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Sailing under a Rising Sun: A Global History of Japanese Shipping in Empire and at War

Greenstein, Elijah J

Princeton, NJ : Princeton University

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SAILING UNDER A RISING SUN:

A GLOBAL HISTORY OF JAPANESE SHIPPING IN EMPIRE AND AT WAR

Elijah J. Greenstein

A DISSERTATION

PRESENTED TO THE FACULTY

OF PRINCETON UNIVERSITY

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OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

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ABSTRACT

This dissertation charts Japan's rise in world shipping from the late nineteenth to the mid-twentieth century. At the turn of the century, several companies established the first transoceanic shipping services under the Japanese flag. Japanese ships could soon be found in ports on every continent, and by the end of the First World War (1914–1918) the nation boasted a fleet that was the world's third largest. In the interwar period, Japanese ships continued to advance into world trade routes, but with the outbreak of the Pacific War (1941–1945), they were mobilized to create an autarkic bloc in Asia. The subsequent destruction of the commercial fleet, however, precipitated the collapse of Japan's empire.

By examining Japanese efforts to develop a national fleet and promote its advance into overseas trade routes, this study argues that Japan's rise as a modern nation-state and imperial power rested on its ships becoming integral components of systems of global transportation. As military transports and naval auxiliaries, commercial ships contributed to imperial expansion by projecting military power overseas. As commercial transports, they contributed to the consolidation of Japan's empire by facilitating movements of people, goods, and information between territories. At the same time, Japanese companies, often with state support, developed shipping services in trade routes beyond the empire. By examining these trajectories of oceanic expansion, this study argues that officials, business leaders, and intellectuals sought to secure Japan's position as a world power by making the nation an agent of global interconnectedness.

Efforts to promote Japanese shipping, moreover, were often influenced by the observation of rival maritime powers. The transnational flows of information made possible by shipping and other infrastructure informed approaches to shipping and maritime affairs in Japan and beyond. By examining how Japan's maritime leaders engaged with and produced ideas about world shipping, this dissertation tells a global story about the ways that imperial competition motivated efforts to create connections across borders and seas.

PRIOR PRESENTATIONS

Materials from this dissertation have been previously presented publicly at the following scholarly conferences and meetings:

"Japan's Trans-Pacific Shipping Lines, 1918–1941," Association for Asian Studies Annual Conference, Denver, CO, March 21, 2019.

"Mapping Maritime Transportation: Spaces of Japanese Shipping in the Early 20th Century," Mid-Atlantic Region Association for Asian Studies Conference, Elizabethtown, PA, November 3, 2018.

"Shipping Lines in the Japanese Empire, 1918–1941," World Economic History Congress, Boston, MA, July 31, 2018.

"Securing Navigation Rights: Japanese Ships in World Shipping, 1893–1914," Department of East Asian Studies Lunch Colloquium, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ, October 25, 2017.

"Colonial Shipping Policy in Interwar Taiwan," Institute of Taiwan History, Academia Sinica, Taipei, June 14, 2017.

"Invisible Empires: Preliminary Notes on Japanese Shipping in the 1930s," Modern Japanese History Workshop, Waseda University, Tokyo, August 5, 2016.

"National Fleet, Global Industry: The Politics of Japanese Shipping in the Early 20th Century," Global History Collaborative Junior Workshop, University of Tokyo, Tokyo, July 11, 2016.

"Shipping Strategies: Businessmen and Transfers of Shipping Knowledge from WWI to Interwar Japan," AAS-in-Asia, Doshisha, Kyoto, June 26, 2016.

"Dalian and Japan's Shipping Empire, 1918–1937," The Osaka Global History Conference, Osaka University, Osaka, March 16, 2016.

"Managing Turbulent Seas: Japan's 1917 Wartime Shipping Control Order," Global Japan Studies Seminar Series, University of Tokyo, Tokyo, November 12, 2015.

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When I made my first summer research trip to Tokyo, Haneda Masashi welcomed me to the University of Tokyo and his global history classroom. When I returned to Japan on subsequent research trips, he hosted me at the Institute for Advanced Studies on Asia, invited me to workshops, lectures, and classes, and always made time to meet with me and share his thoughts on global history, world history, and *sekaishi*. I am immensely grateful for his generosity, without which this dissertation would not have been possible.

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ABBREVIATIONS

Archives

MFA	Diplomatic Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Japan, Tokyo
NAJ	National Archives of Japan, Tokyo
NARA	National Archives and Records Administration (U.S.), College Park, MD
NIDS	National Institute for Defense Studies, Ministry of Defense, Tokyo
TNA	The National Archives (Britain), Richmond

Digital Archives and Collections

*Alphanumeric codes that follow these abbreviations in footnotes are reference numbers for the cited documents.

JACAR	Japan Center for Asian Historical Records (アジア歴史資料センター), Tokyo, https://www.jacar.go.jp/english/index.html
NAJ-DA	National Archives of Japan, Digital Archive (国立公文書館デジタルアーカイブ), Tokyo, https://www.digital.archives.go.jp
NCC	Kobe University Library Newspaper Clippings Collection (神戸大学附属図書館新聞記事文庫), Kobe, http://www.lib.kobe-u.ac.jp/sinbun/
NDL	National Diet Library Digital Collection (国立国会図書館デジタルコレクション), Tokyo, http://dl.ndl.go.jp

Company Histories, Business Reports, and Other Materials

*For full bibliographic information on company histories, see the bibliography.

Awanokuni 50-nenshi	50-year history of the Awanokuni Union Steamship Company (*Awanokuni kyōdō kabushiki gaisha gojū-nenshi*).
DKK 20-nen ryakushi	Abbreviated 20-year history of the Dalian Steamship Company (*Dairen kisen kabushiki gaisha nijūnen ryakushi*).
DKK EH	Business report of the Dalian Steamship Company (*Dairen kisen kabushiki gaisha eigyō hōkokusho*).
Kawasaki kisen 50-nenshi	50-year history of the Kawasaki Steamship Company (*Kawasaki kisen gojū-nenshi*).

Mitsui 80-nenshi	80-year history of the Mitsui Line (*Mitsui senpaku kabushiki gaisha sōgyō hachijū-nenshi*).
NGB	Documents of Japanese Diplomacy (*Nihon gaikō bunsho*). See bibliographic entry under "Gaimu chōsakyoku."
Nisshin kisen 30-nenshi	30-year history of the Japan-China Steamship Company, with supplement (*Nisshin kisen kabushiki gaisha sanjū-nenshi oyobi tsuiho*).
Nisshin kisen JH	Business report of the Japan-Mail Steamship Company (*Nisshin kisen kabushiki gaisha jigyō hōkokusho*).
NYK 50-nenshi	50-year history of the N.Y.K. (*Nippon yūsen kabushiki gaisha gojū-nenshi*).
NYK 100-nenshi	100-year history of the N.Y.K. (*Nippon yūsen kabushiki gaisha hyaku-nenshi*).
NYK 100-nenshi shiryō	100-year history of the N.Y.K., historical documents (*Nippon yūsen kabushiki gaisha hyaku-nenshi shiryō*).
NYK EH	Business report of the N.Y.K. (*Nippon yūsen kabushiki gaisha eigyō hōkokusho*).
NYK TG	Minutes of the N.Y.K. Board of Directors (*Torishimariyaku gijiroku*). Selections reprinted in *NYK 100-nenshi shiryō*.
OSK 50-nenshi	50-year history of the O.S.K. (*Ōsaka shōsen kabushiki gaisha gojū-nenshi*).
OSK 80-nenshi	80-year history of the O.S.K. (*Ōsaka shōsen kabushiki gaisha hachijū-nenshi*).
OSK EH	Business report of the O.S.K. (*Ōsaka shōsen kabushiki gaisha eigyō hōkokusho*).
OSK-Mitsui 100-nenshi	100-year history of the Mitsui O.S.K. Line (*Sōgyō hyaku-nenshi*).
SGS	Records of the House of Representatives (*Shūgiin giji sokkiroku*). Accessed via the Imperial Diet Records Search System 帝国議会会議録検索システム, http://teikokugikai-i.ndl.go.jp/TEIKOKU/swt_startup.html.
SMR 10-nenshi	10-year history of the South Manchuria Railway Company (*Minami Manshū tetsudō kabushiki gaisha jū-nenshi*).
SZS	Shōwa Financial History Records (*Shōwa zaiseishi shiryō*) (NAJ).
Yamashita shashi	Yamashita Steamship, Company history: 15-years since the merger (*Shashi: Gappei yori jūgo-nen*).

CONVENTIONS

Tonnage

When referring to ship tonnage, this dissertation uses the tonnage provided in the cited work. Many sources simply list "tons," but, when possible, this study refers to the specific kind of tonnage, including:

- Gross ton (gt) – The internal volume of a ship.
- Net ton (nt) – The volume of a ship used to carry cargo and passengers.
- Deadweight (dwt) – The weight that a ship can carry when fully loaded.

Japanese, Chinese, and Korean Words

Japanese words are transcribed in Modified Hepburn, Chinese words are transcribed in pinyin, and Korean words are transcribed in Revised Romanization. Japanese, Chinese, and Korean last names precede given names. Exceptions are made for authors of English-language materials, in which case the Romanization and name order of the original source is adopted. Japanese place names that commonly appear in English are transcribed without macrons. Hence, Tokyo instead of Tōkyō.

Place Names

Place names are often highly contested. In the colonial period, Japanese-language materials presented place names in Korea, Taiwan, and China using Chinese characters, but with Japanese pronunciation guides. Hence, 台北 was rendered as "Taihoku," rather

than “Taibei,” and 元山 was rendered as “Genzan,” rather than “Wonsan.” English-language materials from the period often followed the Japanese reading.

To make this study accessible to readers, place names in China and Taiwan are rendered in Chinese, and place names in Korea are rendered in Korean. For place names that have changed, this study uses the name that would be most familiar to the reader—hence, Seoul rather than Gyeongseong (Jp. *Keijō*; 京城), the capital of colonial Korea.

Place names have also been contested outside of the Japanese Empire. This study uses the English reading of place names in Southeast and South Asia, e.g. Bombay rather than Mumbai. Contemporary place names are provided the first time each name appears.

Ship Names

Ship names present a similar set of challenges. Japanese ships named for places in China, Taiwan, and Korea were, at the time, rendered in Roman letters according to the Japanese pronunciation of Chinese characters. Thus, the N.Y.K.’s 元山丸, named for Wonsan, Korea, was recorded in ship registries as the *Genzan Maru*. The 旅順丸, named for Lüshun, China, was recorded as the *Ryojun Maru*. The Romanized names of ships named for places beyond East Asia, in contrast, were often rendered in English rather than in Japanese pronunciation, even if the Japanese name used Chinese characters. The N.Y.K.’s 錫蘭丸, for example, was rendered as *Ceylon Maru*, rather than *Sēron Maru*, and the さいべりや丸 was rendered as the *Siberia Maru* rather than *Saiberia Maru*.

Since these ship names indicate a spatiality that might otherwise be lost to readers who do not read Japanese, this study follows the same practices with ship names as with place names. Ships named for Chinese, Taiwanese, or Korean places are given in Chinese

or Korean. Hence, the 元山丸 is rendered as *Wonsan Maru* and the 旅順丸 as *Lüshun Maru*. Readers may consult the appendix for a list of ship names rendered in Japanese, Chinese, and Korean.

Ships that shared the same name were numbered. In this study, these numbered ships are referred to with the abbreviation "No." Hence, the 第二阿波国丸 is rendered as the *No. 2 Awanokuni Maru*.

Company Names

The names of Japanese shipping companies were often rendered in English according to Japanese pronunciation. To convey the spatialities of companies named for places or regions, these names are rendered in translation, and Romanized names are provided the first time each company is mentioned. Hence, the 近海郵船株式会社 is referred to as the Near Seas Mail Steamship Company, rather than the Kinkai Yusen Kaisha or *Kinkai yūsen kabushiki gaisha*. Companies named for families are rendered with the family name. Hence, the 山下汽船株式会社 is referred to as the Yamashita Steamship Company (Yamashita is the family name) rather than the Yamashita Kisen Kaisha or *Yamashita kisen kabushiki gaisha*.

However, much like Western companies such as the Peninsular & Oriental Steam Navigation Co. (P. & O.), the abbreviations of two Japanese companies were well known in world shipping: the N.Y.K. (Nippon Yusen Kaisha, *Nippon yūsen kabushiki gaisha*) and the O.S.K. (Osaka Shosen Kaisha, *Ōsaka shōsen kabushiki gaisha*). This study uses these abbreviations to refer to the two companies. Readers may consult the appendix for a list of company names in English, Romanized Japanese, and Japanese characters.

INTRODUCTION

This dissertation argues that Japan's rise as a modern nation-state and imperial power rested on Japanese ships becoming integral components of global transportation. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Japan acquired overseas territories to create an extensive overseas empire, and emerged as a major power in world affairs. By transporting flows of goods and people, commercial ships played a key role in imperial expansion and consolidation. Japanese companies, moreover, extended shipping services in trade routes around the world, often with enthusiastic state and popular support. By tracing such shipping activities, this study sheds light on the ways that national and imperial ambitions inspired efforts to claim a place in the global transportation system.

This dissertation also examines how cross-border connections shaped the course of Japan's oceanic expansion. A central argument is that transnational connections and the flows of ideas made possible by shipping and other infrastructure motivated national efforts to create regional and global linkages. The sense of an increasingly interconnected world—and the circulation of ideas about maritime transport—shaped expectations for shipping and the pursuit of national aspirations at sea. Maritime transport was thus at once constitutive of, and constituted by, transnational flows of people, goods, and ideas.

Connecting Empire

The themes of this dissertation place it in conversation with several bodies of scholarship on the history of empires, transportation, and oceans. Japan's imperial

expansion was made possible by modern transportation technologies. Though the railway features prominently in historiography for advancing Japan's national integration and imperialism,[1] steamships—as well as diesel-powered motor ships developed in the early twentieth century—also played a central role in the making of imperial Japan. Much as Daniel Headrick identified the steamship as a "tool of empire" that stitched together European empires by reducing freight costs and accelerating communication,[2] Japanese empire-building rested on shipping. By carrying troops and supplies, ships projected military power overseas, and as linkages between territories, they facilitated the circulation of people, goods, and information throughout the empire.

The study of shipping thus allows for an examination of the Japanese Empire as a unit, as well as interactions among its components. Past scholarship, in contrast, has often focused on individual territories,[3] or the significance of imperial expansion for the metropole.[4] Economic historians have traced intra-imperial trade to examine the

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[1] Carol Gluck, *Japan's Modern Myths: Ideology in the Late Meiji Period* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985), 101. For a study of the South Manchuria Railway, a classic case of Japanese railway imperialism, see Yoshihisa Tak Matsusaka, *The Making of Japanese Manchuria, 1904–1932* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 2001).

[2] Daniel R. Headrick, *The Tools of Empire: Technology and European Imperialism in the Nineteenth Century* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981), 130, 165–76. For a similar perspective on the significance of "linkage systems" for the British Empire, see A.J. Christopher, *The British Empire at its Zenith* (London: Croom Helm, 1988), 45–71.

[3] For example, essays in the classic, three-volume study of the colonial, informal, and wartime dimensions of Japan's empire compare multiple colonies, but seldom address direct connections between territories. Ramon H. Myers and Mark R. Peattie, eds., *The Japanese Colonial Empire, 1895–1945* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984). Peter Duus, Ramon H. Myers, and Mark R. Peattie, eds., *The Japanese Informal Empire in China, 1895–1937* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989). Peter Duus, Ramon H. Myers, and Mark R. Peattie, eds., *The Japanese Wartime Empire, 1931–1945* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996).

[4] For an argument regarding the significance of empire for modern Japan, see Andre Schmid, "Colonialism and the 'Korea Problem' in the Historiography of Modern Japan: A Review Article," *The Journal of Asian Studies* 59, no. 4 (November 2000): 951–76. See also Louise Young, *Japan's Total Empire* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998). Stefan Tanaka, *Japan's Orient: Rendering Pasts into History* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993).

integration of the empire as an economic unit, but have been less attentive to the contours of the system of transportation that carried that trade.[5] Recent scholarship, however, has begun to examine intra-imperial dynamics beyond metropole-colony pairings. Scholars have examined how Taiwanese and Korean subjects expanded Japanese influence in China and Southeast Asia,[6] as well as competition between Japanese settler communities that sought to secure the centrality of their colonies in imperial projects.[7] Daqing Yang, moreover, has shown how Japanese officials sought to utilize telecommunications, an additional "tool" or "technology of empire," to expand the empire and bind its parts together. Like Yang, this dissertation attempts to bring a "systemic perspective to the study of Japanese empire"[8] by examining efforts to foster intra-imperial movements of goods and people through the development of lines of maritime transport.

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[5] For example, Hori Kazuo, *Higashi Ajia shihonshugi shiron*, vol. 1, *Keisei / kōzō / tenkai* (Tōkyō: Minerva shobō, 2009). Idem, "The Formation of Capitalism in East Asia," in *Economic Activities Under the Japanese Colonial Empire*, ed. Minoru Sawai (Spring, 2016), 11–49. Some scholarship, such as studies of colonial trade in Taiwan by Lin Man-houng, addresses the significance of shipping, but devotes less attention to the process whereby the services were developed. Lin Man-houng, "Taiwan yu Dongbei-jian de maoyi (1932–1941)," *Zhongyang yanjiuyuan jindaishi yanjiusuo jikan* 24, no. 2 (1995): 653–96.

[6] Seiji Shirane, "Mediated Empire: Colonial Taiwan in Japan's Imperial Expansion in South China and Southeast Asia, 1895–1945" (Ph.D. diss., Princeton University, 2014). Man-houng Lin, "Taiwanese Merchants in the Economic Relations between Taiwan and China, 1895–1937," in *Japan, China, and the Growth of the Asian International Economy, 1850–1949*, ed. Kaoru Sugihara (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 217–43. Barbara J. Brooks, "Peopling the Japanese Empire: The Koreans in Manchuria and the Rhetoric of Inclusion," in *Japan's Competing Modernities*, ed. Sharon A. Minichiello (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 1998), 25–44. Mariko Asano Tamanoi, "Knowledge, Power, and Racial Classification: The 'Japanese' in 'Manchuria,'" *The Journal of Asian Studies* 59, no. 2 (May 2000): 248–76.

[7] Emer O'Dwyer, for example, has highlighted competition between Japanese communities in the Kwantung Leased Territory and those in Korea, which jockeyed for position within the imperial community. Emer O'Dwyer, *Significant Soil: Settler Colonialism and Japan's Urban Empire in Manchuria* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 2015).

[8] Daqing Yang, *Technology of Empire: Telecommunications and Japanese Expansion in Asia, 1883–1945* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 2010), 10.

By examining intra-imperial shipping, this study reveals the significance of lateral linkages between overseas territories in Japan's imperial project. In a study of the relationship between shipping and imperialism from the 1850s to the 1910s, Kokaze Hidemasa demonstrated that Japanese shipping services oriented the Taiwanese and Korean economies toward the metropole, and served as conduits for Japan's "economic advance" (*keizai shinshutsu*) in the Yangzi River valley.[9] Studies of shipping policy in Taiwan, meanwhile, have shown how the Government-General of Taiwan supported lines of transport to other colonies.[10] An empire-wide perspective, however, further reveals how officials, business leaders, and boosters from across the empire negotiated and competed to foster new patterns of trade and travel. In addition to links between overseas territories and Japan, they also sought to create lateral linkages between imperial possessions. Likewise, the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere (*Dai Tōa kyōeiken*) was imagined in the 1940s in terms of lateral connections, and the military's occupation of Southeast Asia depended on movements of goods and people between occupied territories. Imperial expansion not only bound territories to Japan, it spurred the establishment of new linkages that created a fluidly interconnected empire.

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[9] Kokaze Hidemasa, *Teikokushugi-ka no Nihon kaiun: Kokusai kyōsō to taigai jiritsu* (Tōkyō: Yamakawa shuppansha, 1995), 283. For the significance of colonial shipping policy for the development of Japanese shipping firms, see Katayama Kunio, *Kindai Nihon kaiun to Ajia* (Tōkyō: Ochanomizu shobō, 1996), 211–50.

[10] Dai Baocun, *Jindai Taiwan haiyun fazhan: Rongkechuan dao Changrong jubo* (Taibei: Yushanshe, 2000). You Zhisheng, "Taiwan zongdufu haiyun zhengce zhi yanjiu (1895–1945)" (Ph.D. diss., National Chengchi University, 2015). Lin, "Taiwan yu Dongbei-jian de maoyi (1932–1941)," 653–96. Many thanks to You Zhisheng for kindly sharing his dissertation.

Oceanic Expansion

At the same time that shipping facilitated the integration of imperial territories, it also made possible additional trajectories of expansion. The geography of Japanese shipping rapidly exceeded the scope of Japan's territorial expansion. In the 1890s, as Japan acquired Taiwan, its first colony, and sought to consolidate its influence in Korea, shipping companies opened liner services to India, Europe, Australia, and North America. In the decades that followed, they extended lines to South America, the Atlantic coast of the Americas, Africa, and the Persian Gulf. Many of these services were supported by the state, which sought to foster transoceanic linkages deemed critical to the nation. Ambitions for expansion carried the Japanese flag far beyond the colonial empire emerging in East Asia.

By examining these trajectories of Japanese shipping, this dissertation joins a growing body of scholarship that has begun to evaluate the oceanic dimensions of the Japanese Empire. William Tsutsui has argued that Japanese efforts to dominate offshore fisheries represented the making of a "pelagic empire"—an empire of the open sea that expanded from the late nineteenth century until the outbreak of the Pacific War in 1941. While studies of imperialism have long been centered around land, Tsutsui argues that Japan's exploitation of oceans was motivated by the same political and economic concerns that drove terrestrial expansion, and was "pursued under an ideological banner…fully consistent with the logic and language of Japanese imperialism."[11] Jun

[11] Tsutsui observes that Hobson and Lenin's "time-honored theories of imperialism" have a "fundamentally terrestrial nature." William M. Tsutsui, "The Pelagic Empire: Reconsidering Japanese Expansion," in *Japan at Nature's Edge: The Environmental Context of a Global Power*, ed. Ian Jared Miller, Julia Adeney Thomas, and Brett L. Walker (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2013), 22, 28.

Uchida has similarly traced the place of oceans in imperial imaginations in the 1880s and 1890s, when Japanese imperialists outlined visions for an "oceanic empire" comprising networks of shipping, migration, and trade.[12]

The present study demonstrates that, as in the case of offshore fisheries, Japanese efforts to claim a place in world shipping were framed in terms of many of the same insecurities, imperial rivalries, and ambitions that shaped Japanese empire-building on land. Advocates for shipping expansion emphasized the paucity of Japan's natural resources to assert that economic security depended on maintaining a commercial fleet capable of carrying the nation's foreign trade. In commercial publications, government reports, and other media, world shipping was depicted as an arena of intense competition between nations. Though geographer Philip Steinberg has argued that the popular imagination under industrial capitalism considered ocean-space to lie beyond the scope of "state territoriality,"[13] Japan's maritime leaders and boosters often represented shipping routes as spaces that could be occupied by nations through the commercial activities of ships flying national flags. Claiming a place in shipping routes—what Steinberg might call an exploitation of the "resource of connection"—was discussed in terms of an expansion of the nation's "navigation power" (*kōken*).[14] National fleets and the scope of

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[12] Jun Uchida, "From Island Nation to Oceanic Empire: A Vision of Japanese Expansion from the Periphery," *The Journal of Japanese Studies* 22, no. 1 (Winter 2016): 57–90.

[13] Steinberg suggests that this view of ocean-space was typical under industrial capitalism, whereas, in contrast, "the mercantilist era was characterized by a spatiality that revolved around control over channeled routes of circulation." Philip Steinberg, *The Social Construction of the Ocean* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 110, 113.

[14] For example, in an overview of a "national shipping policy" (*kaiun kokusaku*) developed in 1936 and 1937 (see chapter 5), the Communications Ministry wrote that Japanese shipping was "gradually advancing on the strongholds of the advanced maritime nations, and pushing forward to develop our navigation power." Reprinted in Shadan hōjin senpaku kaizen kyōkai, ed., *Shadan hōjin senpaku kaizen kyōkai jigyōshi* (Tōkyō: Shadan hōjin senpaku kaizen kyōkai, 1943), 160.

their services were also matters of prestige. Officials, businessmen, and intellectuals ranked national fleets by size, celebrated Japan's rise to become the world's third-largest shipping power after WWI, and heaped praise on vessels that carried the nation's flag to distant ports.

Many in the maritime world also expressed ambitions to make Japan into a global, commercial power through shipping expansion. Though overseas shipping was primarily framed in relation to Japan's foreign trade, a number of businessmen, bureaucrats, and intellectuals also called for Japan's ships to earn foreign exchange by assuming a role in the circulation of people and goods between foreign countries. The export of shipping services was an important dimension of British commercial power, and, as the preeminent maritime power of the day, the British Empire was often invoked as a model for Japan. In a study of the British Empire as a "world-system," John Darwin has observed that an important component of British power was its "deep-sea merchant marine, much of it serving non-British customers, but earning a huge income remitted to its owners at home."[15] From as early as the 1890s, and with particular intensity in the 1930s, Japan's maritime leaders similarly sought to strengthen the nation through the creation of an empire that combined overseas territories in Asia and a shipping apparatus with a global reach.

While Japanese shipping expansion was often framed by contemporaries as a challenge to the British Empire and other Western powers, Japan's shipping services also draw attention to entanglements between empires. William Wray, who produced the most

[15] According to Darwin, Britain's possessions represented one part of a "larger conglomerate" that also included a "commercial republic." The "jewel in the crown of this empire of commerce" was the merchant marine. John Darwin, *The Empire Project: The Rise and Fall of the British World-System, 1830–1970* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 10.

significant body of English-language scholarship on Japanese shipping,[16] has argued that a "closer examination of the overseas expansion of Japanese shipping suggests that there was usually some foreign component in its networks."[17] According to Wray, such connections were evident in "transnational strategic alliances (legitimately termed networks if they had sufficient longevity)" between Japanese firms and foreigners. Examining the activities of the N.Y.K. (*Nippon yūsen kabushiki gaisha*), Wray pointed out that in overseas ports the firm relied on foreign (often British) agents for freight solicitation and other services.[18] Another area in which such alliances were evident was the shipping conference: an organization, or cartel, that set freight rates and worked to limit competition from non-member firms.[19] These conferences emerged in the 1870s and 1880s, and dominated international shipping by the end of the century. Though Japan's shipping firms fought to join and expand their position within these conferences, once

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[16] Wray's research centered on the business strategies of the N.Y.K. See William D. Wray, *Mitsubishi and the N.Y.K., 1870-1914: Business Strategy in the Japanese Shipping Industry* (Cambridge, MA: Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard University, 1984). Several Japanese scholars have published essays in English that provide overviews of their more extensive Japanese-language scholarship. See Tsunehiko Yui and Keiichiro Nakagawa, eds., *Business History of Shipping: Strategy and Structure* (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1985). Chida Tomohei, a specialist on Japanese shipping, and Peter Davies, a specialist on British shipping, have also coauthored a volume on Japanese shipping. Chida Tomohei and Peter N. Davies, *The Japanese Shipping and Shipbuilding Industries: A History of Their Modern Growth* (London: Athlone Press, 1990).

[17] William D. Wray, "National Alliances and Global Webs: The Internationalization of Japanese Shipping," in *The Internationalization of the Sea Transport Industries since 1850*, ed. David J. Starkey and Gelina Harlaftis (Oxford: Liverpool University Press, 1998), 91.

[18] William D. Wray, "Nodes in the Global Webs of Japanese Shipping," *Business History* 47, no. 1 (January 2005): 1–22.

[19] In a study of shipping regimes, Alan Cafruny defines a conference as "any type of formal or informal agreement between shipowners that restricts competition." He further observers, "At a minimum, conferences fix freight rates on particular trade routes." See Alan Cafruny, *Ruling the Waves: The Political Economy of International Shipping* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987), 53–54. For a study of conferences, see B.M. Deakin and T. Seward, *Shipping Conferences: A Study of their Origins, Development and Economic Practices* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973).

they became members their interests were aligned with the conferences, and Wray has highlighted several cases in which Japanese conference members acted to impede other Japanese firms from entering conference routes.[20] While Wray has focused on the significance of such alliances in the business strategies of the N.Y.K., this dissertation examines tensions that emerged between ambitions to promote a national shipping industry and the transnational dimensions of maritime business.

An examination of Japanese shipping, moreover, reveals new geographies of imperial expansion, entanglement, and competition. Recent discussion of oceans and Japan's empire has largely centered on the Pacific.[21] Uchida, for example, has emphasized the utility of the concept "Pacific empire" for understanding Japan as an empire that "had multiple vectors—continental, maritime, as well as transpacific—and involved a variety of processes, from trade and shipping to migration and settlement, in which imperialism was but one strategy."[22] Likewise, even in a recent work of global history, an essay addressing the "interdependence between empire building and communication in the emergence of an increasingly integrated global order" situates

[20] Wray, "National Alliances and Global Webs," 95–96. Idem, "The 'Mitsui Fight,' 1953–1956: Japan & The Far Eastern Freight Conference," in *Shipping and Trade, 1750–1950: Essays in International Maritime Economic History*, ed. Lewis R. Fischer and Helge W. Nordvik (Pontefract, West Yorkshire: Lofthouse Publications, 1990), 213–34. Idem, "NYK and the Commercial Diplomacy of the Far Eastern Freight Conference, 1896–1956," in *Business History of Shipping: Strategy and Structure*, ed. Tsunehiko Yui and Keiichiro Nakagawa (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1985), 289–91.

[21] As described by Tsutsui, at its height, Japan's domination of fisheries was largely a Pacific affair: "On the eve of Pearl Harbor, Japan's pelagic empire stretched from the Bering Sea to the Antarctic and along the coastlines of virtually every Asian country, from the pearl beds off of Darwin, Australia, to the trawling grounds of the Gulf of California." Tsutsui, "The Pelagic Empire," 31.

[22] Jun Uchida, "'Pacific Empire' as a Useful Analytical Category," *Amerasia Journal* 42, no. 3 (2016): 28.

Japan's imperial order squarely in the Pacific.[23] As described above, however, Pacific shipping routes represented only one trajectory for Japanese ships, which navigated across ocean boundaries that, at best, were only nebulous constructions. In the interwar period, for example, some of the fiercest Anglo-Japanese shipping competition played out on routes between India and East Asia (China and Japan). British shipping interests not only grew alarmed over Japan's growing share of the India-East Asia traffic, but also increased competition for traffic within the Indian Ocean, such as between Colombo and Bombay (present-day Mumbai).[24]

Japanese shipping companies also developed many ocean services by linking together flows of trade and migration across multiple ocean spaces. In 1916, for example, the O.S.K. (*Ōsaka shōsen kabushiki gaisha*) established a line to Brazil and Argentina. Outbound ships sailed west from Japan, and called at Singapore, Colombo, and South African ports before crossing the Atlantic Ocean. In 1918, the firm routed return sailings through the Panama Canal: ships first called at New Orleans, then at ports in California, before sailing across the Pacific Ocean to Japan. Ships assigned to the line carried Japanese migrants bound for Brazil, and, by the 1930s, Japanese cotton textiles made up the most important outbound cargo. En route, they also collected Indian jute exported to South America.[25] On return voyages, they carried Brazilian coffee to the Pacific Coast of

[23] Much like the historiography on Japan referenced above, the essay also emphasizes the significance of the railway, and provides an overview of Japanese empire-building in a section entitled "Japan's Railway Imperialism." Tony Ballantyne and Antoinette Burton, "Empires and the Reach of the Global," in *A World Connecting 1870–1945*, ed. Emily Rosenberg (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2012), 366–73.

[24] Imperial Shipping Committee, *British Shipping in the Orient* (London: H.M. Stationery Office, 1939), 35.

[25] References to jute cargoes can be found in O.S.K. business reports. See, for example, *OSK EH* 1926-1 (1926), 2. *OSK EH* 1926-2 (1927), 2. *OSK EH* 1927-1 (1927). *OSK EH* 1927-2 (1928), 2.

the U.S., and in American ports loaded raw cotton bound for Japan.[26] The O.S.K. thereby assembled multiple flows of trade and migration, each with a different trajectory, into a single service. Many of Japan's companies similarly combined such flows to develop services with spatialities that transcended any single ocean or maritime space.[27]

Global Linkages

While this dissertation centers on the shipping industry of a single nation, it adopts a transnational approach to argue that competition among nation-states extended beyond shorelines to the global transportation infrastructure. Recent years have seen the emergence of a growing body of scholarship in transnational history and global history.[28] Representative works have traced movements of goods, ideas, and people across national and regional borders to explain historical developments at a variety of scales, from the local to the global.[29]

Steamships and other transportation technologies played key roles in such movements. By reducing freight costs, steamships, canals, and railroads created a global

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[26] This account of the service is based on *OSK 50-nenshi*, 323–332. *OSK 80-nenshi*, 335–357.

[27] My understanding of concepts such as spatialities, flows, and vehicles is based in large part on the work of David Ambaras and Kate McDonald. Idem, "What We're Doing," in *Bodies and Structures: Deep-Mapping Modern East Asian History*, ed. David R. Ambaras and Kate McDonald (2019). https://schalar.chass.ncsu.edu/bodies-and-structures/what-were-doing.

[28] Transnational history and global history share common features. Both aim to examine processes and connections across borders, particularly national "containers." Sebastian Conrad, however, has proposed a distinction between the two: whereas "global structures" often lie in the background of transnational histories, he argues that global histories focus attention on "global integration, or structured transformations on a global level." Sebastian Conrad, *What is Global History?* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2016), 62.

[29] Sven Beckert, *Empire of Cotton: A Global History* (New York: Vintage Books, 2015). Sebastian Conrad and Dominic Sachsenmaier, eds., *Competing Visions of World Order: Global Moments and Movements, 1880s–1930s* (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007).

economy,[30] which was evident in soaring volumes of world trade and convergences in commodity prices in the late nineteenth century.[31] At the same time, communications and transportation technologies transformed experiences of space and time.[32] In David Harvey's words, the world appeared to "shrink" due to "time-space compression"—the "annihilation of space through time."[33] Moreover, as Sebastian Conrad has argued, the end of the nineteenth century saw the development of an "*awareness* that the world was an interlinked place" (author's emphasis).[34]

Systems of transportation and communications have thus often appeared in the background of global and transnational histories, as the preconditions for cross-border (and cross–ocean) movements that had local and global effects. Christopher Hill's study of national-history writing in mid-nineteenth-century Japan, France, and the United States exemplifies this approach. Hill's work has been praised for delineating how transnational processes and connections shaped national-history writing across the three countries.[35] In his introduction, Hill observes, "The advances in communications technology and the

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[30] The opening of the Suez Canal made it possible for steamships to replace sailing ships in the Far Eastern trade. It shortened the distance, and created a route with more convenient coaling stations than the Cape route. It was, moreover, difficult for sailing ships to pass through the canal and navigate the Red Sea. Max E. Fletcher, "The Suez Canal and World Shipping, 1869–1914," *The Journal of Economic History* 18, no. 4 (December 1958): 557–73.

[31] Daniel R. Headrick, *The Tentacles of Progress: Technology Transfer in the Age of Imperialism, 1850–1940* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), 18–48. Kevin H. O'Rourke and Jeffrey G. Williamson, *Globalization and History: The Evolution of a Nineteenth-Century Atlantic Economy* (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1999), 29–55. E.J. Hobsbawm, *The Age of Capital, 1848–1875* (London: Abacus, 1995 [1975]), 49.

[32] Stephen Kern, *The Culture of Time and Space, 1880–1918* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1983).

[33] David Harvey, *The Condition of Postmodernity* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989), 240–42.

[34] Sebastian Conrad, *Globalisation and the Nation in Imperial Germany*, trans. Sorcha O'Hagan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 50.

[35] Sheldon Garon, "Transnational History and Japan's 'Comparative Advantage,'" *The Journal of Japanese Studies* 43, no. 1 (Winter 2017): 72–73. Conrad, *What is Global History?*, 10, 151–53.

trade infrastructure commonly referred to as the 'communications revolution' also propelled changes in economic and political space in the nineteenth century."[36] According to Hill, these changes played a role in generating common practices of history writing that carved out nations in time and space. Other works of global or transnational history often begin with similar references to developments in communications and transportation.[37] The focus of these works, however, has been the flows of people, goods, and ideas conveyed by these technologies, and the political, economic, or cultural consequences of such movements.

This dissertation, in contrast, foregrounds maritime linkages as its objects of study. As maritime historian Michael Miller has observed, "movements [of commodities and people], more presumed than delineated by historians, did not just happen. Rather, they resulted because businessmen constructed a maritime world to organize, coordinate, and process them."[38] While Miller has focused on European businessmen, this study examines Japanese efforts to create a transport apparatus capable of carrying, and fostering, flows of people, goods, and information.

This study, moreover, argues that such efforts were embedded within the transnational flows and connections made possible by shipping. Studies in maritime

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[36] Christopher Hill, *National History and the World of Nations: Capital, State, and the Rhetoric of History in Japan, France, and the United States* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2008), 9.

[37] For example, Conrad writes, "The rapid development of transport and communication technologies was one of the basic conditions that made possible the interlinking of people, goods, and ideas." Conrad, *Globalisation and the Nation in Imperial Germany*, 34. Kevin O'Rourke and Jeffrey G. Williamson devote a chapter of their study of price convergences to "the spectacular transport revolution that took place across the nineteenth century and generated an equally spectacular convergence in commodity prices." O'Rourke and Williamson, *Globalization and History*, 3.

[38] Michael B. Miller, "The Business Trip: Maritime Networks in the Twentieth Century," *Business History Review* 77, no. 1 (Spring 2003): 2.

economic history have often addressed international contexts when examining the development of a national shipping industry, but primarily in terms of fluctuations in international markets for shipping services.[39] Though there is a rich tradition of comparative maritime history,[40] less attention has been devoted to the ways that connections across national shipping industries shaped approaches to maritime transport. As will be seen in this dissertation, however, efforts to improve a nation's place in world shipping were marked by the relentless accumulation of information about shipping and the state's role in shipping in other countries. Businessmen, bureaucrats, and intellectuals involved in Japanese shipping traveled the world and were keen observers of maritime affairs. They consumed and produced information and ideas about shipping that circulated across national borders. Their perception of world trends in shipping and transportation informed their visions for maritime expansion, and the measures they

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[39] Maritime historian Stig Tenold, for example, introduces a recent study of the Norwegian shipping industry with the comment that "It is difficult to explain the development of Norwegian shipping without paying close attention to the underlying basis: the international economy, with its ebbs and flows and with the associated fluctuations in shipping demand and supply." Stig Tenold, *Norwegian Shipping in the 20th Century: Norway's Successful Navigation of the World's Most Global Industry* (Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019), 4. In his classic study of the twentieth-century decline of British shipping, S.G. Sturmey evaluated methods of shipping assistance in thirty countries in the interwar period, and their impact on British shipping, but did not discuss how British contemporaries discussed or depicted such assistance. S. G. Sturmey, *British Shipping and World Competition* (London: The Athlone Press, 1962), 98–137.

[40] Scholarship on Japanese shipping has often included a comparative dimension. Numerous edited volumes, often based on international conferences and workshops, also attest to a long tradition of comparative scholarship. For example: Lewis R. Fischer and Helge W. Nordwick, eds., *Shipping and Trade, 1750–1950: Essays in International Maritime Economic History* (Pontefract, West Yorkshire: Lofthouse Publications, 1990). Lewis R. Fischer and Even Lange, eds., *International Merchant Shipping in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries: The Comparative Dimension* (St. John's, Newfoundland: International Maritime Economic History Association, 2008). Gelina Harlaftis, Stig Tenold, and Jesús M. Valdaliso, *The World's Key Industry: History and Economics of International Shipping* (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012). For comparative perspectives on Japanese shipping, see Nakagawa Keiichirō, *Ryōtaisen-kan no Nihon kaiungyō: Fukyō-ka no kutō to yakushin* (Tōkyō: Nihon keizai shinbunsha, 1980), 11–45. Wray, *Mitsubishi and the N.Y.K.*, 491–504. Yui and Nakagawa, eds., *Business History of Shipping*.

adopted to promote shipping. Other maritime powers, in turn, observed developments in Japanese shipping, and acted to advance their own fleets based on such assessments.

With this in mind, a central argument of this dissertation is, therefore, that global connections shaped national efforts and ambitions to claim a place in the making of those connections. Much as Conrad has argued that the discourses and mechanisms of nation-states were shaped by transnational processes,[41] this dissertation argues that relationships between nation-states and transportation systems were conditioned by transnational flows of ideas and perceptions of an interconnected world. Such processes motivated efforts by nation-states to claim portions of the global transportation infrastructure. Whereas nations have often been framed in terms of border making,[42] this study shows that nationalism also drove efforts to create global linkages.

Sources

This dissertation relies on a range of sources to examine developments in Japanese shipping. Most major shipping companies published official histories (*shashi*), and many also produced guides to shipping routes (*kōro annai*) and other marketing materials.[43] These histories and guides detail the companies' shipping services and ships,

[41] Sebastian Conrad, "Globalization effects: mobility and nation in Imperial Germany, 1880–1914," *Journal of Global History* 3, no. 1, (March 2008): 43–66. Idem, *Globalisation and the Nation*.

[42] Harold James, for example, writes of the nation-state as a reaction to globalization, and one that, in the interwar period, "became increasingly an impediment to integration." Adam McKeown, however, has argued that even efforts to create borders must be understood as "the product and vehicles for global interaction." Harold James, *The End of Globalization: Lessons from the Great Depression* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001), 198. Adam McKeown, *Melancholy Order: Asian Migration and the Globalization of Borders* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008), 6.

[43] Matsuura Akira has published detailed studies of such shipping route guides. As Yoshida Masumi has pointed out, however, the services are not situated in larger contexts, such as Japan's

and present historical narratives that situate companies within Japan's modernization, economic development, and overseas expansion. As such, they offer insights into the ways that managers chose to represent their companies at various historical moments.[44] Official histories published before World War II, moreover, often reproduce petitions, texts of speeches, and other materials that would be otherwise unavailable.

Coverage of maritime affairs in newspapers and trade journals, both in Japan and elsewhere, makes it possible to trace debates and negotiations over shipping policies and shipping services. Opinion pieces and interviews with shipowners, managers, bureaucrats, ministers, and others also make it possible to examine discourses that placed Japanese ships in global trade and commerce. Digital newspaper collections, such as the Kobe University Library's Newspaper Clippings Collection (http://www.lib.kobe-u.ac.jp/inbun/), greatly facilitate the accumulation of information about individuals and companies across multiple newspapers.

Histories and overviews of shipping published in the prewar period similarly include details on shipping companies, shipyards, maritime administration, and other aspects of maritime affairs, as well as prescriptive statements for the future of shipping. Memoirs by managers, bureaucrats, and others involved in shipping, as well as collections of "reminiscences" (*tsuisō*) regarding such figures, offer inside accounts of key historical developments as well as reflections about prominent figures involved in

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foreign relations or imperial expansion. Matsuura Akira, *Kisen no jidai to kōro annai* (Ōsaka: Seibundō shuppan kabushiki kaisha, 2017). Yoshida Masumi, "Matsuura Akira cho *Kisen no jidai to kōro annai*," *Shigaku zasshi* 126, no. 9 (2017): 101–102.

[44] Christopher Gerteis, for example, observes that prewar "NYK official histories and marketing propaganda clearly and proudly documented the company's exploits as an integral member of the imperial era military-industrial complex." Christopher Gerteis, "Marketing History as Social Responsibility," in *Japan since 1945: From Postwar to Post-Bubble*, ed. Christopher Gerteis and Timothy S. George (London: Bloomsbury, 2013), 225.

maritime affairs. They also provide a window, though one refracted through memory, into business trips, business meetings and networking, banquets, and other affairs that have left less of an imprint on the archival record.

Reports and other materials produced by branches of the Japanese government offer details not only on government policies, but also the business activities of Japanese companies. The Mercantile Marine Bureau (*Kansenkyoku*) in the Communications Ministry (*Teishinshō*) was responsible for handling maritime affairs, and its reports can be found scattered across university and municipal archives, and in the National Diet Library. The Foreign Ministry (*Gaimushō*) collected information on the overseas activities of Japanese and foreign shipping companies. The Japan Center for Asian Historical Records has made these records, as well as records produced by the Army and Navy, available on its website (http://www.jacar.go.jp). Colonial governments-general also produced reports about shipping. The Government-General of Taiwan (*Taiwan sōtokufu*) produced a particularly large body of materials related to shipping, which are held in the National Taiwan Library (*Guoli Taiwan tushuguan*).

The transnational perspective of this study has required research in multiple archives. Materials in the British National Archives and the U.S. National Archives and Records Administration provide perspectives on how British and American officials, business leaders, and others viewed and responded to Japanese shipping activities.

Chapter Outline

The first chapter examines the making of the Japanese fleet from the mid-nineteenth to the early twentieth century. It argues that the development of the fleet rested

on a flexible approach to nationalism that prioritized the development of shipping services under the Japanese flag and Japanese management, but permitted imports of many factors of production, particularly ships and skilled labor. The chapter concludes by demonstrating that the mobilization of commercial ships during the wars of the Meiji period (1868–1912) relied on this flexibility, as officials and shipowners imported and chartered foreign ships to supplement national shipping capacity.

The second chapter traces the development of Japanese ocean shipping between the 1890s and World War I. It begins by examining debates on "shipping line expansion" (*kōro kakuchō*) to show how intellectuals, businessmen, and politicians envisioned the place of Japanese ships in the global transportation industry. It then demonstrates how processes of observation and emulation shaped discussion of shipping subsidies in Japan and the U.S. After examining public relations campaigns that sought to generate support for maritime affairs, the chapter concludes by demonstrating the significance of third-country trade (trade between countries other than Japan) for Japan's ocean services.

The third chapter demonstrates that Japan, though often viewed as peripheral to World War I, was directly involved in commercial conflicts that paralleled military hostilities. It shows that Japanese officials and industrialists confronted the tonnage shortages that afflicted countries worldwide, and instituted wartime shipping controls based on observations of wartime policies adopted overseas. It concludes by examining how businessmen and bureaucrats sought to preserve Japan's wartime gains in light of developments in British and American shipping.

The fourth chapter examines how shipping companies, officials, and business leaders across Japan's empire shaped intra-imperial shipping. As a case study, it centers

on shipping in Dalian (Jp. Dairen), a port on China's Liaodong Peninsula administered by Japan from 1905 until 1945. While Dalian is best known for its role in Japanese railway imperialism, the chapter shows how Japanese authorities and business communities in Japan, China, Taiwan, and Korea endeavored to integrate the port into shipping services to foster new patterns of intra-imperial circulation.

The fifth chapter examines two, linked visions of overseas shipping in interwar and wartime Japan. From the early 1920s until the early 1940s, managers of shipping companies and maritime authorities often called for Japanese ships to expand beyond "Japan-centered" shipping and to play an expanded role in the circulation of third-country trade. After Japanese leaders embarked on a war with China in 1937, such visions of global shipping power were linked to territorial expansion, as a means of generating foreign exchange desperately needed to purchase raw materials required by the war economy. After the outbreak of the Pacific War in 1941, however, visions of shipping beyond Japan were reoriented around the development of linkages among occupied territories across Asia. This chapter concludes with an overview of the collapse of Japan's shipping apparatus during the Pacific War, until Japan's surrender in 1945.

A Note on Shipping Terms

A number of terms common in the shipping world, including some unique to Japan's industry, may be unfamiliar to readers, and warrant a brief summary here.

Liner shipping and tramp shipping. Between the mid-nineteenth and the mid-twentieth century, it was common to distinguish between two types of shipping, liner and

tramp.[45] Liners (*teikisen*) provided services on a published schedule along a fixed route. They included cargo liners, combination freight-passenger liners, and passenger liners. Tramps (*futeikisen*) did not follow a fixed schedule, but instead sought out cargoes wherever available. They typically carried full shiploads of bulk commodities, such as grains, ores, lumber, soybeans, and coal.[46] One Japanese description of tramp shipping described it as follows: "Like nomadic people chasing pastures and drifting across the continent, they travel the seven great oceans, chasing cargoes from one port to another, migratory birds irregularly crossing the sea—this is the tramper."[47]

Shasen and shagaisen. In prewar Japan, it was common to distinguish between "shasen" (company ships) and "shagaisen" (outsider ships). When the terms came into use in the 1890s, "shasen" indicated the N.Y.K., O.S.K., and Oriental Steamship Company (*Tōyō kisen kabushiki gaisha*)—large, subsidized liner companies. Shagaisen referred to most other companies, which were small-scale shipowners who engaged in tramp shipping without direct government assistance.[48] The term "shagaisen" continued to indicate firms other than the above three, even as shagaisen owners developed joint-stock companies, received subsidies, and operated liner services.[49] Since these terms were ubiquitous in Japanese discussions of maritime affairs, they have been left untranslated.

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[45] Martin Stopford has distinguished between three market segments in shipping from the mid-nineteenth to the mid-twentieth century: passenger liners, cargo liners, and tramp shipping. Around 1950, this was replaced by a system of bulk shipping, specialized shipping, container shipping, and air freight. Martin Stopford, *Maritime Economics*, third edition (Oxon: Routledge, 2009 [1988]), 28, 34–43.

[46] See, for example, Erich W. Zimmerman, *Zimmerman on Ocean Shipping* (New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1921), 277.

[47] Okazaki Yukitoshi, *Kaiun,* revised ed. (Tōkyō: Diamond sha, 1941 [1938]), 150.

[48] Kōbe kaiungyō kumiai, ed. *Kōbe kaiun gojūnenshi* (Kōbe: Kōbe kaiungyō kumiai, 1923), 79.

[49] For a discussion of the terms, see Nakagawa, *Ryōtaisen-kan no Nihon kaiungyō*, 4.

CHAPTER 1. MAKING JAPANESE SHIPS, 1868–1911

In the spring of 1896, the N.Y.K. (Nippon Yusen Kaisha, *Nippon yūsen kabushiki gaisha*) inaugurated a liner service from Japan to Europe, the first on the route operated by a Japanese company. The first ship to sail on the route, the 5,402-ton *Tosa Maru*, departed Kobe on March 15 and arrived in Antwerp sixty-eight days later, calling at ports en route that included Hong Kong, Singapore, Bombay (present-day Mumbai), and London.[1] In advance of its departure, the company invited "high-ranking gentlemen," both Japanese and foreign, to attend a celebratory banquet aboard the ship while it was moored in Yokohama. As described in the *Asahi Shinbun*, on the day of the occasion, "all of the N.Y.K. ships in the port of Yokohama were decked out in flags, an arch had been erected at the wharf's entrance, and the *Tosa Maru* and the *Weihai Maru* were docked to the right and left of the jetty." In the afternoon, N.Y.K. President Kondō Renpei spoke to the assembled crowd, and remarked: "Thinking on it, after the founding of the N.Y.K. more than twenty years ago…at first we only navigated the coastal waters of Japan [*naichi*], but now, under the Empire's flag, we come and go from Europe's various ports, which is a great advance for our nation's shipping."[2]

As great an advance as it may have been, the ship that first carried the empire's flag to Europe was not of Japanese origin, but was instead a foreign transplant. Originally named the *Islam*, the *Tosa Maru* was built in Belfast in 1892 and imported by the N.Y.K.

[1] The route was Yokohama-Kobe-Moji (if necessary)-Hong Kong-Singapore-Penang-Colombo-Tuticorin (present-day Thoothukudi)-Bombay-Aden-Port Said-London-Antwerp. *NYK TG*, dai-114-kai (February 19, 1896) in *NYK 100-nenshi shiryō*, 464.

[2] "*Tosa Maru* Ōshū kaikō shukuen," *Asahi shinbun*, March 19, 1896, 2.

in 1894. Likewise, the 3,225-ton *Izumi Maru*, the second vessel to sail on the Europe line, was built in Newcastle,[3] and the N.Y.K. board of directors planned to eventually employ six, 6,000-ton ships on the line, five ordered from British yards, and one from the Mitsubishi Nagasaki Shipyard.[4] Until the new ships were ready, the company would charter foreign ships to sail to and from Europe along with the two N.Y.K.-owned ships.[5] The foreign origins of the *Tosa Maru*, the *Izumi Maru*, and the chartered vessels did not, however, diminish the national significance of the firm's expanded reach, and almost a year after the opening of the line, London's *Financial Times* observed that the N.Y.K. was "a Japanese institution that is making its way rapidly in the East, and much of the spirit and energy of Young Japan finds expression in its worldwide operations."[6]

That the foreign-built *Tosa Maru* could represent Japan's advance into world shipping is suggestive of the malleability of ship nationalities. The role of imported and chartered ships in one of the N.Y.K.'s crowning achievements is also representative of broader patterns of Japanese engagement with international shipping in the late nineteenth century. Beginning in the 1850s, both the development of a national fleet and the mobilization of ships to national objectives relied on international markets for transportation services and for ships.[7] In the Meiji period (1868–1912), a flexible

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[3] *NYK TG*, dai-119-kai (March 27, 1896), in *NYK 100-nenshi shiryō*, 464. For details, see *NYK 100-nenshi shiryō*, 663.

[4] The directors later decided to assign twelve ships to the route to permit sailings every two weeks, and ordered ten vessels from British yards and two from Nagasaki. Kamotsuka, ed., *Wagasha kaku kōro no enkaku* ([Tōkyō]: Nippon yūsen kabushiki gaisha kamotsuka, 1932), 391.

[5] "*Tosa Maru* Ōshū kaikō shukuen," 2.

[6] "The 'Nippon Yusen Kaisha.' The Growth of the Japan Mail Steamship Company," *Financial Times*, February 23, 1897, 2.

[7] In an overview of Maritime economics, Martin Stopford has identified four markets that comprise the shipping industry—newbuilding, freight, sale and purchase, and demolition—each of which entails a different cash flow. This chapter, however, focuses on movements of ships as

approach to ship nationality that permitted access to these markets through the transfer of foreign ships to the Japanese registry and the charter of foreign ships by Japanese operators facilitated the development of Japan's modern fleet, as well as its utilization in times of war. At the same time, this chapter argues that the process of marking and registering ships over the course of the late nineteenth century established the nation as a meaningful unit of organizing and measuring fleets. In the case of Japan, this was accomplished in ways that prioritized a congruity between ship nationality and the nationality of its owners and operators, while permitting the transnational circulation of vessels and officers.

Defining the Japanese Ship

Under what conditions did the British-built *Islam* assume Japanese nationality to become the *Tosa Maru*? The transfer of British ships to Japanese owners was hardly a necessary state of affairs. Between 1635 and 1853, the Tokugawa shogunate had prohibited the domestic construction of ocean-going ships, or any vessel larger than 500 *koku*.[8] While Japan nonetheless remained enmeshed in regional systems of trade and diplomacy in the Tokugawa period (1600–1868), the goods circulating through those systems did not include vessels.[9] In 1853, however, four decades before the purchase of the *Tosa Maru*, the shogunate lifted this restriction and permitted domains to acquire

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commodities, and as providers of transportation services. Martin Stopford, *Maritime Economics*, 3rd ed. (New York: Routledge, 2009), 175–214.

[8] Anne Walthall, "Shipwreck! Akita's Local Initiative, Japan's Foreign Debt, 1869–72," *The Journal of Japanese Studies* 39, no. 2 (Summer 2013): 274.

[9] For a study of trade in early modern Japan, see, Robert I. Hellyer, *Defining Engagement: Japan and Global Contexts, 1640–1868* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009).

large vessels (*taisen*).[10] In the following decades, further proclamations and regulations cumulatively created a legal framework through which Japanese subjects could access an international market for ships, and transfer them to a Japanese registry.

The shogunate initially lifted its restriction on large ships for strategic reasons. The late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries were punctuated by incidents in which emissaries from Western states demanded new trade relations with Japan.[11] Though the shogunate rebuffed these approaches, the British defeat of the Qing Empire in the Opium War (1840–42) revealed the dangers posed by Western navies.[12] The arrival of American naval vessels in Uraga Bay in 1853 proved the tipping point. The next year shogunal officials would sign a treaty with the U.S.[13] In the meantime, with a mind to coastal defense, they permitted domains to construct or purchase "large ships" (*taisen*).[14] In the years after 1853, the shogunate and domains assembled modest fleets of Western-style ships (*Seiyō-gata-sen*). By 1868, when samurai from western Japan toppled the shogunate and established a new government under the Meiji Emperor, the shogun's navy included nine warships and forty-five transports, while the domains held twenty-one warships and eighty-five transports. Most of these were foreign imports, though the

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[10] Sasaki Seiji, *Nihon kaiungyō no kindaika: Shagaisen hattatsu shi* (Kōbe: Kaibundō, 1961), 34–35. Walthall, "Shipwreck!," 275.

[11] For a new view of early modern contacts, see David L. Howell, "Foreign Encounters and Informal Diplomacy in Early Modern Japan," *The Journal of Japanese Studies* 40, no. 2 (Summer 2014): 295–327.

[12] Howell, "Foreign Encounters and Informal Diplomacy in Early Modern Japan," 309.

[13] The 1854 treaty, however, was limited in scope compared to commercial treaties signed in 1858. See Michael Auslin, *Negotiating with Imperialism: The Unequal Treaties and the Culture of Japanese Diplomacy* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004), 17–18.

[14] Sasaki, *Nihon kaiungyō no kindaika*, 34.

shogunate and some domains had, after 1853, established shipbuilding facilities that had begun producing Western-style sailing ships and steamships.[15]

While the shogunate and domains secured these first Western-style ships primarily as naval assets, it was not long before shogunal officials also began to encourage their use in the transport of cargoes and passengers. In 1861, the shogunate issued a proclamation that permitted the general populace ("farmers and merchants" [*hyakushō chōnin*]) to own large ships and engage in transportation "throughout the country."[16] Though civilians do not seem to have gained free access to Western-style ships for several more years, the shogunate declared that it would permit the construction of large vessels and purchases of foreign ships in treaty ports.[17]

While the shogunate thus made the first, albeit tentative, moves to permit ship imports, a free trade in ships became a treaty obligation in the 1860s. In 1858, several years after signing its treaty with the U.S., the shogunate signed several commercial treaties with Western powers (the Ansei treaties). These opened several Japanese ports to foreign trade, and fixed tariffs at 5 percent for exports and 20 percent for most imports.[18] In 1866, however, after several years of negotiations, shogunal officials signed a tariff convention with France, Great Britain, the Netherlands, and the U.S. that established 5

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[15] Figures for domain naval forces based on numbers in 1869, rather than 1868. Thomas C. Smith, *Political Change and Industrial Development in Japan: Government Enterprise, 1868–1880*, reprint ed. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1968 [1955]), 7–12. Tominaga Yūji, *Kōtsū ni okeru shihonshugi no hatten* (Tōkyō: Iwanami shoten, 1953), 65–66.

[16] Sasaki, *Nihon kaiungyō no kindaika*, 35–36.

[17] Unekawa Shizuo, *Kaiun kōkokushi*, vol. 1 (Ōsaka: Kaiji ihōsha, 1927), 211. Sasaki, *Nihon kaiungyō no kindaika*, 36.

[18] Ansei was the reign name current in Japan when the treaties were signed. Auslin, *Negotiating with Imperialism*, 1.

percent duties on imports and exports, except those enumerated in a new tariff schedule.[19] Article 8 of the convention also stipulated that

> Any Japanese subject shall be free to purchase either in the open Ports of Japan or abroad, every description of sailing or steam-vessel intended to carry either passengers or cargo; but ships of war may only be obtained under the authorization of the Japanese Government.[20]

The convention fixed tariffs on imported ships at three silver "Boos" (*ichibu*) per ton of steam vessels and one "Boo" per ton of sailing vessels. Upon payment of the duty, ships could be "recorded in a ship registry (*senseki*) as Japanese vessels." The convention therefore assured a trade in ships subject to a fixed duty, and only in 1911, when Japan achieved full tariff autonomy, was the government able to raise tariffs on ship imports.[21]

For their part, upon coming to power Meiji officials showed little inclination to limit imports of Western-style vessels. Instead, the creation of a powerful fleet of commercial ships became an integral part of ambitious nation- and state-building projects pursued by the new regime. The drive to develop this fleet stemmed from a range of interrelated economic and security concerns. On the one hand, officials sought to resist encroachments by foreign ships that, by the 1870s, carried a growing share of domestic traffic between treaty ports. At the same time, an expedition to Taiwan launched in 1874 demonstrated the military value of a fleet of ocean-going, commercial ships.[22] Both of

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[19] In the Meiji period, tariff reform became a major goal of nationalist movements opposed to unequal provisions of the treaties. Michael Auslin, however, has argued that shogunal officials did not initially view the agreements on tariffs with much concern, nor were they overly troubled by the tariff revision of the mid-1860s. Auslin, *Negotiating with Imperialism*, 118–45.

[20] "Amerika gasshūkoku," in *Kyū jōyaku isan*, dai-1-kan, dai-1-bu, MFA, JACAR B13090769000, 42–48.

[21] For tariff autonomy, see Auslin, *Negotiating with Imperialism*, 200. For the revision to ship tariffs, see Yoneda Fujio, *Gendai Nihon kaiun shikan* (Tōkyō: Kaiji sangyō kenkyūjo, 1978), 256.

[22] Historians have framed the concerns of officials in several ways. William Wray writes that "military emergencies and foreign competition" drove government policy. Arthur Tiedemann

these dimensions of shipping policy will be discussed later in this chapter, while this section will focus on the procedures that facilitated the creation of a Japanese fleet of foreign-built vessels.

In the years after the Restoration, Meiji officials built on the shogunate's policy toward ship imports and established additional procedures for transferring foreign ships to the Japanese flag. In late 1869 the Foreign Ministry (*Gaimushō*) requested that the Council of State (*Dajōkan*) clarify the new government's stance on ship ownership. Invoking half of the notion of "rich nation, strong army" (*fukoku kyōhei*) that framed many Meiji policies,[23] foreign ministry officials asserted that foreign commerce was an "essential technique of a rich nation" (*fukoku no yōjutsu*), and that it was imperative that Japanese merchants acquire ships.[24] In response, the Council of State issued a proclamation that, like the shogunate's proclamation of 1861, permitted the general populace to own Western-style sailing ships and steamships.[25] In early 1870, the council also issued Merchant Ship Regulations (*Shōsen kisoku*) that further encouraged subjects to purchase or construct Western-style ships,[26] and that maligned Japanese-style ships

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points to concerns regarding "economic independence" and the transport of tax rice. Yoneda Fujio emphasizes the economic and security implications of foreign ships in the inter-treaty port trade. William D. Wray, *Mitsubishi and the NYK, 1870–1914: Business Strategy in the Japanese Shipping Industry* (Cambridge, MA: Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard University, 1984), 20. Arthur E. Tiedemann, "Japan's Economic Foreign Policies, 1868–1893," in *Japan's Foreign Policy 1868–1941: A Research Guide*, ed. James William Morley (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974), 120. Yoneda, *Gendai Nihon kaiun shikan*, 3.

[23] For the slogan, see Richard J. Samuels, *"Rich Nation, Strong Army": National Security and the Technological Transformation of Japan* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996), 34–42.

[24] "Seiyō-gata-sen heimin shoji wo yurusu," *Dajō ruiten*, dai-1-hen, dai-104-kan, NAJ, JACAR A15070822500.

[25] "Seiyō-gata-sen heimin shoji wo yurusu," *Dajō ruiten*.

[26] The council also issued a set of "Postal Ship Regulations" (*Yūsen kisoku*) for mail carriers, but these were abolished in 1872. "Yūsen oyobi shōsen kisoku wo sadamu," in *Hōki bunrui taizen*, vol. 1, *Un'yu-mon*, vol. 10, ed. Naikaku kirokukyoku (n.p.: Naikaku kirokukyoku, 1891), 1–5.

(*Nihon-gata-sen*) as dangerous and the cause of "no little loss of life and cargo—in other words, damage to the imperial realm (*kōkoku*)."[27]

Historians such as Sasaki Seiji have pointed to such proclamations as evidence of late Tokugawa and early Meiji efforts to Westernize, and thereby modernize, shipping in Japan.[28] In addition to encouraging ownership of Western-style ships, however, Meiji officials also began to define the parameters of the "Japanese ship," and to consolidate the state's regulation of those vessels. The 1869 proclamation on ship ownership required merchants to submit requests to the Foreign Ministry through prefectural officials before importing ships from foreigners.[29] The Merchant Ship Regulations placed ships under the jurisdiction of the Trade Department in the Ministry of Civil Affairs (*Minbushō*), and required owners of Western-style ships to obtain licenses (*menjō*) jointly issued by Civil Affairs and the Foreign Ministry.[30] Ships therefore became Japanese once they were owned by a Japanese subject and registered with the state.

These early regulations also developed standards for marking the nationality of Japanese ships with internationally legible symbols. The end of the shogunate's prohibition of large ships meant that Western-style vessels were no longer Western-

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"Yūsen kisoku wo hai-su," in *Hōki bunrui taizen*, vol. 1, *Un'yu-mon*, 10:14–15. For a discussion, see William D. Wray, "Shipping: From Sail to Steam," in *Japan in Transition: From Tokugawa to Meiji*, ed. Marius B. Jansen and Gilbert Rozman (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), 254–55.

[27] "Yūsen oyobi shōsen kisoku," in *Hōki bunrui taizen*, vol. 1, *Un'yu-mon*, 10:6.

[28] Sasaki, *Nihon kaiungyō no kindaika*, 34–38.

