, ending with questions for Flechsig regarding specific events. Schreber directly asks Flechsig about the nature of the influence that he had on him and provides a possible explanation for this. One of Schreber's main conclusions regarding his relationship with Flechsig is the following:

> Besteht für mich nicht der leiseste Zweifel darüber, daß der erste Anstoß zu Demjenigen, was von meinen Aerzten immer als bloße »Halluzinationen« aufgefaßt worden ist, für mich aber einen Verkehr mit übersinnlichen Kräften bedeutet, in einer von Ihrem Nervensystem ausgehenden Einwirkung auf mein Nervensystem bestanden hat. Worin könnte wohl die Erklärung dieses Umstands gefunden werden? Es scheint mir naheliegend, an die Möglichkeit zu denken, daß Sie – wie ich gern annehmen will, zunächst nur zu Heilzwecken – eine hypnotisierenden, suggerirenden oder wie immer sonst zu bezeichnenden Verkehr und zwar auch beinräumlicher Trennung mit meinen Nerven unterhalten haben.[133]
>
> [I have not the least doubt that the *first impetus* to what my doctors always considered mere "hallucinations" but which to me signified communication with supernatural powers, consisted of *influences on my nervous system emanating from your nervous system*. How could this be explained? I think it is possible that you—at first as I am quite prepared to believe only for therapeutic purposes—carried on some hypnotic, suggestive, or whatever else one could call it, contact with my nerves, *even while we were separated in space*.][134]

He constantly reflects on his relationship with Flechsig and speculates about the reasons behind some of the decisions Flechsig makes regarding Schreber's treatment.[135]

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[133] Schreber, *Denkwürdigkeiten*, VIII.
[134] Schreber, *Memoirs*, 8; emphasis added by translator.
[135] In fact, by explaining the influence of Flechsig on him as an influence on his nervous system emanating from his doctor's nervous system, Schreber offers what could be considered a *sui generis* definition of transference.

Schreber recounts his initial encounter with Flechsig in the opening chapter where he begins addressing his "personal fortunes." He had a positive impression of Flechsig after the treatment of his first illness (which, as he notes, had no supernatural events), and when he and his wife went to see him again after the early signs of his second illness, they both placed all their faith on Flechsig,[136] given the success of his first treatment. Schreber had a long interview with Flechsig, in which he "eine hervorragende Beredtsamkeit entwickelte, die nicht ohne tiefere Wirkung auf mich blieb"[137] ["developed a remarkable eloquence which affected me deeply"].[138]

At a moment in which his illness seemed to be getting worse, Schreber explains that after his wife's trip to Berlin with her father, he saw his wife only once more, since he did not want her to see him in such a low state. Her wife's visits ceased and he underwent a series of changes. Schreber explains that after this time, there was a shift—it is then that his contact with "übersinnlichen Kräften" ["supernatural powers"] began and, as he clarifies,

> namentlich eines Nervenanhangs hervor, den Professor Flechsig mit mir in der Weise unterhielt, daß er zu meinen Nerven sprach, ohne persönlich anwesend zu sein. Von dieser Zeit ab gewann ich auch den Eindruck, daß Professor Flechsig nichts Gutes mit mir im Schilde führe; Bestätigung schien mir dieser Eindruck dadurch zu finden, daß Professor Flechsig, als ich einmal bei einem persönlichen Besuche ihn aus Gewissen fragte, ob we wirklich an die Möglichkeit einer Heilung bei mir glaubte, zwar gewisse Vertröstungen abgab, *aber* – so schien es mir wenigstens – *mir dabei nicht mehr in die Augen sehen konnte*.[139]
>
> [particularly that of nerve-contact which Professor Flechsig kept up with me in such a way that he spoke to my nerves without being present in person. From then on I also gained the impression that Professor Flechsig had secret designs against me; this seemed confirmed when I once asked him during a personal visit whether he really honestly believed that I could be cured, and he held out certain hopes, *but could no longer*—at least so it seemed to me—*look me straight in the eye*.][140]

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136 Schreber, *Memoirs*, 48.
137 Schreber, *Denkwürdigkeiten*, 28.
138 Schreber, *Memoirs*, 48.
139 Schreber, *Denkwürdigkeiten*, 32.
140 Schreber, *Memoirs*, 53.

The first supernatural occurrences take place no less than in relation to his doctor. In the beginning, based on the successful treatment of his first illness, Schreber had faith in Flechsig's ability to cure him, and when his illness got worse, he interpreted that Flechsig's "Heilplan" ["plan of curing"] involved seeking to intensify his nervous depression to bring about a cure.[141] However, after the shift caused by his contact with supersensible powers, he began to suspect that Flechsig was plotting against him, which Schreber claims with more certainty later on: "ein gegen mich gerichtetes Komplott fertig (…), welches dahinging, nach einmal erkannter oder angenommener Unheilbarkeit meiner Nervenkrankheit mich einem Menschen in der Weise auszuliefern"[142] ["a plot was laid against me (…), the purpose of which was to hand me over to another human being after my nervous illness had been recognized as, or assumed to be, incurable"].[143]

What can be read regarding Flechsig in the *Denkwürdigkeiten* is only part of what Schreber originally wrote. There were certain parts of Schreber's manuscript that were considered unfit for publication and, as Zvi Lothane explains, much of what was omitted in the published version of the memoirs had to do with his remarks about Flechsig, like in chapter 3 or footnotes 24 and 91. According to Lothane, Schreber had to tone down his reproach towards Flechsig for political and legal reasons. Since Flechsig, on whom all faith in a possible cure had been placed, transferred Schreber to another hospital and was no longer devoted to curing him, Schreber accused him of "soul murder" [*Seelenmord*]—Lothane interprets this as a masked accusation of malpractice that would be less socially risky than a direct one. As Lothane explains: "Call

141 Schreber, *Denkwürdigkeiten*, 29; Schreber, *Memoirs*, 50.
142 Schreber, *Denkwürdigkeiten*, 41.
143 Schreber, *Memoirs*, 63.

malpractice soul murder and become immune from prosecution for slander. For, a hallucinator can be held responsible for his hallucinations no more than can a dreamer for his dreams."[144]

I have presented an overview of some of the main aspects of Schreber's memoir, focusing on its shifts in tone, his relationship with writing, the conceptualization that he offers of his own illness, the presence of the figure of God, and his relationship with Flechsig. In the following section, I will present Freud's reading of Schreber's autobiographical text. In particular, how did Freud position himself in his reading of the *Denkwürdigkeiten* as well as in the writing of his case history?

A Case without Acquaintance

Freud is usually the reader's only access to the story, and he often explicitly acknowledges this fact when he explains to the reader his own limitations in the writing of a case history based on a treatment. For example, at the beginning of the Dora case, Freud points out that some specific methodological difficulties that arise in the writing of reports of cases include the absence of notes, which he does not take in presence of the patient to avoid causing insecurity in her.[145] The Schreber case, however, is based on a story that can be read by anyone. The fact that Freud invites his readers to be readers of Schreber along with him makes Schreber's case remarkably different from all other case histories.[146] In most case histories, the narrative with which Freud organizes a case history can only be contrasted with hypothetical

144 Lothane, "Schreber, Freud, Flechsig, and Weber Revisited," 235.
145 Freud, *Dora*, 4.
146 The very fact that the Schreber case is considered a case history is not an insignificant one. As Lothane points out, in the strictest sense, Freud's reading of Schreber's memoirs is not a case history, but it was listed as such in the *Standard Edition* of Freud's works, as well as in other publications (Lothane, "Schreber, Freud, Flechsig, and Weber Revisited," 207.)

alternative narratives, which can only be constructed by reading between the lines, consulting other sources, or through speculation. In the Schreber case, on the contrary, the reader has direct access to the material on which Freud based his narrative, which means that she also has the ability not only to conceive other narratives, but also to acknowledge the contingent characteristics of Freud's interpretation and identify the elements that he stresses or omits. In other words, the transferential aspect of Freud's reading comes to the fore from the moment we are reading Schreber along with Freud, rather than through him.

Freud takes the aforementioned invitation to the reader further when he stresses the limits of his own interpretation. He explains how someone with greater knowledge of Schreber's family and life history would be able to explain the origin of his delusions.[147] In addition to his lack of more detailed knowledge about Schreber, Freud explains that he only offers a "ein Mindestmaß von Deutung" ["minimum of interpretation"] and points out that "[w]er in der Deutung dreister wäre als ich" ["[a]ny one who was more daring than I am in making interpretations"] might have been able to draw more conclusions from the information that Schreber provided in his memoirs.[148] In other words, more far-reaching conclusions would be possible due to either boldness or more extensive knowledge, as Freud claims to have neither. The reader, unlike Freud, might be able to reach other conclusions:

> [Ich] darf darauf vertrauen, daß jeder psychoanalytisch geschulte Leser aus dem mitgeteilten Material mehr entnommen haben wird, als ich ausdrücklich ausspreche, daß es ihm nicht schwer gefallen ist, die Fäden des Zusammenhanges enger anzuziehen und Schlußfolgerungen zu erreichen, die ich bloß andeute.[149]
>
> [I feel confident that every reader with a knowledge of psychoanalysis will have learned from the material which I presented more than was explicitly stated by me, and that he

[147] Freud, *Three Case Histories*, 132.
[148] Schreber, *Denkwürdigkeiten*, 293, 317; Freud, *Three Case Histories*, 132, 157.
[149] Schreber, *Denkwürdigkeiten*, 317.

> will have found no difficulty in drawing the threads closer and in reaching conclusions at which I no more than hinted.][150]

Freud claims, in this way, to have left certain clues for the reader to continue the work of interpretation. The reader can not only analyze the same material that he has—that is, the memoirs—but can also take Freud's interpretation further by picking up on his suggestions and turning them into more developed conclusions.

Freud also directly acknowledges his limitations in the treatment of paranoia. At the beginning of Schreber's case, he points out that he does not have many opportunities to treat psychotic patients, since a public institution is necessary for the treatment of psychosis and that without this institutional framework, there is no prospect for therapeutic success. Freud even provides a conceptual explanation for why he is offering an analysis based on a written account:

> Da die Paranoiker nicht zur Überwindung ihrer inneren Widerstände gezwungen werden können und ohnedies nur sagen, was sie sagen wollen, darf gerade bei dieser Affektion der schriftliche Bericht oder die gedruckte Krankengeschichte als Ersatz für die persönliche Bekanntschaft mit dem Kranken eintreten. Ich halte es darum nicht für unstatthaft, analytische Deutungen an die Krankengeschichte eines Paranoikers (Dementia paranoides) zu knüpfen, den ich nie gesehen habe, der aber seine Krankengeschichte selbst beschrieben und zur öffentlichen Kenntnis durch den Druck gebracht hat.[151]
>
> [Since paranoiacs cannot be compelled to overcome their internal resistances, and since in any case they only say what they choose to say, it follows that this is precisely a disorder in which a written report or a printed case history can take the place of personal acquaintance with the patient. For this reason I think it is legitimate to base analytic interpretations upon the case history of a patient suffering from paranoia (or, more precisely, from dementia paranoides) whom I have never seen, but who has written his own case history and brought it before the public in print.][152]

In the original text, Freud states that he "does not consider it inadmissible" ("Ich halte es darum nicht für unstatthaft") to present an interpretation based on the clinical history of a paranoiac

[150] Freud, *Three Case Histories*, 157.
[151] Freud, *Gesammelte Werke*, 8: Werke aus den Jahren 1909-1913:240–41.
[152] Freud, *Three Case Histories*, 83–84.

that he has never met. The reason that he offers is that paranoiacs cannot be forced to overcome their inner resistances. What Freud does not completely clarify is whether there is something about the history being written ("der schriftliche Bericht") that makes the writer overcome internal resistances, or if in a written report, the very absence of an analyst does not cause resistances to arise in the first place. In other words, it could be the case that writing has an active effect on resistances, or that the absence of an interpersonal transferential relationship in the framework of a psychoanalytic treatment prevents resistances from ever arising.

Freud's reading focuses on some specific elements of Schreber's memoirs. One is the idea of being transformed into a woman, which for Freud is "das Punctum saliens, der erste Keim der Wahnbildung"[153] ["the salient feature and the earliest germ of his delusional system"].[154] Before the onset of his second illness, Schreber woke up one morning feeling that "es doch eigentlich recht schön sein müsse, ein Weib zu sein, das dem Beischlaf unterliege" ["it really must be rather pleasant to be a woman succumbing to intercourse"].[155] Freud places this feeling at center of his interpretation of Schreber's *Denkwürdigkeiten*. The other main element of Schreber's delusion, according to Freud, is his privileged relation to God. As he explains, these

[153] Freud, *Gesammelte Werke*, 8: Werke aus den Jahren 1909-1913:253.
[154] Freud, *Three Case Histories*, 96.
[155] Schreber, *Memoirs*, 46.

two elements were united in Schreber's feeling that he was God's wife,[156] and Freud's analysis aims to show the genetic connection between them.[157]

There is yet another aspect that receives considerable emphasis in Freud's analysis of Schreber's memoirs, which is Schreber's relationship with his doctor, Flechsig. As Freud points out, Flechsig played a fundamental role in Schreber's delusions of persecution, which leads Freud to present a formula that explains the relationship between the patient and his persecutor. According to this formula, someone in the patient's present life, who shares many characteristics with someone from the patient's past, becomes extremely powerful and influential and becomes the prosecutor in the patient's delusion. As Freud proceeds to explain, "Die Gefühlsbedeutung wird als äußerliche Macht projiziert, der Gefühlston ins Gegenteil verkehrt; der jetzt wegen seiner Verfolgung Gehaßte und Gefürchtete sei ein einstiger Geliebter und Verehrter"[158] ["The intensity of the emotion is projected outwards in the shape of external power, while its quality is changed into the opposite. The person who is now hated and feared as a persecutor was at one time loved and honoured"].[159]

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[156] In a footnote, Schreber describes the feeling of being fertilized by God (which Freud quotes): "Etwas der Empfängniß Jesu Christi von Seiten einer unbefleckten Jungfrau – d.h. von einer solche, die niemals Umgang mit einem Manne gepflogen hat – Aehnliches ist in meinem eigenen Leibe vorgegangen. Ich habe (und zwar zu der Zeit, als ich noch in der Flechsig'schen Anstalt war) zu zwei verschiedenen Malen bereits einen wenn auch etwas mangelhaft entwickelten weiblichen Geschlechtstheil gehabt und in meine Leibe hüpfende Bewegungen, wie sie den ersten Lebensregungen des menschlichen Embryo entsprechen, empfunden: durch göttliches Wunder waren dem männlichen Samen entsprechende Gottesnerven in meinen Leib geworfen worden; es hatte also eine Befruchtung stattgefunden" (Schreber, *Denkwürdigkeiten*, 3.) ["Something like the conception of Jesus Christ by an Immaculate Virgin—i.e. one who never had intercourse with a man—happened in my own body. Twice at different times (while I was still in Flechsig's Asylum) I had a female genital organ, although a poorly developed one, and in my body felt quickening like the first signs of life of a human embryo: by a divine miracle God's nerves corresponding to make seed had been thrown into my body; in other words fertilization had occurred"] (Schreber, *Memoirs*, 17–18.)

[157] Freud, *Gesammelte Werke*, 8: Werke aus den Jahren 1909-1913:268; Freud, *Three Case Histories*, 107.

[158] Freud, *Gesammelte Werke*, 8: Werke aus den Jahren 1909-1913:275–76.

[159] Freud, *Three Case Histories*, 116.

The external projection of something internal, which later appears merely as coming from outside, is a crucial phenomenon of psychosis. This formula presented by Freud evokes the phenomenon of transference, although it is a kind of transference in which there is not only the evocation of a person of one's past by a person of one's present, but there is also a reversal in quality, in which that evocation may have been associated with positive feelings, and later becomes an external force and the figure of the persecutor. The origin of this process is erased, and the persecutory nature of the person who is now hated appears as a given and incontrovertible fact.

Later in the case history, Freud explains that projection is characteristic of symptom-formation in paranoia. As Freud explains this process: "Eine innere Wahrnehmung wird unterdrückt und zum Ersatz für sie kommt ihr Inhalt, nachdem er eine gewisse Entstellung erfahren hat, als Wahrnehmung von außen zum Bewußtsein"[160] ["An internal perception is suppressed, and, instead, its content, after undergoing a certain degree of distortion, enters consciousness in the form of an external perception"].[161] It is not only the case, then, that something internal is projected outwards, but even more, what is projected outwards fails to be recognized as having ever been internal. It becomes a foreign perception. This general explanation of projection helps understand the mechanism of paranoia, as well as how Flechsig becomes the prosecutor in Schreber's mind. What was once internal and recognizable appears, after being projected outwards, as an external perception that is not recognized has having ever been internal. When Freud explained the uncanny as the return of the repressed, that return involved a particular kind of recognition of something that was once familiar and returns as

[160] Freud, *Gesammelte Werke*, 8: Werke aus den Jahren 1909-1913:302–3.
[161] Freud, *Three Case Histories*, 142.

unfamiliar or distorted. In this case, there is a complete lack of recognition. What was once projected appears as imposing itself from the outside as inevitable and invincible.

Freud explains the importance of the relationship to Flechsig in the second illness by pointing to what happened in its period of incubation. When Freud brings up the dream that Schreber had, in which he thought that it would be nice to be a woman submitting to the act of copulation, he notes that in the *Denkwürdigkeiten*, Schreber mentions this after talking about his recurrent dream of his old nervous illness coming back. The passage from the *Denkwürdigkeiten* reads:

> Es träumte mir einige Male, daß meine frühere Nervenkrankheit wieder zurückgekehrt sei, worüber ich dann natürlich im Traume ebenso unglücklich war, als ich mich nach dem Erwachen glücklich fühlte, daß es eben nur rein Traum gewesen war. Ferner hatte ich einmal gegen Morgen noch in Bette liegend (ob noch halb schlafend oder schon wachend weiß ich nicht mehr) eine Erfindung, die mich beim späteren Nachdenken in vollständig wachem Zustande höchst sonderbar berührte. Es war die Vorstellung daß es doch eigentlich recht schön sein müsse, ein Weib zu sein, das dem Beischlaf unterliege.[162]
>
> [I dreamt several times that my former nervous illness had returned; naturally I was as unhappy about this in the dream, as I felt happy on waking that it had only been a dream. Furthermore, one morning while still in bed (whether still half asleep or already awake I cannot remember), I had a feeling which, thinking about it later when fully awake, struck me as highly peculiar. It was the idea that it really must be rather pleasant to be a woman succumbing to intercourse.][163]

This association is meaningful for Freud and leads him to infer that the fact that Schreber dreamed of the illness coming back manifested Schreber's longing to see Flechsig once again.[164] According to Freud, Schreber remembered his physician when he thought about the possible return of his illness and adopted, in his fantasy, a feminine attitude towards Flechsig.

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[162] Schreber, *Denkwürdigkeiten*, 26.
[163] Schreber, *Memoirs*, 46.
[164] Freud, *Three Case Histories*, 118; Freud, *Gesammelte Werke*, 8: Werke aus den Jahren 1909-1913:277.

The relationship with Flechsig and Schreber's thoughts of his transformation into a woman lead Freud to conclude: "Ein Vorstoß homosexueller Libido war also die Veranlassung dieser Erkrankung, das Objekt derselben war wahrscheinlich von Anfang an der Arzt Flechsig, und das Sträuben gegen diese libidinöse Regung erzeugte den Konflikt, aus dem die Krankheitserscheinungen entsprangen"[165] ["The exciting cause of his illness, then, was an outburst of homosexual libido; the object of this libido was probably from the very first his physician, Flechsig; and his struggles against this libidinal impulse produced the conflict which gave rise to the pathological phenomena"].[166] Freud assumes that his reader will not accept his theory of how the friendly feelings that a patient might have had for his physician could erupt in an amplified way eight years later,[167] so he presents a series of hypothetical objections and offers responses to them.

As a preemptive response to those to whom the theory might seem overly controversial or altogether untenable, Freud invokes the concept of transference. He explains that the relationship between Flechsig and Schreber needs to be understood in light of transference. According to Freud, Schreber must have been reminded by Flechsig of his father or brother, and the intensity of the significance of that family figure would have been transferred to the physician, due to the friendly feelings that Schreber felt towards him—especially after being successfully treated by him during the first illness.[168] The very fact that Freud resorts to transference to understand the relationship between Schreber and Flechsig is remarkable in

165 Freud, *Gesammelte Werke*, 8: Werke aus den Jahren 1909-1913:277–78.
166 Freud, *Three Case Histories*, 118.
167 Freud, 122.
168 Freud, 122.

itself, since Schreber, insofar as he was suffering from psychosis, should be considered incapable of transference by Freud.

The role of the concept of transference in this case history extends to other dimensions of the text, as we will see in the next section. Transference not only explains, for Freud, the relationship between Schreber and Flechsig, as well as some of Schreber's delusions; it also informs the writing of Freud's case history and the interpretation it implies. As a writer of a self-analysis, Freud is aware of the transferential elements of his written production, and in their own way, Schreber's memoirs can be considered a self-analysis. In this sense, Freud is both the author of a self-analysis and the reader of one, despite the differences between *Die Traumdeutung* and Schreber's memoirs. As Eric Santner claims:

> Psychoanalysts have long known about the transferential dimension of literary production, about the ways in which texts provide opportunities for their writers to act out or, ideally, work through, some of the very issues animating the subject matter of the text. This insight applies as much to the texts produced by psychoanalysts as by any other group of writers. And, indeed, Sigmund Freud, who founded psychoanalysis to a large extent on the basis of his own self-analysis, was profoundly aware of this transferential dimension of his own literary production.[169]

This transferential dimension of literary production will be the focus of the following section.

Between Reader and Writer

I have presented some aspects of Freud's interpretation of Schreber's memoirs in the previous section and some of the particularities of this case history. In other case histories, transference appears in the reflections on technique, which look back on the way in which transference was managed during the treatment. But in the Schreber case, transference has instead a purely textual nature. Transference is interwoven in the very fabric of the writing, as we

[169] Santner, *My Own Private Germany*, 19.

will see in this section. In other words, although there might not be transference in its strict clinical sense, there is another kind of transference that pertains to reading and writing. The transferential relationship is, in this case, between reader and writer—and in his analysis of Schreber's memoirs, Freud happens to be both. Building on Santner's observations on the aforementioned transferential dimension of literary production, I will refer to this as "literary transference."

I understand "literary transference" with regard to two different instances in which transference—understood in a broader sense—is at play in the production and reception of texts. The first is the relationship that the writer appears to imagine establishing with the reader at the moment of writing, in which the reader participates by reacting to the expected position that the writer has carved out for her in the writing. In the Schreber case, this instance of literary transference appears in the expectations that Freud seems to have of the reader, how he expects the reader to relate to the case history, of what he tries to convince his reader. When he presents a series of objections from which he defends himself, for example, the reader is put in the position of an incredulous skeptic. It is up to the reader to decide whether she indeed occupies that role, or if she will reject it and move aside from the role that the writer had assigned to or expected of her. The fact that the reader may accept or reject that role is a transferential process in which her imagined relationship with the writer is informed by elements that are external to the reading. And a writer who carves out a place for the reader is also engaging in a transferential process, since the writer imagines the reader according to certain associations that are also being transferred. This process, although transferential, is of course not dynamically bilateral as is the exchange between an analyst and an analysand, but rather unilateral in both ways.

The second instance of "literary transference" consists in the reader witnessing the relationship that the writer has established with the subject about which she is writing, this relationship itself being one informed by transference. In the Schreber case, one can witness the relationship that Freud appears to have established (as a reader) with Schreber. Freud positions himself in a particular way as a physician discussing a subject about which he admits not knowing enough and not having much experience treating, and one can read in the writing itself the transferential elements that shape the writer's (in this case Freud's) relationship to the subject matter (in this case, Schreber's memoirs). To sum up, the first instance of literary transference involves the relationship between the reader and writer of a text, while the second one involves the reader as the witness of a different relationship between reader and writer, one in which the writer herself is a reader.

I will begin with the first kind of literary transference and point to specific moments in which Freud seemed to imagine how his case history would be read and interpreted. I have already referred to some instances of this phenomenon when I mentioned the hypothetical objections that Freud raises to his own theory and how he responds to them, as well as Freud's invitation to the reader to read Schreber's memoirs along with him and draw more far-reaching conclusions than he does in his interpretation of it. A clear moment in which Freud reveals the silhouette of his imagined reader is when he becomes defensive about his theory of paranoia—and especially about how well it seems to map onto Schreber's case. Almost at the end of the last section of the case history, he enumerates a series of symptoms that Schreber experienced and claims that

> diese und manche andere Einzelheiten der Schreberschen Wahnbildung klingen fast wie endopsychische Wahrnehmungen der Vorgänge, deren Annahme ich hier einem Verständnis der Paranoia zugrunde gelegt habe. Ich kann aber das Zeugnis eines

> Freundes und Fachmannes dafür vorbringen, daß ich die Theorie der Paranoia entwickelt habe, ehe mir der Inhalt des Schreberschen Buches bekannt war.[170]
>
> [these and many other details of Schreber's delusional formation sound almost like endopsychic perceptions of the processes whose existence I have assumed in these pages as the basis of our explanation of paranoia. I can nevertheless call a friend and fellow-specialist to witness that I had developed my theory of paranoia before I became acquainted with the concepts of Schreber's book.][171]

Freud explains that, although Schreber's delusion might be an example that fits too well with a theory that existed before the example, his theory is entirely original, was written independently and prior to Schreber's memoirs, and Freud even offers a witness, as if preparing an imaginary court hearing.