[29] "Seiyōgatasen heimin shoji wo yurusu," *Dajō ruiten*.

[30] Owners of Japanese-style ships were to apply for a license (*kansatsu*) from the Shipping Office (*Kaisō kaijo*). In 1871, jurisdiction over licenses was transferred to the Finance Ministry. "Yūsen oyobi shōsen kisoku," in *Hōki bunrui taizen*, vol. 1, *Un'yu-mon*, 10:6–12. "Shōsen menjō Minbu Gaimu renin wo yame Ōkurashō ichiin wo motte kafu-su," in *Hōrei zensho*, Meiji 4-nen, ed. Naikaku kanpōkyoku (n.p.: Naikaku kanpōkyoku, 1888), 516.

owned and operated. As early as 1854, Shimazu Nariaki, lord of the Satsuma Domain, commented on "inconveniences" that arose due to the absence of a general marker to identify "ships of the realm" (*go-kokusen*), and the shogunate therefore designated the Rising Sun flag as a marker for Japanese ships.[31] Similarly, the Merchant Ship Regulations required Japanese ships to fly a national flag (*go-kokki*) one *jō* long and seven *shaku* high from eight in the morning "Western time" until sunset. This flag was to be replaced by a larger version on holidays and by a smaller one in the event of a storm. At the same time, merchant ships were required to fly a separate "Japanese merchant ship flag" (*Nihon shōsen ki*) to distinguish them from warships.[32] Officials explicitly modeled these requirements on Western practices. The article of the Merchant Ship Regulations that mandated the flying of the national flag declared that ships without a flag would be "unapologetically" treated as pirate vessels, in keeping with the practices of international law (*bankoku futsū no kōhō*).[33] Officials thereby marked the national fleet by self-consciously adopting the legal practices of major maritime powers—a key strategy in the Meiji period, when officials sought to resist encroachments by Western empires through the emulation of Western institutions.[34]

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[31] Teishinshō, ed. *Teishin jigyōshi*, vol. 6 (Tōkyō: Teishin kyōkai, 1941), 748.

[32] "Yūsen oyobi shōsen kisoku," in *Hōki bunrui taizen*, vol. 1, *Un'yu-mon*, 10:8, 10–12.

[33] "Yūsen oyobi shōsen kisoku," in *Hōki bunrui taizen*, vol. 1, *Un'yu-mon*, 10:8. The Home Ministry similarly appealed to foreign practices when, in 1875, it suggested eliminating the merchant ship flag. Ministry officials observed that Britain and Russia required merchant ships to fly a national flag distinct from naval vessels, but no country required ships to fly both commercial and national flags. Since ships also often flew the flags of their owners, officials argued that the merchant ship flag was unnecessary. "Shōsen kisoku dai-23-kō shōsen kigō wo hai-su," in *Hōki bunrui taizen*, vol. 1, *Un'yu-mon*, 10:29.

[34] For the emulation of Western police, postal, and newspaper institutions, see D. Eleanor Westney, *Imitation and Innovation: The Transfer of Western Organizational Patterns to Meiji Japan* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1987).

Through additional proclamations officials also created procedures that tethered ships to Japan through markers that were becoming standard in international shipping. In 1873, the Council of State required that naval and commercial ships be assigned call signs under the framework of Britain's International Code of Signals.[35] By publishing those codes in an annual *List of Merchant Shipping* (Senmeiroku), officials created a document that enumerated the scope of the Japanese fleet.[36] In 1874, the Council of State also required that owners or captains of ships sailing overseas obtain navigation certificates (*kōkai kōshō*). These documents certified that the ship was Japanese, and included English, German, French, and Chinese translations of basic information, such as the owner and size of the ship.[37] In 1879, at the request of the Home Ministry, an order by Chief Minister Sanjō Sanetomi also formalized a system of ship registries (*senseki*) under prefectural governments that required owners of "Western-style merchant ships" to select ports of registry.[38] Collectively, these regulations created Japanese ships from paperwork and a set of visual markers, and linked them to particular ports in Japan. In the *List of Merchant Shipping* published in 1894, for example, the *Tosa Maru* could be found as ship number 1,443, call sign HKCQ, alongside information that included the size, date of construction, port of registry, and horsepower of the vessel.[39]

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[35] "Dai-144-gō," *Hōrei zensho*, Meiji 8-nen, ed. Naikaku kanpōkyoku (n.p.: Naikaku kanpōkyoku, 1888), 175.

[36] "Dai-144-gō," *Hōrei zensho*, Meiji 8-nen, 175. This English title appears on the copy of the *Senmeiroku* covering ships in 1893. See Kansenkyoku, *Senmeiroku Meiji 26-nen* (1894).

[37] A sample certificate can be found in "Kōkai kōshō kisoku," in *Hōki bunrui taizen*, vol. 1, *Gaikō-mon*, vol. 3, ed. Naikaku kirokukyoku (n.p.: Naikaku kirokukyoku, 1890), 478–79. Five years later, they were replaced with revised ship licenses. "Kōkai kōshō kisoku wo hai-shi Seiyō-gata shōsen menjō kaisei," in *Hōrei zensho*, Meiji 12-nen, ed. Naikaku kanpōkyoku (n.p.: Naikaku kanpōkyoku, 1890), 46–47.

[38] "Fukoku dai-5-gō," in *Hōki bunrui taizen*, vol. 1, *Un'yu-mon*, 10:29–30.

[39] Kansenkyoku, *Senmeiroku Meiji 26-nen*, 82.

The owner of a ship, however, was not necessarily its operator. As noted at the start of this chapter, when the N.Y.K. opened its service to Europe, its directors initially employed foreign ships. Conversely, foreign subjects could charter Japanese ships, and this potential separation of operation from ownership was a persistent source of concern for officials who sought to limit foreign penetration of Japan. After the Restoration, for example, foreign ministry officials were deeply troubled about the possibility of foreigners entering unopened ports and conspiring with "evil merchants" to conduct illicit trade.[40] Restricting foreign ships to the treaty ports, however, would do little to limit such activities if foreigners directed the operations of Japanese-flagged ships, and when foreign ministry officials requested the proclamation on ship ownership in 1869, they expressed concern about "people of ambiguous identity colluding with foreigners to lend [ships] held in the name of a Japanese person."[41] The Council of State's proclamation therefore ordered prefectural and domainal officials to investigate the identities of buyers to prevent ships from becoming Japanese in name and foreign in operation. The Merchant Ship Regulations, moreover, required owners to notify the Trade Department before leasing ships to foreigners, and ordered chartered ships to fly the national flag of the lessee.[42] Ownership by a Japanese subject was required for a ship to enter the Japanese registry and fly the Japanese flag, but that nationality remained mutable, as a change in operation might temporarily render a ship foreign.

Ownership remained the basic criterion for Japanese ship nationality, even after a broad reorganization of Japan's legal codes at the end of the nineteenth century. After the

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[40] "Gaikokusen no fukaikōjō he kaikō sashitomehō seikyū no ken," in *NGB* 2-2:112–13.

[41] "Seiyōgatasen heimin shoji wo yurusu," *Dajō ruiten*.

[42] "Yūsen oyobi shōsen kisoku," in *Hōki bunrui taizen*, vol. 1, *Un'yu-mon*, 10:10.

promulgation of the Imperial Constitution in 1889, the new Imperial Diet passed a Commercial Law (*Shōhō*) in 1890 that included a volume of Maritime Law (*Kaishōhō*), which required ships to be measured and registered in prefectural ship registries. When, after a decade of debate and revision, the Commercial Law was implemented in 1899, the Communications Ministry (*Teishinshō*) prepared legislation to regulate the registries.[43] The 1899 Ship Law (*Senpakuhō*) began by outlining the preconditions for a ship to be considered a "Japanese ship" (*Nihon senpaku*). The standard was simple: ships that qualified as Japanese ships were those that belonged to Japanese government offices, Japanese subjects (*Nihon shinmin*), or companies or organizations wholly owned or managed by Japanese subjects.[44] Japanese subjects or companies that registered their vessels in Japanese ports secured the right to fly the Japanese flag, which, in turn, entitled the ships to enter unopened ports, access Japan's coastal trade, and receive protection from the Japanese state. Considered by the Diet in the same session as the Nationality Law (*Kokusekihō*)[45]—which stipulated the requirements for individuals to acquire Japanese nationality—the Ship Law again bound the nationality of ships to their owner.

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[43] Separate legislation was required because the drafters of the Commercial Law limited its scope to private law. When the Commercial Law was passed in 1890, the Communications Ministry drafted Ship Registry Regulations (*Senseki kisoku*). When the enforcement of the Commercial Law was delayed, however, the regulations were abandoned. "Senseki kisoku wo sadamu," *Kōbun ruisan*, dai-14-hen, dai-62-kan, NAJ, JACAR A15112140900. "Senseki kisoku shikō wo enki-su," *Kōbun ruisan*, dai-14-hen, dai-62-kan, NAJ, JACAR A15112141200. "Senseki kisoku shikō wo enki-su," *Kōbun ruisan*, dai-16-hen, dai-38-kan, NAJ, JACAR A15112545500. Tanikawa Hisashi, "Kaiji hō," in *Kōza Nihon kindaihō hattatsushi: Shihonshugi to hō no hatten*, vol. 4, ed. Ukai Nobushige, et al. (Tōkyō: Keisō shobō, 1958), 173.

[44] "Hōritsu dai-46-gō," *Kanpō*, no. 4702 (8 March 1899): 139.

[45] *SGS*, dai-12-kai, dai-16-gō (June 10, 1898): 317–18. For a study of Japan's Nationality Law and Family Registry Law (*Koseki hō*), see Endō Masataka, *Koseki to kokuseki no kin-gendaishi: Minzoku / kettō / Nihonjin* (Tōkyō: Akashi shoten, 2013).

In explanations of Japan's maritime law, jurists often provided comparisons of these standards with the practices of other states, and represented the legislation's emphasis on ownership as a particular arrangement of a set of standards used by maritime powers to define ship nationality. Such comparisons are evident, for example, in a 1917 overview of Japanese maritime law by Matsunami Niichirō, a lecturer at Tokyo Imperial University who participated in the drafting of the Seamen's Law (*Kaiinhō*) in 1893, researched maritime law in Britain, France, and Germany in 1897, and helped found the Japanese Maritime Law Association (*Nihon kaihōkai*) in 1916.[46]

According to the jurist, ship nationality in maritime countries rested on one or more of three factors: the ship's owner, its crew, or its place of construction. Like Japan's Ship Law, British and German laws passed in 1894 and 1899 only permitted ships owned by subjects to sail under their national flags, while France, Austria, and Holland, in contrast, permitted ships partially owned by foreigners to enter national registries. French law, however, also required that the captain, officers, and three-fourths of the crew of French-flagged ships be French nationals—a requirement that Matsunami suggested was due to the place of ships in international law as "extensions of sovereignty."[47] Though many Western countries had closed their ship registries to foreign-built ships early in the nineteenth century, by century's end most had abandoned these restrictions, which left the U.S. as the only major maritime power to maintain a registry restricted to American-

[46] "Hishoku kaigun kyōju hōgakushi Matsunami Niichirō kaihō kenkyū no tame Ei-Futsu-Doku he ryūgaku no ken Meiji sanjū-nen shichi-gatsu" (July 1897), in "Monbushō ryūgakusei kankei zakken dai-1-kan," *Gaimushō kiroku* 6-1-7-2, MFA, JACAR B16080818800. Konda Masaki, "Nihon daigaku shodai shōgaku buchō Matsunami Niichirō to kaihō kenkyū no sokuseki," *Shōgaku shūshi* 82, no. 1 (August 2012): 34–37.

[47] Matsunami Niichirō, *Matsunami shiron Nihon kaishōhō* (Tōkyō: Yūhikaku shobō, 1917), 90.

built ships.[48] The link between ownership, operation, and ship nationality that developed in Meiji Japan was, in other words, an inflection of standards common among major maritime powers. As represented by Matsunami, state officials in major powers considered several dimensions of a ship in assigning standards for ship nationality, and often permitted international sourcing of some factors—in the case of Japan, these included the vessels and labor.

The centrality of ownership—and through it, managerial control (i.e. operation)—in Japanese ship nationality had consequences for the pace at which Japanese shipping developed. With the Japanese registry open to foreign-built vessels—and, indeed, propped open by the 1866 Tariff Convention—the growth of the fleet initially outpaced that of shipyards. The Western-style sailing ships and steamships held by the shogunate and domains at the time of the Meiji Restoration totaled around 17,000 tons.[49] Though representative of a dramatic shift in maritime policy in Japan, this was a bare fraction of world tonnage, which in 1850 comprised some 6,900,000 tons of sailing ships and 250,808 tons of steamships, half of which were British-owned.[50] Between 1870 and 1899, however, Japan's fleet saw increases of around 650,000 registered tons, and by 1900, Japanese-flagged shipping made up around 2 percent of world tonnage and was the world's tenth-largest fleet.[51] More than 70 percent of those increases were due to imports:

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[48] Matsunami, *Matsunami shiron Nihon kaishōhō*, 93–94.

[49] Tominaga, *Kōtsū ni okeru shihonshugi no hatten*, 66.

[50] S.G. Sturmey, *British Shipping and World Competition* (London: The Athlone Press, 1962), 15.

[51] Statistics printed annually by Japan's Communications Ministry listed the tonnage of Japanese steamships and sailing ships larger than 100 tons as 488,187 and 68,370 tons, and world steamship and sailing tonnage as 22,369,358 and 6,674,370 tons. In an indication of how information circulated between maritime powers, the ministry cited Lloyd's Register, a British publication on shipping. Kansenkyoku, *Kaiji tekiyō Meiji 36-nen* (1903), Appendix.

while domestic construction briefly exceeded imports from 1878 to 1884, it was not until 1899 that domestic yards became Japan's main source of tonnage. Sailing ships initially made up a large portion of those imports, but beginning in the mid-1880s, and in tandem with a worldwide transition from sail to steam, steamships came to make up the bulk of imported tonnage.[52] The making of the Japanese fleet therefore did not, at first, entail the physical construction of vessels, but instead a large-scale transfer of ships between registries.

Similarly, the fleet grew faster than a labor force capable of sailing the ships, and in the early Meiji period Japanese ships were seldom crewed by Japanese subjects alone.[53] The Merchant Ship Regulations included provisions that permitted shipowners to employ foreigners,[54] and between 1881 and 1885, foreign subjects held most of the A-level captain, officer, and engineer licenses issued by the Mercantile Marine Bureau (*Kansenkyoku*) and required by law to operate the largest steamships.[55] At the same time, the government granted funds to Mitsubishi to establish a mercantile marine school (reorganized as a government school in 1882) to train Japanese seamen,[56] and by the late

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[52] For a brief summary of the technological developments that made steamships more competitive, see Gordon Boyce, *Information, mediation and institutional development: The rise of large-scale enterprise in British shipping, 1870–1919* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1995), 17–20. For Japan, see Wray, "Shipping: From Sail to Steam," 248–270.

[53] Launching a large, Western-style ship with an inexperienced crew could end in disaster, as in 1871, when a steamship purchased by the Akita domain was wrecked off the coast of Sado, precipitating a financial crisis for the domain. Walthall, "Shipwreck!," 286.

[54] "Yūsen oyobi shōsen kisoku," in *Hōki bunrui taizen*, vol. 1, *Un'yu-mon*, 10:10.

[55] Japanese subjects held almost all of the B-level licenses required to crew smaller ships. Teishinshō kansenkyoku, *Kansenkyoku dai-4-ji nenpō* (Teishinshō kansenkyoku, 1886), 24.

[56] Teishinshō, ed., *Teishin jigyōshi*, 6:1118–17, 1125–28. Tiedemann, "Economic Foreign Policies," 121.

1880s Japanese subjects occupied most deck officer positions on coastal services.[57] This temporary employment of foreign officers was in accord with the strategy of hiring foreign experts (*oyatoi gaikokujin*) to advise on political, economic, and legal reforms until Japanese counterparts could be trained to replace them.[58]

In the case of overseas voyages, however, structures of international commerce constrained the replacement of foreign officers with Japanese subjects. In the late nineteenth century, Japanese shipowners generally turned to British financial institutions to insure their ships, which, in turn, were typically unwilling to insure ships unless they were captained by a British subject or an officer licensed by the British government.[59] Only in 1887 did Masuda Takashi, the head of the Mitsui Company, appoint Asai Seiichirō as the first Japanese captain to command an overseas voyage, followed by Fujiki Shigeharu in 1892 and Narasaki Itarō in 1894.[60] By the early 1890s, the N.Y.K., as well as a number of shagaisen owners, had also begun to employ Japanese captains on voyages to ports in China.[61] Just as the Japanese fleet was at first a product of a global exchange in ships, crews initially depended on the circulation of British-licensed officers with credibility in the British insurance industry.

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[57] Teishinshō, ed., *Teishin jigyōshi*, 6:1128–29. Tomohei Chida and Peter N. Davies, *The Japanese Shipping and Shipbuilding Industries: A History of their Modern Growth* (London: The Athlone Press, Ltd., 1990), 20.

[58] For a brief summary, see Hirakawa Sukehiro and Bob Tadashi Wakabayashi, "Japan's turn to the West" in *The Cambridge History of Japan*, vol. 5, *The Nineteenth Century*, ed. Marius B. Jansen (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008 [1989]), 466–72.

[59] Yonekubo Michisuke, *Umi no seija: Narasaki Itarō den* (Kōbe: Nihon kaiin kumiai, 1939), 40. Teishinshō, ed., *Teishin jigyōshi*, 6:1129

[60] Narasaki had, in fact, earned a British-issued captain's license in Hong Kong in 1893. *OSK-Mitsui 100-nenshi*, 51–52.Unekawa, *Kaiun kōkokushi*, 1:721. Yonekubo, *Umi no seija*, 46.

[61] Teishinshō, ed., *Teishin jigyōshi*, 6:1128.

Official encouragement for the introduction of foreign-built ships with foreign crews to Japan, meanwhile, stood in stark contrast to Qing policies toward steamships. In a study of steamships on the Yangzi River, Anne Reinhardt has examined how Qing officials maintained distinctions between foreign and Chinese ships in the mid-nineteenth century. In 1865 the Qing Foreign Office (*Zongli yamen*) solicited opinions from regional officials about the regulation of steamships purchased by Chinese merchants. In response, Shanghai Circuit Intendant Ding Richang proposed rules that would have permitted Chinese-owned steamships to enter any port in China, as long as they did not carry foreign subjects—either as crew or as passengers. Rules issued by Li Hongzhang in 1867, however, confined all steamships to the treaty ports. In Reinhardt's words, "in the end the Qing decided that steamships were always foreign."[62] Meiji officials, in contrast, accepted a flexible ship nationality, and permitted imported, foreign-crewed ships to fly the Japanese flag.

The physical mobility of ships, as well as their often promiscuous relations with national flags and operators, generated unique complications in the making of national fleets in the late nineteenth century. The potential for a ship's operation to separate from ownership meant that ships—both "naturalized" and domestically built vessels—were not necessarily under the control of the nation whose flags they flew. Proclamations issued in the early decades of the Meiji period evinced grave concerns over difficulties pinning down a consistent nationality for mobile objects that could easily change hands. At the same time, even as Meiji officials sought to distinguish Japanese from foreign ships, they

[62] Anne Reinhardt, "Navigating Imperialism in China: Steamship, Semicolony, and Nation, 1860–1937" (Ph.D. diss., Princeton University, 2009), 57–59. Also see Anne Reinhardt, *Navigating Semi-Colonialism: Shipping, Sovereignty, and Nation-Building in China, 1860–1937* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 2018).

permitted foreign-built vessels to flow into the nation's ship registries. Scholars such as Richard Samuels have argued that Meiji officials endeavored to achieve the rapid indigenization (*kokusanka*)—and, hence, autonomy—of strategic industries, and in the case of shipbuilding Samuels argues that "every effort was made to stimulate indigenization, even if the immediate result was inferior products."[63] The extent to which officials sanctioned imports of foreign ships and the employ of foreign seamen, however, suggests a more gradual process of indigenization and a willingness to permit imports of vessels and labor.

The Boundaries of Japanese Shipping

Permitting Japanese subjects to acquire Western-style ships prompted Tokugawa and Meiji officials to create a definition of the Japanese ship as a legal category. At the same time, pressure from Western states for expanded trade relations also motivated officials to carve out spaces reserved for Japanese shipping. The primary area of contention was the "coasting" or "coastal trade" (*engan bōeki*; *enkai bōeki*): the transport of freight and passengers between two ports in one country.[64] In the 1850s and 1860s, both the shogunate and the Meiji government signed treaties that permitted foreign-flagged ships to carry the coastal trade between treaty ports. As foreign ships increasingly pervaded Japanese waters in the 1870s, however, Meiji officials sought to reassert control

[63] Samuels, *"Rich Nation, Strong Army"*, 44.

[64] Reinhardt, "Navigating Imperialism," 41. An advisor to the Meiji government, H.W. Denison, defined the "Coasting Trade" as follows: "The shipment at one port of a country, of goods of national growth, produce or manufacture or of goods of foreign origin which have become nationalized by being duly imported either for consumption, ware-housing or transhipment [*sic*]; the transportation by water of such goods to another port of the same country, and the discharge thereas [*sic*] of the goods so shipped and transported." *NGB* 25:66.

over the coastal trade—an effort that became intertwined with a broader struggle to maintain Japan' sovereignty in the face of aggressively expanding Western empires.

For much of the Tokugawa period, the shogunate maintained a clear division between the spaces that foreign ships could access and those reserved for domestic ships. In the early seventeenth century, the shogunate confined foreign trade to a few channels by funneling trade with Dutch and Chinese merchants through Nagasaki, trade with the Ryūkyū Kingdom through the Satsuma domain, and trade with Korea through the Tsushima domain. As described above, the shogunate also prohibited overseas travel by Japanese subjects and the construction of ocean-going ships.[65] With the exception of trade conducted by Japanese merchants in Busan, Korea, foreign ships thus carried all of Japan's foreign trade, and the ships of each country only called at a single Japanese port. Through this system of foreign relations the shogunate enforced a rigid distinction between the spaces in which foreign and domestic ships carried cargoes.

The signing of the first commercial treaties with the U.S., the Netherlands, Russia, Britain, and France in 1858 forced a reorganization of the division between Japanese and international shipping. As mentioned above, the treaties established tariff schedules for Japan's exports and imports. They also granted extraterritoriality to foreign subjects, included most-favored-nation clauses that extended treaty rights granted to one state to all others, and permitted signatories to begin conducting trade in Kanagawa (Yokohama), Hakodate, and Nagasaki in 1859, followed by Hyōgo (Kobe) in 1867,

[65] The shogunate turned a blind eye to ships as large as 2,000 *koku*, however, as long as they did not have the keels and masts needed for deep-water voyages. Walthall, "Shipwreck!," 274–75.

Tokyo and Osaka in 1868, and Niigata in 1869.[66] Consequently, foreign ships began to call at a new range of Japanese ports. These included tramps as well as ships owned by large companies that knit the treaty ports into growing networks of liner services. In 1859, a British firm, the Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Company (P. & O.), opened the first liner service to Japan: a line from Nagasaki to Shanghai on which it employed four 700-ton steamships.[67] In 1863, the P. & O. reorganized the line into a biweekly Yokohama-Shanghai service, and in 1867 extended it to Hong Kong.[68] From the other side of the Pacific, in January 1867 an American company, Pacific Mail, opened a monthly San Francisco-Yokohama-Hong Kong service with the support of a $500,000 postal contract from the U.S. government. The company employed four wooden steamships on the line, which, at 4,000 gross tons each, had an aggregate tonnage that almost equaled Japan's entire fleet of Western-style ships.[69] In March, Pacific Mail also employed three 2,500-ton steamships on a Yokohama-Shanghai service with stops in Kobe and Nagasaki.[70] By the 1880s, the British companies Blue Funnel and China Mutual, Germany's Hamburg Amerika Linje, the American Oriental and Occidental

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[66] The original treaties held that Niigata was to be opened in 1860, Edo (Tokyo) in 1862, and Hyōgo and Osaka in 1863, but the London Protocol of 1862 delayed their opening. The U.S., meanwhile, had secured most-favored-nation treatment in a treaty signed in 1854. W.G. Beasley, "The Foreign Threat and the Opening of the Ports," in *The Cambridge History of Japan*, vol. 5, *The Nineteenth Century*, ed. Marius B. Jansen (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008 [1989]), 280, 283. Louis G. Perez, *Japan Comes of Age: Mutsu Munemitsu and the Revision of the Unequal Treaties* (London: Associated University Press, 1999), 56–58, 68. Janet E. Hunter and S. Sugiyama, eds., *The History of Anglo-Japanese Relations, 1600–2000*, vol. 4, *Economic and Business Relations* (New York: Palgrave/MacMillan, 2002), 5–6.

[67] As a comparison, the British *Nemesis*, the gunboat that attacked Guangzhou (Canton) to great effect during the Opium War (1840–1842), was about 660 tons. See Daniel R. Headrick, *The Tools of Empire: Technology and European Imperialism in the Nineteenth Century* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1981), 43–57.

[68] *OSK 80-nenshi*, 2.

[69] As noted above, Western-style ships in Japan totaled 17,000 tons in 1868.

[70] *OSK 80-nenshi*, 3.

Steamship Company (O. & O.), and the Canadian Pacific Line had also established liner services to Japan.[71]

While the size of these ships and the regularity of their services transformed the tempo and quantity of Japan's foreign trade, the carriage of that trade in foreign vessels did not deviate from mid-century shipping, when the shogunate left the transport of goods to foreign ships. In a significant departure from previous transportation patterns, however, ships flying a given flag could access multiple ports in Japan, and they eventually began to carry cargoes and passengers between those ports.[72] Though the treaties signed by the shogunate in 1858 did not explicitly permit such activities, in 1869, the Meiji government signed a treaty with Germany that explicitly granted German ships the right to carry the coastal trade between treaty ports. This right was extended to all treaty powers that held most-favored-nation status, as were conditions of a treaty signed with the Austro-Hungarian Empire later that year that exempted Japanese goods carried between treaty ports from duties.[73] Under the terms of these treaties, foreign ships thus gained full access to inter-treaty port traffic.

The entry of foreign ships into coastal shipping through treaty ports was not unique to nineteenth-century Japan, but also occurred through similar developments in Qing China. As described by Reinhardt, the 1842 Treaty of Nanjing that ended the Opium War permitted the British to engage in foreign trade in a greater range of Chinese

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[71] *OSK 80-nenshi*, 2–4.

[72] Kokaze Hidemasa, *Teikokushugi-ka no Nihon kaiun: Kokusai kyōsō to taigai jiritsu* (Tōkyō: Yamakawa shuppansha, 1995), 98.

[73] For German pressure on Japan and negotiations with the Austro-Hungarian Empire, see Auslin, *Negotiating with Imperialism*, 155, 161. For an overview of the opening of the coastal trade by treaty, see Kokaze, *Teikokushugi-ka*, 107–110.

ports.[74] Treaties signed with the U.S. and France in 1844 also exempted transshipped foreign cargoes from duties, and foreign ships began to carry cargoes between the treaty ports, particularly on the Yangzi River after it was opened by the 1858 Treaty of Tianjin. Qing officials viewed this trade with concern as it enabled Chinese merchants to bypass interior customs (*changguan*) and transit duties (*lijin*); in an 1862 revision of Yangzi trade regulations, they limited foreign trade on the river to three ports (Zhenjiang, Jiujiang, and Hankou) and established a half duty on goods transshipped between Chinese ports. While these duties tacitly recognized foreign participation in the coasting trade, in the late 1860s the Qing, like the Meiji government, explicitly guaranteed access to the inter-treaty port trade in treaties signed with Denmark, Spain, Belgium, Italy, and Austria-Hungary.

Within a few years of signing away navigation rights, however, Meiji officials sought to reclaim their authority over the coastal trade. The domination of inter-treaty port routes by large, foreign-owned steamships seems to have helped trigger such efforts, particularly when, in the early 1870s, Pacific Mail petitioned for a charter to expand its coastal operations outside the treaty ports.[75] As a foreign advisor to the Meiji government noted in a memorandum in the early 1880s, the participation of such large, heavily capitalized foreign companies in Japan's coastal trade threatened to impede the development of Japanese steamship companies.[76]

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[74] Reinhardt, "Navigating Imperialism," 39–41.

[75] Saitō Yoshihisa, "Meiji shonen no kaiun seisaku," *Dōshisha shōgaku* 22, nos. 5–6 (March 1971): 66. Kokaze, *Teikokushugi-ka*, 112. *NYK 100-nenshi*, 7. Teishinshō, ed., *Teishin jigyōshi*, 6:776. Tiedemann, "Economic Foreign Policies," 120. Wray, *Mitsubishi and the N.Y.K.*, 32.

[76] *NGB* 25:77–78.

At the same time, the struggle for control over the coastal trade was not just a matter of protecting domestic shipping, but was also part of a broader struggle for sovereignty. After the Restoration, Meiji officials began to perceive certain provisions of the commercial treaties as unequal impositions on Japan.[77] In a letter to Sanjō Sanetomi in 1869, for example, court noble Iwakura Tomomi depicted extraterritoriality as a "national disgrace" and a threat to Japan's independence.[78] While officials viewed extraterritoriality, fixed tariffs, and most-favored-nation status as the most critical elements requiring reform,[79] they also sought to recover the coastal trade to regain full sovereignty over the nation's affairs and thereby join the international community as an equal. A memorandum that Foreign Affairs Vice-Minister Terajima Munenori submitted to a British representative in 1871 called for restrictions on foreign ships in the coastal trade as one of several revisions to the treaties, and in 1872 a diplomatic mission led by Iwakura sought to negotiate limits on the inter-treaty port trade while visiting the U.S.[80]

When these early diplomatic efforts failed to advance, however, Meiji officials pursued alternative methods to expel foreign ships from Japanese waters. As discussed above, beginning in 1869 officials encouraged imports of foreign-built ships in order to develop a competitive Japanese fleet. They also began to promote the development of a shipping enterprise capable of competing with foreign firms, and in 1875 they gave

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[77] Pär Cassel and Auslin have both emphasized that traditions of legal pluralism under the Tokugawa shogunate (and in Qing China) meant that shogunal officials were not overly concerned with extraterritoriality when the treaties were first signed. Pär Cassel, *Grounds of Judgment: Extraterritoriality and Imperial Power in Nineteenth-Century China and Japan* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 39–62, 91–92. Auslin, *Negotiating with Imperialism*, 20, 26.

[78] Cited in Cassel, *Grounds of Judgment*, 93; Auslin, *Negotiating with Imperialism*, 156–57.

[79] Auslin, *Negotiating with Imperialism*, 174.

[80] Kokaze, *Teikokushugi-ka*, 112–13. For the broader context of the negotiations, see Auslin, *Negotiating with Imperialism*, 167, 170–94.

Iwasaki Yatarō's Mitsubishi Company (a predecessor of the N.Y.K.) a grant of government-owned ships and an annual operating subsidy.[81] Later that year, Mitsubishi succeeded in expelling Pacific Mail from its Yokohama-Shanghai line (and shortly thereafter rebuffed an attempt by the P. & O. to enter the service), thereby chasing the American company from Japan's coasts and establishing the first overseas service operated under the Japanese flag.[82] By the end of the decade, Mitsubishi had brought much of the coastal trade into the holds of Western-style ships flying the Japanese flag.[83]

While Mitsubishi's rise reduced the number of foreign ships engaged in Japan's domestic shipping, the complete restoration of Japan's authority over its coastal trade required treaty reform. Renegotiation of the treaties, however, was only accomplished in 1894.[84] In the interim decades, meanwhile, Japan's diplomats at times offered concessions on navigation rights while negotiating for tariff autonomy and the end of extraterritoriality. In an agenda submitted to treaty powers in 1882, for example, Foreign Minister Inoue Kaoru offered to permit foreign-owned ships leased by Japanese subjects to carry the coastal trade between unopened ports for a five-year period.[85] A draft treaty prepared in 1887 included such provisions, and permitted foreign ships to continue

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[81] There are many studies centered on the rise of Mitsubishi and its eventual merger with Union Transportation to form the NYK. For two English-language studies, see: Kozo Yamamura, "The Founding of Mitsubishi: A Case Study in Japanese Business History," *The Business History Review* 41, no. 2 (Summer 1967): 141–60. Wray, *Mitsubishi and the NYK*.

[82] Wray, *Mitsubishi and the NYK*, 84–102.

[83] Kokaze, *Teikokushugi-ka*, 145–48.

[84] The new, revised treaties came into effect in 1899. For an overview of negotiations, see Auslin, *Negotiating with Imperialism*, 195–200. Perez, *Japan Comes of Age*. Ian Nish, "Japan Reverses the Unequal Treaties: The Anglo-Japanese Commercial Treaty of 1894," in *Collected Writings of Ian Nish*, Part 1 (Tokyo: Edition Synapse, 2001 [1975]), 9–21.

[85] *NGB*, *Jōyaku kaisei kankei*, 4-6:189, 199.

carrying the coastal trade between treaty ports.[86] In 1889, Inoue's successor, Foreign Minister Ōkuma Shigenobu, even signed treaties with the U.S. and Germany that permitted foreign ships chartered by Japanese subjects to carry the coastal trade provided that they flew a "distinguishing flag."[87] Though the treaties were never ratified, had they been they would have shifted the parameters for access to the coastal trade from the nationality of a ship to the nationality of its operator, thereby creating a hybrid ship category: foreign-owned and Japanese-operated, and marked as such with a unique flag.

While Inoue and Ōkuma were willing to grant limited concessions on the coastal trade, their negotiations foundered on a combative public opposed to any compromise with the treaty powers. New political parties and a burgeoning press demanded a full recovery of treaty rights, and in the face of their criticism, Japanese officials decided against ratifying the treaties signed with Germany and the U.S.[88] The establishment of the Imperial Diet, moreover, gave the political parties a new platform from which to demand treaty revision, and in an 1893 address to the throne, Lower House members enumerated their major goals: "the removal of extraterritorial rights, the restoration of tariff rights, and the prohibition of [foreigners in] the coastal trade."[89]

The N.Y.K. likewise sought to maintain barriers against foreign capital in the coastal trade. On September 27, 1890, N.Y.K. President Morioka Masazumi submitted a petition to Communications Minister Gotō Shōjirō in which he recalled the 1870s, when

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[86] *NGB*, *Jōyaku kaisei kankei*, 4-6:219, 221.

[87] *NGB*, *Jōyaku kaisei kankei*, 4-6:265–66. For a copy of the treaty (in English), see "Doitsu-koku," in *Kyū-jōyaku isan*, 548–49.

[88] Ian Nish, *Collected Writings of Ian Nish*, Part II, *Japan, Russia and East Asia* (Tokyo: Edition Synapse, 2001), 61.

[89] *SGS*, dai-6-kai, dai-6-gō (May 22, 1894), 122, 131.

British and American steamships "were rampant in our coastal shipping, sovereignty over shipping was in their hands…[and] only with great difficulty was navigation power (*kōken*) on the coasts returned to us."[90] He therefore argued against expanding access to the coastal trade, and maintained that if the government permitted chartered foreign ships to carry the coastal trade, Japan's shipping "would burst like a bubble, and no matter how much it was subsidized, it would be unable to survive."[91] Whereas diplomats appeared primarily concerned with the nationality of the subject that operated a ship in the coastal trade, N.Y.K. executives sought to refocus attention on the ownership of the vessels.

Confronted with this domestic opposition, in the 1890s Japanese diplomats dropped any provisions that would permit chartered foreign ships to enter the unopened ports, but continued to yield on foreign ships participating in the inter-treaty port trade. When diplomats negotiated a revised treaty with Britain in 1894, which was followed by the revision of the remaining treaties,[92] Article 11 guaranteed the Japanese government the authority to regulate its coastal trade in general, but included the following proviso:

> The Japanese Government, however, agrees to allow British vessels to continue, as heretofore, for the period of the duration of the present Treaty, to carry cargo between the existing open ports of the Empire, excepting to or from the ports of Osaka, Niigata, and Ebisu-minato.[93]

Under this treaty, Japan regained partial sovereignty over its coastal shipping, while foreign ships retained rights in the coastal trade between Yokohama, Kobe, Nagasaki, and Hakodate.

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[90] *NYK 50-nenshi*, 101–03.

[91] *NYK 50-nenshi*, 102.

[92] The first revised treaty was signed with Britain in 1894 and was followed by new, revised treaties signed with other states, all of which came into effect in 1899.

[93] "Dai Buriten-koku," in *Kyū-jōyaku isan*, dai-1-kan, dai-2-bu, MFA, JACAR B13090770400, 53.

The provisions of these new treaties, combined with a shift in the Japanese government's commercial policies, created a new geography of shipping in Japan. In 1899, Japanese officials opened an additional twenty-two ports to foreign trade, bringing the total number of open ports to twenty-nine.[94] Since these ports were opened after the new treaties came into effect, they remained outside the circuits of coastal trade left open to foreign ships. At the start of the twentieth century, there were thus three types of ports in Japan: unopened ports that foreign-flagged ships could not access; newly opened ports in which they could carry foreign trade; and four former treaty ports in which they could carry foreign trade and the coastal trade. Japanese diplomats eliminated this last category in 1911, when they negotiated a new set of treaties that did not include an exception for former treaty ports.[95] In doing so, they secured complete control over the coastal trade.

Over the course of the Meiji period (1868–1912), the effort to secure the coastal trade was a struggle to assert sovereignty in Japan against foreign encroachments. Beginning in the late 1890s, however, officials also began to make claims on coastal trades in order to assert control over new territories outside of the Japanese archipelago. As will be discussed shortly, one month after signing the revised treaty with Britain, Japanese leaders launched a war against the Qing Empire. When they emerged victorious in 1895, they had obtained a new colony: Taiwan. The new territory came with new access points to foreign trade: the Qing had previously opened four Taiwanese ports to foreign trade, and when Japanese officials assumed control of the island they kept them

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[94] These twenty-nine ports were in Japan proper (*naichi*). Catherine Phipps, *Empires on the Waterfront: Japan's Ports and Power, 1858–1899* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 2015), 56.

[95] For the revised Anglo-Japanese treaty, see: "Dai Buriten-koku," in *Jōyaku isan*, dai-1-kan, Taishō 14-nen 3-gatsu Gaimushō jōyakukyoku hen, MFA, JACAR B13090778500, 406–7.

and opened an additional treaty port as well. Several years later, after the revised treaties came into effect in 1899, they also opened eight more ports to foreign trade.[96]

The incorporation of these ports into the Japanese Empire soon gave rise to conflicts over their place in Japan's coastal trade. In 1899, British representatives protested after Japanese officials began to charge fees from British ships traveling between Anping and Gaoxiong: two nearby ports administered by a single Qing office, but divided into two different jurisdictions under Japanese rule. The matter was only settled after Foreign Minister Aoki Shūzō announced that, because the ports were opened prior to the ratification of the revised treaties, foreign travel between the two was protected by Article 11's exemption for the "existing open ports of the Empire."[97] In 1903, British and Japanese diplomats again skirmished after Japanese officials prohibited the M. Samuel Co. from carrying cargoes from Jilong, a Taiwanese port, to Kobe, a Japanese port. After protracted negotiations, Japanese officials permitted foreign ships to carry cargoes between Taiwan and Japan under the conditions of Article 11, but foreign rights to carry goods between the two ended with the treaty revision of 1911.[98]

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[96] Phipps, *Empires on the Waterfront*, 53–56.

[97] For correspondence, see "Gaikokusen engan bōeki ni kansuru Taiwan sōtoku rinshin ni taishi naimu daijin yori shōkai ikken Meiji 33-nen 2-gatsu," *Gaimushō kiroku* B-3-2-2-4, MFA, JACAR B10073839200. Also Gaimushō jōyaku kaisei chōsagakari, ed., *Genkō tsūshō jōyakuchū senpaku ni kansuru kitei oyobi sono danpan shimatsu* (1909) in "Jōyaku kaisei junbi iinkai gijiroku dai-6-kan," *Gaimushō kiroku* 2-5-1-0-78-1, MFA, JACAR B06151099700, 576.

[98] Official documents referred to trade between Japan and Taiwan as the "coastal trade" (*engan bōeki*). The Foreign Ministry and Ministry of Finance initially disagreed on whether Article 11 covered the trade, and only settled the matter after a Cabinet meeting. "Gaikoku senpaku no Naichi kaikōjō Taiwan kaikōjō-kan oyobi Taiwan kaikōjō-kan ni Naichi kamotsu yusō ikken," *Gaimushō kiroku* B-3-6-4-16, MFA, JACAR B11092666500. Gaimushō jōyaku kaisei chōsagakari, ed., *Genkō tsūshō jōyakuchū senpaku ni kansuru kitei oyobi sono danpan shimatsu*, in *Gaimushō kiroku*, 576–77.

The colonization of Korea from 1905 to 1910 saw similar assertions of control over coastal trade. When Japan became the paramount power in Korea after the Russo-Japanese War (1904–05), Japanese officials followed patterns of Western imperial expansion and opened the Korean coastal trade to Japanese-flagged ships.[99] After Japan formally colonized the peninsula five years later, top officials further declared that they would continue to permit foreign ships to carry trade between Korea and Japan at pre-colonization tariff rates, but only for the next ten years.[100] Japanese officials thus maintained that transportation in Taiwan and Korea, and between the colonies and the metropole, constituted a part of Japan's coastal trade, and thereby asserted control over new spaces incorporated into Japan's expanding empire.

The confrontation over Japan's coastal trade from 1869 to 1911 was, as with other treaty rights, a struggle for sovereignty. It was also an extended process whereby Japanese and foreign officials redrew the boundaries between Japanese and world shipping. The former sought to sever Japan's coasts from the international shipping industry and reserve them for Japanese-flagged ships. Western diplomats and merchants, in contrast, sought to annihilate any distinction between Japanese and world shipping in order to secure access to those circuits of trade. Much as in China, Western pressure initially yielded a partial extension of international shipping into Japan through inter-treaty port shipping routes, and for much of the Meiji period the treaty ports in Japan were doubly integrated into the international shipping industry: as nodes in networks of foreign trade, and as sites where foreign and Japanese ships competed to provide coastal transportation services. In the 1890s, however, Japanese officials began to not only resist

[99] Chōsen sōtokufu, *Chōsen sōtokufu shisei nenpō Meiji 45-nen Taishō gannen* (1912), 221.

[100] Chōsen sōtokufu, *Chōsen sōtokufu shisei nenpō Meiji 45-nen Taishō gannen*, 222.

foreign pressure but also to expand the scope of the coastal trade outward to encompass new colonies.

Foreign-Flagged Ships Beyond the Treaty Ports

The previous sections have outlined the two basic features of Japan's interface with the international shipping industry. In the ship market, regulations after 1869 permitted Japanese subjects to purchase vessels from foreign owners, and to transfer them to the national registry. The unequal treaties also allowed shippers and passengers to purchase transportation services between treaty ports from foreign ships. This section will now focus on a related dimension of Japan's engagement with international shipping: charters of foreign-flagged ships. While past scholarship has often focused on efforts by officials to expand the Japanese fleet and thereby expel foreign ships from the coasting trade, this section demonstrates that Meiji officials also utilized foreign ships in unopened ports to pursue strategic and commercial goals.

Though the unequal treaties signed by the shogunate only permitted foreign ships to enter the treaty ports, during the Boshin Civil War (1868–69) several domains nonetheless hired foreign ships to transport soldiers and cargoes to other ports as well. The new government did not initially forbid such activities, but instead sought to assert control over the charters. In an official notice issued in mid-1868, for example, the Council of State observed that the Echigo domain had chartered foreign ships to distribute rice rations (*kakoimai*) from the treaty port Niigata. While the council announced that it would permit charters for such purposes, it ordered domain officials to

first apply for permission, and it declared private shipments of rice "strictly forbidden."[101] Likewise, in a proclamation issued in July 1869, the council acknowledged that domains hiring foreign ships to repatriate troops was "unavoidable," but it required domain officials to notify the Kanagawa government of all charters.[102] In the transition to Meiji rule, central officials thus largely lacked the will—or the capacity—to prohibit foreign ships from the unopened ports, but sought to channel charters through treaty port officials.

In August 1869, however, after the last shogunal loyalists surrendered in Hokkaidō,[103] the Council of State issued a blanket prohibition against foreign ships entering the unopened ports. The council reiterated that the hiring of foreign ships had been unavoidable during the recent turmoil (*heiba sōran*), but with the realm quieted it announced that it would no longer permit chartered foreign ships to enter unopened ports, except—in perhaps a recognition of the utility of the vessels in such cases as Niigata—those hired to provide "regional relief."[104] It also declared that it would fine subjects who secretly dispatched foreign ships to unopened ports under the guise of transporting goods between treaty ports. Such orders represented an assertion of the boundary between Japanese and international shipping, though the fines for illicit voyages suggest an ongoing struggle to police that boundary.

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[101] "Gaikokusen yatoiire kakoimai mawashikogi no fushi kokoroekata," in *Hōki bunrui taizen*, vol. 1, *Un'yu-mon*, vol. 11, ed. Naikaku kirokukyoku (n.p.: Naikaku kirokukyoku, 1891), 1.

[102] "Gaikokusen wo koshi shite fukai kōjō ni omomuku mono wa Kanagawa-ken no shiki wo ukeshimu," in *Hōki bunrui taizen*, vol. 1, *Un'yu-mon*, 11:1.

[103] Marius B. Jansen, "The Meiji Restoration," in *The Cambridge History of Japan*, vol. 5, *The Nineteenth Century*, ed. Marius B. Jansen (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008 [1989]), 357–59.

[104] "Gaikokusen wo yatoi fukai kojō ni omomuku wo kin-su," in *Hōki bunrui taizen*, vol. 1, *Un'yu-mon*, 11:2–3.

Despite issuing this proclamation, in the early Meiji years the Council of State continued to permit exceptions to its restrictions on foreign ships. In early 1870, for example, the council notified the Foreign Ministry and the Ministry of Military Affairs that it had granted permission to the Kagoshima domain to hire a foreign ship to carry domain troops back to Kyūshū.[105] That same year, officials in the Karafuto Colonization Commission (*Karafuto kaitakushi*) similarly requested permission to charter foreign ships in Kanagawa and send them to Shinagawa (an unopened port near Tokyo) to collect rice and other cargoes bound for the colonial territory.[106] Domains and agencies of the central government continued to charter foreign ships to such an extent that the Foreign Ministry expressed concern to the Council of State about a "breakdown" (*aikuzure*) of shipping regulations. Ministry officials reported that they were "strictly adhering" (*koshu itashi*) to the regulations regarding foreign ships, but that domain officials from Kagoshima, Takamatsu, and Tonami had on several occasions requested permission to charter foreign ships as troop transports. The Ministry of Military Affairs and the Ministry of Civil Affairs had also dispatched chartered ships to unopened ports, and foreign ministry officials therefore requested further direction regarding the regulation of the ships.[107]

Though there is no record of a response to the Foreign Ministry,[108] in the following years officials continued to permit foreign ships chartered by state ministries and agencies to enter unopened ports for various purposes. In late 1870, the Ministry of

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[105] "Kagoshima-han chōhei kōtai gaikokusen wo motte kikoku-seshimu," *Dajō ruiten*, dai-1-hen, dai-60-kan, NAJ-DA *Da*-00060100-082.

[106] "Kaitakushi Eikoku shōsen wo yaotiire Shinagawa-oki he kaikō-seshimu," *Dajō ruiten*, dai-1-hen, dai-60-kan, NAJ, JACAR A15070470000.

[107] "Gaimushō fukai kōjō he gaikokusen mawashikogi shobun kata hishi wo kou," *Dajō ruiten*, dai-1-hen, dai-63-kan, NAJ-DA *Da*-00064100-057.

[108] A note in the *Dajō ruiten* records "the result is unclear" (*ketsumatsu fushō*).

Military Affairs notified Controllers (*benkan*) in the Council of State of their intent to charter an American vessel to carry instruments for the Armory Office (*Zōheishi*) from Shinagawa to Naniwa, near Osaka.[109] Early the next year, Kagoshima officials again requested permission to transport troops in an American ship, and petitioned for the ship to be allowed to load up on coal in domain territories, instead of at Hyōgo (Kobe) or Nagasaki. Though the Foreign Ministry approved the request, it ordered an official from the Kanagawa Office to travel with the ship to supervise its activities.[110] Later that year the Hokkaidō Colonization Commission (*Kaitakushi*) also petitioned the controllers for permission to charter a ship to transport coal to Hakodate from Iwanai, an unopened port in Hokkaidō that colonial officials described as located in an area of "stormy winds and waves" (*fūtō ken'aku*) where many ships had been wrecked.[111] Similarly, in mid-1872 the Ministry of Industry (*Kōbushō*) requested a permit to allow a British steamship to carry coal from Iwanai to a branch of the Mining Department (*Kōzanryō*) in Sado Prefecture (Niigata).[112] In July 1874 the Foreign Ministry even formalized procedures for notifying customs offices when foreign ships hired by government agencies were to voyage to unopened ports.[113]

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[109] "Heibushō zōheishi kikai wo Naniwa he unyu no tame yatoi gaikokusen Shinagawa nyūkō," *Dajō ruiten*, dai-1-hen, dai-60-kan, NAJ, JACAR A15070469500.

[110] "Kagoshima-han chōhei kōtai futatabi gaikokusen wo koyō-shite kikoku-seshimu," *Dajō ruiten*, dai-1-hen, dai-63-kan, NAJ-DA *Da*-00060100-083.

[111] "Kaitakushi Hokkaidō Iwanai he gaikokusen mawashikogi kyoka wo kou," *Dajō ruiten*, dai-1-hen, dai-60-kan, *Gaikoku kōsai / naichi ryokō fu fukaikōjō kaikō*, NAJ-DA *Da*-00060100-079.

[112] "Kōzanryō sekitan baitoku no tame gaikokusen yatoiire Shiribeshi-no-kuni Iwanai-kō he kaikō," *Dajō ruiten*, dai-1-hen, dai-82-kan, NAJ-DA *Da*-00304100-029.

[113] "Kakuchō nite yatoiire gaikokusen kaisō no fushi zeikan ni shinpō," *Dajō ruiten*, dai-2-hen, dai-196-kan, NAJ-DA *Da*-00418100-009.

In later years, the central government also often permitted foreign ships to collect goods for export from unopened ports. In a study of Japan's special trading ports, Catherine Phipps has outlined how officials opened twenty-two ports to specific trades in the 1880s and 1890s.[114] According to Phipps, in 1889 officials permitted exports of duty-free goods from nine "special ports of export," and she notes that as early as 1876 the Council of State permitted foreign ships to collect rice exports from Yokkaichi and Shimonoseki, and coal from Kuchinotsu.[115] Viewed from the ports, the designation of special trading ports in the 1880s was a formalization of export practices that had been permitted case-by-case since the mid-1870s. From the perspectives of the ships, however, official sanction of the transport of exports in foreign ships was a manifestation of a broader approach to shipping in the early Meiji years: a selective lifting of the barriers between Japanese and international shipping. While past scholarship has primarily focused on efforts by Meiji officials to eject foreign ships from Japan's coasts,[116] in the first years of the Meiji period, officials also regularly hired foreign ships for transportation services. Rather than a complete ban on foreign ships in the unopened ports, the state sought to control and regulate access to international shipping services.

Meiji Wars and International Shipping

While a ship's flag determined the ports that it could access for commercial purposes, its nationality took on another level of significance in times of war. Ships

[114] For a list and map of the ports, as well as the dates of their opening to various trades, see Phipps, *Empires on the Waterfront*, 22, 25.

[115] Shimonoseki, Hakata, Kuchinotsu, Otaru, Yokkaichi, Moji, Karatsu, Misumi, and Fushiki. Phipps, *Empires on the Waterfront*, 40, 43–44, 74–79, 100–102.

[116] Kokaze, *Teikokushugi-ka*, 108, 131–48. Wray, *Mitsubishi and the NYK*, 89–90.

flying a national flag enjoyed the protection of that nation's navy while risking the threat of attacks by its enemies. At the same time, a military might requisition national ships—an aspect of ship nationality that prompted legal experts evaluating the Ship Law in 1898 to suggest that bureaucrats adopt stricter language to require ship registration.[117] Indeed, by the end of the century, several incidents in which the Japanese military utilized ships in military operations underscored the relation between a nation's ships and its capacity to wage war. The result was a normalization of the view that the fleet was not simply a commercial instrument, but also a device that might at any time be called upon for deployment in war. At the same time, the military uses of the commercial fleet did not mean that wartime shipping only involved ships under the Rising Sun flag; instead, a flexible interface with international shipping remained essential during the major conflicts of the Meiji period.

Two conflicts in the 1870s illustrated the military value of maintaining a fleet of commercial ships. First, in 1874 Meiji leaders sent an expedition to Taiwan, nominally to punish aborigines who had murdered shipwrecked fisherman from the Ryūkyūs in 1871. As argued by Robert Eskildsen, the expedition also constituted a broader effort to demonstrate Japan's mastery of Western "civilization" through its export to Taiwan.[118] The military, however, lacked ships necessary to send troops and "civilization" overseas. Meiji leaders instead planned to charter foreign ships as transports, but British and American declarations of neutrality prohibited British- and American-flagged ships from

[117] Nihon gakujutsu shinkōkai, *Hōten chōsakai senpakuhō giji sokkiroku* (1939), 9–11.

[118] Robert Eskildsen, "Of Civilization and Savages: The Mimetic Imperialism of Japan's 1874 Expedition," *American Historical Review* 107, no. 2 (April 2002): 388–418.

participating.[119] Severed from the market for ship charters, Meiji officials scrambled to instead import twelve steamships and one sailing ship for $1,576,800, which they entrusted to Mitsubishi's management.[120] As mentioned above, they later granted these ships to Mitsubishi, along with a number formerly owned by a government-owned company, and thereby concentrated a fleet of ships under a single company.

A few years later Mitsubishi's stock of ships proved useful in the suppression of the Satsuma Rebellion. Between February and July 1877, the military requisitioned 34 ships from Mitsubishi to deploy some 60,000 soldiers to western Japan.[121] Alongside technologies such as the telegraph, which allowed Meiji leaders to communicate with troops during the rebellion, the steamship thus exhibited a dual use in both commerce and war.[122] The redirection of these vessels from the former to the latter, however, disrupted Mitsubishi's coastal services, so the company obtained an $800,000 loan from the government in order to import seven steamships for $1,027,500.[123] Imported ships therefore played a role in both conflicts of the 1870s: in the Taiwan Expedition they were directly employed by officials as transports while, during the Satsuma Rebellion, they replaced requisitioned ships in coastal services.

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[119] Wray, *Mitsubishi and the NYK*, 44.

[120] Unekawa, *Kaiun kōkokushi*, 1:221–22.

[121] For a list of ship names and requisition dates, see Iwasaki-ke denki kankōkai, ed., *Iwasaki Yatarō den*, vol. 2, reprint ed. (Tōkyō: Tōkyō daigaku shuppankai, 1979 [1967]), 249–52. See also Wray, *Mitsubishi and the NYK*, 104.

[122] Daqing Yang, *Technology of Empire: Telecommunications and Japanese Expansion in Asia, 1883–1945* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010), 27–28. Headrick, *The Tools of Empire*, 157–64.

[123] These were large and relatively new British-built vessels: only the *Candia* and the *Massilia* (renamed the *Wakaura Maru* and the *Atago Maru*) were over five-years-old (Table 1.3) Iwasaki-ke denki kankōkai, ed., *Iwasaki Yatarō den*, 2:252–53. See also, Wray, *Mitsubishi and the N.Y.K.*, 104–05. Unekawa, *Kaiun kōkokushi*, 1:224. Iwasaki-ke denki kankōkai, ed., *Iwasaki Yanosuke den*, vol. 1, reprint ed. (Tōkyō: Tōkyō daigaku shuppankai, 1979 [1971]), 159–61.

In the wake of these incidents, anticipation of the wartime applications of commercial ships became a significant factor in the state's shipping policies. When Meiji officials issued their first directive (*meireisho*) to Mitsubishi in 1875, for example, Article 13 guaranteed that the government had the right to use the company's ships "in ordinary times and in times of emergency."[124] A decade later, the vice-minister of agriculture and commerce, Shinagawa Yajirō, reiterated the military significance of shipping in an address to promoters of Union Transportation when he declared: "As you all know, [we] are establishing this company to provide for both military and commercial affairs (*hei shō ryōji*)."[125] At the same time, and as evidenced during the Taiwan Incident and Satsuma Rebellion, the state's capacity to devote ships to these dual purposes rested on access to the international shipping industry.

Likewise, in the Sino-Japanese War (1894–95), Japan's capacity to wage war relied on shipping. The immediate spark for the conflict was a deployment of Qing forces to Korea in June 1894, which prompted the Japanese military to dispatch its own forces later that month, and culminated in formal declarations of war in August.[126] With the war waged in Korea and around North China, Japan's capacity to project power relied on commercial vessels mobilized by the Army and the Navy. After military leaders decided

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[124] The directive is reprinted in Koshino Seikon, ed., *Kaiun shiryō*, vol. 1 (Tōkyō: Koshino Seikon, 1886), 6. For a detailed discussion, see Wray, *Mitsubishi and the N.Y.K.*, 77–83.

[125] "Shinagawa taifu enzetsu," *Mainichi shinbun* (15 October 1882), reprinted in Koshino, *Kaiun shiryō*, 1:638.

[126] Accounts of the war and its origins can be found in Akira Iriye, "Japan's Drive to Great-Power Status," in *The Cambridge History of Japan*, vol. 5, ed. Marius B. Jansen (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008 [1989]), 762–65. Stewart Lone, *Japan's First Modern War: Army and Society in the Conflict with China 1894–95* (New York: St. Martin's Press, Inc., 1994). W. Beasley, *Japanese Imperialism, 1894-1945*, reprint ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989 [1987]), 48. Benjamin Elman, *On Their Own Terms: Science in China, 1550–1900* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005), 379–86.

to dispatch the 9th Mixed Brigade to Korea, the Army ordered the N.Y.K. to send ten ships to Ujina, a naval base in Hiroshima.[127] The next day the N.Y.K. board of directors met and chose to withdraw five steamships from the company's eastern coastal service, three of the four vessels in the western service, and two auxiliary ships (*rinjisen*).[128] These ten steamships totaled 19,318 gross tons: almost a third of the company's tonnage, and one tenth of all steamships in the Japanese registry.[129] A week later, the Army and Navy requisitioned an additional six ships from the N.Y.K. and two from another company, the O.S.K. (Osaka Shosen Kaisha, *Ōsaka shōsen kabushiki gaisha*), and for the next month a transportation and communications office established by the Army in Ujina oversaw the transport of troops and supplies to Incheon.[130]

The military's shipping requirements increased after Japanese leaders declared war on the Qing on August 1, 1894. By October 1894 Army requisitions totaled 113,372 gross tons, and requisitions peaked in July 1895 at around 240,000 gross tons, when the ships were used to repatriate some soldiers and deploy others to Taiwan. During the war, the Army utilized most of the ships to transport troops and supplies, but the Navy also deployed some as torpedo boats or supply ships.[131] The Navy also outfitted the N.Y.K.'s

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[127] Sanbō honbu, ed., *Meiji nijūshichi-hachi-nen Nisshin senshi*, vol. 8 (Tōkyō: Tōkyō insatsu kabushiki gaisha, 1907), 48.

[128] *NYK TG*, dai-29-kai (June 5, 1894), in *NYK 100-nenshi shiryō*, 456. Interview with Kondō Renpei, "Nisshin jiken to kaiun jigyō," *Asahi shinbun*, August 25, 1895, 2. F. Warrington Eastlake and Yamada Yoshiaki, *Heroic Japan: A History of the War between China & Japan* (Tōkyō: Shūeisha daiichi kōjō, 1896), 436–37.

[129] NYK prewar tonnage based on Wray, *Mitsubishi and the NYK*, 303. Tonnage of requisitioned ships based on *NYK 50-nenshi*, 127–30. Prewar (June 1894) tonnage of steamships based on Sanbō honbu, ed., *Meiji nijūshichi-hachi-nen Nisshin senshi*, 8:49.

[130] Sanbō honbu, ed., *Meiji nijūshichi-hachi-nen Nisshin senshi*, 8:48, 50.

[131] *NYK 50-nenshi*, 123–24.

Saikyō Maru as a cruiser, and in September it participated in the Haiyang naval battle.[132] Though the N.Y.K. was the main source of requisitions, other shipowners also pursued potentially lucrative military contracts. In mid-July, the Japan Shipping Alliance notified the Army Ministry that its members were "resolved to respond to requisitions at any time,"[133] and half of Army requisitions in December were ships owned by O.S.K., Mitsui, and nineteen shagaisen shipowners.[134]

The mobilization of these quantities of shipping also required engagement with international shipping. Peak requisitions in mid-1894 exceeded Japan's prewar steamship tonnage by almost 50,000 gross tons, and military operations alone therefore depended on an expansion of the Japanese-flagged fleet. At the same time, the diversion of ships from commercial transportation (*shō*) to military affairs (*hei*) disrupted established movements of goods and people. A history of the war published by the Army General Staff commented that even the initial requisition of ten N.Y.K. steamships "greatly obstructed transportation, and [places] such as Hokkaidō fell into the adverse situation of an almost complete stoppage of supplies."[135] According to Kondō Renpei, the N.Y.K. vice-president (and president from 1895 to 1921),[136] fertilizer bound for Hokkaidō accumulated in Japan's main islands as the freight rate "leapt" from 3 to 6 *sen*.[137] After the formal declaration of war, the withdrawal of additional ships from coastal services

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[132] For a description, see Eastlake and Yamada, *Heroic Japan*, 78–88. *NYK 50-nenshi*, 123–26.

[133] "Kaiungyō dōmeikai no chinjo," *Asahi shinbun*, July 19, 1894, 2.

[134] "Senpaku shiyō meirei no ken (hōsen kaisha ha nozoku)," in "Meiji 27-nen 6-gatsu yori 'kinyō jikōshū,'" *Rikugunshō dai-nikki* M27-10-111, NIDS, JACAR C06060166900.

[135] Sanbō honbu, ed., *Meiji nijūshichi-hachi-nen Nisshin senshi*, 8:48.

[136] *NYK 100-nenshi shiryō*, 78.

[137] "Nisshin jiken to kaiun jigyō," 2.

also disrupted the transport of coal from mines in Hokkaidō and Kyūshū to urban centers in Honshū.[138]

In order to rapidly secure sufficient tonnage to meet military and commercial demand, officials and shipowners drew on international markets. When N.Y.K. directors met on June 5 to discuss the first requisitions, they allocated ¥700,000 for ship purchases to prevent disruptions to coastal services, and eight days later approved the import of four foreign ships.[139] The Army and Navy, however, requisitioned the vessels shortly after their arrived in Japan, while retaining the original ten requisitions.[140] Between January and March 1895, the N.Y.K. imported five more used vessels—renamed after Chinese cities at the center of the war: Rongcheng, Haicheng, Weihai, Dalian, and Tianjin—but these were also requisitioned by the military in March and only released at the end of the year.[141] While the import of the nine used vessels increased N.Y.K. tonnage by around a third, the military's requisition of the ships meant that they did little to maintain coastal services.

Japan's status as a belligerent, meanwhile, complicated the acquisition of a large ship ordered before the war: the *Tosa Maru*. N.Y.K. directors had ordered the vessel in early 1894, but when Japan declared war in August, the ship was still in Europe, docked

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[138] "Nisshin jiken to sekitan," *Asahi shinbun*, September 1, 1894, 1. "Sekitan no futtei to kakaku bōtō," *Asahi shinbun*, September 13, 1894, 1.

[139] The directors approved the purchase of seven ships. Three of those were imported as part of the Army and Navy purchases discussed below. *NYK TG*, dai-29-kai (June 5, 1894); *NYK TG*, dai-30-kai (June 13, 1894), in *NYK 100-nenshi shiryō*, 456.

[140] The *Sendai Maru* was released in late July 1894, but was requisitioned again in June and remained in service until December 1895. *NYK 50-nenshi*, 127.

[141] For a full list of wartime requisitions of NYK ships, see *NYK 50-nenshi*, 127–30.

in Glasgow, where several alterations were made to its deck.[142] These were completed on August 11, but three days later the British Secretary of State issued a warrant to the Glasgow customs office to detain the *Tosa Maru* on the grounds that the ship had been "built, commissioned, or equipped" contrary to the 1870 Foreign Enlistment Act, which prohibited British subjects from outfitting the ships of belligerent states while Britain remained neutral.[143] The Japanese consul in Glasgow, A.R. Brown, summarized British concerns as follows:

> It would appear that the Authorities first considered the cargo ports cut between the main and upper decks were intended to be used as gun ports, but after these had been examined by Government Experts they appeared to abandon their former Contention and then maintained that although the fittings of the vessel may only be such as are necessary and usual in the vessels of the Nippon Yusen Kaisha, yet she was well adapted for the conveyance of troops, and may possibly be used for such a purpose after her arrival in Japan. I pointed out to the Collector of Customs that the same argument would apply to any vessel, as any ship having two decks could be used for the Conveyance of troops such a short distance as between Japan and Corea [*sic*], and if that view were maintained it would prevent the transfer of any Merchant Vessel to any belligerent power during hostilities.[144]

According to Brown, who had negotiated other N.Y.K. ship purchases, the cargo ports that aroused suspicion were typical on the company's ships, as they permitted light cargo

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[142] *NYK TG*, dai-10-kai (January 31, 1894), in *NYK 100-nenshi shiryō*, 451. A.R. Brown, Consul, Glasgow, to Viscount Aoki, Japanese Legation, London, August 11, 1894, in "Nisshin sensō no sai Sokoku 'Gurasugō' ni oite kō'nyū shitaru Nippon yūsen kaisha kisen *Tosa Maru* Eikoku seifu ni yokuryū ikken," *Gaimushō kiroku* 5-2-14-0-6, MFA, JACAR B07091144100, 337.

[143] "Detention of the Ship 'Islam' at Glasgow" (August 1894), in "Nisshin sensō no sai," *Gaimushō kiroku*, 359–61. Similarly, the *Tatsuta*, a warship en route to Japan in August 1894, was delayed due to concerns that its British crew was in violation of the act. "Nisshin sen'eki no sai teikoku gunkan Tatsuta kaikō no michi Eikoku seifu ni oite yokuryū ikken," *Gaimushō kiroku* 5-2-14-0-7, MFA, JACAR B07091144200. For the act, see Nir Arielli, Gabriela A. Frei, and Inge Van Hulle, "The Foreign Enlistment Act, International Law, and British Politics, 1819–2014," *The International History Review* 38, no. 4 (2016): 636–56.

[144] A.R. Brown, Consul, Glasgow, to Hayashi Tadasu, Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs, Tokyo, August 30, 1894, in "Nisshin sensō no sai," *Gaimushō kiroku*, 335.

to be "passed in and out of the ship by hand."[145] The British Secretary of State, however, cited the subsidies that the Japanese government granted the N.Y.K. "so that their vessels may, in case of necessity, be used as transports and armed cruisers,"[146] and he only released the *Tosa Maru* after Ambassador Aoki Shūzō guaranteed that it would not participate in the war.[147] In late August, the ship finally departed for Japan, where it provided coastal services for the war's duration despite requests from the Army to employ the ship in the transport of supplies to Incheon.[148]

Government officials, meanwhile, also observed the necessity of obtaining additional ships both to support military operations and to ensure the continued flow of goods along Japan's coasts. Such concerns were evident in a June 26, 1894 cabinet resolution, which began:

> Transportation is something that the people's livelihood cannot dispense with for even one day. Needless to say, this is particularly true in our nation: a nation surrounded on four sides by the sea, in which steamships are necessary for national defense and for trade. However, among our nation's current ships, those suitable for overseas voyages number no more than 94,000 gross tons. This cannot be said to be sufficient in times of peace; how can we be surprised if they are also insufficient in times of great emergency? Recently, troops have been dispatched to Korea, necessitating transport ships above all; the N.Y.K. has therefore been issued orders, and 14 vessels (more than 27,000 tons gross) have been used. This has immediately created inconveniences in transportation, and freight in various places has been brought to a temporary standstill.

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[145] A.R. Brown, Consul, Glasgow, to Viscount Aoki, Japanese Legation, London, August 13, 1894; A.R. Brown, Consul, Glasgow, to E.H. Wildish, Collector of Customs, Glasgow, 16 August 1894, in "Nisshin sensō no sai," *Gaimushō kiroku*, 338–39, 343.

[146] Kimberley, Foreign Office, to Viscount Aoki, August 25, 1894, in "Nisshin sensō no sai," *Gaimushō kiroku*, 353.

[147] Kimberely, Foreign Office, to Viscount Aoki, August 27, 1894, in "Nisshin sensō no sai," *Gaimushō kiroku*, 356–57.

[148] Nabeshima, Secretary, Hiroshima, to Foreign Minister Mutsu, November 3, 1894; Foreign Minister Mutsu to Nabeshima, Secretary, Hiroshima, November 3, 1894; Foreign Minister Mutsu to Nabeshima, Secretary, Hiroshima and Count Itō, February 12, 1894, in "Nisshin sensō no sai," *Gaimushō kiroku*, 326, 331–32.

> Hokkaidō in particular has developed transportation blockages, not only giving rise to commercial fears, but fears that the consequences might also spread to agriculture and industry. How can we bear this?[149]

To compensate for the shortages, the Cabinet allocated ¥2,500,000 to import ten ships for use as troop transports during the war and in commercial shipping after its end.[150]

To acquire these ships, the military turned to the N.Y.K. In June 1894, the Army ordered the company to purchase nine steamships and turn them over at designated ports within two months. Under a directive finalized on 10 July,[151] the Army agreed to charter the ships back to the N.Y.K. for the duration of the war at an annual rate of 5 percent of the purchase price, during which time the company would use the vessels to transport troops and military supplies. In return, the N.Y.K. was allowed to repurchase the ships after the war for the original price less charter fees on interest-free installments over twenty years.[152] In short, the company received favorable terms of ship finance in return for cooperating with the Army. The first nine ships purchased by the N.Y.K. totaled 16,196 gross tons and cost ¥3,370,000.[153] In September, the Navy issued orders for five more ships, and the Army and Navy thereby acquired fourteen ships totaling 41,800 gross tons.[154] O.S.K. directors also approached Prime Minister Count Itō Hirobumi in

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[149] "Kakugian," in "Senpaku kō'nyū ni kakaru kakugi oyobi meirei no ken," *Rikugunshō dai-nikki* M27-10-111, NIDS, JACAR C06060167600.

[150] "Kakugian," in "Senpaku kō'nyū ni kakaru kakugi," *Rikugunshō dai-nikki*.

[151] *NYK 50-nenshi*, 122. *NYK TG*, dai-34-kai (July 11, 1894), in *NYK 100-nenshi shiryō*, 457.

[152] "Meireisho," in "Senpaku kō'nyū ni kakaru kakugi oyboi meirei no ken," *Rikugunshō dai-nikki*. "Meireisho," in "Nippon yūsen kabushiki kaisha oyobi Ōsaka shōsen kabushiki kaisha he kashitsuke no senpaku Ryojun Maru hoka roku-seki wo dō-kaisha he kaimodosashimu fu meireishoan," *Kōbun ruishū*, dai-20-hen, dai-24-kan, NAJ, JACAR A15113108100.

[153] "Meiji 27-nen 12-gatsu 20-ka shirabe," in "Senpaku kō'nyū ni kakaru kakugi," *Rikugunshō dai-nikki*.

[154] See *NYK 50-nenshi*, 122. The NYK received the order on 1 September 1894. See *NYK TG*, dai-42-kai (September 5, 1894), in *NYK 100-nenshi shiryō*, 458.

December for a similar arrangement, but while they aimed for a contract to operate a large ship, such as the *Lüshun Maru* (4,794 gross tons) or the *Jinzhou Maru* (3,967 gross tons), Itō and other officials only agreed to transfer the N.Y.K.'s lease on the *Busan Maru* (2,491 gross tons).[155]

The heightened wartime demand for tonnage thus resulted in a rapid influx of foreign vessels to the Japanese registry. In the course of the war, the N.Y.K. imported 69,936 gross tons, and shagaisen owners such as Hiroumi and others in the Shipowners' Alliance also imported some 60,000 gross tons.[156] Requisitions, however, dramatically outpaced imports, and even as the Japanese fleet grew between mid-1894 and mid-1895, requisitions left less than 80,000 gross tons remaining for commercial use—less than half of Japan's prewar tonnage.[157]

Officials and shipowners therefore required additional means of compensating for the withdrawal of Japanese-flagged tonnage from commercial shipping. On 11 September 1894, Finance Minister Watanabe Kunitake observed to Prime Minister Itō that:

> Since the outbreak of the Qing Incident, ships previously used in Japan's [*naichi*] coastal transport have, in general, been requisitioned by the Army and Navy. Since Japan's shipping services have been practically

[155] Itō initially ordered the Army Ministry to transfer both the *Busan Maru* and the *Sakura Maru* (2,953 gross tons) to the O.S.K., but the N.Y.K. argued that it planned to use the *Sakura Maru* on its Bombay Line. "Senpaku kō'nyū ni kakaru ryōsha no kakushitsu," *Asahi shinbun*, December 9, 1894, 1. "Meireisho," in "Nippon yūsen kabushiki kaisha oyobi Ōsaka shōsen kabushiki kaisha he kashitsuke no senpaku Ryojun Maru," *Kōbun ruishū*. *NYK TG*, dai-55-kai (December 5, 1894); dai-56-kai (December 12, 1894), in *NYK 100-nenshi shiryō*, 459–60.

[156] Unekawa, *Kaiun kōkokushi*, 1:268–69.

[157] Japanese tonnage based on Teishinshō, *Teishin jigyōshi*, 6:998–99. Requisitions based on Sanbō honbu, ed., *Meiji nijūshichi-hachi-nen Nisshin senshi*, 8:49–50.

> obstructed, commercial freight has accumulated, throwing off the balance between supply and demand.[158]

Watanabe argued that a collapse of transportation might lead to a decline in industry (*shōkōgyō no suitai*), and he therefore suggested that the government permit foreign ships to participate in the coastal trade. He did not, however, advocate that foreign ships gain unfettered access to the coasts. Instead, he proposed that Japanese shipowners and operators be permitted to charter foreign ships and employ them in the coastal trade, and on September 22, 1894, the central government ordered the prefectures to permit chartered ships to enter unopened ports for the next six months.[159] According to one account, by March 1895, the N.Y.K. had chartered around thirty-three steamships totaling 76,000 tons, which it employed in its major coastal service and on the lines to Okinawa, Shanghai, and Korea.[160] Through a combination of imports and charters, the military therefore managed to devote commercial tonnage to wartime objectives without triggering a complete collapse of Japan's coastal transportation.

When, a decade after the war with the Qing, Japan again embarked on a war for influence in Northeast Asia, similar dynamics played out in shipping. In 1903, on the eve of the Russo-Japanese War (1904–05), there were around 1,088 steamships (657,000 gross tons) in the Japanese registry.[161] Wartime requisitions peaked at 177 ships (440,000 gross tons) for the Army and 89 ships (230,000 gross tons) for the Navy,[162] with the

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[158] "Teikoku shinmin ni shite kaiun wo eigyō to suru mono ni kagiri tōbun no uchi gaikokusen wo koyō shite enkai shokō ni kaisō wo tokkyo su," *Kōbun ruisan*, dai-18-hen, dai-37-kan, NAJ, JACAR A01200788300.

[159] Eastlake and Yamada, *Heroic Japan*, 443.

[160] Eastlake and Yamada, *Heroic Japan*, 443–44.

[161] Teishinshō, ed. *Teishin jigyōshi*, 6:998–99.

[162] Teishinshō, ed., *Teishin jigyōshi*, 6:954.

N.Y.K. again providing the largest single contribution of ships—55 ships totaling 212,927 gross tons.[163] In contrast to the previous war, however, the N.Y.K. did not provide the majority of ships, as the military also requisitioned 381,200 tons of shagaisen shipping. Shagaisen owners had once again actively pursued these contracts: when war seemed likely in December 1903, the Japan Shipowners' Alliance had notified the communications minister that its members would prepare weekly tables of the locations of their ships to prepare for requisition orders.[164]

As in the Sino-Japanese War, however, wartime requisitions exceeded prewar steamship tonnage, and shipowners and officials—who seem to have learned lessons from the war with China—again turned to imports and charters of foreign ships to obtain additional tonnage. The construction of 217 steamships (57,589 gross tons) and the capture of 64 enemy ships (150,763 gross tons) also expanded the Japanese-flagged fleet, but imports of 172 ships (316,004 gross tons) made up the majority of tonnage increases.[165] In the days before the declaration of war, some foreign-flagged ships even sailed to Yokohama expecting that hostilities would create heightened demand for ships.[166] By the end of 1905, the Japanese fleet included 691 ships larger than 100 gross tons, and, at 870,839 gross tons, it had become the world's sixth largest.[167]

Communications officials, meanwhile, anticipated the necessity of again permitting foreign ships to access the coastal trade, and rapidly implemented policies

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[163] Unekawa, *Kaiun kōkokushi*, 1:288.

[164] "Senshu dōmeikai to go-yōsen," *Asahi shinbun*, December 31, 1903, 3.

[165] Teishinshō, ed., *Teishin jigyōshi*, 6:956.

[166] "Gaikoku baisen Yokohama ni kaikō," *Asahi shinbun*, February 8, 1904, 2. "Gaikokusen baikyaku no mōshikomi," *Asahi shinbun*, May 18, 1904, 7.

[167] Sixth by steamships larger than 100 gross tons. *Teishinshō*, ed., *Teishin jigyōshi*, 6:956–57.

similar to those adopted in the previous war. On February 1, 1904, only days before the February 10 declaration of war, Communications Minister Ōura Kanetake permitted chartered foreign ships to enter the unopened ports and carry the coasting trade.[168] Over the next two years, the tonnage of chartered ships only twice dropped below 100,000 tons.[169] Charters also allowed the N.Y.K. to maintain several transoceanic services established in the late 1890s. While requisitions forced the suspension of Oriental Steamship's San Francisco line and the N.Y.K's Australia line, the N.Y.K. continued to provide services on its Seattle and Europe lines by hiring foreign ships.[170]

As indicated by slogans about the application of Japanese shipping to both "military and commercial affairs" (*hei shō nito*), commercial ships played a role in the military conflicts of the Meiji period. After the 1874 Taiwan Expedition, officials promoted shipping enterprise in Japan in part to maintain a reserve fleet of ships that the military could utilize in emergencies. Despite the steady growth of the Japanese fleet in the late nineteenth century, however, the combined demands of military requisitions and commercial services exceeded Japan's shipping capacity during the Satsuma Rebellion, the Sino-Japanese War, and the Russo-Japanese War. Imports of foreign-flagged ships and the temporary relaxation of restrictions on the coasting trade therefore proved essential in mobilizing shipping during moments of national crisis.

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[168] "Gaikokusen fukaikōjō kikō tokkyo," *Asahi shinbun*, February 2, 1904, 2. Unekawa, *Kaiun kōkokushi*, 1:288.


[169] Unekawa, *Kaiun kōkokushi*, 1:288.

[170] Teishinshō, ed., *Teishin jigyōshi*, 6:955–56.

Conclusion

The Japanese ship emerged in the late nineteenth century as part of a wider effort to build a nation from a position of weakness. Through ship registries and other administrative practices derived from transnational models, Meiji officials sought to tether a set of ships to the nation and resist the advance of Western empires into Japan's coastal trade. By adopting a definition of ship nationality predicated on vessels remaining under the control of Japanese subjects, they sought to ensure that those ships would be directed to national goals framed under slogans such as "rich nation, strong army." Officials embraced the import of large numbers of foreign-built ships and the temporary entrance of foreign crews to Japan. By permitting the particular transgressions of the boundaries between Japan and the world, officials enabled the rapid creation of a fleet of ships flying the Rising Sun flag, as well as the mobilization of that fleet during Japan's wars with China and Russia. At the same time, these laws and regulations also made the nation into the organizing principle for the regulation and tabulation of ships. The fleet of ships in the national registry became something to be measured, and its size was often charted in official and commercial maritime publications as it expanded over the course of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. (Figure 1.1)

FIGURE 1.1 Tonnage of Japanese Steam Vessels, 1870–1938
Source: Teishinshō, *Teishin jigyōshi*, 6:998–999.



CHAPTER 2. EXPANDING NAVIGATION POWER, 1893–1914

FIGURE 2.1 Commemoration of the Steam Tonnage of Japan exceeding 1,000,000 tons
Source: Lafayette College, East Asia Image Collection, Imperial Postcard Collection, https://digital.lafayette.edu/collections/eastasia/imperial-postcards/ip0361.



Imperial Postcard Collection
Lafayette College Libraries
http://digital.lafayette.edu/collections/eastasia/imperial-postcards/ip0361

The above postcard was produced to celebrate a benchmark in the development of Japan's shipping industry: in 1906, Japanese steamship tonnage surpassed 1,000,000 tons. A table inset in the lower half plots out the inexorable expansion of that fleet from a mere 10,000 tons in 1870. Much of the postcard, however, is dominated by a map, centered on Japan, with red lines that indicate trade routes plied by the expanding fleet. The lines extend in all directions: to ports in the near seas around Japan, across the Pacific to North America, south to Australia, and west to India, Suez, and Europe. An object of circulation itself, the postcard not only commemorated the achievement of a

1,000,000-ton fleet, but also the extensive reach of those ships and their position in trade routes that spanned oceans.

Many of the shipping services depicted by the postcard were established in the late 1890s. As discussed in the previous chapter, Japanese-flagged ships first began to provide overseas services on a regular schedule in 1875, when Mitsubishi opened its Shanghai line. In the years that followed, several companies expanded this network in the near seas, but in the 1890s politicians, businessmen, and intellectuals began to call for the establishment of additional overseas services. These were to include a direct connection between Japan and Vladivostok, as well as services in the "Three Big Shipping Routes" (*san dai kōro*)—the transoceanic routes to North America, Australia, and Europe. These ambitions were realized in 1896, when the Diet passed a package of navigation and shipbuilding subsidies intended to project Japanese ships into overseas trade routes. As discussed in the previous chapter, in the spring of 1896, the *Tosa Maru* made the first sailing on the N.Y.K.'s Europe line.

This chapter examines discussion of shipping expansion, the government's subsidy policies, and conditions and representations of transoceanic shipping lines from the 1890s until the 1910s. It argues that in this period, many businessmen, officials, and intellectuals came to view an active role in shipping as an important facet of a modern nation. In order to join the ranks of Western powers engaged in the ordering of transportation at sea, they sought to emulate relationships between state and maritime transport observed overseas, and they produced publications that marketed Japan's place in maritime affairs in order to encourage popular support for oceanic expansion. Through

shipping, they sought to place Japan beyond its borders in the maritime interstices between territories.

Visions of a World Connected

In the 1870s and 1880s, Meiji leaders were primarily concerned with the development of coastal shipping, though they also supported the extension of Japanese-flagged services to ports in Northeast Asia. As Japanese companies consolidated their hold on intra-Japanese traffic, however, companies and policymakers began to turn their attention to more distant horizons. In the late 1880s, the N.Y.K. sent ships to test the waters in French Indochina, Singapore, Hawai'i, and Australia, and petitioned cabinet ministers for a ¥500,000 postal subsidy to support the purchase of the O. & O.'s San Francisco-Hawai'i-Yokohama-Hong Kong service. Though N.Y.K. petitions regarding the San Francisco route were rejected by communications officials, the company opened unsubsidized services to Manila in 1891 and Bombay in 1893.[1] In the early 1890s, moreover, a number of politicians, intellectuals, and business leaders began to advocate for the "expansion of shipping lines" (*kōro no kakuchō*) and urged the government to implement measures to foster overseas shipping.[2] In the process, they mapped out a

[1] *NYK 50-nenshi*, 86–88, 113–20. For studies of the opening of the Bombay line, see Kokaze Hidemasa, *Teikokushugi-ka no Nihon kaiun: Kokusai kyōsō to taigai jiritsu* (Tōkyō: Yamakawa shuppansha, 1995), 295–303. Miwa Ryōichi, *Nihon kindai no keizai seisaku shiteki kenkyū* (Tōkyō: Tōkyō daigaku shuppankai, 2003), 353–65. William D. Wray, *Mitsubishi and the N.Y.K., 1870–1914: Business Strategy in the Japanese Shipping Industry* (Cambridge, MA: Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard University, 1984), 293–308.

[2] Examining debates on shipping in the press, Diet, and business community, Katayama Kunio has argued that commercial concerns, rather than military or imperial objectives, motivated shipping expansion. Miwa Ryōichi has also examined debates on shipping expansion in terms of a transition in Japanese shipping policy from a focus on companies (support for the N.Y.K.) to a focus on particular shipping routes. Katayama Kunio, *Kindai Nihon kaiun to Ajia* (Tōkyō: Ochanomizu shobō, 1996), 129–57. Idem, "The Expansion of Japan's Shipping Interests before

rapidly expanding system of global transportation, and asserted that Japan's rise as a world power required its ships to contribute to the global circulation of people and goods—not only between Japan and the world, but between foreign countries as well.

With the establishment of the Imperial Diet in 1890, newly elected politicians began to call for reforms to the government's shipping policy. In 1892, Nishiyama Yukuzumi and eight other members of the Liberal Party (*Jiyūtō*) elected to the Lower House submitted a "Draft Resolution on the Expansion of Shipping Lines" (*Kōro kakuchō kengian*) to the Diet. Emphasizing the importance of shipping to Japan, "an island ringed by seas," they lamented the limited scope of Japan's overseas shipping, which extended lines to China, Korea, Russia, and the Philippines. To expand the reach of Japanese ships, Nishiyama and his supporters demanded that the government discontinue subsidies for coastal services, and instead direct resources to overseas shipping. In particular, they emphasized the importance of immediately developing shipping services to Australia and Europe, and suggested that companies eventually establish services to the Americas as well as a direct connection to Vladivostok.[3]

Intellectuals and business leaders soon began to echo and elaborate on these calls for shipping expansion. In 1893, the Japan Economic Society (*Nihon keizaikai*) solicited essays on the past, present, and future of Japanese shipping, and the following year published a collection of four prizewinning essays under the title *On Japanese Shipping*

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the Sino-Japanese War," in *The Internationalization of the Sea Transport Industries since 1850*, ed. David J. Starkey and Gelina Harlaftis (Liverpool Universty Press, 1998), 157–60. Miwa, *Nihon kindai no keizai seisaku shiteki kenkyū*, 310–29. Idem, "Maritime Policy in Japan: 1868–1937," in *Business History of Shipping: Strategy and Structure*, ed. Tsunehiko Yui and Keiichirō Nakagawa (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1985), 130–36.

[3] *SGS*, dai-4-kai, dai-14-gō (December 16, 1892), 310.

(Nihon kaiunron).[4] All of the essayists emphasized that the future of Japanese shipping lay overseas. First prize was awarded to Terashima Shigenobu, a civilian employed in the Navy Ministry to translate the works of American naval strategist Alfred Mahan.[5] In his essay, Terashima echoed Nishiyama's calls to "expand shipping lines overseas," and, referencing the Liberal Party and N.Y.K. policy proposals, offered a detailed discussion of the relative merits of different policies and trajectories of expansion.[6] In an essay published under the same title, Tsuboya Zenshirō, a journalist with the publishing house Hakubunkan, also proposed a variety of measures to expand Japan's shipping and shipbuilding industries.[7] The following year, moreover, the Tokyo Chamber of Commerce organized a committee under Mitsubishi Director Shōda Heigorō that investigated maritime policies and produced proposals regarding shipping and shipbuilding.[8]

Though the specifics of their policy proposals varied, these politicians, essayists, and business leaders all represented shipping as an essential component of a nation's wealth and power.[9] In his Diet resolution, Nishiyama asserted, "the ebb and flow of

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[4] Yano Yoshihiro, *Nihon kaiunron* (Tōkyō: Nihon keizaikai, 1894).

[5] For Terashima's career, see: Shibasaki Rikiei, "Kasō jun'yōkan wo teishō shita Terashima Shigenobu," *Memoirs of the Osaka Institute of Technology*, Series B 55, no. 1 (2010): 29–34. For a discussion of Mahan's theories of sea power and history, see Jon Testuro Sumida, *Inventing Grand Strategy and Teaching Command: The Classic Works of Alfred Thayer Mahan Reconsidered* (Washington, D.C.: The Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1997).

[6] Terashima Shigenobu, "Nihon no kaiun," in *Nihon kaiunron*, ed. Yano Yoshihiro (Tōkyō: Nhon keizaikai, 1894), 87–88.

[7] Tsuboya Zenshirō, *Nihon kaiunron* (Tōkyō: Hakubunkan, 1894).

[8] Shōda Heigorō, *Kaiun shinchō hōhō torishirabesho: Fu enzetsu hikki* (n.p.: ca. 1895).

[9] For an overview of the different routes prioritized by theorists, business leaders, and politicians, see Katayama, *Kindai Nihon kaiun to Ajia*, 129–57. Idem, "The Expansion of Japan's Shipping Interests before the Sino-Japanese War," 157–60.

shipping correlates to the rise and fall of nations."[10] More specifically, Terashima wrote that shipping was integral to Japan's "three great policies" (*san dai saku*): "prosperity through commerce" (*tsūshō rikkoku*), national defense through naval power, and the alleviation of overpopulation through overseas migration.[11] A range of concerns—commercial, military, and Malthusian—thus converged on ships and their capacity to set in motion flows of people and goods, and Terashima addressed these manifold uses of ships when he listed several different dimensions of shipping:

1. A tool for transportation overseas
2. A source to enrich the nation
3. Supporting commerce and trade
4. Mediating migration policy
5. A postal institution
6. A support for military armament[12]

With regard to commerce, proponents of shipping expansion observed that the development of Japanese-flagged shipping could reduce payments to the foreign firms that carried the bulk of Japan's foreign trade. Introducing his resolution to the Diet, Nishiyama observed, "our nation's trade goods are handled by foreign vessels, which earn as much as eight-tenths of profits from transportation."[13] Such concerns made the establishment of services to the United States and Europe particularly urgent. The U.S. was Japan's largest trading partner, but Terashima observed that foreign companies

[10] *SGS*, dai-4-kai, dai-14-gō (December 16, 1892), 310. Other advocates of shipping expansion made similar statements. For instance, the prefatory comments to the Japan Economic Society's essay collection declared that "the ebb and flow of the shipping industry relates to the interests of the national economy." Yano, *Nihon kaiunron*, 1. In his discussion of the future of Japanese shipping, Terashima wrote that "one thing related to the ebb and flow of our nation's fate is [shipping]." Terashima, "Nihon kaiunron," 87. Tsuboya similarly concluded his essay with the statement: "in summary, the rise and fall of shipping brings the rise and fall of a nation's destiny." Tsuboya, *Nihon kaiunron*, 200.

[11] Terashima, "Nihon kaiunron," 1.

[12] Terashima, "Nihon kaiunron," 123.

[13] *SGS*, dai-4-kai, dai-14-gō (December 16, 1892), 310.

(Pacific Mail, the O. & O., Canadian Pacific Steamship, and Northern Pacific Steamship) monopolized profits from the carriage of that trade. Similarly, trade with countries along the route to Europe (India, Britain, Germany, and other European countries) made up around 40 percent of Japan's foreign trade by value, but almost all of that trade was carried by foreign ships.[14] The establishment of services to the U.S. and to Europe therefore promised to shift shares of those cargoes into Japanese holds. Services to ports in the Americas, moreover, might allow Japanese ships to gain shares of passenger traffic, and foster Japanese emigration.[15]

Anticipation of imminent developments in world trade also motivated proposals for Japanese ships to establish new lines of transportation. Though Terashima acknowledged that Japanese trade with Australia was "insignificant," he also pointed out that "Australia is a newly opened continent, with rich resources across the territory, and, in addition, its demand is almost limitless."[16] Since a direct service had yet to be opened in routes between Australia and Japan or China, Nishiyama and Shōda also suggested that if a Japanese company moved fast, it might secure a monopoly on the route.[17] Likewise, the impending completion of the Trans-Siberian Railway promised to invite additional flows of trade through Vladivostok. Though the N.Y.K. already operated services to the Russian port via Korea, Terashima and Shōda called for an expansion of Japanese activities in the port, and the establishment of a direct, Japan-Vladivostok connection.[18]

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[14] Terashima, "Nihon kaiunron," 89, 97–98.

[15] Terashiima, "Nihon kaiunron," 93, 173. Shōda, *Kaiun shinchō hōhō torishirabesho*, 51.

[16] Terashima, "Nihon kaiunron," 102.

[17] *SGS*, dai-4-kai, dai-14-gō (December 16, 1892), 310. Shōda, *Kaiun shinchō hōhō torishirabesho*, 52.

[18] Terashima, "Nihon kaiunron," 107–9. Shōda, *Kaiun shinchō hōhō torishirabe sho*, 11, 48.

The urgency behind these proposals for shipping expansion in part stemmed from a vision of world shipping in which the lines of transportation that crisscrossed ocean spaces were divided up among nations. Regardless of the provenance of the ship or the nationality of its crew, as viewed by Nishiyama, Terashima, and others, shipping services were linked to the nations whose flags they flew. This view was clearly articulated by Shōda in a presentation to the Tokyo Chamber of Commerce:

> The world's oceans belong to no one, but are the common property of the world. Anyone can use them. To float ships upon the ocean and make a shipping line, to set ships in motion makes the common property of the world into a national object. It makes an avenue for foreign trade on common property. No matter how much the ocean may be common property, if one does not erect one's own avenue, then it as if one passes along on another's road.[19]

In his remarks, Shōda adopted a Grotian view of *mare liberum* (freedom of the seas), under which oceans were open to the ships of all nations.[20] At the same time, he indicated that in erecting oceanic "roads" capable of competing for traffic, ships transformed a portion of the maritime commons into "a national object." Though oceans lay beyond the space of the nation, shipping lines extended the reach of nations out into the ocean for as long as ships remained in motion.

Though discussion of shipping expansion focused on ensuring that Japanese foreign trade was carried in Japanese vessels, advocates of new services also envisioned more substantial roles for Japanese shipping in world trade. Terashima, for instance, pointed out that ships on the Europe route would, after departing Japan, call at Hong Kong, Singapore, and Aden, before passing through the Red Sea and the Mediterranean

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[19] Shōda, *Kaiun shinchō hōhō torishirabesho*, 46.

[20] For a summary of Grotius' works, see Alan W. Cafruny, *Ruling the Waves: The Political Economy of International Shipping* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987), 41–44.

to London and Hamburg. As a result, he observed that they would situated to carry cargoes between several countries:

> Upon opening a regular, Japanese service to Europe, and with steady steps forward, our ships will not only be able to carry our nation's imports and exports, but at length they will advance and we can expect that trade between various ports on the route will fall into the hands of our ships. In other words, at the same time that our navigation power is restored, in all likelihood we will be able to seize navigation power elsewhere as well.[21]

The Australia route was viewed in similar terms. Ships on the service proposed by Terashima and Tsuboya would call at Hong Kong and the Philippines before calling at ports along the east coast of Australia. Tsuboya therefore suggested that ships would not only be positioned to carry south-bound Japanese goods, but would also be able to collect cargoes in Hong Kong, such as the tea, sugar, and oil that made up much of China's exports to Australia.[22]

Tsuboya, moreover, outlined a vision of an expanding, interconnected set of Japanese-owned and operated shipping lines. For instance, he proposed that the N.Y.K. establish feeder services to Hong Kong from Fuzhou, Xiamen, Shantou, and Taiwan, and coordinate them with a service to Australia. The company would thereby carry sugar exports from South China to Hong Kong and transfer the cargoes to its Australia-bound ships. Since N.Y.K. vessels on the Bombay route also called at Hong Kong, Tsuboya recommended that the company synchronize its Bombay and Australia services. This would allow the N.Y.K. to carry goods such as rice from Saigon and sugar from Java to Hong Kong, and then transfer the cargoes to its Australia service.[23] Likewise, Terashima suggested that companies coordinate Japanese-flagged services from Vladivostok to

[21] Terashima, "Nihon kaiunron," 89.

[22] Tsuboya, *Nihon kaiunron*, 166.

[23] Tsuboya, *Nihon kaiunron*, 166.

Shanghai with services to Australia, in order to facilitate the transport of cargoes from Europe to Australia via Russian railways and Japanese shipping lines.[24]

Shipping expansion represented an assertion of control over the cargoes and passengers passing through Japanese ports. By reducing Japan's reliance on foreign carriers, new shipping services would improve Japan's international balance of payments. At the same time, the extension of Japanese-flagged services into international waters promised to reverse the nation's position in global transportation. Not only would Japan reduce its dependence on foreign ships, by erecting its own oceanic highways the nation would also profit from the circulation of freight and passengers between foreign countries.

State Subsidies

The geography of Japanese shipping in the early 1890s, however, was a far cry from the global aspirations expressed in publications and on the floor of the Diet. Comparisons of the tonnage of national fleets mapped out the distribution of maritime power in the world, and placed Japan low in the ranks—sixteenth, according to Terashima—of a global hierarchy of maritime nations.[25] For many proponents of shipping expansion, Japan's minor role in world shipping justified state interventions in the industry. As they debated measures to promote overseas shipping, moreover, politicians, policymakers, and intellectuals often made sense of shipping policy in relation to other maritime powers. In the process, they articulated a view of a world in which nation-states commonly reached out beyond terrestrial borders to order lines of

[24] Tsuboya, *Nihon kaiunron*, 159.

[25] Terashima, "Nihon kaiunron," 48–51.

transport at sea. For Japan's maritime leaders, this competition among nation-states motivated efforts to emulate relationships between states and ships observed overseas.

Calls for the government to support shipping expansion in the early 1890s frequently invoked subsidy programs adopted by Western powers. Introducing his resolution in 1893, Nishiyama condemned the N.Y.K.'s annual subsidy for its "ambiguity" (*botsuzen*), as the government did not specify how much of the subsidy was intended to support each of the ordered lines maintained by the N.Y.K. Nishiyama's resolution instead called on the government to "reform completely the qualities of the N.Y.K.'s subsidy, and, emulating the subsidy legislation of various countries, calculate an average subsidy per nautical mile based on the relative difficulty and distance of each shipping line."[26] In his presentation to the Diet, Nishiyama elaborated on this reference to foreign legislation by observing that the subsidies of Western countries were calculated based on the size of ships and the difficulty of navigation on a given route.[27]

Essayists such as Terashima and Tsuboya similarly offered proposals for subsidy programs based on shipping policies adopted in other countries. Terashima, for instance, asserted that there were two ways for states to support shipping: indirectly through laws that granted special rights to companies, and directly through subsidies (*hojokin*) or bounties (*shōreikin*). According to Terashima, in the eighteenth century almost all Western "maritime nations" (*kaikoku*) had enforced navigation acts that restricted the activities of foreign ships in national ports, only to abandon the acts in the nineteenth century as they embraced " a tendency toward free commerce." Many countries had instead imitated the British government, which had begun to subsidize shipping in the

[26] *SGS*, dai-4-kai, dai-14-gō (December 16, 1892), 311.

[27] *SGS*, dai-4-kai, dai-14-gō (December 16, 1892), 313.

late eighteenth century. Situating Japan in shipping's present, rather than its past, Terashima proposed that Japanese authorities also promote overseas shipping through direct, financial support.[28]

As outlined by Terashima and Tsuboya, foreign maritime powers provided direct support to shipping in a number of different ways. Both described legislation passed in France and Italy in the 1880s to support overseas shipping by offering bounties for every 1,000 nautical miles sailed overseas, and Tsuboya recommended the implementation of a similar program in Japan.[29] The essayists also proposed that the government subsidize services in particular routes. Terashima, for example, referenced British admiralty subsidies, and proposed that the government provide two classes of subsidies to ships assigned to particular routes: one class for ships capable of conversion into naval cruisers, and a lower class for ordinary steamships.[30] Subsequent drafts of subsidy programs, such as that developed by the Tokyo Chamber of Commerce, similarly proposed combined support for overseas shipping in general as well as particular shipping lines.[31]

These ambitions were realized in 1896, when the Diet approved a new program of shipping subsidies prepared by the Communications Ministry. A Navigation Encouragement Law offered bounties to Japanese shipping companies that employed ships on overseas voyages, and a Shipbuilding Encouragement Law encouraged the construction of ships larger than 1,000 tons. The Diet also approved a budget that included appropriations for subsidies that the Communications Ministry issued to

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[28] Terashima, "Nihon kaiunron," 122–23.

[29] Tsuboya, *Nihon kaiunron*, 124–25. Terashima, "Nihon kaiunron," 126–28.

[30] Terashima, "Nihon kaiunron," 134–35, 145–50.

[31] Shōda, *Kaiun shinchō hōhō torishirabesho*, 1–17.

companies to support designated lines. The first lines designated to receive these subsidies were the N.Y.K.'s Bombay and Australia lines, and lines to Vladivostok and Korsakov (a port on Sakhalin Island) established by the shipowner Ōya Shichihei. This combined package of navigation bounties and designated line subsidies undergirded Japan's overseas shipping between 1896 and 1914, with subsidies representing around ten percent of the annual income of the N.Y.K. and O.S.K.[32]

In the years that followed, communications bureaucrats and politicians regularly made adjustments to this subsidy program. As Miwa Ryōichi has observed, the government phased out the navigation bounties that supported overseas shipping in general in favor of subsidies issued to support designated lines maintained on a fixed schedule. In 1899, the Diet imposed a term on the navigation bounty program, which was to expire in 1914, and the Communications Ministry expanded the number of subsidized lines.[33] These included the N.Y.K.'s Europe and Seattle lines; a San Francisco line opened by a new firm, the Oriental Steamship Company (*Tōyō kisen kabushiki gaisha*); a range of services in the "near seas of the Orient" (*Tōyō kinkai*); and a growing network of steamship services that Japanese firms opened on China's Yangzi River. (Figure 2.2) William Wray has also pointed out that amendments to the subsidy program often imposed new limitations on management. The passage of the Transoceanic Shipping Line Subsidy Law in 1909, for example, reduced subsidies for transoceanic lines and imposed


[32] For the significance of shipping subsidies for the N.Y.K. and O.S.K., see Miwa, *Nihon kindai no keizai seisaku shiteki kenkyū*, 310–15. For a discussion of the impact of the subsidies on shipping and shipbuilding see Inoue Yōichirō, "Meiji kōki no kaiji seisaku," in *Nihon keizai seisaku shiron*, vol. 1, ed. Andō Yoshio (Tōkyō: Tōkyō daigaku shuppankai, 1973), 201–5.

[33] For analysis of these amendments, see Miwa, *Nihon kindai no keizai seisaku shiteki kenkyū*, 310–29. For an English-language summary, see Miwa, "Maritime Policy in Japan," 130–36.

such stringent requirements on subsidized companies that N.Y.K. directors considered pursuing alternative financial strategies.[34]

FIGURE 2.2 Shipping Services subsidized by the Ministry of Communications, 1896–1914

Source: Teishinshō, *Teishinshō nenpō* (1896–1915).



Throughout this process of experimentation and reform, policymakers and journalists sought to position Japan within a world of competing nation-states. Policy proposals were often formulated in reference to foreign practices. The import of a large number of new ships from Britain in 1896, for example, led communications bureaucrats

[34] Wray, *Mitsubishi and the N.Y.K.*, 416–20.

to propose an amendment to the Navigation Encouragement Law in 1898 which would halve bounties for foreign-built ships.[35] In a memorandum to the prime minister, Communications Minister Yoshikawa Akimasa discussed the amendment as a means of promoting domestic ship production while minimizing state expenditures on subsidies. At the same time, he framed the amendment in terms of France's subsidy policy, suggesting that the government "adopt a system modeled on the principles of the old French law and provide half bounties to foreign-built ships."[36]

Observation of foreign shipping policies also informed efforts to completely overhaul Japan's shipping subsidies in the early 1900s. One major advocate for reform was Ōmiya Eiji, a member of the Lower House from Akita, who levied attacks on what he depicted as excessive government support that had left several firms dependent on the state and impeded the development of others.[37] In March 1905, Ōmiya and nine other members of the Lower House submitted a Draft Resolution on Navigation Subsidies (*Kōkai hojo ni kansuru kengian*) in which they declared that recent developments in domestic and world transportation mandated the reduction, or elimination, of the government's shipping subsides.[38] Though the House rejected the resolution, three years later Ōmiya made an additional, though again unsuccessful, attempt to reform Japan's shipping subsidies through amendments to the Navigation Encouragement Law that, if passed, would have limited navigation bounties to 3,000-ton, 13-knot ships.[39]

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[35] *SGS*, dai-10-kai, "Shūgiin yosan iinkai, dai-4-ka, dai-4-gō," (January 29, 1897), 42–45.

[36] "Kaigai kōro hogo ni kansuru hōshin no ken," *Kōbun betsuroku*, Teishinshō, dai-1-kan, NAJ, JACAR A03023090700.

[37] *Nihon jinmei daijiten*, s.v. "Ōmiya Eiji," JapanKnowledge, https://japanknowledge.com.

[38] *SGS*, dai-21-kai, dai-14-gō (February 7, 1905), 198.

[39] *SGS*, dai-24-kai, dai-14-gō (March 12, 1908), 293.

Though Ōmiya's resolution and amendments were both voted down in committee, the debates on shipping policy that ensued in the Lower House revealed an abiding concern with ensuring that Japanese policy conformed to the successful practices of other maritime powers. Despite the appeal of the French bounty program in the 1890s, by the early 1900s French shipping policy had become subject to derision. Addressing the Lower House in 1905, Ōmiya observed:

> Our "protectionist policies," if compared against current world history, are not at all effective. If you, gentlemen, were to investigate examples of world shipping subsidies, … in England, which possesses sea power (*kaijōken*), shipping does not advance due to subsidies. If you were to give an example of a history of failure, it would be France. France, like Japan, grants excessive subsidies, but France is failing greatly. And our nation is repeating that failure.[40]

In committee, Ōmiya reiterated this critique, pointing out that Japanese and French subsidies far surpassed those of Britain, the U.S., Germany, and Italy, and had made Japan into a "laughingstock of the world."[41]

The observation and evaluation of shipping policies likewise informed the formulation of the Transoceanic Shipping Line Subsidy Law introduced in 1909. In anticipation of the expiration of the trans-Pacific and Europe line subsidies, in early 1908 the Communications Ministry formed a committee to investigate European and American methods of flag discrimination and reevaluating Japan's program of shipping subsidies.[42] To collect information on overseas conditions, Communications Minister Viscount Horita Masayasu dispatched Uchida Kakichi, chief of the Mercantile Marine Bureau, and

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[40] *SGS*, dai-21-kai, dai-14-gō (February 7, 1905), 199.

[41] *SGS*, dai-21-kai, "Kōkai hojo ni kansuru kengian iinkai kaigiroku dai-2-gō" (February 13, 1905), 4.

[42] "Zōsen kōkai shōreihō kaisei (kaiun hogo seido chōsakai secchi)," *Asahi shinbun*, April 25, 1908, 4.

Umemura Teimei, chief of the Maritime Bureau, on a tour of Europe and the U.S.[43] The ministry revealed the results of these investigations early the next year when it submitted a draft Transoceanic Shipping Line Subsidy Bill to the Diet. Its introduction set off a storm of controversy, not least for threatening to drastically reduce subsidies on major transoceanic lines, but also for granting the communications minister authority to conclude subsidy agreements with companies before securing Diet approval.[44]

Coverage of shipping subsidies in the press likewise made frequent reference to foreign examples. In December 1908, the liberal *Oriental Economist* (Tōyō kezai zasshi) provided an overview of the subsidies issued by major shipping powers. (Table 2.1) Based on these figures, Japan's annual shipping subsidies were the world's second-largest: more than ten times the amount granted by the German government, and twenty times those offered by the British government. Per ton, moreover, Japan's subsidies were the world's largest. Like Ōmiya in 1905, the article's author criticized the French policy: "France pays the highest rate of shipping subsidies in the world, but at the same time its carrying trade is known for being the most stagnant."[45] Early the next year, the *Asahi Shinbun* similarly concluded that the state could no longer support subsidies that increased almost "without limit," and pointed to Germany's apparent success in shipping

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[43] The tour began with attendance at the 11th International Congress of Navigation held in St. Petersburg in May. "Teishinshō kansen kyokuchō Uchida Kakichi hoka ichimei Ō-Bei kakkoku he sashitsukawasaruru no ken," in *Meiji 41-nen Ninmen maki-9*, NAJ-DA, *Nin*-B00503100-016. Communications Minister Horita Masayasu to Foreign Minister Hayashi Kaoru, April 16, 1908, in "Bankoku kōkai kaigi ikken fu suiro kaigi dai-1-kan," *Gaimushō kiroku* 2-9-8-0-4, MFA, JACAR B07080465700, 154.

[44] Article 1 of the draft legislation granted the communications minister the authority to conclude subsidy agreements with shipping companies. Members of the House therefore concluded that the minister would be able to commit the government to an expenditure without Diet approval. *SGS*, dai-25-kai, dai-5-gō (February 3, 1909), 50–51. *SGS*, dai-25-kai, "Zōsen shōreihōchū kaisei hōritsuan hoka ikken iinkaigiroku dai-2-gō," (February 12, 1909), 7–8.

[45] "Kōro hojo zokuhi no daimonda," *Tōyō keizai shinpō*, No. 469 (December 5, 1908): 5.

and France's failure to suggest that, "the rise and fall of shipping is not at all in proportion to subsidy amounts."[46]

TABLE 2.1 Shipping Subsidies granted by Maritime Powers, 1907/1908

	Subsidy (¥)	Tonnage (gt)	Subsidy/ton (¥)
Japan	13,165,695	1,151,682	12.30
France	19,500,000	1,751,864	11.13
Russia	3,526,605	938,660	3.75
Italy	4,465,629	1,217,788	3.67
U.S.	9,816,710	4,511,351	2.18
Germany	3,331,200	4,112,590	0.81
Britain	10,348,040	18,329,850	0.56

Source: "Kōkai hojo zokuhi no daimondai," *Tōyō keizai zasshi*, no. 469 (December 5, 1908), 5–6.
Note: Japanese subsidies based on the budget for fiscal year 1908; other subsidies based on budgets in 1907.

Likewise, in debate on the legislation in the Diet, communications officials and members of the Lower House positioned Japan's subsidy program relative to policies adopted by other maritime powers. Presenting the draft legislation to a Lower House committee, Communications Vice-Minister Nakashōji Ren observed, "with regard to current conditions in world shipping, each country puts a great deal of effort into the navigation and shipbuilding industries, and as much as possible seeks to overwhelm others in shipping."[47] Like the *Oriental Economist*, he then outlined the shipping subsidies issued by Western powers: ¥11,774,481 in Britain, ¥4,871,577 in Germany, ¥8,737,282 in the U.S., ¥24,832,499 in France, and ¥8,032,420 in Austria. Members of the Lower House, moreover, pressed communications officials on such comparisons. Representative Nishimura Tanjirō of Okayama Prefecture, for example, contrasted the

[46] "Kōro hojo hōan," *Asahi shinbun* (February 1, 1909): 3.

[47] *SGS*, dai-25-kai, "Zōsen shōreihōchū kaisei hōritsuan-gai ikken iinkai giroku (sokki) dai-2-kai" (February 12, 1909), 3.

expansion of German shipping, which received minimal subsidies, with the heavily subsidized yet sluggish French industry to suggest that excessive subsidies impeded shipping. In response, Mercantile Marine Bureau Chief Uchida Kakichi observed that even Britain, the world's paramount maritime power, subsidized several companies and had recently helped to finance new ship purchases by the Cunard Company.[48] Despite these reservations, the bill passed in early 1909, though with amendments that limited the terms of subsidies to five years and that required the communications ministry to receive Diet approval before concluding contracts with firms.[49]

As politicians and bureaucrats skirmished over government spending on shipping, they also positioned Japan among other nation-states engaged in competition for shares of global traffic. Budget concerns, jurisdictional turf wars, and other domestic politics shaped Japan's shipping policy, but so too did perceptions of conditions in world shipping. In the press and in the Diet, bureaucrats, politicians, and journalists repeatedly framed their views on shipping policy in relation to their understanding of the activities of rival maritime powers. They consistently expressed a worldview in which nation-states were an active force that shaped maritime transportation—and in which Japan would either join along, or be left without a place in the world's oceans.

Views from Across the Pacific

Just as the observation of foreign methods of shipping promotion informed many of Japan's shipping policies, Japanese shipping subsidies were also observed by members

[48] SGS, dai-25-kai, "Zōsen shōreihōchū kaisei hōritsuan-gai ikken iinkai giroku (sokki) dai-2-kai" (February 12, 1909), 8–9.

[49] SGS, dai-25-kai, "Zōsen shōrei hōchū kaisei hōritsuan hoka ikken iinkaigiroku dai-7-kai" (March 1, 1909), 39–42.

of foreign maritime circles. Considerable increases of Japanese tonnage followed the implementation of navigation bounties, shipbuilding bounties, and line subsidies, and Japan's fleet of steamships rose in world ranks from tenth- to sixth-largest. From 1895 to 1903, Japanese steamship tonnage more than tripled to 585,542 gross tons, and then from 1903 to 1910 doubled to 1,146,977 gross tons. In 1910, Japan's fleet of steamships was still less than a third the size of the American and German fleets, and less than a tenth the size of Britain's, but from 1895 to 1910, when the Japanese government granted shipping and shipbuilding subsidies on a scale matched only by France, the Japanese fleet grew at one of the fastest rates in the world.[50] How, then, did officials and businessmen in other countries view Japan's shipping subsidies, and with what significance for their own policies toward shipping?

In the mid-1890s, the Anglophone press greeted news of Japan's new shipping subsidies with mild interest and words of caution for British and American carriers. In London, for example, *The Times* reported that "Our Consul at Yokohama in his last report warns those shipowners who are interested in the carrying trade of Japan that they will soon have to encounter strenuous opposition from Japanese shipowners."[51] The article cautioned that, with the passage of new legislation, the Japanese government would grant "liberal subsidies" to companies such as the N.Y.K. to support lines to England, America, and Australia. Similarly, in March 1896, *The New York Times* reported that the N.Y.K. was prepared to open new steamship lines to "America, England, Australia, and Formosa [Taiwan]," and that "All the Nippon Yusen lines are

[50] Figures based on Teishinshō kansenkyoku, *Kaiji tekiyō Meiji 36-nen* (1903), Appendix 1. Teishinshō kansenkyoku, *Kaiji tekiyō Meiji 43-nen* (1910).

[51] "The Japanese Mercantile Marine," *The Times*, August 29, 1896, 9.

heavily subsidized by the Japanese Government."[52] Both papers described the new subsidies and services as a product of the Sino-Japanese War, which had left "the Japanese [with] more ships than they knew what to do with."[53]

By the early twentieth century, however, policymakers began to pay close attention to the rapid growth of Japan's commercial fleet and its expansion overseas. Such was evident in debates on shipping policy that played out in the U.S. in the early twentieth century. For much of the nineteenth century, the U.S. merchant marine was a major force in the Atlantic, but the transition to steel steamships, the Civil War, and protectionist policies contributed to a decline in American deep-water shipping. In the late nineteenth century, politicians made a few attempts to arrest that decline, but a bounty program passed by the Senate in 1890 was defeated in the House of Representatives, and subsidies granted under the Ocean Mail Act of 1891 only supported a few lines.[54] In 1904, President Theodore Roosevelt called for new policies to aid the merchant marine, and a Senate commission chaired by Senator Jacob Gallinger of New Hampshire began to interview businessmen and officials involved in shipping. In its final report, the commission pointed to foreign subsidies as the main obstacle to US ships in overseas routes, and members drafted a bill intended to develop shipping lines through mail subsidies. Though the bill received Roosevelt's endorsement, it died in Congress, as did several others sponsored by Gallinger in the years that followed.[55]

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[52] "Japan's Steamship Line," *New York Times*, March 18, 1896, 10.

[53] "The Japanese Mercantile Marine," *The Times*, August 29, 1896, 9. "Japan's Steamship Line," *New York Times*, March 18, 1896, 10.

[54] Andrew Gibson and Arthur Donovan, *Abandoned Ocean: A History of United States Maritime Policy* (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 2000), 82–84.

[55] Gibson and Donovan, *Abandoned Ocean*, 93–94.

Though the Gallinger Commission did not culminate in a new shipping policy, its report, "Development of the American Merchant Marine and American Commerce," shared much in common with the debates on shipping policy then taking place across the Pacific. Like Terashima and others in Japan, the commission represented shipping subsidies as a common, "world-wide practice" adopted by all major powers:

> To sum up, therefore, it may be said that every nation possessing a deep-sea merchant fleet of any real importance encourages and supports this interest to the degree and in the way which its judgment approves or its national resources make possible. The most frequent form of this national assistance is the mail subvention to regular lines.[56]

According to the report, Britain was the "pioneer and chief exemplar" of these subventions;[57] Japanese-flagged shipping, however, also featured as a competitor of the American merchant marine. In a summary of shipping policies in thirteen countries, the report noted: "Japan has a most comprehensive system of national aid to shipping—bounties to shipyards, subsidies to mail lines, bounties upon navigation. Japan's ocean fleet has increased more rapidly of late years than any other shipping in the world."[58] Several subsidized companies, moreover, competed with American firms, and the commission contrasted the $600,000 subsidy that supported Japanese sailings on the San Francisco route with Pacific Mail's $63,902 postal contract.[59]

Interviews conducted during the commission's investigation also provided anecdotal evidence of the reach of Japanese shipping. In a hearing, John Barrett, a U.S.

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[56] S. Rep. No. 58-2949, at 15 (1905), PQ-C, 4755 S.rp.2949.

[57] S. Rep. No. 58-2949, at 13 (1905).

[58] S. Rep. No. 58-2949, at 14 (1905).

[59] S. Rep. No. 58-2949, at 16 (1905).

minister to Panama, Argentina, and Thailand, provided an account of a recent round-the-world trip:

> From San Francisco around to New York I never saw one large merchant vessel in interoceanic traffic carrying the American flag, but in every port I saw the flag of England, the flag of Germany, and while in Asia and in other countries I saw in many places the flag of Japan.
>
> *I emphasize the flag of Japan because of the fact that their Government has done so much to build up their foreign shipping.* When I wanted to go to Australia the only steamer on which I could go was a modern Japanese passenger and mail vessel. When I was at one time in the Indian Ocean and wished to go from one port to another, I found a Japanese mail and fast freight steamer to carry me instead of an English vessel. Another time, in the Mediterranean, I found a Japanese vessel to travel on. I might say also that there were most always to be found in the principal ports of the Far East the fast mail and passenger and freight steamers of Germany, Great Britain, and France.[60] [emphasis mine]

The expanded reach of Japanese shipping companies was thus evident to Barrett not only in the near seas around East Asia, but also in Pacific routes and as far as the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean Sea. The American minister, moreover, observed that Japanese ships facilitated travel beyond Japan, between foreign ports.

Not every American observer of world shipping, however, agreed with the commission's conclusion that subsidies were the driving force behind the advances in shipping exhibited by Japan and other countries. Princeton economist Royal Meeker, for example, offered a firm rebuttal to subsidy proposals in an article published in the *Political Science Quarterly*. Arguing that subsidies did little to advance shipping, and instead risked impeding the development of the industry, he concluded: "it seems inadvisable to tinker the merchant marine with the subsidy hammer."[61] Nonetheless, Meeker also acknowledged that "The rapid expansion of Japanese shipping and

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[60] Merchant Marine Commission, Vol. 2, *Hearings on the Great Lakes and Pacific Coast*, Part 1, 58th Cong. 10.682–11.683 (1904) (statement of John Barrett), PQ-C, HRG-10-4-MMC-0002.

[61] R. Meeker, "Shipping Subsidies," *Political Science Quarterly* 20, no. 4 (December 1905): 611.

commerce in conjunction with the granting of subsidies in 1896 has furnished much ammunition to the advocates of subsidies."[62] Still, he argued that the legislation had generated an oversupply of British-built vessels in Japan. Alongside a critique of French subsidies, Meeker again observed that Japan seemed to offer the "best material for the believer in subsidies to conjure with," but maintained that its shipbuilding industry would eventually encounter limits due to Japan's lack of coal and iron.[63]

Though the Gallinger Commission and Meeker arrived at antithetical positions regarding subsidies, their discussion of Japanese subsidies indicates that, by the early twentieth century, Japanese shipping had begun to ascend in the global hierarchy of maritime powers, at least as understood by American maritime leaders. With the Japanese flag increasingly visible in world ports, other shipping powers began to take notice of Japan's shipping industry, and what were perceived to be exorbitant subsidies thrown at it by the government. Moreover, much as debates on shipping in Japan were framed in terms of shipping conditions in Britain, France, or the U.S., Gallinger's report, Barrett's interview, and Meeker's article indicate that Japan had become a point of reference for similar discussions taking place across the Pacific.

National Industry, Transnational Networks

Though discussion of shipping promotion, both in Japan and the U.S., presented world shipping as a collection of discrete, national fleets, shipping firms often relied on factors of production sourced from foreign countries as well as business networks that crossed national boundaries. In the early 1900s, Japan's shipping companies continued to

[62] Meeker, "Shipping subsidies," 602.

[63] Meeker, "Shipping subsidies," 603.

import foreign ships and labor, and as they advanced into overseas trade routes they came to rely on relationships with foreign firms. At times, however, such transnational qualities appeared to be discordant in what was perceived to be a nationally significant industry, and generated hostility toward the business practices of firms that received state support.

Such tensions were particularly obvious when efforts to promote overseas sailings of ships flying the Japanese flag conflicted with efforts to foster the indigenization of steamship technology and the training of a maritime labor force. Under the original Navigation Encouragement Law, foreign-built ships were eligible for bounties equal to those granted to domestically constructed vessels. As discussed above, however, the 1899 amendment encouraged the use of Japanese-built tonnage by halving bounties for foreign-built ships, while the 1909 Transoceanic Shipping Line Subsidy Law rendered foreign-built ships ineligible for subsidies.[64] Japanese subsidies also encouraged the employment of Japanese staff and officers by requiring subsidized companies to receive permission before employing foreigners as staff in headquarters or branch offices, or as captains or stewards aboard ships. Politicians, however, betrayed unease about the apparent willingness of the Communications Ministry to waive that requirement. In 1908, for example, Representative Andō Shintarō questioned communications bureaucrats about their permissive approach to the employment of foreigners in high-ranking positions on ships. "It is extremely regrettable," he declared, "that Japanese are unable to man ships flying the Sun Disc flag, and that foreigners are used instead."[65] Though officials and companies maintained a flexible approach to ship nationality, the promotion

[64] *SGS*, dai-25-kai, dai-5-gō, (February 3, 1909), 48.

[65] *SGS*, dai-24-kai, "Kōkai shōreihō-chū kaisei hōritsuan gai ikken iinkai giroku dai-3-kai," (March 18, 1908), 16–17.

of overseas shipping under the Japanese flag was at times tempered by efforts to ensure that the vessels were built in Japan and crewed by Japanese subjects.

Transnational business networks, however, represented a more complicated challenge to shipping nationalism. As Wray has demonstrated, the establishment of overseas shipping services by Japanese companies often rested on transnational alliances with foreign firms. These included arrangements with agents that handled freight solicitation and various services in ports, as well as participation in shipping conferences, horizontal arrangements between shipping firms that set rates on particular routes.[66] In the early 1900s, however, politicians expressed concerns about such alliances, and the possibility that subsidized, Japanese ships might come under the control of foreign firms.

Tensions between the ideal of a national fleet and the realities of transnational operations were particularly evident in criticism leveled at the Oriental Steamship Company in the early 1900s. On the surface, Oriental Steamship was an active participant in the expansion of shipping promoted by Nishiyama and others. The company was founded in 1896 by the wealthy industrialist Asano Sōichirō, who, in the company's prospectus, proposed opening shipping lines to New York and to the Black Sea, with an eye on importing oil from Russia. Shibusawa Eiichi, however, advised Asano to enter the trans-Pacific trade, and, after touring American ports, Asano decided to establish a regular service between Hong Kong and San Francisco. The line was opened in late 1898, and designated for subsidies in 1899.[67]

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[66] William D. Wray, "National Alliances and Global Webs: The Internationalization of Japanese Shipping," in *The Internationalization of the Sea Transport Industries since 1850*, ed. David J. Starkey and Gelina Harlaftis (Oxford: Liverpool University Press, 1998), 91. Idem, "Nodes in the Global Webs of Japanese Shipping," *Business History* 47, no. 1 (January 2005): 1–22.

[67] Nakano Hideo, *Tōyō kisen rokujūyon-nen no ayumi* (Tōkyō: Yumani shobō, 2017 [1964]), 37, 43–45.

Asano and his company established this new service by lacing together Japanese capital and management, American trade networks, and British ships and capital. After Asano set his sights on San Francisco, he approached the Southern Pacific Railroad to negotiate an agreement on a land-sea connection. The railroad, however, already had an arrangement with Pacific Mail and the O. & O., and Southern Pacific's vice-president rebuffed Asano. In response, Asano instead advertised plans to open a line to San Diego, which attracted attention from the port's business community. Further negotiations with Southern Pacific President C.P. Huntington, however, yielded a partnership between the firms, concluding what the *Los Angeles Times* referred to as a "Wily Scheme" in which Asano "used San Diego and Los Angeles as a Club to Beat the Southern Pacific."[68] In December 1897, Oriental Steamship, Pacific Mail, and the O. & O. finalized an agreement for a joint sailing schedule, with each company employing three ships on the Orient-San Francisco route, as well as joint representation in ports of call. For ships, Asano turned to British shipyards, where he ordered the 6,000-ton *Nippon Maru*, *America Maru*, and *Hong Kong Maru*.[69] In mid-1905, near the end of the Russo-Japanese War, the company placed orders for larger, 12,000-ton ships, and turned to the Samuel Samuel & Co. for assistance securing a loan from the London Rothschilds.[70]

Though the company's ships carried the Japanese flag to Hong Kong, Honolulu, and San Francisco, its operations were entwined with those of two foreign steamship

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[68] "Asano's Wily Scheme: Jap's Story of His Tilt with Huntington," *Los Angeles Times*, July 21, 1897, 3.

[69] This account of the founding of the company; negotiations with Southern Pacific, the O. & O., and Pacific Mail; and the purchase of ships from British shipyards is based on Nakano, *Tōyō kisen rokujūyon-nen no ayumi*, 11–25, 35–37.

[70] "Toyo Kisen Kaisha: Extension of Manila Line," *South China Morning Post*, February 16, 1905.

companies. This arrangement came under attack in early 1905, when Representative Ōmiya accused the company of serving as a front for foreign capital. When introducing his resolution on shipping subsidies to the Diet in February, he raised suspicions that the company was secretly owned by foreigners.[71] In committee, he also claimed that Oriental Steamship had been tied up with foreigners since its founding, and, interrogating communications officials about the management of the company, he demanded information regarding Oriental Steamship's employment practices. The politician expressed particular misgivings regarding reports that the company employed two captains, one Japanese and one foreign, on its ships, as well as dual sets of stewards and branch office staff members.[72] In response, Uchida Kakichi, the chief of the Mercantile Marine Bureau, denied that the company employed two captains on its ships, but acknowledged that Oriental Steamship's arrangements with Pacific Mail and the O. & O. required foreign staff to jointly handle freight and passenger arrangements. He also observed that foreigners were employed as stewards in order to serve the company's foreign passengers and cargoes.[73]

Though Ōmiya's 1905 resolution died in committee, politicians continued to launch attacks on the links between Japanese shipping companies and foreign firms. In amendments to the Navigation Encouragement Law proposed in 1908, Ōmiya sought to strengthen employment restrictions by requiring subsidized companies to secure approval

[71] *SGS*, dai-21-kai, dai-14-gō (February 7, 1905), 199.

[72] *SGS*, dai-21-kai, "Kōkai hojo ni kansuru kengian iinkai kaigi roku dai-2-kai" (February 13, 1905), 10–11.

[73] *SGS*, dai-21-kai, "Kōkai hojo ni kansuru kengian iinkai kaigi roku dai-2-kai" (February 13, 1905), 11.

to employ foreigners in agencies (*eigyō dairiten*).[74] In committee, he lambasted companies for using foreign agents such that, "in other words, Japanese ships are entrusted to foreigners,"[75] and he aimed to ensure that subsidized companies used Japanese agents overseas.

The issue resurfaced the following year, during debate over the Transoceanic Shipping Routes Subsidy Law. In committee, Representative Kotera Kenkichi sought to amend the draft legislation to prohibit companies from employing foreigners in agencies (*dairiten*). Mercantile Marine Bureau Chief Uchida Kakichi expressed opposition to the amendment, arguing that shipping companies primarily turned to agencies when engaging in business in foreign countries. Kotera, however, suggested that the requirement would foster Japan's overseas commerce, and Representative Ogawa Heikichi pointed out that Oriental Steamship actually relied on a foreign agent even in Nagasaki.[76] Despite these broadsides against foreign agents, the amendment was voted down in committee.

Slogans such as "shipping route expansion" represented new shipping services as purely Japanese affairs—red lines that could be traced on maps across ocean spaces. Overseas services, however, often rested on relationships between carriers and traders of multiple nationalities. As Japanese companies extended the first transoceanic services with the support of government subsidies, such relationships between Japanese shipping firms and foreign agents were condemned by Ōmiya and other politicians. Though their

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[74] *SGS*, dai-24-kai, dai-14-gō (March 12, 1908), 293.

[75] *SGS*, dai-24-kai, "Kōkai shōreihōchū kaisei hōritsuan gai ikken iinkai giroku dai-1-kai," (March 13, 1908), 2.

[76] *SGS*, dai-25-kai, "Zōsen shōreihōchū kaisei hōritsuan-gai ikken iinkai giroku dai-7-kai," (March 1, 1909), 42.

criticism did not have legislative consequences, their repeated criticism of foreign agents underscores the incongruity between the imagination of shipping as a discrete, national affair, and the transnational entanglements that enabled movements of goods and people across national borders.

An Ocean-Minded Public

As officials, businessmen, and others promoted new shipping services, they also sought to recruit the general public in support of maritime expansion. In 1894, Terashima Shigenobu concluded his prize-winning essay with proposals to foster an "ocean-minded enlightenment" (*kaiji shisō no keihatsu*). In part, Terashima called for the education of Japan's "unschooled and ignorant" seamen, but he also proposed that the government, companies, and other institutions adopt measures to educate the general population about maritime affairs. The essay contest in which he had participated, of course, represented one such educational endeavor, but Terashima also suggested that maritime museums and tours of warships could introduce the public to the maritime world. Citing Western communities in Shanghai as a model, he also proposed the formation of yacht clubs, as "gentlemen of maritime nations enjoy nothing so much as a yacht race."[77]

As shipping companies opened new services at the turn of the century, businessmen, intellectuals, and bureaucrats actively pursued such pedagogical projects to create a public that would enthusiastically support shipping activities—an ocean-minded public.[78] To accomplish this, many turned to Japan's burgeoning press. In 1901, for

[77] Terashima, "Nihon no kaiun," 159–61.