In his interpretation of the transferential dimension of Freud's reading of Schreber's memoirs, Santner focuses on the question of originality and influence—something that Freud shared with Schreber.[172] According to Santner, in the same way that Schreber's psychotic fantasies revolved around the concern about the originality of his own thoughts and language, Freud feels the need to clarify that he is not plagiarizing Schreber.[173] These questions of originality and influence, as Santner explains, pertain "to the transfer of knowledge and authority in the very domain that Freud was staking out as his own."[174] He analyzes different moments of the Schreber case in which this "influence anxiety" becomes evident. He mentions that Freud refers to the work of colleagues who contributed to the views presented in the case history, like when he refers to Carl Jung's, Karl Abraham's, and Sándor Ferenczi's work and contributions. There is no anxiety attached to Abraham's influence, as Santner notes, since by referring to his

[170] Freud, *Gesammelte Werke*, 8: Werke aus den Jahren 1909-1913:315.
[171] Freud, *Three Case Histories*, 154.
[172] Santner, *My Own Private Germany*, 21.
[173] Santner, 21.
[174] Santner, 21.

work, Freud is reciprocating an allusion that Abraham made to Freud's influence on one of his papers—an allusion that Freud explicitly mentions.[175] However, when Freud mentions Jung's contribution to the study of dementia praecox, he neglects to indicate that Jung also discusses Schreber's memoirs and that it was Jung[176] who brought Schreber to Freud's attention, as Santner notes.[177]

Freud's influence anxiety, according to Santner, is associated with the state of emergency—and emergence—of the field of psychoanalysis. As he explains, it was a moment in which certain founding terms and concepts would shape the discipline and the institution. In this context, there was a greater preoccupation for originality, which makes certain gestures of authority feel necessary. And these gestures of authority were not only what was needed to shape the institution of psychoanalysis, but also became constitutive of psychoanalysis as a practice. Santner stresses the degree to which psychoanalysis depends on what he calls the "performative magic that contributes to the symbolic authority of institutional speech in general, that allows that speech to effectuate changes in social reality."[178] As he explains, it is the concept of transference that gives performativity its importance in psychoanalysis:

> With the notion of transference, psychoanalysis has, in essence, formally inscribed the dependence on performativity into its very foundations. An analysis or therapy will be effective only if the analysand at some level believes that it will, only if he or she believes that the analyst enjoys a privileged access to the true meaning of his or her words, stories, and symptoms. This transfer of faith and credit to the analyst and his or her

[175] Freud, *Three Case Histories*, 116, note 9; Santner, *My Own Private Germany*, 22–23.
[176] Jung himself was no stranger to the failure to recognize contributions to his own ideas. A rather glaring example is found in the lack of acknowledgment of Sabina Spielrein's contributions to the death instinct theory, as Brian Skea points out. One of her most important papers, "Destruction as the cause of coming into being," was edited by Jung and yet he only made a brief reference to it in a footnote of the 1952 edition of *Wandlungen und Symbole der Libido*. As Skea explains, Freud was also familiar with Spielrein's work, but there is no reference to it in his work (Skea, "Sabina Spielrein," 528.)
[177] Santner, *My Own Private Germany*, 22.
[178] Santner, 25.

> power to decode, appreciate, and ultimately to particulate in the analysand's message, is crucial to the production of that power in the analyst.[179]

It is the performative gestures, be they authoritative or otherwise, that constitute the aforementioned first kind of literary transference. Through these gestures—defending himself from the reader's skepticism, inviting her to read along with him, establishing that his ideas are truly original—Freud positions himself in a specific way towards the reader. And, at the same time, he reveals the position that he imagined for the reader. The reader must then decide in what instances she effectively occupies the position of the writer's imagined reader, and in what others she must coexist with that imagined reader and read alongside her.

As regards the transferential aspects that the reader witnesses—that is, the second instance of literary transference—it is possible to find in Freud's analysis of the memoirs how he related (or imagined relating) to Schreber. As we know, Freud never met Schreber, and even though he considered visiting him to find out more details about his life, he never actually did it.[180] Freud's interpretation of Schreber's memoirs has been criticized,[181] in a sense, for that from which Freud defends himself. Freud's interpretation of Schreber's *Denkwürdigkeiten* raised objections by many analysts and theorists, and these objections, I would argue, involved ideas that Freud read into the memoirs—which other analysts and critics have, as readers, witnessed.

Certain aspects of Freud's interpretation, as some critics have pointed out, do not quite correspond with Schreber's actual words. In the previous section, I mentioned the interpretation

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[179] Santner, 25.

[180] See footnote 109.

[181] I will address some of the critiques that Freud's interpretation of Schreber's memoirs has received, with a focus on Lothane's work, who has devoted much of it to Schreber and who is a reference to many other authors who have written about the *Memoirs*. The literature on Schreber and on Freud's interpretation of the memoirs is very vast, and I only aim here to focus on specific aspects that shed light on the specific kind of transference that, as I argue, is at stake.

that Freud made of the succession of two thoughts that Schreber had: that his former illness would return, and that it must be pleasant to be a woman succumbing to intercourse. Freud interprets this succession as an association between the memory of Flechsig and a feminine attitude directed towards him, since his dreams about his illness were a manifestation, according to Freud, of Schreber's longing to see Flechsig again. However, Lothane claims that this association is based on an arbitrary interpretation. For Lothane, by interpreting that Schreber's longing for Flechsig consists in an erotic desire, Freud dismisses Schreber's real concern, which is the threatening prospect of falling ill again.[182]

Along the same lines, Marvin Osman claims that a close reading of Schreber's memoirs reveals that homosexual issues were not predominant in the psychodynamics of Schreber's psychosis. Rather than homosexual conflicts, Osman points out that the main factor was "intense conflict over pursuit of ambitions, particularly those stimulating masculine self-expression, experienced as inducing dangerous competition with current and past objects."[183] Santner seems to agree with this contention when he observes that, curiously, Freud did not consider the connection between Schreber's alleged outburst of homosexual libido and his change of status, that is, his *Ernennung* or nomination to the powerful position of *Senatspräsident*, on the one hand, and his *Entmannung* or unmanning.[184]

Another aspect of Freud's interpretation that Lothane criticizes is the association between soul murder and castration. According to Freud, Schreber's fear of God could be translated into fear of his father, and his father's threat of castration was—as Freud explains—what provided the material for Schreber's fantasy of being transformed into a woman. Freud

[182] Lothane, *In Defense of Schreber*, 335.
[183] Osman, "Listening to Schreber," 631.
[184] Santner, *My Own Private Germany*, 40.

associates this castration with the idea of soul murder—and it is Flechsig who, for Schreber, is the soul murderer.[185] First, Lothane points out that Schreber does not refer to any kind of mutilation, but rather to a transformation into a woman that results from a regression to the stages of development during pregnancy, in which elements of both sexes are present. Rather than homosexuality, what Schreber describes points to hermaphroditism.[186] Second, Lothane reads Freud's interpretation of soul murder as castration as "a psychoanalytic cliché, a universal hermeneutic formula."[187] According to Lothane, rather than focusing on Schreber's very words, Freud applies a general formula that imposes itself onto a discourse that points in a different direction.

When, in one of the passages above, Freud defends the originality of his ideas, he mentions a colleague who could verify that he had developed his ideas on the role of homosexuality in the formation of paranoiac affections before reading Schreber. Lothane explains that this colleague is Ferenczi. Freud had developed certain ideas about homosexual libido and paranoia,[188] and he felt the need to repeatedly state that the development of these

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185 Freud, *Three Case Histories*, 89, 131.

186 Lothane, *In Defense of Schreber*, 337. This is explicitly described by Schreber: "This process of unmanning consisted in the (external) male genitals (scrotum and penis) being retracted into the body and the internal sexual organs being at the same time transformed into the corresponding female sexual organs, a process which might have been completed in a sleep lasting hundreds of years, because the skeleton (pelvis, etc.) had also to be changed. A regression occurred therefore, or a reversal of that developmental process which occurs in the human embryo in the fourth or fifth month of pregnancy, according to whether nature intends the future child to be of male or female sex. It is well known that in the first months of pregnancy the rudiments of both sexes are laid down and the characteristics of the sex which is not developed remain as rudimentary organs at a lower stage of development, like the nipples of the male" (Schreber, *Memoirs*, 61.)

187 Lothane, *In Defense of Schreber*, 337.

188 The connection that Freud established with the libido theory constituted, as Lothane explains, a new understanding of paranoia, different from the account that he had presented in his 1896 paper on the neuroses of defense. This theory was initially successful, and Lothane observes that after Freud's essay on Schreber in 1911, psychoanalysts associated paranoia to latent homosexuality for two decades, although this association was later questioned. It should be noted that Freud's reading of Schreber was

ideas was previous to the Schreber case. Osman and Lothane argue that Freud analyzed Schreber's memoirs with his theory in mind, since he wanted an example that would illustrate and provide evidence to his theory.[189] Thomas McGlashan also points out that Freud had seen cases of paranoia and dementia praecox as a practicing neurologist, but not as a psychoanalyst, which is why Schreber's memoirs were a unique opportunity to apply his new libido theory to psychotic disorders, as well as to further develop his theory of psychological dynamics.[190]

Based on these critical readings of Freud's interpretation of the *Denkwürdigkeiten*, it would seem that Freud approached the Schreber material with his theory in mind. Even though he invites the reader to read along with him—which points to Freud's confidence in the veracity of his own interpretation—the critiques to his interpretation of the memoirs suggest that Freud might have been unaware of his own eagerness to confirm his theories. In addition, Freud might have been unaware of the effect that his own "performative magic" had on him, as it appeared to contribute to the development of the psychoanalytic discipline and institution, to return to Santner's argument.

Some of the particularities of Freud's reading were pointed out as arguments against his interpretation and in fact, some of these elements can be conceived as transferential aspects of the relationship that Freud established with the *Denkwürdigkeiten* and their author, not only as a case of psychosis, but also as material that could contribute to the understanding of psychosis by

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particularly influential in the United States, since, as Lothane points out, US American psychiatrists were more interested in dynamic formulations such as Freud's. The Europeans, on the contrary, were more interested in phenomenology and differential diagnosis, with Kraepelin and Jaspers representing the organic approach (Lothane, 332–48).

[189] Lothane, "The Schism between Freud and Jung...," 107–9; Osman, "Listening to Schreber," 632. Lothane goes as far as to attribute Freud's interpretation of Schreber's conflicts as related to homosexuality as a projection of Freud's own homosexual conflicts that resulted from his relationship with Fliess (Lothane, *In Defense of Schreber*, 338–39.)

[190] McGlashan, "Psychosis as a Disorder of Reduced Cathectic Capacity," 476, 479.

confirming his latest developments on the subject. Other elements, as I have argued, can be understood as the transference between Freud and his reader. It is impossible for Freud to include, as he usually does, an account of transference in the Schreber case, due to the particular nature of this case history. However, a textual analysis of a literary kind of transference reveals the transferences that were present in the text, and yet remained, to some extent, invisible to Freud. Once again, transference was present from the beginning, even if it did not manifest in the way that Freud expected.

Chapter Three | The Legibility of Psychosis

Why did neuroses define the limits of Freudian psychoanalysis, while psychoses remained excluded from what it considered clinically treatable? If psychosis was illegible for Freud, what made other readings of psychosis consider this condition treatable by psychoanalysis? Historically, part of the reason that kept psychosis outside the realm of Freudian psychoanalysis was the Austrian separation between neurology and psychiatry. While Freud showed little interest in psychoses, some of his contemporaries—among them aspiring psychoanalysts—devoted their work to these affections. Victor Tausk, a Slovak neurologist and psychoanalyst who was Freud's disciple, was the first member of the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society[191] to clinically study psychoses[192] at a time when Freud was only interested in treating less disturbed patients.[193] Roazen attributes this difference of interests to the fact that Tausk had chosen to become a psychiatrist. At the time, hospitalized mental patients were only seen by psychiatrists, while psychoanalysts usually had little experience with them.[194] Unlike Freud, Tausk had access to psychiatric material and had experience with psychotic patients. While the Viennese clearly distinguished between neurology and psychiatry, the Swiss, for example, did not

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[191] Tausk is believed to have influenced Freud—Gilles Tréhel points out that Tausk presented a discussion on narcissism at the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society a few years before Freud wrote his famous essay on narcissism (which Tausk later cited), and the same happened a presentation that Tausk made on melancholy, after which Freud published "Mourning and Melancholia" (Tréhel, "Victor Tausk (1879-1919)," 167–68.) Tausk's talent was acknowledged by Freud, but psychoanalysis remained defined by the treatment of transference neuroses.

[192] During the First World War, Tausk served as a military doctor and developed an understanding of war psychoses. Faced with cases where the diagnostic categories of melancholy and paranoia were inaccurate, Tausk coined the category of "paranoia cum melancholia," which was not merely a combination of both conditions, but rather implied their parallel development and the conflict between them (Tausk, "Diagnostic Considerations Concerning the Symptomatology of the So-Called War Psychoses," 392.)

[193] Roazen, *Brother Animal*, xxxv.

[194] Roazen, 29.

keep these realms separated—Carl Jung and Eugen Bleuler are examples of Swiss analysts that came to psychoanalysis from within academic psychiatry.[195]

How does psychosis, then, need to be read in order to become legible? Lacan, who was himself a psychiatrist, answered this question with his theory of psychosis and his understanding of transference in its treatment. Psychosis was in fact the very point of departure of his thought and practice. His doctoral thesis in psychiatry, titled *De la psychose paranoïaque dans ses rapports avec la personnalité* [*Paranoid psychosis and its relation to the personality*], was devoted to paranoid psychosis, as the title indicates, and presented a case history known as "Aimée."[196] According to Lacanian psychoanalysis, it is possible to establish a transferential relationship with psychotic patients—but it is a kind of transference different from the one that can be established with neurotic patients. When treating psychosis, the analyst must occupy a different position than in the treatment of neurosis, which leads Lacan to understand transference in terms of "maneuvers." In this chapter, I examine Lacan's theory of psychosis, his understanding of transference in its treatment, what it means for transference to be "the source of fiction" in this context, and address the following question: what was the conceptual shift that made transference in psychosis possible for Lacan when Freud had excluded it from the realm of psychoanalytic treatment? The lack of legibility of psychosis in Freudian psychoanalysis will point to a problem of translation.

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[195] Roazen, 30.

[196] His views on psychosis, however, changed throughout his intellectual life and came to be significantly different from those presented in his dissertation. These changes are analyzed by Stijn Vanheule in *The Subject of Psychosis: A Lacanian Perspective* and Erik Porge in *Jacques Lacan, un psychanalyste*.

An Absent Metaphor

Unlike other approaches to psychosis, Lacan understands it as a structure, which—as Stijn Vanheule points out—has the advantage of providing a logical explanation to the process of becoming a subject, instead of allowing for speculation about scenes of family life. Rather than tracing the origin of psychosis through conjectures about specific events in the subject's personal life, the emphasis is on formal relationships. Maternal desire, for example, is not about the mother, it is a function that could be fulfilled by the father.[197] The same applies to the paternal function, which is the symbolic function of authority, of an ultimate law that needs no justification.[198] This law is promulgated by giving a place to the Name-of-the-Father ("Wait till your father gets home!").[199] But the paternal function is not related to the actual person of the father; in fact, as Lacan explains, the absence of the real father is more than compatible with the presence of its signifier ("Wait till your grandmother gets home!" would be giving a place to the Name-of-the-Father as well).[200]

This structural understanding of psychosis has a direct effect on the way in which transference is conceived in its treatment. The analyst is not necessarily guiding the analysand's investigation into unconscious knowledge, as it is the case in the treatment of neurosis, but instead needs to position herself in such a way that the functions that organize reality can be temporarily constructed. We will return to the positioning of the analyst in the treatment of psychosis in the following section.

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[197] Vanheule, *The Subject of Psychosis*, 58.
[198] Vanheule points out that, while in the 1950s Lacan conceptualized the Name-of-the-Father as the ultimate point of reference in the Symbolic, he would reconceptualize it in the 1960s, arguing that an ultimate point of reference is lacking both in neurosis and psychosis. (Vanheule, 135.)
[199] Lacan, *Écrits II*, 57.
[200] Lacan, 35.

Vanheule distinguishes different stages in Lacan's understanding of psychosis. He points out that this understanding was initially defined by the theory of foreclosure of the Name-of-the-Father, and later changed in the 1960s with the formulation of the concepts of *objet a* and *jouissance*. These two concepts allowed for a different interpretation of the Name-of-the-Father, which in turn impacted Lacan's understanding of psychosis.[201] Lacan's reconceptualization of the relation between the Real, the Symbolic, and the Imaginary in the 1970s, as Vanheule points out, also had an effect on the understanding of psychosis.[202] I will not account for all the shifts in Lacan's understanding of psychosis but rather focus on the ones that are relevant for his understanding of transference in relation to psychosis.

In his essay "D'une question préliminaire à tout traitement possible de la psychose" from 1957-58, finished shortly after the end of his seminar on psychoses in 1956, Lacan explains the main aspects of his understanding of psychosis and addresses the question of the treatment of this affection. Lacan points out that what characterizes psychosis, and in turn distinguishes it from neurosis, is the foreclosure of the Name-of-the-Father in the place of the Other, as well as the failure of the paternal metaphor.[203] The term foreclosure is the translation that Lacan proposes, in his seminar devoted to psychoses, for the German term used by Freud *Verwerfung* (translated in the *Standard Edition* as "repudiation").[204] In an early essay titled "Die Abwehr-Neuropsychosen" ["The Neuro-Psychoses of Defence"], Freud explains different kinds of instances in which an incompatibility takes place in ideational life, that is, when the ego

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[201] Vanheule, *The Subject of Psychosis*, 126.
[202] Vanheule, 151–53.
[203] Lacan, *Écrits II*, 53.
[204] Laplanche and Pontalis point out, however, that although "foreclosure" is the translation that Lacan offers for the Freudian term "*Verwerfung*," the latter term does not always correspond what is denoted by the Lacanian concept of foreclosure, and, at the same time, other Freudian terms designate what Lacan meant with the term "foreclosure." (Laplanche and Pontalis, *Vocabulaire de La Psychanalyse*, 165.)

undergoes a distressing experience and, faced with no confidence in her power to resolve the contradiction between this incompatible idea and the ego, the subject forgot it.[205] Freud explains that in some kinds of defense (like repression), the incompatible idea is separated from its affect and remains in consciousness, albeit in a weakened form. *Verwerfung*, however, is a stronger and more successful kind of defense in which the ego rejects both the incompatible idea and its affect,[206] such that the ego behaves as if that idea had never occurred to it.[207] Freud had associated the concept of *Verwerfung* with psychosis, and, in the same way, the concept of foreclosure is, for Lacan, at the very origin of psychosis.

While psychosis is marked by foreclosure, neurosis is marked by repression. In neurosis, there is a knowledge that is there but is not accessible, and psychoanalysis helps the neurotic analysand translate that inaccessible unconscious knowledge into a conscious one. But foreclosure not only makes a certain knowledge inaccessible, but also separates it from consciousness. This separation is such that if this knowledge returns, rather than being recognized, it appears as an inexplicable event coming from outside, with no recognition of that ever having been part of the psyche. Unconscious knowledge, as Lacan explains, is "*un savoir qui ne se sait pas*" ["*a knowledge that is not known*"][208] but while for the neurotic that knowledge is recognized as such when it becomes known, for the psychotic it appears as something completely new and alien.

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[205] Freud, *Standard Edition*, 1962, III (1893-1899): Early Psycho-Analytic Publications:47.
[206] In Laplanche's and Pontalis's words, foreclosure is the primordial expulsion of a fundamental signifier from the subject's symbolic universe. Unlike repression, the foreclosed signifiers are not integrated into the subject's unconscious, and do not return "from within," but rather in the realm of the Real, especially through hallucinations. (Laplanche and Pontalis, *Vocabulaire de La Psychanalyse*, 163–64.)
[207] Freud, *Standard Edition*, 1962, III (1893-1899): Early Psycho-Analytic Publications:58.
[208] Lacan, *Séminaire XVII*, 35 (my translation).

It is in the place of the Other, as Lacan explains, that the Name-of-the-Father is foreclosed. The notion of the Other plays a central role in the paternal metaphor and is fundamentally—although not exclusively—related to the mother. Lacan defines it in several different ways, but in the aforementioned essay on psychosis, he characterizes it as "le lieu d'où peut se poser à lui [au sujet] la question de son existence"[209] ["the locus from which the question of his existence [the subject's] may be presented to him"].[210] In other words, the Other is neither a subject nor an object, but rather a place, and it is from this locus that existential questions—such as "who am I?" or "what is reality?"— are evoked in the subject.

Before addressing the paternal metaphor, I want to turn to Lacan's understanding of metaphor more generally. He explains that the "formula" for the metaphor is "*un mot pour un autre*" ["*one word for another*"] and consists in a substitution where the signifier that is replaced remains present through the metonymic connection to the rest of the signifying chain.[211] Both signifiers (the one that is replacing another signifier and the signifier that is being replaced) are not equally actualized, as it would be in the case with a simile, but there is rather a substitution that does not completely erase the replaced signifier. For example, if someone said that they were showered with gifts, the fact that one does not imagine a person in a bathtub getting hit by gift boxes from above points to the fact that the replaced signifier (having received many gifts) is still present in some way, even it is not actualized in the metaphor (of being showered with them).

[209] Lacan, *Écrits II*, 27.
[210] Lacan, *Ecrits*, 148.
[211] Lacan, *Écrits I*, 504.

In the context of the discussion of psychosis, as Vanheule stresses, metaphor is not simply a trope, but rather a structural mode of speech,[212] which is based on the substitution that I have described. Unlike metonymy, in which signifiers are connected in chains without producing any ambiguity or surprise at the level of the signified, metaphor introduces a new element in the chain.[213] To continue with the previous example, to say that someone was given many gifts describes a situation and causes no surprise, but saying that someone was showered with gifts introduces a new element and, with it, an ambiguity. Metaphors always hide the signifier that they are substituting, but that signifier is secretly present through its metonymic connection to the signifying chain. In a metaphor, then, a signifier that is metonymically anticipated in the signifying chain (the many gifts that someone received) is replaced by a new signifier (being showered).[214] In a chain of signifiers, rather than a signifier that would be expected according to the anticipated signification, an unexpected signifier appears in the signifying chain, introducing a new idea.

What fails in psychosis, then, is the paternal metaphor, which consists in a substitution where the father replaces the mother. The father detaches the child from the mother, which means that she is forgotten as the primary object.[215] The function of the father is to come between the child and the mother, which leads the child to realize that she is not the only object of desire of the mother, that her love is not boundless, but that there is something that the mother desires that the child does not have.[216] When the father intervenes, what is incorporated

[212] Vanheule, *The Subject of Psychosis*, 56.
[213] Vanheule, 51–55.
[214] Vanheule, 55.
[215] Lucchelli, *Le transfert de Freud à Lacan*, 216.
[216] It is this intervention of the father between the child and the mother that is able to regulate *jouissance* and allow for the separation from object *a*. I will address these two concepts later.

symbolically, as Juan Pablo Lucchelli points out, allows for the sacrifice of the harmful *jouissance* of being "everything" for the Other: "[Les] insignes du père servent à relativiser et à symboliser l'Autre primordial qu'est la mère, objet primaire de la jouissance" ["[The] insignia of the father help relativize and symbolize the primordial Other that is the mother, [who is] the primary object of jouissance"].[217] In other words, the father shows the child that the mother's desire is not exclusively devoted to her, and this detachment makes it possible for the mother to no longer be a boundless source of *jouissance*.

In the paternal metaphor, the fact that the father replaces the mother means that the Name-of-the-Father substitutes *le désir de la mère*, which in French means both the desire *of* the mother (or the mother's desire) and the desire *for* the mother. The child has a signifier for maternal desire, but its signified is unclear, which produces anxiety in the child. This signifier, as Vanheule points out, is material and consists in the appearances and disappearances of the mother, although the meaning of this alternation is unclear.[218] It is in the context of being desired by another person (the mother) that the paternal metaphor can take place. In the metaphor of the Name-of-the-Father, the mother's desire is removed because it is named (to return to Lucchelli's words, the primordial Other is symbolized). Vanheule explains this metaphor in the following terms: "By bringing the paternal signifier into dialectic with the maternal signifier, the subject acquires a concept of what it is that the mother wants. Its instalment enables the subject to understand what motivates human interrelations in general, and maternal desire in particular."[219] With the signifier of the Name-of-the-Father, the child can make sense of the desire of the mother, but without it, this desire—along with all other

[217] Lucchelli, *Le transfert de Freud à Lacan*, 220 (my translation).
[218] Vanheule, *The Subject of Psychosis*, 59.
[219] Vanheule, 61.

instances of desire—becomes an unpredictable enigma. Vanheule points out that what is elucidated when the Name-of-the-Father names maternal desire is not the identity of the subject but its *position*, since through the Name-of-the-Father, the child is recognized in relation to the desire of the mother.[220] The law that is imposed in the paternal metaphor is imposed upon the mother as a symbolic framework, and it is within this framework that the child is positioned.[221]

The paternal metaphor is essential because it is the substitution that allows for all future substitutions. When this metaphor is foreclosed in psychosis, no other substitution is possible. Lucchelli offers as an example that, in treatment, an analyst cannot suggest to a psychotic patient that the conflict that he has with his boss is taking the place of the conflict he has with his father. In such an interpretation, there is, as it were, a metaphorical jump from the conflict with the boss to the conflict with the father, one conflict substitutes another, but a psychotic person would not be able to make that substitution. Luchelli notes that what would be found, if this were suggested to a psychotic patient, is the real presence of that term, which would not be symbolized because it is not symbolizable.[222] The paternal metaphor is what allows for this symbolization, and without it, there is no ability for other metaphors, that is, for other substitutions.

The positioning caused by the imposition of the Name-of-the-Father is missing in the psychotic structure. When the signifier of the Name-of-the-Father is foreclosed, there is no master signifier and therefore no law that regulates one's position in relation to the Other—which, initially, is the desire of the mother. According to this explanation of psychosis, Vanheule claims that its basic manifestations appear "when an appeal to position oneself via the signifier is

[220] Vanheule, 61.
[221] Vanheule, 61.
[222] Lucchelli, *Le transfert de Freud à Lacan*, 216.

made, but no support is found in any signifier, which interrupts the signifying chain, or train of thoughts, that make up our experience of reality."[223] The act of positioning oneself via the signifier implies existential questions, which points to the radicality of this interruption in the signifying chain.