[78] I have adopted a "ocean-minded"—an inclination to think on oceans—as a translation for "kaiji shisō," which might also be translated as "maritime thought." In coming up with the term "ocean-

example, the N.Y.K. published an *Illustrated Guide for Steamship Passengers* (Jōkyaku annai yūsen zue) as a special issue of Tōyōdō's *Manners and Customs Illustrated* (Fūzoku gahō).[79] The following year, in celebration of the fifteenth anniversary of its founding, Hakubunkan published a special issue of the popular magazine *The Sun* (Taiyō) entitled *Japan of the Sea* (Umi no Nihon).[80] Through essays, travel writing, and depictions of life at sea, these two publications encouraged readers to engage in maritime travel, and, in the process, represented Japanese ships as cosmopolitan spaces of leisure and integral components of global trade and commerce.

Both magazines maintained explicitly pedagogical missions. Tōyōdō editors framed their *Illustrated Guide* as an effort to cultivate leisure practices common in the West. In prefatory remarks on the "delights of ships," the editors observed that, "the red-haired people of the West delight in boarding ships." Tokugawa-era restrictions on overseas travel, however, had left the Japanese people "close to the mountains but ignorant of the sea."[81] Through rich illustrations and descriptions of maritime travel, editors promised to teach readers how to board a ship and behave at sea, and expressed

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mindedness," I have been inspired by aviation history, and its discussion of "air-mindedness." See, for example: Juergen Paul Melzer, "Assisted Takeoff: Germany and the Ascent of Japan's Aviation, 1910–1937" (Ph.D. diss., Princeton University, 2014).

[79] Christopher Gerteis has situated the *Illustrated Guide* in the history of N.Y.K. marketing materials, and highlighted its depictions of "the luxuries of shipboard life available to the elite transoceanic traveler." Christopher Gerteis, "Marketing History as Social Responsibility," in *Japan since 1945: From Postwar to Post-Bubble*, ed. Christopher Gerteis and Timothy S. George (London: Bloomsbury, 2013), 226.

[80] Kitaoka Shin'ichi has highlighted how the special issue exhibited the influence of Mahan's notions of sea power, and indicated the publishers' concern with promoting commerce between "East" and "West." Kitaoka Shin'ichi, *Monko kaihō seisaku to Nihon* (Tōkyō: Tōkyō daigaku shuppankai, 2015), 216–18.

[81] "Fune no tanoshimi," *Fūzoku gahō*, no. 239 (1901): 2. Jun Uchida has outlined similar views on Tokugawa-era maritime restrictions in the writings of Sugiura Shigetake in the late 1880s and early 1890s. Jun Uchida, "From Island Nation to Oceanic Empire: A Vision of Japanese Expansion from the Periphery," *The Journal of Japanese Studies* 22, no. 1 (Winter 2016): 65.

their hope that readers would "eventually make the world their playground, for the sake of the nation." For the editors of the guidebook, the ideal Japanese subject was thus an ocean-going subject.

Contributors to *Japan of the Sea*, meanwhile, sought to provide readers with a more general education about shipping, shipbuilding, naval affairs, port infrastructure, and other maritime issues. In prefatory comments, Hakubunkan editor Ōhashi Shintarō wrote that the volume was intended to "clarify the significance of Japan as a maritime nation (*kaikoku*)" and "rouse the maritime thought (*kaikoku shisō*) of our compatriots."[82] The volume offered to do so through a selection of photographs, essays by maritime officials and shipping executives, travel writing, and poems on maritime themes. In an introductory essay, Moriyama Moriji, outlined the stakes of this project. Echoing a view of the sea developed by Alfred Mahan, Moriyama detailed the importance of sea power (*kaiken*) in history, before lamenting the state of affairs in Japan:

> Japan lacks ocean-mindedness (*kaiji shisō*). Its government does not understand the status of the Army and Navy and makes no effort to promote overseas trade. Its Diet calls for cuts [in spending] on the Taiwan lines and rejects plans for the monopolization of the sea-lanes to China and Korea. Its people entrust the power to trade to foreign merchants and do not understand that this is something to be regretted and begrudged.[83]

For Moriyama, an understanding of maritime affairs would therefore foster support for shipping subsidies,[84] the Navy, and programs of trade promotion.

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[82] Ōhashi Shintarō, "Hakkan no kotoba," *Taiyō* 8, no. 8 (1902): 2–3.

[83] Moriyama Moriji, "Umi no Nihon hakkō no shushi," *Taiyō* 8, no. 8 (1902): 2.

[84] In 1900, the Lower House rejected a request from the O.S.K. for a subsidy to support shipping lines between Japan and ports in Korea and North China, and in 1902 it amended the budget submitted by the Government-General of Taiwan to reduce subsidies for designated lines between Taiwan and Japan, and along Taiwan's coasts. *OSK 50-nenshi*, 259. Kichikai Ushita, *Taiwan kaiunshi*, ed. Asaka Teijirō (Taihoku: Taiwan kaimu kyōkai, 1941), 36–39.

Though the objectives of the two magazines differed slightly, they provided readers similar ways of understanding Japanese ships and their place in the world. Both, for example, offered tantalizing glimpses of the luxury that could be enjoyed while travelling aboard a Japanese liner. In the *Illustrated Guide*, Tōyōdō editors presented the N.Y.K.'s *Kasuga Maru*, a 3,819-gross-ton steamer built in Glasgow and assigned to the Australia line, as a model of the facilities and services offered by the N.Y.K. Passengers traveling first-class on the ship were provided with accommodations in a two-person cabin on the upper deck, and had access to a first-class smoking room, social hall, dining hall, and promenade deck. In the smoking room, passengers could pass their time in transit playing games such as chess or go, and partake of a variety of alcoholic beverages. On the promenade deck, they could exercise by walking or playing games, such as a slipper race.[85] Such luxury and leisure were, of course, only enjoyed by a small number of the passengers that travelled aboard these liners. Though the guide featured illustrations of steerage, far less attention was devoted to the accommodations, where passengers shared a large room with 200–300 fellow travelers.[86]

Similar descriptions of luxury and leisure also appeared in travel writing published in *Japan of the Sea*. In an overview of the N.Y.K.'s Shanghai line, Kokubu Saitō praised the airflow in first-class cabins, as well as the curtains, bedding, sink, electric light, and gas heaters. He also highlighted the activities available to passengers:

> Should first-class passengers desire to exercise or dispel their boredom, they may got the promenade on the deck, and walk and gaze about as they

[85] In a slipper race, which the guide reported was a game primarily played by women, the slippers of passengers were collected and placed in a bag. Runners raced across the deck in their socks, threw on a pair of slippers, and ran back to their starting place, often confusing another passenger's pair of slippers for their own. "Uwagutsu kyōsō," *Fūzoku gahō*, no. 239 (1901): 26.

[86] "Kyakushitsu," *Fūzoku gahō*, no. 239 (1901): 13. See the illustration between pages 10–11.

> like, and there are rattan easy chairs for a rest. In the smoking parlor, they may converse, and in the social hall they may play at go, chess, and cards, or play the piano and other Western instruments.[87]

Saitō observed, moreover, that quality facilities were modeled on the advanced ships of Europe and the U.S., and thereby indicated that Japanese vessels were equally capable of conveying world travelers between ports.

The magazines also depicted the space of Japanese ships as spaces of encounter between the world's nations and races. In *Japan of the Sea*, Moriyama Moriji, writing under the pen name Tokō, detailed a trip to Taiwan. On the voyage from Kobe, he had shared a room with a young, English botanist sailing for Okinawa to collect butterflies and small birds, and during the voyage Moriyama offered advice on food and accommodations in Okinawa.[88] Such encounters were also depicted in the *Illustrated Guide*. In an overview of the first-class promenade deck, the editors suggested that Western and Chinese passengers, marked by their fair hair and queues, respectively, were equal participants in leisure activities:

> People with white faces, golden hair, and blue eyes. Passengers with eagle eyes, tall noses, wide brows, and red hair. Important guests with blue robes, purple skirts, and queues. They read, converse, play, socialize, or exercise. At times, the races of the East and West, without distinction, join in a round of pigs eye or a slipper race.[89]

Colorful illustrations throughout the *Guide* similarly depicted the accommodations, dining halls, and decks of the *Kasuga Maru*—and, by extension, N.Y.K. ships more generally—as spaces rigidly segmented by class, but accessible to people of all races and

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[87] Kokubu Saitō, "Shanhai kōro," *Taiyō* 8, no. 8 (1902): 388–89.

[88] Moriyama Tokō, "Taiwan kōyūki," *Taiyō* 8, no. 8 (1902): 342.

[89] "Kanban undojō," *Fūzoku gahō*, 24. In "pigs eye," a pig was drawn on the deck in chalk. A passenger was blindfolded and spun around three times. Remaining blindfolded, the passenger would attempt to draw an eye on the pig. "Yūgeki," *Fūzoku gahō*, 26.

nationalities that could afford the ticket price. As Christopher Gerteis has pointed out, however, such depictions glossed over the segregation of Chinese and Korean third-class passengers from Japanese, European, and American passengers traveling in steerage.[90]

In addition to delineating the spaces aboard Japanese-flagged ships, the magazines also situated Japan's ships and shipping infrastructure within global structures of trade and travel. Past scholarship has traced efforts to position the Japanese Empire and its ports in global networks of circulation. Kate McDonald, for example, has shown how early twentieth-century discourse on circulation distinguished between civilized and non-civilized territories in terms of degrees of movement, such that "the development of an infrastructure of circulation served to justify Japanese colonialism."[91] Such was evident, for example, in guidebooks produced by Japan's South Manchuria Railway (SMR; *Minami Manshū tetsudō kabushiki gaisha*), which highlighted infrastructure developments in Dalian as an "emblem of the SMR's commitment to improving circulation in East Asia."[92]

Essays in *Japan of the Sea* similarly sought to position major ports in Japan as hubs in global networks of transportation and trade. In an essay on Yokohama, for instance, Tsuboya Zenshirō, writing under his penname, Suisai, highlighted the growing number of ships entering and exiting the port, and delineated the liner services that linked Yokohama to ports in Europe, East Asia, Australia, and North America.[93] Likewise, Kokubu Saitō devoted a portion of his essay on Shanghai to a discussion of Osaka,

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[90] Gerteis, "Marketing History as Social Responsibility," 226–27.

[91] Kate McDonald, "Imperial Mobility: Circulation as History in East Asia under Empire," *Transfers* 4, issue 3 (Winter 2014): 76.

[92] McDonald, "Imperial Mobility," 80. For more on the SMR and Dalian, see Chapter 4.

[93] Tsuboya Suisai, "Yokohama-kō," *Taiyō* 8, no. 8 (1902): 217–18, 225–28.

which, he argued, would "not only become the center of the nation's prosperity, but also a great economic center of shipping, trade, and commerce."[94]

At the same time, as the two magazines situated Japan within an interconnected world, they also positioned Japanese ships within shipping routes and commercial hubs beyond the nation's borders. Overviews of shipping services frequently emphasized the ability of Japanese ships to keep pace with foreign steamers, even in difficult routes. In *Japan of the Sea*, Asakura Hakkō described the N.Y.K.'s Seattle line, which, he observed, "is among the world's longest. Once you depart Yokohama and float out into the waves of the great ocean, for days, truly, for two weeks, you see neither mountain nor shore."[95] According to Hakkō, however, the three new N.Y.K. ships assigned to the line were able to match the speed of the Canada Mail Company's parallel service—sailing at thirteen to fourteen knots, they made the passage across the North Pacific in under fourteen days.[96] In an overview of the N.Y.K.'s Europe service in the *Illustrated Guide*, editors similarly celebrated that the company's ships "raise the Japanese flag high in the wide, blue waves of the ocean, and race alongside the ships of Europe and America."[97]

Other essays placed Japanese ships in overseas centers of circulation and trade. Kokubu Saitō, for example, highlighted the N.Y.K.'s facilities in Shanghai. Arriving in the "Orient's foremost market," the company's ships moored at an N.Y.K.-owned pier. According to Saitō, "the company's branch office, warehouse, and pier occupy one of the

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[94] Kokubu Saitō, "Shanhai tokōki," *Taiyō* 8, no. 8 (1902): 383.

[95] Kuratsuji Hakkō, "Shiatoru kōro," 461.

[96] Kuratsuji Hakkō, "Shiatoru kōro," 462.

[97] "Naigai sho kōro," *Fūzoku gahō*, 3.

best sites among the Shanghai wharves."[98] As a result, "nothing lifts the confidence of Japanese people more than to arrive at the N.Y.K. pier, and to look up at the towering, three-story brick warehouse, high enough to pierce the sky, and marked with the three letters N, Y, K." The premier location, moreover, enabled the company to streamline flows of cargoes and passengers between land and sea.

Descriptions of shipping services also emphasized their integration with other modes of transportation.[99] Just as the Oriental Steamship concluded an agreement with a railroad to develop a service to San Francisco, the N.Y.K. opened its service to Seattle by concluding a traffic agreement with the Great Northern Railroad Company.[100] Both magazines represented this steamship-railroad connection as a major selling point for the N.Y.K. In a summary of the service in the *Illustrated Guide*, editors briefly listed the N.Y.K.'s ports of call, before providing a detailed description of conditions on the railroad:

> The scenery along the Great Northern Railroad, which includes the Columbia River and the Rocky Mountain Range, is the most beautiful in America, and the views are excellent. In the "buffet library" car, new books and newspapers are provided for passengers to read. One can read and chat, and if one gets tired of that, gaze out the windows at the vast plains and the overlapping mountain ranges.[101]

The appeal of the N.Y.K.'s service therefore in part derived from the access it provided to luxurious travel by rail across the American continent. In his overview of the Seattle line in *Japan of the Sea*, Kuratsuji pointed out that, upon arriving in Puget Sound, N.Y.K.'s

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[98] Kokubu Saitō, "Shanhai tokōki," *Taiyō* 8, no. 8 (1902): 391.

[99] Likewise, Kate McDonald has examined how the SMR sought to develop through traffic agreements with railroads and shipping companies. Kate McDonald, "Asymmetrical Integration: Lessons from a Railway Empire," *Technology and Culture* 56, no. 1 (January 2015): 115–49.

[100] For details, see *NYK 50-nenshi*, 143–49.

[101] "Naigai sho kōro," *Fūzoku gahō* (1901): 4.

ships berthed at docks owned by the railroad, and he similarly outlined the reach of Great Northern: "the company takes St. Paul, Minnesota as its starting point, and its rail lines extend to Seattle, Tacoma, and Portland in the West; combined with a number of branch lines, the company's owns more than 3,000 miles of railway."[102]

The depictions of shipping and maritime affairs in the *Illustrated Guide* and *Japan of the Sea* thus encouraged wealthy, educated readers to participate in the maritime world that linked Japanese cities and ports into circuits of transportation. At the same time, the magazines also placed Japanese ships in the world, out beyond the space of the nation, in sea-lanes and foreign ports where they contributed to global movements of trade, commerce, and travel. Through essays and images, editors, essayists, and illustrators suggested that Japanese ships contributed to the nation-building project insofar as they were linked to transcontinental railways and foreign hubs of commerce, and served as vehicles for the goods and people of many nations.

Patterns of Circulation on Transoceanic Routes

Though, on paper, the major transoceanic services appeared to radiate out from Japan, connecting the nation to other countries, the cargoes and passengers conveyed through these lines did not necessarily originate or terminate in Japan. Instead, ships assigned to the services also carried passengers and third-country trade between foreign ports. In a discussion of sea power in the early 1910s, Kawashima Seijirō, a prolific

[102] Kuratsuji Hakkō, "Shiatoru kōro," *Taiyō* 8, no. 8 (1902): 462–63.

writer on naval affairs,[103] observed that on the overseas lines, "passengers and cargoes are not only loaded and unloaded between Japan and terminal ports, but many passengers and cargoes are also loaded and unloaded at each port in intermediate countries along the line."[104] In establishing connections between Japan and the world, Japan's ships therefore became vehicles for other flows of world trade as well.

The significance of third-country trade for transoceanic shipping was evident in figures that Kawashima provided on cargoes carried by Japanese ships on the Seattle, Tacoma, San Francisco, South America, Australia, and Europe routes. Though William Wray and Kokaze Hidemasa have emphasized the significance of China's foreign trade for Japanese shipping,[105] a close examination of these figures reveals the significance of additional flows of trade, as well as variations in the significance of Chinese trade for different lines.

Kawashima's figures include details on the total quantity of freight carried on the six lines in 1911, as well as "major cargoes" (*jūyō kamotsu*) carried in 1911 and 1912.[106]

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[103] Kawashima wrote several books on naval matters, and after WWI addressed the possibility of war between Japan and the U.S. See Uesugi Shinkichi's preface to Kawashima Seijirō, *Nichi-Bei issenron: Ichimei "mushiki no kyōfu"* (Tōkyō: Keibunkan, 1925), 3.

[104] Kawashima Seijirō, *Kaijō no Nihon* (Niyūsha, 1914), 41.

[105] Wray has emphasized that the transport of Chinese exports to Europe played an important role for the N.Y.K.'s Europe line. Though Europe exported large quantities of goods to Japan, Japanese exports to Europe were negligible, and the transport of Chinese freight therefore filled space on outbound sailings. Kokaze, moreover, has highlighted Shanghai and Hong Kong's significance as hubs for the major transoceanic services of the early 1900s. William D. Wray, "Japan's Big-Three Service Enterprises in China, 1896–1936," in *The Japanese Informal Empire in China, 1895–1937*, ed. Peter Duus, Ramon H. Myers, and Mark R. Peattie (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), 31–64. Kokaze, *Teikokushugi-ka no Nihon kaiun*, 283–85.

[106] Kawashima provided figures on the amount of cargoes (in tons) loaded and unloaded in Japan (without distinguishing among Japanese ports), and in foreign ports. Figures are available for the period from January to December 1912 for the O.S.K. (Tacoma line) and Oriental Steamship (San Francisco and South America lines), and from October 1911 to September 1912 for the N.Y.K. (Europe, Seattle, and Australia lines). They include details on the quantity of freight carried

The aggregate figures for 1911 offer profiles of the freight carried within Japan (coastal trade between Japanese ports), to and from Japan (foreign trade), and between foreign ports (third-country trade).[107] Based on these figures, in 1911 Japanese ships carried over 1,000,000 tons of cargo on the six routes, of which around one third (400,000 tons) was third-country trade. (Table 2.2) The significance of third-country trade varied across the services. Whereas third-country trade made up the majority of cargoes carried on outbound sailings on the Europe and South America routes, Japan's foreign trade made up the majority of inbound cargo on the two routes. In contrast, Japan's foreign trade made up the majority of both outbound and inbound freight carried on the Seattle, Tacoma, San Francisco, and Australia route. Of those four, third-country trade made up the smallest proportion of cargoes on the Australia route, where 75 percent of cargoes carried in both directions represented Japanese foreign trade.

Details on ports of loading and discharge for "major cargoes" also makes it possible to trace cargo movements between specific countries in 1911 and 1912, and therefore reveal how each service joined together multiple flows of commodities. (Figure 2.3) The following descriptions of each service, in contrast to the aggregate figures discussed above, cover a two-year period. Business reports also provide an indication of passenger movements on these routes.

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between Japanese ports, to Japan from specific foreign ports, from Japan to foreign ports, and between foreign ports. Kawashima, *Kaijō no Nihon*, 41–52.

[107] Kokaze uses these figures to analyze the place of Shanghai and Hong Kong in Japan's shipping network. As will be seen in this section, however, Kawashima's figures also make it possible to examine the significance of other ports in that network, as well as the different patterns of third-country trade carried on the lines. Kokaze, *Teikokushugi-ka no Nihon kaiun*, 283–85.

TABLE 2.2 Cargoes Carried on Japan's Transoceanic Lines, 1912

All Lines	Tons	Percent
Japan, Coastal Trade	7,532	0.70
Japan, Foreign Trade	668,672	62.38
Third-Country Trade	395,675	36.91
Total	1,071,879	100.00

	Seattle		Tacoma		San Francisco	
Outbound	Tons	Percent	Tons	Percent	Tons	Percent
Japan, Coastal Trade	266	0.39	-	-	39	0.05
Japan, Foreign Trade	53,840	79.88	35,457	61.04	53,482	63.43
(To Japan)	*11,615*	*17.23*	*12,966*	*22.32*	*9,023*	*10.70*
(From Japan)	*42,225*	*62.65*	*22,491*	*38.72*	*44,459*	*52.73*
Third-Country Trade	13,291	19.72	22,628	38.96	30,800	36.53
Total Outbound	67,397	100.00	58,085	100.00	84,321	100.00
Inbound						
Japan, Coastal Trade	980	1.09	4,235	3.00	31	0.07
Japan, Foreign Trade	53,806	59.92	96,963	68.78	31,738	72.85
(To Japan)	*39,348*	*43.82*	*82,505*	*58.53*	*20,043*	*46.01*
(From Japan)	*14,458*	*16.10*	*14,458*	*10.26*	*11,695*	*26.85*
Third-Country Trade	35,014	38.99	39,772	28.21	11,795	27.08
Total Inbound	89,800	100.00	140,970	100.00	43,564	100.00
Total	157,197		199,055		127,885	

	Europe		Australia		South America	
Outbound	Tons	Percent	Tons	Percent	Tons	Percent
Japan, Coastal Trade	1,380	0.68	338	0.98	-	-
Japan, Foreign Trade	70,209	34.72	26,075	75.80	4,807	21.15
(To Japan)					*1,445*	*6.36*
(From Japan)					*3,362*	*14.79*
Third-Country Trade	130,638	64.60	7,988	23.22	17,923	78.85
Total Outbound	202,227	100.00	34,401	100.00	22,730	100.00
Inbound						
Japan, Coastal Trade	156	0.06	107	0.32	-	-
Japan, Foreign Trade	172,975	70.88	25,311	75.82	44,009	86.35
(To Japan)					*21,908*	*42.98*
(From Japan)					*22,101*	*43.36*
Third-Country Trade	70,901	29.05	7,966	23.86	6,959	13.65
Total Inbound	244,032	100.00	33,384	100.00	50,968	100.00
Total	446,259		67,785		73,698	

*Note: Trans-Pacific services carried cargoes to and from Japan on sailings in both directions.

**Note: Figures for the N.Y.K.'s services (Europe, Seattle, and Australia lines) cover October 1911 to September 1912. All other figures are for the period January to December 1912.

Source: Kawashima, *Kaijō no Nihon*, 41–52.

On the Seattle route, the N.Y.K. linked together several regional and trans-Pacific flows of trade to maintain its service. Japanese exports and imports made up the majority of cargoes carried on both outbound and inbound services. According to N.Y.K. business reports, in 1911 trade on the route had begun to recover from a recent slump, and the firm therefore employed three free ships (*jieisen*) between Kobe and Seattle, while ordered ships (*meireisen*) maintained services between Hong Kong and Seattle via Japan.[108] By weight, grains made up the largest export loaded in Seattle: 35,664 tons of wheat and 15,143 tons of wheat flour were carried to Japanese ports, and another 64,264 tons of wheat flour to Shanghai and Hong Kong.[109] Smaller quantities of braided straw and patterned mats were carried from Shanghai and Hong Kong back across the Pacific, but it was Japanese exports that made up the bulk of Seattle-bound cargoes, including tea (12,729 tons), ceramics (6,606 tons), *hanagoza* patterned mats (5,386 tons), and raw silk (5,192 tons). A large portion of eastbound cargoes loaded in China were bound for Japan: mostly rice (10,169 tons) exported from Hong Kong. A number of U.S.-bound cargoes also included transshipped products from India.[110] N.Y.K. ships, moreover, also carried a number of Chinese passengers to the U.S.[111] On the Seattle line, third-country trade thus mostly took the form of American grain that flowed west across the Pacific to Hong Kong and Seattle, along with grain bound for Japan. This grain trade, meanwhile, paralleled two eastbound flows of cargoes: rice exports carried to Japan and Japanese exports carried to Seattle.

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[108] *NYK EH*, 27-1 (1912), 4.

[109] Figures on specific cargoes based on Kawashima, *Kaijō no Nihon*, 41–52. Kawashima provides figures on the amounts of "major cargoes" (*jūyō kamotsu*) for 1911 and 1912.

[110] *NYK EH*, 27-2 (1912), 4.

[111] *NYK EH*, 27-1 (1912), 4.

In 1909, the O.S.K. opened a service on a similar course across the Pacific to Tacoma, though on westbound sailings ships also called in Manila. These ships carried cargoes in a pattern similar to that on the N.Y.K.'s Seattle line. The cargo carried in the largest quantities was American flour (83,360 tons) exported out of Tacoma. As on the Seattle line, O.S.K. vessels carried it to several destinations: Japan (31,562 tons), Shanghai (15,308 tons), Manila (12,826 tons), and Hong Kong (23,664 tons). At the same time, O.S.K. ships also carried a considerable quantity of raw cotton (27,424 tons) out of Tacoma, almost all of which (26,027 tons) was unloaded in Japanese ports. Japanese exports (tea, ceramics, and patterned mats) again made up the bulk of eastbound, trans-Pacific cargoes. O.S.K. ships also carried smaller shipments from Chinese ports across the Pacific, as well as Chinese passengers bound for British Columbia.[112] Like the N.Y.K., the O.S.K. generated income from a combination of Japanese foreign trade, and third-country trade that included American exports to Shanghai, Hong Kong, and Manila.

The cargoes transported by Oriental Steamship on the San Francisco line, meanwhile, included several trade circuits. The company's ships carried Japan's foreign trade with China, Hawai'i, and the U.S.; China's trade with Hawai'i and the U.S.; and flows of trade from Japan and the U.S. to the Philippines. Of these, the cargo that circulated in the largest quantity was raw cotton (21,701 tons) exported from San Francisco. Unlike the American grain loaded in Seattle and Tacoma, however, almost all of this cotton (20,701 tons) was unloaded in Japan, with only small amounts continuing on to Shanghai and Hong Kong. Eastbound, Oriental Steamship carried a familiar set of Japanese exports to San Francisco: tea (13,000 tons), patterned mats (6,100 tons), and

[112] *OSK EH*, 1911-2 (1911), 2. *OSK EH*, 1912-2 (1912), 2.

raw silk (5,207 tons). On the western loop of the line, the firm's ships carried a large amount of goods between Japan and Hong Kong: matches (8,070 tons), marine products (4,007 tons), and vegetables (1,489 tons) loaded in Japan, and rice (7,934 tons) and sugar (3,069 tons) loaded in Hong Kong. Third-country trade from Hong Kong to San Francisco also made up a large portion of Oriental Steamship's eastbound, trans-Pacific cargoes, including rice (7,764 tons), gunny sacks (7,704 tons), and patterned mats (5,084 tons). Tea (6,332 tons) was also carried from Shanghai to San Francisco. A smaller quantity of goods from San Francisco was, in turn, carried back to treaty ports in China. Similarly, Oriental Steamship transported a large quantity of rice (14,202 tons), along with other goods from Japan to Honolulu, but only a small amount of coffee from Honolulu to Japan. While westbound American grain was the third-country cargo carried in the greatest quantities on the Tacoma and Seattle lines, most of the third-country trade carried by Oriental Steamship was, instead, eastbound goods loaded in Hong Kong and Shanghai.

On the Australia line, as on the San Francisco line, cargoes carried to and from Japan made up a larger share of major cargoes (around 75 percent of both outbound and inbound cargoes) than on the Tacoma and Seattle lines. Most cargoes circulated between Japan and Australia. Southbound, the major Japanese cargoes were sulfur (4,130 tons), bamboo handicrafts (2,850 tons), and fish oil (2,421 tons). Australian goods bound for Japan included fertilizer (9,734 tons), lead (9,581 tons), wool (7,889 tons), animal fats (2,267 tons), and wheat flour (2,122 tons). Parallel to this Japan-Australia trade, ships on the route also carried cargoes between Japan and Hong Kong, and third-country trade between Hong Kong and Manila on the one hand and Australia on the other. On the

northern segment of the route, N.Y.K. ships carried marine products (5,157 tons) from Japan to Hong Kong and rice (8,262 tons) from Hong Kong back to Japan. On the southern segment, they carried tea (2,210 tons) and rice (1,820 tons) from Hong Kong, and jute (4,538 tons) from Manila to Australia, and returned with Australian wheat flour—8,807 tons discharged in Manila and 1,844 tons in Hong Kong. As on the Seattle and Tacoma routes, Japanese ships carried Australian grains to ports outside of Japan, as well as a sizeable third-country trade bound for Australia.

The South America line exhibited its own, distinct pattern of cargo movements. The major South American cargo was potassium nitrate (saltpeter), and in 1912 Oriental Steamship carried 56,727 tons west across the Pacific. Most of this (44,402 tons) was discharged in Japan, but, as in the trans-Pacific grain trade, a portion was also carried to foreign ports: 2,502 tons to Mexico, 9,473 tons tons to Honolulu, and 350 tons to Hong Kong. In contrast to the Seattle and Tacoma lines, however, in which Japanese exports made up the vast majority of outbound cargoes, Oriental Steamship carried very few Japanese exports across the Pacific—only 4,726 tons to Hawai'ian, Mexican, and South American ports. Instead, ships on eastbound sailings were loaded with rice (22,260 tons) exported from Hong Kong. On voyages from Japan to Hong Kong, meanwhile, the company carried a large quantity of coal (42,129 tons). In order to sustain the transport of potassium nitrate to Japan, Oriental Steamship therefore relied on additional cargo movements: Hong Kong rice exports and Japanese coal exports.

The N.Y.K.'s Europe line, finally, exhibited a pattern of cargo traffic similar to the South America line, but with several key differences. Twelve, 6,000-ton ships maintained sailings every other week, and the volume of freight carried on the line

(446,259 tons) was more than twice as much as the next-most trafficked service (the Tacoma line, 199,055 tons). In Europe, the company found abundant cargoes to transport to Japan: metals (82,964 tons), pig iron (31,807 tons), window glass (14,221 tons), and machinery (13,155 tons). In contrast, the company carried about half as many cargoes from Japan to Europe, with raw materials such as lumber (14,485 tons), copper (11,758 tons), and graphite (7,434 tons) the main exports. Wray has pointed out that the N.Y.K.'s business strategy therefore depended on the carriage of Chinese exports to Europe.[113] Indeed, alongside Japanese exports, the N.Y.K. also carried cargoes to Europe from Shanghai, such as sesame (13,285 tons) and tea (11,757 tons), and 33,950 tons from Hong Kong, such as patterned mats (14,676 tons). With a half dozen other ports of call between Hong Kong and the line's terminus in Antwerp, however, the N.Y.K. also carried a considerable amount of cargoes from other intermediate ports. These included tin and copra from Singapore and Penang, tea and oil from Colombo, and a small quantity of oil from Marseilles. In 1911, exports from ports west of Hong Kong totaled 74,729 tons, slightly more than the 71,589 tons of exports from Japan, and considerably more than the 55,909 tons loaded in Shanghai and Hong Kong. On the return voyage, in contrast, cargo traffic from Europe (Middlesbrough, Antwerp, London, and Marseilles) to Japan made up just under sixty-five percent of all westbound cargoes. The rest included third-country trade carried from Europe to Singapore and Hong Kong (mostly metals) and a small amount of rice transported from Hong Kong to Japan.

[113] William D. Wray, "Japan's Big-Three Service Enterprises in China, 1896–1936," in *The Japanese Informal Empire in China, 1895–1937*, ed. Peter Duus, Ramon H. Myers, and Mark Peattie (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014), 38–41.

Though Kawashima's overview of these cargo movements did not include figures for cargoes on the N.Y.K.'s Bombay line, company reports provide anecdotal evidence for the significance of third-country trade on the line. In the two decades before WWI, the line originated in Kobe or Yokohama, and passed through Moji, Hong Kong, Singapore, and Colombo before arriving in Bombay. Eastbound, ships called at Singapore, Hong Kong, and Kobe before returning to Yokohama, with occasional stops in Tuticorin and Colombo. In 1906, the company made Shanghai a regular eastbound port of call. While raw cotton shipped from India to Japan was the major cargo on the line, business reports and other company records indicate that goods were also loaded and discharged in Shanghai and Hong Kong. An internal history of N.Y.K. lines, for example, noted that in 1903 the firm obtained "considerable" quantities of cotton yarn in India that was transported to Hong Kong.[114] Though the firm initially struggled to secure westbound shipments to balance eastbound cargoes, after the Russo-Japanese War the N.Y.K. recorded modest increases in exports to India and intermediate ports between 1906 and 1908, and in the following few years, cargoes from Hong Kong and Singapore joined the Japanese exports shipped to India.[115] The internal history, moreover, regularly referenced not only Japanese cotton imports, but also shifts in the Chinese market for cotton yarns shipped from India, such as slight reductions in 1907, or a "considerable increase" in cotton yarns unloaded in China in 1912.[116] N.Y.K. ships therefore carried three additional sets of cargoes along with the primary trade in raw cotton shipped from

[114] Kamotsuka, ed., *Wagasha kaku kōro no enkaku* ([Tōkyō]: Nippon yūsen kabushiki gaisha kamotsuka, 1932), 165.

[115] Kamotsuka, ed., *Wagasha kaku kōro no enkaku*, 165–66.

[116] Kamotsuka, ed., *Wagasha kaku kōro no enkaku*, 166.

India to Japan: a mix of cargoes from Japan carried to Bombay and intermediate ports; small amounts of third-country cargoes shipped from China to India; and, eastbound, cotton yarns shipped from India to Hong Kong and Shanghai. Viewed in the contest of intra-Asian trade between China, Japan, India, and Southeast Asia,[117] the N.Y.K.'s Bombay line therefore facilitated flows of trade from Japan to India and from India to China, which contributed to the consolidation of Asia as an economic unit.[118]

The names given to shipping lines based on their termini, such as Seattle or the more general "Europe," provided only a partial indication of their place in world trade. Though most debates on subsidies in the Diet centered on the carriage of Japanese foreign trade in Japanese ships, the "restoration" of navigation power between the archipelago and other countries also meant that Japan's vessels began to carry passengers and cargoes between foreign ports. One consequence, however, was that self-sufficiency in the transport of Japanese foreign trade created new dependencies on trade and people moving between other countries. Hints of such vulnerabilities could be found in N.Y.K. reports that at times referenced disruptions not only in terminal ports, such as British strikes in 1911, but intermediate ports as well, such as Chinese boycotts of Japanese ships on the Australia line in 1909.[119] At the same time, in laying claim to navigation power on routes that threaded between multiple countries, Japanese ships were positioned to

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[117] See Kaoru Sugihara, ed., *Japan, China, and the Growth of the Asian International Economy, 1850–1949*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 8. See also: Idem, "Patterns of Asia's Integration into the World Economy, 1880–1913," in *The Integration of the World Economy, 1850–1914*, vol. II, ed. C. Knick Harley (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elger Publishing Limited, 1996), 700–719.

[118] Shigeru Akita has also observed the significance of the N.Y.K.'s Bombay line in intra-Asian trade. See Shigeru Akita, "Intra-Asian Competition and Collaboration against the West," *Asian Review of World Histories* 6 (2018): 277–93.

[119] *NYK EH*, 26-2 (1911), 3. *NYK EH*, 24-2 (1909), 5.

generate wealth through the collection of tolls from shippers and passengers who sought passage on Japan's ocean highways.

Conclusion


Fierce competition for navigation power motivated many maritime powers to seek out knowledge of how rivals utilized state power to promote national shipping industries. Japanese authorities, businessmen, and journalists aggressively pursued such competitive emulation, and between the 1890s and 1910s they developed, implemented, and adapted programs of shipping subsidies based on practices observed in Western maritime powers. At the same time, the transportation apparatus that emerged with the support of such policies extended beyond the scope of Japan's foreign trade, and, as envisioned by Terashima and Tsuboya, Japanese ships began to carry flows of trade beyond those passing through Japanese ports. Marketing materials aimed at encouraging an ocean-minded population to support maritime affairs highlighted the integral role of Japanese ships in global transportation, while Japanese shipping firms began to earn revenue through the transport of people and goods between world ports.

FIGURE 2.3 Patterns of Cargo Traffic on Japan's Transoceanic Lines, 1911–1912


Note: Red arrows represent cargoes carried between Japanese and foreign ports. Blue arrows represent cargoes carried between foreign ports. Arrow sizes indicate the share of all "major cargoes" carried on the line.

Source: Kawashima, *Kaijō no Nihon*, 41–52.


Seattle Line




Tacoma Line




San Francisco Line




Australia Line



South America Line



Europe Line



CHAPTER 3. JAPANESE SHIPS IN THE GREAT WAR, 1914–1921

At the start of the twentieth century, shipping lines pumped trade around the world as the primary arterial structure of the world economy. Capillary systems of railways carried cargoes and passengers between ports and inland destinations, and across a few continents, but it was marine transportation that linked those railways into a global transportation infrastructure. As much of world shipping became embroiled in the First World War, however, the distribution of national fleets around the world underwent dramatic changes.

Marine transportation was essential to the prosecution of that war. Alongside the clash between militaries, the two sides struggled for control over resources, each seeking to sever their enemy from access to overseas goods and services. After the war, one official involved in Allied transportation would write:

> It was as much a war of competing blockades, the surface and the submarine, as of competing armies. Behind these two blockades the economic systems of the two opposing groups of countries were engaged in a deadly struggle for existence…[1]

With Britain the world's paramount naval power, the Allies imposed a blockade on the Central Powers, leaving German ships (11 percent of world tonnage) little choice but to retreat to neutral or friendly ports or be seized by enemies.[2] Allied shipping requirements,

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[1] Arthur Salter, *Allied Shipping Control: An Experiment in International Administration* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1921), 1.

[2] David Kennedy, *Over Here: The First World War and American Society*, 25th anniversary ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004 [1980]), 301. For German tonnage, see S.G. Sturmey, *British Shipping and World Competition* (London: The Athlone Press, 1962), 37. Keith Neilson, "Reinforcements and Supplies from Overseas: British Strategic Sealift in the First World War," in

meanwhile, were twofold: ships transported personnel and matériel, and they carried raw materials that fueled industrial production in Europe's metropoles. German attacks on shipping lines, however, reduced the efficiency per ton of Allied shipping by forcing ships to travel in convoys and make longer voyage around dangerous stretches of ocean.[3] Cumulatively, the Allied blockade and German submarine campaign created a worldwide shortage of shipping that led to new dynamics in markets for ships and shipping services.

These disruptions to patterns of trade and transportation prompted many countries (belligerents and neutrals alike) to adopt measures to maintain their national shipping capacity—and, in some cases, to improve their position in world shipping. In the U.S., for example, the withdrawal of German and British ships from major sea-lanes created a crisis for exporters,[4] and, even before the U.S. declared war in 1917, President Woodrow Wilson sought to establish a government-owned, government-operated shipping company—an unprecedented intervention into private enterprise by the federal government. In addition to preserving American access to overseas markets, Wilson also sought to promote American shipping in the world as part of a broader effort to give shape to a new economic order.[5] Among the Allies, meanwhile, British officials sought to maintain the empire's shipping capacity, and devote it to trades deemed essential to the war effort. To prevent drains of ships out of the British registry, officials implemented

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The Merchant Marine in International Affairs 1850-1950, ed. Greg Kennedy (London: Frank Cass, 2000), 32.

[3] Neilson, "Reinforcements and Supplies from Overseas," 33–34.

[4] For the decline of American shipping, see Andrew Gibson and Arthur Donovan, *Abandoned Ocean: A History of United States Maritime Policy* (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 2000), 72–99. For the impact of the war, see ibid., 103–4. Kennedy, *Over Here*, 301.

[5] A detailed account of American shipping policy can be found in Jeffrey J. Safford, *Wilsonian Maritime Diplomacy, 1913-1921* (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1978). See also Kennedy, *Over Here*, 301–5, 324–29. Gibson, *Abandoned Ocean*, 103–15.

export controls, and, as the war progressed, adopted successively expansive powers to direct British-flagged ships to specific trades.[6] While wartime shipping policy in the U.S. sought to remake the structure of world shipping, British officials aimed to mobilize tonnage in the pursuit of wartime objectives. Both efforts entailed new government interventions in shipbuilding, ship markets, and shipping services—developments also common among many other shipping powers, such as France, Norway, and Italy.[7]

In this, Japan was no exception. Though half the world away from the war's major battlefields, the archipelago keenly felt the worldwide tonnage shortages. With Japan an ally of the Entente, Japanese owners retained free access to Allied ports around the world.[8] Soaring demand for shipping services, meanwhile, created unprecedented opportunities for profit. As Japanese ships expanded into new trade routes, however, shippers in the home islands came to view the shipping industry's boom as an impediment to the circulation of the nation's trade. Business interests soon began to call for the state to rein in shipowners and ensure that the nation's ships remained employed in the nation's trade. Bureaucrats charged with asserting control over Japanese ships weighed such entreaties against the potential advantages of solidifying gains made by Japanese-flagged ships. In order to manage the dual imperatives of promoting shipping while minimizing disruptions to trade, officials finally imitated foreign policymakers and adopted policies that expanded the state's control over Japanese-flagged ships.

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[6] For details on British shipping controls, see Salter, *Allied Shipping Control*, 38–87, 102–108. For analysis, see Neilson, "Reinforcements and Supplies from Overseas," 31–58.

[7] Sturmey, *British Shipping and World Competition*, 40–45. A survey of such measures produced by Japanese officials during the war can be found in Teishinshō rinji chōsakyoku, *Kakkoku senji senpaku kanri seido gaiyō* (Teishinshō kansenkyoku, 1917).

[8] This point is emphasized in William D. Wray, "Opportunity vs Control: The Diplomacy of Japanese Shipping in the First World War," in *The Merchant Marine in International Affairs 1850-1950*, ed. Greg Kennedy (London: Frank Cass, 2000), 59–60.

The expansion of Japanese shipping during the First World War, Japanese shipping controls, and efforts during and after the war to advance Japan's position in world shipping are the subjects of this chapter. In historical scholarship, Japan's place in the war often appears peripheral, and the effects of the war on Japan as significant but indirect. Observation of industrial and social mobilization in Europe inspired Japanese military officers to develop new notions of "total war," but the application of such ideas waited for another world war two decades later.[9] Japanese ships, however, became directly embroiled in a commercial struggle over shipping that paralleled military hostilities, and efforts to maneuver for position in the economic order that followed the Great War prompted new debates on how to coordinate shipping in the pursuit of national interests.

New Horizons

In 1922, several years after the end of WWI, Japan's Mercantile Marine Bureau prepared a report entitled *World Shipping in the Age of the Great War*. In it, bureau officials wrote that the war had impacted "various affairs" in Japan, but that its influence on shipping had been particularly "acute" since the industry was "not only an institution indispensable to the execution of that war, but also an industry of a most international nature." As a result, during the war Japan's "trade and navigation power (*kōken*) was expanded, shipbuilding capacity increased, and Japan's world status as a shipping nation

[9] See, for example, Janis Mimura, *Planning for Empire: Reform Bureaucrats and the Japanese Wartime State* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2011). Michael A. Barnhart, *Japan Prepares for Total War: The Search for Economic Security, 1919-1914* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987).

and as a shipbuilding nation was remarkably improved."[10] The improvement of Japan's position in world maritime affairs could be summarized by a simple figure: Japan had entered the war the world's sixth-largest shipping power, but by June 1919, its fleet had swelled to become the world's third-largest, totaling almost 3,000,000 gross tons.[11] This expansion of the fleet did not simply build upon the shipping services established before the war, but entailed more fundamental changes in the place of Japanese ships in the world.

Different sectors of Japanese shipping did not share in the war's opportunities equally. For the large liner companies—the N.Y.K. and the O.S.K.—the withdrawal of British and German ships from major shipping routes provided opportunities to open new services, such as the N.Y.K.'s round-the-world service or services to India opened by the O.S.K.[12] As historian Sasaki Seiji has observed, however, the main beneficiaries of world tonnage shortages were the "outsiders," or "shagaisen" owners who, in 1914, primarily operated tramp services in near seas routes around Japan.[13] While the terms of N.Y.K.

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[10] Teishinshō kansenkyoku, *Taisen jidai no sekai kaiun* ([Tōkyō]: 1922), 100. Such commentary was comparable to Inoue Junnosuke's summary of wartime industrial production in Japan as "enlargement, expansion, increase, and advance" (*zōdai, kakuchō, zōka, zōshin*). Quoted in Mark Metzler, *Lever of Empire: The International Gold Standard and the Crisis of Liberalism in Prewar Japan* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006), 95.

[11] Ranked by the total tonnage of steamships larger than 100 gross tons. Though Japan's fleet became the third largest in the world, the British and American fleets were both an order of magnitude larger at 20,000,000 and 14,000,000 gross tons, respectively. At 2,995,878 gross tons, Japan's fleet was closer in size to the French (2,963,229 gross tons) and Italian (2,118,429) gross tons. Teishinshō kansenkyoku, *Taisen jidai no sekai kaiun*, 103. *OSK 80-nenshi*, 41. Teishinshō, ed., *Teishin jigyōshi*, vol. 6, (Tōkyō: Teishin kyōkai, 1941), 983–84.

[12] Hashimoto Jurō, "Kyodai sangyō no kōryū," in *Nijū kōzō*, ed. Nakamura Takafusa and Odaka Kōnosuke (Tōkyō: Iwanami shoten, 1989), 84. For the N.Y.K. round-the-world service, and other new, transoceanic lines, see *NYK 100-nenshi*, 215–20. *OSK-Mitsui 100-nenshi*, 142–54.

[13] See introduction for a summary of "shagaisen." The term was used by contemporaries to refer to, essentially, Japanese shipowners other than the three major liner companies—the N.Y.K., O.S.K., and Oriental Steamship Company. Though most of the shagaisen owners operated tramp

and O.S.K. subsidies required the firms to secure government permission before raising freight rates on subsidized services, the unsubsidized shagaisen owners were able to seek out the highest rates that the wartime market could bear.[14] Some dispatched ships overseas to carry third-country trade, or leased their vessels to foreign charterers. Both activities led to new spatialities of shipping in which Japanese ships became separated from Japanese trade routes and Japanese management.

An early area of shagaisen expansion was Southeast Asia. Before WWI, a few shagaisen owners shipped coal from Kyūshū to Manila or Singapore, but the challenge of securing inbound cargo generally limited the viability of such services.[15] With German steamships expelled from the region, however, Japanese consuls began to encourage shipowners to develop new lines from Singapore to Thailand and Borneo, and direct from Japan to Thailand.[16] Articles in *The Maritime Magazine* (Kaiji shinpō), for example, encouraged the N.Y.K. and O.S.K. to charter shagaisen ships and establish services to Southeast Asia and India as an "advance party of imperial trade."[17] At the same time, some shagaisen owners sought to enter the region's trade routes directly. In 1916, for example, the Yamashita Steamship Company (*Yamashita kisen kabushiki gaisha*) sent Tachino Norimitsu—ringleader of a gang of young employees remembered for "drinking,

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services, the term did not simply refer to the tramp sector of Japanese shipping, particularly after WWI when a number of shagaisen owners opened liner services.

[14] Sasaki Seiji, *Nihon kaiungyō no kindaika* (Kōbe: Kaibundō, 1961), 394–95.

[15] *Yamashita shashi*, 404.

[16] "Jikyoku to kōro kakuchō," *Kaiji shinpō*, no. 292 (November 5, 1914): 40. "Shagaisen riyō no gi," *Kaiji shinpō*, no. 292 (November 5, 1914): 42.

[17] "Shagaisen riyō no gi," *Kaiji shinpō*, no. 292 (November 5, 1914): 42.

eating, and making trouble"—to Singapore to investigate shipping conditions.[18] In the months that followed, the company developed relations with rice and sugar merchants in Thailand, the Straits Settlements, Burma (present-day Myanmar), French Indochina, and Java. With these merchants as agents, Yamashita Steamship mediated charters of Japanese-owned ships to Singapore-based shippers.[19] Expansion into Southeast Asia therefore not only entailed the carriage of goods between the region and Japan, but also the carriage of third-country trade among the region's ports, though in ships chartered to foreign traders.

By early 1915, however, the war also seemed to provide opportunities outside Asia. Several of the larger shagaisen companies, such as the Kishimoto Steamship Company (*Kishimoto kisen kabushiki gaisha*) and the Tatsuuma Steamship Company (*Tatsuuma kisen kabushiki gaisha*), began to dispatch ships on transoceanic voyages beyond the Indian Ocean. Demand for Australian products in Europe, for example, led to increases in freight rates that made it possible for shagaisen owners to realize profits on voyages to Europe even without return cargoes. After carrying coal from Japan to Southeast Asia, some shagaisen ships began to collect wool and other products in Australia to carry to Liverpool and other European ports.[20] Other owners also found opportunities in overseas charter markets. A branch office of the Yamashita Steamship Company in London, for example, brokered charters of shagaisen ships to foreign firms such as Furness Withy and Andrew Weir, as well as the French government.[21] From

[18] Tanaka Masanosuke, *Daidō: Daidō seisei no yurai, kankyō, sono shikō to jissen* (Kōbe: Daidō kaiun, 1964), 225–26.

[19] *Yamashita shashi*, 405–8.

[20] "Shagaisen no hatten," *Kaiji shinpō*, no. 293 (February 5, 1915): 29–30.

[21] *Yamashita shashi*, 405.

January to March 1915, shagaisen owners leased at least ten ships to clients based in Europe, eight to the U.S., four to Australia, and three to India.[22] As in Southeast Asia, the expanding geography of shagaisen activities brought a new set of Japanese ships out into the world to carry both Japanese trade and shares of third-country trade.

For many in Japan's maritime industries, the appearance of the nation's flag in an expanded range of foreign ports seemed to bring a range of intangible benefits to Japanese shipping. Watanabe Kōtarō, superintendent of the Imperial Marine Association (*Teikoku kaiji kyōkai*), observed that owners and captains were able to gain valuable experience in foreign ports in the quotidian affairs of marine transportation: deals with longshoremen, procedures with port authorities, and other routines involved in overseas navigation.[23] Communications Vice-Minister Yukawa Motoumi, moreover, declared that, "the current displays of their technology and their diligence have a great effect in increasing trust (*shinyō*) in our ships and seamen."[24] As escalated demand for shipping increased the visibility of Japanese ships overseas, many shared such optimism that wartime expansion heralded a new place for the nation's ships in world shipping.

A disaster at sea similarly brought favorable attention to Japanese ships, officers, and seamen. On December 21, 1915, the N.Y.K.'s *Yasaka Maru*, a 10,932-ton passenger steamer built in Kobe in 1914, was about 500 nautical miles off the coast of Port Said when she was struck by a missile fired without warning by a German U-Boat. In less than an hour the ship sank beneath Mediterranean waves, but quick action by Captain

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[22] Unekawa Shizuo, *Kaiun kōkokushi*, vol. 1 (Ōsaka: Kaiji ihōsha, 1927), 380.

[23] Watanabe Kōtarō, "Senpaku no kangen (furībōdo) ni tsuite," *Kaiji shinpō*, no. 300 (November 5, 1916): 3.

[24] Yukawa Motoumi, "Ōshū senran to waga kaiungyō," *Kaiji shinpō*, no. 294 (May 5, 1915): 8.

Yamawaki Takeo and his crew saved the lives of the 120 passengers, who were rescued by a French destroyer around midnight.[25] The loss of the new, ¥2,600,000 ship demonstrated the risks of navigating waters patrolled by German submarines, and prompted the N.Y.K. to redirect its European services around the Cape of Good Hope, rather than through the Suez Canal.[26] At the same time, English-language newspapers in cities ranging from San Francisco to Hong Kong and London praised Captain Yamawaki and his crew for rescuing the passengers, which included European nationals who reportedly expressed admiration for the crew's "perfect discipline."[27] In a stark contrast to the late nineteenth century, when ships captained by Japanese officers struggled to secure insurance policies from British financial institutions,[28] the foreign press collectively complimented the Japanese captain who had proven capable of rescuing Western lives.[29]

In addition to visibility and prestige, wartime demand for ships and shipping services also created opportunities for shipowners and shipbrokers to earn lucrative profits. Uchida Nobuya, for example, had left the Mitsui Ship Department (*Mitsui*

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[25] *NYK 100-nenshi*, 212.

[26] "Nan'A bōeki no sokushin," *Tōkyō asahi shinbun*, January 15, 1916, NCC 10008018.

[27] "Sink Liner = Cargo $5,000,000: Japanese Ship," *Chicago Daily Tribune*, December 23, 1915. "Japanese Liner is sunk by Diver: New Steamship Yasaka Maru sent to the Bottom in Mediterranean," *San Francisco Chronicle*, December 23, 1915. "The Sinking of the Yasaka Maru: Passengers Interviewed at HongKong," *The North-China Herald and Supreme Court & Consular Gazette*, January 29, 1916, 268. "Yasaka Maru Survivors: Entertained at Hongkong," *The Times of India*, February 26, 1916, 16.

[28] See Chapter 1.

[29] The world's reception to the sinking of the *Yasaka Maru* also offered a stark contrast to the sinking of a British ship, the *Normanton*, off the coast of Japan in 1886. In the wake of that incident, the Japanese public erupted in outrage when it became known that the British captain and crew, who had failed to save a single Japanese passenger, had been found innocent of any negligence by a British consular court. Hirakawa Sukehiro and Bob Tadashi Wakabayashi, "Japan's turn to the West," in *The Cambridge History of Japan*, vol. 5, *The Nineteenth Century*, ed. Marius B. Jansen (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008 [1989]), 488.

senpakubu) in mid-1914 to establish an independent ship brokerage in Kobe with cash assets of ¥20,000. After the war began, he chartered the *No. 8 Tamon Maru* from Baba Hisamichi on a one-year contract at a monthly rate of ¥4,200, but then sub-chartered the vessel to Yamamoto Tadasaburō at a rate of ¥8,000 to net a profit of around ¥45,600.[30] Over the following year, Uchida purchased several ships to establish the Uchida Steamship Company (*Uchida kisen kabushiki gaisha*), but he continued to focus on charters as the company's main source of revenue. As charter rates rose in 1915, the new company earned tremendous profits and paid dividends of 60 percent on capital in the second half year of 1915.[31] As world tonnage shortages heightened demand for ships, Uchida and other brokers were able to earn fantastic profits by inserting themselves into the circulation of ships between owners and operators.

Owners, as well as investors new to the industry, also sought profits in markets for ships. Increased freight and charter rates in 1915 and 1916 set off what Unekawa Shizuo, a publisher of maritime news, described as a "fever of speculative ship purchases."[32] Ship prices soared. In 1915, one shipowner reportedly broke a contract to sell the *Daihoku Maru* for ¥170,000 in order to sell it to another buyer for ¥340,000. Despite paying ¥30,000 for breach of contract, the original owner earned an additional ¥140,000.[33] In 1916, the founder of the Yamashita Steamship Company, Yamashita Kamesaburō, sold his 36-year-old *Shōka Maru* for ¥800,000—seventeen times its 1910

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[30] The activities of *fune-narikin* Uchida Nobuya and Yamashita Kamesaburō are discussed in Kamioka Kazufumi, "Daiichiji taisenki ni okeru fune-narikin no shutsugen: Uchida Nobuya to Yamashita Kamesaburō," *Hōsei daigaku inobēshon manejimento kenkyū sentā wākingu pēpā shirīzu*, no. 132 (September 6, 2012): 3–6. Also see Unekawa, *Kaiun kōkokushi*, 1:379–80.

[31] "Honpō kaiunkai no jissei (jō/ge)," *Kōbe shinbun*, January 5–6, 1916, NCC 00139572.

[32] Unekawa, *Kaiun kōkokushi*, 1:381.

[33] Unekawa, *Kaiun kōkokushi*, 1:382.

purchase price.[34] Late in the war, Katsuta Ginjirō, founder of the Katsuta Steamship Company (*Katsuta kisen kabushiki gaisha*), gained fame for cutting a ¥10,000,000 check as deposit for a ¥100,000,000 ship purchased fresh off the docks of the Osaka Ironworks.[35] The trade in the second-hand market thereby intensified under the severe wartime shortages, and the trade in ships could earn owners small fortunes.

As this fevered profit-making activity continued, wealth began to cluster around several particularly successful shipowners. The figure of the *narikin*, or *nouveau riche*, remains an enduring symbol of Taishō Japan (1912-1926) and the Second Industrial Revolution precipitated by the Great War.[36] The *narikin*, however, were not all cut from the same cloth, and the term *fune-narikin*, or "shipping *nouveau riche*," began to appear in the press in reference to wealthy magnates who built fortunes on ships.[37] Stories abounded of their ostentatious displays of wealth. Uchida Nobuya, for example, became known for hosting a party in which he included a live snapper in the soup course (according to his memoir, he only used live goldfish).[38] Bands of what Terai Hisanobu, a future N.Y.K. president, retrospectively referred to as "masterless samurai" (*nobushi*)

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[34] *Yamashita shashi*, 405–6.

[35] Matsuda Shigeo, *Hyōden Katsuta Ginjirō* (Tōkyō: Aoyama gakuin, 1980), 49.

[36] Louise Young, for example, references the *narikin* and urban crowds as indicators of the social effects of the war and its "booms." Louise Young, *Beyond the Metropolis: Second Cities and Modern Life in Interwar Japan* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2014), 15–33.

[37] For example: "Jiji shinpō sha dai-3-kai chōsa zenkoku 50-man en ijō shisanke," *Jiji shinpō*, March 29, October 6, 1916, NCC 00797596. "Kōbe no kaiunteki seiryoku," *Ōsaka mainichi shinbun*, August 5, 1917, NCC 00482090.

[38] Hirohata Tadataka references the snapper story, while Uchida claims that the tale grew with each telling such that his playful goldfish transformed into snappers. Hirohata Tadataka, *Kaiun yorubanashi* (Tōkyō: Nihon kaiji gakkai shuppanbu, 1932), 63–64. Uchida Nobuya, *Fūsetsu gojūnen* (Tōkyō: Jitsugyō no Nihonsha, 1951), 24.

emerged in Kobe, and poured lucrative wartime profits into antiques, parties, and geisha.[39]

As the conflagration in Europe tore apart the shipping lines that undergirded the world economy, Japanese shipowners and shipbrokers launched their ships into the breach and realized tremendous windfalls while expanding the scope of their shipping activities. As early as February 1915, Asano Sōichirō, founder of the Oriental Steamship Company, reportedly described the war as "an opportunity unlike any in a thousand years" (*sensai fugū no kōki*), a turn of phrase frequently invoked to summarize the war's significance for Japanese shipping.[40] As the major industrial and shipping nations devoted their national power to war, Asano declared that Japanese shipping had an opportunity "to spread its wings and implant a power (*seiryoku*) that will be secure in peace and incapable of removal."[41] Through this reference to the peace, however, Asano highlighted the potential fragility of wartime expansion, as well as what would become a major concern as the war continued: would Japanese ships be able to maintain their expanded position in world shipping after the wartime boom came to an end?

The Costs at Home

The expansion of the navigation industry, however, did not confer benefits to everyone in Japan. On the one hand, demand for ships triggered developments in related

[39] Terai Hisanobu, *Shio no michiboshi* (Tōkyō: Goshima shoten, 1953), 128–30.

[40] Such comments were fairly common, though expressed with slight variations. NYK President Kondō Renpei, for example, referred to an "opportunity that comes in a thousand years" (*sensai ichigū no ki*). William D. Wray, "The NYK and World War I: Patterns of Discrimination in Freight Rates and Cargo Allocation," *The International Journal of Maritime History* 5, no. 1 (June 1993): 61.

[41] Asano Sōichirō, "Kōro dai hatten no ki," *Kaiji shinpō*, no. 293 (February 5, 1915): 28–29.

industries, such as shipbuilding and steel, particularly due to restrictions on ship exports in European countries that limited Japanese access to foreign yards and registries as sources of new and secondhand ships.[42] Shippers, however, struggled to secure transportation services. The withdrawal of European ships from shipping lanes left almost all of Japan's foreign trade to Japanese ships,[43] but as growing numbers of Japanese ships sought profits abroad, it was not long before some business interests began to suggest that such expansion obstructed the distribution of goods at home. As cargo accumulated on Japan's docks, they began to call for an "adjustment" (*chōsetsu*) of tonnage to ensure that Japanese ships remained available to carry Japanese cargoes.

As early as 1915, articles in trade journals began to suggest that inefficient allocations of Japanese tonnage in overseas services exacerbated tonnage shortages. Articles in *The Maritime Magazine* observed that extended voyages combined with long-term charters of shagaisen ships to foreigners reduced the tonnage available for Japanese cargoes.[44] Pointing to the activities of shagaisen ships as the main source of trouble, the journal depicted the sector as a kind of reserve of ships that ideally ensured a regular supply of ships to meet fluctuating demand for services. As shagaisen ships expanded into foreign shipping routes, however, this reserve drained overseas. In a reversal of Meiji anxieties over the potential for foreign-owned ships to enter Japan's coastal trade, the expanding role of Japanese ships in world shipping thus raised concerns that Japanese-

[42] Hashimoto, "Kyodai sangyō no kōryū," 93.

[43] Prior to the war, the loading rate of Japan's foreign trade by Japanese ships was just under 50 percent, but during the war it exceeded 90 percent. Miwa Ryōichi, *Nihon kindai no keizai seisaku shiteki kenkyū* (Tōkyō: Nihon keizai hyōronsha, 2002), 261–62.

[44] "Senpuku daiketsubō no jitsujō," *Kaiji shinpō*, no. 294 (May 5, 1915): 10–11.

flagged ships might sail away and serve the transportation needs of foreign nations, even as they remained under the Japanese flag.

In addition to such censure of shagaisen activities, some journals also published criticism of the configuration of ordered lines. The *Chūgai Shōgyō Shinpō*, for example, proposed that the government allow the N.Y.K. and O.S.K. to divert some of the 6,000-ton ships used in subsidized services between Japan and Taiwan to essential overseas services.[45] The redirection of the ships to other trade routes, the article suggested, could alleviate accumulations of cargo in Kobe bound for Europe, India, and Southeast Asia. As seen in Chapter 2, line subsidies supported the advance of Japanese ships into overseas services before the war, but, confronted with worldwide disruptions to shipping during WWI, the rigid framework of the ordered lines seemed to contribute to cargo congestion.

Even increased production by Japanese shipyards seemed to do little to alleviate tonnage problems. European shipping powers limited ship exports during the war, and Japanese owners therefore relied almost entirely on domestic production for new ships.[46] As a communications official wrote after the war, almost overnight Japan transformed from an importer of old ships to a "shipbuilding nation" (*zōsenkoku*).[47] The N.Y.K. and

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[45] "Senpuku hojū ōkyūsaku," *Chūgai shōgyō shinpō*, repr. in *Kaiji shinpō*, no. 294 (May 5, 1915): 13.

[46] This was regularly observed by the press. See, for example: Yukawa Motoumi, "Ōshū senran to waga kaiungyō," *Kaiji shinpō*, no. 294 (May 5, 1915): 7. Imaoka Junjirō, "Shinzōsen no zōka ni tsuite," *Kaiji shinpō*, no. 294 (May 5, 1915): 9.

"Zōsen no seikyō," *Hōchi shinbun*, repr. in *Kaiji shinpō*, no. 294 (May 5, 1915): 13–14.

[47] Hirohata, *Kaiun yorubanashi*, 55.

O.S.K. ordered considerable quantities of vessels to employ on their new liner services.[48] Even shagaisen owners who, before the war, struggled to acquire funds for purchases of new ships began to invest wartime profits in new ships.[49] Ships fresh off of Japanese docks, however, did not necessarily remain in the Japanese registry. The Suzuki Company (*Suzuki shōten*), for example, ordered a number of ships from the Kawasaki Shipyard in order to sell them in European markets,[50] and in early 1917, the British firm Furness Withy and Co., purchased seven such ships on behalf of the British government (an aspect of the transaction that the firm sought to conceal from Suzuki's agents).[51] Though Japanese shipyards produced 138,011 gross tons of shipping in 1916 and 266,843 tons in 1917, in those years the Japanese merchant marine only saw increases of 91,700 and 130,500 tons.[52] Though Japanese shipbuilding developed along with the navigation industry,[53] Japan's ship markets remained open to foreign clients, which permitted ships to exchange the Japanese flag for foreign colors.

While the expansion of Japanese ships into foreign shipping services enriched Yamashita, Uchida, and other shipping *nouveau riche*, their activities overseas seemed to aggravate tonnage shortages at home. In May 1915, as traders struggled to secure

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[48] Inoue Yōichirō, *Nihon kindai zōsengyō no tenkai* (Tōkyō: Mineruva shobō, 1990), 142–44, 153.

[49] Communications Vice-Minister Yukawa Motoumi described this as representative of a "fundamental development" in Japanese shipping. Motoumi, "Ōshū senran to waga kaiungyō," 7. See also Imaoka, "Shinzōsen no zōka ni tsuite," 9. Sugiyama Kazuo, *Kaiungyō to kin'yū: Fukyōki no shikin chōtatsu* (Tōkyō: Nihon keizai shinbunsha, 1981), 48–50.

[50] *Kawasaki kisen 50-nenshi*, 32.

[51] Ministry of Shipping to Treasury, February 14, 1917; Furness Withy & Co. to Shipping Control Committee, March 14, 1917, "Purchase of vessels in Japan," MT 25/35A, TNA.

[52] Based on figures on steamship tonnage and shipbuilding in Teishinshō, ed., *Teishin jigyōshi*, 6:998–1004.

[53] Inoue, *Nihon kindai zōsengyō no tenkai*, 138–72.

transportation services, a contributor to the *Osaka Mainichi Shinbun* thus described the charter and sale of ships to Europe as akin to "reconciling oneself to starvation, and emptying the house rice chest to save a neighbor." While the article condemned the industry as a whole, its author also focused criticism on shagaisen owners who were "dazzled by profits," and sold and leased ships in excessive quantities to foreign clients.[54] Before WWI, a range of business interests promoted the advance of Japanese ships into overseas services, but the sudden flood of the nation's fleet into distant routes led many to call for methods to tether ships to the nation.

World Shipping Remade

The disruptions to world shipping that contributed to the rise of Japan's shipping *nouveau riche*, and that afflicted its traders, also impacted shipowners and shippers in other parts of the world. In times of peace, the shipping lines laced through the world's oceans bound nations and empires together. During WWI they conveyed economic disturbances far beyond the main battlefields. Many countries shared the experience of tonnage shortages, and the concurrent shifts in shipping markets; economic, social, and political conditions particular to each, however, meant that the consequences varied considerably. While Japanese shipping managed a threefold expansion—the fleet grew in size, the scope of its operations expanded into new routes, and the bank accounts of owners and companies swelled with wartime profits—the war had different implications for fleets, lines, and owners around the world.

[54] "Senpaku fusoku mondai," *Ōsaka mainichi shinbun*, repr. in *Kaiji shinpō*, no. 294 (May 5, 1915): 15.

Japan was one of only a few countries that ended the war with a fleet larger than at its start. From 1914 to 1919, the fleet saw increases of 600,000 tons (equal to 35 percent of prewar tonnage). Brazil and the Netherlands also saw modest increases of 200,000 and 100,000 tons, respectively, but the largest fleet expansion occurred in the U.S., where American tonnage expanded from 2,000,000 to 9,800,000 tons between 1914 and 1919.[55] These increases were due to the efforts of the U.S. Shipping Board: a government-owned shipping company established by a Shipping Act that President Wilson pushed through the Congress in 1916. When the U.S. entered the war in 1917, the board utilized its emergency powers to form an Emergency Fleet Corporation. In addition to purchasing secondhand ships (Wilson having opened the American registry to foreign-built ships in 1914), the corporation established a number of new shipyards that built a massive fleet of cargo ships.[56] In contrast, most other major shipping powers saw their fleets shrink. The Greek fleet, for example, was reduced from 836,868 tons in 1914 to 323,795 tons in 1919 due to a combination of war losses (some 30 percent of prewar tonnage) and sales to foreign buyers (around 40 percent).[57] With world tonnage ending the war about 2,500,000 tons greater than in 1914,[58] the expansion of Japan's fleet was part of a broader redistribution of shipping capacity that saw reductions for most European fleets and an expansion of the American merchant marine across the Atlantic.

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[55] The British Empire saw an increase of 300,000 tons, but these were offset by the United Kingdom's loss of 2,600,000 tons. Sturmey, *British Shipping and World Competition*, 37.

[56] For the Ship Registry Act (1914), the Shipping Act (1916), and the wartime activities of the U.S. Shipping Board, see Gibson, *Abandoned Ocean*, 104–15. Safford, *Wilsonian Maritime Diplomacy*, 67–115. Kennedy, *Over Here*, 301–5. Sturmey, *British Shipping and World Competition*, 37–39.

[57] Gelina Harlaftis, *A history of Greek-owned shipping: The making of an international tramp fleet, 1830 to the present day* (London: Routledge, 1996), 184–85. Sturmey, *British Shipping and World Competition*, 44–45.

[58] Sturmey, *British Shipping and World Competition*, 37.

Despite reductions in the size of many national fleets, ship losses did not necessarily carry over to the account books of owners. Insurance indemnities and income from ship sales, in combination with high charter and freight rates, were more than enough to enable Greek owners to realize high wartime profits.[59] Likewise, owners in Norway profited from soaring freight rates, and received government compensation to cover wartime losses.[60] British owners, in contrast, saw much of their tonnage requisitioned at "Blue Book rates" fixed by an agreement concluded between shipowners and the British government in 1915. Though these rates initially promised favorable returns, they were soon surpassed by market rates, and British shipowners subject to requisitions were unable to earn the wild profits realized by owners left unconstrained by the Blue Books.[61] Though Japan's shipping *nouveau riche* occupied a rather advantageous position, particularly in comparison to British owners, they were not the only magnates to emerge from the war with handsome profits.

Japan's advance into new trade routes in Asia and beyond, moreover, was not the only redistribution of national flags in major shipping lanes. German ships practically vanished from world trade routes after the war began, while market demand—and extensive state controls—pulled most British ships into certain war trades. Despite suffering heavy losses, Greek ships found opportunities to depart from established, nearby trade routes in the Mediterranean and the Black Sea and entered into Atlantic

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[59] Harlaftis, *A History of Greek-Owned Shipping*, 185. Sturmey, *British Shipping and World Competition*, 44.

[60] Stig Tenold, *Norwegian Shipping in the 20th Century: Norway's Successful Navigation of the World's Most Global Industry* (Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019), 63–89. Sturmey, *British Shipping and World Competition*, 41–43.

[61] Sturmey, *British Shipping and World Competition*, 46–55.

trades.[62] Wilson and his administration, meanwhile, sought to project the expanded shipping capacity of the U.S. out into world sea-lanes, and some of the new American ships entered trade routes formerly plied by British ships—particularly those in North and South America.[63] This moment of global upheaval thus led to a distribution of national flags across the world's oceans.

As Europe, the world's center of finance, transportation, and commerce, imploded, policymakers and business leaders in multiple countries perceived an opportunity to extend their influence in the world via lines of maritime transport. For Wilson in particular, the government-owned merchant marine in the U.S. was not only a means of managing wartime disruptions—it was also a tool for advancing the American commercial interests in the world economy.[64] British officials and shipowners, in contrast, sought to minimize the long-term effects of the war on the world shipping order. By fixing favorable freight rates in essential war trades, for example, British officials not only sought to devote world shipping to the war effort, but also aimed to prevent neutral ships from entering services formerly maintained by the British.[65] The result was an Anglo-American clash over the future of world shipping and the world economy—a commercial "war after the war" that continued even after military hostilities ceased in 1918.[66] The U.S. and Britain were not, however, the only shipping powers to pursue ambitions in world shipping.

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[62] The end of the war, however, found many Greek ships back in their prewar areas of activity. Harlaftis, *A History of Greek-Owned Shipping*, 182, 187.

[63] Sturmey, *British Shipping in World Competition*, 38.

[64] See, for example, Kennedy, *Over Here*, 299, 305.

[65] Kennedy, *Over Here*, 304.

[66] Stafford, *Wilsonian Maritime Diplomacy*, 141–219. Kennedy, *Over Here*, 329.

Investigating Control

As the war continued, policymakers, journalists, and others in Japan's maritime circles recognized that the shipping situation in Japan was shared with other countries, and intimately linked to maritime conditions the world over. An article on the "tonnage supply problem" published in the *Yomiuri shinbun* in April 1916, commented that "this is truly a problem common around the world, not just in Japan; every country is troubled by tonnage shortages, and faces a similar situation."[67] The article, moreover, reported that officials in the Communications Ministry had begun to investigate means to address the situation. Indeed, in the face of persistent tonnage shortages, officials in Japan began to research measures to force shipowners—who owned globally mobile national assets—to resist the temptations of opportunities abroad, and utilize their ships in the pursuit of national interests. As these officials evaluated Japan's situation, they also actively observed strategies adopted by their counterparts overseas, and considered the applicability of similar policies to Japan's navigation industry. Japanese shipping thereby became linked to the global moment not only through international shipping markets, but also via such efforts to observe and emulate approaches to shipping.

At the start of the war, Japanese officials adopted only a few measures to protect shipping. In September 1914, the Diet passed legislation drafted by the Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce that provided government compensation to marine insurers

[67] "Senpuku hokyū mondai: Gaikokukan no shin sūsei," *Yomiuri shinbun*, April 30, 1916, NCC 00139635.

that suffered losses due to acts of war.[68] During the occupation of Germany's concession in Qingdao and colonies in the Pacific, meanwhile, the Army and Navy primarily issued requisition orders to shagaisen owners, rather than the N.Y.K. or O.S.K., in order to minimize disruptions to liner services.[69] Since a condition of the Transoceanic Lines Subsidy Law of 1909 required companies to secure government approval before raising rates on subsidized services, the Communications Ministry was also able to limit increases of freight rates on many N.Y.K. and O.S.K. services.[70]

As business representatives called for solutions to tonnage shortages in 1915 and 1916, however, officials also began to consider further interventions. One institution instrumental in evaluating such policies was the Economic Research Council (*Keizai chōsakai*). The council was established by the Ōkuma Cabinet in April 1916 to prepare for an Allied Economic Conference held in Paris in June, at which time Allied representatives produced a number of resolutions to promote economic cooperation during and after the war.[71] Over the next year and a half, members of the Cabinet's research council, which included bureaucrats, politicians, intellectuals, and business representatives, met to discuss the conference's resolutions as well as policies that might

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[68] The legislation was called the Wartime Marine Insurance Compensation Law (*Senji kaijō hoken hoshōhō*). In 1917 it was replaced by a Wartime Marine Re-Insurance law (*Senji kaijō sai-hokenhō*), under which the Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce collected premiums to reinsure contracts that provided war-risk insurance. "Hōritsu dai-44-gō," *Kanpō*, no. 636 (September 12, 1914), 271. For a discussion, see Teishinshō, *Teishin jigyōshi*, 6:831–35.

[69] Teishinshō, *Teishin jigyōshi*, 6:832.

[70] Sasaki, *Nihon kaiungyō no kindaika*, 394–95. Wray, "The NYK and World War I," 42.

[71] The countries that sent representatives were Japan, Britain, France, Russia, Italy, Belgium, Serbia, and Portugal. Harada Mikio, "(Kaidai) Rengōkoku keizai kaigi to keizai chōsakai," in *Daiichiji taisenki tsūshō/sangyō seisaku shiryōshū*, vol. 1, ed. Harada Mikio (Tōkyō: Kashiwa shobō, 1987), 5.

reduce the war's harmful effects on industry and commerce, and strengthen Japan's position in the world economy after the war.[72]

With regard to transportation, the council's discussions centered on shipping, beginning with the alleviation of tonnage shortages. In May 1916, Wakamiya Sadao, chief of the Mercantile Marine Bureau, presented a proposal on transportation, entitled "Present methods to adjust tonnage."[73] The proposal reflected the Communications Ministry's primary concern with the maintenance and expansion of liner services. Wakamiya reported that his bureau's initial response to the war was to support the opening of new lines to Europe, North America, and Australia.[74] Supplementary reference materials, however, stressed that tonnage shortages made it difficult for Japan's liner companies to secure charters of ships for use as auxiliaries.[75] In the face of continued shortages, moreover, Wakamiya reported that his office had begun to consider additional interventions in shipping, such as restrictions on ship exports, limits on tramp services, the reallocation of tonnage used in colonial services, the use of naval vessels as civilian transports, and the purchase of ships in China and Manila.[76] In a subsequent

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[72] For details on the conference and council, see Harada, "(Kaidai) Rengōkoku keizai kaigi to keizai chōsakai," 4–17. Also Itō Takashi, "'Kokuze' to 'kokusaku' / 'tōsei' / 'keikaku,'" in *Nijū kōzō*, ed. Nakamura Takafusa and Odaka Kōnosuke (Tōkyō: Iwanami shoten, 1989), 326.

[73] Reference materials and records of council and committee meetings regarding the proposal are collected and reproduced in facsimile in "Kōtsū dai-1-gō teian," *Daiichiji taisenki tsūshō/sangyō*, vol. 3, ed. Harada (Tōkyō: Kashiwa shobō, 1987), 1–48. Wakamiya's proposal and reference materials are found in ibid., 1–9.

[74] "Kōtsū dai-1-gō teian," 12.

[75] "Kōtsū dai-1-gō teian," 2.

[76] "Kōtsū dai-1-gō teian," 13.

report, Wakamiya also discussed measures such as reductions in foreign cargoes carried on ordered lines, and restrictions on the scope of shagaisen activities.[77]

Wakamiya and other communications bureaucrats devised these policies in part based on observations of wartime shipping policies adopted by other powers. A printed copy of Wakamiya's report concluded with a brief outline of shipping controls adopted by belligerents and neutrals, such as restrictions on ship exports and license systems that required owners to secure government approval before sending ships on overseas voyages.[78] In his presentation to the council, the bureaucrat also observed that many belligerents and European neutrals had already imposed such restrictions in order to manage disruptions to maritime transportation.[79] The linked crises in shipping, in other words, were generating a common set of measures to manage transportation resources.

When a committee of the Economic Research Council discussed the application of such controls in Japan, members weighed the benefits of expansion against the disruptions to cargo movements. Even as Wakamiya introduced various methods to control shipping, he argued that the measures were premature. The war, according to the bureau chief, had allowed shipowners once "limited to a narrow area in the near seas of the Orient" to expand their operations as far as Europe. Optimistic that shipowners would "expand shipping services and improve the quality of their ships," Wakamiya cautioned against the uncritical imitation of foreign powers—particularly those that, unlike Japan, were "on the brink of an extreme emergency."[80] Representatives of trade interests, on the

[77] "Kōtsū dai-1-gō teian," 14.

[78] "Kōtsū dai-1-gō teian," 8–9.

[79] "Kōtsū dai-1-gō teian," 13.

[80] "Kōtsū dai-1-gō teian," 14.

other hand, suggested that expansion came at a cost. Ōkura Group Vice-President Kadono Jūkurō, for example, condemned time charters that left Japanese ships in the hands of foreigners for long periods. There were drawbacks, argued Kadono, when "ships of Japanese nationality [traveled] to distant lands to make their earnings."[81] He therefore suggested that the chartered ships return to Japan, and thereafter only undertake voyages between Japanese and foreign ports.[82] The executive therefore sought to anchor Japanese shipping services to the nation's ports, and limit the carriage of third-country trade.

After several meetings, the committee in the Economic Research Council eventually sided with Wakamiya and decided against recommending the adoption of extensive shipping controls. In a report to the Economic Research Council on August 5, Baron Den Kenjirō (appointed communications minister the following year) suggested that Japan's tonnage shortages were, in part, aggravated by charters of shagaisen ships to overseas clients such that they "ran between foreign ports with no relation to Japanese cargoes."[83] Nevertheless, he observed that, "Japan's ships are raising the Sun Disc flag everywhere around the world; with regard to expanding our maritime power (*kaijōken*), such [activities] plant the seeds of a great development, though very indirectly."[84] While trends in shipping, particularly among the globe-trotting shagaisen ships, posed challenges for trade, in 1916 officials still had little inclination to constrain Japanese-flagged ships as they found a new, expanded place in world ports.

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[81] "Kōtsū dai-1-gō teian," 21.

[82] "Kōtsū dai-1-gō teian," 22.

[83] "Kōtsū dai-1-gō teian," 44.

[84] "Kōtsū dai-1-gō teian," 45.

Though the Economic Research Council did not recommend immediate action on the shipping situation, it did gather a considerable body of information on wartime shipping controls adopted worldwide. In this, the council was at the front of a wave of institutions established to investigate wartime conditions around the world. Chambers of commerce and private firms also organized research groups; a research section opened in the N.Y.K. produced numerous reports on the ways that Britain, the U.S., and other Western powers managed wartime shipping, shipbuilding, and maritime affairs.[85] In addition to the Cabinet, government ministries also established specialized research organs. Among them, the Temporary Military Research Committee (*Rinji gunji chōsa iinkai*), established by the Army in September 1915, features prominently in scholarship on the development of ideas about industrial planning and mobilization later framed under the concept of "total war."[86] In February 1917, the ministries of foreign affairs, communications, agriculture and commerce, and finance also established research groups to investigate wartime affairs.[87] The communications research bureau contained a Maritime Affairs Division (*Kaijibu*) devoted to issues in marine transportation, shipbuilding, and seamen.[88] Between 1917 and 1920, the division printed twenty-two reports on shipping affairs in Japan and around the world, which included translations of

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[85] These NYK reports were collected under the title "research materials" (*chōsa shiryō*). The October 1917 collection, for example, included reports on American shipping policies, new French policies to support the construction and import of ships, general shipping policies in Germany, and the extension of British war insurance to neutral vessels. See *Chōsa shiryō* 6, no. 21 (September 1917). For an account of the establishment of this research section, see Wray, "Opportunity vs Control," 67.

[86] Janis Mimura, *Planning for Empire*, 16–21. Itō, "'Kokuze' to 'kokusaku' / 'tōsei' / 'keikaku,'" 335.

[87] Itō, "'Kokuze' to 'kokusaku' / 'tōsei' / 'keikaku,'" 327.

[88] The Bureau also had an Electricity Division. "Teishinshō rinji chōsakyoku kansei," *Kanpō*, no. 1357 (February 12, 1917): 250. "Teishinshō rinji chōsakyoku bunka kitei," *Kanpō*, no. 1361 (February 16, 1917): 363.

foreign reports, as well as reports from engineers who traveled to Europe, the U.S., and China to observe shipping and shipbuilding practices and policies.[89]

Japanese interventions in shipping were minimal for the first three years of the war, but a flood of information regarding wartime controls began to inundate government offices and private firms. In evaluating Japan's shipping situation, communications bureaucrats and others closely observed how other countries sought to manage the turmoil in world shipping. As indicated by Wakamiya's initial hesitancy to apply controls, officials did not immediately distill their knowledge of foreign shipping controls into comparable policies for Japanese ships, and instead shelved shipping controls for another day. When the war of blockades escalated the following year, however, and threw the maritime industries into further disarray, officials had an array of methods ready for implementation.

Implementing Control

Though the Economic Research Council considered interventions in shipping unnecessary in mid-1916, Germany's announcement of unrestricted submarine warfare in January 1917 heralded an intensification of the tonnage shortages afflicting Japan and its allies. Between 1915 and 1916, the Central Powers sank 4,500,000 gross tons of commercial shipping, but in 1917 alone they destroyed more than 6,600,00.[90] In Europe, the destruction of merchant shipping threatened to halt industrial production in Britain,

[89] The first report printed by the division in October 1917, meanwhile, provided a broad outline of wartime ship control ordinances adopted by various other countries. Teishinshō rinji chōsakyoku kaijibu, *Kakkoku senji senpaku kanri rei seido gaiyō*. For another example, see Teishinshō rinji chōsakyoku kaijibu, *Ōbei seitetsugyō no jōkyō* (Teishinshō kansenkyoku, 1917).

[90] Teishinshō kansenkyoku, *Taisen jidai no sekai kaiun*, 9–10.

France, and Italy.[91] Though Japanese-flagged ships made up only a small part of wartime losses (just over 128,000 tons),[92] disruptions to services between Europe and Asia also aggravated cargo congestion in Japan. Japanese officials therefore faced demands from shippers to improve transportation at home, and from Allies who called for shipping assistance. In September 1917, the government issued an emergency imperial ordinance (*kinkyū chokurei*) that granted the Communications Ministry sweeping powers to direct the activities of Japanese-flagged shipping for the duration of the war, and for one year after its end.[93] With the ordinance, Japanese officials experimented with the kinds of shipping controls adopted by many other maritime powers, and attempted to reconfigure the place of Japanese shipping in the national and the global transportation infrastructure.

In Japan, the escalation of the German blockade effort triggered a crescendo of speculation in shipping markets, which prompted further calls for regulation. With space on ships a rare commodity, brokers in Kobe reportedly contracted for tonnage only to charge shippers exorbitant fees for its use.[94] In the summer of 1917, as investors rushed to profit from high freight and charter rates, seventeen shipping ventures were established in a one-month period.[95] Due to tonnage shortages, in mid-1917 some 400,000 tons of

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[91] Neilson, "Reinforcements and Supplies from Overseas," 37–43.

[92] In relative terms, too, Japanese losses were minimal, representing around 7 percent of prewar tonnage. In contrast, British losses of 7,700,000 tons represented 37 percent of prewar tonnage. Teishinshō kansenkyoku, *Taisen jidai no sekai kaiun*, 12.

[93] Two recent studies have examined this ordinance. Yoshida Masumi has shown that shagaisen owners worked with political parties to pressure the government to lift the regulations, and Morohashi Eiichi has emphasized that civilian officials, rather than military officers, administered the controls. Yoshida Masumi, "Senji senpaku kanrirei no un'yō wo meguru seiji to kaiungyō," *Shigaku zasshi* 126, no. 6 (2017): 1–35. Morohashi Eiichi, "Daiichiji sekai taisen to kaiun tōsei seisaku: Senji senpaku kanrirei wo chūshin ni," *Gunji shigaku* 54, No. 1 (June 2018): 27–48.

[94] Hirohata, *Kaiun yorubanashi*, 58. Unekawa Shizuo, *Kaiun kōkokushi*, 1:408. Wray, "The NYK and World War I," 47–48.

[95] Unekawa, *Kaiun kōkokushi*, 1:414.

cargo accumulated on Japanese docks.[96] Shippers therefore insisted on state intervention, some calling on Communications Minister Den Kenjirō to demand government action.[97]

Domestic demands for solutions to the shipping situation were accompanied by external pressure from the Allies, who called on Japan to provide ships to support the war effort. Although the British commercial fleet remained the world's largest, the German submarine campaign took a toll: shipbuilding was unable to keep up with losses, and the threat of attack compounded inefficiencies in transportation.[98] To manage supply lines, the British cabinet under David Lloyd George created a Ministry of Shipping and expanded controls over shipping services.[99] The American entry into the war in April 1917 further strained Allied shipping resources by requiring the diversion of ships from trade to the transport of the American Expeditionary Force.[100] In desperate need of ships, British officials suggested that Japan's government requisition Japanese-flagged ships and loan them to Britain.[101] When assistance was not forthcoming, they suggested that the U.S. pressure the Japanese government to acquire tonnage.[102]

On July 9, 1917, such pressure materialized when President Wilson issued an executive order to restrict exports of essential war commodities, such as steel and iron. Japan was, at the time, almost entirely dependent on the U.S. for its steel imports, due to the loss of German and Belgian markets in 1914 and British restrictions on steel exports

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[96] Teishinshō, *Teishin jigyōshi*, 1:841.

[97] Shōyū kurabu, ed., *Den Kenjirō nikki*, vol. 3 (Tōkyō: Shōyū kurabu, 2012), 365, 388, 395.

[98] Britain's fleet ended the war with 85 percent its prewar tonnage. Kennedy, *Over Here*, 325.

[99] Wray, "Opportunity vs Control," 66.

[100] Kennedy, *Over Here*, 328.

[101] Shōyū kurabu, ed., *Den Kenjirō nikki*, 3:375. Wray, "Opportunity vs Control," 60.

[102] Wray, "Opportunity vs Control," 68.

introduced in 1916.[103] Japanese officials and industrialists clearly viewed the steel embargo in relation to the shipping situation.[104] From July to August, Den met with cabinet ministers and communications officials to discuss Anglo-American demands for shipping, and in August he began to discuss a "wartime shipping policy" with Communications Vice-Minister Uchida Kakichi and Mercantile Marine Bureau Chief Wakamiya Sadao.[105] Representatives of the majority political party, the Seiyūkai, also met with Den to push for a shipping policy as a solution to the steel crisis.[106] By the end of August, communications bureaucrats had drafted shipping controls to meet the converging domestic and international demands on Japanese-flagged shipping.[107]

The Wartime Shipping Control Ordinance issued on September 28 gave communications officials a range of powers over shipping.[108] The first three provisions instituted passive systems of control that required shipowners and shipyards to obtain permission from the communications minister before exporting or leasing Japanese ships to foreign clients, and before employing ships on voyages between foreign ports. In addition to these permit systems, additional provisions gave the ministry active powers to

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[103] Shōsen-Mitsui, *80-nenshi*, 42.

[104] Hamao Arata, for example, expressed this view in of the Privy Council to discuss the shipping controls. Sūmitsuin, *Sūmitsuin kaigi gijiroku* (Tōkyō: Tōkyō daigaku shuppankai, 1984), 304. Morohashi Eiichi has argued that the diplomatic, rather than economic, significance of the controls was evident in discussion of the ordinance by the Foreign Research Council (*Gaikō chōsakai*) before it was issued. Morohashi, "Daiichiji sekai taisen to kaiun tōsei seisaku," 34.

[105] Shōyū kurabu, ed., *Den Kenjirō nikki*, 3:386–400.

[106] "Yoron masumasu futtō su: Beikoku daitōryō he denwa kaikin undō seiji mondai taran," *Kōbe shinbun*, August 18, 1917, NCC 0045379. Shōyū kurabu, ed., *Den Kenjirō nikki*, 3:399–401, 402, 404–406, 408. "Kintetsu mondai to seifu: Seiyūkai no keikoku," *Chūgai shōgyō shinpō*, August 27, 1917, NCC 0045393.

[107] Shōyū kurabu, ed., *Den Kenjirō nikki*, 3:413–14.

[108] The ordinance came into effect on October 1. "Senji senpaku kanri rei," *Kanpō*, no. 1549 (September 29, 1917): 657–58.

prohibit or to order specific shipping activities, to order fare reductions, and to "expropriate" (*shūyō*) and "use" (*shiyō*) ships, shipyards, and shipbuilding materials. The controls resembled the measures discussed by Wakamiya and the Economic Research Council the previous year, and the press noted that the ordinance was modeled on similar shipping controls adopted in Britain and the U.S.[109]

Rumor of the impending shipping controls stirred up shagaisen owners, many of whom made efforts to avert regulation. In a memoir, Tanaka Masanosuke, then an employee of the Yamashita Steamship Company, recalled that, upon hearing word of the controls, Kobe's shipping magnates either turned "bright red or deathly pale" and arose "in a clamor."[110] Katsuta Ginjirō and other Kobe owners visited Den to request the lenient application of the controls, but their visit only provoked the minister, who recorded his suspicions of their motivations in his diary: "I discoursed on the general tide of the war and trends in the economic struggle, and for somewhat more than two hours I discussed their undue selfishness. They left bowed in submission."[111] For Den, the controls were an opportunity to bring the mass of shagaisen owners into line, and direct their activities to national objectives formulated by officials.

Shipowners, however, continued to press for minimal application of the controls. Petitions submitted to the government by Japanese shipowners indicate that a major point of contention centered on access to cargoes in ports around Asia. In late October, the Japan Shipowners' Alliance proposed several amendments to the controls: approval for

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[109] See, for example, "Senji senpaku kanri: Judōteki gaikō no sanbutsu = kikeiteki senji seisaku," *Ōsaka mainichi shinbun*, September 30, 1917, NCC 00460364.

[110] Tanaka, *Daidō*, 192.

[111] Shōyū kurabu, ed., *Den Kenjirō nikki*, 3:415.

charters concluded before October; the replacement of the permit system with a notification system for voyages between foreign ports east of the Suez Canal; and blanket permission to navigate shipping routes in South China and Southeast Asia.[112] In a study of the interplay between the adoption of the controls and Japanese party politics, Yoshida Masumi has shown that shagaisen owners developed connections with Japan's two major political parties, the Seiyūkai and Kenseikai, to pressure the government to limit interventions.[113] By late 1917, intercession by the Seiyūkai led to an agreement by Den and other officials to authorize sailings between foreign ports east of Suez.

Though officials did not use the shipping controls to confine Japanese shipping to flows of Japanese trade, the restrictions on charters, sales, and navigation prompted shifts in the relationship between the nation's trade, ships, and shipyards. The restrictions on ship exports channeled Japanese ship production directly into the Japanese registry, rather than abroad. As the passage of the ordinance coincided with an expansion of Japanese shipbuilding capacity, the Japanese fleet swelled in size. In the first three years of the war, annual tonnage increases ranged from 27,000 to 91,000 tons, but in 1917 the Japanese fleet grew by 130,000 tons, and from 1917 to 1919, expanded by 1,000,000 tons.[114]

Restrictions on charters, meanwhile, forced a number of owners to begin directly operating overseas services. Though the ordinance required owners to notify the government regarding overseas voyages, a number of firms remained active beyond

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[112] Nihon senshu kyōkai, ed., *Nihon senshu kyōkai enkakushi* (Kōbe: Nihon senshu kyōkai, 1936), 34–35.

[113] Yoshida, "Senji senpaku kanrirei no un'yō wo meguru seiji to kaiungyō," 12–24.

[114] Teishinshō, *Teishin jigyōshi*, 6:841, 998–99.

Japan. In late 1917, for example, Yamashita Steamship's Tachino Norimitsu reported that "mountains" of cargo bound for Europe and Asia had accumulated in ports from Singapore to Bombay. The company seized the opportunity and established a new branch office to oversee the transport of Thai rice and Javanese sugar, and entry into routes between Burma and India.[115] Government restrictions on charters, however, forced the company to operate its own ships, rather than lease them to foreign agents, even as it carried third-country trade. At the same time, the Taiyō Shipping Company (*Taiyō kaiun kabushiki gaisha*), founded in 1917 by a former Mitsui employee, Ishida Teiji, also began to pursue a business plan centered on the operation of ships chartered from other shagaisen owners.[116] Nakagawa Keiichirō and Sasaki Seiji have, therefore, emphasized the significance of the ordinance in precipitating the emergence of shagaisen operators, distinct from other owners whose relationship to their ships was similar to an investment in real estate.[117] At the same time, in forcing the operation of Japanese ships by Japanese firms, the Wartime Shipping Control Ordinance shared features with the Merchant Ship Regulations of 1870 or the Ship Law of 1899.[118] Like the laws regarding ship nationality, the ordinance prioritized consistency in the nationality of a vessel and the nationality of its owner and operator.

As seen in the adoption of the control ordinance in Japan, the shared experience of wartime tonnage shortages encouraged the adoption of similar shipping policies around the world. Through institutions such as the Economic Research Council and the

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[115] Tanaka, *Daidō*, 225–29. *Yamashita shashi*, 408–9.

[116] *OSK-Mitsui 100-nenshi*, 136–37.

[117] Nakagawa Keiichirō, *Ryōtaisen-kan no Nihon kaiungyō* (Tōkyō: Nihon keizai shinbunsha, 1980), 60–62, 87, 99–100. Sasaki, *Nihon kaiungyō no kindaika*, 398–405.

[118] See Chapter 1.

research bureau established in the Communications Ministry, Japanese officials accumulated information about foreign shipping, and, in the face of intensified demands on the Japanese fleet, instituted policies comparable to those observed in Britain and elsewhere. Though the Wartime Shipping Control Ordinance reflected foreign shipping controls in its design, domestic political pressure forced Japanese officials to adopt a light touch in its implementation. Rather than intervene to actively manage shipping affairs, communications officials instead utilized export controls and notification systems to connect the nation's shipbuilding to its navigation industry, and to ensure that Japanese-flagged ships not only remained Japanese-owned but Japanese-operated.

Preparing for Commercial War

Though bureaucrats issued the Wartime Shipping Control Ordinance to manage shipping during the war, a number of officials, shipowners, and intellectuals also began to devise strategies for maintaining Japan's improved position in world shipping after the war's end. Much like Wilson, who sought to expand American influence in world maritime affairs, Japanese maritime interests sought to cement wartime advances into Asia in preparation for the peace. Two strategies that came under frequent discussion included the establishment of institutions to streamline finance for the industry, and the consolidation of shipping companies into a smaller number of large enterprises. In 1919, shortly after the war's end, these ideas converged and contributed to the merger of a number of shagaisen companies to form a new company, the International Steamship Company (*Kokusai kisen kabushiki gaisha*), financed by large loans. The following year also saw an attempt at a more sweeping reorganization of Japanese shipping when several

N.Y.K. shareholders proposed the merger of Japan's largest firms into a single, national combine.[119] This chapter concludes by demonstrating that both stemmed from an evaluation of trends in shipping observed overseas. Much as American and British officials sought to prepare for a commercial "war after the war," Japanese officials and industrialists also anticipated an eruption of a commercial conflict after the war's end, and framed efforts to consolidate Japan's position in shipping in advance of such competition in terms of their observation of developments abroad.

When the Economic Research Council convened between 1916 and 1917, it not only addressed methods to alleviate wartime tonnage shortages, but also methods to support Japanese shipping after the war. On May 9, 1916, members met to discuss a report on postwar shipping prepared by Wakamiya, who predicted that "fierce international competition" would ensue following the war.[120] The bureau chief therefore proposed five methods whereby the government could assist shipowners: familiar methods, such as support for shipping services and shipbuilding, as well as proposals for marine finance, interventions in marine insurance, and protections for seamen.[121] With regard to finance, the bureau chief proposed that the government support the establishment of a new bank devoted to maritime affairs. Banking interests and officials in the Finance Ministry, however, opposed the establishment of a separate institution, and instead advocated for the revision of the charter of an existing bank to include marine finance. Faced with these two proposals, members of the Economic Research Council

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[119] For a detailed study of financial concerns that motivated these two issues, see Sugiyama, *Kaiungyō to kin'yū*, 61–89.

[120] "Kōtsū dai-2-gō teian," *Daiichiji taisenki tsūshō / sangyō seisaku shiryōshū*, vol. 3, ed. Harada Mikio (Tōkyō: Kashiwa shobō, 1987), 71.

[121] "Kōtsū dai-2-gō teian," 50.

vacillated, and in mid-1917 simply called for the government to support finance for shipowners either through a new or an established financial institution.[122]

In addition to the Economic Research Council, in the last years of WWI a range of individuals and institutions discussed the outlook for shipping after the war. One such figure was Itō Jūjirō, an economist at Waseda University with a Ph.D. from the University of Pennsylvania.[123] Shortly after the implementation of the Wartime Shipping Control Ordinance, Itō published a defense of the shipping controls in terms of postwar prospects for shipping:

> As a matter of general opinion, it is said and thought that Japan's shipping has become very prosperous, and is a great force (*daiseiryoku*) in the world. This is a grave error. Japan's shipping has only become a great force in the world in the last two years or so. Not because Japan's force has become powerful, but because of reductions of the world's ships.[124]

Pointing to the transience of the industry's recent prosperity, Itō called on shipowners to improve their ships and make the fleet into "a truly great force in the world."[125] Criticizing the shipping *nouveau riche* for wasteful spending, he suggested that the shipping controls could impose discipline on the industry, which would enable it to remain competitive even in peace.

In other publications, Itō offered more detailed suggestions of how shipping firms could prepare for renewed competition with foreign shipping powers. In an article on

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[122] Sugiyama, *Kaiungyō to kin'yū*, 48–60.

[123] Kakumoto Ryōhei, "Waseda daigaku," in *Kōtsū gakusetsushi no kenkyū*, vol. 1, ed. Kōtsū gakusetsushi kenkyūkai (Tōkyō: Seizandō shoten, 1982), 112. Maeda Yoshinobu, "Meiji / Taishōki no kaiun oyobi tetsudōron no tenkai," in *Kōtsū gakusetsushi no kenkyū*, vol. 2, ed. Kōtsū gakusetsushi kenkyūkai (Tōkyō: Un'yu keizai kenkyū sentā, 1985), 226–28. Jiujiro Ito [*sic*], "North Atlantic Transportation: Its Organization and Management" (Ph.D. diss., University of Pennsylvania, 1908).

[124] Itō Jūjirō, "Jisshi seraru beki senpaku kanri rei," *Umi no sekai* 11, no. 10 (October 1, 1917): 1.

[125] Itō, "Jisshi seraru beki senpaku kanri rei," 2.

"Japan's postwar shipping," for example, Itō argued that the dominant wartime trend in British, German, and American shipping was the concentration of ships and capital under the management of ever-larger companies. As examples, Itō cited the P. & O.'s purchase of some 211,000 tons of shipping from owners in New Zealand, concentrations of German tonnage under shipping giants Norddeutscher Lloyd and HAPAG, and the organization of steamships under government ownership in the U.S.[126] The economist then contrasted such developments against Japan, where ships and capital were dispersed among a large number of small owners, and argued that new financial institutions and the merger of companies into combines (*gōdō*) would enable owners (particularly shagaisen owners) to strengthen their "financial power."[127] For Itō, the maintenance of recent advances into new shipping routes necessitated a reorganization of management and finance.

Itō Jūjirō was not the only figure to suggest that shipowners would face a jarring transition from war to peace. In early 1918, Itō Yonejirō, an executive director of the N.Y.K., also pointed to trends in British shipping to suggest that Japan's owners prepare for postwar competition with large combines.[128] Communications Minister Den, moreover, situated the shipping situation in a larger struggle looming on the horizon, and in an interview predicted, "As soon as the war draws to an end, a so-called worldwide economic war (*keizaisen*) will break out with great vigor; it is not hard to predict that this

[126] Itō Jūjirō, "Sengo no Nihon kaiunkai," *Kaiji shinpō*, no. 301 (February. 5, 1917): 14–15.

[127] Itō, "Sengo no Nihon kaiunkai," 16–19. Itō made similar points in idem, "Sengo no kaiunkai ni taisuru kokumin no tōitsuteki doryoku," *Zaisei keizai jihō* 4, no. 8 (August 1, 1917): 30–33.

[128] Itō Yonejirō, "Kaiun no zento," *Kaiji shinpō*, no. 305 (February 5, 1918): 18–20.

will be extremely fierce as a competition for navigation and a competition to monopolize raw materials.[129]

As Itō Jūjirō and others warned of commercial conflict, officials and business leaders also made progress in developing financial policies to support Japanese shipping after the war. In addition to the Economic Research Council, the Maritime Research Council—founded in October 1916 with members that included shipowners, naval officers, bureaucrats, and intellectuals—also advanced research on a range of maritime issues.[130] In early 1917, a committee of the Maritime Research Council began to investigate marine finance, and in 1918 issued recommendations drafted by council member Itō Jūjirō that called for the establishment of a marine finance division in a bank, such as the Industrial Bank of Japan (IBJ).[131] As Sugiyama Kazuo has shown, this period also saw negotiations between communications and finance officials to amend the charter of the IBJ, and in April 1918 the Diet approved legislation that permitted the bank to begin providing marine finance.[132]

As officials sought to create new avenues for ship finance, Uchida Kakichi, the former communications vice-minister, continued to promote a shipping combine along the lines described by Itō Jūjirō and others. In early 1919, Uchida returned from a tour of the U.S. and announced that he had been approached by a wealthy magnate, who had

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[129] Den Kenjirō, "Sengo no kaiunkai," *Kaiji shinpō*, no. 305 (February 5, 1918): 14–15.

[130] For the founding of the Maritime Research Council and its first members see "Sōkai," *Kaiji kenkyūkai kaihō*, no. 1 (February 1, 1918): 36–37. For its activities (committees, resolutions, lectures), see "Tokubetsu iinkai," *Kaiji kenkyūkai kaihō*, no. 1 (February 1, 1918): 41–47. "Ketsugi mokuroku" and "Kōen no bu," *Kaiji kenkyūkai kaihō*, no. 13 (March 1933): 33–48.

[131] Itō Jūjirō, "Senpaku kinyū mondai," *Kaiji kenkyūkai kaihō*, no. 3 (November 1, 1918): 53–55, 62–63. "Sokai" and "Tokubetsu iinkai," *Kaiji kenkyūkai kaihō* (1918), 40, 43–45.

[132] Sugiyama, *Kaiungyō to kin'yū*, 48–60.

proposed joint Japanese and American investment in a new steamship venture.[133] Uchida therefore suggested that Japanese shipowners join the Americans and invest a combined ¥200,000,000 in a company that would open three transoceanic lines: a South America line from Calcutta to New York via Japan and Brazil, an America-Russia line from New York to Petrograd across the Atlantic, and a Europe line from Kobe to Liverpool. The idea garnered attention from several wealthy shagaisen owners, who hosted a conference in Kobe to discuss the proposal, but O.S.K. and N.Y.K. branch managers raised doubts about the viability of the venture.[134] Uchida, however, defended the proposal in terms that echoed Itō Jūjirō: a necessity in a world in which shipping exhibited a trend toward "mergers and large capital management." With Japanese shipping remaining "divided into small amounts of capital," Uchida worried that the nation's firms "cannot possibly endure such competition."[135]

While Uchida's proposal for joint investment foundered on opposition to American capital, discussion of a combine moved forward. A number of shagaisen owners, particularly those who had predicted a strong market for shipping after the war, began to struggle to remain afloat as freight and charter rates began to fall after the war, and many viewed combines as an opportunity to dispose of ships purchased at inflated wartime prices.[136] Disagreement over ship appraisals, however, forestalled one early

[133] "Nichibei senpaku daigōdō," *Kōbe shinbun*, March 13, 1919, NCC 0014070. Also reprinted in *Kawasaki kisen 50-nenshi*, 36.

[134] "Nichibei senpaku daigōdō," *Kōbe shinbun*, March 13, 1919.

[135] Reprinted in *Kawasaki kisen 50-nenshi*, 36.

[136] Sugiyama, *Kaiungyō to kin'yū*, 61–63.

effort at merger among shagaisen owners.[137] Instead, it was a mix of shipyards and shagaisen owners, including Yamashita Steamship, Uchida Steamship, and the Suzuki Company, that negotiated a combine. In July 1919, representatives of eight companies met in Kobe to establish the International Steamship Company with a capital of ¥100,000,000, and declared their intent to "combine large numbers of ships and, furnished with great capacity, sail into world shipping with great ambition, fulfill demand for ships overseas, and thereby preserve the shipbuilding capacity developed during the war."[138]

The IBJ's new marine finance played a key role in the formation of International Steamship. The eight companies invested ships appraised at ¥350 per ton for a total of ¥175,000,000, and received compensation half in International Steamship stock and half in cash. To raise funds for the cash payments, International Steamship received loans totaling ¥62,500,000 from the IBJ and three other banks, as well as ¥25,000,000 from the Finance Ministry's Deposit Department. With fifty-nine ships totaling 318,000 gross tons, International Steamship became Japan's third-largest company overnight, behind the N.Y.K. (516,000 gross tons) and the O.S.K. (394,000 gross tons).[139] The company,

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[137] Some owners demanded compensation of ¥500 per ton of each ship invested, while others argued that saddling a company with ships of such inflated value would impede its ability to function. In comparison, prewar ship prices were around ¥100 per ton, but by 1917 were as much as ¥900. *Kawasaki kisen 50-nenshi*, 37–38. Sugiyama, *Kaiungyō to kin'yū*, 68.

[138] Quote reprinted in Yoneda Fujio, *Gendai Nihon kaiun shikan* (Tōkyō: Kaiji sangyō kenkyūjo, 1978), 83. The eight companies, and their representatives, were the Kawasaki Shipyard (represented by Matsukata Kōjirō), Kawasaki Steamship Company (Kawasaki Yoshitarō), the Suzuki Trading Company (Kaneko Naokichi), Asano Shipyard (Asano Sōichirō), Hashimoto Steamship Company (Hashimoto Kizō), Uraga Docks/Yamashita Steamship Company (Yamashita Kamesaburō), Yokohama Ironworks/Uchida Steamship Company (Uchida Nobuya), Nippon Steamship Company (Nakayama Yoshitarō), and Ishikawajima Shipyard (Watanabe Yoshikazu).

[139] Yoneda, *Gendai Nihon kaiun*, 85. Sugiyama, *Kaiungyō to kin'yū*, 70–71, 84.

moreover, was redolent with symbols that reflected its global ambitions. Its name, of course, proclaimed its intended sphere of operation, and the company flag bore the characters "A1"—a reference to the highest ship standard of Britain's main classification society, Lloyd's, and one that the company's charter required of all of its vessels.[140]

The establishment of International Steamship in 1919 did not, however, bring an end to the discussion of steamship combines, which returned with vigor in an industry-wide debate the next year. The debate began in July 1920 when Tachikawa Matahachirō, a shipbroker and N.Y.K. shareholder, proposed that the government nationalize the shipping industry. In his proposal, Tachikawa estimated the value of the Japanese fleet of ships larger than 1,000 tons at ¥840,000,000, and, adding the cost of facilities and other assets, he suggested that the state purchase all Japanese shipping assets for ¥1,020,000,000.[141] Tachikawa justified his proposal on the grounds that marine transportation was an essential element of "sea power" (*seikaiken*) critical to the defense of a "maritime nation" (*kaikoku*).[142] He further argued that the profit-seeking activities of private firms were incompatible with national interests—during the Russo-Japanese War, for example, shagaisen owners had behaved "just like a group of masterless samurai who, with no training and no unity, were truly unable to avoid criticism for behaving as a disorderly flock of birds."[143] Tachikawa therefore proposed nationalization as a method to ensure "unity" (*tōitsu*) and "moderation" (*sessei*) in shipping.[144]

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[140] *Kawasaki kisen 50-nenshi*, 39.

[141] Tachikawa Matahachirō, *Senpaku kokuyū ikensho* (1920), 48–56. Sugiyama, *Kaiungyō to kin'yū*, 77–78.

[142] Tachikawa, *Senpaku kokuyū ikensho*, 8–10.

[143] Tachikawa, *Senpaku kokuyū ikensho*, 11.

[144] Tachikawa, *Senpaku kokuyū ikensho*, 13.

Though Tachikawa's proposal gained little support, it sparked interest in a nation-wide merger of ships. Communications Minister Noda Utarō suggested that Japan's shipping companies merge to create a strong economic base under "unified organization" (*tōitsu soshiki*) to compete with British and American shipping giants,[145] and Wakamiya likewise proposed a merger of liner companies and major shagaisen firms into a single, national combine.[146] In September, several influential businessmen began to voice support for a shipping combine (*senpaku gōdō*), as did Yamashita Kamesaburō and major N.Y.K. shareholders Katsuta Ginjirō and Yasuda Zenjirō.[147] Not to be left behind, Tachikawa abandoned his nationalization proposal, jumped on the bandwagon, and called for a merger of shipping firms.[148]

In some quarters, however, the notion of a national combine drew criticism as a cover for relief for International Steamship. Despite the initial optimism behind the founding of International Steamship, just one year after its establishment, the company struggled to earn enough income to pay the interest on its loans. The *Ironworks and Shipbuilding Gazette* (Tekkō zōsen jihō) therefore accused the Communications Ministry of seeking a resolution to International Steamship's financial woes through a further merger of shipping firms.[149] The trade journal also observed that Tachikawa had been criticized for holding an ulterior motive: the distribution of N.Y.K. and O.S.K. reserves to

[145] Reprinted in *NYK 100-nenshi*, 246.

[146] *NYK 100-nenshi*, 246.

[147] *NYK 100-nenshi*, 242, 246.

[148] Tachikawa Matahachirō, "Senpaku gōdō ni tsuite," *Tekkō zōsen jihō* 6, no. 8 (August 20, 1921): 40–41. Itō Yonejirō, *Nihon no kaiun* (Tōkyō: Tōkyō hōbunkan, 1922), 266–67.

[149] "Yukinayamaru senpaku gōdō," *Tekkō zōsen jihō* 5, no. 10 (October 20, 1920): 1.

shareholders.[150] Tachikawa had purchased a large quantity of N.Y.K. stock during the war and become the sixth-largest N.Y.K., but with the onset of the postwar depression, the value of his shares plummeted.[151] Tachikawa would receive cash from the N.Y.K.'s reserves, however, were the company to be merged through a bare combine in which liquid assets would be distributed to shareholders.[152]

Tachikawa's financial interests aside, the idea of a national combine emerged as part of a broader discussion of how to efficiently organize Japanese ships to confront competition posed by maritime powers that had begun to assert themselves in the wake of the war. On June 5, 1920, one month before Tachikawa proposed nationalizing the shipping industry, President Wilson signed the Merchant Marine Act, or "Jones Act," into law. The act promoted the privatization of the government-owned fleet, and it also included provisions intended to strengthen American shipping. Among them, several discriminatory provisions triggered a worldwide controversy: one clause brought the Philippines under the umbrella of the American coastal trade, and another reduced rail rates for American cargoes transported at sea under the American flag.[153] Admiral William S. Benson, who drafted the law and modeled some provisions on the commercial policies of prewar Germany, explicitly stated that the act was intended "to meet and

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[150] Tachikawa, "Senpaku gōdō ni tsuite," *Tekkō zōsen jihō* 6, no. 8 (August 20, 1921): 40.

[151] According to one account, Tachikawa invested in stock because by investing the amount of money required to purchase a 10,000-ton ship, he could purchase enough NYK stock to become an "owner" of around 100,000 tons of shipping. Sumita Shōichi, *Kaiun seisuiki* (Tōkyō: Sōgensha, 1952), 29–31. *NYK 100-nenshi*, 241.

[152] In 1920, the NYK had reserves of ¥92,900,000 and few liabilities; International Steamship, in contrast, had reserves of ¥1,700,000 and combined loans of ¥52,200,000. Sugiyama, *Kaiungyō to kin'yū*, 81, appendix IV, X.

[153] For a summary of the act, see Safford, *Wilsonian Maritime Diplomacy*, 229–32.

offset the countless discriminations by other nations against American shipping."[154] Though foreign opposition and concerns from State and Commerce forced the suspension of the preferential rail rates,[155] the Jones Act was a clear signal of American intentions to continue the advance of American shipping into the world.

While Tachikawa and others may have focused on dividends and payouts, the broader discussion of shipping combines pivoted on how to enable Japanese ships to compete with foreign-flagged ships backed by foreign governments. In his original nationalization proposal, Tachikawa mentioned a "new commercial shipping law" issued in violation of treaties, and observed, "America has, essentially, a bad habit of occasionally enacting reckless laws and enjoying a temporary pleasure in stupefying the people of the world."[156] In a defense of his proposal in August, Tachikawa also mentioned that the Jones Act had prompted the discussion of shipping combines, and argued that "if shipping were managed by the government, then there would be nothing to fear in the American shipping law in question."[157] Intensified competition among shipping nations therefore contributed to the momentum behind the combine proposals in Japan.

Despite support for combines in some quarters, the idea met with fierce resistance from N.Y.K. and O.S.K. management, which eventually sank the proposal. Critics argued that a merger would impede the "natural advance" of industry through free competition,

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[154] Quoted in Safford, *Wilsonian Maritime Diplomacy*, 229.

[155] Safford, *Wilsonian Maritime Diplomacy*, 232.

[156] Tachikawa, *Senpaku kokuyū ikensho*, 25–26.

[157] Tachikawa Matahachirō, "Senpaku wo kokuyū to seyo: Shikin ha jūoku en wo motte taru, kokubōjō kara mite shōbi no kyūmu nari," *Kaiji shinpō*, no. 320 (August 25, 1920): 16–17.

lead to increased freight rates, and invite foreign reprisals.[158] In autumn 1920, communications officials and N.Y.K. executives debated the issue in *The Monthly Shipping Journal*. In support, Wakamiya cited trends in world shipping to suggest that the merger of shagaisen companies and major liner companies would equip the industry for "war on the ocean."[159] In a rebuttal, however, N.Y.K. executive Itō Yonejirō also appealed to foreign examples: he pointed out that even the largest British company made up only one-tenth of British-flagged shipping, and insisted that proposals for nationalization contained communist opinions that assumed the "omnipotence of state ownership."[160] When, the following year, N.Y.K. and O.S.K. shareholders voted on the combine question, the arguments by Itō and other executives carried the day to defeat the proposal.[161]

The end of the Great War saw the onset of the commercial struggle anticipated by intellectuals, officials, and businessmen. As shipowners, shipbuilders, and other sought to manage the vicissitudes of the shipping market and postwar competition, they proposed mergers similar to those observed taking place in other maritime countries. Support from recently ascendant magnates, such as Yamashita Kamesaburō and Uchida Nobuya, and from authorities such as Uchida Kakichi, also advanced the emergence of the kind of combine envisioned by Itō Jūjirō and others. Interest in further concentrations of shipping assets under the management of a single company, however, met with stiff resistance

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[158] "Senpaku gōdō ha jiki ni arazu: Nippon yūsen kaisha no taido hyōmei saru," *Tekkō zōsen jihō* 6, no. 4 (April 15, 1921): 34.

[159] Wakamiya Sadao, "Kaiun gōdō no kōki," *Kaiun geppō* 5, no. 9 (September 1920): 1–2.

[160] Itō Yonejirō, "Senpaku kokuyūsetsu ni tsuite," *Kaiun geppō* 5, no. 9 (September 1920): 3–4.

[161] *NYK 100-nenshi*, 246–47.

from Itō Yonejirō and N.Y.K. management, who sought to protect the company's long-accumulated wealth.

Conclusion

As in many countries, the war's disruption to world shipping had significant implications for Japan's maritime industries. Shagaisen owners seized the opportunity to dispatch their ships to a greater range of ports and shipping routes, and the most successful magnates accumulated substantial riches. The expanded role of Japanese ships overseas, however, seemed to exacerbate interruptions in the carriage of Japanese cargoes. Confronted with a shipping situation similar to that faced by many shipping powers, Japan's Economic Research Council and other institutions actively gathered information about shipping policies adopted around the world, and eventually formulated a version of such controls with the passage of the Wartime Shipping Control Ordinance in September 1917. Though existing scholarship often focuses on the Army and Navy's observations of wartime mobilization in Europe and its influence on planning for a future war,[162] this ordinance was an immediate experiment with controls aimed at mobilizing ships to the war effort. While the First World War served as a lesson for military planners preparing for future conflicts, communications bureaucrats directly experienced the challenges of asserting control over vessels that, despite flying the Japanese flag, could venture to distant ports in pursuit of profits.

Such experiments in mobilization also left their mark on the immediate postwar years as shipowners and bureaucrats sought to prepare the industry for renewed

[162] Hara Akira, *Nihon senji keizai kenkyū* (Tōkyō: Tōkyō daigaku shuppankai, 2013), 8–12. Barnhart, *Japan Prepares for Total War*, 23–24, 94–95. Mimura, *Planning for Empire*, 17–21.

competition with companies from Europe and the U.S. For those observing foreign trends as part of research groups such as the Maritime Research Council, wartime concentrations of ships in Britain and Germany, and the emergence of a state-owned fleet in the U.S., were both menacing and inspirational. The disputes that beset the merger of shagaisen assets, the struggles of International Steamship to remain afloat, and the scuttling of a national combine, however, indicated the difficulties involved in maintaining the swollen fleet in the postwar years. In the decade that followed the First World War, the expanded fleet would weigh down the industry, contribute to a long-lasting recession in shipping, and impede efforts by shipowners and bureaucrats to escape the doldrums.

CHAPTER 4. SHIPPING ACROSS THE EMPIRE, 1905–1937

Japan emerged from the First World War a shipping and shipbuilding power. Japan's commercial fleet had grown to become the world's third largest, and its expanded role in global transportation was evident in the extensive geography of its shipping services. A survey of ordered lines prepared by the Communications Ministry in 1926 provides an indication of that scope.[1] Though Japan's largest liner companies, the N.Y.K. and O.S.K., no longer relied on subsidies to the extent that they had before the war,[2] the government continued to support a wide range of liner services. In 1926, subsidized ships traversed oceans to carry the Japanese flag to the Americas, Europe, Australia, and Africa, and in the near seas, a cluster of subsidized lines called at ports ranging from Kamchatka to Java.

The ministry's survey also illustrated the range of state institutions that helped finance liner services. The Communications Ministry administered the largest subsidies, but several prefectural governments also issued shipping subsidies, as did colonial governments-general. The sprawling apparatus of maritime infrastructure that developed under the Japanese flag was thus not only managed by multiple private firms, but also supervised and directed by multiple government offices, each motivated by a different set of territorial concerns.

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[1] Teishinshō kansenkyoku, *Meirei kōro genkō shisetsu shirabe* ([Tōkyō]: Teishinshō kansenkyoku, 1926).

[2] From 1897 to 1914, subsidies typically made up more than 20 percent of the N.Y.K. annual revenue, and around 10 to 20 percent of O.S.K. revenue. For N.Y.K. and O.S.K. subsidies, revenue, and profit, see Miwa Ryōichi, *Nihon kindai no keizai seisaku shiteki kenkyū* (Tōkyō: Nihon keizai hyōronsha, 2002), 352.


Among the near seas shipping services supported by the government in 1926 were several connections between colonies and the metropole. There were also a number of subsidized services that extended between colonies, or between colonies and ports in China, Russia, or Southeast Asia. Japanese ships not only connected Japan to overseas territories, they were also conduits for flows of goods and passengers between colonies and across imperial borders. As a result, they often became focal points for negotiations between institutions across the empire.

Such empire-wide interactions are the subject of this chapter. As a case study, this chapter focuses on Japanese-flagged shipping routes centered on one colonial port: Dalian. A range of actors and institutions from across the empire—government offices, chambers of commerce, traders, and private shipping firms—had an interest in the ultimate configuration of these shipping routes, and sought to shape the circuits of ships that called at the seaport. Though anchored to a single port, this chapter examines how the heterogeneous objectives of a range of imperial actors converged on Dalian and its shipping routes—at times in ways that reinforced each other, and at times in ways that led to conflict.

Dalian in the Japanese Empire

Located on the southern half of the Liaodong Peninsula (Figure 4.1), Dalian initially developed into a commercial port under Russian administration. In 1898, the Russian Empire, in pursuit of ice-free access to the Pacific, coerced several concessions from the Qing Empire: a lease over a portion of the Liaodong Peninsula and rights to construct a branch railway from the Trans-Siberian Railway to the peninsula. Russian

FIGURE 4.1 Major Ports in East Asia



Source (base layer): ArcWorld Supplement, "World Countries (generalized)."

officials developed Port Arthur (Ch. Lüshun; Jp. Ryojun) into a major naval base, and invested in the development of harbor facilities in what they called Dalny—several villages formerly known as Qingniwa that became the southern terminus of the China Eastern Railway (CER).[3] Following the Russo-Japanese War, however, the Kwantung Leased Territory (*Kantōshū*) was transferred to Japan, along with the portion of the CER that extended from Port Arthur and Dalian to Changchun. In 1906, the Japanese government established a semi-official company, the South Manchuria Railway (SMR;

[3] For a history of the place names, see Emer O'Dwyer, *Significant Soil: Settler Colonialism and Japan's Urban Empire in Manchuria* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 2015), 23.

Minami Manshū tetsudō kabushiki gaisha), with a sweeping mandate to manage those rail lines and administer the surrounding Railway Zone.[4] A garrison force, the Kwantung Army (*Kantōgun*), was stationed to protect the Railway Zone, and in 1906 a Kwantung Office (*Kantōchō*), was established to oversee the SMR and administer affairs in the leasehold.[5]

This extension of control over the Kwantung Leased Territory and Railway Zone was part of a broader process of Japanese imperial expansion that took place in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. In 1895, Japan acquired sovereignty over Taiwan after defeating the Qing Empire in the Sino-Japanese War. After the Russo-Japanese War, Japan secured the concessions in Manchuria, as well as sovereignty over Karafuto, the southern half of Sakhalin Island. Victory over Russia also left Japan the paramount power in Korea, and in 1910 the Japanese government formally annexed the peninsula. During WWI, the Japanese military further occupied several German colonies in Micronesia, and after the war, the Japanese government continued to govern the islands, or Nan'yō, as a League of Nations Mandate. With each annexation, governments-general were established to administer the new territories. Laws passed in Japan suspended the Constitution in these territories, and granted governors-general the authority to issue ordinances with the force of law.[6] The governments-general also

[4] Kate McDonald, "Asymmetrical Integration: Lessons from a Railway Empire," *Technolgoy and Culture* vol. 56, no. 1 (January 2015): 120. Yoshihisa Tak Matsusaka, *The Making of Japanese Manchuria, 1904–1932* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 2001).

[5] O'Dwyer, *Significant Soil*, 7.

[6] For a useful overview, see, Hui-yu Caroline Ts'ai, *Taiwan in Japan's Empire Building: An institutional approach to colonial engineering* (London: Routledge, 2009), 15–43.

drafted budgets as special accounts (*tokubetsu kaikei*) for submission to the Diet.[7] Under this combined legal-fiscal regime, each of the colonial governments-general had the authority and financial capacity to adopt maritime policies independent from the central government.

In the Kwantung Leased Territory and Railway Zone, the semi-official SMR also played a prominent role in developing transportation infrastructure. Pursuing a policy of "Dalian centrism" (*Dairen chūshinshugi*), SMR managers sought to develop the seaport into a major hub for cargo and passenger traffic. Past scholarship has largely focused on competition between Dalian and other transportation networks for shares of Manchuria's exports and imports. Through investment in harbor facilities and the development of commercial services such as banking, insurance, and warehousing, the SMR was able to divert soybean traffic to Dalian and away from Yingkou (Jp. Eikō; also known as Niuzhuang),[8] the most heavily trafficked seaport in Manchuria at the turn of the century.[9] Kate McDonald, moreover, has demonstrated that the SMR also negotiated agreements with other railways in order to integrate its rail lines into regional and global networks and thereby secure shares of traffic between Europe and Asia.[10] In the 1910s, Dalian's centrality to this traffic faced challenges from rival transportation networks in Korea and

[7] See Mizoguchi Toshiyuki and Umemura Mataji, eds., *Kyū Nihon shokuminchi keizai tōkei* (Tōkyō: Tōyō keizai shinpōsha, 1988).

[8] Yingkou (Jp. Eikō) was the name of a port located in the northeast of the Bohai Bay. Japanese and English publications, however, at times used the name of a nearby city, Niuzhuang (Jp. Gyūsō; E. Newchuang) to refer to the port. In this chapter, I will use the place name used in original documents, but when I refer to Niuzhuang I will include Yingkou in parentheses.

[9] Matsusaka, *The Making of Japanese Manchuria*, 131–38.

[10] McDonald, "Asymmetrical Integration," 128–35.

Siberia,[11] but by 1916 Dalian had surpassed Yingkou to become the busiest port in Northeast China. By 1919, it was the second busiest port in China after Shanghai.[12]

Japanese Shipping in Dalian

Alongside its rise as a gateway for exports of Manchurian soybean and Europe-Asia overland traffic, Dalian also became integrated into a growing array of shipping lines that conveyed goods and passengers between the seaport and overseas destinations. A guide to shipping services (*kōro annai*) published by the O.S.K. in 1919, for example, located Dalian within a larger network of O.S.K. lines.[13] Publications centered on Dalian, meanwhile, mapped out in list form the various shipping lines that regularly serviced the port-city. In 1913, for example, a pamphlet published by the SMR's Dalian Wharf Office listed fourteen regular services with stops in Dalian. These included three services from Europe to Asia managed by German and British firms, and eleven near seas lines.[14] By 1921, however, the city had undergone what Shinozaki

[11] In Korea, the government-general promoted the Busan-Seoul-Andong-Fengtian (Mukden) route by negotiating a reduction of customs on goods from Japan carried to Manchuria across the Sinuiju-Andong border in 1913, and, in what became known as the Three Rails Affair, reduced SMR and Chōsen (Korea) Railway rates in 1916. Russian officials, meanwhile, sought to funnel Europe-Asia traffic to Japan via the Trans-Siberian Railway and Vladivostok. Competition between Dalian and Vladivostok for this traffic culminated in a conference on Japan-Russia traffic in 1912. For competition between Dalian and Korea, see Kitaoka Shin'ichi, *Nihon rikugun to tairiku seisaku* (Tōkyō: Tōkyō daigaku shuppankai, 1978), 235–36. O'Dwyer, Significant Soil, 73–76, 102–25. For competition between Dalian and Vladivostok, see Kaneko Fumio, *Kindai Nihon ni okeru tai-Manshū tōshi no kenkyū* (Tōkyō: Kondō shuppansha, 1991), 117–20. Kokaze Hidemasa, *Teikokushugi-ka no Nihon kaiun: Kokusai kyōsō to taigai jiritsu* (Tōkyō: Yamakawa shuppansha, 1995), 250–52. McDonald, "Asymmetrical Integration," 135–38.

[12] Not including Hong Kong. O'Dwyer, *Significant Soil*, 41.

[13] Ōsaka shōsen kabushiki gaisha, ed., *Kōro annai* ([Ōsaka]: Ōsaka shōsen kabushiki gaisha, 1919).

[14] Minami Manshū tetsudō kabushiki gaisha Dairen futō jimusho, *Dairenkō* ([Dairen]: Minami Manshū tetsudō kabushiki gaisha Dairen futō jimusho 1913), 7–9.

Yoshirō, general secretary of the Dalian Chamber of Commerce, described as a "remarkable reform and expansion of shipping services."[15] Ships owned by Japanese and American companies called at Dalian on services that extended to the U.S., Europe, and Southeast Asia. Several Japanese steamship companies as well as a Chinese firm, the Zhengji Company, also managed seventeen near seas services that called at ports ranging from Kobe to Incheon, Shanghai, and Gaoxiong. (Figure 4.2)

The Japanese-flagged shipping lines mapped out in these guides had emerged in the wake of the Russo-Japanese War. The earliest routes opened by Japanese firms connected the Liaodong Peninsula and Japan. Before the Russo-Japanese War had even ended the O.S.K. established the first regular shipping services to Dalian. Before the war, the company had made several attempts to open similar services to North China that met with little success. A request for a subsidy to support sailings from Kobe to Niuzhuang (Yingkou) was refused by the Diet in February 1900, and, ironically, the company's service struggled as Russia's development of Dalny reduced export traffic out of Niuzhuang (Yingkou).[16] As the Japanese Army gained ground on the Liaodong Peninsula, however, O.S.K. managers maneuvered to take advantage of the changing geography of Japanese military power. Dalian fell to the Japanese in late May 1904, and in July O.S.K. management sent an employee, Suenaga Ichizō, to the city to evaluate prospects for a shipping line. On January 2, 1905, the Russian general in Port Arthur surrendered to Japanese forces.[17] Twelve days later, the O.S.K. inaugurated a line from

[15] Shinozaki Yoshirō, *Dairen* (Dairen: Ōsaka yagō shoten, 1921), 729.

[16] For O.S.K. efforts to develop North China services, see *OSK 50-nenshi*, 258–59.