The absence of the signifier of the Name-of-the-Father thus implies an inability to interpret the desires of others, as if all the unwritten rules about how to relate to others had never existed. The psychotic does not have a clear sense of what laws govern her reality, which makes her experience of the world a confusing one, in which things happen for unexplained reasons. Any attempt to make sense of them without an understanding of what the laws are can result in a maddening exercise of hazardous divination. As Joachim Cauwe and Stijn Vanheule express it, "[p]sychosis is characterized by the experience that the Other has gone mad."[224] For example, thanks to the signifier "sports match," it makes sense that a huge crowd might be vigorously waving flags with inscriptions on them, loudly celebrating or angrily yelling at a group of people dressed in brightly colored uniforms who run around in unpredictable patterns on a parcel of ground with markings on it. Without that signifier, this group of actions, events, sounds, and reactions would be perplexing and unpredictable, which can define the experience of psychosis.[225]

One of Freud's most important contributions to the understanding of psychosis, which Lacan confirms, is that hallucinations are a secondary symptom and an attempt at recovery. In

[223] Vanheule, "Conceptualizing and Treating Psychosis," 391.
[224] Cauwe and Vanheule, "Manoeuvres of Transference in Psychosis," 379.
[225] In Kantian terms, the psychotic experience would be like understanding reality without transcendental ideas, that is, without principles that organize the knowledge constituted by the categories.

relation to Schreber, Freud argues that, after what could be described as the "destruction of the world,"

> der Paranoiker baut sie wieder auf, nicht prächtiger zwar, aber wenigstens so, daß er wieder in ihr leben kann. Er baut sie auf durch die Arbeit seines Wahnes. Was wir für die Krankheitsproduktion halten, die Wahnbildung ist in Wirklichkeit der Heilungsversuch, die Rekonstruktion.[226]
>
> [the paranoiac builds it up again, not more splendid, it is true, but at least so that he can once more live in it. He builds it up by the work of his delusion. *The delusion-formation, which we take to be a pathological product, is in reality an attempt at recovery, a process of reconstruction*.][227]

Hallucinations are attempts at reconstructing the legal framework of reality that is missing in the psychotic's psychical structure due to the failure of the paternal metaphor. Along these lines, Erik Porge explains the difference between neurosis and psychosis in the following way: "la différence entre la névrose et la psychose tient à ce que dans la psychose le sujet *croit* son symptôme (ses voix) alors que dans la névrose le sujet *croit à* son symptôme" ["the difference between neurosis and psychosis rests on the fact that in psychosis, the subject *creates* [*croit*] her symptom (the voices), while in neurosis, the subject *believes in* [*croit à*] her symptom"].[228]

Because of the failure of the paternal metaphor, existential questions, such as "who am I?", are not followed by reflection on one's identity, but instead reveal the Real, the realm of the non-signified.[229] Questions such as these are the ones that a psychoanalytic treatment could potentially involve, as it is the case in the treatment of neurosis. A neurotic analysand might question her existence in that framework, but a psychotic one would be faced with an impenetrable absence of meaning in such a situation. It is for this reason that Lacan, in his essay

[226] Freud, *Gesammelte Werke*, 8: Werke aus den Jahren 1909-1913:308.
[227] Freud, *Three Case Histories*, 147 (emphasis added by translator).
[228] *Jacques Lacan, un psychanalyste*, 81 (my translation).
[229] Vanheule, *The Subject of Psychosis*, 70.

on psychosis, mentions the need for "maneuvers" of transference.[230] I will devote the next section to an examination of this concept based on clinical cases.

The Position of the Analyst

While Lacan does not offer specific examples of the maneuvers of transference, the Lacanian analysts Cauwe and Vanheule write about a specific case history and illustrate them. These two analysts follow Lacan's understanding of psychosis based on the concepts he developed in the 1960s, that is, *jouissance* and object *a*, both of which are important to understand how transference works in psychosis in the context of Lacanian theory. The object *a*, as Joël Dor describes it, is the object of desire and the object that causes desire at the same time, the lost object.[231] The object *a* is permanently lacking, it is never found in reality, following Lacan's general understanding of desire as a lack. Dor explains that, for Lacan, when a child is born, she is inscribed in a symbolic universe that precedes her, and she manifests—without intentionality—needs that are constituted as demands by the mother's response. This response causes enjoyment, *jouissance*, in the child, beyond the satisfaction of the physical need, exceeding it. When the child is hungry and cries, the need for food is satisfied and accompanied by something that exceeds that satisfaction, which is the "pleasure of the mouth."[232] Desire, then, emerges such that it indefinitely seeks to reencounter that first *jouissance*.[233]

Both the concepts of object *a* and *jouissance* are not only central to Lacan's understanding of psychosis in the 1960s, but also crucial to handling transference, since they reveal how the

[230] Lacan, *Écrits II*, 61.
[231] Dor, *Introduction à La Lecture de Lacan*, 1. L'inconscient structuré comme un langage:185.
[232] Lacan, *Séminaire XI*, 188.
[233] Dor, *Introduction à La Lecture de Lacan*, 1. L'inconscient structuré comme un langage:187–88.

analyst needs to position herself in order for the treatment to be possible. Cauwe and Vanheule draw the main differences between the treatment of neurosis and the treatment of psychosis based on how the object *a* is articulated in each case. As they explain, neurosis is characterized by the quest for the eternally missing object *a*, and transference is possible as long as the object *a* is situated in the field of the Other, the enigmatic presence of the analyst.[234] On the contrary, there is no separation of the object *a* in the psychotic structure.[235] Rather than being an external object, then, object *a* is an internal element that the subject has to manage.[236]

The placing of the object *a* in neurosis and the non-separation from object *a* in psychosis result in radically different ways of handling transference. As Cauwe and Vanheule articulate it, "rather than looking for the missing piece to satisfy an intrinsically unsatiable desire through fantasy, as in neurosis, psychosis is marked by the reverse: the Other looks for something in the patient."[237] Psychotic transference is characterized by the presence of an Other that either profoundly loves or profoundly hates the psychotic subject, which means that the analyst could easily seem to show "too much interest" or her silences could make her presence mortifying.[238] Lacan claims that in psychosis, the presence of the analyst tends toward an "*érotomanie mortifiante*" ["mortifying erotomania"],[239] which points to the fact that the analyst must position herself in such a way that does not position the analysand as the object of a boundless desire. In Vanheule's words, the analysand feels like "a puppet" in the hands of the analyst, the object of the other's *jouissance*.[240]

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[234] Cauwe and Vanheule, "Manoeuvres of Transference in Psychosis," 378.
[235] See Cauwe and Vanheule, 379.
[236] Vanheule, *The Subject of Psychosis*, 137.
[237] Cauwe and Vanheule, "Manoeuvres of Transference in Psychosis," 379.
[238] Cauwe and Vanheule, 379.
[239] *Autres Écrits*, 217.
[240] Vanheule, "Conceptualizing and Treating Psychosis," 394.

How, then, must the analyst position herself? The enigmatic figure of the silent analyst who listens to the analysand and makes minimal interventions would profoundly unsettle a psychotic analysand. Rather than invite free association, which would allow the repressed to come to the surface, psychoanalytic work with psychosis must temporarily fill the gap of foreclosure.[241] The analyst must avoid a dual relationship in which she is the Other whose drive is satisfied through the analysand, who would in turn be the target of the analyst's *jouissance*. Instead, she must install a triangular relationship,[242] which makes the analyst's interventions subject to an external ruling that both the analysand *and* the analyst must follow.

This triangular relationship, along with other "maneuvers of transference," is illustrated by Cauwe and Vanheule with a case history of melancholic psychosis: "Hans." Cauwe, who treated this patient, recounts that in his first session, Hans talked about his relationship to previous mental health professionals. His last psychiatrist had allowed him to call her, but after doing it repeatedly, she told him that he could not call her anymore. Another treatment had ended with Hans being hospitalized after he looked for his psychiatrist at her holiday home after she did not respond to his phone calls. One of the first things that Hans asked Cauwe was to let him know when he went "too far."[243]

In view of these past events, Cauwe made specific interventions aimed at countering Hans's dependent tendency. Namely, Cauwe explains that one of the first maneuvers of transference was to tell Hans not to telephone in between sessions; instead, he could send him emails, which would be discussed in the following session. In addition, the choice of a standard 50-minute session instead of variable sessions helped prevent the risk of having the analyst

241 Vanheule, 394.
242 Vanheule, 394.
243 Cauwe and Vanheule, "Manoeuvres of Transference in Psychosis," 383–84.

occupy the position of "an almighty and whimsical Other."[244] By setting a boundary in the therapeutic frame, on the one hand, Cauwe prevented Hans from feeling the need to "go too far" when he failed to manage the absence of the Other. On the other hand, this framework showed that the analyst was also submitting to time and to certain rules. Cauwe framed himself as a clinician who adhered to a certain psychoanalytic school of thought and whose behavior and actions were informed by that school.[245] Hans was thus not placed in the position of an object at the mercy of the Other's *jouissance*—the analyst was himself following rules rather than imposing whims. These maneuvers contributed to the installation of the aforementioned triangular relationship.

One recurrent point in the treatment is that Cauwe did not inquire into certain subjects, such as what it meant to "go too far" or the meaning of his poetry or sculpture projects. Rather than exploring those themes, Cauwe followed Hans's discourse and instead of delving into the meaning of his speech, made interventions that redirected that speech. This is the case, for example, with regard to Hans's self-hatred. Hans felt like a burden to everyone around him, and when his discourse became excessively negative, Cauwe would introduce a new subject. He explains that being empathetic would have made him an ally to Hans self-destructiveness.[246] Cauwe notes that "[s]peaking in itself did not annul this jouissance of self-hatred, so it was necessary to actively put a stop to it."[247]

Since merely speaking does not have a therapeutic effect in the treatment of psychosis, the analyst manages transference by introducing topics and exchanging speaking and listening

[244] Cauwe and Vanheule, 387.
[245] Cauwe and Vanheule, 388.
[246] Cauwe and Vanheule, 386.
[247] Cauwe and Vanheule, 387.

positions with the analysand, resembling an everyday conversation.[248] Cauwe and Vanheule characterize Hans's conversational style as "free flowing exchanges," which consisted in the discussion of various topics without a narrative and without looking for links or repetition between themes.[249] The conversational style points not only to the question of who is speaking and who is listening and to how silence needs to be managed, but more broadly to the question of time. Lacan claims that "le transfert est une relation essentiellement liée au temps et à son maniement" ["transference is a relationship [that is] essentially connected to time and its handling"].[250] And because the kind of transferential relationship in neurosis is so different from the one in psychosis, the handling of time correspondingly differs in each case. In neurosis, temporality is determined by the rule of free association. The analyst remains silent to allow speech in the psychoanalytic framework to follow the temporality of the associative thinking of the analysand. In classical Freudian psychoanalysis, the analyst must be a blank screen on which the analysand may project certain elements of her past history. In a regular conversation between two people, on the contrary, there are interruptions, and associations are made by both interlocutors, which means that the temporality of the conversation is not governed by the free-flowing thinking of one person.

Transference in psychosis, on the contrary, requires the analyst to interrupt speech rather than letting it associate freely. In fact, as Cauwe points out with regard to Hans's self-destructive speech, letting the analysand freely associate thoughts in such a case would only exacerbate his self-hatred. An interruption is, in this case, what makes another discourse possible.[251] In other

[248] Cauwe and Vanheule, 380.
[249] Cauwe and Vanheule, 386–87.
[250] Lacan, *Écrits II*, 324 (my translation).
[251] Cauwe and Vanheule, "Manoeuvres of Transference in Psychosis," 386.

words, the temporality of free-flowing thought in psychosis does not have a therapeutic effect. It is necessary for the analyst to handle time by shaping the temporality of the analysand's discourse rather than analyze the shape it reveals to have already.

The Source of Another Fiction

In the first chapter, I analyzed the fictional elements of transference based on Lacan's understanding of transference as a source of fiction and of the analytic setting as a pseudo-situation. Based on the role of the analyst and the aim of psychoanalytic treatment, the kind of fiction that can be imagined in the context of neurosis is profoundly different from the kind of fiction that can be conceived in psychotic transference. If transference is, as Lacan claims, a source of fiction, what kind of fiction can be conceived through psychotic transference?

In his "Ratschläge für den Arzt bei der Psychoanalytischen Behandlung" ["Recommendations to Physicians Practising Psycho-Analysis"], Freud claims that that the model that analysts should follow is that of the surgeon, "der alle seine Affekte und selbst sein menschliches Mitleid beiseite drängt und seinen geistigen Kräften ein einziges Ziel setzt: die Operation so kunstgerecht als möglich zu vollziehen"[252] ["who puts aside all his feelings, even his human sympathy, and concentrates his mental forces on the single aim of performing the operation as skillfully as possible"].[253] The justification that he offers for what he calls "Gefühlskälte" ["emotional coldness"] is that it protects the emotional life of the analyst and provides the most help for the patient. He follows this recommendation by the observation that all the recommendations that he offers have the aim of creating for the analyst a counterpart to

[252] Freud, *Gesammelte Werke*, 8: Werke aus den Jahren 1909-1913:381.
[253] Freud, *Standard Edition*, 1966, XII (1911-1913): The Case of Schreber, Papers on Technique and Other Works:115.

the rule of free association. In this sense, the technique of analytic neutrality[254] is inherently associated with the development of free association. But neither analytic neutrality nor free association, as we have seen, are compatible with the treatment of psychosis from a Lacanian standpoint.

What Freudian analytic neutrality achieves is that the analysand is restricted as little as possible in terms of the representations that she transfers onto the analyst. Just as free association invites the analysand to speak without criticism, censure, or obstructions, the analyst must in turn maintain a certain degree of neutrality that allows for the patient to transfer elements of her past history even though the gender, age, voice, clothing, general appearance, etc. of the analyst can limit, at least to some extent, the kinds of representations that are transferred. This neutrality makes it possible for the analyst to react to the transference of the analysand's representations and to handle and analyze the transferential relationship as it develops. The dialogue in analysis, then, is less symmetrical than a regular conversation. This asymmetry, however, cannot take place in the treatment of psychosis, since it would run the risk of placing the analysand as the object of the Other's *jouissance*. By exchanging speaking and listening positions with the analysand, the analyst offers rules and limits to the analysand, and sets certain rules that limit what the psychotic analysand perceives as the madness of the Other.

In neurosis, the fictional elements have to do with the specific way in which certain representations are reproduced in analysis. But in psychosis, fiction cannot function in the same way. While neurosis requires the analyst to remove as many obstacles as possible for the analysand to verbalize freely associated thoughts and allow for representations from her past

[254] The question of analytic neutrality will be addressed more in depth in the context of the work of Marie Langer in the fifth chapter.

history to be actualized in the transference, psychosis requires her to introduce rules and provide limitations. What in neurosis could be considered obstacles to free association, in psychosis are elements that help temporarily fill the gap of foreclosure. The "blank screen" that Freud recommended for the treatment of neurosis would never be "blank" for a psychotic analysand. Instead, it would have a clear threatening content, and it would impose the position of the object on the analysand rather than invite associative thought. If the analyst were to remain silent and provide a blank screen for the analysand, the psychotic analysand would feel radically loved or radically hated by the analyst, and a transferential relationship would not be established.

The goal of the treatment of psychosis in Lacan, according to Vanheule, is that of "rehabilitation," which is rooted in the Latin word *habitare*: "Lacanian psychoanalysis aims at finding and inventing tailor-made solutions that make the house of mental life and social relations inhabitable again."[255] The fiction of psychotic transference, then, consists in the creation of habits, rules, and another experience of time—it is by enacting these elements in the transferential relationship that a psychotic analysand might be able to peacefully inhabit the house of her mental life, by having the experience of inhabiting the space of analysis.

The fictional aspect of psychotic transference does not, then, have to do with the reproduction of representation and the assemblage of past and present representations. Instead, fiction has to do with the filling of the gap of foreclosure. The analysand gets to experience the counter-factual success of the paternal metaphor through the relationship with the analyst. While in neurosis, transference reproduces in analysis relationships from outside analysis, in psychosis, the analysand will hopefully be able to reproduce outside analysis the kind of relationship that she established with the analyst in the analytic setting.

[255] Vanheule, "Conceptualizing and Treating Psychosis," 393.

The Missing Translation

After looking at Freud's understanding of narcissistic neuroses and his reading of Schreber as well as the role of transference in that reading in the previous chapter, as well as Lacan's elaboration of psychoses and the Lacanian maneuvers of transference in this one, I return now to this chapter's initial question: what was the conceptual shift that made psychotic transference possible for Lacanian theory and practice, after Freud considered it impossible and foreign to psychoanalysis? There are several elements that characterize transference in the treatment of neurosis which are incompatible with the treatment of psychosis: the prevalence of silence and the enigmatic character of the analyst, the in-depth exploration of certain topics, the reflection on the repetition of certain themes. These technical aspects are tied together by what Freud calls "die Grundregel der psychoanalytischen Technik" ["the fundamental rule of psychoanalysis"], that is, free association.

In his essay "Zur Einleitung der Behandlung," Freud claims that the patient is free to choose where to begin, there is only one rule she must follow. He writes—in direct speech—what the patient should be told:

> Noch eines, ehe Sie beginnen. Ihre Erzählung soll sich doch in einem Punkte von einer gewöhnlichen Konversation unterscheiden. Während Sie sonst mit Recht versuchen, in Ihrer Darstellung den Faden des Zusammenhanges festzuhalten und alle störenden Einfälle und Nebengedanken abweisen, um nicht, wie man sagt, aus dem Hundertsten ins Tausendste zu kommen, sollen Sie hier anders vorgehen. Sie werden beobachten, daß Ihnen während Ihrer Erzählung verschiedene Gedanken kommen, welche Sie mit gewissen kritischen Einwendungen zurückweisen möchten. Sie werden versucht sein, sich zu sagen: Dies oder jenes gehört nicht hieher, oder es ist ganz unwichtig, oder es ist unsinnig, man braucht es darum nicht zu sagen. Geben Sie dieser Kritik niemals nach und sagen Sie es trotzdem, ja gerade darum, weil Sie eine Abneigung dagegen verspüren. Den Grund für diese Vorschrift — eigentlich die einzige, die Sie befolgen sollen — werden Sie später erfahren und einsehen lernen. Sagen Sie also alles, was Ihnen durch den Sinn geht. Benehmen Sie sich so, wie zum Beispiel ein Reisender, der am Fensterplatze des Eisenbahnwagens sitzt und dem im Inneren Untergebrachten beschreibt, wie sich vor seinen Blicken die Aussicht verändert. Endlich vergessen Sie nie

> daran, daß Sie volle Aufrichtigkeit versprochen haben, und gehen Sie nie über etwas hinweg, weil Ihnen dessen Mitteilung aus irgendeinem Grunde unangenehm ist.[256]
>
> ['One more thing before you start. What you tell me must differ in one respect from an ordinary conversation. Ordinarily you rightly try to keep a connecting thread running through your remarks and you exclude any intrusive ideas that may occur to you and any side-issues, so as not to wander too far from the point. But in this case you must proceed differently. You will notice that as you relate things various thoughts will occur to you which you would like to put aside on the ground of certain criticisms and objections. You will be tempted to say to yourself that this or that is irrelevant here, or is quite unimportant, or nonsensical, so that there is no need to say it. You must never give in to these criticisms, but must say it in spite of them—indeed, you must say it precisely *because* you feel an aversion to doing so. Later on you will find out and learn to understand the reason for this injunction, which is really the only one you have to follow. So say whatever goes through your mind. Act as though, for instance, you were a traveller sitting next to the window of a railway carriage and describing to someone inside the carriage the changing views which you see outside. Finally, never forget that you have promised to be absolutely honest, and never leave anything out because, for some reason or other, it is unpleasant to tell it.'][257]

Freud asks his patients to conceive speech in analysis as a different kind of dialogue, one in which nothing should be excluded, even though the meaning of certain words might only become clear afterwards. The task consists in witnessing one's thoughts and describing them without criticism. It is worth pointing out that the word *Kritik* can refer not only to criticism and censure, but also to the Kantian critical tradition, in which the task of critique consists in finding boundaries and making distinctions that allow for the legitimate use of the faculties. In this case, Freud asks his analysands to erase all boundaries, since the fundamental rule of psychoanalysis makes all thoughts and associations legitimate.

Free association, however, cannot be installed in the treatment of psychosis, as I mentioned above. Freud noticed this technical incompatibility insofar as he claimed that psychoanalysis consisted in the treatment of neuroses and that psychotic patients "zeigen keine

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256 Freud, *Gesammelte Werke*, 8: Werke aus den Jahren 1909-1913:468.
257 Freud, *Standard Edition*, 1966, Vol. XII (1911-1913): The Case of Schreber, Papers on Technique and Other Works:134–35; Freud, *Gesammelte Werke 8*, Bd. 8: Werke aus den Jahren 1909-1913:468.

Übertragung und darum sind sie auch für unsere Bemühung unzugänglich, durch uns nicht heilbar"[258] ["manifest no transference and for that reason are inaccessible to our efforts and cannot be cured by us"].[259] Psychoanalysis was initially shaped by the treatment of neuroses and governed by the fundamental rule of free association, which accounted for a kind of transference that could not be established in the treatment of psychoses. Lacan acknowledges this aspect of the history of psychoanalytic technique in his seminar on psychoses when he claims: "Nous avons été formés dans l'analyse par l'expérience des névroses"[260] ["We've been trained in analysis through the experience of the neuroses"].[261]

Indeed, the fact that free association was considered by Freud to be the "fundamental" rule of psychoanalysis already points to the fact that psychoanalytic technique was conceived through the understanding of neuroses and the development of a treatment for them. Freud, in fact, formulated the concept of transference in the context of the treatment of Dora, a case of hysteria, one of the transference neuroses. Neurosis, then, came to define transference, which in turn came to define psychoanalytic technique and the task of psychoanalysis as a whole.

What made psychoses untreatable by psychoanalysis, then, resulted from the very premises of psychoanalytic technique as they were initially established. In other words, Freud's judgment on the impossibility for psychoanalysis to treat psychosis resulted from the fact that he read psychosis through the prism of neurosis, and that reading made psychosis clinically illegible. In order to make it legible, I argue that it was necessary to "translate" transference, as it were, to the realm of psychoses. From a Freudian perspective, if transference did not manifest as it did

[258] Freud, *Gesammelte Werke*, 11: Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Psychoanalyse:465.
[259] Freud, *Standard Edition*, 1917, XVI (1916-1917): Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis (Part III):447.
[260] Lacan, *Séminaire III*, 501.
[261] Lacan, *Seminar 3*, 320.

with transference neuroses, then there was no possibility for transference at all, and the treatment of those affections necessarily remained outside the scope of psychoanalysis. And by considering psychotics incapable of transference, the contingent conditions in which the concept of transference was formulated by Freud were forgotten. This forgetting of the history of the conceptualization of transference dissociated the concept of transference from the treatment of any specific affections (namely neurosis), even if that led to consider that some affections were untreatable.

Acknowledging the contingent character of the history of transference makes it possible to translate it to the treatment of psychosis. But this contingency does not limit the concept of transference—on the contrary, it is by understanding such contingency that transference can in fact be understood and reimagined as a technical tool to treat affections like the psychoses. There is not such a thing as a "neutral" concept of transference that can apply to every case; the historical association of transference to neurosis is exactly what can allow for an understanding of transference that makes this translation possible.

What led psychoses to be considered untreatable by Freudian psychoanalysis is, then, the absence of translation. Freud failed to translate the therapeutic effects of transference—as they were developed in the treatment of neurotics—to other affections, namely the psychoses. He expected to find the effects of transference with neurotics in the treatment with psychotics, and the indifference of narcissistic neurotics led him to consider that psychoanalysis could not treat them. It was after Freud that psychoanalysis was reconfigured to not only be a psychoanalysis of neuroses but also a psychoanalysis of psychoses.

In the early days of psychoanalysis, then, psychosis remained foreign to it. In this sense, psychoanalysis was faced with a specific kind of otherness, as it were, in the very stages of its

development, without leaving the Austrian borders. This otherness would be defined by an object that escapes the discipline, something that remains foreign to it once the disciplinary limits of psychoanalysis were established by Freud. The translation of transference from the framework of neurosis to that of psychosis was perhaps one of the most important translations within European psychoanalysis.

From Freud's time until now, several technical aspects of psychoanalysis have been revised, reinterpreted, and many others have been proposed. Psychosis is not the only instance that required psychoanalytic technique to move away from Freud's recommendations. Not only did other psychoanalytic schools conceive other positions for the analyst, but even Freudian analysts and analysts whose clinical practice was to some extent inspired by Freud's work needed to distance themselves from this model. Psychosis was possibly the first instance in which psychoanalysis was faced with something foreign to it. Lacan developed other ways to treat psychosis, and therefore found a way to translate psychoanalytic technique to the realm of the treatment of psychosis. This, however, was only one of the translations that psychoanalysis underwent—its circulation across geographies and persistence throughout history elicited many others.

Chapter Four | Oedipus in Translation: Moustapha Safouan and Girindrasekhar Bose

From its very early days, psychoanalysis began traveling across the world. Already in the 1920s, Freud was corresponding with Peruvian psychiatrist, philosopher, and linguist Honorio Delgado and with Indian psychoanalyst and physician Girindrasekhar Bose. Moreover, today the city recognized as "world capital of psychoanalysis" is in fact not Vienna, but Buenos Aires.[262] Taking the publication of Freud's *Die Traumdeutung* in 1900 as point of reference, Joy Damousi and Mariano Plotkin claim that the twentieth century was the "psychoanalytic century."[263] The theoretical body of psychoanalysis, "created in Vienna (a declining capital of a declining empire) by a Bohemian-born Austrian Jewish medical doctor who occupied a relatively marginal position in the academic and professional fields of his country," quickly became a transnational discipline.[264]

The early dissemination of psychoanalysis meant that this theoretical body and clinical practice quickly began settling in places that were significantly different from Freud's Vienna. In this encounter with other terrains, the contingencies that characterize Freudian psychoanalysis started to appear as more culturally specific than it might have appeared to a reader of psychoanalysis in and around Vienna. One could say that psychoanalysis was more universal in its local milieu than what it became in its transnational circulation, which brought to the fore its situated idiosyncrasy. Such idiosyncrasy is sometimes clearly inscribed in psychoanalytic concepts, as is the case with explicit references to Freud's literary references, which are often Goethe, Shakespeare, and myths and stories from Ancient Greece. Edward Said points out that,

[262] Damousi and Plotkin, *The Transnational Unconscious*, 5.
[263] Damousi and Plotkin, 1.
[264] Damousi and Plotkin, 5.

although Freud's work is about the Other insofar as it addresses the question of the limits of reason, convention, and consciousness, it is

> always about the Other recognizable mainly to readers who are well acquainted with the classics of Graeco-Roman and Hebrew Antiquity and what was later to derive from them in the various modern European languages, literatures, sciences, religions and cultures with which he himself was well acquainted.[265]

For Said, the Other conceived in Freud's work is an Other that is mostly legible through a European lens, something that can impact on psychoanalytic practice. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak alludes to this question of legibility from a practical perspective when she asks: "When we [ex-colonials] make promises or excuses, for curing or not wanting to be cured (…) can *we* perform conventions laid down according to Hebraic and Hellenic stories?"[266] The task of analysts in non-European regions involves negotiating their own stories with the ones that are already inscribed in psychoanalytic concepts.

While it is true that the Other of psychoanalysis is most legible through a European lens, the fact that psychoanalysis has spread its influence across the world in the twentieth century is proof of its translatability, even if its translation involved a complex negotiation. This chapter engages with the kind of negotiation that takes place when psychoanalysis travels to new geographies. I argue that such negotiation consists in a process of translation, and that this process involves transference. I address the use of the metaphor of translation in Freud's work, the translatability and universality of psychoanalytic concepts, and the stakes in their translation. I take the Oedipus complex as an emblematic case. This complex is based on an idiosyncratic reading of a Greek myth, which Freud takes as a narrative framework to explain the development of the psychic structure and how desire is oriented. In that sense, it is an example

[265] Said, *Freud and the Non-European*, 14.
[266] Spivak, "Psychoanalysis in Left Field and Fieldworking," 43.

of a psychoanalytic concept that is informed by Hellenic stories, and which can appear as more explicitly situated than other concepts.

What is translatable about the Oedipus complex? How can it be translated and what is at stake in such translation? How can we understand the translation of psychoanalysis more broadly? This chapter seeks to answer these three questions by turning to the work of two different analysts. In order to answer the first question, I examine the work of Egyptian analyst Moustapha Safouan, who wrote about the universality of the Oedipus complex and not only translated several books into Arabic—including Freud's *The Interpretation of Dreams*—but also stressed the importance of translation more broadly in his work. I answer the second question through the work of Indian analyst Girindrasekhar Bose. I begin by presenting an overview of his work and focus on his interpretation of the Oedipus complex, and then turn to his correspondence with Freud, which leads me to the third question. In addition to analyzing the translation of the Oedipus complex in light of Safouan's and Bose's work, I argue that the kind of negotiation that takes place in the translation of psychoanalysis as a practice is transferential. Before delving into Safouan's and Bose's work, however, I turn to the problem of translation as a metaphor.

Translating the Unwritten

In his work, Freud often resorts to translation as a metaphor[267] to understand certain psychical processes, like the passage from unconscious to conscious content. This metaphorical use may in fact be inspired by the practice of translation, since Freud translated several books

[267] Jacques Derrida addressed Freud's use of metaphors in "Freud et la scène de l'écriture" ["Freud and the Scene of Writing"] in *L'écriture et la différence*.

into German, including works by John Stuart Mill, Jean-Martin Charcot's *Tuesday Lectures*, and two books by French physician Hippolyte Bernheim.[268] An analysis of this metaphorical use of the figure of translation will provide a framework to understand how the translation of psychoanalytic concepts and of psychoanalysis more broadly might be understood.

In an article titled "Freud and Cultural Translation," Robert Young analyzes Freud's use of the figure of translation, both as a concept and a practice, and looks into the principles that Freud used in his own translation work. Young points out diverse instances in which Freud discusses questions of linguistic translation, like in his explanations of dream-work or everyday parapraxes, and claims that Freud's discussions "emphasize the degree to which we inhabit a translational space, suggesting that the psyche is multilingual, alert to the constant possibility of using translation as a mechanism of displacement in the face of repression."[269] An example Young offers is the use of polite euphemisms, which involve a linguistic displacement that is itself a fundamental part of our psychical apparatus.[270]

Young emphasizes the work of translation that is at play in psychoanalytic practice, and refers to the case story "Katharina," where a specific scene, in which Freud tells her that if she could remember what happened to her, that would help her, and she responds: "Yes, if I could. But I was so frightened that I've forgotten everything."[271] Katharina's response is translated by Freud to psychoanalytic discourse in the "Preliminary Communication" as "The affect itself created a hypnoid state, whose products were then cut off from associative connection with the ego-consciousness."[272] This translation, as Young explains, does not result in an equivalent in a

[268] Freud and Fliess, *The Complete Letters of Sigmund Freud to Wilhelm Fliess*, 17.
[269] Young in Marcus and Mukherjee, *A Concise Companion to Psychoanalysis, Literature, and Culture*, 368.
[270] Young in Marcus and Mukherjee, 368.
[271] Cited in Marcus and Mukherjee, 369.
[272] Cited in Marcus and Mukherjee, 370.

different ordinary language but rather in a formulation in another discursive regime—Katharina's colloquial remark is translated into Freud's own psychoanalytic terminology.[273] This instance of translation of ordinary language into the realm of medical science is, however, different from the kind of translation the Freud carries out in *Die Traumdeutung*, where, according to Young, translation is "put into reverse."[274]

Freud's innovation with regard to dream interpretation, according to Young, is to understand it in the framework of translation—this kind of translation does not consist in the rendering of a formulation in a given discourse into a different one, but rather a translation of the unknown.[275] He notes that the term *Übersetzung* appears at least forty-five times in *The Interpretation of Dreams*, although the term is used in multiple different ways.[276] When addressing the question of dream interpretation, Freud explains the following:

> Traumgedanken und Trauminhalt liegen vor uns wie zwei Darstellungen desselben Inhaltes in zwei verschiedenen Sprachen, oder besser gesagt, der Trauminhalt erscheint uns als eine Übertragung der Traumgedanken in eine andere Ausdrucksweise, deren Zeichen und Fügungsgesetze wir durch die Vergleichung von Original und Übersetzung kennen lernen sollen. Die Traumgedanken sind uns ohne weiteres verständlich, sobald wir sie erfahren haben. Der Trauminhalt ist gleichsam in einer Bilderschrift gegeben, deren Zeichen einzeln in die Sprache der Traumgedanken zu übertragen sind. Man würde offenbar in die Irre geführt, wenn man diese Zeichen nach ihrem Bilderwert anstatt nach ihrer Zeichenbeziehung lesen wollte.[277]
>
> [The dream-thoughts and the dream-content are presented to us like two versions of the same subject-matter in two different languages. Or, more properly, the dream-content seems like a transcript of the dream-thoughts into another mode of expression, whose characters and syntactic laws it is our business to discover by comparing the original and the translation. The dream-thoughts are immediately comprehensible, as soon as we have learnt them. The dream-content, on the other hand, is expressed as it were in a pictographic script, the characters of which have to be transposed individually into the language of the dream-thoughts. If we attempted to read these characters according to

[273] Young in Marcus and Mukherjee, 370.
[274] Young in Marcus and Mukherjee, 371.
[275] Young in Marcus and Mukherjee, 372.
[276] Young in Marcus and Mukherjee, 371.
[277] Freud, *Gesammelte Werke*, 2/3: Die Traumdeutung, Über den Traum:283–84.

> their pictorial value instead of according to their symbolic relation, we should clearly be led into error.][278]

Freud points out that the signs [*Zeichen*] and laws of construction [*Fügungsgesetze*][279] of the dream-content (that is, the manifest content) become legible once it is compared with the dream-thoughts (that is, the latent content).[280] The dream-thoughts can be comprehended by learning them, but the dream-content is expressed "in a pictographic script," which can lead the interpreter to base her interpretation on the pictorial elements rather than analyzing the sign-relations[281] among its different elements. Laplanche and Pontalis explain the passage of dream-content to dream-thoughts in the following way: "the latent content means the complete and genuine translation of the dreamer's discourse, the adequate formulation of his desire; as such it stands in opposition to the manifest content, which is both incomplete and mendacious."[282]

Freud provides an example of a rebus or picture-puzzle that depicts a house which has a boat on its roof, the physical presence of one letter of the alphabet, and the figure of a gigantic headless man who is running. If analyzed pictorially, this scene appears to be nonsensical, as these elements seem to defy reality as we know it. But rather than being object to criticism in this way, Freud claims that the procedure should consist in replacing each element by a word that can be represented by that element in some way: "Die Worte, die sich so zusammenfinden, sind nicht mehr sinnlos, sondern können den schönsten und sinnreichsten Dichterspruch

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[278] Freud, *The Interpretation of Dreams*, 295–96.
[279] I am translating *Zeichen* literally as signs and *Fügungsgesetze* more literally as laws of disposition in order to avoid the references to alphabetic writing.
[280] The term that Freud uses to refer to this "transcript" of dream-thoughts into a different mode of expression is *Übertragung*, this "transcript" is the result of a process of transference. In the context of *Traumdeutung,* transference has a very specific meaning different from how it is usually understood, as I have pointed out in the first chapter.
[281] I have translated *Zeichenbeziehung* more literally as sign-relation to avoid the reference to symbols.
[282] Laplanche and Pontalis, *The Language of Psycho-Analysis*, 235.

ergeben. Ein solches Bilderrätsel ist nun der Traum"[283] ["The words which are put together in this way are no longer nonsensical but may form a poetical phrase of the greatest beauty and significance. A dream is a picture-puzzle of this sort"].[284] By analyzing the symbolic relations between the different elements of the dream, as well as doing this work of substitution, the dream puzzle is rendered into a poetical phrase—the translation of the nonsensical pictographic script.

To briefly return to Young, he points out that according to these principles that Freud lays out in *The Interpretation of Dreams*, the meaning of dreams is not in the dreams themselves, but rather in their invisible origins. He refers to Jean Laplanche's notion of *detraduction* [detranslation], which consists in a dismantling and reversion of translation. In Laplanche's words:

> l'interprétation *analytique* consiste à défaire une traduction existante, spontanée, éventuellement symptomatique, pour retrouver, en deçà d'elle, ce qu'elle désirait ardemment traduire et pour en permettre, éventuellement, une traduction « meilleure », c'est-à-dire plus complète, plus englobante et moins refoulante.
>
> [*analytic* interpretation consists in undoing an existing translation, one that is spontaneous, possibly symptomatic, in order to find below it what it ardently desired to translate. This is what ultimately allows for a "better" translation, that is, one that is more complete, more encompassing, and with less repression].[285]

As Laplanche suggests, the manifest dream-content is a bad translation, one that is incomplete. Through the process of detranslation, it is possible to find the dream-throughs which eventually led to that bad translation.

[283] Freud, *Gesammelte Werke*, 2/3: Die Traumdeutung, Über den Traum:284.
[284] Freud, *The Interpretation of Dreams*, 296.
[285] Laplanche, *La révolution copernicienne inachevée*, 327 (my translation).

What results from this process of detranslation, however, is not an original in the way that the original is understood in linguistic translation, but rather, as Young points out, a third text, which is the analyst's rephrasing:

> Unlike conventional translation, it may be observed, in de-translation there is no real hierarchy between the different texts because although the original dream thoughts may be "the primary text," they are only made evident through the process of de-translation in which they are restated by the analyst in his own transposed language of psychoanalysis.[286]

Rather than a process in which there is an original text that precedes a translation, the process of detranslation seeks to unwind an already translated material whose "primary text" is unknown. Moreover, the result of the detranslation process does not seek to restore that "primary text" but rather results in a third text, which is the analyst's rephrasing. Instead of "moving forward"—from original text to translation—the process of detranslation "moves backward"—seeking to reverse a translated material and yet resulting in a text that is not the original, but a third text.

The way in which Freud deploys the figure of translation opens up new aspects of what the work of translation might mean in contexts in which what is translated is not a written text. Not only that, but "the primary text" that is translated and the result of that process of translation do not, as Young claims, have clear places in a hierarchy. I would propose to understand what Young calls a hierarchy as a chronological precedence, since a hierarchy between original text and translation in conventional translation is not necessarily clear. In conventional translation, the primary text (the original) precedes the translation in time, since the translation results from a work that comes after and takes the original as a basis. In psychoanalytic translation, the question of temporality is less clear, since "the primary text," as

[286] Young in Marcus and Mukherjee, *A Concise Companion to Psychoanalysis, Literature, and Culture*, 375.

Young points out, is accessed through a process of detranslation that, rather than rendering the "primary text" in the "original language" in which it might have been formulated, such detranslation results in a third text, which is the analyst's rephrasing. In other words, the process of detranslation does not attempt to retrace the process that led to the translation, such that the "primary text" is restored, but instead is one that produces a third text that could never be compared with the "primary text."

The notion of translation that I am proposing here is a broad one, and it follows Freud in being a metaphorical understanding of translation. There is, in fact, a process of translation in the passage between latent and manifest content, but translation here is taken in such a way that the primary text and the translation are not equivalent. In this process of translation—or detranslation—there is a transformation of the "primary text" into something else, which does not restore the primary text but instead results in a third text. This "primary text" does not exist and can never be contrasted with its translation; the detranslation is yet another instance of translation rather than a "rewinding" of a complete translation process.

This fundamental transformation that takes place in what Laplanche calls "analytic translation" is what is at the center of my understanding of translation. I propose to understand the reconfiguration of concepts as one that undergoes a process of transformation that follows the principles of psychoanalytic translation as I have described above. I understand this transformation of concepts as a process of conceptual translation, such as the one that takes place, as I argue in the previous chapter, in the Lacanian understanding of the "maneuvers of transference," which themselves offer a revision of the Freudian concept of transference. In order to understand how this conceptual translation can take place in the transnational circulation of psychoanalysis, I turn to the work of Moustapha Safouan.

Othello in Egypt

Like Freud, Moustapha Safouan was also an analyst who both translated texts from a foreign language to their mother tongue and theorized about translation, although in different ways. Safouan translated Freud's *The Interpretation of Dreams* to Arabic, as well as Shakespeare's *Othello* to spoken Egyptian, and presents a strong position regarding politics and translation in his book *Why are the Arabs not Free?*.

Safouan was born in Alexandria, Egypt, in 1921 and passed away in Paris in 2020. He spent his childhood and youth in Alexandria, where he later received a university degree in Philosophy.[287] Driven by his interest in language, he planned to go to Cambridge to pursue a doctorate in formal logic, and because he was top of his class, he was in a good position to get a scholarship. However, at that time, Cambridge decided to give absolute priority to the admission of young British soldiers who had returned from combat, which meant that Safouan could be waiting for a long time before being admitted. As an alternative plan, he was offered the possibility to study at the Sorbonne in Paris, where he arrived at the beginning of 1946. He was advised to start a licentiate before pursuing a doctorate and, following this advice, he began his licentiate in Philosophy at the Sorbonne. It was the same year that he arrived in Paris that Safouan decided to start an analysis with the French psychoanalyst Marc Schlumberger, who was bilingual in English and French, and with whom Safouan could start an analysis in English.[288] One year before finishing his licentiate in Philosophy in 1950, Safouan started attending the meetings at the Société Parisienne de Psychanalyse where he met Lacan, with whom he started a

[287] "Zamyn — MacCabe with Safouan Interview."
[288] "Zamyn — MacCabe with Safouan Interview."

training analysis. Lacan was a particularly interesting figure for Safouan because of his emphasis on language and speech.

Safouan had become familiarized with psychoanalysis before arriving in Paris. In 1940, the Egyptian analyst Moustapha Ziwar, whose training and clinical practice was in France, went back to Egypt because of the war. At the time, Ziwar was a young analyst, and he shared his enthusiasm for psychoanalysis by teaching Freud's *Psychopathology of Everyday Life*, always trying to find examples in Arabic that would be equivalent to those in German. Egypt, as Raja Ben Slama explains, was the first Arab country where psychoanalysis was practiced, which started in the 1930s, and began to be taught in the university in the 1950s with the foundation of a department of Psychology at the university of Aïn Chems by Moustapha Ziwar.[289] Along with Yusuf Murad—a professor of psychology trained in Cairo and Paris—Ziwar also founded the *Jamaʿat ʿIlm al-Nafs al-Takamuli* [Society of Integrative Psychology] and the Egyptian *Majallat ʿIlm al-Nafs* [Journal of Psychology] in 1945. Murad also supervised the translation and publication of numerous works of psychology.[290] However, Ben Slama also points out that, while the arrival of psychoanalysis in Egypt was early in comparison with other parts of the region, it was rather belated in comparison with parts of the world, like Brazil, where the name of Freud started to circulate in 1899, and India, where *The Interpretation of Dreams* began to get translated in 1911.[291] In Japan, to provide another example, Freud began to be studied in 1912, as Japanese psychiatrist Masahisa Nishizono points out.[292]

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[289] Ben Slama, "La psychanalyse en Égypte," 83.
[290] El Shakry, *The Arabic Freud*, 23.
[291] Ben Slama, "La psychanalyse en Égypte," 85. However, Nandy and Sinha point out that translations of Freud only reached India after the war, as we will see later. Ben Slama does not clarify in what way Freud's work began to get translated.
[292] Nishizono, "Introduction," 113.

Safouan's original plan was not to settle in France but to go back to Egypt. However, when he traveled to Egypt at the end of 1953, Nasser came to power, which meant that he had to do a five-year service for the Nasserian State in order to have a right to have a visa. During these years, Safouan translated Freud's *The Interpretation of Dreams* to Arabic, as well as Shakespeare's *Othello* to spoken Egyptian. It was after these years that Safouan decided to leave Egypt definitely, and he lived in Paris in exile from 1959 until the end of his life in 2020.

In *Why are the Arabs not Free?*, Safouan examines the question of politics of writing in the Egyptian context. Throughout the book, Safouan makes a case for literature being written and translated to vernacular languages, rather than separating vernacular languages from the "classical" languages devoted to literature and culture. He points out that while it is often believed that Arabic is one language, the distance between classical Arabic and the Arabic of Egypt, the Gulf States, and North Africa is analogous to the relation between Latin and the Romance languages Italian, Spanish, and French.[293] Based on this fact, he claims:

> The aim of writing should be to furnish the materials with which people may articulate a fuller understanding of their situation. At the moment the majority of intellectuals restrict themselves to self-satisfied irony expressed in the classical language which makes them accomplices of the despot.[294]

For Safouan, writing in and translating texts to vernacular languages has a profound political effect. This analysis of language and his position on translation are the way in which he addresses the question of Arab despotism. As a psychoanalyst, Safouan was aware of the impact that the figure of the imaginary father can have, as Colin MacCabe observes.[295]

[293] Safouan, *Why Are the Arabs Not Free?*, 10.
[294] Safouan, 44.
[295] MacCabe in Safouan, ix.

Safouan's *Othello* in Egyptian Arabic instantiates many of his ideas about translation. He explains that his goal in translating this work was to show that it was possible to have admirable literature in spoken Arabic, as well as to enable ordinary people to read great writers in their mother tongue.[296] The indisputable greatness of Shakespeare made it impossible to deny Safouan's translation the character of a "sublime" work, even if it was in a language disdainfully considered to be "vulgar."[297] In order to disprove the "vulgarity" often assigned to spoken Arabic, Safouan points out that the difficulties that this translation presented were in fact no different than those involved in translating a text to any other language. These difficulties included metonymies that lose their meaning due to the differences in cultural context and the rephrasing that is necessary because of the differences in syntactic structures.[298]

Following Yves Bonnefois in his claim that every language has a certain philosophy implicitly inscribed in it, Safouan states that

> translating Shakespeare into French does not mean making him look French; on the contrary, such a translation is a struggle to make the French language comply with a different philosophy. (…) Translation into Arabic should not follow the so-called ideal of 'Arabisation'; on the contrary, translating consists in using the language in order to free ourselves from the limits imposed on us by that language.[299]

The idea of a specific kind of freeing appears in this passage, in which Safouan states the character and limits of translation. What is demanded of the translated text is not for it to hide its foreign origin (for example, to sound French) but rather to open up a linguistic space ruled by laws different from the ones that govern the primary text. Because the destination language needs to adapt to a different philosophy in the process of translation, to follow Bonnefois's

[296] Safouan, 49.
[297] Safouan, 52.
[298] Safouan, 53.
[299] Safouan, 54.

terms, in Safouan's translation of *Othello*, Egyptian Arabic frees itself from "Arabization" because rather than making Othello sound Arabic, Egyptian Arabic needs to reconfigure itself according to the philosophy of the English language. In this reconfiguration, Egyptian Arabic frees itself from the limits imposed by its own philosophy.[300]

When Safouan justifies why he decided to translate *Othello*, he points out that Othello speaks as if constantly looking in a mirror hoping to confirm that he has "all the perfections that fascinate the eye and please society."[301] This attachment with the fantasy of his own perfection is what interests Safouan. This fascination with the ideal, which becomes a desire to master the Other's desire, emerges from the fascination that the imaginary or ideal father has early on in life and which has conscious and unconscious effects that take as long as a whole lifetime to dissipate.[302] Safouan sees the figure of the ideal father incarnated by the monarch, who in Arab societies, he explains, is where the political power is concentrated. He admits that his choice of Othello as the text to translate into his mother tongue was a result of his experience of psychoanalysis.[303] "More than any other play I know, *Othello* teaches us to temper this natural infatuation for ideals that annihilates thought."[304] In a different way, it is also Othello's teaching that reappears in Safouan's reading of the Oedipus complex, which is the focus of the next section.

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[300] Walter Benjamin makes a similar point in "Die Aufgabe des Übersetzers" ["The Task of the Translator"] when he claims that the highest praise of a translation is not to say that it reads as if had been originally written in that language: "Die wahre Übersetzung ist durchscheinend, sie verdeckt nicht das Original, steht ihm nicht im Licht, sondern läßt die reine Sprache, wie verstärkt durch ihr eigenes Medium, nur um so voller aufs Original fallen" (Benjamin, *Gesammelte Schriften. 2*, 18.) ["A real translation is transparent; it does not cover the original, does not block its light, but allows the pure language, as though reinforced by its own medium, to shine upon the original all the more fully"] (Benjamin, *Selected Writings*, 1 (1913-1926):260.)

[301] Safouan, *Why Are the Arabs Not Free?*, 52.

[302] Safouan, 52.

[303] Safouan, 52.

[304] Safouan, 53.

The Translatability of Oedipus

The question of the Oedipus complex is present at multiple points in Safouan's work, involving an analysis of *Oedipus Rex*, a Lacanian interpretation of the Oedipus complex, and a reading of societal changes that identifies contemporary society as being "post-Oedipal." His analysis is attentive to structural changes in society and involves inquiries about the changing place of psychoanalysis in the last decades of the 20th century, as well as about the need to reflect on this repositioning as these structural transformations—such as the transformation of family structures and the development of assisted reproduction—take place.[305] I will focus here on Safouan's reading of the Oedipus complex and of *Oedipus Rex*.

In *Regard sur la civilization œdipienne*, Safouan offers his own interpretation of *Oedipus Rex*. In his reading, he stresses the difference between the father who raised Oedipus and the biological father. The father whom Oedipus murders is in fact not the father who recognized him as his son and who carried for him the Name-of-the-Father, but rather the biological father, the one who rejected him.[306] As he explains: "le père géniteur, c'est le père réduit au phallus comme conduit spermatique. Tout le sens du complexe d'Œdipe tourne ici autour de la différence entre cet organe et le phallus symbolique tel que Lacan l'introduit avec sa théorie de la métaphore paternelle" ["the biological father is the father who has been reduced to the phallus as a spermatic conduit. The whole meaning of the Oedipus complex here revolves around the difference between this organ and the symbolic phallus as was introduced by Lacan in his theory of the paternal metaphor"].[307] This difference is in fact fundamental in Safouan's understanding of the Oedipus complex, as we will see later.

[305] The question of transhistorical translation, however, will be the focus of the next chapter.
[306] Safouan, *Regard sur la civilisation oedipienne*, 158.
[307] Safouan, 158 (my translation).

Safouan claims that the fact that Oedipus killed his biological father, whom he did not know, shows the extent to which this perverse father was diverted to a representation of the phallus of which he was a rival. In other words, because of the extent to which this image of the father was identified with the phallus, and because this identification caused a rivalry with this representation of the father, Oedipus kills him. This rivalry was "animé par une passion débridé de l'être comme s'il cherchait à reconstruire la complétude perdue de je ne sais quel Être Suprême" ["animated by an unrestrained passion as if he sought to rebuild the lost completeness of who knows what Supreme Being"].[308] Oedipus's guilt, for Safouan, lies on the transgressive capture of his desire. His unrestrained passion was driven by the desire to restore what appeared to be the lost completeness of an imagined Supreme Being. Safouan points out that with this story, Sophocles provided the model of a man who went to the greatest lengths in the discovery of what is "stupid" in the Hegelian master's desire, and this was precisely Oedipus's heroism. He tore his eyes out in the hopes of erasing what was deceptive of them, "et ce n'est que lorsqu'il n'était plus rien qu'il est devenu quelque chose" ["and it was not until he was no longer anything that he became something"].[309]

This reading of Sophocles's story provides some important elements to understand Safouan's interpretation of the Oedipus complex, which he explains in his essay "L'Œdipe est-il universel?" ["Is the Oedipus Complex Universal?]. It should be noted that the universal character of the Oedipus as it is understood in this essay is not conceived as being independent and abstracted from societal organization, as Christian Hoffmann points out; instead, it is a social imperative to which society must respond in one way or another.[310] This universality, in

[308] Safouan, 159 (my translation).
[309] Safouan, 160 (my translation).
[310] Christian Hoffmann, "Présentation" in Safouan, *Études sur l'Œdipe*, V–VI.

this sense, consists in a structural necessity in the constitution of desire rather than a characteristic disassociated from any historical and social references.

Safouan's essay begins by explaining that his question—"Is the Oedipus Complex Universal?"—was driven by his reading of Freud's *Totem and Taboo*. He was led to relativize the Oedipus complex but not, as he remarks, in opposition to other forms that would be alternative to the Oedipus complex. Instead, as he explains:

> Il s'agit d'une *relativation* qui se fait en *partant de l'intérieur même du complexe d'Œdipe*, c'est-à-dire de la psychanalyse, pour autant que nous considérons celle-ci comme l'expérience que nous ferons de la subjectivité, au niveau de son enveloppement le plus radical dans l'ordre symbolique.[311]
>
> [This was a *relativisation* carried out *from within the Oedipus complex itself*, i.e., from within psychoanalysis itself, insofar as I regard the latter as our experimental access to subjectivity, at the level of its most radical containment in the symbolic order.][312]

This is an important clarification, since Safouan points to the fact that this relativization does not consist in turning to factors external to the concept (cultural patterns, historical events, etc.). It is not a relativization in which the concept gets absorbed or refuted by what lies outside of its conceptual structure, but instead looks within the very framework of psychoanalytic theory. The Oedipus complex is not understood in relation to elements external to its conceptual structure, but instead is relativized with regard to its role in the structuration of desire within psychoanalysis.