[17] For an overview of military operations during the Russo-Japanese War, see John W. Steinberg, "The Operational Overview," in *The Russo-Japanese War in Global Perspective: World War Zero*, ed. John W. Steinberg, et al. (Leiden: Brill, 2005), 105–28.

Osaka to Dalian via Kobe and Moji. The company initially employed two 1,000-ton ships, the *Maizuru Maru* and *Maiko Maru*, on a schedule of four sailings per month, but soon added the 1,500-ton *Jilong Maru* and *Anping Maru* to increase sailings to twice a week.[18]

This was not the first time that the O.S.K. followed the flag to establish shipping lines after the forceful annexation of new territory. In September 1895, mere months after the conclusion of the Sino-Japanese War, the firm had similarly dispatched a director, Sugiyama Kōhei, and several employees to evaluate transportation conditions in Taiwan. In February 1896, the firm submitted an opinion paper to the newly established Government-General of Taiwan, in which it outlined a proposal to open coastal services and a Japan-Taiwan connection with the support of subsidies. Later that year, the government-general began to subsidize sailings between Kobe and Taiwan via Okinawa, and in 1897 issued directives to the O.S.K. regarding two Taiwan-Japan services and three coastal services.[19] These lines were reorganized in 1898, when the Army requested that the government-general also issue subsidies to the N.Y.K. to support a parallel serivce on the Kobe-Jilong (Jp. Kīrun; E. Keelung) route. The O.S.K., however, maintained a monopoly over subsidized coastal services.[20]

Unlike in Taiwan, the O.S.K. successfully monopolized the Osaka-Dalian service. After petitioning the Communications Ministry, the firm began to receive a subsidy in

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[18] For the line's opening, see *OSK 50-nenshi*, 243. For tonnage, see *OSK 80-nenshi*, 719, 733.

[19] *OSK 50-nenshi*, 209–11. The O.S.K. also aggressively advocated for the development of services on the Yangzi River, newly opened to Japanese-flagged shipping under the terms of the Treaty of Shimonoseki. See Katayama Kunio, *Kindai Nihon kaiun to Ajia* (Tōkyō: Ochanomizu shobō, 1996), 179–250.

[20] *OSK 50-nenshi*, 219.

April 1906.[21] Ships released from military requisitions, however, also began to compete with the O.S.K. for traffic.[22] The N.Y.K., for example, opened a parallel Kobe-Dalian line in early 1906,[23] but after several months of competition, discontinued the service.[24] The N.Y.K. and O.S.K. instead concluded an agreement to respect their respective monopolies on the Shanghai and Dalian routes.[25] By early 1907, O.S.K. business reports noted that the service had begun to flourish due to the development of facilities in Dalian, the port's tax free status, and busy passenger traffic that followed the opening of business on the SMR.[26]

Between 1907 and 1911, the O.S.K. cemented its position in the route by establishing through traffic agreements with several rail networks. In March 1907, it began to coordinate sailings with the Japan Government Railway's (JGR) freight services to Kobe and Moji, and in 1908 concluded agreements regarding passenger and parcel traffic. In 1909, the O.S.K. and SMR established similar agreements regarding passengers and luggage, and in 1911 all three companies established agreements on the coordination of freight traffic.[27] The primary outbound cargoes on the line were cotton threads and textiles from Japan; inbound, the ships returned with soybean products and pig iron.[28]

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[21] *OSK 50-nenshi*, 244.

[22] *OSK EH*, 1906-1 (1906), 1. *OSK EH*, 1906-2 (1907), 1.

[23] *NYK 50-nenshi*, 232.

[24] Shinozaki, *Dairen*, 712. *NYK EH*, 24-1 (1907), 3.

[25] *OSK 50-nenshi*, 243–44. Kamotsuka, ed., *Wagasha kaku kōro no enkaku* ([Tōkyō]: Nippon yūsen kabushiki gaisha kamotsuka, 1932), 96–99.

[26] *OSK EH*, 1907-1 (1907), 1.

[27] *OSK 50-nenshi*, 244. Also see McDonald, "Asymmetrical Integration," 128–29.

[28] *OSK 50-nenshi*, 247.

Passengers traffic was also a source of revenue, and the O.S.K.'s 1919 guide to shipping routes advertised the speed and comfort of its ships:

> Ships employed on [the Osaka-Dalian route] are all new, large-scale passenger ships. We exclusively employ superior ships (*yūshūsen*) larger than 2,000 gross tons and capable of speeds of fifteen knots or more. The most splendid accommodations are provided onboard, and nothing is lacking to entertain travelers. Each ship is outfitted with radiotelegraph equipment, and we strive to provide satisfactory treatment to all passengers. The *Harbin Maru* in particular is the newest, most ideal passenger ship. First-class facilities in particular not only include a bedroom, but also a living room, washroom, and private bathroom to provide the pleasure of a "moving home."[29]

In addition to these expansive first-class rooms, the guide also assured travelers that third-class passengers would find comfortable accommodations.

At times, however, Japanese interests in Manchuria became discontented with the O.S.K.'s monopolization of the Osaka-Dalian route. Despite the claims made by the company in its guidebook, in mid-1919, the *Manshū Nichinichi Shinbun* published a series of articles that decried the poor quality of O.S.K. ships on the route, as well as the poor treatment of passengers by the company's employees. According to the articles, Dalian services were inferior to those in Taiwan, and their author therefore contended that it was "a matter of great urgency to follow the example of the Taiwan services and employ both N.Y.K. and O.S.K. ships [on the Dalian route]."[30] In several articles published in August, the paper proposed that the Communications Ministry or the

[29] Ōsaka shōsen kabushiki gaisha, ed., *Kōro annai*, 1–2.

[30] "Dairen kōro mondai: Kaizen ha mokka no kyūmu," *Manshū nichinichi shinbun*, July 27, 1919, NCC 00143141.

Kwantung Office subsidize a competitor on the route, preferably the N.Y.K., in order to foster competition and thereby encourage improvements.[31]

Despite the criticism leveled by the *Manshū Nichinichi Shinbun*, the Osaka-Dalian service was not the only connection between Japanese ports and the Kwantung Leased Territory, it was simply the most direct. After the Russo-Japanese War, both the N.Y.K. and the O.S.K. incorporated Dalian into additional shipping lines from Japan to North and Northeast China. Unlike the Osaka-Dalian line, however, these called at a greater number of ports in Japan, Korea, and China, and therefore conveyed flows of traffic between Dalian and Japan alongside other commodities and passengers circulating in Northeast Asia. The N.Y.K., for example, incorporated Dalian as an intermediate port of call on two subsidized services to North China opened before the war: a Kobe-North China line and a Kobe-Korea-North China line.[32] In 1906, the N.Y.K. also opened a subsidized Yokohama-Niuzhuang (Yingkou) line via Moji, Incheon, Dalian, and Dagu (China).[33] The N.Y.K.-O.S.K. non-competition agreement did preclude the N.Y.K. from carrying cargoes to and from Dalian on these services, as long as the firm did not undercut the O.S.K. rate.[34] The O.S.K., meanwhile, used ships eligible for navigation bounties to open a service from Nagasaki to Dalian via Busan and Incheon in 1905, and

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[31] "Dairen kōro kaizen hitsuyō: Kyōsōsen wo kaisha seyo," *Manshū nichinichi shinbun*, August 11, 1919, NCC 00141117. "Yūsen Dairen kōro: □kō kaisha chōsa kanryō," *Manshū nichinichi shinbun*, August 14, 1919, NCC 00141127. Dairen kōro mondai: Yūsen no kōro kaishi hōhō," *Manshū nichinichi shinbun*, August 15, 1919, NCC 00141133.

[32] These are seen in Shinozaki, *Dairen*, 712.

[33] *NYK 50-nenshi*, 231.

[34] Similarly, the O.S.K. was permitted to carry cargoes to and from Shanghai on its American services as long as the company matched the N.Y.K. rate. This description of the agreement can be found in an article published in the *Asahi Shinbun* in 1922, and the terms may have changed between 1906/1907 and 1922. See "Yūshō kōro kyōgi heikō kōro seiri," *Asahi shinbun* (June 2, 1922). Kamotsuka, ed., *Wagasha kaku kōro no enkaku*, 96–99.

began to employ ships on provisional, monthly sailings from Yokohama to Dalian via Yokkaichi, Osaka, Kobe, Moji, and Incheon in 1907. In 1910, the O.S.K. formalized the latter service into a regular Yokohama-Dalian line. It also merged the Nagasaki-Dalian service with a Nagasaki-Korea service to create a Nagasaki-Korea-Dalian line subsidized by the Nagasaki prefectural government, and maintained sailings on the route until 1918.[35]

In addition to the routes between Dalian and ports in Japan, Japanese steamship companies also developed shipping services between Dalian and ports in China, Korea, and Taiwan. One of the earliest firms to establish regular lines from Dalian to other ports in the Bohai Bay was the Tokushima-based Awanokuni Union Steamship Company (*Awanokuni kyōdō kisen kabushiki gaisha*). A competitor of the O.S.K. in the Seto Inland Sea, Awanokuni Union began to develop its first near sea services after the Russo-Japanese War. The firm opened a line from Incheon to Zhifu (Jp. Chīfū; E. Chefoo) via Dalian in March 1906, a line from Dalian to Andong via Zhifu in May, and a line from Dalian to Incheon in November.[36] The ships employed on the lines were smaller steamships, such as the 387-ton *No. 10 Union Maru* or the 243-ton *No. 6 Union Maru*. Consular reports indicate that the company relied on a Chinese agent, the Shunyi Company (*Shunyi gongsi*), to obtain cargoes and passengers and to coordinate voyages.[37]

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[35] Nagasaki Prefecture had already eliminated the subsidy in 1916. For accounts of these services, see *OSK 50-nenshi*, 190–91, 260, 270–71.

[36] The Incheon-Zhifu line included intermediate stops in Chinnanpo, Ryongampo, Andong, Dalian, and Port Arthur. The Dalian-Incheon line stopped in Zhifu and Weihaiwei. *Awanokuni 50-nenshi*, 8–9, 19–23.

[37] Okuyama to Minister Saionji, September 11, 1906, in "Antō-Dairen-Chīfū-kan kōro hojo no gi Awanokuni kyōdō kisen kaisha yori shutsugan ikken," *Gaimushō kiroku*, 3-6-3-72, MFA, JACAR B11092485300, 150. Most of the Japanese-flagged ships that called at Zhifu on services to Andong and Dalian seem to have been handled by Chinese companies (the Shunyi Company

In September, Awanokuni Union managers petitioned the Communications Ministry for a subsidy to support its Dalian-Andong line on the grounds that the firm's smaller capitalization left it struggling to compete with foreign flagged rivals.[38] Ministry officials considered it advantageous to maintain regular stops in Dalian on Japanese-flagged services between Andong and Zhifu, and began to provide the firm with a port-of-call subsidy (*kikō hojo*) the following month.[39]

Several years later, a number of Japanese traders also began to manage regular services in the bay with the support of subsidies issued by the Kwantung Office. In 1909, the colonial government began to subsidize services along the Liaodong Peninsula managed by the Shiki Group, and the following year the office granted a subsidy to a trader, Tanaka Sueo, to support regular sailings from Dalian to Longkou (on China's Shandong Peninsula) via Port Arthur and Dengzhou.[40] In 1911, Tanaka organized his shipping operations under a new company that he established with another trader, Kawabe Katsu. North China Steamship Company (Jp. *Hokushin rinsen kōshi*; Ch. *Beiqing lunchuan gongsi*) had a capital of ¥20,000, and managed two shipping lines, both subsidized by the Kwantung Office: the *Fukusei Maru* (789 gross tons) sailed twice a

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and the Zhengji Company), with a few handled by the Japanese Taishin Company (Jp. *Taishin yōkō*; Ch. *Taixin yanghang*).

[38] Kawamata Tokusaburō, Director, Awanokuni kyōdō kisen kabushiki gaisha to Communications Minister Yamagata Isaburō, "Kōkai hojokin kafugan," August 27, 1906, in "Antō-Dairen-Chīfū-kan kōro hojo no gi Awanokuni kyōdō kisen kaisha yori shutsugan ikken," *Gaimushō kiroku*, 145–146.

[39] Uchida Kakichi, Mercantile Marine Bureau Chief, to Kurachi Tetsukichi, Political Affairs Bureau Chief, "Dairen-Antōken kikō hojo meirei no ken," October 3, 1906, in "Antō-Dairen-Chīfū-kan kōro hojo no gi Awanokuni kyōdō kisen kaisha yori shutsugan ikken," *Gaimushō kiroku*, 154.

[40] Unekawa Shizuo, *Kaiun kōkokushi*, vol. 2 (Ōsaka: Kaiji ihōsha, 1927), 296. Kantōchō, ed., *Kantōchō shisei nijū-nenshi* ([Dairen]: Kantōchō, 1926), 425.

month between Dalian, Zhifu, Andong, and Tianjin, and the *Ryūhei Maru* sailed almost weekly on the Dalian-Longkou route.

Shortly after its establishment, North China Steamship also began to develop shipping lines in coordination with the SMR, which sought to make Dalian into a "mouth" (*dontokō*) for Manchurian trade and "an entrepôt (*chūkeikō*) for freight entering and exiting ports on the Bohai coast."[41] In pursuit of this goal, in 1912 the SMR purchased two new, shallow-draft ships for use in coastal routes: the *Saitsū Maru* (1,033 gross tons) and the *Tenchō Maru* (1,249 gross tons). Rather than manage the ships directly, however, the SMR leased them to North China Steamship, which assigned them to a service from Dalian to Tianjin via Zhifu and Andong.[42] The Kwantung Office increased its subsidy, and North China Steamship increased its sailings to once per week.[43]

Over the next few years, Tanaka and Kawabe's shipping company assumed management of additional services in the Bohai Bay. In January 1913, Tanaka and Kawabe reorganized the firm into the Dalian Steamship General Partnership (*Dairen kisen gōshi kaisha*), increased its capital to ¥100,000, and hired Tsukamoto Teijirō, the delivery manager of Mitsui's Dalian branch, to manage the firm as director.[44] In its prospectus, the new company framed its mandate in terms of national interests. On the grounds that the inability of Japanese ships to monopolize shipping in North China

[41] *SMR 10-nenshi*, 383. Similar language can be found in an article about the SMR in the *Ōsaka Mainichi Shinbun*. "Minami Manshū tetsudō kabushiki kaisha," *Osaka mainichi shinbun* (October 26, 1913), NCC00099155. A portion of the article is reproduced in Matsuura Akira, *Kisen no jidai: Kindai higashi Ajia kaiiki* (Ōsaka: Seibundō shuppan kabushiki gaisha, 2013), 161.

[42] According to the SMR official history, SMR managers were concerned about attracting competition from foreign-flagged ships active in the area. *SMR 10-nenshi*, 383.

[43] *DKK 20-nen ryakushi*, 27.

[44] *DKK 20-nen ryakushi*, 28.

impeded the "advance of the nation's destiny," the founders declared their intent to unify management of the region's shipping lines. Dalian Steamship inherited the shipping lines of its predecessor, and purchased the coastal services maintained by the Shiki Group. The company also chartered two additional ships from the SMR—the newly launched *Hakushin Maru* (1,441 gross tons) and *Isshin Maru* (1,482 gross tons)—for use on unsubsidized sailings to Tianjin, Andong, and other ports in the bay.[45]

During WWI, however, the railway began to assume greater control over the shipping firm. After consultations between managers of the SMR and Dalian Steamship, the latter was, in February 1915, reorganized into a joint-stock company (*Dairen kisen kabushiki gaisha*) and its capital increased to ¥500,000, partly through an investment by the SMR. In April the following year, the SMR invested an additional ¥1,500,000 and became the majority shareholder. Dalian Steamship then purchased six ships from its new parent company, including four already employed on charter.[46] Often referred to as an "auxiliary force" (*betsudōtai*) of the SMR, Dalian Steamship remained a subsidiary of the railway until its dissolution after WWII.

The shipping lines opened by Dalian Steamship and Awanokuni Union in the Bohai Bay conveyed several different flows of traffic. The primary cargo on Dalian Steamship's line between Dalian, Zhifu, Andong, and Tianjin was Tianjin-bound lumber

[45] For an overview of Dalian Steamship's early services, see *DKK 20-nen ryakushi*, 29–31. For the SMR-owned ships, see *SMR 10-nenshi*, 284–85.

[46] *DKK 20-nen ryakushi*, 39, 282–83. *SMR 10-nenshi*, 385.

from Andong.[47] Ships on the Dalian-Longkou line carried coal on outbound voyages, and returned with vegetables, beef, and grain.[48]

One of the most important cargoes carried across the Bay, however, was people—"coolies," or Chinese laborers, that circulated between Shandong and Manchuria.[49] Shipping firms packed these laborers onto vessels in the largest quantities possible. In 1921, for example, the Andong customs house discovered 1,419 Chinese passengers (including 156 children) aboard Awanokuni Union's *No. 22 Union Maru*—a cargo ship without passenger facilities.[50] An account of coolie labor published in *The China Daily Review* in 1927, clearly articulated the commodification of these laborers:

> Coolies are cargo, the shipping agent in a port of embarkation will tell the forwarding agent of a batch of coolies. As cargo they will be charged according to the amount of cargo already consigned to be shipped. When goods cargo is heavy, charges for human cargo are correspondingly higher. … The shipping companies regard these immigrant laborers as exceptionally good cargo inasmuch as they are automotive. They walk on, and walk off, thus requiring no handling. No food is furnished them. Many are deck passengers and when cargo is heavy they rest on the packing cases.[51]

Viewed in this way as ambulatory goods, Chinese passengers on these ships were also, at times, disposed of like objects. In October 1926, the Japanese consul in Zhifu reported to the Kwantung Governor-General (*Kantō chōkan*) that the Zhifu customs office had held Dalian Steamship's *Eijun Maru* after receiving word from passengers that crew members

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[47] *DKK 20-nen ryakushi*, 242. *DKK EH*, dai-1-kai (1915). *DKK EH*, dai-2-kai (1916). *DKK EH*, dai-3-kai (1917).

[48] *DKK 20-nen ryakushi*, 245. For information on cargoes in the first years of operation, also see *DKK EH*, dai-1-kai (1915). *DKK EH*, dai-2-kai (1916). *DKK EH*, dai-3-kai (1917).

[49] *DKK 20-nen ryakushi*, 242, 245.

[50] "Awa kyōdō kisen kaisha shoyū *Dai-22 Kyōdō Maru* no futō ryokyaku tōzai no ken," in "Kaisō teihaku kankei zakken dai-3-kan," *Gaimushō kiroku* 3-6-4-8, MFA, JACAR B11092650900.

[51] C. Walter Young, "Chinese Labor Migration to Manchuria," *The China Weekly Review*, November 19, 1927, 302.

had discarded the corpse of a deceased, fourth-class passenger into the ocean—an incident that left the consul concerned about the reputation of Japanese ships and seamen.[52]

In addition to shipping in the Bohai Bay, the SMR also developed and directly managed services from Dalian to Shanghai and ports in South China. In 1908, the company inaugurated a twice-weekly express rail service from Dalian to Changchun as part of a "trunk line, Europe-Asia connection."[53] To attract Europe-Asia traffic, the SMR opened a shipping line from Dalian to Shanghai—"the center of transportation and trade in the Orient."[54] The SMR chartered the 2,877-ton *Kobe Maru* from the N.Y.K. in August 1908, and began to coordinate its voyages to Shanghai with the railway's express train to create the "fastest connection from Europe to Shanghai and South/Central China."[55] The SMR then expanded the service by employing the N.Y.K.'s 2,904-ton *Saikyō Maru* on the route in 1909, as well as its own 3,402-ton *Sakaki Maru* in 1913.[56]

SMR shipping to South China, in contrast, was organized around cargo, particularly coal from the railway's Fushun (Jp. Bujun) mines. In 1913, the SMR opened a service to Hong Kong and Guangzhou using the company's 3,569-ton *Taishan Maru* as well as a 3,424-ton ship under charter from the Noguchi Company. The SMR maintained a semi-regular service of two to three sailings per month between Dalian/Yingkou and

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[52] Beppu Kumakichi, Vice-Consul, Zhifu, to Count Kodama Hideo, Kwantung Governor-General, October 15, 1920, "Dairen kisen kaisha kisen *Eijun Maru* Shinajin jōkykau shitai kaichū hōki no ken," in "Naigai senpaku kankei zakken dai-2-kan," *Gaimushō kiroku* 3-6-3-100, MFA, JACAR B11092622600, 116–18.

[53] *SMR 10-nenshi*, 376.

[54] *SMR 10-nenshi*, 376.

[55] *SMR 10-nenshi*, 376. Similar language can be found in "Minami Manshū tetsudō kabushiki kaisha," *Osaka mainichi shinbun*, October 26, 1913.

[56] *SMR 10-nenshi, 376*.

Hong Kong/Guangzhou, with occasional intermediate stops in Zhifu, Weihaiwei, or Qingdao. Confronted with competition from Butterfield & Swire, Jardine Matheson & Co., and the China Merchants' Steam Navigation Company (Ch. *Zhaoshangju*), however, the SMR increased tonnage on the route by assuming management of a Hong Kong line managed by a Japanese trader based in Zhifu, the Iwashiro Company (*Iwashiro shōkai*). The SMR chartered the trader's *Taiyō Maru* and *No. 12 Kenkon Maru* and increased sailings to South China to four to five times per month. In addition to Fushun coal, ships employed by the SMR also began to load Kaiping coal in Qinhuangdao and bean powder in Zhifu. Unlike the Shanghai line, the South China service only began to carry passengers in 1915.[57]

At first the SMR directly managed these services to Shanghai and South China, but after acquiring a majority stake in Dalian Steamship, the railway began to turn over the lines to its subsidiary. In 1916, Dalian Steamship assumed management of semi-regular sailings to South China, and in 1918 took on sole responsibility for the transport of Fushun coal to South China and Southeast Asia.[58] In 1922, it also took over operation of the Shanghai line.[59]

The SMR and Kwantung Office, meanwhile, were not the only colonial institutions to promote sailings to and from Dalian. In 1912, the Government-General of Taiwan also began to grant the O.S.K. subsidies to maintain regular sailings from Gaoxiong to Tianjin via Jilong, Shanghai, and (after 1914) Qingdao. The government-general's involvement in shipping in mainland China had begun in 1898,

[57] For an overview of the South China service, listed in the SMR's ten-year history as the South China coastal service (*Minami Shina engan kōro*) see *SMR 10-nenshi*, 380–83.

[58] *DKK 20-nen ryakushi*, 251. *SMR 10-nenshi*, 385.

[59] *DKK 20-nen ryakushi*, 240.

when it first subsidized O.S.K. lines from Taiwan to South China. After several years of intense competition with a British firm, Douglas Steamship, the O.S.K. had expelled its rival from the straits and achieved a monopoly on Taiwan-China liner services.[60] Ships on these routes initially called at ports between Hong Kong and Fuzhou, but in 1905, the Government-General appropriated funds for subsidies to support a line from Hong Kong to Shanghai. In 1911, the service was reorganized into two lines—one from Fuzhou to Hong Kong and the other from Gaoxiong to Shanghai.[61] The latter was extended to Tianjin and Dalian the following year. Under the terms of the 1912 directive, the O.S.K. was required to maintain a schedule of two sailings per month.[62] As later described by Kichikai Ushita, an official in the government-general's Communications Division, the new service was intended to create new outlets for Taiwanese sugar while developing an avenue for imports of soybeans for use as fertilizer. According to Kichikai, however, traffic in coastal China was initially more significant than goods and passengers circulating between Taiwan and North China/Manchuria.[63]

In the years after Japan's acquisition of the lease on the Kwantung Leased Territory, multiple shipping firms and government offices thus developed circuits of ships that situated Dalian as a hub for flows of people and commodities. These lines were oriented around several cargoes—coal, soybeans, sugar, lumber—as well as passengers that included Japanese migrants to Korea, Chinese laborers, and transcontinental travelers. Dalian developed into a commercial center in part through its connection with

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[60] Katayama, *Kindai Nihon kaiun to Ajia*. Kokaze, *Teikokushugi-ka no Nihon kaiun*.

[61] Kokaze, *Teikokushugi-ka no Nihon kaiun*, 260.

[62] *OSK 50-nenshi*, 271–72. Kichikai Ushita, *Taiwan kaiunshi*, ed. Asaka Teijirō (Taihoku: Taiwan kaimu kyōkai, 1941), 314–15.

[63] Kichikai, *Taiwan kaiunshi*, 315.

the metropole, but also through the development of linkages to ports in other Japanese colonies and in coastal China. The SMR built Dalian into a hub for transportation in part by building on commercial centers in East Asia dominated by the British Empire. The connection to Shanghai became key to the SMR's transcontinental strategy; as outlined in the Dalian Wharf Office's 1913 pamphlet, the Dalian-Shanghai line "not only developed commerce and the economies of North and South China, but also greatly facilitated world transportation and commerce."[64] Similarly, the connection to Hong Kong, another center for regional and transoceanic shipping, became essential to the circulation of Fushun coal mined by the railway.

Intra-Imperial Shipping

The previous section examined how institutions from across the Japanese Empire developed shipping services that converged on Dalian. This section, in contrast, examines a different kind of convergence: cases in which the shipping policies of multiple institutions intersected on particular shipping routes to and from Dalian. In the decade following WWI, officials, business groups, and shipowners from around the empire continued to reconfigure Japan's apparatus of near seas shipping. Business interests or officials based in a range of cities and territories often aimed to develop certain shipping lines in order to foster particular patterns of circulation, both of commodities (trade) and people (migration). In the process, the profitability of those services at times rested on the transport of additional flows of goods and passengers across the empire.

[64] Minami Manshū tetsudō Dairen futō jimusho, *Dairenkō*, 35.

One example of this convergence took place in in the early 1920s. In the years after WWI, representatives from Nagasaki City Hall advocated for the opening of a service between Nagasaki, Korea, and Manchuria. One motivation was the streamlining of migration from Japan to Korea through the establishment of a "direct connection" (*chokusetsu renkei*) between southern Kyūshū and major ports in Korea. At the time, Korea-bound passengers from Nagasaki made the passage to the peninsula via the Shimonoseki-Busan ferry. By establishing a direct shipping service, city representatives aimed to facilitate migration, and, simultaneously promote economic ties between the regions. They therefore negotiated with shipping firms and the Government-General of Korea, and proposed the reestablishment of a Nagasaki-Korea-Dalian service similar to the one managed by the O.S.K. from 1905 to 1918.[65]

The city's ambitions coincided with a reorientation of shipping policy in Korea. While colonial authorities had largely focused on coastal shipping after the territory's annexation in 1910, in the mid-1920s transportation officials began to develop a "plan for the reform and expansion" of the colony's ordered lines. In 1925, they issued directives to the O.S.K. and the Korea Mail Steamship Company (*Chōsen yūsen kabushiki gaisha*) to jointly manage a route from Nagasaki to Dalian via Busan and Incheon, and maintain a schedule of thirty-four sailings per year.[66] In addition to a subsidy of ¥35,000 issued by

[65] Nagasaki shiyakusho, *Man-Sen kōro to Taiwan kōro fukkō mondai* ([Nagasaki]: 1931), 1.

[66] Chōsen sōtokufu, *Chōsen sōtokufu shisei nenpō Shōwa 1-nendo* (1927), 336–37. Korea Mail Steamship was established through the joint investment of the N.Y.K. and O.S.K. See Chōsen yūsen kabushiki gaisha, *Chōsen yūsen kabushiki gaisha nijūgo-nenshi* (Keijō: Chōsen yūsen kabushiki gaisha, 1937).

the government-general, the Nagasaki city government also provided the companies ¥15,000, and the cities of Kumamoto and Kagoshima each contributed ¥5,000.[67]

This kind of convergence was also evident in the case of several other shipping lines debated, established, and reconfigured over the course of the mid- to late 1920s. The summer of 1925, for example, saw discussion of two shipping lines in the *Taiwan Nichinichi Shinpō*: a Taiwan-Dalian line and a Taiwan-Korea line. As early as July 16, an article made a case for establishing a new, regular service between Taiwan and Dalian, and a few days later, the newspaper also reported word from Osaka that the Busan Chamber of Commerce had begun to advocate for a regular liner service from North Korea to Taiwan via Busan and Shanghai.[68] Discussion of these two shipping lines also briefly converged when it was suggested that they be developed as a single Taiwan-Dalian-Busan service.[69] Over the next three years, services from Taiwan to Dalian and from Taiwan to Korea followed different trajectories, before converging with the establishment of a Taiwan-Korea-Manchuria line in 1928.

In the Taiwanese press, the case for sailings to Dalian centered on a single product: bananas. As outlined by the *Taiwan Nichinichi Shinpō*, banana production had increased considerably in Taiwan since the early 1920s.[70] Though the fruit had outlets in Japan—primarily around Tokyo/Yokohama, Kobe/Osaka, and Moji/Shimonoseki—peak

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[67] Nagasaki shiyakusho, *Man-Sen kōro to Taiwan kōro fukkō mondai*, 1.

[68] "Busan kiten Shanhai keiyu no Tai-Sen kōro wo keikaku: Gentō wanmai kamotsu wo inyū shi kokumotsu mamekasu suisanbutsu wo ishutsu," *Taiwan nichinichi shinpō* (July 18, 1925). Reports of the proposal also appeared in the Korean press. See: "Bu-Dae hanglo gaesi: Busan sangeob hoeuiso eseo pyowon," *Sidae ilbo*, July 13, 1925.

[69] "Tai-Sen bōeki to Dairen kōro no kakuchō: Taiwan-Dairen-Busan-kan kōro no hitsuyō," *Taiwan nichinichi shinpō*, July 26, 1925.

[70] "Banana no Hoku Shina yushutsu: Dairensen kaisetsu no hitsuyō naru yuen," *Taiwan nichinichi shinpō*, July 16, 1925.

banana production in the summer months coincided with the loquat and strawberry season in Japan, and the abundant supply of fruit drove down prices. The Taiwanese paper therefore emphasized the necessity of developing new markets. Though it noted the potential for almost unlimited demand along China's Yangzi River, it observed that anti-foreign demonstrations (likely those inflamed by the May 30th Incident earlier that year) had created "unstable" (*fuantei*) conditions for trade—something particularly problematic for the export of a fruit that might rot while awaiting delivery to consumers. The article therefore proposed that shippers export bananas to Manchuria via Dalian, where Japanese control over the Railway Zone ensured that "exchange was stable and reliable." At the time, Taiwanese colonial officials were also preparing to promote bananas at an upcoming industrial exposition in Dalian (*Dairen kangyō hakurankai*)—"everyone in Manchuria has to try one," read an exhibition slogan. As described in the *Taiwan Nichinichi Shinbun*, the moment was therefore ripe for the establishment of a Taiwan-Dalian service to convey bananas and tea to markets in Manchuria and as far as Siberia. On return voyages, moreover, the ships would be positioned to carry loads of bean cakes and other soybean products.

The case for the Taiwan-Korea service, in contrast, addressed several commodity flows. Taiwanese coverage of the Busan proposal reported that the chamber of commerce sought to develop imports of Taiwanese sugar, rice, fruits, and salt to Korea while promoting the export of Korean grains, soybean products, and marine products.[71] In the 1920s, such trade had begun to expand, at least in part due to the elimination of tariffs

[71] Evident in two articles. "Busan kiten Shanhai keiyu no Tai-Sen kōro wo keikaku: Gentō wanmai kamotsu wo inyūshi, kokumotsu mamekasu suisanbutsu wo ishutsu," *Taiwan nichinichi shinbun*, July 18, 1925. "Tai-Sen kōro to bōeki: Katani wo kanwa shite, hontō no ichi wo kōjō saseru," *Taiwan nichinichi shinpō*, July 19, 1925.

between the two colonies in 1922, but much of it was transshipped through Moji or Shimonoseki, rather than transported directly.[72] By including a stop in Shanghai, representatives from Busan also suggested that the line might contribute to the expansion of trade relations between Korea and China.[73]

The Busan interests therefore sought to promote two sets of trade relations via the new shipping line: one between Korea and Taiwan and the other between Korea and China. The chamber reportedly planned to petition both governments-general for subsidies.[74] Discussion of the shipping route in the Taiwanese press, meanwhile, identified an additional advantage of the service: it would connect Taiwan to the railway, or "continental trunk line" (*tairiku kansen*), that began in Busan. The integration of Taiwan into this new transportation service thus promised to "promote the development of transportation and improve the status of Taiwan."[75]

Of the two services discussed in mid-1925, it was the line to Dalian that initially received government support. In its 1926 budget, the Government-General of Taiwan allocated a ¥40,000 subsidy to support a direct Gaoxiong-Dalian service to be opened by the O.S.K. in April.[76] As discussed in the Taiwanese press, the government-general's primary objective for promoting the service was the development of new markets for

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[72] "Tai-Sen bōeki to Dairen kōro no kakuchō: Taiwan-Dairen-Busan-kan kōro no hitsuyō," *Taiwan nichinichi shinpō*, July 26, 1925. "Tai-Sen kōro to bōeki: Katani wo kanwa shite, hontō no ichi wo kōjō saseru," *Taiwan nichinichi shinpō*, July 19, 1925.

[73] "Tai-Sen kōro to bōeki: Katani wo kanwa shite, hontō no ichi wo kōjō saseru," *Taiwan nichinichi shinpō*, July 19, 1925.

[74] "Busan kiten Shanhai keiyu no Tai-Sen kōro wo keikaku: Gentō wanmai kamotsu wo inyūshi, kokumotsu mamekasu suisanbutsu wo ishutsu," *Taiwan nichinichi shinpō*, July 18, 1925.

[75] "Tai-Sen kōro to bōeki: Katani wo kanwa shite, hontō no ichi wo kōjō saseru," *Taiwan nichinichi shinpō*, July 19, 1925.

[76] Kichikai, *Taiwan kaiunshi*, 59–60.

bananas through direct, rapid transportation.[77] Under the terms of the subsidy, the O.S.K. was to maintain four sailings per month, employing vessels of at least 2,500 gross tons on sailings from Gaoxiong direct to Dalian. The *Hubei Maru* inaugurated the service on April 20, departing Gaoxiong with 2,000 baskets of bananas and 3,000 boxes of alcohol. O.S.K. management invited officials and civilians to attend a celebratory banquet on the ship the morning of its departure.[78] The other three ships employed on the service were the *Nittō Maru*, *Jinryū Maru*, and *Delhi Maru*.[79] The terms of the government-general's directive only mandated the outbound sailing direct from Gaoxiong to Dalian. On return voyages, ships were free to call at Tianjin, Yingkou, Zhifu, Qingdao, Hong Kong, and Guangzhou depending on the availability of cargoes.

The establishment of a subsidized Gaoxiong-Dalian service was part of a larger reorientation of the government-general's shipping policy after WWI. During the war, the government-general had promoted the development of new shipping services to Southeast Asia, and permitted the N.Y.K. and O.S.K. to reallocate tonnage from the Jilong-Kobe line to trade routes suffering from shortages. In the mid-1920s, in contrast, the government-general began to reduce subsidies for services to Southeast Asia and increased funding for those to Japan. The latter included several new Taiwan-Japan shipping lines. While the main Taiwan-Japan connection had long been the O.S.K. and N.Y.K.'s subsidized Jilong-Kobe line, increased banana production in the 1920s encouraged several companies to open new lines from Gaoxiong or Jilong to other destinations in the metropole, such as Osaka, Nagoya, or Yokohama. Colonial officials

[77] Taiwan sōtokufu kōtsūkyoku teishinbu, *Taiwan no kaiun* ([Taihoku]: Taiwan sōtokufu kōtsūkyoku teishinbu, 1935), 12–13.

[78] "Kō-Ren dai-1-sen: *Kohoku* [*Hubei*] *Maru* tsumini," *Taiwan nichinichi shinpō*, April 19, 1926.

[79] *OSK 50-nenshi*, 276.

saw potential in developing services between Taiwan's southern region and Japan's Kantō region, and in 1925 began to subsidize a Gaoxiong-Yokohama line jointly managed by the O.S.K., Yamashita Steamship, and the N.Y.K.'s regional subsidiary, the Near Seas Mail Steamship Company (*Kinkai yūsen kabushiki gaisha*).

At the same time, the government-general sought to develop the primary Jilong-Kobe connection. Past subsidies had required the commission of six 6,000-ton ships,[80] but in 1925 colonial officials revised the terms of the subsidy to require the employment of three ships larger than 8,000 tons and three larger than 6,000 tons. The following year, the government-general also mandated that the larger vessels sail at a higher speed to reduce the sailing to two days and two nights—a "speed up" that one colonial official described as appropriate to a time when "world transportation manifested as an age of speed at sea, on land, and in air."[81] Though the government-general was able to increase its budget for shipping subsidies by ¥120,000, this was not enough to cover the planned increases on the Jilong-Kobe line. To secure additional funds, colonial officials eliminated a ¥120,000 subsidy for the O.S.K.'s Jilong-Bangkok line, which had struggled in the postwar recession, and reduced subsidies on the O.S.K.'s Jilong-Hong Kong line from ¥80,000 to ¥70,000. With an additional ¥250,000 now available for shipping subsidies, officials devoted ¥210,000 to the Jilong-Kobe line. The remainder, ¥40,000, was allocated to the Gaoxiong-Dalian service.[82]

The Government-General of Taiwan's interest in developing a direct connection to Dalian also coincided with a reevaluation of shipping in China by O.S.K. management.

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[80] Taiwan sōtokufu, *Kōkai meireisho Taishō 11-nendo* (1922), 2.

[81] Kichikai, *Taiwan kaiunshi*, 58.

[82] For an overview, see Kichikai, *Taiwan kaiunshi*, 58–60.

Early in 1925, O.S.K. executive director Murata Shōzō toured the Chinese coast to inspect ports from Hong Kong to Dalian. A China hand with considerable experience, between 1901 and 1909 Murata had been assigned to O.S.K. offices in Hankou, Shanghai, and Chongqing. During his tour, Murata met with residents in ports to publicize O.S.K. services, and wined and dined local officials. In one incident recalled in his memoirs, Murata attended a banquet hosted by the governor of Fuzhou. There, Murata amused the guests, who included the Japanese consul and Chinese military officers, by announcing his intent to drink "*huojiu*" ("fire alcohol") only to place a lit candle in his mouth.[83] In March 1925, after Murata concluded his inspection, the O.S.K. opened two coastal services: a North-South China line from Dalian to Guangzhou and a line from Shanghai to Tianjin.[84] These paralleled the O.S.K.'s service from Gaoxiong to Tianjin, which remained subsidized by the Government-General of Taiwan.

These new coastal services were also part of a broader intensification of Japanese shipping activities in coastal China. As discussed above, in the 1910s the SMR and Dalian Steamship opened services from Dalian to Shanghai and South China. In the early 1920s, the Japan-China Steamship Company (*Nisshin kisen kabushiki gaisha*) also began to enter the coastal routes. Founded in 1907, Japan-China Steamship had initially specialized in shipping on the Yangzi and other inland waters, but in 1920 opened a

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[83] Murata Shōzō, "Jijoden," in *Murata Shōzō tsuizōroku*, ed. Ōsaka shōsen kabushiki gaisha (Ōsaka: Ōsaka shōsen kabushiki kaisha, 1928), 308–9. Hashimoto Shin'ichi, "Taishō 14-nen no Chūgoku shisatsu," in *Murata Shōzō tsuizōroku*, ed. Ōsaka shōsen kabushiki gaisha (Ōsaka: Ōsaka shōsen kabushiki kaisha, 1928), 61.

[84] On the former, the North-South China line, the firm employed the *Nittō Maru* and *Ginzan Maru*, which regularly called at Zhifu, Qingdao, and Hong Kong on a schedule of two to three sailings per month. Provisional stops included Weihaiwei, Fuzhou, Xiamen, and Shantou. Later that year, however, the O.S.K. eliminated the stop in Hong Kong, and in February 1926 reduced sailings to once per month, employing only the *Nittō Maru*. For their establishment see *OSK 50-nenshi*, 275–76.

subsidized, coastal line from Shanghai to Hong Kong.[85] In April 1926, the same month that the O.S.K. opened its Gaoxiong-Dalian line, Japan-China Steamship also opened a shipping line from Shanghai to Tianjin with the support of a subsidy from the Communications Ministry. The firm employed two newly launched ships, the *Huashan Maru* and *Tangshan Maru*, as well as the older *Baling Maru*, and the three vessels made outbound stops in Qingdao and inbound stops in Dalian.[86]

Articles in the Japanese press celebrated the effort to devote tonnage to coastal routes in China long dominated by "foreign ships." As described by Japanese observers, these included both those owned by the British firms Butterfield & Swire and Jardine Matheson, as well as the China Merchants' Steam Navigation Company.[87] An article in the *Osaka Mainichi Shinbun* by a Dalian-based correspondent, for example, observed that this was a necessary reorientation of shipping policy to nearby trade routes that had been neglected due to "feverish" attention to the transoceanic routes.[88] At the same time, the article raised doubts about the ability of the nation's ships to "expel" (*kuchiku*) the Union Jack from China's coasts, since the establishment of parallel services by three Japanese firms invited competition between Japanese-flagged ships. The correspondent therefore called for the "unification of subsidy policy and a united front of the nation's ships" to avoid "self-destructive competition."[89]

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[85] For the Southern line, see *Nisshin kisen 30-nenshi*, 216.

[86] For details on the Northern line, see *Nisshin kisen 30-nenshi*, 218.

[87] "Kōro hojohi no tsūka to shin-4-kōro no naiyō," *Kokumin shinbun*, March 16, 1926, NCC 00158333.

[88] A similar critique can be found in Unekawa's histry and overview of Japanese shipping. Unekawa, *Kaiun kōkokushi*, 1:1467–68.

[89] "Nisshōki to Ei-kokki: Shina engan kōro no shin kyōsō, hōsen suberaku kyōchō icchi seyo," *Ōsaka mainichi shinbun*, April 18, 1926, NCC 00158353.

The plans for new shipping lines to Dalian that emerged in Taiwan therefore became intertwined with the advance Japanese shipping in coastal China. In an account of the Gaoxiong-Dalian line, Kichikai Ushita stated that officials in Taiwan sought to build on the O.S.K.'s North-South China line to open the Gaoxiong-Dalian service, and thereby foster Taiwan-Manchuria trade.[90] In other words, while the *Taiwan Nichinichi Shinpō* primarily framed the service in terms of banana exports, the employment of four ships on the service also rested on the carriage of China's coastal trade on southbound voyages.

In March, on the eve of its establishment, prospects for the Gaoxiong-Dalian line seemed encouraging. Articles in the *Taiwan Nichinichi Shinpō* suggested that a "direct service" (*chokkōro*) to Dalian promised to foster trade between southern Taiwan and Manchuria. Travel from Gaoxiong to Dalian took seventeen days on the O.S.K.'s Gaoxiong-Tianjin line,[91] but on the new service, fruits and vegetables from Gaoxiong would reach Dalian in five days and five nights. Citing recent trends in trade between the two regions, the article therefore concluded: "Though it would not do to have too many hopes, it is clear that there will be a noticeable increase in shipments, which undoubtedly will result in the promotion of Taiwanese industry."[92]

Japanese ships, however, soon faced greater difficulties in China's coastal routes than competition with other ships flying the Japanese flag. Instead, anti-foreign strikes and boycotts across China disrupted trade and shipping throughout much of the

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[90] Kichikai, *Taiwan kaiunshi*, 59.

[91] Taiwan sōtokufu shokusankyoku, *Kita Shina, Kantōshū, Chōsen ni okeru hontō seikabutsu hanro chōsa ni kansuru hōkoku* ([Taihoku]: Taiwan sōtokufu shokusankyoku 1923), 1.

[92] "Kō-Ren-kan no keizai kankei: Dairen kōro no zento," *Taiwan Nichinichi Shinpō*, March 17, 1926.

mid-1920s. Strikes by Chinese seamen employed by Japan-China Steamship on its South China line, for example, forced the suspension of sailings between June and August 1925.[93] Between 1926 and 1928, the Nationalist Army's Northern Expedition, the military campaign whereby the Nationalists (Guomindang; GMD) asserted control over the country, only further disrupted trade and commerce. Japan-China Steamship struggled to obtain cargoes on its new North China line,[94] and in May 1927, the O.S.K. suspended its North-South China service.[95]

The difficulties that beset the coastal services also had implications for the Gaoxiong-Dalian line, and within months of its opening, the optimism of March seemed woefully misplaced. As early as June 1926, articles in the *Taiwan Nichinichi Shinpō* reported that the O.S.K. was struggling to secure enough outbound cargoes to make an operating profit.[96] The dearth of outbound banana traffic seems to have in part stemmed from the refusal of Taizhong fruit associations to ship their produce on the line, partly due to competition with Gaoxiong producers who stood to benefit from the new shipping line.[97] Conditions on the coasts of China likely exacerbated the O.S.K.'s losses. In June 1927, the O.S.K. reduced the number of vessels on the line.[98] By September, it was rumored that the O.S.K. had suffered as much as ¥300,000 in losses in less than two

[93] *Nisshin kisen JH*, 19-1 (1925), 2–3.

[94] *Nisshin kisen JH*, 21-1 (1926), 5. *Nisshin kisen JH*, 21-2 (1927), 2–3.

[95] *OSK 50-nenshi*, 275.

[96] "Shōrai wo shokubō saruru Dairen kōro no zento: Hikan ha shōsō de aru," *Taiwan nichinichi shinpō*, June 14, 1926. "Tōzai nanboku," *Taiwan nichinichi shinpō*, August 22, 1926.

[97] "Bashō mondai to Dairen kōro: Dai-1-sen wo 4-gatsu 20-ka ni enki," *Taiwan nichinichi shinpō*, March 21, 1926.

[98] *OSK 50-nenshi*, 276.

years. "Reality has betrayed [our] hopes," lamented one article.[99] The O.S.K. sought to withdraw from the service, and by February 1928 the press reported that the line's closure was practically a certainty.[100] A postmortem on the line included in a report prepared by colonial officials in 1928 outlined the failure as follows:

> After the opening of the Gaoxiong-Dalian line in the first year of Shōwa [1926], the distribution of fruits from the central and southern regions of this island were not as hoped. Moreover, the connection between North and South China—the main objective of this [service]—was greatly influenced by the political struggles, disturbances, and anti-foreign movements in mainland China …[101]

Tethered to coastal traffic, the Gaoxiong-Dalian line was unable to stay afloat in the face of the boycotts and strikes in China.

Parallel to the establishment and collapse of the Gaoxiong-Dalian line, however, Dalian was also incorporated into a parallel shipping circuit between Taiwan and Korea. Despite efforts by the Busan Chamber of Commerce to secure government support for this line in 1925, this Taiwan-Korea service initially developed at the initiative of several traders and shipping companies in early 1927. As in the case of the Gaoxiong-Dalian line, the service was primarily oriented around one commodity: molasses and derivative products such as alcohol. In the mid-1920s, Jilong-based trader Shirosaki Hikogorō was engaged in the export of molasses to the Incheon branch of the Asahi Brewing Company. After visiting Korea in late 1926, he began to devise plans to begin semi-regular sailings

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[99] "Kesson tsuzuki no Dairen teiki kōro haishi ka!! Keizoku ka: Tokufu no sochi ikan," *Taiwan nichinichi shinpō*, September 15, 1927.

[100] "Haikō to naitei shita Takao-Dairen sen no kongo: Jiyū kōro toshite yaru ga teiki deha sōrōban ga torenu," *Taiwan nichinichi shinpō*, February 8, 1928.

[101] Taiwan sōtokufu, *Taiwan jijō Shōwa 3-nen-ban* ([Taihoku]: Taiwan sōtokufu, 1928), 243.

between the two colonies.[102] While Shirosaki's primary objective may have been the transport of molasses, reports on the proposed service in the *Taiwan Nichinichi Shinpō* also speculated that ships on the route might transport Korean goods directly to Taiwan, rather than via Japan and China, and even foster the export of Korean goods to South China via Taiwan.[103]

Shirosaki opened his direct, Taiwan-Korea service in March 1927. The inaugural voyage was made by the *Shinshū Maru*, a 4,000-ton steamship owned by the Azuma Steamship Company (*Azuma kisen kabushiki gaisha*) and outfitted with molasses tanks. The line was opened as a semi-regular service between Jilong, Incheon, and Jinnampo on a schedule of twelve sailings per year.[104] Shirosaki also concluded a contract with Mitsui to transport molasses and alcohol from Taiwan to Korea—goods previously transshipped in Moji.[105] In July 1927, however, the Near Seas Mail Steamship Company took over management of the line, the *Shinshū Maru*, and the contract with Mitsui. In doing so, the shipping firm extended the line to Gaoxiong. In addition to outbound cargoes of molasses and alcohol from Gaoxiong and Jilong, the firm also reportedly planned to transport coke

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[102] "Shirosaki shōkai ga Tai-Sen kōro: Rainen ichigatsu kara junteikitekini kaishi," *Taiwan nichinichi shinpō* (November 16, 1926).

[103] "Shirosaki shōkai ga Tai-Sen kōro: Rainen ichigatsu kara junteikitekini kaishi," *Taiwan nichinichi shinpō*, November 16, 1926.

[104] There is some variation in reports on the number of sailings. When the line's establishment was first reported in February 1927, it was listed as having a schedule of a planned six voyages per year. After it was opened in March, however, Azuma Kisen's agent in Jilong, Toikawa Transport, was quoted as saying the firm plannd a monthly service. "Hirakareta Tai-Sen kōro: Mitsui wo haikei to suru Shirosaki-shi no te de Shō, Yū, Kawasaki izure mo rōbai, 3-gatsu 10-ka dai-1-sen shuppan," *Taiwan nichinichi shinpō*, February 25, 1927. "Tai-Sen kōro no senpuku ha jūbun mitaseru," *Taiwan nichinichi shinpō*, March 21, 1927.

[105] "Tai-Sen kōro no senpuku ha jūbun mitaseru," *Taiwan nichinichi shinpō*, March 21, 1927.

from Mitsubishi's Kenjiho Ironworks to the Gaoxiong-based operations of Asano cement.[106]

Whereas reports on the Gaoxiong-Dalian line were filled with calamities in 1927, the press reported promising results on the Taiwan-Korea line. Despite its name, the Taiwan-Korea service (*Tai-Sen kōro*) also included regular stops in Dalian, where ships loaded Taiwan-bound cargoes. On its first voyage from Jilong, for example, the *Shinshū Maru* reportedly loaded 370 tons of molasses; 280 tons of gasoline; 60 tons of tangerines, cabbage, and bamboo shoots; and 50 tons of sundry goods bound for Korea. On its return, the ship was expected to load soybean products in Incheon and Dalian.[107] After Near Seas Mail took over the service, the company's Jilong manager also described plans to carry a triangular set of trade flows between Taiwan (Gaoxiong and Jilong), Korea (Busan, Mokpo, Incheon, and Jinnampo), and Dalian:[108]

Taiwan to Korea:	Bananas, vegetables, rice, molasses, gasoline, sugar
Korea to Taiwan:	Coke, pig iron, cement
Dalian to Taiwan:	Soybean products

The firm appeared to find considerable quantities of cargoes in Dalian: an article published on August 2, 1927 reported that the *Shinshū Maru* was scheduled to arrive that afternoon in Jilong loaded with 4,000 tons of soybean cakes from Manchuria.[109] In September, the ship also arrived in Jilong with 200 tons of drum cans, 60 tons of empty barrels, and 7 tons of sundry goods from Incheon; 400 tons of soybean cake loaded in

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[106] "Kin'yū no hikiuketa Tai-Sen kōrosen to tsumini: Tōmitsu gasorin seishu nado, fukkō niha gaitan kuzu ga aru," *Taiwan nichinichi shinpō*, July 12, 1927.

[107] "Tai-Sen kōro no senpuku ha jūbun mitaseru," *Taiwan nichinichi shinpō*, March 21, 1927.

[108] "Tsuki 1-kai no Tai-Sen kōro: Tōbun Dairen no mamekasu daizu de uginau, shōrai ha 2-3-kai kayowaseuru," *Taiwan nichinichi shinpō*, July 23, 1927.

[109] "*Shinshū Maru* chikaku nyūkō: Tai-Sen kōrosen," *Taiwan nichinichi shinpō*, August 2, 1927.

Dalian and bound for Gaoxiong; and 500 tons of soybean cake, wheat, beans, and bran loaded in Dalian and bound for Jilong.[110]

With ships on the Taiwan-Korea line doing brisk business, officials in both governments-general began to discuss the possibility of opening a subsidized service on the route. In early 1927, an engineer from the Government-General of Korea made a tour of Taiwan, during which time he met with Shirosaki, representatives from the Mitsui Company, and officials in the Government-General of Taiwan. At the time, this prompted rumors that the Government-General of Korea might begin to subsidize Shirosaki's shipping service.[111] In March, a group of business representatives from Busan also traveled to Taiwan for ten days of research on Taiwan-Korea trade and shipping. At the conclusion of the tour, the head of the Busan Chamber of Commerce and the manager of the O.S.K.'s Busan Branch Office visited heads of the colonial government's Industrial Section, Special Industries Section, and Communications Department, during which time they discussed the possibility of opening a regular line centered on Busan.[112] Later that year, the head of the Communications Department in Taiwan, Fukakawa Shigeharu, traveled to Korea to discuss opening a Taiwan-Korea line jointly subsidized by both governments-general.[113]

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[110] "Tai-Sen kōro: Dai-1-sen *Shinshū Maru* fukkō tumini 1,200 ton," *Taiwan nichinichi shinpō*, September 10, 1927.

[111] "Hirakareta Tai-Sen kōro: Mitsui wo haikei to suru Shirosaki-shi no te de Shō, Yū, Kawasaki izure mo rōbai, 3-gatsu 10-ka dai-1-sen shuppan," *Taiwan nichinichi shinpō*, February 25, 1927.

[112] "Busan kara shisatsudan: Tai-Sen kōro, Tai-Se torihiki wo kenkyū," *Taiwan nichinichi shinpō*, March 6, 1927. "Tai-Xian-jian dingqi hanglu: Chaoxian shichatuan daibiao fang Zongdufu shu xiwang," *Taiwan riri xinbao*, March 17, 1927.

[113] For Fukakawa's full name, see Naikaku insatsukyoku, ed., *Shokuinroku Shōwa 2-nen* (Naikaku insatsukyoku, 1927), 208.

As discussion of a subsidized service developed through the summer, several firms began to compete for the subsidy. In August, the *Taiwan Nichinichi Shinpō* reported competition among Near Seas Mail, Korea Mail, and Dalian Steamship.[114] The O.S.K. also expressed interest in the subsidy, and the press suggested that colonial officials might grant the firm the subsidy as compensation for the O.S.K.'s "sacrifice" on the Gaoxiong-Dalian line.[115] Though it was also suggested that the O.S.K. and Near Seas Mail might jointly manage the ordered line, Near Seas Mail ultimately won the bid and opened the subsidized Taiwan-Korea-Manchuria line in May of 1928.[116] As one correspondent for the *Taiwan Nichinichi Shinpō* declared, this left the O.S.K. "looking like a fool" after losing hundreds of thousands of yen on the Dalian line.[117] The terms of the subsidy required Near Seas Mail to employ two ships on the line in order to increase the number of sailings to twice per month.[118] In addition to the *Shinshū Maru*, which was primarily equipped to carry molasses, Near Seas Mail also employed its 2,220-ton *No. 2 Yōrō Maru*.[119] The subsidized service connected Gaoxiong to Dalian via outbound sailings with calls in Jilong and Incheon, and inbound sailings with calls in Jinnampo, Incheon, Busan, and Jilong. Officials in Taiwan and Korea planned to jointly issue a

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[114] "Sen-Tai kōro jumeisha: Kinkai yūsen yūbō," *Taiwan nichinichi shinpō*, August 20, 1927.

[115] "Tai-Sen kōro no jumei arasoi mōretsu: Kekkyoku Kin'yū Shōsen no kyōdō jumei ka, Kawasaki no jiyū shūkō ga kyōi," *Taiwan nichinichi shinpō*, August 31, 1927.

[116] In the press in mid-1928, this line was still occasionally referred to as the Taiwan-Korea line (*Tai-Sen kōro* or *Tai-Sen-sen*), but in the reports of the Government-General of Taiwan, it was listed as the Taiwan-Korea-Manchuria line (*Taiwan-Chōsen-Manshū-sen*). "Tai-Sen kōro iyoiyo 6-ka yori kaikō: *Shinshū Maru* to *Dai-2 Yōrō Maru* wo haikō, kanzei mondai ha jōkenzuki de kaiketsu," *Taiwan nichinichi shinpō*, May 3, 1928. Taiwan sōtokufu, *Taiwan jijō Shōwa 3-nen-ban*, 244.

[117] "Kaiunkai katagata," *Taiwan nichinichi shinpō*, April 14, 1928.

[118] Kichikai, *Taiwan kaiunshi*, 63.

[119] "Tai-Sen kōro iyoiyo 6-ka yori kaikō: *Shinshū Maru* to *Dai-2 Yōrō Maru* wo haikō, kanzei mondai ha jōkenzuki de kaiketsu," *Taiwan nichinichi shinpō*, May 3, 1928.

subsidy of ¥80,000–¥120,000, but budgetary issues in Korea left its government-general unable to provide its share.[120] As a result, the Government-General of Taiwan was the only office to provide funds: ¥40,000, reallocated to the new line after the elimination of the Gaoxiong-Dalian subsidy.[121] Near Seas Mail nonetheless maintained the subsidized service into the following decade.

Despite the apparent complementarity of Taiwan's sugarcane plantations and Manchurias fields of soybeans, the establishment of a direct service between Gaoxiong and Dalian was unable to instantly summon forth trade relations between the two territories in amounts sufficient to maintain a profitable Taiwan-Manchuria shipping line. The O.S.K. and Government-General of Taiwan therefore sought to build a service on a combination of inter-colonial (Taiwan-Manchuria) trade and Chinese coastal trade. When the latter collapsed under the weight of rising hostility to foreign economic interests in China, the shipping line sank along with it. In the case of the Taiwan-Korea service, in contrast, Shirosaki and Near Seas Mail maintained sailings between the two colonies in part by incorporating Dalian into the route. Ships on the line therefore carried a combination of Taiwan-Manchuria and Taiwan-Korea trade. As a line that thus conveyed multiple flows of transcolonial trade, the Taiwan-Korea(-Manchuria) line represented the ambitions of institutions from across the empire—ranging from Shirosaki's trading firm

[120] At various times, articles in the press listed the subsidy under discussion in different amounts. "Tai-Sen kōro no jumei arasoi mōretsu: Kekkyoku Kin'yū Shōsen no kyōdō jumei ka, Kawasaki no jiyū shūkō ga kyōi," *Taiwan nichinichi shinpō*, August 31, 1927. "Tai-Sen kōro jumei kaisha ha mada happyō sarenu," *Taiwan nichinichi shinpō*, November 9, 1927. "Kukyō ni tatsu Tai-Sen kōro: Taiwan dake no hojokin deha tasukaranu, gyaku kōsu mo tataru," *Taiwan nichinichi shinpō*, July 29, 1928.

[121] Kichikai, *Taiwan kaiunshi*, 62–63.

to the Busan Chamber of Commerce, Mitsui interests in Taiwan, and officials in both colonies who sought to support the service.

Manchukuo and the Reconfiguration of Shipping Lines

This final section examines another set of cases in which organizations and institutions from across the empire pinned ambitions for new trade and migration flows to particular shipping lines. Unlike previous sections, however, this section centers less on the convergence, or congruity, of their ambitions, and more on their collision in the midst of geopolitical upheaval. In September 1931, Japan's Kwantung Army detonated explosives on SMR rail tracks and used the incident as an excuse to occupy all of Manchuria. The following March, Japan announced the establishment of Manchukuo (Jp. *Manshūkoku*; Ch. *Manzhouguo*), a new, nominally independent state under Japanese control. The Manchurian Incident and the events that followed had a twofold impact on Japan's shipping. The rush to develop Manchukuo stimulated cargo and passenger traffic among territories under Japanese control. At the same time, the occupation sparked anti-Japanese boycotts and protests throughout much of China, which forced the suspension of many Japanese-flagged services in Chinese ports. Confronted with a political and economic terrain undergoing rapid changes, shipping companies and officials began to reconfigure many shipping lines in the region. One firm to adopt a particularly aggressive strategy for acquiring traffic was the Dalian Steamship Company—the SMR's "auxiliary force." From 1931 until around 1936, the company attempted to develop an entirely new geography of shipping lines. The firm's ambitions for an expanded role in the transport of new patterns of cargo and passenger traffic,

however, brought it into fierce competition with other Japanese firms supported by officials in different arms of the bureaucracy. The result was an empire-wide conflict over the evolving spatiality of Japanese shipping.

Dalian Steamship's pursuit of new shipping lines was in part brought on by devastating blows to its coastal services from boycotts and strikes that erupted after the Manchurian Incident. As Chinese traders and passengers adopted slogans such as "don't buy, don't load, don't transport" (*bugou, buji, buyun*), the firm struggled to obtain cargoes and local passengers on its Shanghai line, while boycotts in South China halted the traffic in Fushun coal. The firm therefore reduced sailings on its Dalian-Shanghai line and coastal tramp services until 1933, and suspended a service recently opened between Dalian/Yingkou and Hong Kong/Guangzhou.[122] Other Japanese firms active in China likewise struggled to maintain services. Resignations by Chinese crews and boycotts of Japanese ships by Chinese shippers forced the Japan-China Steamship Company to suspend several Yangzi and coastal lines in late 1931.[123] The N.Y.K. temporarily suspended subsidized cargo services to Shanghai from Kobe/Osaka and Yokohama,[124] and the O.S.K. suspended its Guangzhou line.[125] Only in Qingdao were Japanese companies able to continue business as usual, which the N.Y.K. attributed to decent relations with Qingdao-based beef exporters.[126]

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[122] An overview of these conditions can be found in *DKK 20-nen ryakushi*, 63, 240–42, 249, 263.

[123] *Nisshin kisen 30-nenshi*, 100.

[124] Similarly, during the Shanghai boycotts of 1925, the N.Y.K. had suspended all of its Shanghai services from June to August. *NYK 50-nenshi*, 452–53.

[125] Kōsaka Masayasu, Governor of Aichi, to Home Minister Adachi Kenzō, et al., "Ōsaka shōsen Kanton-sen kyūkō ni kansuru ken," December 2, 1931, in "Honpō Man-Shi engan narabini Shina naisui kōro kankei," *Gaimushō kiroku* F-1-6-0-7-1, MFA, JACAR B09030242700, 43.

[126] *NYK 50-nenshi*, 454.

With many of its lines no longer viable, Dalian Steamship began to shift its business away from China's coasts.[127] Even as Japanese shipping in central and south China struggled, traffic between Manchukuo and other parts of the Japanese Empire began to surge.[128] Dalian Steamship's management therefore developed plans to open a shipping line on the Osaka/Kobe-Dalian route long monopolized by the O.S.K. Since 1923, Dalian Steamship had managed a shipping line from Yingkou/Dalian to Kobe/Osaka oriented around cargo traffic, but as early as May 1932, rumor circulated that the company planned to develop a service to compete with the O.S.K. According to a memo circulated by the Kwantung Office in August 1932, these plans centered on the transport of migrants to Manchukuo. In the memo, colonial officials asserted that the prospect of mass migration organized by the government required the employment of high-speed ships in order to reduce sailing times between Kobe and Dalian. As outlined by the Kwantung Office, Dalian Steamship's role in establishing such a connection was warranted by the SMR's mission (*shimei*) to "develop the resources and culture of Manchuria-Mongolia."[129] The office also suggested that it was necessary to break the O.S.K.'s monopoly over liner services to Manchuria, which led to "complaints from passengers regarding the food, service, and rates." Dalian Steamship had therefore developed plans to purchase the N.Y.K.'s *Ten'yō Maru* (13,027 tons, capable of carrying

[127] This is explicitly stated in *DKK 20-nen ryakushi*, 63.

[128] Louise Young, *Japan's Total Empire: Manchuria and the Culture of Wartime Imperialism* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999). Jun Uchida, *Brokers of Empire: Japanese Settler Colonialism in Korea, 1876–1945* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 2011). Lin Man-houng, "Taiwan yu Dongbei jian de maoyi (1932–1941), *Zhongyang yanjiuyuan jindaishi yanjiusuo jikan* 24, no. 2 (1995): 653–96.

[129] Police Affairs Bureau Chief, Kwantung Office, to Vice-Minister of Colonial Affairs, et al., "Dairen kisen kaisha no Nichi-Man renraku kōro (Dairen, Moji, Kōbe)-sen shūkō keikaku ni kansuru ken," August 9, 1932, in "Honpō Man-Shi engan narabini Shina naisui kōro kankei," *Gaimushō kiroku*, JACAR B09030242800, 110–12.

731 passengers), *Korea Maru* (11,810 tons, 624 passengers), and *Siberia Maru* (11,800 tons, 616 passengers) for use on a new line.