One of the main points of the essay consists in explaining the difference between, on the one hand, imaginary castration, or the feeling of castration and, on the other hand, symbolic castration, that is, the castration that allows human desire to exit its indetermination as desire of

311 Safouan, 115.
312 Safouan, "Is the Oedipus Complex Universal?," 83.

the Other.[313] Safouan begins by asking why seizing of the subject by the symbolic order causes the unconscious effects of castration, and later explains that the reason for symbolic castration is that it "jette les assises de la relation d'objet chez l'être humain, pour autant qu'elle impose, non pas le deuil de l'objet primordial, ce qui est plutôt l'affaire de la loi, mais *la limitation du narcissisme* dans lequel se figerait la relation à l'objet tout court"[314] ["lays the foundations for the object relation in the human being, in so far as it imposes not mourning for the primordial object, which is rather a matter of the law, but a *restriction on the narcissism* into which the relation to the object as such would otherwise set"].[315] The determination of the object-relation, which—as Laplanche and Pontalis define it—is the way in which the subject relates to the world as a result of an organization of the personality,[316] takes place as a result of the limitation of narcissism. It is thanks to this limitation that a non-narcissistic object-choice is possible.

Safouan then proceeds to explain that the possibility of object choice depends on a detour that takes place in two stages: one is the genesis of an ideal with which the subject identifies and satisfies their narcissism but in respect to which they feel castrated, the second is a break in this capture by the ideal, thanks to which the feeling of castration does not last indefinitely in the subject. While the feeling of castration, as Safouan explains, is experienced by the subject in the comparison with the father, it does not result from that comparison, which explains why the feeling gets resolved in the girl as well as the boy. This comparison does not lead to the birth of the ideal, which in turn is a fundamental stage in the development of an object choice. The function of the ideal is rooted in the promotion of the phallus, which is

[313] Safouan, *Études sur l'Œdipe*, 116.
[314] Safouan, 121.
[315] Safouan, "Is the Oedipus Complex Universal?," 87.
[316] Laplanche and Pontalis, *The Language of Psycho-Analysis*, 277.

discovered as an insufficiency in the boy and an inexistence for the girl through a paternal attribute.[317]

At this point, I would like to briefly return to Othello. When Safouan, following Bonnefois, claims that in translation, a language is used to free ourselves from the limits imposed by another language, the dynamic that leads to a non narcissistic object choice is at play. In the case of Safouan's *Othello*, Egyptian Arabic does not "follow the ideal of 'Arabisation'"— the capture by the ideal is ruptured by the philosophy of the English language. A language, then, rather can running the risk of indefinitely being captured by an ideal that satisfies its narcissism (the ideal of "Arabization"), is freed through a rupture carried out by the philosophy of a different language. Because translation requires a language to comply with the rules established by a different language, that is, to formulate itself according to the philosophy of another language, it becomes, one could say, non narcissistic.

Back to Oedipus. The rupture of the ideal involves the subordination of the phallus to a symbolic order, which does not have any relationship with a natural order in which the phallus is equivalent to the penis. It is rather the play of the signified that explains the introduction of the phallus, and that which this introduction entails, namely "la subordination de l'accès à la génitalité à un mouvement que le sujet ressent comme une exclusion par rapport à ce phallus même"[318] ["the subordination of access to genitality to a movement which the subject feels as an exclusion from that very phallus"].[319] The introduction of the phallus acts as a banishing presence, which is, as Safouan points out, a particular case of induction of the imaginary by the symbolic, which he illustrates with the following example:

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[317] Safouan, *Études sur l'Œdipe*, 122–23.
[318] Safouan, 123.
[319] Safouan, "Is the Oedipus Complex Universal?," 89.

> imaginons un sujet qui s'interroge sur ce que c'est que d'être roi, alors qu'il ignore tout du contexte symbolique où s'insère la royauté. Il est inévitable qu'un signifiant vienne répondre à cette question, par exemple : l'aigle ou le chêne, dont l'image va draper le roi de son redoutable manteau, dont le sujet se découvre du même coup démuni. Il en va de même dans une interrogation sur le père, à ceci près que, pour les raisons que nous venons d'expliquer, il y a nécessité que l'image métaphorique soit celle du phallus.[320]
>
> [imagine a subject who asks himself about what it is to be king, even though he is completely ignorant of the whole symbolic context in which monarchy is located. Inevitably a signifier will come to answer the question, e.g., the eagle or the oak, the image of which will wrap the king in its redoubtable mantle, whose lack the subject will then immediately feel. The same goes for an interrogation about the father, except that, for the reasons I have just explained, it is a necessity that the metaphorical image be that of the phallus.][321]

In Safouan's example, the father takes the place of the king, and just as monarchy is necessary to understand the place of kingship, the metaphorical image of the phallus is necessary to understand the place of the father. This image appears to the subject with the introduction of a signifier, which in the case of the king is the eagle or the oak on the mantle. With the introduction of the symbolic order, the imaginary father gets separated from the Name-of-the-Father, to which the imaginary father is subordinated. This introduction makes it possible to understand the place of the (imaginary) father—it is the symbolic that allows for the induction of the imaginary.

Having clarified the stages in the development of (non narcissistic) object-choice, as well as the difference between imaginary and symbolic castration, Safouan proceeds to answer the question in the title of his essay:

> Non seulement *l'essentiel du complexe d'Œdipe ne réside pas dans la rivalité* qu'il conditionne, mais encore, c'est cette rivalité même qui en occulte l'essentiel.
>
> L'Œdipe n'est au fond qu'*une forme culturelle* parmi d'autres, qui sont également possibles pourvu qu'elles accomplissent la même fonction, qui est *la promotion de la fonction de la castration* dans le psychisme.[322]

[320] Safouan, *Études sur l'Œdipe*, 123.
[321] Safouan, "Is the Oedipus Complex Universal?," 89.
[322] Safouan, *Études sur l'Œdipe*, 124.

> [Not only does *the essence of the Oedipus complex not lie in the rivalry* for which it is the precondition, it is even that very rivalry that obscures its essence.
>
> The Oedipus complex is in the end no more than *one cultural form* among others, those others being equally possible providing they perform the same function of *promoting the function of castration* in the psyche.][323]

The rivalry with the father that takes place at the level of the imaginary conceals, for Safouan, what is essential about the Oedipus complex. As MacCabe points out, Safouan follows Lacan in his distinction between the rivalry with the father that takes place at the level of the imaginary and the realization that the father is not an all-powerful figure but is instead subjected to a symbolic order that is out of his control.[324] If the rivalry with the father is placed in the foreground, the essential aspect of the Oedipus complex is pushed into the background, which is the promotion of the function of castration. What is universal about the Oedipus complex, then, is not the Oedipus complex itself, but the promotion of this function. The Oedipus complex is merely one possible way ("one cultural form") in which desire can be structured. The function of castration can lead to other structures of desire, and this is the universal element of the Oedipus complex.

In relation to the statement with which Safouan started his essay about examining the Oedipus complex within the very psychoanalytic framework, Safouan points out that ethnographic and ethnopsychiatric literature do not shed light on the discussion on the universality of the Oedipus complex, since such relativization can only be carried out correctly "si nous partons de l'expérience psychanalytique en tant qu'elle met en lumière *les conditions qui régissent la structuration du désir et les temps selon lesquels elle s'ordonne*"[325] ["if we start from

[323] Safouan, "Is the Oedipus Complex Universal?," 89.
[324] MacCabe in Safouan, *Why Are the Arabs Not Free?*, x.
[325] Safouan, *Études sur l'Œdipe*, 124–25.

psychoanalytic experience in so far as it brings to light *the conditions which govern the structuration of desire, and the moments through which that structuration proceeds*"].[326] The universal element of the Oedipus complex, in this sense, does not have to do with Oedipus, even if Sophocles's story is a fundamental part of the conceptual history of this complex. Rather, it has to do with the function of castration and with the structuration of desire that results from the subordination of the phallus to the symbolic order.

Safouan's conclusion regarding the universality of the Oedipus complex provides a conceptual framework for a discussion about its translatability. If the universality of this complex resides in a structural function, which in turn can take different forms in diverse social contexts, the translatability of this concept will consist in an interpretation of how a different context responds to the Oedipal imperative, and it is in this response that the first transferential element can be found. In order to examine the question how a concept like the Oedipus complex is translated and what the stakes are in this translation, I turn to the work of Girindrasekhar Bose.

A Deck Chair in Calcutta

Girindrasekhar Bose was born in 1887 in the north of Bihar, and his family later moved to Calcutta, where Bose received his medical degree in 1910 from Calcutta Medical College. From the beginning of his medical practice, he became interested in psychiatry and began to treat mental patients. He was the pioneer of psychoanalysis in India and founder of the Indian

[326] Safouan, "Is the Oedipus Complex Universal?," 90.

Psychoanalytic Association, and he practiced psychoanalysis in Calcutta from 1909 until his death in 1953. He is often described as the first non-Western psychoanalyst.[327]

Bose began to develop his theory of the "opposite wishes" having only heard about the existence of psychoanalysis.[328] Ashis Nandy points out that Bose might have learned about psychoanalysis as early as 1905, but only became interested in it in 1909 when he had access to articles published in newspapers.[329] English translations of Freud's works only began to reach India in 1918, once the war ended.[330] In the preface to his doctoral thesis, titled *The Concept of Repression*, Bose recounts that he began treating patients with the psychoanalytic method by the end of 1909, even though there was no systematic presentation of psychoanalysis in English at the time, and points out: "Many truths which I then found out from my analysis of patients, and which I accounted original, were in fact widely known findings as I discovered afterwards. This was both a pleasure and a disappointment to me."[331]

As translations of Freud's works were published, Bose became increasingly committed to psychoanalysis, and successfully applied Freud's method in his psychiatric practice.[332] By the time Bose was in his forties, he was widely recognized as a successful and gifted therapist. Psychoanalytic therapy in Calcutta, however, differed significantly from Freud's psychoanalytic practice. According to Nandy, Bose's writings show some indication that he may have been "overly didactic" in his therapeutic style, and the fact that he may have been so direct in his interventions had an effect on how the therapy was conceived: "Therapy was viewed primarily

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[327] Nandy, *The Savage Freud and Other Essays on Possible and Retrievable Selves*, 83; Sinha, "Development of Psycho-Analysis in India," 428.
[328] Sinha, "Development of Psycho-Analysis in India," 427–28.
[329] Nandy, *The Savage Freud and Other Essays on Possible and Retrievable Selves*, 93.
[330] Nandy, 93; Sinha, "Development of Psycho-Analysis in India," 428.
[331] Bose, *Concept of Repression*, v.
[332] Nandy, *The Savage Freud and Other Essays on Possible and Retrievable Selves*, 94.

as a cognitive venture, involving the acquisition of knowledge or information, and only secondarily as a matter of rearrangement or reinterpretation of emotions."[333]

For Nandy, the public's general indifference towards psychoanalysis defines its reception in India. With his psychoanalytic theory, Freud introduced the notion of the unconscious and developed a clinical treatment aimed at learning about this unknown part of the self. When psychoanalysis presented a new set of principles that explained the psyche, the Victorians, as Nandy expresses it, "could neither ignore nor swallow" these principles.[334] But Nandy claims that in India,[335] psychoanalysis was remarkably less controversial, since only a very small section of the Indian society had internalized Victorian moral codes—Freud, as Nandy claims, "might have viewed himself as one of those who disturbed the sleep of the world, but he did not disturb many Indians even in their waking hours."[336] Although it is not unthinkable that psychoanalysis might have been received less scandalously outside the realm of, to quote Carl Schorske, the "garden-variety Victorianism" that characterized most of Europe at the time,[337]

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[333] Nandy, 108.
[334] Nandy, 111.
[335] Although Nandy speaks of psychoanalysis in India without qualification, the history of psychoanalysis in the region is not uniform. Anup Dhar, who explains the multifariousness of the history of psychoanalysis in India, claims that it "spans the birth and genesis of psychoanalysis in largely four cities, Kolkata, Mumbai, Delhi and Bangalore including Patna, Benaras, even Rangoon in 1948." Dhar also points out that psychoanalysis was marked by different characters in each of these four cities; Kolkata: Freudian, Mumbai: Kleinian, Delhi: Winnicottian, and Bangalore: Jungian ("Girindrasekhar Bose and the History of Psychoanalysis in India," T199.). A qualified understanding of psychoanalysis in India is also important in the examination of Bose's theory because of the role that religion plays in it. The fact that Bose emphasized the influence of Puranas, Yoga Sutra, and Bhagwad Gita, and the overall presence of Hinduism in his thought means, according to Zehra Mehdi, that under Bose, psychoanalysis in India emerged as a nationalist science. "What stands out in his [Bose's] writing as well as other analysts in Indian psychoanalytic society is how there is no mention of any other religion in the discussion of Indian patients. One wonders why Hinduism ended up becoming not only the central but the only description of the Indian, since at the time Calcutta was populated by a substantial population of Muslims as well as Jews" (Mehdi, "Phobia of Religion," 233.).
[336] Nandy, *The Savage Freud and Other Essays on Possible and Retrievable Selves*, 111.
[337] Schorske, *Fin-de-Siècle Vienna*, 6.

the general indifference regarding psychoanalysis that Nandy describes could also be explained by the fact that only a small fraction of the population in Calcutta had access to psychoanalytic treatment.

One specific example of Bose's own variation of psychoanalysis is that he replaced Freud's couch with a deck chair. Christiane Hartnack stresses the contrast between Freud's practice—filled with Persian rugs, dark and heavy furniture, and antique statuettes—and Bose's, which only had a desk and a chair, bookshelves, and "the quintessentially colonial deck chair."[338] This deck chair, Hartnack notes, "was neither Freudian nor Bengali, but mirrored the foreign origin of this form of therapy," and it represented a form of relaxation that was unrelated both to Bose's local traditions and to the Austrian origin of psychoanalysis.[339] Interestingly, Freud's couch was "European" insofar as it represented the taste of the European *bourgeoisie* at the time. In the context of her analysis of Freud's office, Diana Fuss describes this aspect of interior design at the time in the following way:

> In Europe's fin-de-siècle fascination with the East, oriental interiors—especially the smoking room—were closely associated with leisure and relaxation. The bright dyes, luxurious textures, and bold designs of increasingly popular Persian carpets were instrumental in importing into the bourgeois Victorian home an aura of Eastern exoticism. In fact, the last decades of the nineteenth century found Europe in the grip of what one German design historian has called "Oriental carpet fever."[340]

Both Freud's and Bose's practice appeared visually, in their own particular ways, as foreign, inviting patients to engage in an activity that was new to them. And of course, such foreign character was materialized by objects that were not unknown in an abstract way, but instead

[338] Hartnack, *Psychoanalysis in Colonial India*, 123.
[339] Hartnack, 122.
[340] Fuss, *The Sense of an Interior*, 39.

recognizable as originary from concrete places that were familiar insofar as they could be identified as belonging to a different family, so to speak.

Another distinctive difference between Freud's practice and Bose's was, as Hartnack points out, that Freud mostly interacted with middle-class, educated, urban women, while the patients of early Indian analysts were almost exclusively male. Hartnack explains that psychoanalysis in India began in a colonial setting and that Western-educated urban men, who occupied the section of society closest to the foreign colonizers, had the most access to "imports" like psychoanalysis.[341] It is possible that the gender difference between Freud's and Bose's patients had an effect on their respective conceptual developments as well.

The stark contrast sometimes established between Indian and British—for example, by Hartnack—did not quite define the reality of the upper-caste Western-educated Bengali elite.[342] Akshi Singh points out that Hartnack uses the adjective "Indian" uncomplicatedly, and in direct opposition to "Western." According to Singh, Hartnack considers these categories to be fully constituted and available to be used by the people that she writes about, and in so doing, her book "obfuscates questions of self-representation and identification which are particularly important to psychoanalysis if it is to be understood as a theory of mental representations (and their undoing)."[343] Singh explains that the Indian Psychoanalytical Society made no distinction

[341] Hartnack, "Vishnu on Freud's Desk," 922.
[342] This section of society is often referred to as the *bhadralok*. Andrew Sartori observes that "[u]sed without qualifiers, the term *Bengalis* refers not, it turns out on closer inspection, to the inhabitants of Bengal generally (including the Muslim peasants or the low-caste laborers who numerically predominated), but rather to the Bengali *bhadralok*—the respectable classes that spanned the range of social positions from lowly clerks and village priests through intermediate tenure holders and professionals to magnates and quasi-aristocrats like the Tagores; who, broadly speaking, combined high Hindu caste with nonmanual employment; and who were responsible for the production of new political, ethical, and literary forms that would overwhelmingly define the self-conception of the region in the colonial and postcolonial eras" (*Bengal in Global Concept History*, 8.)
[343] Singh, "The Talking Cure in the 'Tropics,'" 18.

between British and Indians with regard to membership and shows that Bose was invested in the distinction between the "primitive" and the "civilized," a concern shared with other analysts of the time.[344] The interest in this distinction, as it is often the case, involves an identification with the "civilized" in opposition to the "primitive," something that is true in Freud as much as in Bose. In reference to these aspects of Hartnack's reading, Kalpana Seshadri-Crooks claims that "the danger is of forcing a familiar (master/slave) narrative and perhaps obfuscating deeper problems."[345] The opposition, then, between Indian and Western (in particular, British), did not define the context of the psychoanalytic circle in Calcutta, and it seems that Bose was concerned with many of the same questions that Freud was. A stark distinction between Indian and Western in the context of this milieu of British and Western-educated upper-caste Bengali professional men seems therefore to overstate (and, to some extent, fabricate) their differences and overlook their similarities.

Bose's main conceptual development was the aforementioned theory of the "opposite wishes," according to which "in every instance the satisfaction whether voluntary or involuntary of any wish leads to the development of its opposite."[346] This theory explains how certain traits, like sadism and masochism, occur in pairs, as well as how wishes that appear in a specific sequence during treatment are related to one another. Bose addresses the origin of the opposite wishes and explains that when the subject-object distinction emerges in the ego of the child—that is, then the child is able to distinguish herself from the environment—and her interest becomes attached to external objects, there is a splitting-up of the subject's ego into two

[344] Singh, 17–18.
[345] Seshadri-Crooks, "The Primitive as Analyst," 186.
[346] Bose, "The Genesis and Adjustment of the Oedipus Wish," 227.

opposite halves: a subjective and an objective one. These two phases of the ego are in turn invested with opposite wishes.[347]

In his essay "A New Theory of Mental Life," Bose explains that this theory is based on what he calls the "see-saw" phenomenon, explained as follows:

> It seemed as if the opposite tendencies that appeared alternately in consciousness and disappeared in the unconscious were the warring elements. So long as the conflict lasted one seemed to oppose the entry of the other into consciousness; one was the repressing force and the other was the repressed and they could reverse their roles; they each clamoured to occupy the field of consciousness but only one could do so at a time.[348]

According to Bose's theory, every wish is accompanied by its opposite, but a conflict concerning these two opposite wishes only allows space for one of them in consciousness, the other remaining unconscious.

Bose presents some case histories to illustrate this theory, one of which is the case of an educated young Muslim man who, after a communal riot, developed an obsessive fear of being stabbed from behind. As psychoanalytic treatment proceeded, retaliatory fantasies emerged, in which the patient imagined himself as exceedingly strong, even though he complained about his physical weakness in session. These aggressive fantasies brought up memories about school fights in his childhood. The patient, according to Bose's interpretation, had unconsciously equated ordinary fight with sexual assault. Later in the treatment, the retaliatory aggressive fantasies disappeared and were replaced by an early incident in which a servant had forced him to play the passive part. In Bose's analysis, "the fear of being stabbed represented in the patient's unconscious a wish to be passively treated in a homo-sexual situation."[349] Because of the conflict this patient was undergoing, the obsessive fear of being stabbed was blatantly present in

[347] Bose, "The Genesis of Homosexuality," 68.
[348] Bose, "A New Theory of Mental Life," 45–46.
[349] Bose, 48.

consciousness, and although this fear was attached to the (unconscious) wish to play the passive role in a sexual relation with a man, it was only when the fears disappeared that this wish became conscious.

The theory of the "opposite wishes" incorporated a duality in the understanding of desire that is not present in Freudian psychoanalysis. In addition to developing a psychoanalytic theory of his own, Bose translated psychoanalytic theory and technique based on the observations he made in the treatment of his patients in Calcutta. Having addressed some of the aspects that characterize Bose's theory and practice, I will now examine his interpretation of the Oedipus complex.

Is the Ganesha Complex Particular?

A specific aspect in which the situated character of Freudian psychoanalysis comes to the fore is the role that Greek classical culture plays in psychoanalytic concepts as Freud formulated them, which brings us back to the Oedipus complex. As other cultivated Austrians of his generation, Freud was well educated in classical Graeco-Roman culture. Even more, he offered a reinterpretation of Greek mythology. As Elisabeth Roudinesco explains: "This Oedipus [Sophocles's] has nothing in common with the one reinvented by Freud, guilty of a double desire: the desire to kill his father and the desire for sexual possession of his mother's body."[350]

The Oedipus complex is a perfect example of a concept based on Greek mythology. Freud described it in his autobiographical study as "eine Gesetzmäßigkeit des seelischen

[350] Roudinesco, *Freud in His Time and Ours*, 79.

Geschehens"[351] ["a universal law of mental life"][352] and even claimed that "im Ödipus-Komplex die Anfänge von Religion, Sittlichkeit, Gesellschaft und Kunst zusammentreffen"[353] ["the beginnings of religion, morals, society and art converge in the Oedipus complex"].[354] While Safouan might agree with this based on his answer to the question about the universality of the Oedipus, some objections have been raised with regard to these statements. In particular, Spivak points out critically that in situating matriarchal polytheisms in the prehistory of mankind, Freud claims, as she explains, "the parricide story as the beginning of human history."[355] Should psychoanalysis, then, be re-elaborated based on other mythologies?

Anup Dhar explores the question of what happens when "India" and psychoanalysis meet, and asks: "was it [inaugurating] *Indian* psychoanalysis? But in which sense was it 'Indian'? Was it the 'Indian logic' of the psyche? Or was it the logic of the 'Indian psyche'?"[356] He proposes different possible answers to these questions, among which is the possibility of displacing the European universal with an Indian version, one in which there is a corresponding version of the Oedipus complex: the Ganesha complex. Following the myths of Ganesha, the elephant-headed Hindu god of beginnings, it is not the son who kills the father, but the father (Shiva) who beheads/castrates the son (Ganesha). Moreover, Dhar also asks whether another psychology could be inaugurated based, for example, on the ancient epic of Mahabharata—a

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351 Freud, *Gesammelte Werke*, 14: Werke aus den Jahren 1925–1931:89.
352 In translating *Gesetzmäßigkeit* as "universal law," James Strachey introduces the idea of universality; a more literal translation would be "a lawful fact of mental life." While there is no explicit allusion to universality in Freud's original formulation, the legal character that he ascribes to the Oedipus complex suggests a predominance of regularity over situated contingency. (Freud, *Standard Edition*, 1964, XXIII (1937-1939): Moses and Monotheism, An Outline of Psycho-Analysis and Other Works:63.)
353 Freud, *Gesammelte Werke*, 9: Totem und Tabu:188.
354 Freud, *Standard Edition*, 1964, XXIII (1937-1939): Moses and Monotheism, An Outline of Psycho-Analysis and Other Works:156–57.
355 Spivak, "Psychoanalysis in Left Field and Fieldworking," 49.
356 Dhar in Bandyopadhyay and Kundu, *Imperial Maladies*, 33.

psychology "different from what the west could think of – given its obsession with Greek tragedy."[357]

Although Bose did not develop the Ganesha complex that Dhar suggests, he did offer an interpretation of the Oedipus complex different from Freud's, and it is in this interpretation that we return to the question of translation.[358] Bose explains that when the child's ego[359] begins to differentiate itself from the environment, what predominates is passive experiences. Since the most significant impressions come from the mother, the fact that the child repeatedly plays the passive role in being taken care of by the mother leads to the emergence of active wishes in the child, who begins to act like the mother, taking the mother herself as the object as if she were now the child. Through acting like the mother, the child begins to take her place (during play, for example)—to use Bose's terms, "action-identity" is followed by "ego-identity."[360] In imagining taking the place of the mother, the child also imagines the father as a husband, which leads to the development of a "feminine sexual attitude" towards the father, a "desire to be a woman." Bose then claims: "At this stage of sexual development the genitalia of the child are already rich in sensations and this coupled with the knowledge of the difference in sexual organization in the male and the female makes the male child wish for a removal of its

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[357] Dhar Bandyopadhyay and Kundu, 34.

[358] I will here address some of the main aspects of Bose's views of the Oedipus complex. A more in-depth analysis can be found in Alf Hiltebeitel's *Freud's India: Sigmund Freud and India's First Psychoanalyst Girindrasekhar Bose* (Chapter 6).

[359] Although Bose only talks about "the child" without specifying gender (and often using the pronoun "it"), he seems to mostly refer to male children, as it becomes evident later in the text. At different points in the argument of "The Genesis and Adjustment of the Oedipus Wish" he points out certain differences between the psycho-sexual development of female children, but he also admits that "[o]ur knowledge of the oedipus complex in females is not very satisfactory" ("The Genesis and Adjustment of the Oedipus Wish," 226, 229.) Since most of Bose's patients were male, I will not develop these differences between genders regarding the Oedipus complex. I will address the Oedipus complex in relation to sexual difference in the next chapter.

[360] Bose, 230.

phallus."[361] What results from the desire to be a woman is not a castration complex, but a castration wish.

Bose situates his understanding of these processes by stating that "[i]n the average Indian family the boy or the girl usually goes about naked (…) up to a comparatively late period in life," which allows them to compare male and female genitalia from a very early age. While Bose points out that he has observed the castration complex in his European patients,[362] he claims that he has not observed it in the analysis of his Indian patients, which leads him to assume that the development of this complex is associated with differences in the social environment.[363]

Besides castration, it is also possible for male children to play "the female role" by developing "passive homosexuality." In both cases, the passive wishes involved in the "feminine or passive homosexual role" towards the father are followed by active wishes, where the child assumes a "male role" towards the father, who is in turn imagined to be a woman or to play "the passive homosexual part." As the father's interests become the child's interests, action-identity, once again, is followed by ego-identity. The child imagines himself to be an adult like his father, and the mother appears now as a new sexual object—a stage that Bose calls "the oedipus point."[364]

Based on this understanding of castration as a wish, and the different roles that the child plays (as the child, the mother, and the father) Bose disagrees with Freud's version of the Oedipus complex. According to Bose, it is the son who castrates the father and the superego is "feminized":

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[361] Bose, 231.
[362] In a different essay, Bose presents a more qualified statement: "Superficial analysis of European patients seems to show the importance of the castration complex" (Bose, 237.)
[363] Bose, "The Genesis of Homosexuality," 74.
[364] Bose, "The Genesis and Adjustment of the Oedipus Wish," 232.

> I do not agree with Freud when he says that the oedipus wishes ultimately succumb to the authority of the super-ego. Quite the reverse is the case. The super-ego must be conquered and the ability to castrate the father and make him into a woman is an essential requisite for the adjustment of the oedipus wish. The oedipus is resolved not by the threat of castration, but by the ability to castrate.[365]

As Bose explains, then, passive wishes are followed by active ones and, in the same way, the desire to be a woman (and thus the castration wish) is replaced by the assumption of a "male role" towards the father, which means that he is now imagined to be a woman—and thus castrated. By focusing on the ability to castrate, Bose's interpretation ends with the castration of the father. Interestingly, for Lacan and Safouan the father also ends up being castrated, although for different reasons and with different consequences. Rather than being castrated by the child, Lacan introduces the dimension of the symbolic order, which subordinates both the father *and* the son.

Is the Ganesha complex, then, particular? Bose, as I mentioned, did not develop a Ganesha complex, and in fact his translation of the Oedipus complex did not consist in finding an analogous myth in Hinduism to explain the structuration of desire. Such a gesture would have been perhaps the kind of relativization of the Oedipus complex that Safouan chose not to do—a relativization which would have made something like the Ganesha complex, in fact, particular. Instead, Bose's interpretation of the Oedipus complex is arguably the specific way in which he interpreted the response to this social imperative that is universal in its structural function in his patients in Calcutta. In this way, the universal aspect of the Oedipus complex that Safouan formulated is at play, and it finds its new form through translation. The negotiation between the structural imperative and the context is the point at which we return to transference.

[365] Bose, 237.

Imaginative Portraits

In the previous sections, I have introduced Bose's work, and have provided an overview of his theory and practice in comparison with Freud's. As we have seen in Safouan's analysis of the universality of the Oedipus, the translatability of the complex resides in its function in the structuring of desire and, according to Bose, this can take the form of a castration wish. In this section, I address the translation of psychoanalysis in more general terms through the concept of transference, and explore the possibility of translation as a form of transference by referring to a historical episode: the letter exchange between Bose and Freud.

The exchange between Bose and Freud started in 1921 and lasted until 1937. Throughout their correspondence, the positions that each of them adopted took different forms. In this first letter, Bose expressed his admiration for Freud's theory and attached his thesis, *The Concept of Repression*, hoping to hear Freud's perspective on his conceptual developments. Freud responded expressing surprise that psychoanalysis had received so much interest in Bose's "far off country."[366] Bose sent Freud more essays of his in other letters, to which Freud replied positively, referring to the great impression that Bose's texts had made on him, while also raising objections and showing some skepticism.[367]

The positions that both Bose and Freud adopted in this exchange, as well as the way in which they imagined their respective interlocutor, are suggested in a particular episode. In one of the first letters, Bose asked Freud—with some timidity—to send him a picture, explaining that his circle of admirers was eager to see what he looked like, as no images of Freud had reached India. Before receiving Freud's photograph, Bose sent Freud a pencil sketch by an Indian artist,

[366] Bose and Freud, *The Beginnings of Psychoanalysis in India: Bose-Freud Correspondence*, 2.
[367] For example, in Bose and Freud, 16.

Mr. J. Sen, who admired Freud and had drawn him from imagination according to what he "ought to look like."[368] After receiving the drawing, Freud responded: "You will soon have occasion to confront it with the photo and see that the artist did not take into account certain racial characters."[369] In fact, in a letter to Lou Andreas-Salomé, Freud referred to this episode in the following way:

> Die interessanteste Nachricht aus der ΨA ist wohl die Gründung einer Ortsgruppe in Calcutta, geführt von Dr. Girindrashekar Bose, einem Prof. extraord[inarius] und Verfasser des Buches »The concept of Repression«. (…) Von derselben Seite erhielt ich auch ein »Imaginative Portrait«, d.h. ein Bild, wie sich hemand, angeblich ein berühmter indischer Maler, meine Person, von der er nie ein Konterfei gesehen hat, vorstellt. Natürlich sehe ich nach ihm urenglisch aus.[370]
>
> [The most interesting item of news in the psycho-analytic world is the foundation of a local group in Calcutta, led by Dr. Girindrasekhar Bose, a Professor Extraordinary and author of the book *The Concept of Repression*. (…) From the same quarter I received an 'Imaginative Portrait', i.e., a painting by someone who is said to be a famous Indian artist, and which represents his idea of my person, of whom he has never seen a likeness. Naturally, he makes me look the complete Englishman.][371]

The drawing, which Nandy calls "a near-perfect test of projection,"[372] possibly reveals something about the place that Freud had in the imaginary of Bose and his inner circle. Hartnack's interpretation is that Freud was portrayed as the colonizer.[373]

However, to return to Singh's critique of Hartnack, the relationship between the British and the upper-caste Bengali elite was not one of utter opposition. Since the Indian Psychoanalytic Association made no distinction between Indian and British members with regard to their categorization, it is possible that the portrayal of Freud as an Englishman (even

368 Bose himself uses quotation marks in the letter when he mentions this detail. (Bose and Freud, 6.)
369 Bose and Freud, 8.
370 Freud, Andreas-Salomé, and Pfeiffer, *Briefwechsel*, 125.
371 Freud and Andreas-Salomé, *Sigmund Freud and Lou Andreas-Salomé, Letters*, 114.
372 Nandy, *The Savage Freud and Other Essays on Possible and Retrievable Selves*, 101.
373 Hartnack, *Psychoanalysis in Colonial India*, 139.

more, *urenglisch*, with a sort of primordial Englishness) meant that he was imagined as a white (or Western) colleague, and not simply as the colonizer. The concept of transference is especially helpful in interpreting the particular imbrication of British colonial officers, on the one hand, and British colleagues in the Indian Psychoanalytic Association, on the other. In *Fragment of an Analysis of a Case of Hysteria*, Freud defined transferences as "new editions or facsimiles of the tendencies and phantasies which are aroused and made conscious during the progress of the analysis."[374] J. Sen's portrait of Freud is, I would suggest, a new edition of associations that were part of Sen's and Bose's imaginaries, based on their relationship to the British as both colonizers and fellow members of the Indian Psychoanalytic Association. One might also consider Bose's decision to use a deck chair in his practice as an attempt to evoke Freud's own. If Freud was portrayed as an Englishman, the Freudian couch may have been imagined as a colonial deck chair rather than as a Victorian daybed covered by Persian rugs.

The relationship between Bose and Freud is marked by a colonial imaginary. Freud seemed to see in Bose's work and in the Indian Psychoanalytic Association the blurred character of conquered territory. In fact, he explicitly alluded to the idea of conquest in relation to the circulation of psychoanalysis in a letter to Bose. Years after they started their exchange, towards the end of the 1920s, Bose sent Freud an ivory statuette of Vishnu[375] on behalf of the Indian Psychoanalytic Society. When Freud received Bose's gift, he responded:

> The statuette is charming. I gave it the place of honour on my desk. As long as I can enjoy life it will recall to my mind the progress of psychoanalysis, the proud conquest it has made in foreign countries and the kind feelings for me it has aroused in some of my contemporaries at least.[376]

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[374] Freud, *Dora*, 106.
[375] While most sources state that it was a statuette of Vishnu, Sinha claims that it was instead one of a dancing Shiva, Nataraj ("Development of Psycho-Analysis in India," 431.)
[376] Bose and Freud, *The Beginnings of Psychoanalysis in India: Bose-Freud Correspondence*, 21.

Hartnack points out that, despite Freud's interest in Greek, Roman, and Egyptian antiquities, he did not show any interest in the symbolism of the statuette of Vishnu that the Indian Psychoanalytic Society sent him. Rather than a cultural artifact, Freud seemed to think of this statuette—as Hartnack notes—merely as a symbol of his conquest.[377]

For his part, Bose showed great admiration and respect for Freud's theory, acknowledging his authority as the father of psychoanalysis. As a European man, Freud was likened to an Englishman—a colonial officer, a British colleague, or an imbrication of both. But Bose also presented himself as a professional colleague. He asked Freud's opinion about his work, as well as for a statement of Freud's impressions on his dissertation on the concept of repression, since he was planning its publication. In other letters, Bose defended his theory when Freud raised objections or showed skepticism. After reading some of the essays that Bose sent with his letters, Freud accused Bose of "underrat[ing] the efficiency of the castration fear," even though Bose explicitly pointed to the differences between his Indian and European patients in his essays. In response to Freud's critical observation, Bose stressed this difference again in his following letter to Freud.[378] Four years later, Freud admitted that he had not given attention to Bose's ideas in the past, and offered Bose the possibility of publishing an article on his theory of the "opposite wishes," also offering to have it translated to German in Vienna. In the letter in which he proposed this, Freud seemed considerably enthusiastic about this possibility: "I suspect that your theory of opposite wishes is practically unknown among us and never mentioned or discussed. This attitude was to be abolished. I am eager to see it weighed

[377] Hartnack, *Psychoanalysis in Colonial India*, 138.
[378] Bose and Freud, *The Beginnings of Psychoanalysis in India: Bose-Freud Correspondence*, 16–17.

and considered by English and German analysts all over."[379] This possibility, however, never materialized.[380]

In their correspondence, Freud did not seem to acknowledge the possibility that different versions of psychoanalysis might result from its geographical circulation and subsequent translation. In the letter where he admitted not having given attention to Bose's ideas and showed enthusiasm at the possibility of publishing an article of his, Freud stated that "[t]he contradictions within our current psychoanalytic theory are many and deep-going."[381] The fact that Freud pointed to the existence of contradictions, as if all psychoanalytic notions should converge in a unified theoretical corpus, shows that Freud's views on the international circulation of psychoanalysis did not seem to allow for different versions of it, or permit its translation through its clinical practice in other regions of the world. However, even if Freud himself did not necessarily account for the translatability of psychoanalysis, his theoretical corpus and clinical practice did in fact acknowledge this possibility, as can be attested in the very fact that psychoanalysis traveled through geographies, languages, historical times, and political contexts.

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[379] Bose and Freud, 24.

[380] The reason why Bose never sent Freud his paper is not clear. Although Bose showed enthusiasm at the prospect of publishing a paper on the theory of the opposite wish for circulation in Freud's circle, he also told Freud that he had "accidentally" (Bose himself uses quotation marks) burnt his face and right hand, which meant that he could not work at the moment and promised to send the paper two months after the date of the letter (Bose and Freud, 25.) But Bose never sent the article. Alf Hiltebeitel offers a thorough analysis and some hypotheses in *Freud's India: Sigmund Freud and India's First Psychoanalyst Girindrasekhar Bose*, Chapter 3.

[381] Bose and Freud, 24.

Chapter Five | Against Neutrality: Marie Langer

The Oedipus complex was originally focused on the male child. Although the function of castration, as we saw in the previous chapter, is universal and it can structure desire in various ways, the fact that its original focus in Freud was the male child meant that it was necessary to translate this complex into the psychosexual development of female children. The question of the universality of the Oedipus is a fundamental point when considering the question of translation from male to female. If the function of castration is universal, what might that mean for the structuring of desire in the case of female children as opposed to male children?

The universality on which Safouan insisted has a structural character; it is a universality that does not imply uniformity or, as Alenka Zupančič points out, neutrality. She claims that this is what made Lacan's thought revolutionary with regard to sexual difference:

> castration (or the "phallic function") is a universal function, a prerogative of subjectivity as such (regardless of sex), yet there is nothing sexually neutral about its operation; it always involves following the *logic* of this or that (sexed) position, and does not exist as a neutral foundation, or as a zero level of subjectivity.[382]

The fact that castration might be a universal function does not mean that it requires no translation (that it is neutral). The universality of the phallic function does not mean blind applicability to all sexes and all cases, but rather follows the logic of each sexed position. The inexistence of neutrality is very fact that points to the need for translation.

The translation from male to female is one of the most fundamental translations with which some psychoanalytic concepts have had to contend, and it was one of the many translations that the Austro-Argentine analyst Marie Langer carried out in her work. Her

[382] Zupančič, *What Is Sex?*, 49–50.

thought and clinical practice was very much situated in its historical and political context; she wrote about the question of neutrality both in the analytic setting and in relation to psychoanalytic institutions in their denial of history and politics and in the expectation of psychoanalysts to be beyond ideology. She was aware of her political, ideological, and institutional position throughout her life, and she acknowledged the instances in which certain elements of psychoanalytic theory and technique needed to be translated in order to function clinically in her own practice. Her contributions are a constant attempt to clinically account for gender differences, class differences, and is inevitably working between languages and cultures because of her repeated migrations. Throughout her professional life, she sought to translate psychoanalysis to the clinical treatment of feminine affections and of social classes that could not afford a traditional psychoanalytic treatment. Her theoretical work is always inscribed in practice, as she is constantly guided by the clinical effects of concepts. She connected feminism and Marxism, Europe and Latin America, German and Spanish, individuals and groups.

I follow here the understanding of translation as a metaphor that I developed in the previous chapter, this time focusing on the kind translation that is elicited by historical changes. While Safouan addressed the translatability of psychoanalysis with his analysis of the universality of the Oedipus complex and Bose exemplified how this concept—and psychoanalysis more generally—was in fact translated, Langer embodies herself many of the translations that psychoanalysis can undergo. She develops a psychoanalytic practice that is sensitive to the particularity of her times, especially in relation to the changes in the position of women in society, and is aware of the shortcomings of other psychoanalytic theories with regard to epochal changes, as well as according to her own political affinities. She reflects on the role of analysts in her time as opposed to their role in Freud's time, attending to the cases that

psychoanalysis often treats and treated in each case and how the technical principles of the analyst should account for those differences. In this sense, she rewrites psychoanalysis based on a situated reading of her own times.

An Autobiographical Narrative

Marie Langer was born in Vienna in 1910 and passed away in Buenos Aires in 1987. She began her training as an analyst in Austria and left Europe to escape fascism. Shortly after arriving in Argentina, she co-founded the Argentine Psychoanalytic Association (APA). She was one of the first analysts to write about psychoanalysis and women in Spanish, co-authored the first book about group therapy in Spanish along with Argentine psychoanalysts León Grinberg and Emilio Rodrigué, and published numerous essays about the role of the analyst with regard to ideological positions and class differences. She became one of the most renowned analysts in Latin America, and her contributions to psychoanalytic theory and practice in Spanish earned her the title, at least according to Austrian author Raimund Bahr, of the mother of Latin American psychoanalysis.[383]

She was born to a bourgeois Jewish and atheist family in Vienna and lived most of her adult life in Buenos Aires, also living in Spain, Uruguay, and Mexico at different points of her life. She spent her childhood and youth in Austria, where she studied to be a doctor but was unable to complete her training, and where she later started her training as a psychoanalyst. She later volunteered as an anesthetist for the International Brigades along with her future husband Max Langer, who was a surgeon, in Spain during the civil war. The rise of fascism in Europe led Langer and her husband to Uruguay, where they spent four years, and they then settled in

[383] Bahr, *Marie Langer*, 114.

Argentina, where they spent many years and where Langer developed most of her career as a psychoanalyst. Langer would later have to emigrate again in 1974, two years before the coup d'état in Argentina, as she became a target of the Triple A, the Alianza Anticomunista Argentina [Anti-Communist Argentine Alliance], a far-right death squad that had been formed during the 1970s. She spent some years in Mexico and returned to Argentina towards the end of her life. At that point, she was very sick and passed away in Buenos Aires.

During her years in Mexico, Langer co-authored an autobiographical book titled *Memoria, historia y diálogo psicoanalítico* [*Memory, History, and Psychoanalytic Dialogue*], with Jaime del Palacio, her son-in-law, and Enrique Guinsberg, her friend and colleague. As the three co-authors explain in their own way, the book resulted from three different ideas about what the book (and its readers) should be, which all co-exist in one same volume. The book covers her personal history, professional career, and contributions, as well as some documents.

The first section is devoted to her childhood and family history, as well as her beginnings as a political activist in the Communist Party in Austria and of her career as a doctor, anesthetist, and later psychoanalyst in formation. This autobiographical section, written in the first person, also recounts when she left Vienna for Spain, and later Spain for Uruguay. It ends when she arrives in Argentina, and the following sections take the form of an interview with Guinsberg. The part of her life in which she develops her career as a psychoanalyst, then, takes the form of a dialogue between two people, which evokes the bipersonal nature of psychoanalysis. In these interviews, Guinsberg and Langer talk about her development as an analyst in Argentina, her relationship with political activism, the institutional role she occupied in the Argentine Psychoanalytic Association and her later stance against it, her most important theoretical developments, among other topics. One of the documents included in the book is the

declaration of the Plataforma movement—a movement where Langer participated when she broke with the APA—which criticizes the lack of political engagement of the APA, as well as their will to dictate what psychoanalysis is. These documents are followed by more interviews and two final essays, one by Langer on the question of woman and another one, more personal, by Jaime del Palacio.

The book intertwines Langer's personal history, her institutional and political affiliations, and historical events in one same narrative. In his preface to the book, Guinsberg explains that, in addition to a desire to tell the story of Marie Langer, characterized by a "constante coherencia entre pasado y presente, entre decir y hacer"[384] ["a constant coherence between past and present, between words and action"],[385] her personal history is one that is "entretejida en una historia social que la abarca y comprende, donde marxismo y psicoanálisis –esos dos grandes cuerpos teóricos que dijo que nunca abandonaría—permiten un acercamiento articulado"[386] ["interwoven with a social history which both embraces and contains it, wherein Marxism and psychoanalysis – these two great bodies of theory that she would never abandon – permit a two-fold approach"].[387]

In her narration, there is at certain points a coincidence or coherence between the individual and the social. One example is when she talks about losing her first child. Langer recounts that when she and her husband were in Spain volunteering for the International Brigades, they at one point traveled to Paris in order to buy machines for manufacturing prosthetic devices, as they had to perform many amputations. Because the money was taking

[384] Langer, Guinsberg, and Palacio, *Memoria, historia y diálogo psicoanalítico*, VI.
[385] Langer, *From Vienna to Managua*, 27.
[386] Langer, Guinsberg, and Palacio, *Memoria, historia y diálogo psicoanalítico*, VII.
[387] Langer, *From Vienna to Managua*, 28.

longer than expected to arrive, their contact from the Brigades advised to take some time off. They took his advice and went to Nice, where Langer, who was pregnant at the time, started having premature contractions. Her baby was born alive, only to die over the following three days. At this point in the narration, she explains:

> En Niza pasé la peor época de mi vida. No llegó el dinero, la niña había muerto, tantos compañeros también y no solamente España, sino toda Europa se estaba desmoronando. Me acuerdo de un versito de la primera guerra mundial que obsesivamente me daba vuelta en la cabeza:
>
> Drüben am Wegesrand sitzen zwei Raben,
> Wer wird der Nächste sein, den wir begraben?
>
> (En el borde del camino dos cuervos están sentados, ¿quiénes serán los próximos que deberán ser enterrados?)[388]
>
> [In Nice, I went through the worst time of my life. The money didn't arrive, the baby had died, so many comrades as well, and not only Spain but all of Europe was falling apart. I remember a little verse from the First World War that went around in my head obsessively:
>
> Drüben am Wegesrand sitzen zwei Raben,
> Wer wird der Nächste sein, den wir begraben?
>
> (At the edge of the road sit two ravens, Who will be the next to have to be buried?)][389]

In a certain way, the events of her personal life resonate with the political situation considered at large. This resonance appears on several occasions throughout her narration, and this narrative echo formally points to the connection and compatibility that Langer found between psychoanalysis and politics.

As I mentioned above, Langer did not initially train to be an analyst, but to be a physician. She qualified as a doctor in 1935, but she was not able to complete her clinical training: as Langer herself expresses it, "[m]is inclinaciones profesionales posteriores fueron

[388] Langer, Guinsberg, and Palacio, *Memoria, historia y diálogo psicoanalítico*, 68.
[389] Langer, *From Vienna to Managua*, 89–90.

decididas por el austrofascismo y por mi interés por la psiquiatría"[390] ["[m]y later professional inclinations were decided by Austro-fascism and my interest in psychiatry"].[391] In order to become a Social Security doctor (as medicine was socialized for the most part), she needed to spend two years doing hospital specializations. This part of her training became impossible, however, as with the rise of Austro-fascism, no hospital would hire Jewish doctors. The only remaining option was the Israeli hospital, but it would not take her because she had renounced her religion when she was seventeen years old.[392] She was thus forced to take a different path towards clinical practice.

Because of the situation in Austria, and given Langer's interest in psychiatry, she decided to start an analysis. Part of her interest in psychoanalysis was her will to better understand psychosis: "Pensé entonces que un análisis podría venirme bien, tanto por mi propia neurosis como porque intuía que para entender a mis pacientes psicóticos era necesario algo más que la mera descripción detallista, fenomenológica de los síntomas, como entonces se hacía"[393] ["At the time I thought that analysis would suit me fine, as much for my own neurosis, as my feeling that something more than the mere detailed, phenomenological description of symptoms (that they did then) was necessary in order to understand my psychotic patients"].[394] She began her analysis with a renowned analyst and a disciple of Freud: Richard Sterba. A year after Langer began her analysis, the possibility of training to be an analyst herself became increasingly serious,

[390] Langer, Guinsberg, and Palacio, *Memoria, historia y diálogo psicoanalítico*, 53.
[391] Langer, *From Vienna to Managua*, 76.
[392] Langer, Guinsberg, and Palacio, *Memoria, historia y diálogo psicoanalítico*, 53.
[393] Langer, Guinsberg, and Palacio, 53.
[394] Langer, *From Vienna to Managua*, 77.

as by then it had become evident that getting a position in a hospital without being Catholic would be impossible.[395]

It was this impasse that led Langer to psychoanalysis, which represented the possibility of a clinical practice outside of hospitals. After an interview with Anna Freud, Langer was accepted into the Wiener Vereinigung. The beginnings of her training as an analyst in Austria coincided with a very politically active period, which at a certain point made psychoanalysis and politics incompatible. This stage of her psychoanalytic formation had a forceful end in 1934. Hitler was already in power in Berlin, and the German psychoanalyst Edith Jacobson had been captured after one of her patients was followed. In order to protect psychoanalysis and psychoanalytic patients, the Wiener Vereinigung decided to prohibit analysts from participating in any clandestine political party or having a patient who did. This measure applied to almost all political parties, since at the time most political organizations had been banned. Langer decided to keep her political activism secret while she continued her studies at the Wiener Vereinigung until she got detained for two days along with other doctors, and the director of the institute found out and told Langer that she was breaking the established rules.

The conflict got quickly resolved by Richard Sterba, Langer's analyst, as it had mainly resulted from personal grudges between him and the director of the institute at the time, Edward Bibring. This situation brought to the fore a practical incompatibility between psychoanalysis and politics, but for Langer, the tension went beyond the rules and measures established by the Wiener Vereinigung. In her words: "De alguna manera estaba de acuerdo con la actitud del Partido hacia el psicoanálisis; en cierto modo era también una frivolidad. 'Mientras arde el mundo uno no puede estarse mirando el ombligo', me repetía de nuevo y nunca antes el

[395] Langer, Guinsberg, and Palacio, *Memoria, historia y diálogo psicoanalítico*, 54.

mundo había ardido como en esa época"[396] ["In a way, I was in agreement with the Party's attitude to psychoanalysis – in a certain sense, it was frivolous. 'One cannot be contemplating one's navel while the world's burning,' I repeated to myself once again. And the world had never before burned as it was doing at the time"].[397] Her commitment psychoanalysis at the time was in fact only second to her commitment to the Communist Party. Psychoanalysis would not become a fundamental part of Langer's life until later, once settled in Argentina.

In-between Positions

In many ways, Langer inhabited many positions. On the one hand, she was European, highly educated, and came from a Viennese bourgeois family. On the other hand, she had certain—as she called them—disadvantages: namely, being Jewish and a woman, and a third one was added later: being divorced.[398] The fact that she inhabited very different spaces in various countries forced her to occupy diverse positions in relation to her environment. For example, she attended a private Realgymnasium that gave her access to a university education and she later qualified as a doctor, but then was unable to complete her training because she was Jewish (but not Jewish enough to work at the Israeli Hospital). She was able to use her skills as an anesthetist in Spain and as an analyst in formation in Austria, but the rise of fascism in Europe meant that she had to emigrate to Uruguay, where neither she nor her husband were able to practice as doctors; during those years, Langer earned money cooking for factory workers while her husband worked at a textile factory. Once she arrived in Argentina, she was able to develop

396 Langer, Guinsberg, and Palacio, 57.
397 Langer, *From Vienna to Managua*, 80.
398 Langer, Guinsberg, and Palacio, *Memoria, historia y diálogo psicoanalítico*, 9.

her career as an analyst, but at the same time would not be able to validate her Austrian medical degree until many years later, which gave her an ambiguous status.