Dalian Steamship's plans to enter the service prompted the O.S.K. to devote additional tonnage to the route. At the time of the Manchurian Incident, the O.S.K. employed five ships on the Osaka-Dalian route and maintained nine to ten sailings per month. (Table 4.1) The press suggested that Dalian Steamship's plans to develop a "Japan-Manchuria connection" (*Nichi-Man renraku*) were a "shock" to the O.S.K.,[130] and in September 1932, the governor of Fukuoka reported word from the captain of the *Harbin Maru* that the O.S.K. planned to add two large, fast ships to the route to preempt Dalian Steamship's entry.[131] Likewise, in early 1933 the governor of Osaka reported that the O.S.K. planned to devote several large, 8,000-ton ships to the line.[132] By March, the governor reported that the O.S.K. would add the *Seattle Maru* and *Tacoma Maru* to the line. In the years that followed the O.S.K. continued to employ additional, larger ships on the service, including several vessels newly launched at the Mitsubishi Nagasaki Shipyard. As the O.S.K. increased the number of ships on the service, sailings became more frequent; by 1937, when the Sino-Japanese War broke out, the firm maintained a schedule of twenty-five sailings per month.[133]

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[130] "Ōsaka shōsen shin-keikaku: Daiki taikō no," *Ōsaka mainichi shinbun*, October 14, 1932, NC 00159195.

[131] Oguri Kazuo, Governor of Fukuoka, to Home Minister Yamamoto Tatsuo, et al., "Ōsaka shōsen Dairen kōro kakujū ni kansuru ken, August 28, 1932, in "Honpō Man-Shi engan narabini Shina naisui kōro kankei," *Gaimushō kiroku*, 116–17.

[132] Agata Shinobu, Governor of Osaka, to Home Minister Baron Yamamoto Tatsuo, et al., "Dairen kōro kaizen keikaku ni kansuru ken," February 21, 1933, in "Honpō Man-Shi engan narabini Shina naisui kōro kankei," *Gaimushō kiroku*, 153.

[133] *OSK 80-nenshi*, 282.

TABLE 4.1 O.S.K. Ships Assigned to the Osaka-Dalian Route, 1931–1937

Ship Name	Gross Tonnage	Year Launched	Year Assigned
Harbin Maru	5,169	1914	1915
Baikal Maru	5,266	1921	1921
Hong Kong Maru	5,993	1898	1924
America Maru	6,069	1898	1924
Ural Maru	6,374	1928	1929
Ussuri Maru	6,385	1931	1932
Seattle Maru	5,773	1907	1933
Tacoma Maru	5,772	1907	1933
Fusō Mar	8,188	1909	1934
Jilin Maru	6,784	1935	1935
Rehe Maru	6,784	1935	1935
Heilong Maru	7,369	1937	1937
Yalu Maru	7,363	1937	1937

Source: *OSK 50-nenshi*, 245–46, 436–39. *OSK 80-nenshi*, 282, 724–25.

In addition to this attempt to develop services to Osaka/Kobe (which management apparently shelved in early 1933), Dalian Steamship also sought to develop lines of transportation from Manchuria to Japanese ports located on the Sea of Japan—a region known as "Ura Nihon," or the "backside" of Japan. In December 1932, the company began to employ the *Hebei Maru* (3,277 tons) on irregular services between Dalian and Niigata. In May 1933 the company further assigned the *Henan Maru* (3,280 tons), and reorganized the line into a regular service from Dalian to Niigata via Fushiki and Tsuruga. Outbound, the ships carried soybean products, Fushun coal, and bran; inbound they transported diesel, hydrochloric acid, machinery, lumber, and fruits. Passenger traffic was minimal, although the ships at times carried groups of passengers.[134]

[134] *DKK 20-nen ryakushi*, 246–47. *DKK EH*, dai-23-kai (1933), 3.

Manchukuo's founding, moreover, was followed by the construction of new transportation infrastructure in northern Manchuria and Korea, which, in turn, reduced Dalian's centrality to Manchurian traffic. As early as the 1910s, Japanese military planners harbored ambitions for the establishment of a rail service from Changchun, in Jilin Province, to ports in North Korea via Hoeryeong. Despite several attempts by Japanese officials to secure concessions from China for the construction of a Jilin-Hoeryeong rail line (Jp. *Kichi-Kai-sen*)—most notably as part of the infamous Nishihara Loans—in the 1930s a railway from North Korea's major ports (Cheongjin and Unggi) to Manchuria had yet to be completed.[135] After the Manchurian Incident, however, the SMR, Army, and Navy finally realized their ambitions for a rail connection. In September 1933, Japanese officials oversaw the opening of a railway from Dunhua to Tumen (on the Manchuria-Korea border), and the completion of a connection between Unggi/Cheongjin and Changchun (recently designated the capital of Manchukuo and renamed Xinjing [Jp. Shinkyō]). A branch railway to Harbin was also completed in December 1933, as was a massive port project in Najin in late 1936.[136]

Amidst the development of these rail lines, a new discourse surrounding the Sea of Japan also emerged. In January 1932, Matsuoka Masao published an article in the *Tōkyō Nichinichi Shinbun* and *Osaka Mainichi Shinbun*, in which he advocated for the

[135] Matsusaka, *Making of Japanese Manchuria*. Yoshii Ken'ichi, *Kan-Nihonkai chiiki shakai no hen'yō: "Man-Mō" / "Kantō" to "Ura Nihon"* (Tōkyō: Aoki shoten, 2000).

[136] For an account of negotiations among the SMR, Foreign Ministry, Government-General of Korea, Army, and Navy regarding the establishment of these railways and the selection of Najin as a major terminus for the service, see Yoshii, *Kan-Nihonkai chiiki shakai no hen'yō*, 244–59.

"lake-ification of the Sea of Japan" (*Nihonkai no kosuika*).[137] With the opening of the new railways, the Japanese press heralded Cheongjin's rise as the "fastest route between Japan and Manchukuo" (*Nichi-Man saikeiro*).[138] An article on the arrival of the "age of the Sea of Japan" (*Nihonkai jidai*) emphasized North Korea's rise as the "gateway of North Manchuria," and highlighted the shorter distance of travel between Xinjing and Osaka, Tokyo, or Nagoya via Cheongjin.[139] (Table 4.2)

TABLE 4.2 Distances from Xinjing to Osaka, Tokyo, and Nagoya via different Ports

	Cheongjin*	Dalian	Busan
Xinjing-Osaka	1,693 km	2,401 km	2,319 km
Xinjing-Tokyo	2,111 km	2,961 km	2,887 km
Xinjing-Nagoya	1,734 km	2,591 km	2,519 km

*Note: Across the Sea of Japan to Cheongjin via Tsuruga.

Source: "Nihonkai jidai," *Ōsaka mainichi shinbun*, November 1–23, 1933.

Though Dalian Steamship's shipping activities had long centered on the port that was its namesake, in early 1933 it began to develop plans for a new Japan-Manchuria connection across the Sea of Japan. The planned service would extend between ports in Ura Nihon (Tsuruga, Fushiki, and Niigata) and North Korea (Unggi, Najin, and

[137] A portion is reprinted in Yoshii, *Kan-Nihonkai chiiki shakai no hen'yō*, 260–62. Also in Tanabe Teizō and Hatakenaka Ryūsuke, eds., *Kita Nihon kisen kabushiki gaisha nijūgo-nenshi* (Otaru: Kita Nihon kisen kabushiki gaisha, 1939), 104–7.

[138] "Seishin/Yūki-Shinkyō-kan kyō kara chokutsū ressha: 24-jikan de hitohashiri senkusha no unten de shinpai ha nai, Nichi-Man renraku saikeiro kansei," *Ōsaka mainichi shinbun*, October 15, 1933, NCC 00102887.

[139] "Nihonkai jidai," *Ōsaka mainichi shinbun*, November 1–23, 1933, NCC 00467802.

Cheongjin).[140] According to the press, the company planned to employ the 2,500-ton *Tianjin Maru* on the route and maintain four sailings per month.[141]

These plans, however, were stymied by the Communications Ministry, which refused to issue permits to the company to engage in transportation between the Korean and Japanese ports. Communications officials considered transportation between Korea and Japan as part of Japan's "coastal trade" (*engan bōeki*), but viewed ships registered in the Kwantung Leased Territory as outside of the scope of Japan's 1899 Ship Law. As a result, though Dalian Steamship's vessels flew the Japanese flag, they were considered foreign ships, and required permission from the Communications Ministry to carry coastal trade.

Communications bureaucrats, meanwhile, opposed Dalian Steamship's entry to the Sea of Japan for several reasons. First, and as will be discussed in the next chapter, in 1932 the ministry attempted to alleviate the effects of the Great Depression by adopting a scrap-and-build scheme. Under the scheme, communications officials attempted to rationalize the Japanese fleet by issuing subsidies to firms that scrapped old ships and ordered replacements from Japanese shipyards.[142] In 1933, however, Dalian Steamship planned to import a dozen used ships for employment in transoceanic services—a

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[140] "Engankō kinshi ni Mantetsu awateru: Daiki funkyū, Rajin chikkō mo ta wo risuru nomi Takumushō mo tsūfunsu," *Ōsaka Mainichi Shinbun*, March 19, 1933, NCC 00159247.

[141] "Dairen kisen no Nichi-Man shin-kōro shinsei ha fukyoka ni kettei: Teishinshō chikaku seishiki ni tsūshō," n.d., in "Honpō Man-Shi engan narabini Shina naisui kōro kankei," *Gaimushō kiroku*, 148.

[142] Yoneda Fujio, *Gendai Nihon kaiun shikan* (Tōkyō: Kaiji sangyō kenkyūjo, 1978).

strategy that communications bureaucrats believed would undermine their efforts to improve the quality of the Japanese fleet.[143]

There were, moreover, already several subsidized shipping services in operation across the Sea of Japan. (Table 4.3) Due to the increased traffic between Japan and Manchuria, in April 1934 the Communications Ministry also planned to begin subsidizing a direct service from Tsuruga to Cheongjin operated by the North Japan Steamship Company (*Kita Nihon kisen kabushiki gaisha*) since 1928.[144] In addition to the conflict over Dalian Steamship's imported ships, communications officials thus refused to issue the permits necessary for the company to open a Sea of Japan line on the grounds that the company's entry to the route would exacerbate the already excessive competition among Japanese companies.[145]

The waters between Manchuria and Japan were not the only ones that garnered attention from Dalian Steamship after the Manchurian Incident. In late 1932, the company withdrew two diesel-powered ships—the *Shandong Maru* and *Shanxi Maru*—from its Hong Kong service, and reassigned them to a new Dalian-Taiwan service.[146] The company inaugurated the line on November 9, when the *Shanxi Maru* sailed from Dalian with a full load of soybean products and returned with a load of Taiwanese bananas and fruit. In 1934, Dalian Steamship also concluded a through traffic agreement with the SMR and Taiwan Railway.[147]

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[143] "Daiki no kosen yunyū kitei hōshin wo koshu: Teishinshō ha engankō kinshi de taikō, kekkyoku dakyō no hoka nashi," *Ōsaka mainichi shinbun*, March 13, 1933, NCC 00462924.

[144] Tanabe and Hatakenaka, *Kita Nihon kisen kabushiki gaisha nijūgo-nenshi*, 87–93.

[145] "Dairen kisen no Nichi-Man shin-kōro shinsei ha fukyoka ni kettei," 148.

[146] *DKK 20-nen ryakushi*, 63.

[147] *DKK 20-nen ryakushi*, 246.

TABLE 4.3 Subsidized Shipping Lines across the Sea of Japan, 1932

Line (Ports of Call)	Company	Subsidizing Office
Cheongjin-Tsuruga Line (Cheongjin-Seongjin-Wonsan-Tsuruga-Miyazu-Maizuru-Shin Maizuru)	Korea Mail Steamship Company	Government-General of Korea
Niigata-Hokkaidō Line (Hakodate-Kushiro-Akkeshi-Kiritappu; provisional calls at Rausu, Aomori, Funagawa, Niigata, Fushiki, Nanao; subsidized call at Cheongjin)	Shimatani Steamship Company (*Shimatani kisen kabushiki gaisha*)	Hokkaidō Office (line subsidy); Government-General of Korea (port-of-call subsidy, Cheongjin)
Japan-East Korea Coast-Vladivostok Line (Fushiki-Najin-Unggi; provisional calls at Nanao, Vladivostok, Seohojin, Wonsan, Seongjin; subsidized call at Cheongjin)	Hokuriku Steamship Company (*Shimatani kisen kabushiki gaisha*)	Tōyama Prefecture, Ishikawa Prefecture (line subsidy); Government-General of Korea (port-of-call subsidy, Cheongjin)

Sources: Teishinshō, *Teishinshō nenpō*, dai-45-gō (1932), 303, 308. Chōsen sōtokufu, *Chōsen sōtokufu shisei nenpō Shōwa 6-nendo Shōwa 7-nendo* (1932), 350–52. Seishin shōkō kaigisho, *Seishin shōkō kaigisho-shi* (Seishin: Seishin shōkō kaigisho, 1944), 79–80.

Though the O.S.K. had struggled to obtain outbound cargoes on its Gaoxiong-Dalian service between 1926 and 1928, trade between Taiwan and Manchuria picked up following the Manchurian Incident.[148] According to an article in the *Manshū Nippō* published in November 1933, ships on the "Manchuria-Taiwan service" were doing brisk business in the transport of Manchurian soybean products and Taiwanese fruits. At the same time, Dalian Steamship's entry to the route once again brought it into competition with Japan-based shipping companies, and the article in the *Manshū Nippō*

[148] Lin, "Taiwan yu Dongbei jian de maoyi."

reported an intensification in competition between the SMR subsidiary, the O.S.K., and Near Seas Mail. Dalian Steamship's arrangement with the two railways, moreover, posed a "threat" (*kyōi*) to the other two firms.[149]

In coordination with the Government-General of Taiwan, meanwhile, the O.S.K. and Near Seas Mail also began to reorganize their sailings in the mid-1930s. When the Government-General of Taiwan issued directives for shipping subsidies in 1934, it included a revision to Near Seas Mail's line to Korea and Manchuria. Under the new directive, the company's ships were no longer to stop in Korea on outbound sailings, but were instead to sail from Gaoxiong and Jilong direct to Dalian, and then return to Taiwan via Incheon.[150] The revised conditions of the subsidy also included a new requirement that the company employ ships with facilities for at least fifty passengers.[151] Discussion of a similar revision to the O.S.K.'s Gaoxiong-Tianjin line in 1935, on the other hand, provoked concern from foreign ministry officials and Japanese residents in Fuzhou. In March, the Japanese consul in Fuzhou sent a message to the Foreign Ministry to report that the O.S.K. planned to divide the Gaoxiong-Tianjin line into two services: one from Taiwan to Shanghai via Fuzhou, and another from Taiwan direct to North China. The consul, however, criticized the decision as adverse to Japanese residents in Fuzhou, and an impediment to "the maintenance and development of Japan's navigation power (*kōken*) in China."[152] Later that month, the consul telegraphed a request that either the

[149] "Man-Tai kōro ni san kisen kyōsō gekika: Hōshō gawa ga hojo zōgaku shinsei," *Manshū nippō*, November 26, 1933, NCC 00159322.

[150] Kichikai, *Taiwan kaiunshi*, 66.

[151] Kichikai, *Taiwan kaiunshi*, 69.

[152] Usami, Consul General, Fuzhou, to Foreign Minister Hirota, March 14, 1935, in "Honpō Man-Shi engan narabini Shina naisui kōro kankei," *Gaimushō kiroku*, JACAR B09030243100, 410.

O.S.K. maintain services from Fuzhou to North China on the O.S.K. line, or that Japan-China Steamship include a stop in Fuzhou on its Tianjin-Guangzhou line.[153] The Tianjin consul also raised concern about the elimination of the Fuzhou-North China connection on the grounds that British or Chinese firms would likely replace the O.S.K.—a development that would be "incredibly regrettable for the maintenance of our navigation power on the coasts."[154] While the O.S.K. service subsidized by the Government-General of Taiwan was reorganized beginning in April 1935,[155] the Communications Ministry approved the revision of Japan-China Steamship's coastal service to include a stop in Fuzhou.[156]

The abrupt transformation of patterns of cargo and passenger movement that followed the 1931 Manchurian Incident gave rise to competition between Dalian Steamship and other Japan-based firms in three trade routes: the Dalian-Osaka/Kobe route, North Korea-Ura Nihon route, and Taiwan-Manchuria route. By 1936, however, much of this competition had begun to simmer down. In April 1935, Dalian Steamship, the O.S.K., and Near Seas Mail concluded an agreement on cooperation in the Taiwan-Manchuria service, and the Government-General of Taiwan began to subsidize Dalian Steamship's line to Dalian alongside the O.S.K.'s line to Tianjin and the line to

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[153] Usami, Consul General, Fuzhou, to Foreign Minister Hirota, March 22, 1935, in "Honpō Man-Shi engan narabini Shina naisui kōro kankei," *Gaimushō kiroku*, 413.

[154] Kawagoe, Consul General, Tianjin, to Foreign Minister Hirota, March 28, 1935, in "Honpō Man-Shi engan narabini Shina naisui kōro kankei," *Gaimushō kiroku*, 417.

[155] Okabe, Consulate General, Fuzhou, to Foreign Minister Hirota Kōki, May 17, 1935, in "Honpō Man-Shi engan narabini Shina naisui kōro kankei," *Gaimushō kiroku*, 434.

[156] Mercantile Marine Bureau Chief, Communications Ministry, to Commerce Bureau Chief, Foreign Ministry, April 20, 1935, in "Honpō Man-Shi engan narabini Shina naisui kōro kankei," *Gaimushō kiroku*, 426.

Dalian/Korea operated by Near Seas Mail.[157] Though the company continued its campaign to open lines in the Sea of Japan, new executives were appointed to manage the SMR and Dalian Steamship: Matsuoka Yōsuke was appointed director of the SMR in August and Yasuda Masaki replaced Masuda Yoshio at the helm of Dalian Steamship Company in October.[158] In January 1936, the *Jiji Shinpō* reported that, at Matsuoka's direction, Dalian Steamship planned to dramatically revise its business strategy, and adopt policies more in "harmony" with the Japan-based shipping industry. Among concessions announced in early 1936: the abandonment of efforts to enter the Ura Nihon route, and the adoption of a policy centered on new ships.[159]

Conclusion

This chapter has examined the establishment and maintenance of shipping lines that conveyed goods and people between Dalian and ports throughout the Japanese Empire and beyond. In the process, it has evaluated various interactions between imperial institutions located across that empire. First, it traced how officials in the metropole, the Kwantung Leased Territory, and colonial territories (Taiwan and Korea) promoted, supported, and structured shipping routes that intersected at Dalian. It then examined the establishment and development of lines between Taiwan, Korea, Manchuria, and China as cases in which policies adopted by multiple imperial institutions converged on

[157] "Dairen-Taiwan kōro: Sansha kyōtei naru," *Tōkyō asahi shinbun*, February 25, 1935.

[158] Masuda had directed Dairen Steamship as a member of the board of directors, whereas Yasuda was appointed the "president" (*shachō*) of the company. Hata Ikuhiko, *Senzenki Nihon kanryōsei no seido / soshiki / jinji* (Tōkyō: Tōkyō daigaku shuppankai, 1981), 413. *DKK EH*, dai-28-kai (1935), 11.

[159] "Dairen kisen ga kōro sasshin: Shinsen wo kenzō shite naichisen to kyōchō," *Jiji shinpō*, January 19, 1936, NCC 00159635.

particular routes. Finally, it concluded with a study of empire-wide competition between Japanese companies that followed the Manchurian Incident, and its relation to conflict between the bureaucratic institutions that administered different parts of the empire.

Through these case studies, this chapter has sought to examine the Japanese Empire not merely as a collection of discrete territories and zones of control, but in terms of movement between those spaces—movements of ships, as well as the goods and people carried by those ships. Having examined such movements, several conclusions can be drawn about how shipping linked the components of the empire together into an imperial whole. First, narratives of the expansion and consolidation of Japan's empire tend to focus on relationships between the metropole and the colonies, such as studies of Taiwan and Korea's importance to the empire as sources of food for the metropole and as outlets for Japanese manufactures. An examination of shipping services, however, does not simply reveal a radial arrangement of shipping lines extending from the metropole to each overseas colony or territory. In addition to services such as the Jilong-Kobe line, the Osaka-Dalian line, or the Shimonoseki-Busan ferry, private firms—often with government support or in coordination with officials—also developed lateral linkages between Japan's overseas territories. Trade between Taiwan, Korea, and Manchuria was minimal until the 1930s,[160] but shipping lines between ports in those territories were a part of imperial shipping policy from as early as 1911, when the Government-General of Taiwan subsidized the extension of the Gaoxiong-Shanghai line to Tianjin and Dalian.

Second, the shipping lines examined in this study indicate the extent to which shipping in Taiwan and Korea was intertwined with Japanese activities in China often

[160] See Mizoguchi and Umemura, eds., *Kyū Nihon shokuminchi keizai tōkei*, 246–251.

analyzed by scholars as a form of "informal empire."[161] Kokaze Hidemasa, for example, has examined Taiwan as a stepping stone for the projection of Japanese shipping influence into South China and Southeast Asia.[162] The Gaoxiong-Dalian line represented a case in which the Government-General of Taiwan aimed to build on Japanese shipping activities in coastal China in order to develop economic relations with Manchuria. Likewise, the development of trade relations between Taiwan and Korea relied in part on flows of goods to and from Manchuria via Dalian. Commodities and passengers between these territories did not circulate through the empire as separate flows, but instead converged on particular shipping lines that conveyed them across the sea.

Finally, this chapter has shown that actors and institutions based across the empire framed connection—as represented by regularly scheduled shipping services—as essential to the prosperity of cities, colonies, and the empire. Representatives from Busan and Nagasaki, for example, sought to develop new shipping services in order to direct flows of passengers and goods through their respective cities. For many of the actors and institutions discussed in this chapter, connection seemed to promise economic transformation—the rise of new patterns of circulation that would allow a city or territory to flourish. The establishment of new connections did not, however, invariably lead to new trade relations, as demonstrated by the failure of the Gaoxiong-Dalian service. Nonetheless, in the decades examined in this chapter, metropolitan, municipal, and


[161] For the classic example, see Peter Duus, Ramon H. Myers, and Mark R. Peattie, eds., *The Japanese Informal Empire in China, 1895–1937* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989).

[162] Kokaze, *Teikokushugi-ka no Nihon kaiun*, 259–69. See also Seiji Shirane, "Mediated Empire: Colonial Taiwan in Japan's Imperial Expansion into South China and Southeast Asia, 1895–1945," (Ph.D. diss., Princeton University, 2015).

colonial institutions consistently sought to situate cities and territories within shipping routes that serviced ports across the empire.

FIGURE 4.2 Near Seas Lines calling at Dalian, ca. 1920–21

Source: Shinozaki, *Dairen*, 729–732. Maps generated with Palladio: http://hdlab.stanford.edu/palladio/.



All Companies




Awanokuni Union Steamship




Korea Mail Steamship



Dalian Steamship



N.Y.K.



O.S.K.



SMR



Uda Company



Zhengji Company (Chinese)

CHAPTER 5. SHIPPING BEYOND JAPAN, 1919–1945

As firms, officials, and boosters developed and reconfigured shipping lines across the Japanese Empire, shipping firms and maritime authorities also sought to expand Japanese-flagged shipping beyond the empire. In the 1920s, shipping executives outlined visions of a future in which Japanese ships would play a role in global transportation, not merely in the transport of Japan's foreign trade but also as vehicles for movements of goods and people between foreign countries. Due to the recession that followed the First World War, such visions remained aspirational for over a decade, as Japanese firms instead endeavored to maintain established services against foreign competition. In the early 1930s, however, Japanese ships began to carry growing shares of trade in routes between Japan and the world, and many businessmen and officials saw opportunities open for further expansion into routes between foreign ports. Even the outbreak of an undeclared war in China in July 1937 did little to dampen such ambitions, as business leaders and maritime authorities linked territorial occupation in China to global trajectories of oceanic expansion by arguing that foreign exchange earnings from overseas shipping could contribute to the war economy.

This chapter examines such discourses on Japan's place in world shipping from the 1920s to the 1940s, efforts to develop Japanese shipping in trade between overseas ports, and the conflicts and rivalries that resulted from such activities. Japan's place in the world in the 1930s is often framed in terms of its invasion of Manchuria in 1931, its withdrawal from the League of Nations in 1933, its diplomatic isolation, and the

catastrophic decision of its leaders to launch a war to "liberate" Asia in 1941.[1] By examining the statements and actions of shipping executives and officials, however, this chapter argues that maritime leaders remained committed to participation in global interconnectedness until the final months before the Pacific War. Business leaders and officials did not represent these ambitions as antithetical to the imperialism pursued in Manchuria and Asia, but instead suggested that maintaining a role in global integration could help the nation weather its crises.

One consequence of such efforts to expand Japanese shipping beyond the flows of Japanese foreign trade was the intensification of imperial competition over transportation linkages. The entry of Japanese ships into trades between foreign countries represented a challenge to rival maritime powers, particularly the British Empire, which depended on its merchant fleet to link its far-flung territories together and to remit an income to British owners. Whereas the interwar period, and particularly the 1930s, are often discussed in scholarship in terms of the rise of tariff walls and other obstacles to global trade,[2] this chapter argues that economic nationalism also drove competition to create and dominate the transportation linkages that enabled flows of goods and people.

Despite these aspirations for Japan's ascendance as a global shipping power, the logistical requirements of the war in China, as well as diplomatic tensions with Britain and the U.S., ultimately constrained Japanese shipping. By mid-1941, Japanese

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[1] For example, Louise Young, *Japan's Total Empire: Manchuria and the Culture of Wartime Imperialism* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999). Akira Iriye, *The Origins of the Second World War in Asia and the Pacific* (London: Longman, 1987).

[2] Harold James, *The End of Globalization: Lessons from the Great Depression* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001). Kevin H. O'Rourke and Jeffrey G. Williamson, *Globalization and History: The Evolution of a Nineteenth-Century Atlantic Economy* (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1999).

expansion into China and French Indochina had foreclosed on expansion in transoceanic routes. Nevertheless, this chapter concludes by arguing that the development of shipping beyond the Japanese home islands remained an ambition for maritime leaders, even as it was redirected to the making of an autarkic economic bloc in Asia.

The "Internationalization" of Japanese Shipping

Though bureaucrats, businessmen, and intellectuals embraced expansive visions of maritime power as early as the 1890s, after World War I several N.Y.K. executives began to articulate those visions in new ways. They called for the "internationalization" (*kokusaika*) of Japanese shipping: the establishment of services oriented primarily around the carriage of third-country trade. Such activities, they contended, would not only be profitable for Japan's firms, but would be advantageous for the nation. By transporting goods and people between foreign ports, Japanese ships could earn the foreign exchange that was vital to an island nation dependent on imported resources.

One of the earliest advocates of internationalization was Terashima Shigenobu, author of one of the prize-winning essays on Japanese shipping published in 1894.[3] Terashima had become employed by the N.Y.K. in 1897,[4] and in early 1919 he accompanied N.Y.K. President Baron Kondō Renpei to the Paris Peace Conference and a tour of Europe and the U.S.[5] When he returned to Japan later that year, Terashima was greeted in Yokohama by a journalist for the *Jiji Shinpō*, who published an interview with

[3] See Chapter 2.

[4] Shibasaki Rikiei, "Kasō jun'yōkan wo teishō shita Terashima Shigenobu," *Memoirs of the Osaka Institute of Technology*, Series 8, vol. 55, no. 1 (2010): 29–34.

[5] Terashima Shigenobu, *Teikoku kaiun seisakuron* (Tōkyō: Ganshōdō shoten, 1924), 99.

the N.Y.K. executive under the title "The Future of Japanese Shipping." In his comments, Terashima stressed the importance of steering Japanese shipping to distant horizons:

> Based on the principles of internationalization (*kokusaika-shugi*), it is necessary to operate global shipping services (*sekaiteki kōro*) that are not directly related to Japan; for example, the transport of grains from Shanghai to Europe, the carriage of copra from Singapore and sugar from Java to Europe, or shipping services from Bombay to Southern Europe or from South America to France, Italy, or Holland. The development of shipping routes globally will naturally bring in a tremendous amount of income from fares, and in addition to direct trade, as a shipping nation (*kaiunkoku*) this will lay the basis for the great development and advance of national wealth.[6]

As outlined by Terashima, Japan's ships could advance national interests not only through the transport of exports and imports critical for an "island nation" (*shimaguni*), but also by creating connections between overseas markets. Though Japan's "production power" (*seisanryoku*) was limited, the mobility of Japan's ships made it possible for them to exceed those limits by selling shipping services to traders around the world.

Terashima's ideas also garnered attention in American shipping circles across the Pacific. In mid-1920, an article on Japanese shipping in the *Pacific Marine Review* quoted a statement by Terashima in which he expressed a global vision for Japan's commercial activities: "In trade and shipping we should regard the whole world as our sphere of activity." Achieving a place in world routes, moreover, would enable Japan to "occupy a place among the five powers of the world, not only in name but in reality."[7] Participation in world shipping was, in other words, a means of assuming a role as one of the world leaders that helmed the Paris Peace Conference. To accomplish this, Terashima proposed expanding the Japanese merchant marine to 5,000,000 tons.

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[6] Reprinted in Terashima, *Teikoku kaiun seisakuron*, 99.

[7] "Internationalization of the Japanese Shipping," *Pacific Marine Review* (May 1, 1920). A portion of the article is also reprinted in Terashima, *Teikoku kaiun seisakuron*, 100–101.

At the same time, N.Y.K. President Baron Kondō also emphasized the importance of developing overseas shipping lines. In October 1919, the *Asahi Shinbun* published an interview with Kondō in which he suggested the necessity of developing shipping in the South Seas (*Nan'yō*) and, eventually, South Africa and South America.[8] As with Terashima, the *Pacific Marine Review* also reported on the expansive aspirations expressed by N.Y.K. leadership:

> Under these circumstances, it is interesting to note that Baron Kondo [sic], President of the Nippon Yusen Kaisha, urges that Japan turn her attention more and more to the "South Seas" (which means Australasia and Malayasia [sic] more than the South Seas and South America proper); with South Africa and South America also important potentially. The baron said that the time had passed when Japan might hope to operate her vessels with home as a center, meaning, inferentially, that she should take a page from England's book and carry cargoes between foreign countries.[9]

Internationalization on the model of Britain would thus decenter the Japanese archipelago in Japan's commercial activities, while centering Japan's ships in world trade routes.

Though Kondō passed away in 1921, his successor as N.Y.K. president, Itō Yonejirō, was also a vocal proponent of internationalization. Itō's tenure was short-lived, as a labor dispute forced his resignation in 1924. During his time as president, however, he prioritized the firm's transoceanic lines and oversaw the delegation of management of near seas and coastal services to a separate department, which was reorganized into a subsidiary firm, Near Seas Mail Steamship Company, in 1923.[10] Itō did not confine his views on shipping to the N.Y.K.'s boardroom, but also published a book, *Japanese Shipping* (Nihon no kaiun), in 1922. In this volume, which he drafted with the assistance of Terashima, Itō sketched out a geography of maritime power that stressed the

[8] Kondō Renpei, "Sekai kaiun zento," *Asahi Shinbun*, October 20, 1919, 3.

[9] "Japanese Marine Notes," *Pacific Marine Review* (January 1920): 93.

[10] For N.Y.K. business strategies in the 1920s, see *NYK 100-nenshi*, 254–66.

significance of shipping for Japan's island economy.[11] Invoking common fears of resource scarcity, Itō observed that "Japanese territory is narrow, its resources sparse, and agriculture and mining are insufficient for nation building. As such, it is necessary to develop commerce and industry, and flourishing manufacturing and trade."[12] These commercial ambitions rested on shipping. Fortunately, however, Itō claimed that Japan was the sole maritime nation in the Pacific. According to the executive, recent advances by American ships in Pacific trade routes were contrary to the "national conditions" (*kokujō*) of the U.S. In his book, Itō called for the U.S. to conform to the "international division of labor" (*kokusai bungyō no gensoku*) and leave trans-Pacific navigation to Japan.[13] He also expressed this view in an opinion piece submitted to the *New York Times*.[14]

At the same time, Itō also outlined a future in which Japanese ships would enrich the nation by carrying flows of trade between foreign countries. Outlining a "new national policy" (*shin-kokusaku*), Itō expressed hope for the internationalization of Japanese shipping. The world, according to Itō, was linked together by a massive "net" of shipping services that conveyed trade in all directions:

> At present, the world's countless resources are ruled by each country's relations of supply and demand, which draw multiple tides of trade between the ports of the world; just like a spider's web, the trunk and branch lines of the net of shipping services are spread out, this tide of trade, or net of trade routes, is fated to an almost unlimited expansion

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[11] Itō references assistance from Terashima in his preface. See Itō Yonejirō, *Nihon no kaiun* (Tōkyō: Tōkyō hōbunkan, 1922), 4.

[12] Itō, *Nihon no kaiun*, 177–178.

[13] Itō Yonejirō, *Kokusakujō yori mitaru Waga kaiun* (n.p.: n.d.), *SZS* 6-63, NAJ, JACAR A09050536800.

[14] A search of historical editions of the *New York Times* does not yield this opinion piece, but its submission is referenced in Asahara Jōhei, *Nihon kaiun hattenshi* (Tōkyō: Chōryūsha, 1978), 272.

> along with the advance of future civilization. A new direction for shipping under our new shipping policy is thus none other than to ride this tide.[15]

"Riding" the tide of trade flowing through these nets would require the establishment of shipping services that were not centered on Japan, but were instead primarily, or exclusively, organized around third-country trade. Pointing to another island empire, Itō observed that British ships carried around half of world trade, and were active not only in routes centered on Britain but also in routes between foreign countries. The income that these ships generated from exporting shipping services, meanwhile, played an important role in offsetting British trade deficits.[16] Itō also referenced Norway as another example of a maritime trading nation (*kaishōkoku*), where income generated from the global activities of its tramp fleet helped settle persistent trade deficits.

Even as Itō expressed ambitions for new trajectories of expansion, the post-WWI competition posed by British and American ships also forced the N.Y.K. president to focus on the defense of existing services.[17] Of particular concern for Itō were large, fast vessels that American and British firms had begun to assign to trans-Pacific routes. Arguing that "the North Pacific shipping routes hold the key to the rise and fall of Japanese shipping," Itō emphasized the importance of consolidating Japan's position in the Pacific, as well as other routes where Japanese companies had developed services.[18]

In order to improve Japan's position in the trans-Pacific routes and beyond, Itō joined an industry-wide discussion on the production of a fleet of "superior ships"

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[15] Itō, *Nihon no kaiun*, 178–79.

[16] Itō, *Nihon no kaiun*, 179.

[17] See Chapter 3.

[18] Itō, *Nihon no kaiun*, 184, 190.

(*yūshūsen*).[19] After WWI, reports and other coverage of shipping increasingly discussed shipping policy in terms of the elimination of old ships and introduction of new, fast ships to the fleet for use in world trade routes. In 1922, for example, the Maritime Affairs Committee (*Kaiji iinkai*), a committee comprised of owners and bureaucrats and organized by the Communications Ministry, outlined a plan for the construction of 500,000 tons of new shipping, including six, 20,000-ton vessels for the North America routes.[20] A maritime dictionary published in 1926 framed the "superior ship question" (*yūshūsen mondai*) as follows:

> Superior ship construction is an urgent matter in our country. Oriental Steamship's San Francisco line and the N.Y.K. and O.S.K. Seattle lines have felt considerable pressure, especially since the end of the war, when Britain and America assigned *Empress*- and *State*-class vessels to the Pacific. Passengers, needless to say, as well as silk and tea require superior ships, and have been snatched away by these vessels.[21]

In *Japanese Shipping*, Itō similarly provided an overview of the superior ships found under the flags of major maritime nations.[22] (Table 5.1) Though industry leaders and maritime authorities hailed Japan's rise to become the third-largest shipping power after World War I, such comparisons framed the global hierarchy of shipping in terms of ship quality, and made Japan's place in world rankings appear far more precarious than indicated by the aggregate size of its fleet.

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[19] Also known as "crack ships." I have rendered "*yūshūsen*" as "superior ships" to make the meaning readily apparent.

[20] Teishinshō, *Yūshūsen kenzō ni kansuru kakuan no kōgai (Teishinshō-an to no hikaku)* ([Tōkyō]: 1925), 1–2, *SZS* 6–63, NAJ, JACAR A09050537000.

[21] *Kaiji daijisho*, Sumita Shōichi (Kōbe: Kaibundō shoten, 1926), s.v. "Yūshūsen mondai," 2740.

[22] Itō, *Nihon no kaiun*, 199–200.

TABLE 5.1 Comparison of Superior Ships by Flag, 1922–1923
Ships larger than 5,000 tons and capable of speeds of 15 knots

Flag	15-17 knots	17-20 knots	20+ knots	Total
Britain	18	64	8	90
U.S.	29	14	5	48
Japan	12	4	-	16
France	10	8	6	24
Italy	13	6	1	20
Netherlands	11	1	-	12

Note: Total for Britain amended from the original to match figures.
Source: Itō, *Nihon no kaiun*, 199-200.

Despite the urgency conveyed by such proposals for superior ship construction, the introduction of new ships by Japan's liner firms was a more gradual process. In 1926, the N.Y.K. assumed control over the Oriental Steamship Company's San Francisco and South America lines, and approved a plan to build three superior ships for the San Francisco route—17,000-ton, 20-knot *Asama Maru*-class vessels launched in 1929 and 1930. The following year, the board of directors approved an additional plan to build superior ships for the company's lines to Europe, South America, and Seattle, as well as the Japan-China connection.[23] Like the N.Y.K., the O.S.K. also purchased new ships to streamline its services, and the company drew attention when, in the late 1920s, it began to employ high-speed, diesel-powered freighters on its struggling New York service. The speed of six *Kinai Maru*–class ships launched in 1930 and 1931 quickly attracted raw silk, a high-quality cargo carried on the route, which, along with reduced fuel costs, helped the line turn a profit.[24]

[23] *NYK 100-nenshi*, 258–59. The ships were financed with corporate bonds, in contrast to pre-WWI ship purchases, which were largely financed by the company's reserves. For a study of the financing of the N.Y.K.'s superior ship purchases, see Sugiyama, *Kaiungyō to kin'yū*, 140–62.

[24] For details on N.Y.K. and O.S.K. business strategies on the trans-Pacific route, see Mariko Tatsuki, "Intensifying Competition and the Streamlining of Japanese Shipping Companies: The

Terashima, Kondō, and Itō's aspirations for an internationalization of shipping thus collided with the intensified competition and recession that followed WWI. Confronted by new, fast ships that emerged from wartime shipping, the N.Y.K., though the source of many pronouncements on internationalization, instead focused on measures to improve the profitability of its established services. The development of shipping services between foreign ports was instead deferred for another day.

Japan's "Advance"

As the N.Y.K. and O.S.K. introduced new classes of ships in the late 1920s and early 1930s, the onset of the Great Depression threw the world economy into shambles. An overview of the world economy prepared by the League of Nations in 1933 offered bleak prospects for the near future:

> In the early summer of 1932, economic activity in the world as a whole had touched depths unprecedented during the present depression, and international economic organisation was in a state of extreme confusion. It is still too soon, early in 1933, to be sure that the depths reached in the middle of 1932 were the lowest point.[25]

Within a few years, however, Japan's shipping and shipbuilding industries were booming. In the depths of the depression, a number of Japanese operators began to gain shares of traffic in a number of transoceanic routes. With the support of a new subsidy program adopted by the government, moreover, many companies introduced new, fast ships to their portfolios.

Pacific Routes between the Two World Wars," *Business History* 35, no. 3 (1993): 88–107. Idem, "Kaiun fukyō to teikisen no gōrika: Ōsaka shōsen no kēsu," *Shakai keizai shigaku* 52, no. 3 (1986): 303–35.

[25] League of Nations, *World Economic Survey 1932–33* (Geneva: 1933), 11.

The advance of Japanese ships into world trade routes was in part buoyed by increased Japanese exports that followed the depreciation of the yen in early 1932. In December 1931, Finance Minister Takahashi Korekiyo removed Japan from the gold standard. No longer fettered to gold, the yen's value plummeted, and Japanese exports soon began to pour into overseas markets.[26] Shagaisen companies rapidly began to develop new services oriented around carrying these exports to overseas markets. In September 1934, the *Kobe Yūshin Nippō* celebrated that Japan's fleet had begun to "ride a wave of Japanese cargoes to conquer the world's oceans."[27] With several shagaisen operators opening or expanding services in routes to Australia, India, the Persian Gulf, Africa, the Americas, and Europe, the newspaper heralded the dawn of a "golden age of liner shipping."[28] (Table 5.2)

In response to the Great Depression, the government also adopted measures to promote the production of superior ships. Though Japan's shipping industry was relatively successful in navigating the depression, with a lower proportion of Japanese ships laid up than the world average,[29] shipping firms, shipyards, and unions were still threatened by the slump in world trade. Proposals for the elimination of excess tonnage or

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[26] For an account of Japanese monetary policy, see Mark Metzler, *Lever of Empire: The International Gold Standard and the Crisis of Liberalism in Prewar Japan* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006). A brief overview is also provided in Hiroshi Shimizu, *Anglo-Japanese Trade Rivalry in the Middle East in the Interwar Period* (London: Ithaca Press, 1986), 29–59.

[27] "Honpō en'yō shōsentai no katsuyaku," *Kōbe yūshin nippō* (September 26, 1934), KNC 00159457.

[28] The development of liner services by shagaisen owners matched general trends in world shipping in the interwar period. Nakagawa Keiichirō has observed that the spread of protectionist policies, industrialization, programs of industrial rationalization, and the improvement of port facilities tended to favor the development of liner shipping. Nakagawa Keiichirō, *Ryōtaisen-kan no Nihon kaiungyō* (Tōkyō: Nihon keizai shinbunsha, 1980), 152–58.

[29] The percentage of Japanese ships that were laid up peaked at around 5.2 percent in 1932 compared to world rates of 20.6 percent. Nakagawa, *Ryōtaisenkan no Nihon kaiungyō*, 25.

the projection of tonnage into transoceanic routes filled trade journals and the press.[30] In July 1932, a committee of bureaucrats, business leaders, and union representatives proposed that the government encourage the construction of new, efficient ships by adopting a scrap-and-build scheme and operating subsidies for services in ocean routes. Though the latter subsidies were rejected, finance officials approved the former scheme, and in November the Communications Ministry began to implement the first "Ship Improvement Support Facilities" (*Senpaku kaizen josei shisetsu*).[31]

TABLE 5.2. Transoceanic Services operated by Shagaisen Companies, ca. 1934

Company	Services
International Steamship	Australia line*, South Africa line*, New York line, India line, North America (Atlantic Coast) line, Europe line
Mitsui	New York line, Madras line, Bangkok line
Kawasaki Steamship	Australia line, Pacific line, New York line, South Africa line
Yamashita Steamship	Pacific line, Persia line, South Africa line, Australia line, Dalian-Europe Line**
United Ocean Transport	Pacific line
Ishihara Industries	Java line, Singapore line

* Note: International Steamship, Yamashita Steamship, and Kawasaki Steamship jointly managed the Australia and South Africa services

** Note: Yamashita Steamship's Dalian-Europe line was a semi-regular service.

Source: "Honpō en'yō shōsentai no katsuyaku," *Kōbe yūshin nippō* (September 26, 1934).

[30] See, for example, issues of *Kaiun geppō* published in 1932.

[31] Yoneda Fujio, a bureaucrat in the Communications Ministry from 1924 until 1941, offers a detailed account of the proposals and negotiations that culminated in the Ship Improvement Support Facilities. See Yoneda Fujio, *Gendai Nihon kaiun shikan* (Tōkyō: Kaiji sangyō kenkyūjo, 1978), 185–286. For additional details, see Shadan hōjin senpaku kaizen kyōkai, ed., *Shadan hōjin senpaku kaizen kyōkai jigyōshi* (Tōkyō: Shadan hōjin senpaku kaizen kyōkai, 1943).

Under the terms of the scheme, between 1932 and 1934 the Communications Ministry offered up to ¥11,000,000 in subsidies to support the purchase of 200,000 tons of new shipping built in Japanese yards, on the condition that the owners scrap 400,000 tons of old shipping. In 1935 and 1936, the ministry implemented two additional scrap-and-build schemes, each of which provided for the disposal of 50,000 tons of shipping and their replacement by 50,000 tons of new ships. New ships were to be larger than 4,000 tons and capable of speeds of at least 14 knots. Between 1932 and 1937, eighteen companies purchased forty-eight ships launched under the program.[32]

As companies acquired new vessels, many followed the example set by the O.S.K.'s *Kinai Maru* and assigned fast freighters to the New York route. The N.Y.K. purchased six 7,000-ton, diesel-powered freighters to expand its New York service, and International Steamship, Mitsui, and Oriental Steamship also assigned thirteen new freighters (130,000 tons) to the New York route.[33] In the early to mid-1930s, Kawasaki Steamship (*Kawasaki kisen kabushiki gaisha*), United Ocean Transport (*Daidō kaiun kabushiki gaisha*), and Yamashita Steamship also entered the New York route, though with ships purchased independent of the scheme.[34] By the mid-1930s, Japanese ships held a commanding position in trans-Pacific shipping, carrying the largest share of cargoes on trans-Pacific routes between the U.S. and the "Far East."[35] (Table 5.3)

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[32] For the terms of the scrap-and-build scheme, see Yoneda, *Gendai Nihon kaiun shikan*, 225, 228, 250. For a complete list of all ships built and scrapped, see Shadan hōjin senpaku kaizen kyōkai, ed., *Shadan hōjin senpaku kaizen kyōkai jigyōshi*, 202–14.

[33] *NYK 50-nenshi*, 384. For information on the "N-class" ships, see *NYK 100-nenshi*, 320–22. The six ships were the *Nagara Maru*, *Noto Maru*, *Nako Maru*, *Noshiro Maru*, *Naruto Maru*, and *Nojima Maru*.

[34] *NYK 100-nenshi*, 326. *Yamashita shashi*, 454–55.

[35] In this source, the "Far East" indicates India, the Netherlands East Indies, the Straits Settlements, the Philippines, China, and Japan. Figures only refer to trans-Pacific trade, and do

TABLE 5.3 United States–Far East* Trade via Trans-Pacific Routes, 1936

Nationality of Carrier	From U.S. to Far East		To U.S. from Far East	
	Tons	Percentage	Tons	Percentage
Japanese	1,463,645	35.8	938,355	42.7
American	642,882	15.7	562,441	25.6
British and Dutch	464,919	11.4	190,030	8.6
Danish and Norwegian	378,648	9.3	259,376	11.8
German	106,421	2.6		
Tramp**	1,026,666	24.1	249,985	11.4
Total	4,083,181	100.0	2,200,187	100.0

*Note: "Far East" refers to Japan, China, the Philippines, Straits Settlements, the Netherlands East Indies, and India.

**Note: Tramp shipping not distinguished by flag in these figures.

Source: Walter A. Radius, *United States Shipping in Transpacific Trade, 1922–1938* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1944), 132–133.

What significance did Japanese businessmen attribute to these new arrangements of shipping lines? For many, the expanded Japanese presence on the New York route heralded Japan's ascendance in world shipping. In July 1937, Toda Teijirō, the manager of the O.S.K.'s Passenger Department (*Senkyakuka*) participated in a summer lecture series organized by the Yokohama Trade Association (*Yokohama bōeki kyōkai*), and offered a history of the Panama Canal routes and the "advance" (*yakushin*) of Japanese shipping. According to Toda, with the opening of the Panama Canal a new age had dawned on the Pacific, which was in part fulfilled by the opening of the New York service.[36] Toda also viewed the establishment of rapid freight services to New York as an epochal shift in Japanese shipping. Whereas Japanese ships had merely "followed in the footsteps of foreign ships" to establish the first transoceanic services, the development of

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not include American trade with the Netherlands East Indies and India that was carried through the Suez Canal and across the Atlantic.

[36] Toda Teijirō, "Nihon kaiun no yakushin to Panama keiyu kōro," in *Bōeki kaki daigaku kōgishū*, ed. Yokohama bōeki kyōkai (Yokohama: Yokohama bōeki kyōkai, 1937), 108.

the New York route had marked a transition to "creativity" (*dokusō*).[37] Toda therefore argued that in developing fast freight services to New York, Japanese firms had moved beyond the structures of maritime transport developed by Western powers to effect a fundamental transformation of global transportation.

The O.S.K. manager further underscored the significance of Japanese shipping via Panama in terms of foreign reactions to the ships employed on the New York route. According to Toda, at a trade conference in Houston in 1935, an American admiral had called for the U.S. to build ships equal to the quality of the Japanese vessels then calling at the country's Atlantic ports. A British specialist on shipping commented that Japan's ships were of the highest standard, with hulls and equipment second to none. Further evidence of the success of Japanese ships could be found in the reorganization of services by the Silver Line and Prince Line, once British "champions" (*hasha*) of the New York–Far East route. Confronted with Japan's superior ships, the companies had abandoned regular port calls in Japan, and instead routed their vessels direct to the Philippines.[38] Japan's "advance" in shipping was therefore evident not only in the expanded geography of Japanese services, but in the recognition accorded Japanese ships by foreign powers. Such recognition, however, was accompanied by efforts to limit Japanese expansion.

Shipping Competition in the 1930s

Many foreign firms and policymakers greeted developments in Japanese shipping in the early to mid-1930s with alarm, and a number of commercial and diplomatic disputes erupted as Japanese ships carried growing shares of traffic and entered new

[37] Toda, "Nihon kaiun no yakushin to Panama keiyu kōro," 119.

[38] Toda, "Nihon kaiun no yakushin to Panama keiyu kōro," 120.

routes. Due to the global reach of the British Empire and its merchant fleet, many of these disputes involved British firms and colonial institutions, with conflicts developing in India, the Straits Settlements, and Australia. Fierce competition between Japanese and Dutch firms also took place in the routes between Japan and the Netherlands East Indies. While scholars have examined several of these shipping disputes individually, this section connects these conflicts by demonstrating the significance of the Dutch-Japanese confrontation, and its settlement, for British efforts to constrain Japanese shipping.[39] At the same time, this section traces how policymakers and businessmen in Britain and Japan linked competition in particular routes to a broader, Anglo-Japanese confrontation for control of world shipping. Though recent scholarship on intra-Asian trade in the 1930s has argued that European financial concerns had an interest in the growth of Japan's export trade to British and Dutch colonial markets, an examination of the ships that carried that trade shows how competition to create and maintain maritime linkages led to conflicts between Japan and European empires.[40]

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[39] For Anglo-Japanese competition in India, see Chih-lung Lin, "British Shipping in the Orient, 1933–1939: Reasons for Its Failure to Compete," *International Journal of Maritime History* 20, no. 1 (June 2008): 153–72. For pre-WWI competition in India, see Douglas McLean, "Tilting on a Level Playing Field: The Japanese Penetration of India's Coastal Shipping, 1911–1915," *International Journal of Maritime History* 5, no. 2 (December 1993): 57–74. For competition in the Netherlands East Indies, see Kokaze Hidemasa, "Nichiran kaiun masatsu to Nichi-Ran kaishō: Nichi-Ran kaiun dōmei no hōkai to Nan'yō kaiun no seiritsu," in *Senkanki Tōnan Ajia no keizai masatsu: Nihon no nanshin to Ajia/Ōbei*, ed. Sugiyama Shin'ya and Ian G. Brown (Tōkyō: Dōbunkan shuppan kabushiki gaisha, 1990), 109–40. An account of these multiple incidents of shipping competition can be found in *Mitsui 80-nenshi*, 172–81.

[40] See, for example, Shigeru Akita, "British Informal Empire in East Asia, 1880s to 1930s: A Japanese Perspective," in *Gentlemanly Capitalism and British Imperialism: The New Debate on Empire*, ed. Raymond E. Dumett (London: Longman, 1999), 141–56. For an overview of Japanese scholarship on intra-Asian trade, and an argument that the development of intra-Asian trade fostered conflicts rather than cooperation, see Antony Best, "Economic appeasement or economic nationalism? A political perspective on the British Empire, Japan, and the rise of Intra-Asian Trade, 1933–37," *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 30, no. 2 (2002): 77–101.

Shipping competition in the routes between Japan and the British and Dutch colonies paralleled, and became linked to, trade conflicts. In the early 1930s, the devaluation of the yen, as well as programs of industrial rationalization, stimulated exports of Japanese manufactures, particularly cotton textiles, which flooded European colonial markets across Asia, the Middle East, and East Africa.[41] British and Dutch efforts to curb Japanese exports often had consequences for shipping. For example, when new tariffs on Japanese textiles in India prompted a Japanese boycott of Indian raw cotton, Mitsubishi's efforts to secure substitute cotton imports from the Persian Gulf provided an opportunity for the Yamashita Steamship Company to establish a direct, Japan-Persia service. As a result, Yamashita Steamship began to carry shares of Gulf-bound traffic previously transshipped in Bombay by the British members of the Bombay Conference. Conference members, including the N.Y.K. and O.S.K., attempted to drive off Yamashita Steamship by extending Japan-Bombay services to Persia and Iraq, but in 1935 they concluded a new arrangement on sailings with Yamashita Steamship.[42]

In the Netherlands East Indies, trade and shipping also became intertwined as Japanese and Dutch representatives began protracted trade negotiations in 1934. As Kokaze Hidemasa has shown, Dutch negotiators made any agreement on trade contingent on a resolution of Dutch-Japanese shipping competition on the Japan/China–Java route. In the early 1930s, the Dutch firm Japan China Java Line (J.C.J.L.) had seen its share of East Indies–bound cargo fall from 54.3 to 30.3 percent.[43] The entry of Ishihara Industries (*Ishihara sangyō kabushiki gaisha*), which held mining interests in the Dutch colony, had

[41] For an overview of cotton competition, see Shimizu, *Anglo-Japanese Trade Rivalry*.

[42] *Mitsui 80-nenshi*, 172–173. Shimizu, *Anglo-Japanese Trade Rivalry*, 42–44.

[43] Kokaze Hidemasa, "Nichiran kaiun masatsu to Nichiran kaishō," 118.

been particularly disruptive on the route. The Royal Packet Navigation Company (K.P.M., Koninklijke Paketvaart Maatschappi), which carried the colony's coastal trade, also faced competition when a Japanese firm, the South Seas Mail Steamship Company (*Nan'yō yūsen kabushiki gaisha*), began to carry cargoes formerly transshipped in Java direct to Sumatra. To protect J.C.J.L. and K.P.M., the Dutch government imposed new restrictions on imports and the coastal trade. In response, the four Japanese firms active in the route merged their operations to establish the South Seas Shipping Company (*Nan'yō kaiun kabushiki gaisha*). The new company began negotiations with J.C.J.L. in 1935, but these were nearly upended by a renewed attempt by Ishihara Industries to undercut rates. To forestall the collapse of negotiations, communications bureaucrats introduced a Shipping Routes Control Law (*Kōro tōseihō*) to the Diet in mid-1936, which gave the ministry the authority to suspend sailings in the event of "excessive" competition between Japanese companies. The passage of the legislation led Ishihara Industries to abandon the rate war, and South Seas Shipping and J.C.J.L. were able to conclude an agreement on traffic ratios.[44]

The strategy adopted by Dutch authorities in the East Indies inspired similar efforts by authorities across the British Empire. In March 1937, the governor of the Straits Settlements wrote to the Colonial Office regarding Japanese competition in North Borneo. Ishihara Industries had recently established a monthly service from Japan to British North Borneo via Java and Singapore, and the governor observed that the situation paralleled the recent events in the Dutch colonies:

> A similar position arose in the Netherlands Indies in recent years with serious consequences to the established retail businesses and certain of the

[44] Kokaze, "Nichiran kaiun masatsu to Nichiran kaishō," 109–40.

> Netherlands shipping interests. This process was only checked by the introduction of legislation restricting import by Japanese vessels by quota and by the protective shipping legislation to which I have referred in my previous dispatch.[45]

With the British colonies facing commercial advances similar to those experienced by the Dutch, the governor suggested that the British North Borneo Company emulate the Dutch and adopt shipping quotas to limit Japanese advances.

Likewise, Dutch strategies informed responses to Japanese competition in routes to Australia. In the mid-1930s, the O.S.K., N.Y.K., and the Japan Australia Line (J.A.L., jointly managed by Yamashita Steamship, International Steamship, and Kawasaki Steamship) carried around 80 percent of Japan-Australia traffic, while the British-flagged Eastern & Australia Steamship Co. (E. & A.) carried 20 percent.[46] Advances by the O.S.K. and Yamashita Steamship in the routes to New Zealand, however, threatened Britain's hold on Australia and New Zealand's trade with Japan and China. As Australian-based shipping interests discussed measures to maintain British-flagged shipping in the routes in early 1937, E. & A. representatives referenced the Dutch success in linking trade agreements to negotiations on shipping.[47] Like the Dutch, Commonwealth representatives informed Japanese negotiators that negotiations on trade would only be settled once an agreement on shipping had been reached, and in mid-1938 the N.Y.K., O.S.K., and J.A.L. concluded a pooling agreement that guaranteed the E. & A. a 22.5 percent share of receipts.[48]

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[45] Governor of Straits Settlement to Colonial Office (May 1, 1937), CO 852/117/4, TNA.

[46] *Mitsui 80-nenshi*, 177–79. *Yamashita shashi*, 453.

[47] "Shipping to the East: Federal Action," *The Sydney Morning Herald*, January 21, 1937, in "Honpō kisen kaisha gaikoku kōro kankei zakken dai-1-kan," *Gaimushō kiroku* F-1-6-0-7, MFA, JACAR B09030239200.

[48] Imperial Shipping Committee, *British Shipping in the Orient* (London: His Majesty's

While the above disputes centered primarily on traffic between East Asia and British and Dutch colonies, Japanese leaders also expressed ambitions to develop shipping services beyond the lines of Japan's foreign trade. When he introduced the Shipping Routes Control Law to the Diet in May 1936, Communications Minister Tanomogi Keikichi called for the expansion of Japan's 5,000,000-ton fleet, and suggested that a fleet of "6,000,000 tons of superior ships" would enable Japanese ships to reach ever more distant horizons.[49]

In late 1936, communications officials began to develop measures to advance such ambitions by drafting a new "national shipping policy" (*kaiun kokusaku*). The new policy included subsidies for passenger and cargo ships (¥50,000,000 over eighteen years), as well as banking facilities to finance ship purchases.[50] It also included measures to promote shipping services between foreign ports by offering subsidies (¥10,000,000 over five years) to ships that voyaged beyond the near seas region for more than 180 days.[51] The ministry justified these new subsidies and facilities in terms of shipping's importance to foreign trade and national security, and in terms of the significance of shipping in Japan's balance of trade. In 1934, shipping receipts had brought in more than ¥250,000,000 in foreign exchange, making shipping services Japan's third-largest export after cotton textiles and raw silk.[52]

Stationery Office, 1939), 85–87.

[49] Quoted in Unekawa Shizuo, *Kaiji yōran* (Ōsaka: Kaiji ihōsha, 1936), 275.

[50] Reprinted in Shadan hōjin senpaku kaizen kyōkai, ed., *Shadan hōjin senpaku kaizen kyōkai jigyōshi*, 159–174. For an overview of the policy, also see Teratani Takeaki, *Kaiungyō to kaigun: Taiheiyō sensō-ka no Nihon shōsentai* (Tōkyō: Nihon keizai shinbunsha, 1981), 41–45.

[51] Shadan hōjin senpaku kaizen kyōkai, ed., *Shadan hōjin senpaku kaizen kyōkai jigyōshi*, 171–72.

[52] Shadan hōjin senpaku kaizen kyōkai, ed., *Shadan hōjin senpaku kaizen kyōkai jigyōshi*, 163.

Officials, as well as business leaders, also framed the new shipping policy in terms of the competition that Japanese ships faced from subsidized rivals. Shipowners had unsuccessfully lobbied for a tramp subsidy since the drafting of the first scrap-and-build scheme in 1932.[53] Britain's adoption of tramp subsidies through the passage of the British Shipping (Assistance) Act in 1935, however, provided new ammunition for Japanese shipowners.[54] Yamashita Kamesaburō, for example, produced an opinion paper in which he argued: "If, from now on, Britain will continue to pay subsidies, then, needless to say, we must use the same method to counter them."[55] In their overview of their national shipping policy, communications officials similarly listed protectionist policies adopted by other shipping powers, and depicted a world in which "every country is investing enormous government funds, developing a national policy, and is intent on strengthening their commercial fleet."[56]

Such efforts to advance Japanese ships into routes between foreign ports did not go unnoticed by other maritime powers. British shipowners viewed Japanese ships as competition not only on routes between British possessions and Japan/China, but also in routes beyond those directly linked to Japan. Addressing a P. & O. shareholder's meeting in December 1936, Alexander Shaw outlined the alarming decline of British shipping since the Great War, and devoted special attention to Japanese competition. Like business

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[53] Yoneda, *Gendai Nihon kaiun shikan*, 217–19.

[54] The Communications Ministry referenced the British subsidy in its overview of its new national shipping policy. Shadan hōjin senpaku kaizen kyōkai, ed., *Shadan hōjin senpaku kaizen kyōkai jigyōshi*, 165. For an examination of the British Shipping (Assistance) Act, which also included loans to support purchases of new ships by owners who scrapped old ships, see Julian Greaves, "Managing Decline: The political economy of British shipping in the 1930s," *The Journal of Transport History* 28, iss. 1 (March 2007): 57–74.

[55] Yamashita Kamesaburō, *Kaiun shiken* (n.p.: Yamashita Kamesaburō, 1935), 55.

[56] Shadan hōjin senpaku kaizen kyōkai, ed., *Shadan hōjin senpaku kaizen kyōkai jigyōshi*, 167.

leaders and officials in Japan, Shaw emphasized the intensification of state efforts to promote shipping, which he attributed to "soaring national ambitions as much out of touch with economic common sense as they are with the ideal of a cooperative world." According to Shaw, such competition had implications not only for British shipping firms, but for the empire as a whole:

> …as British shipping provides £100,000,000 every year of those invisible exports which balance our trade account, Great Britain must have the services of a large mercantile marine to enable her to pay for her food and raw materials and thus avoid the collapse which follows upon a real excess of imports over exports…[57]

In addition to generating invisible income for the empire, British ships also played an essential role in the empire as the vehicles that carried food and other resources to the home islands, and as "the origin, the links, and the sustaining channels of Empire."

Japanese ships, however, represented a prominent threat to the British fleet and the empire's linkages. The Japanese fleet, observed Shaw, "is largely in excess of her economic needs. It is already capable of carrying her trade twice over, and now under the auspices and with the lavish assistance of her Government…important further additions to her merchant fleet are about to be made." Drawing attention to the routes between India and Japan, which British ships had dominated at the turn of the century, Shaw claimed that British shares had declined dramatically, with over 70 percent of the trade now carried by Japanese vessels

At the same time, Shaw also emphasized Japanese advances in trades beyond those directly linked to Japan. Referencing the Shipping Routes Control Law passed by the Diet earlier that year, he cited an official statement that announced that the legislation

[57] All of the excerpts of Shaw's speech that follow are drawn from "Company Meetings: Peninsular & Oriental Steam Navigation Company," *The Times* (December 10, 1936), 22.

was intended "to strengthen Government control over Japanese ships and to turn this extended power to the direction of competition with foreign companies." Pointing to conditions in Asia and Africa, he called attention to incursions by Japanese ships in trade between British possessions: "Japanese ships can and do increasingly invade the coasting trade of the British Empire—Hong-kong [sic] to Singapore, on to Penang and to Colombo, as well as our ports in the Indian Empire, in our African territories and the great Dominion of South Africa itself." Much as Tanomogi and communications officials called for Japanese ships to play a role in a range of shipping routes, Shaw suggested that the rival fleet posed a threat to British shipping services across the British Empire.

Others in the British Empire also grew concerned by the competition that Japanese ships posed beyond the routes to Japan. In Singapore, for example, International Steamship and the Mitsui Shipping Department began to carry rubber from Singapore to the U.S. eastward via Panama in 1934, and British shipowners and authorities grew alarmed when Japanese shares of the rubber trade increased rapidly to 30 percent by mid-1935, and 50 percent in November and December 1935, before falling to 20 percent from mid- to late 1936.[58] A communication from the Governor of the Straits Settlements in early December 1936, as well as more general discussion of Japanese shipping in the British press, prompted Britain's Imperial Shipping Committee to open an investigation.[59] The committee's research culminated in a report, "British Shipping in the

[58] For a description of the rubber trade, see Imperial Shipping Committee, *British Shipping in the Orient*, 87–90. British shipowners attributed Mitsui's success to the fact that the Mitsui Company acted as both merchant and shipper. For a discussion, see William D. Wray, "NYK and the Commercial Diplomacy of the Far Eastern Freight Conference, 1896–1956," in *Business History of Shipping: Strategy and Structure*, ed. Tsunehiko Yui and Keiichiro Nakagawa (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1985), 297–98.

[59] "Summary of course of enquiry with particular reference to the colonial office," CO 852/118/1, TNA.

Orient," published in early 1939, which identified a number of areas of Anglo-Japanese competition, including the routes between Japan and India, Australia, Europe, and the U.S.[60] The committee, moreover, delineated several additional areas of competition:

> Japanese and British shipping also compete to some extent in the trade between British Malaya and New York, and in the coasting trades of India, China, and East Africa. It should finally be stated that the British and Japanese flags compete in a considerable amount of the 'interport' trade along some of the foregoing routes, notably at Hong Kong, Singapore, Rangoon [present-day Yangon] and Colombo.[61]

The realization of the expansionary ambitions expressed by Tanomogi and others thus brought Japanese ships into competition with British shipping interests active in routes throughout Asia and East Africa.