This mixed status comes up several times in *Memoria, historia y diálogo psicoanalítico*. For example, she mentions that while she was Jewish, she was sometimes able to hide this fact:

> Yo tuve suerte porque ni mi apellido ni mi físico parecen judíos. Y mi nombre, Marie, es insospechable. Un día pregunté a mi madre por qué me había puesto un nombre tan vulgar.
> —No me animé a bautizarte —me respondió—; me conformé con ponerte el nombre más católico.[399]
>
> [I was lucky because neither my surname nor my physical appearance is Jewish, and my name, Marie, is above suspicion. One day I asked my mother why she had given me such a common name. 'I didn't venture to have you christened', she replied, 'so I resigned myself to giving you the most Catholic of names.][400]

Langer would later do something similar with her own children, whom she baptized Protestant.[401] Another anecdote that points to this mixed status is an episode that took place while she was in Spain. Although she went as a volunteer during the Spanish civil war and was willing to go to the front, she went through the following situation:

> Ahí nos pasó algo muy divertido. Vestíamos nuestros uniformes ingleses, llevábamos mascaras antigás, todo de primera. Así fuimos a la Generalitat y a la Sanitat sin saber ni catalán ni español para decir que queríamos trabajar, que queríamos ir al frente para ayudar. Max como cirujano y yo como anestesista. "Vuelvan mañana, vuelvan mañana", nos dijeron. Y al día siguiente: "Vuelvan mañana, vuelvan mañana". Y al otro día: "Vuelvan mañana…" Y nosotros no entendíamos nada porque veíamos a la gente que se despedía en las estaciones porque evidentemente marchaba al frente y creíamos que debía haber urgencia de médicos. Al cuarto día de la misma respuesta me volví hacia Max y le dije, en alemán, que no entendía nada. El tipo que nos había recibido nos preguntó en un francés sorprendido: "¿Ustedes no son ingleses?". "No, desde luego, somos austríacos". "Perdón, los tomamos por ingleses y pensamos que ya intentaban de nuevo colonizarnos". Nos aceptaron.[402]

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399 Langer, Guinsberg, and Palacio, 9.
400 Langer, *From Vienna to Managua*, 38.
401 Sinay, *Marie Langer*, 18.
402 Langer, Guinsberg, and Palacio, *Memoria, historia y diálogo psicoanalítico*, 61.

> [Something very funny happened to us there. We were wearing our top-quality English uniforms and gas masks when we went to the Generalitat and the Sanitat and we didn't know enough Catalan or Spanish to say we wanted to work, we wanted to go to the front to help, Max as a surgeon and me as an anesthetist. 'Come back tomorrow, come back tomorrow,' they said. And the following day, 'Come back tomorrow, come back tomorrow.' And the next, 'Come back tomorrow…' We didn't understand what was going on: we could see the people saying goodbye at the stations, evidently they were going to the front, and we thought there must be an urgent need for doctors. On the fourth day after the same reply, I turned to Max and I said in German that I didn't understand what was going on. The fellow who had received us asked us in a very surprised French, 'You're not English?' 'No, of course not, we're Austrian.' 'Sorry, we thought you were English and were trying to colonize us again.' They took us on."][403]

Langer and her husband did not speak Spanish at the time and the language of the International Brigades was French, which meant that this dialogue took place in a language that was foreign to all the speakers involved. Langer and her husband had gone to Spain to combat fascism in a different country, after being discovered by the Austrian police when she had been detained. But even though they went to Spain guided by their political convictions and willing to risk their lives at the front, what defined their first encounters at the Generalitat and the Sanitat was their uniforms, which gave them, one could say, the disguise of colonizers. The misunderstanding was resolved once they showed that the mother tongue behind their French was not English, but German. This episode, of course, was the result of a misunderstanding, but is a reminder of how Langer's status changed as she traveled.

Years later, once in Argentina, she would again have a mixed status. The small group of analysts and analysts in formation in Argentina took her on, and in 1942 they founded the Argentine Psychoanalytic Association (APA), which would shortly after be recognized as a psychoanalytic group by Ernest Jones. Despite her limited training, she had more than enough to join, since psychoanalysis was still very young in Argentina. But, as an exile, she was

[403] Langer, *From Vienna to Managua*, 83 (translation modified).

considered a second-grade citizen,[404] was the only woman in the group, and she was in fact not named as one of the founding members. In addition, because she was not able to validate her medical degree for many years, until 1959, she was not able to hold the position of president of the APA. This position would have otherwise fallen into her much earlier, as the founding members took turns to be presidents of the association.

Because of her status as a second-degree member and due to her previous experiences with politics and psychoanalysis, she initially chose to hide her political affinities from the APA. She claims that there was a break in her relationship with politics in 1942, where she substituted her political militancy with an institutional-analytic "militancy."[405] She explains that because she was now part of the generation that had founded the psychoanalytic society, the diffusion of psychoanalysis had to be one of her main interests, and continues: "¿Podría haber sido de otro modo? Creo que sí. Pero elegí la solución más fácil: aceptar, a cambio de mi ideología, una *Weltanschauung* psicoanalítica, aunque ésta, según Freud, no existe como tal. E indudablemente Freud tiene razón" ["Could it have been any other way? I think so. But I chose the easiest solution: accepting, in exchange for my ideology, a psychoanalytic *Weltanschauung*, although, according to Freud, this doesn't exist. And without a doubt, Freud was right"].[406] Langer would later reengage with politics, both in Argentina and in Mexico. While living in Mexico, for example, she regularly visited Nicaragua, where she was a consultant to the Sandinista government's efforts to build their first national mental healthcare system.[407]

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[404] Langer, Guinsberg, and Palacio, *Memoria, historia y diálogo psicoanalítico*, 82.
[405] Langer, Guinsberg, and Palacio, 79.
[406] Langer, *Mujer, psicoanálisis y marxismo*, 69 (my translation).
[407] Nancy Caro Hollander, "Introduction" in Langer, *Motherhood and Sexuality*, 2.

Langer was aware of her mixed status, and her work was to a large extent defined, as I propose to understand it, by an effort to translate between different positions and languages. This work of translation applies to the multiplicity of languages that marked her life, as well as to the conceptual and clinical work that she carried out in psychoanalysis. As regards languages, Langer's mother tongue was German, and she learned English, French, and Spanish. As she explains: "Pasé mi infancia y juventud en Austria, mi madurez en Argentina y mi vejez transcurre en México. Pienso, sin darme cuenta siquiera, indistintamente en alemán y en español, agregando, tal vez, alguna expresión muy gráfica en otro idioma"[408] ["I spent my childhood and youth in Austria, my mature years in Argentina and my old age I spend here in Mexico. Without realizing it, I think indiscriminately in German and Spanish, sometimes adding a graphic expression from another language"].[409] She conducted analysis in Spanish and French in Argentina and wrote her autobiography in Spanish.[410] And because she wrote her autobiography in Spanish—especially the first section, written in the first person—she had to translate childhood memories that were in German to Spanish, quoting her mother, for example, in direct speech.

Insofar as she occupied different positions throughout her life and in her various professional roles and social, political, and institutional spheres that she inhabited, Langer embodies many instances of translation. Her migrations, the languages that she spoke, her political activity and ideological positions, the varying status that she inevitably had as her career developed, all these elements offered Langer positions from which to translate, which she did in

[408] Langer, Guinsberg, and Palacio, *Memoria, historia y diálogo psicoanalítico*, IV.
[409] Langer, *From Vienna to Managua*, 26.
[410] One could actually point to another layer of translation in the fact that, since the book was published in Mexico, the second person singular used in Argentina, "vos," which was the one used in the original interviews, was changed to the second person singular used in Mexico, "tú."

her theoretical and clinical work. Some of Langer's work of translation involved clinically translating psychoanalysis to the treatment of women who started analysis because of affections related to pregnancy, frigidity, and menstruation, among other things. I will devote the following section to briefly present her most important book on the psychoanalytic treatment and conceptualization of women, her turn to Melanie Klein's thought, and focus on the analysis of a "modern myth."

Women and Roasted Children

Langer's most well-known work, *Maternidad y sexo* [*Maternity and Sex*] was published in 1951. As Ximena Sinay explains, it was the first time in Argentina that feminine sexuality was reflected upon from a psychoanalytic perspective, and this book would later become a classic.[411] Throughout the book, Langer talks about the conflict between motherhood and professional life in her times, provides a brief overview of Freudian thought and the shortcomings of its theory, critically analyzes the question of the psychosexual development in boys as opposed to girls, and examines other topics, such as maternal instinct, conflicts regarding menstruation, virginity, frigidity, pregnancy, and offers case histories that provide clinical examples of the issues that she develops. In this section, I will focus on Langer's departure from Freud regarding the conceptualization of feminine sexuality, her turn to Klein, and her analysis of a "modern myth" in *Maternidad y sexo*, which will provide some context to her critique of neutrality, which is the focus of the following section.

A central topic of the book is psychosomatic medicine, which was one of the strengths of Argentine psychoanalysis in its first stages of development. Her reflection upon

411 Sinay, *Marie Langer*, 44.

psychosomatic problems, which she developed in *Maternidad y sexo*, began when a colleague in Buenos Aires asked her to take on a patient who had psychogenic infertility, who nine months after beginning her therapy finally got pregnant.[412] In fact, Langer received most of the female patients that wanted to start a psychoanalytic treatment, as she was the only woman among the founders of the APA and, at the beginning, one of the few female psychoanalysts in Buenos Aires.[413]

Langer read Melanie Klein's work for the first time in Argentina when Arminda Aberastury, one of the first analysts in Argentina to focus on the psychoanalysis of children, was translating Klein's work from the English, and Langer helped her by supervising the translation from German.[414] In *Maternidad y sexo*, she provides an account of Freud's personal history and professional development and speculates about the reasons for Freud's shortcomings regarding women's affections and the psychosexual development of girls. And explains her turn towards Kleinian theory:

> Ahora, ¿por qué adopté la teoría de Melanie Klein? Por su criterio sobre la evolución psicosexual de la niña y la psicología de la mujer. Porque la teoría de Freud –con todo el respeto que le tenía, que en ese entonces era mucho más reverencial del que puedo sentir actualmente, porque no creo más en las ventajas de lo reverencial– la teoría freudiana sobre la mujer me era en parte incomprensible y en parte humillante. Pero, además, y eso sería lo más importante, no me servía clínicamente. Freud nos describe a la niña como varón castrado. Pero un varón castrado no tendría su capacidad de reproducción. Melanie Klein toma en cuenta esta capacidad innata e investiga lo específicamente femenino, es decir las fantasías y ansiedades de la niña pequeña alrededor de su todavía latente capacidad biológico-reproductiva.[415]
>
> [Now, why did I adopt the theory of Melanie Klein? For its criteria on the psychosexual evolution of the female child and the psychology of women. Despite all the respect that I had for Freud – which at the time was much more reverential than what I'm capable of feeling at present, because I don't believe in the advantages of being reverential anymore

[412] Langer, Guinsberg, and Palacio, *Memoria, historia y diálogo psicoanalítico*, 91.
[413] Hollander, "Introduction" in Langer, *Motherhood and Sexuality*, 10.
[414] Langer, Guinsberg, and Palacio, *Memoria, historia y diálogo psicoanalítico*, 77.
[415] Langer, Guinsberg, and Palacio, 153.

> – his theorization of women was, to me, partly incomprehensible and partly humiliating. But, in addition, and this is most important, it was of no use to me clinically. Freud describes the female child as a castrated male child. But a castrated male child would not have the female child's capacity for reproduction. Melanie Klein takes this innate capacity into account and examines the specifically feminine, in other words, the fantasies and anxieties of the little girl pertaining to the still latent biological-reproductive capacity.][416]

Despite her respect for Freud's theory, Langer does not find it clinically useful to understand her female patients or herself. Her criticism is very focused on the clinical utility of Freud's understanding of feminine sexuality. Her theoretical affinities are shaped by her clinical experience rather than imposed on it.

As was mentioned, *Maternidad y sexo* touches upon several different topics. I will not provide an overview of the whole book but instead focus on one particular section in which Langer offers an analysis of a different kind of material—not clinical material from her practice or psychoanalytic theories, but instead a "modern myth," borrowing the term from the French psychoanalyst Marie Bonaparte. The modern myth to which she refers was a rumor that circulated widely and swiftly in Buenos Aires in the late 1940s. To Langer, the speed of dissemination (she mentions that she heard nine different versions within a week) proves that it corresponds to a repressed imaginary situation and an infantile anguish that is present in most adults.[417] Langer recounts this myth in the following way:

> La versión más completa de la extraña historia que se relataba en junio de 1949 en todo Buenos Aires era la siguiente: Un joven matrimonio toma una sirvienta, estando la esposa cerca del final de su embarazo. Nace la criatura. Algunas semanas después, marido y mujer salen de noche para ir al cine, dejando el niño al cuidado de la sirvienta, que hasta ese momento ha merecido su confianza. Al regresar los recibe muy ceremoniosamente, vestida con el traje de novia de la señora, según una versión, y les dice que ha preparado una gran sorpresa para ellos. Los invita a pasar al comedor para servirles una comida especial. Entran y se encuentran con un espectáculo horripilante. En medio de la mesa, puesta con sumo cuidado, ven en una gran fuente a su hijo, asado y rodeado de papas. La infeliz madre enloquece en el acto. Pierde el habla y nadie le ha oído pronunciar desde

[416] Langer, *From Vienna to Managua*, 145.
[417] Langer, *Maternidad y Sexo: Estudio Psicoanalítico y Psicosomático*, 98.

> entonces una sola palabra. El padre, quien, según varias versiones, es militar, extrae su revólver y mata a la sirvienta. Después huye y no vuelven a tenerse noticias de él.[418]
>
> [The most complete version of the strange story that was reported throughout Buenos Aires in June of 1949 was as follows: A young married couple hire a servant as the wife approaches the end of her pregnancy. The baby is born. Several weeks later the husband and wife go out one evening to see a film, leaving the baby in their trusted servant's care. Returning home, they are received quite ceremoniously by the servant, who, according to one version, is dressed in the wife's bridal gown. She tells them that she has prepared an elaborate surprise for them and invites them to go to the dining room so that she can serve them a special meal. They enter and encounter a horrifying spectacle: In the middle of the table, arranged with a great deal of care, they see their small infant son in a large bowl, roasted and surrounded with potatoes. The distressed mother goes mad immediately. She loses the ability to speak, and no one has heard her say a single word since. The father, a military officer according to some versions, takes out his gun and kills the servant. Afterward, he flees and is never heard from again.][419]

According to some later explanations, the tragedy was explained by the fact that the servant was a psychotic who had recently escaped an asylum. Langer explains that other versions of the event presented some differences. For example, in some versions, the husband is a physician, who does not kill her son's assassin but instead commits suicide.

Langer presents this myth in the context of developing the idea of the "bad mother." She follows Klein's understanding that we all carry two images of the mother: one that is good and another that is horrific, that kills and devours the child. She associates the roasted child myth to other myths and stories with similar themes. She begins with a Freudian gesture by referring to the classical myth of Tantalus, which is the most similar to the myth of the roasted child. In order to prove his divinity, Tantalus served parts of his son's body to the gods. His wife Ceres, absorbed by the grief of having lost his son, ate part of his son's shoulder. Tantalus's son Pelops was then given his life back by the gods, and his shoulder was replaced with one made of ivory. As Langer points out, while it is the father who kills the son, it is the mother who completes the

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418 Langer, 98–99.
419 Langer, *Motherhood and Sexuality*, 54.

crime by eating the horrible meal.[420] Langer continues with other references to similar narratives, such as the fairy tales *Snow White* or *Hansel and Gretel*, as well as to the dream of a patient.[421]

What Langer's analysis shows is that the original crime in the myth is not a wish to devour the child, but the child's wish to devour the mother, which makes the child not the victim but instead the true criminal. Langer claims that when the mother leaves with the father and therefore abandons the child, the aggressive hunger experienced by the child is intensified. And it is this aggressive hunger that Langer considers the original crime. The tragedy takes place when the mother becomes absent because she is with the father.[422] Because the servant occupies the place of the mother in carrying out the same activities—feeding, bathing, and taking care of the child—and because in the myth she actually puts herself in the position of the mother by wearing her wedding dress, Langer claims that the servant is a representative of the "bad mother," that is, the image of the mother that abandons the child, on whom the child projects her cannibalistic wishes. This is, as Langer explains, the oral dimension of the analysis.

An Oedipal dimension is introduced by Langer in her analysis when she observes that the father is in some versions of the myth a military and in others, physician. In both cases, he occupies an authoritative place, which corresponds to the image that the young girl has of the father. Langer introduces the question of the Oedipal conflict in girls, who at some point fall in love with the father and want to take the place of the mother, seeing the mother as bad. In addition, if a sibling is born, all jealousy and hatred is directed towards the newborn. When the tragedy finally happens, some versions of the myth say that the father killed the servant by

[420] Langer, *Maternidad y Sexo: Estudio Psicoanalítico y Psicosomático*, 101.
[421] Langer, 99–100.
[422] Langer, 104.

shooting her or beating her, something that Langer interprets, at the level of masochistic regression, as her intercourse with the father. As Langer explains:

> Lo reprimido, la satisfacción sexual prohibida y negada, irrumpe otra vez en la consciencia, aunque en forma disfrazada y dolorosa. Pero por poco tiempo, pues el padre desaparece o se suicida y la madre enmudece, lo que simboliza también a la muerte. Esto es, que la niña-sirvienta sufre el castigo más grave que un niño pueda imaginarse: por su crimen de celos es abandonada por ambos padres.[423]
>
> [The prohibited and denied sexual satisfaction that is repressed erupts once more into consciousness, although in a disguised and painful form. It exists for only a brief time, though, because the father disappears or commits suicide and the mother becomes mute, which also symbolizes death. Thus, the girl-servant suffers the most serious punishment that a child can imagine: for her crime of jealousy she is abandoned by both parents.][424]

The servant, on the one hand, takes the place of the bad mother, on whom the baby projects her cannibalistic wishes. On the other hand, she occupies the position of an older sister, who was present in the house before the baby was born, as the myth recounts, and is now jealous of her new sibling. In revenge, she cooks the baby and serves her to the parents. This crime is punished by the death of the father, who disappears or commits suicide, and the symbolic death of the mother, who becomes mute.

Langer cites Bonaparte's claim that modern myths are reactions to distressing situations. In *Myths of War*, the work where Bonaparte develops the idea of modern myths, the distressing situation behind the myths she analyzes is the Second World War. According to her, those myths correspond to a common psychologic constellation shared by many different people. What the distressing situation might be in the case of the myth of the roasted child that Langer analyzes is left unsaid. But while she does not further develop how Bonaparte's claim about modern myths might apply to the myth that she analyzes in *Maternidad y sexo*, she returns to it six

[423] Langer, 106.
[424] Langer, *Motherhood and Sexuality*, 61.

years later, in 1957, in an essay titled "El niño asado y otros mitos sobre Eva Perón" ["The roasted child and other myths about Eva Perón"]. In this essay, she presents once again the myth and explains that she had avoided analyzing to what extent the political situation at the time had contributed to the origin of the myth because that would have made its publication impossible. But since the Argentine political situation had changed with the fall of Perón in 1955, she went back to the myth to complete its analysis.[425]

In order to complete the analysis of this myth, then, Langer refers to two other myths that circulated at the time in Buenos Aires, both of which had a woman as their protagonist and a tragic end. She explicitly states that her analysis is neither political, nor an analysis of the actual person of Eva Perón. Instead, she aims to show where these contradictory images came from, and how they came to be projected onto Eva Perón. There were, as Langer explains, two images of Eva Perón: one adored by the Peronist masses, and one feared by the opposition. These, however, were only the conscious images. In the myths, which circulated among absolutely everyone, regardless of class and political affinities, what arose was a double-faced unconscious image. The reason why the myth of the roasted child originated (along with the other two myths that Langer mentions) was precisely that neither Eva Perón's supporters nor her opponents consciously knew that they were talking about her. And while Langer observes that it is not surprising that she would be represented as a perverse servant, a murderous mother, and a mortal lover by her detractors, she points out that those who adored her also assigned her this meaning because of how much they idealized her:

> La idealización extrema de Eva Perón fue la causa, por la cual también sus adictos, aunque inconscientemente, la equipararan con lo terrorífico, porque es esto lo que nos lleva a la idealización. Así se estableció un círculo vicioso. Cuanto más terrorífica la sintieron, más se vieron obligados de nuevo a idealizarla, para poder mantener su imagen.

[425] Langer, *Fantasías eternas a la luz del psicoanálisis.*, 85.

> [The extreme idealization of Eva Perón was the reason why even those who were addicted to her—although unconsciously—equated her with that which was terrifying, because this is what leads us to idealization. It was thus established a vicious circle. The more terrifying they felt she was, the more they felt the obligation yet again to idealize her, so that they would maintain her image.][426]

In this sense, because the idealization of Eva Perón was, according to Langer, an effect of a terrifying image, both images are connected rather than opposed to each other. Even more, both images coexist in the same character of this narrative.

With this analysis, Langer introduces a political dimension to what had previously been a rather abstract examination. By introducing this political aspect, Langer also provides a more situated analysis, and her analysis becomes properly psychoanalytic, as she is able to intervene with her interpretation not by addressing a politically abstracted version of the modern myth, but rather attending to all the particularities of the story in the context in which it circulated.

From a historical perspective, Plotkin stresses the importance of this turn in Langer's analysis, as at the time, the APA proclaimed its political neutrality, and she was the first prominent member to read a political situation through psychoanalysis.[427] And her rejection of political neutrality applies not only to the institutional aspects of psychoanalysis, but also to its technical principles, namely the question of analytic neutrality. Langer's engagement with the political side of the myth of the roasted child was one way to incorporate a political perspective into a psychoanalytic analysis, and after her period of institutional-psychoanalytic "militancy," she would reengage with politics in 1965, after the death of her husband. The following section will be devoted to some aspects of this return to politics.

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[426] Langer, 89 (my translation).
[427] Plotkin, *Freud in the Pampas*, 99.

The Problem with Surgeons

Langer's first experience of the institutional tensions between politics and psychoanalysis was with the Wiener Vereinigung, when she had to hide her political activism because of the institute's regulations. At the time, she was critical of the institute's denial of the alarming political situation in Europe, and she claims that in this context, one had to choose between psychoanalysis or social revolution.[428] When she arrived in Buenos Aires, she did not have to choose between both. She participated in an organization called Junta de la Victoria [Victory Board], an anti-fascist women's organization founded in 1941 that collaborated with the Allies during the Second World War.[429] However, as Langer puts it, in 1945 the war against fascism was replaced by the Cold War against communism and the Soviet Union. In Argentina, Perón came to power, and once again it became dangerous to be involved with the political left.[430]

Unlike the Wiener Vereinigung, the APA did not categorically prohibit political activism, but a certain tendency to isolationism mean that activism was implicitly condemned, which is why Langer gave up Marxism.[431] After years of hiding her politics, she adopted a more combative position when she became an Argentine citizen and was able to validate her physician diploma.[432] And although the tensions between psychoanalysis and politics that she had identified in her years in the Wiener Vereinigung reappeared in Argentina under different historical circumstances, this time, Langer was in a fundamentally different position: she was no longer an unconvinced analyst in formation but now a co-founder of a psychoanalytic institute and a renowned psychoanalyst. She developed her critical stances against institutionalized

[428] Langer, *Mujer, psicoanálisis y marxismo*, 68.
[429] See Deutsch, "Argentine Women Against Fascism."
[430] Langer, *Mujer, psicoanálisis y marxismo*, 69.
[431] Langer, 69.
[432] Langer, Guinsberg, and Palacio, *Memoria, historia y diálogo psicoanalítico*, 82–83.

psychoanalysis precisely from this position, and these involved not only an institutional critique but also one that concerned technical aspects of psychoanalysis.

In an article titled "Viciscitudes del movimiento psicoanalítico argentino" ["Vicissitudes of the Argentine psychoanalytic movement"], she presents some aspects of institutionalized psychoanalysis, taking the APA as her main example. Reflecting upon its history and her role in it, she states:

> Nosotros nos proponíamos salvar al mundo a través del psicoanálisis. Y no sabíamos, algunos lo ocultaron conscientemente, otros lo tenían reprimido, que como miembros de la clase dominante salvábamos únicamente a nuestros analizandos que pertenecían a la misma clase y participaban como nosotros de la explotación. (…) Estábamos en eso, sin darnos cuenta de que un grupo de gente con buenas intenciones nos habíamos transformado en sostenedores de un aparato ideológico del estado.
>
> [We were determined to save the world through psychoanalysis. And we didn't know—some consciously concealed it, others had repressed it—that as members of the ruling class, we were only saving our analysands, who belonged to the same class and took part in exploitation as much as we did. (…) That's what we were doing, we didn't realize that a group of people with good intentions, we had turned into supporters of an ideological state apparatus.][433]

While Langer voiced the problems and shortcomings of the APA, she expresses her criticism through a reference to Louis Althusser without failing to recognize her role in the association. She is aware of the new institutional position she occupies and her own complicity with what she is ideologically against.

Despite the disagreements and the fact that Langer eventually left the APA to be the co-founder of another psychoanalytic group, it should be noted that there were certain aspects that she celebrated about the APA and its members. In particular, Ángel Garma—a Spanish-Argentine analyst and one of the pioneers of psychoanalysis in Argentina—imposed a measure that allowed for psychoanalysis to be widely disseminated without it becoming elitist. Unlike

[433] Langer, *Mujer, psicoanálisis y marxismo*, 102 (my translation).

other associations, where analysts in training were required to take on two patients for free during the first two years before being able to charge for their work, Garma determined that analysts in training (because they were already physicians) could take on patients and get paid from the very beginning. This meant, as Langer explains, that in order to finish a psychoanalytic training in Argentina, candidates did not need to come from a wealthy family, something that Langer considered very laudable.[434]

But even so, Langer sought to find other ways to make psychoanalysis less elitist, which is why she became interested in group psychoanalysis, so that psychoanalysis could be at the service of the lower classes. She learned to work with groups with her colleague Emilio Rodrigué, who had been in England and had had experience with groups following the theories of Melanie Klein, Wilfred Bion, and Henri Ezriel. Together, Rodrigué and Langer founded the Asociación Argentina de Psicología y Psicoterapia de Grupo [Argentine Association of Psychology and Group Psychotherapy] in 1954, and later wrote a book on the subject with León Grinberg. Langer believed that social psychology could be better studied in groups, as every person, throughout their life, inhabits many different groups, such as the family, the school, the nation, etc.[435]

Although the ideological differences between the members of the APA had always existed, it was in 1971 that a subgroup of its members decided to break with the association (as well as with the IPA) and form another one called Plataforma.[436] This group claimed that with psychoanalysis, Freud revolutionized the social sciences, and its emergence was and is always

[434] Langer, Guinsberg, and Palacio, *Memoria, historia y diálogo psicoanalítico*, 90.
[435] Sinay, *Marie Langer*, 56.
[436] There was another psychoanalytic group called Documento which also broke with the APA and the IPA and held similar ideas. Since I am focusing on Marie Langer's work and she was a member of Plataforma, I will not talk about Documento.

determined—despite its relative autonomy—by the socio-political context in which it is practiced.[437] In their official declaration, the analysts of the Plataforma group explicitly state that the decisive reason for their separation is ideological. According to this declaration, by isolating itself from external reality, the APA configured a psychoanalytic professional practice that is both asocial and apolitical.

> Esa penosa condición es racionalizada con el criterio de la "neutralidad valorativa" del científico, supuestamente posible y necesaria, integrante de toda una concepción utópica que incluye ilusas esperanzas de cambio social al que como hombres no podemos aportar porque el profesionalismo nos absorbe y como psicoanalistas tampoco porque todo intento en ese sentido es acusado de "violación ética" y "mezcla entre Ciencia y Política."
>
> [This pitiful condition is rationalized based on the scientist's "neutrality of values"—supposedly possible and necessary—which takes part in a utopic understanding that includes naïve hopes of social change to which we cannot contribute: as men, because we are absorbed by professionalism and, as psychoanalysts, because any such attempt is accused of being an "ethical violation" or a "mixture of Science and Politics"].[438]

The Plataforma members sought to separate psychoanalysis from the official psychoanalytic institution and declared that they wanted to practice "true psychoanalysis." They state that psychoanalysis exists wherever psychoanalysts are, and that rather than an understanding of science is that is isolated and isolating, they hold one that is engaged with the realities that it seeks to both study and transform.[439]

One of Langer's central critiques to the psychoanalytic institutions involved the question of neutrality. There were two kinds of neutrality that Langer criticized, which are related but operate in different ways. One is the question of neutrality that concerned the lack of political engagement in psychoanalytic associations. The two associations with which Langer was

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[437] "Declaración del grupo Plataforma" in Langer, Guinsberg, and Palacio, *Memoria, historia y diálogo psicoanalítico*, 124.
[438] "Declaración del grupo Plataforma" in Langer, Guinsberg, and Palacio, 128 (my translation).
[439] "Declaración del grupo Plataforma" in Langer, Guinsberg, and Palacio, 128.

connected, the Wiener Vereinigung and the Argentine Psychoanalytic Association, both avoided engaging with the political situations of their respective times and contexts.

The lack of political engagement in institutionalized psychoanalysis was also pointed out by Jacques Derrida with regard to the discourse of the International Psychoanalytic Association (IPA). As he observes, an official statement from the IPA mentions a request from the Australian Society asking the IPA to "look into rumours [*sic*] of alleged violation of human rights in Argentina."[440] Derrida stresses that this was said at a time in which the violation of human rights in Argentina and other countries was a reality rather than a matter of rumors or allegations. When such violation became undeniable, a statement was later issued by the IPA condemning such violations using very non-specific language and, rather than naming the countries where these violations were perpetrated, the statement claims that they were taking place "in certain geographical areas."[441] Derrida criticizes this "[g]eographical abstraction, which effectively neutralizes political discourse." Under the guise of neutrality, the IPA refuses to acknowledge the aspects of the violation that have to do with politics. The violation then becomes an abstract event that takes place somewhere on the earth, with no reference to concrete people, histories, or spaces—a description that is, in a sense, "neutral."

The lack of political engagement and tendency to abstraction that Derrida points out in the IPA is also at the center of Langer's critique to the Wiener Vereinigung. In her autobiography, Langer mentions that she never met Freud, as she was not a very convinced analyst in training and he was already old and debilitated by cancer, and when she had the opportunity to attend a celebration to commemorate him when he turned eighty years old, she

[440] Cited in Derrida, "Geopsychoanalysis," 207.
[441] Cited in Derrida, 208.

decided not to go. She felt resentment towards the institute and anger because of how everyone pretended that nothing was happening, and—as she states—psychoanalysts played that "dangerous game of denial" better than anybody.[442] By not engaging with the political circumstances that they inevitably coexisted with, psychoanalysts worked in an abstract space not unlike the one that Derrida highlights.

Although Langer was critical of this same kind of political neutrality in regard to the APA, at this point in her career, her critique of neutrality developed further and addressed the neutrality of the analyst. She then considered not only the neutrality of institutions with regard to their engagement with their political context, which for Langer needed to be analyzed in session and therefore enter the analytic setting, but also the question of neutrality in psychoanalytic technique.

Before delving into Langer's critique of neutrality and its implications, however, I want to turn to the question of neutrality as Freud understood it. In his technical writings, he makes the following recommendation to analysts:

> Ich kann den Kollegen nicht dringend genug empfehlen, sich während der psychoanalytischen Behandlung den Chirurgen zum Vorbild zu nehmen, der alle seine Affekte und selbst sein menschliches Mitleid beiseite drängt und seinen geistigen Kräften ein einziges Ziel setzt: die Operation so kunstgerecht als möglich zu vollziehen.[443]
>
> [I cannot advise my colleagues too urgently to model themselves during psycho-analytic treatment on the surgeon, who puts aside all his feelings, even his human sympathy, and concentrates his mental forces on the single aim of performing the operation as skillfully as possible.][444]

[442] Langer, Guinsberg, and Palacio, *Memoria, historia y diálogo psicoanalítico*, 58.
[443] Freud, *Gesammelte Werke*, 8: Werke aus den Jahren 1909-1913:380–81.
[444] Freud, *Standard Edition*, 1966, XII (1911-1913): The Case of Schreber, Papers on Technique and Other Works:115.

Freud explains this recommendation by stating that a cold and surgeon-like mindset enables the analyst to keep personal feelings out of the treatment and to be attentive to the resistances that arise in the analysand, which at the same time protects the analyst's own emotional life. By being neutral, the analyst listens to the discourse of the patient, not getting overly involved in the demands and expectations that arise in the transferential relationship, but instead listening to them and analyzing them appropriately. This aspect is expressed by the maxim "don't play the patient's game," as Laplanche and Pontalis point out.[445] By not listening to the patient with certain preconceptions, the analyst thus follows another recommendation that Freud makes: to not direct their attention to anything in particular, but instead to hold what he calls "evenly-suspended attention" [*gleichschwebende Aufmerksamkeit*].

Implied in Freud's recommendation of following the model of the surgeon is an unconditionality towards the patient. Regardless of her personal feelings and sympathy (or lack thereof), the analyst must treat her patient "as skillfully as possible." This can also apply to the political affinities of the patient, with which the analyst might not agree, but which must not affect the analyst's duty towards the patient. Even if the patient has views that are radically opposed to the analyst's, that patient should be treated as any other.

In a later essay, Freud explains the question of neutrality in different terms, this time in the context of a controversy with followers of Jung:

> Wir haben es entschieden abgelehnt, den Patienten, der sich Hilfe suchend in unsere Hand begibt, zu unserem Leibgut zu machen, sein Schicksal für ihn zu formen, ihm unsere Ideale aufzudrängen und ihn im Hochmut des Schöpfers zu unserem Ebenbild, an dem wir Wohlgefallen haben sollen, zu gestalten. Ich (…) habe auch erfahren, daß eine so weit gehende Aktivität gegen den Patienten für die therapeutische Absicht gar nicht erforderlich ist. Denn ich habe Leuten helfen können, mit denen mich keinerlei

[445] Laplanche and Pontalis, *The Language of Psycho-Analysis*, 271.

> Gemeinsamkeit der Rasse, Erziehung, sozialen Stellung und Weltanschauung verband, ohne sie in ihrer Eigenart zu stören.[446]
>
> [We refused most emphatically to turn a patient who puts himself into our hands in search of help into our private property, to decide his fate for him, to force our own ideals upon him, and with the pride of a Creator to form him in our own image and see that it is good. (…) I have learnt by experience, too, that such a far-reaching activity towards patients is not in the least necessary for therapeutic purposes. For I have been able to help people with whom I had nothing in common—neither race, education, social position nor outlook upon life in general—without affecting their individuality.][447]

Freud distinguishes the imposition of the analyst's ideals onto the patient, determining her fate according to the image of the very analyst, from a treatment that does not disrupt or affect the patient's idiosyncrasy [*Eigenart*] in this imposing way. Interestingly, Freud points out not only that, as part of his recommendations, the analyst must not form the patient in her image (an idea that Freud rejects), but also that this is unnecessary. Even if the patient and the analyst have nothing in common, from race and class (or, as Freud says, "social position") to their own *Weltanschauung*, the analyst can indeed help the patient without shaping the patient in her own image. There is, in this statement, an idea of neutrality based on letting the patient form her own image and find her own fate, something that the analyst must not disrupt.

The dimension of neutrality with which Langer agrees is that which concerns transferential manifestations ("don't play the patient's game"). However, she does not believe that the analyst can suspend all her values and ideals.[448] In Langer's view, the transferential relationship between analyst and analysand cannot but involve ideology. Claiming that this dimension can be omitted in the psychoanalytic setting through the ideal of neutrality is simply

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446 Freud, *Gesammelte Werke*, 12: Werke aus den Jahren 1917-1920:190.
447 Freud, *Standard Edition*, 1966, XII (1911-1913): The Case of Schreber, Papers on Technique and Other Works:164–65.
448 Langer, Guinsberg, and Palacio, *Memoria, historia y diálogo psicoanalítico*, 171.

unrealistic and reveals a conservative political position rather than placing itself beyond ideology. The neutrality of the analyst, as she claims, can only mean to opt in favor of the *status quo*.[449]

The way in which Langer uses the term "ideology" has a clear Marxian influence. She does not usually use this term to refer to that which advances the interests of the ruling class (using the expressions "ideology of the ruling class" or "conservative ideology" when she wants to denote this stricter sense), but she does consider ideology as rooted in material conditions. She would agree with Marx and Engels when they claim the following:

> Auch die Nebelbildungen im Gehirn der Menschen sind notwendige Sublimate ihres materiellen, empirisch konstatierbaren und an materielle Voraussetzungen geknüpften Lebensprozesses. Die Moral, Religion, Metaphysik und sonstige Ideologie und die ihnen entsprechenden Bewußtseinsformen behalten hiermit nicht länger den Schein der Selbständigkeit. Sie haben keine Geschichte, sie haben keine Entwicklung, sondern die ihre materielle Produktion und ihren materiellen Verkehr entwickelnden Menschen ändern mit dieser ihrer Wirklichkeit auch ihr Denken und die Produkte ihres Denkens. Nicht das Bewußtsein bestimmt das Leben, sondern das Leben bestimmt das Bewußtsein.[450]
>
> [The phantoms formed in the brains of men are also, necessarily, sublimates of their material life-process, which is empirically verifiable and bound to material premises. Morality, religion, metaphysics, and all the rest of ideology as well as the forms of consciousness corresponding to these, thus no longer retain the semblance of independence. They have no history, no development; but men, developing their material production and their material intercourse, alter, along with this their actual world, also their thinking and the products of their thinking. It is not consciousness that determines life, but life that determines consciousness.][451]

Marx and Engels suggest that ideology, in its befogged character, is a sublimation of material life processes, such that—in the same way that morality, religion, and metaphysics—they cannot claim to be disassociated from such life processes. Ideology is always a result of material

[449] Langer, Guinsberg, and Palacio, 112.
[450] Marx and Engels, *Werke, Band 3*, 26.
[451] Marx and Engels, *The German Ideology*, 42.

conditions, rather than a system of ideas that determines those conditions in the first place—in other words, it is an effect rather than a cause.

Langer seems to follow this understanding of ideology, and it is in this sense that she seeks to reflect on the way it is at play within the analytic setting. Such an examination involves both the role of ideology in the relationship with the patient, as well as her own status as an analyst. She understands the tensions in her own position as a member of the ruling class and as a prominent member of the psychoanalytic community in Argentina, and seeks to find ways in which her psychoanalytic profession and her political ideas can consistently work alongside one another:

> Nosotros tenemos necesidad del psicoanálisis como instrumento para apoyar la lucha de clases y para ayudar a la toma de conciencia de las masas, pero no como ciencia exacta no como ciencia idealista, pero, sin embargo como una ciencia social capaz de esclarecer ideologías y motivaciones.
>
> [We need psychoanalysis as an instrument to support class struggle and to contribute to the consciousness of the masses, but not as an exact science or as an idealist science, rather as a social science able to clarify ideologies and motivations.][452]

Langer contrasts here an exact or idealist science with a social science that aspires to clarify ideologies and motivations, such that psychoanalysis does not seek to stay neutral, so to speak, but rather take a position within social and political struggles.

The dimension of ideology, then, inevitably enters when considering the question of the cure and the progression of treatment for Langer. She offers the example of a patient she had had in group analysis,[453] a young French woman who had emigrated because of the war. At first,

[452] Langer, *Mujer, psicoanálisis y marxismo*, 96 (my translation).
[453] As mentioned above, Langer contributed to the theory of group psychoanalysis, which was another attempt at integrating the dimension of the social with psychoanalysis. Since I want to focus on her writings on feminism and on ideology and politics, I will not develop her contributions on group psychoanalysis.

her lack of language skills in Spanish made it impossible for her to finish her high school studies, and later she got married and had two children. However, after some time, a desire from her adolescence reappeared, which was to become a doctor. She had difficulties finishing her high school studies for some time, which caused her great anguish and depression. She wanted to be in analysis because of this situation, as well as to work through a sexual problem she had with her husband. When she was finally able to finish her high school studies, as well as to take the entrance exam to medical school, she showed an interest in beginning an individual analysis, and Langer recommended a colleague of hers. Some years later, she ran into him and asked about this patient:

> "¿Qué tal está Marianne?" le pregunté. "Muy bien; estoy muy satisfecho del tratamiento. Me mandaste una muy buena paciente", me contestó amablemente: "¿Seguramente ya dio anatomía?" "Pero no", me respondió, casi con asco, "dejó medicina hace tiempo, pero está esperando a un tercer hijo"[454]
>
> ["How's Marianne?" I asked him. "Very well, I'm very pleased with her treatment. You sent me a very good patient". "She must surely have done anatomy by now?" "No", he replied, virtually in disgust. "She left medicine some time ago, but she's expecting her third child"].[455]

Langer offers this anecdote as an example of how analysts, in good faith, are not neutral even when they claim to be. Every analyst inevitably analyzes with some desire for the patient. The unconscious desires that this analyst had for this patient, Marianne, were for Langer the manifestation of a sexist ideology—something that in turn reveals her own ideology and her own wishes[456] for the treatment of this patient.

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[454] Langer, Guinsberg, and Palacio, *Memoria, historia y diálogo psicoanalítico*, 180–81.
[455] Langer, *From Vienna to Managua*, 166.
[456] In Langer's critique of neutrality and in her objection to her colleague's treatment of Marianne, there is a clear connection between the analyst's desires and ideology. The relationship between ideology and desire—and in particular the desire of the analyst—would deserve a careful examination and discussion that exceeds the scope of this chapter.

To briefly go back to the model of the surgeon, Langer interprets this ideal as one that is in fact neither achievable nor desirable—something that is supported, as she notes, by later studies on countertransference. She states that this ideal of neutrality is a "fiction" put forward by Freud and sustained by many analysts.[457] Interestingly, however, she claims that Freud's own teachings point to the impossibility of neutrality:

> Y si tomas en cuenta que Freud nos enseñó que en el análisis se relaciona el inconsciente del analista con el de su analizando y nos dice (…) que toda la personalidad del analista incide sobre el proceso analítico, y su ideología forma, forzosamente, parte de ésta, su papel de pantalla o de frío cirujano se vuelve inverosímil.[458]
>
> [If you take into account that Freud taught us that in analysis the analyst's unconscious forms a bond with the analysand's and he tells us (…) that all aspects of the analyst's personality impact upon the analytic process – and his ideology necessarily forms part of this – then his role as screen or cool-headed surgeon becomes improbable.][459]

While Langer disagrees with the model of the surgeon, which she interprets as following the ideal of neutrality that she saw in many of her colleagues, she sees in Freud's very writings the acknowledgement of the impact of ideology. The premise that she adds to Freud's explanation is, of course, that ideology plays a crucial role in the formation of the personality, something that is implied in her critique of neutrality.

The question of ideology is particularly relevant, according to Langer, in her times in contrast with Freud's. She observes that the kind of patients that turn to psychoanalysis changed significantly since Freud's times: "Buena parte de los casos que se presentan ahora suelen definirse como 'neurosis de carácter': en estos casos la meta de salud mental depende mucho de la ideología –y uso este término en un sentido muy amplio– del terapeuta"[460] ["A large number

[457] Langer, Guinsberg, and Palacio, *Memoria, historia y diálogo psicoanalítico*, 167.
[458] Langer, Guinsberg, and Palacio, 180.
[459] Langer, *From Vienna to Managua*, 166.
[460] Langer, Guinsberg, and Palacio, *Memoria, historia y diálogo psicoanalítico*, 171.

of the cases that present themselves today are usually defined as 'character neurosis'. In this cases the mental health goal depends a lot on the ideology – and I use the term in a very broad sense – of the therapist"].[461] "Character neurosis," as Laplanche and Pontalis define it, is a kind of neurosis in which the defensive conflict is not manifested in clearly identifiable symptoms but instead in character traits, behavior, or a pathological organization of personality.[462] When there are clear symptoms that the patient is experiencing, then the treatment can perhaps be less susceptible to ideological elements—for example, if someone who cannot leave their house is able to go outside as a result of psychoanalytic treatment. But in the case of character neurosis, there could be decisions regarding studying as opposed to being a housewife, as in Marianne's case, or regarding having children, traveling and leaving family behind, prioritizing work or personal life, making certain work decisions, etc. In those cases, the ideology of the analyst inevitably enters the analytic setting.

The question of positioning is one that is crucial to consider in the context of ideology. Althusser presents a particularly compelling view of this in his essay on Freud and Marx, where he claims that Marxist theory and psychoanalysis share the same relationship with conflictuality [*conflictualité*]. In both cases, objectivity is not defined by standing outside of the conflict that they take as their object, but rather consists in taking a position within that very conflict. In the case of Marxism, Althusser explains that in order to understand a class society, which is necessarily conflictual, one must take the positions of the proletarian classes, since "*on ne peut pas tout voir de partout*" ["*we cannot see everything from everywhere*"]. It is not from every perspective that the conflict in question can be seen and understood, and in fact and passively occupying other positions, as

461 Langer, *From Vienna to Managua*, 159.
462 Laplanche and Pontalis, *The Language of Psycho-Analysis*, 67.

Althusser explains, is equivalent to getting dragged "dans la logique de l'illusion de classe qui s'appelle l'idéologie dominante" ["into the logic of the illusion of class that is called the ruling ideology"].[463] The positions of the proletarian classes are philosophical positions that make visible what bourgeois ideology keeps occult.[464]

In Freud's case, Althusser claims that psychoanalysis breaks with the philosophical form of bourgeois ideology, in which the unity of the subject is assured by consciousness, which required Freud to switch positions with regard to consciousness:

> s'il à changé de position par rapport aux problèmes de la conscience, s'il a rompu avec la physiologie et la médecine, c'est *parce qu'il a été éduqué par ses propres patients hystériques* qui lui ont littéralement *appris* et *donné à voir* qu'il existait un langage de l'inconscient inscrit dans leur corps, et c'est Anna O. qui non seulement a inventé pour lui le terme de « *talking cure* » (étape décisive de la découverte), mais lui a imposé la reconnaissance de l'existence du transfert et du contre-transfert.
>
> [if he changed his position in relation to the problems of consciousness, if he broke with physiology and medicine, it is *because he was educated by his own hysteric patients* who literally *taught* and *showed* him that there was an unconscious language inscribed in their bodies, and it was Anna O. who not only invented for him the term "talking cure" (a decisive stage in the discovery), but forced him to acknowledge the existence of transference and counter-transference.][465]

Freud was able to see the conflict and take a position within it thanks to the change of position that his own patients imposed on him. And it is possible to see this not only in the term of "talking cure" but also, as we saw in the first chapter, with the formulation of transference in the Dora case. The fact that, in order to understand a conflict, it is necessary to occupy certain positions and not others can be formulated in terms of the inexistence of neutral positions. A neutral position might imply, as Althusser claims, the passive reliance on a position that cannot but fall into the ruling ideology, which is what Langer put in practice in her own work.

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[463] Althusser, *Écrits sur la psychanalyse*, 229 (my translation).
[464] Althusser, 228.
[465] Althusser, 239 (my translation).

Throughout her different positions in psychoanalytic institutions, her work with individual and group analysis, and her writings on women and the influence of ideology in psychoanalysis, Langer performs several kinds of translations through which she offers a rewriting of psychoanalysis. She seeks to translate psychoanalysis to the treatment of women and the specific affections that they have in relation to their femininity, to the treatment of patients in the lower classes as part of a critique to its elitist character, and from Freud's time to hers. She carries out these translations based on the various positions, languages, and spaces that she occupies throughout her life. Langer's life and work is an example of how psychoanalysis can be translated and reimagined attending at specific historical, political, and institutional contexts. Moreover, her critique of neutrality emphasizes the need to acknowledge ideological positions in the analytic setting. Langer's work attempted at developing a psychoanalytic practice that would be consistent with her Marxism, and in this sense, she sought—to return to Althusser—to take a position that would reveal the conflict that Marxist theory takes as its object of study through a psychoanalytic practice.

Conclusions

I will begin by going backwards. The problem of neutrality as Marie Langer addresses it reminds us that the aspiration to build a space detached from certain contingencies—in particular, ideology—is a construction. The artificial character of this construction does not mean that it is false, but rather that, like all constructions, it results from certain material conditions and even wishes. It does not ingenuously appear in history, just as concepts are not inherently ahistorical, as Nietzsche diagnosed, but have often been mummified by philosophers. Neutrality, as Langer concludes, is not constitutive of knowledge. Because in analysis the unconscious of the analysand relates to the unconscious of the analyst, acknowledging the impossibility of neutrality is also an acknowledgment of transference itself.

In her writings and clinical practice, Langer rewrites psychoanalysis based on a situated reading of her own reality, including her personal history, political convictions, and institutional position. The fact that Langer's translation of psychoanalysis was possible—and that psychoanalysis is translatable—points back to Moustapha Safouan and his theoretical framework to understand the universality of psychoanalytic concepts through his analysis of the Oedipus complex. Langer herself reads the Oedipal conflict through her interest in the psychoanalysis of women, and bases her rewriting of psychoanalysis not only in what she observes in her clinical practice, but also through her own contingent character as an analyst. Safouan points out that ethnographic literature cannot provide the key to understanding the universality of the Oedipus complex, since that relativization has to take place within psychoanalysis itself. In other words, it is not about analyzing the contingencies of the concept of the Oedipus complex—as Freud formulated it—in contrast with other interpretations of the complex (along with their own contingencies). Rather, it is a structural analysis of what leads to interpretations of the Oedipus

complex that makes it possible to think about universality. In other words, it is not that the structural aspects are detached from contingency and are, to borrow Nietzsche's words, *sub specie aeterni*. Such structural aspects can *only* manifest themselves through contingency, just as transference can only exist in specific bipersonal relationships (there is no transference outside its contingent instances) and yet it is what makes it possible to understand how such relationships are being structured. One cannot argue for the universality of the Oedipus complex, for example, by comparing Girindrasekhar Bose's interpretation of it with Langer's. The notion of universality that Safouan offers does not take the common denominator of various interpretations, but instead seeks to provide a psychoanalytic analysis of how desire is structured (which is then manifested in specific interpretations, such as Bose's and Langer's). One could say perhaps that he carries out a detranslation—to briefly return to Jean Laplanche—of the Oedipus complex as it is usually understood in order to find what leads to a given translation, that is, to an interpretation of the Oedipus complex.

Bose's work is not only an example of how psychoanalysis can be translated to a social and cultural context very different from Freud's, but also a reminder that any translation needs to be based on nuanced readings. In the literature on psychoanalysis in India, there is often a stark opposition between "India" and "the West," making them homogeneous categories and erasing questions of class and caste. Addressing such questions with a closer and more nuanced reading is akin to the attention to contingencies that must inevitably be a part of psychoanalytic treatment. It is in this sense that I take transference as a framework to understand the translation of psychoanalysis. Translating psychoanalysis is a process that involves the redirection and projection of memories from the past, something that can be witnessed in the letter exchange between Bose and Freud.

Conclusions

I address the question of reading and legibility in relation to transference in the context of a discussion of psychosis. Because psychosis was illegible for Freud, it was not treatable by psychoanalysis as he determined the limits of the discipline. The reason for this illegibility was no other than the conceptualization of transference. Conceived on the basis of free association and the treatment of neurosis, transference as formulated by Freud made the treatment of psychosis impossible. By translating transference, as I argue, to the structural particularities of psychosis, Lacan was able to formulate a way to treat psychoses based on his own understanding of them.

Despite the fact that psychosis and transference were incompatible for Freud, I point to the presence of a different kind of transference in his reading of Schreber's memoirs. This literary transference not only delineates how the writer's imaginary reader is shaped by the redirection of past memories and desires, but also how the reader herself—in a countertransference of sorts—responds to that projection and, at the same time, is able to analyze how the writer relates to her subject matter. Moreover, this form of transference, hidden between the lines, is an instance of the already-there character of transference, which can be found not only in this literary instance of transference, but also in the very formulation of the concept in Freud's thought.

I return, then, to the beginning. Conceptualizing transference requires a recognition of the fact that it was present all along. In the case of analysis, it was what was shaping the relationship between analyst and analysand. I present a reading of transference that emphasizes the fictional nature of bipersonal interaction, since it is precisely that fiction which manifests the truth. There is no relationship that is not informed by transference, and in this way, the absence of fiction is impossible. To declare the absence of transference is equivalent to assuming the

possibility of a knowledge so spontaneous that it does not presuppose any previous experiences. It would be the fantasy of being able to generate knowledge with the literacy of an adult but the rawness of a newborn. In telling the story of how the formulation of transference changed both within Freud's thought and between Freud and Lacan, I seek not only to provide a thorough analysis of transference, but also suggest that the *nachträglich* character of the conceptualization of transference and the fact that transference always takes place in the present, even if it is a reproduction and reenactment the past, might offer a psychoanalytic understanding of how concepts are formed—within and beyond psychoanalysis.

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