British antagonism, meanwhile, did little to discourage Japanese business leaders and officials from pursuing additional trajectories of expansion. In January 1937, the month after Shaw's speech to P. & O. shareholders, *The Times* published a rebuttal submitted by Saitō Takeo, manager of the N.Y.K.'s London branch office, on behalf of the Japan Shipowners' Association.[62] In it, Saitō challenged Shaw's argument that Japanese success in the Indian trade was the result of unfair competition on the grounds that neither the N.Y.K. nor the O.S.K. received subsidies to operate ships on the India

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[60] The report has had a long afterlife in postwar scholarship. It has often been used as a source of information on prewar shipping, even as scholars have often refuted its claims regarding the sources of Japanese success in competition with British shipping. See, for example, Tatsuki, "Intensifying Competition and the Streamlining of Japanese Shipping Companies," 90. S.G. Sturmey, *British Shipping and World Competition* (London: The Athlone Press, 1962), 100–137. Keiichiro Nakagawa, "Japanese Shipping in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries: Strategy and Organization," in *Business History of Shipping: Strategy and Structure*, ed. Tsunehiko Yui and Keiichiro Nakagawa (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1985), 18.

[61] Imperial Shipping Committee, *British Shipping in the Orient* (London: H.M. Stationery Office, 1939), 34.

[62] The association was rendered in the article as the "Nippon Shipowners' Association." Saitō was rendered as "T. Saito." For Saitō's time in London, see *NYK 100-nenshi shiryō*, 827.

route. At the same time, he rejected the basic premise of Shaw's complaint—that the proper size of a nation's fleet was in proportion to the size of its trade—and wrote, "It is not usually considered in Great Britain that nations should possess only such ocean-going tonnage as is sufficient to carry their own trade."[63]

Over the course of 1937, shipowners continued to promote the expansion of Japanese ships into new routes, often emphasizing their capacity to earn foreign exchange. The military's expanded control over the Japanese government, particularly after an attempted coup in early 1936, led to increased military spending that reduced Japanese exports while increasing Japan's dependence on imported raw materials.[64] Addressing a general meeting of the Japan Shipowners' Association in May 1937, Director of the Association and O.S.K. President Murata Shōzō outlined trade conditions, and observed that "for various reasons, imports have drastically increased this year while exports have come to a standstill." Concerned that the year's trade deficit might reach ¥400,000,000, he declared: "since shipping income makes up an important part of the settlement [of that deficit], those of us in the shipping industry have, in a word, a duty to win large amounts of income, and alleviate the worries of the state."[65] He therefore called on shipowners to adopt a national perspective, avoid "unnecessary competition" with other Japanese companies, and conclude cooperative agreements on sailings and freight rates. On July 1, 1937, the seven companies active on the New York route, including the O.S.K., made moves toward such cooperation by forming the Self-Regulating Shipping

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[63] T. Saito, "Merchant Fleet of Japan: Tonnage and Trade," *The Times*, January 27, 1937, 10.

[64] Jerome B. Cohen, *Japan's Economy in War and Reconstruction* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1949), 12–20. Michael A. Barnhart, *Japan Prepares for Total War: The Search for Economic Security, 1919–1941* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987), 95.

[65] "Kyōkai no tōsei kyōka no hitsuyō to senshu no jichō wo yōbō," *Kaiun*, dai-181-gō (June 1937): shiryō, 16.

Federation (*Kaiun jichirenmei*).[66] Competition was to be directed outward, against foreign companies, in order to increase foreign exchange earnings.

By mid-1937, Japanese shipping companies, backed by a new national shipping policy, seemed poised to develop new lines of transportation throughout the world. In his lecture on the Panama Canal route in July 1937, the O.S.K.'s Toda Teijirō emphasized that the ascendancy of Japanese ships in the Pacific would make it possible for them to assume a greater role in the transport of third-country trade. In part, this would include the foreign trade of Manchukuo and China, but the Panama Canal route also made additional trajectories of expansion possible.[67] The Yamashita Steamship Company, for example, planned to open a new service to New York that would return to Japan after calling at ports in South America. In addition to Japanese exports and imports, the company would thus begin to handle traffic flowing from North to South America.[68] As emphasized by Toda, by advancing into the Atlantic with fast ships, Japanese firms aimed to handle traffic between foreign ports.[69]

In an overview of the shipping industry published in June 1938, Okazaki Yukitoshi, a ship-broker, similarly emphasized the importance of shipping receipts while outlining a vision of Japan's ascent to global shipping power. In the opening chapters of his volume, Okazaki asserted that Japan had achieved "hegemony" (*haken*) in the Pacific

[66] For an account of the formation of the federation, see Teratani, *Kaiungyō to kaigun*, 46–50.

[67] Toda, "Nihon kaiun no yakushin to Panama keiyu kōro," 122.

[68] *Yamashita shashi*, 454–455.

[69] Toda, "Nihon kaiun no yakushin to Panama keiyu kōro," 122–123.

due to its dominant position in the Far East–North America Routes.[70] This, in turn, had laid a foundation for additional trajectories of expansion:

> Japanese shipping eagerly aimed for the Age of the Pacific [*Taiheiyō jidai*], and today is a threat to world powers. Encouraged by this, our shipping fleet calls for the conquest of seas in India, in Persia, in Australia, in Africa, in South America, in the South Seas, and in Europe, and the domination of the world. The seven seas are narrow, and under the Sun Disc flag, the fleet strides across the ocean.[71]

As outlined by Okazaki, the world's trade routes could be meaningfully divided into two broad regions (*chiiki*): "East of Suez" (*Suezu itō*) and "West of Suez" (*Suezu isei*). The former extended from the Suez Canal to the Atlantic coast of North America, as a "great, wide ocean" that encompassed the Pacific, the South Seas, and the Indian Ocean.[72] According to Okazaki, within the "East of Suez" region, Japanese ships had already assumed a dominant position in routes centered on Japan. As evidence, he pointed to the recent outpouring of alarm in Britain, where, according to Okazaki, "the remarkable advance of Japan's commercial fleet is seen as an invasion of the foundation of British shipping in the Orient."[73] Further expansion, meanwhile, would require Japanese ships to engage in a kind of "migrant work" between foreign ports.[74] By developing such lines of transport, Japanese ships could gain control of the "East of Suez" region, and thereby develop a foundation for further advances toward "world domination" (*sekai seiha*).[75]

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[70] Okazaki Yukitoshi, *Kaiun*, revised ed. (Tōkyō: Diamond sha, 1941 [1938]), 14.

[71] Okazaki, *Kaiun*, 16.

[72] Okazaki, *Kaiun*, 17.

[73] Okazaki, *Kaiun*, 35.

[74] Okazaki referred to these routes as "*dekasegi kōro*," combing a term for "leaving home" for work in another region or country with the word for "shipping routes." Okazaki, *Kaiun*, 32.

[75] Okazaki, *Kaiun*, 32–33.

Invisible Income and the War in China

Less than a week after the seven companies on the New York route established the Self-Regulating Shipping Federation, Japanese and Chinese soldiers exchanged fire on the outskirts of Beijing, near the Marco Polo Bridge. In Japan, Prime Minister Prince Konoe Fumimaro approved Army plans to dispatch additional troops to North China, and tensions between Japan and China—left simmering after the 1933 Tanggu Truce—rapidly escalated to war. The Japanese military quickly overwhelmed Chinese forces to occupy much of north and littoral China, but by late 1938 its momentum had stalled, and for the next several years the war remained at a stalemate.[76]

Following the outbreak of the war in China, businessmen and officials sought to mobilize Japan's fleet to support the war effort. In part, this included measures to limit shipping activities in order to forestall the market volatility experienced during the previous war. In September 1937, communications officials shepherded a Provisional Shipping Control Law (*Rinji senpaku kanrihō*) through the Diet. Replicating many of the provisions of the Wartime Shipping Control Ordinance issued in the previous war, the new legislation imposed controls on the export and import of ships, restricted voyages between foreign ports, and gave the Communications Ministry the authority to regulate sailings, freight rates, shipbuilding, and seamen.[77] In the first years of the war, however, the regulation of the industry was largely left to associations organized by shipping

[76] Hans van de Ven, *China at War: Triumph and Tragedy in the Emergence of the New China* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2018), 65–72. Barnhart, *Japan Prepares for Total War*, 77–90.

[77] Ozeki Shōgen, *Senji keizai to kaiun kokusaku* (Tōkyō: Sangyō keizai gakkai, 1941), 65, 80.

firms.[78] The Self-Regulating Shipping Federation, for example, though established to coordinate activities on the New York route, negotiated with firms and shipowners' associations to fix key freight and charter rates.[79]

At the same time, many businessmen and maritime authorities integrated their visions of global shipping with the conflict in China. Discussion of shipping in the months and years that followed the Marco Polo Bridge Incident continued to emphasize the importance of ships not only for their role in trade and military operations, but also for their capacity to earn foreign exchange. Business leaders and officials framed a resolution to the conflict in China as dependent on Japanese shipping maintaining a global reach, and continued to promote advances of ships into new trade routes.

Such views on the relationship between shipping, the balance of trade, and events in China were articulated during a round-table discussion among shipping managers organized by the *Oriental Economist* (Tōyō keizai shinpō) in April 1938. Ōkubo Kenjirō, managing director of Kawasaki Steamship, emphasized the importance of shipping receipts to the national economy, and proposed an expansion of the fleet from 5,000,000 to 10,000,000 tons. Excess tonnage in the near seas, he proposed, could be directed overseas.[80] In a discussion of shipping conditions on the continent, Nōga Masatomo, managing director of Yamashita Steamship, and Kaharu Toshio, director of the O.S.K.'s Orient Division (*Tōyōka*), also asserted that it was necessary for Japanese ships to acquire

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[78] An overview of the first set of shipping controls is available in Teratani, *Kaiungyō to kaigun*, 45–50. A detailed account of these controls is provided in Ozeki, *Senji keizai to kaiun kokusaku*, 64–114.

[79] Examples of such activities are detailed in Ozeki, *Senji keizai to kaiun kokusaku*, 67–72.

[80] "'Jikyoku-ka no kaiun-kai wo kataru' zadankai," *Tōyō keizai shinpō*, dai-1808-gō (April 16, 1938): 102–3.

a majority share of China's coastal and overseas trade, though it would require fierce competition with the British firms that carried forty to fifty percent of Chinese trade.[81]

Maritime authorities similarly produced propaganda materials that emphasized the earning of foreign exchange as a key function of shipping. In August 1938, the Cabinet's Information Division (*Jōhōbu*) devoted the twenty-eighth issue of its "national policy pamphlet," *Photographic Weekly* (Shashin shūhō), to shipping. A prefatory essay by Communications Minister Nagai Ryūtarō celebrated that Japan's "superior, commercial fleet flies the Sun Disc flag in all corners of the world."[82] Shipping, he observed, was being fully utilized during the ongoing crisis. Requisitioned ships served an important role as a "second line of national defense," and they transported essential goods required for domestic industry. At the same time, Nagai reminded readers that shipping receipts were an "excellent" source of invisible income that helped settle the international balance of trade. "Considering recent trends in trade," observed the minister, "our expectations of shipping are all the greater."[83] The minister concluded with a line often invoked in Japanese discussions of British sea power: "who controls the sea controls the world."[84]

The visual content of the magazine also emphasized the global reach of Japanese-flagged shipping and the invisible income that it generated. A two-page spread of photographs under the title "Our active fleet" followed Nagai's preface. The photographs

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[81] "'Jikyoku-ka no kaiun-kai wo kataru' zadankai," *Tōyō keizai shinpō*, 106.

[82] Nagai Ryūtarō, "Jikyoku to kaiun," *Shashin shūhō*, dai-28-gō (August 24, 1938).

[83] Nagai Ryūtarō, "Jikyoku to kaiun," *Shashin shūhō*, dai-28-gō (August 24, 1938).

[84] Perhaps derived from Sir Walter Raleigh: "He who commands the sea commands the trade routes of the world. He who commands the trade routes, commands the trade. He who commands the trade, commands the riches of the world, and hence the world itself." Alan W. Cafruny, *Ruling the Waves: The Political Economy of International Shipping* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987), front matter.

showed Japanese liners entering harbors in Honolulu and Cape Town, looming alongside docks in San Francisco and Auckland, and navigating the Panama Canal. A caption explained, "our fleet flies the Japanese flag, leaving wakes around the world, in harbors in every foreign port."[85] A sixth photograph, moreover, presented a well-dressed "foreign" couple reserving passage at the counter of a Japanese shipping firm. "The foreign currency they pay to board a safe and fast Japanese ship," explained the caption, "amounts to almost ¥20,000 annually, and contributes greatly to the improvement of [Japan's] international balance of trade."[86] Below the collage, a brief note on "Our nation's shipping" from the Communications Ministry reiterated the importance of shipping for trade, the balance of trade, and national defense.[87] On a later page, a graph juxtaposed above a photograph of a liner loading cargo highlighted the dramatic increase in net income from shipping between 1925 and 1936.[88]

Such efforts to generate foreign exchange via shipping did not go unnoticed in foreign shipping circles. In late 1937, the Yamashita Steamship Company had opened an eastward service to New York that returned to Japan via ports in South America, Panama, and California.[89] When, in mid-1938, the company cut rates on coffee from Brazil to California, a specialist on shipping writing for the *Far Eastern Review* observed:

> The strenuous efforts of the Japanese to enter into the indirect trade between South America and the United States is closely associated with the exchange and trade difficulties that country has encountered as a result

[85] *Shashin shūhō*, dai-28-gō (August 24, 1938).

[86] *Shashin shūhō*, dai-28-gō (August 24, 1938).

[87] Teishiinsho, "Wagakuni no kaiun," *Shashin shūhō*, dai-28-gō (August 24, 1938).

[88] "Wagakuni kaiun kankei jun'shū'nyū ruinen hikaku," *Shashin shūhō*, dai-28-gō (August 24, 1938).

[89] *Yamashita shashi*, 454–455.

> of the present conflict in the Orient. In the past, shipping freights have been one of Japan's most important sources of foreign exchange.[90]

Yamashita Steamship's attempt to acquire a share of this "lucrative trade," in turn, threatened the operations of an American carrier, the Pacific-Argentine-Brazil Line, and the Norwegian Westfal-Larsen Line, members of the Pacific Coast/River Plate Brazil Conference. With the O.S.K. similarly attempting to gain shares of the coffee trade by reducing rates below the conference level, the American and Norwegian firms protested to the U.S. Maritime Commission, which launched an investigation.[91] Though the commission forced the Japanese firms to respect conference rates, the short-lived competition for coffee indicated the potential for efforts to acquire foreign exchange through shipping to generate new sites of competition and confrontation.

Despite enthusiastic endorsements for shipping expansion by officials and business leaders, in the months after the outbreak of the war in China, demand for shipping in the near seas led to a decline in Japanese activities in transoceanic routes. The government suspended the transoceanic tramp subsidies developed as a part of the national shipping policy, though it moved forward with the program of subsidized, superior ship construction.[92] In its July 1938 evaluation of the Japanese economy, the Japan-Manchuria Finance and Economics Research Council noted that shipping receipts had fallen after the start of the "China Incident." In June 1938, 1,024,000 tons of

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[90] Walter A. Radius, "Japanese Rate Cuts Precipitating Shipping War," *Far Eastern Survey* 7, no. 20 (October 12, 1938): 236.

[91] For details on O.S.K. activities between Brazil and California, see *OSK 80-nenshi*, 346–49. For the investigation, see, Press release, United States Maritime Commission, January 28, 1939; United States Maritime Commission, "In the matter of rates, charges, and practices of Yamashita Kisen Kabushiki Kaisha and Osaka Syosen Kabiki Kaisya," January 26, 1939, NARA 178-P1-596, file no. 116-507.

[92] Teratani, *Kaiungyō to kaigun*, 42–45.

shagaisen shipping was active in transoceanic routes, a decline of 351,000 tons from the previous year. The council therefore concluded that it was unlikely that Japan would earn the same levels of invisible income in 1938.[93]

Rather than exporting shipping services, the outbreak of the war led Japanese shipowners to instead secure additional tonnage from overseas. Though communications officials had imposed controls on ship imports in 1933 in order to advance the goals of the scrap-and-build program, some owners had circumvented the restrictions by entering ships in foreign registries. In 1937, these "distorted ship imports" (*hentai yu'nyūsen*) were estimated at 600,000 tons deadweight, and many were believed to be in Chinese registries.[94] Though the Provisional Shipping Control Law also included import controls, maritime authorities generally used the controls to facilitate transfers of ships to the Japanese registry. As demand for tonnage rose in late 1937, officials relaxed restrictions, and over the following year, Japanese shipowners imported eighty-three ships (356,693 tons), almost half of which were transferred from Republic of China registries.[95] Between 1937 and 1939, ship imports totaled 500,000 gross tons.[96] Operators also sought to expand their tonnage by chartering foreign ships. To minimize charter rates, the Self-Regulating Shipping Federation cooperated with several non-member companies to establish a Provisional Charter Division (*Rinji yōsenbu*) to coordinate negotiations and

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[93] "Honpō keizai kokuryoku handan (dai-2-kai)," in *Kokka sōdōin (1): Keizai*, ed. Nakamura Takafusa and Hara Akira (Tōkyō: Misuzu shobō, 1970), 33.

[94] Ozeki, *Senji keizai to kaiun kokusaku*, 91.

[95] "Kanrihō ni yoru shutoku kyoka senpaku: 83 seki, 35-man sōton ni tassu," *Kaiun*, dai-201-gō (February 1938): shiryō, 4.

[96] Ozeki, *Senji keizai to kaiun kokusaku*, 93. Teratani lists the number as around 350,000 tons. See Teratani, *Kaiungyō to kaigun*, 36–39.

minimize overlapping bids.[97] Foreign-flagged ships under charter totaled some 443,000 tons deadweight in March 1938, and increased to 900,000 tons in January 1939.[98] Far from permitting the export of shipping services, the war effort in China instead required firms to acquire additional tonnage from overseas.

Though business leaders and officials emphasized the compatibility, and, indeed, complementarity, of global shipping and the conflict in China, the drive for territorial expansion began to constrain the shipping industry's capacity for oceanic expansion. Even as maritime authorities and businessmen embraced visions of a world in which Japanese ship played an essential role in global connectedness, tonnage shortages in Japan and East Asia forced Japanese shipping companies to instead turn to world markets for secondhand ships and ship charters.

The War in Europe and Japanese Shipping

The outbreak of war in Europe in 1939, however, transformed the distribution of shipping in the world. For many businessmen and officials, the disruptions brought on by the war initially seemed to create new possibilities for expansion, much like in the previous World War. As a neutral power with an increasingly antagonistic relationship with Britain, however, Japan soon found itself squeezed out of international shipping markets. British leaders leveraged their position in world shipping to mobilize allied and neutral ships, which reduced the international supply of tonnage. Until 1941, moreover, Japanese companies operated in a world of trade and transportation that remained

[97] The companies were Ishihara Industries, Dalian Steamship, and the Mitsubishi Ship Division. Ozeki, *Senji keizai to kaiun kokusaku*, 94–95.

[98] Ozeki, *Senji keizai to kaiun kokusaku*, 110, 145.

dominated by the Anglo-American powers, and as Japan embraced relations with Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy, British leaders used their naval and financial power to limit Japan's access to the international shipping industry.

In the immediate aftermath of Germany's blitzkrieg in September 1939, businessmen in Japan's shipping circles excitedly discussed the new trajectories of expansion that seemed possible now that Europe had again erupted into conflict. In October, the Japan Shipping Exchange hosted a roundtable that was reprinted in *Shipping* under the title "Acquisition of foreign exchange?! Extension of navigation power?!"[99] Using language reminiscent of the previous world war, Yamashita Steamship's Nōga observed that the upheaval in Europe was an "opportunity that comes once in a thousand years," both for the nation and for the shipping industry.[100] Though Nōga acknowledged that conditions in China placed considerable demands on the fleet, he suggested that the war in Europe had provided an opportunity for shipping firms to advance into trade routes where they could earn foreign exchange and expand Japan's navigation power.[101] Tsuchii Masao of United Ocean Transport further suggested that foreign ships under charter might be employed in near seas routes to alleviate demands on Japanese-flag tonnage. By chartering mid-sized ships active in India and China (and therefore well-suited to near seas services), owners could employ foreign ships in East Asia routes and free up larger Japanese ships that could be assigned to transoceanic routes.[102]

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[99] "Gaika kakutoku?! Kōken shinchō?! Dai-1-sen no seiei wo sōdōin, Kaiun jikyoku zadankai," *Kaiun*, no. 210 (November 1939), 12–27.

[100] See Chapter 3.

[101] "Gaika kakutoku?! Kōken shinchō?!," *Kaiun*, 12–27.

[102] "Gaika kakutoku?! Kōken shinchō?! Dai-1-sen no seiei wo sōdōin, Kaiun jikyoku zadankai," *Kaiun*, no. 210 (November 1939), 20.

Shipping requirements in Japan and East Asia, however, constrained the ability of shipping companies to pursue opportunities in distant routes. After the outbreak of war in China, officials had primarily intervened in the industry to stabilize prices, but had left the specifics to the Self-Regulating Shipping Federation and other associations organized by firms. In late 1939, however, officials passed measures to place the distribution of tonnage, as well as freight and charter rates, under government control. New legislation and ordinances provided for the formation of new cartels and associations that were required to meet transportation targets set by the government. Controls were further strengthened in November 1940 with the establishment of the Central Shipping and Transportation Cartel (*Kaiun chūō tōsei yusō kumiai*). Participation was compulsory for all shipping firms, and the cartel was directly supervised by the Communications Ministry.[103] These associations and government controls limited the extent to which Japanese firms were able to pursue opportunities overseas.

At times, however, the profitable rates found in transoceanic routes overcame controls that were imperfectly implemented. In his memoir, Ariyoshi Yoshiya, an N.Y.K. manager in the late 1930s, recalled challenges faced by the Central Shipping and Transportation Control Cartel after its establishment in November 1940. Under the cartel, Japan's companies had been organized into twelve groups, and, on paper, a company assigned as group leader was to draft plans and direct the activities of its group members. According to Ariyoshi, however:

> …transportation plans were drafted with the assumption that all ships belonging to a group's members could be used, but ships went missing.

[103] Teratani, *Kaiungyō to kaigun*, 50–58. Ozeki, *Senji keizai to kaiun kokusaku*, 115–361.

> Freight rates between other countries saw such extreme increases, that before you knew it [those ships] had run off to foreign countries.[104]

Group leaders responsible for transoceanic liner services thus at times developed plans only to find that ships had disappeared in pursuit of more lucrative traffic between foreign ports.

The German blitzkrieg, meanwhile, led to a reduction in foreign shipping that had serviced Japan's foreign trade. A report on the Japanese economy produced by the Japan-Manchuria Finance and Economics Research Council in February 1940 painted a grim picture of shipping conditions in Japan. After September 1939, many foreign ships that had carried Japan's imports of salt, phosphates, scrap metal, and soybeans had withdrawn from world trade routes, and the council estimated that Japan's economy required an additional 1,000,000 tons of shipping.[105] As in the months after the Sino-Japanese War, businessmen and officials looked to foreign markets, in addition to domestic shipyards, as a source of tonnage. After a Cabinet resolution called for tonnage increases in May 1940, for example, several firms established the Empire Ship Company (*Teikoku senpaku kabushiki gaisha*) to minimize overlapping orders for ships and shipbuilding supplies. Shortly after its founding, the company purchased twenty-one ships (72,726 tons deadweight), which included vessels imported from neutral Panama, as well as countries on both sides of the war: Germany, as well as Greece, Norway, and Britain.[106]

The spread of hostilities in early 1940, however, pulled many of the remaining maritime powers into the war, with disruptive consequences for Japan's ability to utilize

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[104] Ariyoshi Yoshiya, *Kaiun 50-nen* (Tōkyō: Nihon kaiji shinbunsha, 1975), 46.

[105] "Honpō keizai kokuryoku handan (dai-4-ji hōkoku)," in *Kokka sōdoin (1): Keizai*, ed. Nakamura Takafusa and Hara Akira (Tōkyō: Misuzu shobō, 1970), 121, 123–24, 129.

[106] Also 30,000 tons of steel and pig iron. Ozeki Shōgen, *Senji keizai to kaiun kokusaku*, 186–87.

foreign vessels. The invasion of Norway in April 1940, for example, complicated the operations of several companies that operated twelve Norwegian ships under time charter in routes ranging from coastal China to trans-Pacific routes, the Mexican Gulf, and routes between Suez and Singapore. Another 100,000 tons deadweight of Norwegian shipping, moreover, were engaged by Japanese firms on trip charter.[107] The German invasion muddled the status of these vessels, particularly in relation to British naval power. Out of concern that Norwegian-flagged vessels might be seized by British naval forces in China, the East Asia Shipping Company (*Tōa kaiun kabushiki gaisha*) ordered the *Haiping* and *Haitong*—two Norwegian vessels under charter and employed on the Tianjin-Shanghai route—to call at the nearest Chinese port.[108] In Canada, the *Maloja*, on charter to the Kawasaki Steamship Company and loaded with lumber bound for paper mills in Niigata, received orders from Norwegian consular officials to make for Victoria. When Seattle-based employees of Yamashita Steamship made inquiries, the captain reported that British naval officers had ordered the ship to remain in port.[109] Reports of similar issues arrived from other quarters of the world. The N.Y.K. branch office in Singapore reported that a British cruiser had captured a Kobe-bound, Norwegian ship off Sumatra and diverted it to Hong Kong.[110] The *Shilvaplana*, on charter to Mitsui, disappeared after departing Vladivostok for Yokohama on April 13, only to reappear in Hong Kong on

[107] Tani Masayuki, Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs, to Sir Robert Craigie, British Embassy, April 19, 1940, in "Yōsen kankei [Noruwē]," *Gaimushō kiroku* F-1-5-0-18-5, MFA, JACAR B09030197900, 35–41.

[108] Shanghai Branch, East Asia Shipping Company, to Consulate General, Shanghai, April 13, 1940, in "Yōsen kankei [Noruwē]," *Gaimushō kiroku*, 19.

[109] Nakauchi, Consul, Vancouver, to Foreign Minister Arita, April 15, 1940; Nakauchi, Consul, Vancouver, to Foreign Minister Arita, April 16, 1940; Nakauchi, Consul, Vancouver, to Foreign Minister Arita, April 18, 1940, in "Yōsen kankei [Noruwē]," *Gaimushō kiroku*, 20, 22–23, 31.

[110] Toyota, Consul General, Singapore, to Foreign Minister Arita, April 22, 1940, in "Yōsen kankei [Noruwē]," *Gaimushō kiroku*, 48.

April 21, apparently under the control of the British Navy. British authorities similarly diverted the *Throrshovdi*, a tanker under charter to Mitsui, to Hong Kong while it was en route to Japan from Iran.[111]

Though British authorities permitted most of these Norwegian-flagged ships to resume sailing by late April, British shipping requirements began to undercut Japanese access to Norwegian vessels. In June 1940, the Japanese ambassador in London reported that British and American demand for ships had driven up Norwegian charter rates as Yamashita Steamship negotiated a six-month lease of the *Thorhild*.[112] In November, the ambassador further reported that a number of charter agreements nearing their deadline were unlikely to be renewed.[113]

The conclusion of the Tripartite Pact in September 1940,[114] only further disrupted the sailings of foreign-flagged ships under charter to Japanese owners. In September, consular officials in Hong Kong reported that the Allies had issued a prohibition against ships entering French Indochina due to the possibility of "unrest."[115] In November, a Greek ship, the *Laconikos*, en route to Japan from the U.S. with a load of cotton and scrap metal interrupted its voyage and remained in San Francisco to await orders from

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[111] Wakasugi, Consul General, New York, to Foreign Minister Arita, April 23, 1940, in "Yōsen kankei [Noruwē]," *Gaimushō kiroku*, 53.

[112] Ambassador Shigemitsu, London, to Foreign Minister Arita, June 19, 1940, in "Yōsen kankei [Noruwē]," *Gaimushō kiroku*, 64.

[113] Ambassador Shigemitsu, London, to Foreign Minister Matsuoka, November 22, 1940, in "Yōsen kankei [Noruwē]," *Gaimushō kiroku*, 68.

[114] For a recent study of Japanese motivations for signing the Tripartite Pact, see Jeremy A. Yellen, "Into the Tiger's Den: Japan and the Tripartite Pact, 1940," *Journal of Contemporary History* 51, no. 3 (2016): 555–76.

[115] Okazaki, Consul General, Hong Kong, to Foreign Minister Matsuoka, September 1, 1940, "Yōsen kankei [Noruwē]," in *Gaimushō kiroku*, 65.

Greek owners then organizing a shipping committee in London.[116] The following July, the *Star of Cairo*, an Egyptian-flagged ship carrying oil to Japan from the Middle East, was stopped by British authorities. Responding to protests from Japanese diplomats, the British replied that, before concluding the charter, the owner had offered guarantees to remain within the British Empire, and would therefore only sail as far as Singapore or Hong Kong.[117]

Foreign crews also began to impede the use of foreign ships by Japanese operators. Around the time of Germany's invasion of Norway, thirty-two Chinese seamen disembarked from a Norwegian ship under charter to Mitsui while the vessel was moored at Tampico, a Mexican port on the Gulf coast.[118] Mexican replacements, however, demanded that the company provide a security to guarantee return passage to Mexico—a development that Japanese diplomats suspected was the work of British, American, and Chinese consular officials. Rumors swirled that the ship was a blockade-runner chartered by German agents, and the ship departed Tampico only after 26,000 pesos were set aside as a reserve fund.[119] Similarly, in November 1940, Japanese consular officials in New York reported that Greek seamen on the *Moldova*, a Romanian ship en route to Japan

[116] Kawasaki, Consulate General, San Francisco, to Foreign Minister Matsuoka, November 8, 1940, in "Yōsen kankei [Gikoku]," *Gaimushō kiroku*, JACAR B09030198100, 103.

[117] Commercial Counsellor, British Embassy, Tokyo to Itaro Misuno, Director of the Commercal Bureau, The Gaimusho, Tokyo, August 4, 1941, in "Yōsen kankei [*Sutā obu Ejiputo–gō* tumini ni kansuru ken]," *Gaimushō kiroku*, JACAR B09030199600, 138.

[118] Ambassador Koshida, Mexico, to Foreign Minister Arita, April 12, 1940, in "Yōsen kankei [Noruwē]," *Gaimushō kiroku*, 18.

[119] Ambassador Koshida, Mexico, to Foreign Minister Arita, April 18, 1940, in "Yōsen kankei [Noruwē]," *Gaimushō kiroku*, 29.

from New York, had refused to sail from Los Angeles unless they received guarantees that they would not be imprisoned in Japan.[120]

Despite the global reach of Japanese shipping in the late 1930s, by late 1941 most Japanese ships had been withdrawn, or were returning, from transoceanic routes. Due to the war in Europe, in 1940 the N.Y.K. and O.S.K. suspended their European services, though they maintained services to the Americas, Australia, and India. After the Japanese military advanced into southern Indochina in July 1941, however, the U.S., Britain, and the Netherlands East Indies froze Japanese assets, and the liner companies suspended their remaining transoceanic services.[121]

Intra-Asian Connections and the Pacific War

In December, after Japanese leaders launched a war for resources in Southeast Asia, they sought to mobilize ships to support the expulsion of Western colonial regimes and the conquest of a vast empire. The Japanese military quickly overran British, Dutch, and American forces in Southeast Asia, and by mid-1942 claimed territories extending from Burma to the Solomon Islands, and as far north as the southernmost Aleutian Islands.[122] Japanese leaders justified this war in Pan-Asianist terms as the creation of a

[120] Iguchi, Consulate General, New York, to Foreign Minister Matsuoka, November 23, 1940, in "Yōsen kankei [Be-koku Rūmania]," *Gaimushō kiroku*, F-1-5-0-18-5, MFA, JACAR B09030198400, 172.

[121] *NYK 100-nenshi*, 377–81. *OSK-Mitsui 100-nenshi*, 286–97.

[122] Peter Duus, "Japan's Wartime Empire: Problems and Issues," in *The Japanese Wartime Empire, 1931–1945*, ed. Peter Duus, Ramon H. Myers, and Mark R. Peattie, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), xii–xiii.

"Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere" (*Dai Tōa kyōeiken*) founded on cultural and racial affinities, and devoted to economic cooperation.[123]

The occupation of territories across this vast maritime region and their incorporation into an economic bloc rested on an immense transportation system in which ships served as crucial linkages. Ships enabled the circulation of resources within the maritime empire, as well as movements of troops and supplies that sustained military occupations. The major axis of transportation connected Southeast Asia and Japan to carry troops and munitions south and transport resources north. However, the establishment of linkages among Southeast Asian territories also played a significant role in the making of the wartime empire and in the conceptualization of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. Much as the interwar period saw concerted efforts to develop maritime linkages both among imperial territories and between foreign ports, the Pacific War saw attempts to develop lateral linkages between occupied territories to create an integrated Asian economy.[124]

Even before the outbreak of the Pacific War, prominent figures in Japan's shipping world imagined an expanded role for Japanese ships in transport between Asian territories. In 1938, N.Y.K. executive Terai Hisanobu began to propose the expansion of Japanese shipping in routes throughout East and Southeast Asia. An N.Y.K. manager, Terai had served as the executive director of the South Seas Shipping Company from 1935 to 1938. Returning to the N.Y.K. in mid-1938, he was appointed vice-president in

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[123] Duus, "Japan's Wartime Empire," xix–xxvii.

[124] Hara Akira has pointed out that Japan's "import capacity" (*yu'nyūryoku*) was constrained by foreign exchange during the Sino-Japanese War and by transport capacity during the Pacific War. Shipping thus contributed to Japan's import capacity in both cases, as an earner of foreign exchange and as a transport device. Hara Akira, "Nitchū sensōki no kokusai shūshi: Gaika fusoku mondai to keizai tōsei," *Shakai keizai shigaku* 34, no. 6 (1969): 560–93.

November.[125] In the summer of 1938, Terai participated in the Yokohama Trade Association's summer lecture series, presenting on "Current Problems in Shipping" (*Genka no kaiun mondai*). After providing an overview of trends in shipping markets since the outbreak of the war in China, he outlined measures for the industry that, he argued, would contribute to the making of a new China and a new Orient.

Echoing views on shipping similar to those expressed by others in the industry, Terai emphasized the importance of developing shipping routes oriented around third-country trade. Observing that only 22.6 percent of shipping receipts came from the transport of goods between foreign ports, he called for Japanese shipowners to move beyond their reliance on Japanese trade, and develop lines of transportation between foreign countries.[126] Unlike Toda or Okazaki, however, he called for the replacement of "Japan-centered" trade with what he referred to as an "Orient-centered policy" (*Tōyō chūshinshugi seisaku*).

According to Terai, this could be accomplished, in part, through the unification of Japanese shipping operations in China. Japanese ships represented around 17.5 percent of ships active in Chinese water transport in 1936, whereas British and Chinese ships made up 39.5 percent and 30.4 percent, respectively. In order to gain a larger share of traffic in China, Terai advocated for the establishment of a single Japanese company, which, he argued, would make it possible to expel British influence.[127] In this, Terai joined a number of business leaders and officials who began to discuss establishing a China-

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[125] Asahara, *Nihon kaiun hattenshi*, 371–73. Terai Hisanobu denki hensan iinkai, ed., *Terai Hisanobu* (Nippon yūsen kabushiki gaisha shanai Terai Hisanobu denki hensan iinkai, 1965), 129–31, 141–52.

[126] Terai Hisanobu, "Genka no kaiun mondai," in *Bōeki kaki daigaku kōgishū*, ed. Yokohama bōeki kyōkai (Yokohama: Yokohama bōeki kyōkai, 1939), 132–33.

[127] Terai, "Genka no kaiun mondai," 134–35.

centered company in early 1938. These ambitions were realized in late 1939 when the government ordered companies active in near seas, coastal, and inland shipping in China to merge their operations into a national policy company (*kokusaku kaisha*): the East Asia Shipping Company.[128]

Beyond China, however, Terai also urged shipping firms to develop shipping services between foreign ports in Southeast Asia, including the Netherlands East Indies, the Philippines, French Indochina, British Malaya, and Thailand. According to the executive, in 1935 Japanese ships constituted just 7 percent of ships entering ports in those territories, and those vessels were primarily engaged in transport between Southeast Asia and Japan.[129] Terai, however, called for Japanese ships to sail beyond routes directly linked to Japan and begin to carry trade and passengers between foreign ports.

After the outbreak of the Pacific War, Terai reframed these proposals in terms of wartime objectives and the building of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. In February 1942, he spoke on shipping at an event organized by the Japan Chamber of Commerce, the Tokyo Chamber of Commerce, and the South Seas Association. In his lecture, he suggested that the outbreak of war in Asia had created opportunities for new trajectories of shipping, and asserted that "Truly like a signal from heaven, the direction

[128] Tomoda Ken'ichi, "Tōa kaiun kabushiki gaisha: Chūgoku/Tōnan Ajia wo shiya ni shita wagakuni senji kokusaku kaiun kaisha no shiryō kenkyū," *Kaiun keizai kenkyū*, dai-33-gō (1999): 223–241. Idem., "Senji kokusaku kaiun kaisha 'Tōa kaiun kabushiki gaisha' setsuritsu mokuteki no bunseki," *Kaiun keizai kenkyū*, dai-34-gō (2000): 155–71. Hsiao Ming-li, "Ziyuan yunyu yu zhanlingqu hangyun panduan longduan tizhi: Yi Zhong-Ri zhanzheng qianqi Dongya haiyun zhushi huishe de chengli yu jingying zhongxin (1937–1941)," *Zhongyang yanjiuyuan jindaishi yanjiusuo jikan*, no. 82 (December 2013): 93–143.

[129] Terai, "Genka no kaiun mondai," 139.

of a new policy is clear: discard the old Japan-centrism and transition to Greater East Asia–centrism [*Dai Tōa chūshinshugi*]."[130]

Terai's subsequent discussion of the tonnage requirements of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere underscored the scale of the endeavor. Eventually, he argued, the sphere would require 15–20,000,000 tons of shipping.[131] This estimate was based on his evaluation of prewar coastal and international shipping in the territories that made up the sphere, which had relied on 14,000,000 tons of shipping—almost half of which was British—to carry cargoes among Asian territories and from Asia to Europe and the Americas. (Table 5.4) In the short term, Terai suggested that the conquest of territories in the sphere would require around 6,000,000 tons of cargo ships as well as 1,700,000 tons of tankers to carry important resources to Japan from Southeast Asia. The subjugation of the territories and ultimate consolidation of the sphere's economy, however, would eventually require the Japanese fleet to double in size.[132]

Though Terai's depiction of transportation in the Co-Prosperity Sphere appeared as a simple redistribution of tonnage across Asia, the mobilization of shipping during the war was a complex affair that involved a range of companies and government institutions. Following the outbreak of the Pacific War, both the Army and the Navy requisitioned large quantities of vessels. An ordinance issued in March 1942 placed the remainder of the merchant fleet under direct government control, exercised through a new institution, the Shipping Control Association (*Senpaku un'eikai*). The ordinance

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[130] Terai Hisanobu, "Dai Tōa kyōeiken to waga kaiun," in *Nanpō kensestu no kihon mondai*, ed. Nanpō keizai kondankai (Tōkyō: Naigai shobō, 1942), 267.

[131] Terai, "Dai Tōa kyōeiken to waga kaiun," 270.

[132] Terai referred to three stages in building the Co-Prosperity Sphere: the conquest stage (*sakusen-ki*), subjugation stage (*heitei-ki*), and consolidation stage (*keiron-ki*). Terai, "Dai Tōa kyōeiken to waga kaiun," 271–73.

TABLE 5.4. Prewar Shipping in the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere

Region	Tons
Liner Shipping	
1. Coastal Shipping (within the sphere)	2,195,000
2. Intra-Regional Shipping (within the sphere)	1,279,000
3. International Shipping (sphere to world)	6,512,000
Total, Liner	*9,986,000*
Tramp Shipping (within the sphere)	4,000,000
Total, Liner and Tramp	*13,986,000*

Source: Terai, *Dai Tōa kyōeiken to waga kaiun*, 260.

thereby rendered all shipping firms into owners that received charterage. Some companies, however, remained involved in operations. Executives and managers from the largest firms assumed roles in the Shipping Control Association as directors, and companies appointed as "operators" (*unkō jitsumusha*) supplied vessels and handled other routine affairs. Ships requisitioned by the Army were referred to as "A ships," those by the Navy as "B ships," and the Shipping Control Association directed "C ships." Despite frequent pronouncements by officials and business leaders on the necessity of "unified operations" (*ichigenteki unkō*), the fleet remained under this three-way division of management until the last months of the war. Many analysts and scholars have therefore concluded that inefficiencies stemming from divided operations hastened the collapse of the war economy.[133] Only in May 1945 did the government establish an agency, the

[133] For the Shipping Control Association, Army and Navy requisitions, and the consequences of this divided administration, see United States Strategic Bombing Survey, *The War Against Japanese Transportation 1941–1945* (n.p.: Transportation Division, 1947), 31–33. Mark Parillo, *The Japanese Merchant Marine in World War II* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1993), 64, 74–83. Y. Ariyoshi to Ingersoll, 12 November, 1945, *Records of the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey*, Entry 41, *Pacific Survey Reports and Supporting Records 1928–1947*, NDL 02488642, http://dl.ndl.go.jp/info:ndljp/pid/8820309. Cohen, *Japan's Economy in War and Reconstruction*, 104–109. Teratani, *Kaiungyō to kaigun*, 67–89.

Shipping Superintendent-General (*Kaiun sōkanbu*), to manage all shipping operations, both military and civilian.

Both the military and the Shipping Control Association handled the transportation of resources from Southeast Asia to Japan. In late December 1941, the government issued economic plans that included the allotment of tonnage to the Army and Navy for the transport of essential resources, such as oil, nickel, bauxite, manganese, chromium, and copper ore.[134] C ships, though primarily active in the inner territories of "Japan-Manchukuo-China" (*Nichi-Man-Shi*), also carried resources from Southeast Asia to Japan.[135] The military and civilian transportation systems were coordinated separately. A postwar analysis by the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey observed that while C ships often sailed south in ballast, A and B ships often returned empty to Japan to collect troops and supplies. The result was "the paradox of a maritime nation, desperately short of ships, waging a far-flung war across the seas, but still permitting a condition to exist where empty ships might frequently pass each other going in opposite directions."[136]

In addition to circulation between Japan and Southeast Asia, the wartime empire also rested on movements of goods and people within Southeast Asia to sustain the occupation and local populations. Rice, for example, circulated throughout the empire. Though Burma, Thailand, and French Indochina produced surpluses of 5,400,000 tons of rice in 1941, other territories in the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere relied on imported rice of some 2,000,000 tons. These included British Malaya, the Netherlands

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[134] Kurasawa Aiko, *Shigen no sensō: "Dai Tōa kyōeiken no jinryū / butsuryū* (Tōkyō: Iwanami shoten, 2012), 311–12.

[135] Senpaku un'eikai, *Senpaku un'eikai kaishi*, vol. 1 (Senpaku un'eikai, 1947), 261–310.

[136] United States Strategic Bombing Survey, *The War Against Japanese Transportation*, 33.

East Indies, British Borneo, the Philippines, and New Guinea as well as Japan, Manchukuo, and China.[137] In mid-1942, the military produced plans regarding the exchange of goods among Southeast Asian territories.[138] From 1942 to 1945, for example, Japanese-occupied Malaya imported 700,000 tons of rice from Burma, Thailand, Indochina, and Java.[139] Though Japan's military planners may have formulated the occupation of Southeast Asia primarily in terms of the extraction of oil and other resources, the vast region was a space of multidirectional flows of goods and people beyond the commodity flows directed to Japan's home islands.

Much as Terai had urged the development of shipping lines among Southeast Asian territories before the Pacific War, the occupation of Southeast Asia saw efforts to develop linkages among territories. The Army and Navy, which maintained military governments in occupied territories in the "Southern Regions" (*Nanpō*),[140] oversaw the establishment and operation of intra-regional transportation, which included shipping between territories, inland and coastal shipping within territories, as well as railways and other land-based transportation.[141]

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[137] Kurasawa, *Shigen no sensō*, 90. For rice policies in Southeast Asia, see ibid., 90–225.

[138] Shibata Yoshimasa, "'Nanpō kyōeiken' no bōeki seisaku," in *"Nanpō kyōeiken": Senji Nihon no Tōnan Ajia keizai shihai*, ed. Hikita Yasuyuki (Tōkyō: Taga shuppan, 1995), 194–95.

[139] Kurasawa, *Shigen no sensō*, 302.

[140] The Army was responsible for the administration of Hong Kong, the Philippines, British Malaya, Sumatra, Java, British Borneo, and Burma, while the Navy administered Dutch Borneo, Celebes, the Molucca (Maluku) Islands, the Lesser Sunda Islands, New Guinea, the Bismarck Islands, and Guam. Thailand and French Indochina remained nominally independent. "Kaisetsu," in *Nanpō no gunsei: Shiryōshū*, ed. Bōeichō bōei kenkyūjo senshibu (Tōkyō: Asagumo shinbunsha, 1985), 13–34.

[141] Details on shipping and land transport in each region can be found in Shibata Yoshimasa, "'Nanpō kyōeiken' ni okeru un'yu seisaku," in *"Nanpō kyōeiken": Senji Nihon no Tōnan Ajia keizai shihai*, ed. Hikita Yasuyuki (Tōkyō: Taga shuppan, 1995), 553–613.

TABLE 5.5 Wartime Shipping Companies in Southeast Asia

Region	Company
Hong Kong - Guangdong - Foshan Hainan Island - Saigon	Hong Kong Motorized Sailing Ship Operating Corporation (*Hon Kon kihansen unkō eidan*)
Philippines, Coast Philippines - North Borneo	O.S.K. Philippines Operations Division
Burma, Coast	N.Y.K. Burma Operations Division (*Buruma unkōbu*)
Burma, Irawaddy River	Yamashita Steamship Co. Irawaddy Water Transport Division (*Irawaji suiunbu*)
Malaya - Java - North Borneo - Burma Malaya - Sumatra Malaya, Coast Sumatra, Coast	Southern Regions Operations Company
Java, Coast	South Seas Shipping Co. Java Operations Division (*Jawa unkōbu*)
North Borneo, Coast	South Japan Steamship Co. (*Minami Nihon kisen kabushiki gaisha*) North Borneo Operations Division (*Kita Boruneo unkōbu*)
French Indochina, Mekong River French Indochina, Coast - Army	O.S.K.
French Indochina, Coast - Navy	Saigon Motorized Sailing Ship Operations Corporation (*Saigon kihansen unkō kumiai*)
Celebes, Coast South Borneo, Coast Lesser Sunda Islands, Coast Pulau Halmahera Palau Islands	South Seas Shipping Co., Hinomaru Navigation Co. (*Hinomaru kōun*), Kōnan Transport Co. (*Kōnan un'yu*), Yamato Navigation Co. (*Yamato kōun*), Nittō Shipping Co. (*Nittō kaiun*), N.Y.K.

Source: *OSK 80-nenshi*, 104.

To set up shipping operations, the two military branches assigned responsibility for particular rivers, coasts, and sea-lanes to different companies. (Table 5.5) The O.S.K.'s Philippines Operations Division (*Firipin unkōbu*), for example, handled coastal

shipping in the Philippines, as well as transport between the Philippines and North Borneo. Organizations to manage motorized sailing ships (*kihansen*) were established in Hong Kong and Saigon. Yamashita Steamship and the O.S.K. managed river transport on, respectively, the Irrawaddy River in Burma and the Mekong River in Indochina. Several companies formed a new firm, the Southern Regions Operations Company (*Nanpō unkō kaisha*), which managed coastal shipping in Malaya and Sumatra, as well as intra-regional transport between Malaya, Sumatra, Java, North Borneo, Burma, and the Philippines.[142]

Though the requisition of Japanese ships by the military and the Shipping Control Association appeared to remove private companies from maritime affairs, the war thus saw several companies expand their activities in Southeast Asia. Such was evident, for example, in the spread of N.Y.K. and O.S.K. branch offices across Southeast Asia. (Table 5.6) Managers, seamen, and ships also travelled from Japan and Korea to Southeast Asia. The Southern Regions Operations Company was staffed by 150 land-based employees and 1,100 seamen from Japan, while another 350 land-based employees and 1,9000 seamen were recruited from occupied territories. Its fleet of ships included large vessels, such as the *Sumire Maru*, a 1,729-ton passenger ship sent from Japan and assigned to regular services between Jakarta and Singapore. The company's fleet also included motorized sailing ships sent from Japan and Korea.[143]

[142] *OSK 80-nenshi*, 104.

[143] *OSK 80-nenshi*, 131–132. *NYK 100-nenshi*, 389–390.

TABLE 5.6 N.Y.K. and O.S.K. Branch Offices in South China and Southeast Asia

	N.Y.K.		O.S.K.	
	Pre-1941	Wartime	Pre-1941	Wartime
Jilong	O	(SS)		
Taibei		O		
Gaoxiong		O		
Hainan Island			O	
Hong Kong	O	O	O	O
Hanoi				O
Haiphong				(SS)
Saigon		O	(SS)	O
Manila		O		O
Bangkok				O
Singapore	O	O	O	
Rangoon		O		(SS)
Palau		O		

Note: O = branch (*shiten*); (SS) = branch office (*shucchōsho*)
Sources: *NYK 100-nenshi*, 393. *OSK 80-nenshi*, 613–23.

Connections Severed

Visions of an interconnected Asian empire and efforts to create intra-regional linkages, however, collided with the realities of occupying and defending territories scattered across the ocean. Forecasts that the nation would be able to maintain the shipping capacity required to hold the empire together proved overly optimistic, and shipping became the bottleneck of the wartime economy.

Multiple challenges plagued the imperial economy's transportation system. What were supposed to be temporary military requisitions dragged on, and the Army and Navy were slow to release ships to the civilian sector. The Army, moreover, placed additional demands on civilian tonnage by assuming control over C ships that it used to transport

people and resources in Southeast Asia.[144] Losses of ships to the Allied submarine and air campaigns also far exceeded prewar predictions. Underestimating the American capacity to project submarine power into Asia, the Navy did not enter the war with plans to defend merchant shipping, and only gradually began to arm merchant ships and organize convoys in vulnerable shipping routes.[145] At the end of the war, a member of the Shipping Control Association told American officials that equipment shortages had led the Army to arm transports with field guns, while C ships used fake, wooden guns to give an appearance of defense.[146]

Facing severe shortages, officials and maritime leaders developed multiple strategies to maintain and expand the empire's transportation capacity. Efforts were made to streamline the loading and unloading of cargoes in harbors. Where possible, officials diverted freight traffic to railways, such as in Northeast Asia, where cargoes were conveyed to Japan through Korea. Officials implemented programs to construct standardized ships, but the vessels were often of poor quality.[147] One crewmember of a wartime-standard tanker later recalled that the vessel "shook like a malaria patient" when sailing at full speed.[148]

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[144] For these "allotted ships" (*haitōsen*), see Senpaku un'eikai, *Senpaku un'eikai kaishi*, 1:311–390. For a summary, see Teratani, *Kaiungyō to kaigun*, 87–89.

[145] Sakaguchi Taisuke, *Taiheiyō sensōki no kaijō kōtsū hogo mondai no kenkyū: Nihon kaigun no taiō wo chūshin ni* (Tōkyō: Fuyō shobō shuppan, 2011).

[146] Y. Ariyoshi, "Brief Survey of Japanese Shipping During the Pacific, 1941–1945," Tokyo, 1945, *Records of the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey*, Entry 41, *Pacific Survey Reports and Supporting Records 1928–1947*, NDL 024886422, http://dl.ndl.go.jp/info:ndljp/pid/8820309, 2.

[147] Furukawa Yumiko, "Ajia/Taiheiyō sensōchū no Nihon no kaijō yusōryoku zōkyōsaku," (Ph.D. diss., Hitotsubashi University, 2004). Teratani, *Kaiungyō to kaigun*, 89–104.

[148] The 2,800-ton *Eishō Maru*. Kaijō no tomo, ed., *Buki naki umi: Nihon shōsen no senji kiroku* (Tōkyō: Kaijō rōdō kyōkai, 1961), 209–10.

None of these programs, however, kept pace with the fleet's destruction. In late 1943, Allied forces began to sever the empire's sea-lanes. (Table 5.7) From September 1943 to the end of 1944, the American military destroyed more than 3,000,000 tons of Japanese shipping. Within Southeast Asia, the military sought to drive each region to self-sufficiency; meanwhile, the destruction of shipping disrupted the circulation of goods among occupied territories.[149] In March 1945, convoys ceased sailing between Japan and Singapore, and Japanese shipping became confined to a region from Shanghai to the Sea of Japan. Aerial mining of Japanese harbors and the Straits of Shimonoseki impeded transport from China and Korea to Japan.[150]

TABLE 5.7. Abandoned Shipping Routes, 1943–1944

Abandoned	Route
Dec-1943	Truk - Kwajalein
Dec-1943	Truk - Rabaul
Jan-1944	Palau - Truk
Mar-1944	Japan - Palau
May-1944	Kao (Halmahera) - Manokwari (New Guinea)
Jun-1944	Saipan - Japan, Truk, Palau
Jul-1944	Palau - Taiwan
Aug-1944	Palau - Philippines, Balikpapan (S. Borneo)
Sep-1944	Yulin (Hainan Island) - Gaoxiong, Manila
Sep-1944	Philippines - Kao (Halmahera)
Oct-1944	Singapore - Medan (Sumatra)

Source: Bōeichō bōei kenkyūjo, *Shiryōshū Nanpō no gunsei*, 268.

In total, Japan lost 8,300,000 tons of shipping, and ended the war with a merchant fleet of 1,200,000 tons.[151] (Figure 5.1) In the final months of the war, tonnage shortages


[149] Kurasawa, *Shigen no sensō*, 280–311. Shibata, "'Nanpō kyōeiken' no bōeki seisaku," 195.

[150] United States Strategic Bombing Survey, *The War Against Japanese Transportation*, 1–6.

[151] Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers, *Water Transportation*, vol. 52 of *History of the Nonmilitary Activities of the Occupation of Japan* (n.p.: 1945–1951), 1.

brought Japan's economy near to a standstill. After the war, many analysts drew conclusions similar to the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey: "The war against shipping was perhaps the most decisive single factor in the collapse of the Japanese economy and the logistic support of Japanese military and naval power."[152]

FIGURE 5.1 Japanese Tonnage, 1941–1945



Note: "A Ships" were under Army control, "B Ships" were under Navy control, and "C Ships" were controlled by the Shipping Control Association.

Source: Senpaku un'eikai, *Senpaku un'eikai kaishi*, 191–92.

Conclusion

For much of the interwar period, and into the Pacific War, business leaders and officials sought to harness Japanese ships to movements of people and good beyond

[152] United States Strategic Bombing Survey, *The War Against Japanese Transportation*, 6. See also Cohen, *Japan's Economy in War and Reconstruction*, 196.

Japan's shores. Throughout the 1920s and 1930s, maritime leaders endeavored to project ships beyond Japan's foreign trade, to claim a place in lines of transportation that were not anchored to Japanese territories. These ambitions for a role in global connectedness persisted into the late 1930s and early 1940s. As the nation's leaders devoted resources to an undeclared war in China, members of Japan's shipping circles continued to entertain aspirations for oceanic expansion, which they posed as a project complementary to territorial expansion on the continent.

Visions of Japanese ships contributing to circulation beyond Japan's shores lasted even after the breakdown of Japanese relations with the U.S. and Britain in 1941. Though the Pacific War foreclosed on aspirations for a global reach, executives such as Terai reframed shipping between foreign ports in terms of the making of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. Though the war ultimately had disastrous consequences for the fleet, the effort to build a sphere of multidirectional circulation evidenced a consistent effort to expand Japan's place in the world through the creation of new transportation linkages.

CONCLUSION

When, on August 15, 1945, Emperor Hirohito announced the end of World War II by radio, the Japanese fleet stood at 1,340,000 gross tons—a fifth the size of the prewar fleet.[1] Over 30,500 Japanese seamen had perished, along with untold numbers of human cargoes—laborers, POWs, and other passengers.[2] By value, 80 percent of Japan's shipping assets had been destroyed.[3] Partially sunken hulks dotted the harbors and rivers of the collapsed empire, their location later noted by members of the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey:

> Manila Bay is strewn with sunken ships from a cruiser to cargo ships and tankers.[4]
>
> Numerous wrecks are in the river [at Saigon] and I was informed they were all sunk by our airplanes.[5]
>
> There are 38 wrecks in the harbor and its approaches [at Hong Kong] sunk and damaged by our air forces.[6]

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[1] Tomohei Chida, "The development of Japan's post-war shipping industry," *The Journal of Transport History* 5, no. 1 (March 1, 1984): 82.

[2] These losses represented around 43 percent of all Japanese seamen. Kaijō no tomo, *Buki naki umi: Nihon shōsentai no senji kiroku* (Tōkyō: Kaijō rōdō kyōkai, 1961), 313.

[3] Kaji Teruyoshi, Okaniwa Hiroshi, and Furukawa Tetsujirō eds., *Gendai Nihon kaiunshi: Sengo jūgo-nen no ayumi* (Tōkyō: Nikkan kaiji tsūshinsha, 1961), 31.

[4] "Manila. Report No. 54cc(1)," *Records of the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey*, Entry 41, *Pacific Survey Reports and Supporting Records 1928–1947*, NDL 02488653, http://dl.ndl.go.jp/info:ndljp/pid/8820240.

[5] "Saigon. Report No. 54cc(2)," *Records of the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey*, Entry 41, *Pacific Survey Reports and Supporting Records 1928–1947*, NDL 02488654, http://dl.ndl.go.jp/info:ndljp/pid/8820241.

[6] "Hong Kong. Report No. 54cc(2)," *Records of the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey*, Entry 41, *Pacific Survey Reports and Supporting Records 1928–1947*, NDL 02488655, http://dl.ndl.go.jp/info:ndljp/pid/8820242.

Most vessels, however, had disappeared into the depths of the ocean, their last known location rendered visible only as marks on maps.[7]

On September 2, in advance of the Allied occupation of Japan, the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers (SCAP) ordered a halt to the movement of the Japanese vessels that remained afloat.[8] The machinery that had conveyed goods and people throughout Japan's empire ground to a stop, awaiting Allied orders. In October, SCAP placed the operation of Japanese merchant ships under a new agency, the Shipping Control Authority for Japanese Merchant Shipping (SCAJAP); in November, SCAJAP began to manage operations through the Shipping Control Association, the institution that had managed Japan's wartime operations.[9] Over the course of the Occupation (1945–1952), authorities repurposed Japanese ships to new ends, and renegotiated their place in the world. By way of a conclusion, this chapter will reflect on the dimensions of shipping discussed in this dissertation in terms of developments during the Occupation.

From the late nineteenth century until the end of the Pacific War, Japanese ships linked Japan's empire together and facilitated the circulation of people and goods throughout its territories. Within weeks of the war's end, however, Japanese ships were engaged in the dismantling of that empire, and the projection of U.S. military power into Asia. More than 6,900,000 Japanese soldiers and civilians were stationed or residing outside of the Japanese archipelago at the end of the war, while over 2,000,000 Korean, 56,000 Chinese, and 34,000 Taiwanese subjects could be found in Japan. Though their

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[7] For example, figures 28 to 43 in United States Strategic Bombing Survey, *The War Against Japanese Transportation, 1941–1945* (n.p.: Transportation Division, 1947).

[8] Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers, *Water Transportation* (n.p.: 1945–1951), 26, Appendix 30–31.

[9] Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers, *Water Transportation*, 10–15.

postwar residency was at first up in the air, Allied and Japanese authorities decided to disentangle the populations, and rapidly organized a mass migration to place these subjects in their "home territories."[10] When SCAP issued its first sailing authorization on August 27, 1945, it ordered the resumption of the Hakata-Busan ferry to facilitate repatriation from Korea. Occupation authorities also ordered naval and cargo vessels to carry food and medical supplies to overseas territories—where Japanese garrisons faced severe food shortages—and to return with repatriates. Due to tonnage shortages, American Liberty-class ships manned by Japanese crews were also used in repatriation efforts.[11] At the same time, SCAP utilized Japanese ships to support the occupation of Japan's former empire; in late September, it issued orders for Japanese ships to carry the first cargoes for Occupation forces: monthly deliveries of coal to Busan for use by Korean railways.[12] Japanese ships continued to carry goods and people in shipping routes throughout East and Southeast Asia, but they did so in service of a new imperial project.

Though the Pacific War saw Japanese ships confined to this region of Asia, prior to the war the global trajectories of Japanese ships had been a potent symbol of Japan's status as a modern nation. Carrying the national flag in the major trade routes and hubs of global commerce, the vessels seemed to cement the nation's position in world affairs as a Great Power. During the occupation, however, SCAP stripped Japan's merchant ships of that flag, and ordered crews to instead fly the international signal flag "Easy" (a blue horizontal band above a red band) modified with a triangle cut from the end. The Rising

[10] For recent studies of Japanese repatriation, see Lori Watt, *When Empire Comes Home: Repatriation and Reintegration in Postwar Japan* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009). Sumiyo Nishizaki, "After empire comes home: Economic experiences of Japanese civilian repatriates, 1945–1956" (Ph.D. diss., London School of Economics, 2016).

[11] Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers, *Water Transportation*, 85–88.

[12] Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers, *Water Transportation*, 26.

Sun only gradually returned to the sea. In January 1949, SCAP permitted Japanese-owned ships to fly the national flag in port, but continued to require the modified "Easy" at sea.[13] When, in early April 1952, SCAP lifted the prohibition on the national flag a few weeks before the San Francisco Peace Treaty came into effect, the *Yomiuri Shinbun* celebrated that Japanese ships could once again openly navigate the "seven seas."[14]

For much of the Occupation, however, it remained uncertain whether Japanese ships would return to the world's oceans. American officials arrived in Japan intent on eliminating the nation's capacity to wage war, and began to implement far-reaching economic, political, and social reforms. In April 1946, after a five-month mission in Japan, Edwin Pauley submitted a report to President Truman in which he advocated for considerable restrictions on Japan's industrial capacity. Among those measures, he proposed that Japan be prohibited from owning more than 1,500,000 tons of shipping, and only be permitted to engage in "service within the home islands and between Japan and Korea and Japan and the coast of China."[15] In 1947, however, as tensions, rather than cooperation, with the Soviet Union deepened, American policy toward Japan underwent a shift, and, in what became known as the "reverse course," American officials began to pursue the recovery of Japanese industry.[16] Subsequent reports on Japan's economy by Army officers and consultants revised their targets for Japanese shipping capacity up—to

[13] Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers, *Water Transportation*, 30.

[14] "7-nen buri masuto ni Hi-no-maru: Nihon shōsen harete nanatsu no umi he," *Yomiuri shinbun*, April 4, 1952, 3.

[15] Edwin W. Pauley, "Report on Japanese reparations to the President of the United States, November 1945 to April 1946," April 1, 1946, Department of State, Publication 3174, Far Eastern Series 25, at 38, PQ-C S1.38:25.

[16] Bruce Cumings, "Japan's Position in the World System," in *Postwar Japan as History*, ed. Andrew Gordon (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), 35–45. Kenneth Pyle, *Japan in the American Century* (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2018), 150–158.

2,000,000 tons, and then 4,000,000 tons, until the Johnston report of 1948 proposed the elimination of any limits on fleet size.[17]

Even then, the ultimate place of those ships in the world remained contested. In 1948, American shipowners argued that any peace treaty with Japan ought to include limitations on shipping—not only on the size of the fleet, which they contended should be held to 1936 levels, but also restrictions that would prohibit Japanese ships from carrying more than 50 percent of Japan's foreign trade, and bar them from third-country trade.[18] American officials, however, increasingly viewed Japan as an essential component of U.S. power in the region.[19] Far from containing Japanese shipping, they instead began to facilitate the return of Japanese vessels to world trade routes. Though Japanese vessels required clearance from foreign governments to enter foreign ports, in 1948 and 1949, they received blanket clearances to enter ports in the Philippines, Taiwan, India, and Argentina. In 1950, SCAP and the U.S. State Department also began to pressure foreign governments to authorize the entry of Japanese ships, and by 1951, Japanese vessels had received clearance to enter ports in some thirty-five countries.[20]

The last years of the occupation saw Japanese ships begin to return to world shipping. In 1950, SCAP turned over management of shipping to private companies, and by the end of the year forty-three had applied for permission to establish liner services in thirteen routes ranging from Bangkok to North America, Argentina, India-Pakistan,

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[17] Kaji, Okaniwa, and Furukawa, eds., *Gendai Nihon kaiunshi*, 102–104, 115–19.

[18] Kaji, Okaniwa, and Furukawa, eds., *Gendai Nihon kaiunshi*, 338–39.

[19] Cumings, "Japan's Position in the World System," 34–63. Pyle, *Japan in the American Century*, 155–78.

[20] Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers, *Water Transportation*, 112.

Australia, and beyond.[21] In August 1950, the O.S.K. and four other companies received authorization from SCAP to open the first overseas service under civilian management. In an indication of the reconfiguration of boundaries underway in Japan's former empire, it was a service to Okinawa, governed by the U.S. from 1945 until 1972. In November, the O.S.K. further received permission to open a service to South America via South Africa, and in December, the *Kobe Maru* set sail, marking the resumption of Japan's transoceanic services.[22] In the months and years that followed, Japanese companies established additional overseas lines.

The end of the Pacific War saw a dramatic reconfiguration of Japan's place in the world. During the war, Japanese leaders sought to extend control over a vast swath of territories and people in East and Southeast Asia. In defeat, they were compelled to relinquish their hold on those spaces and bodies—including some held prior to the war, such as Okinawa, Taiwan, and Korea. As Japanese and American authorities remade the nation, however, they fostered renewed trajectories of oceanic expansion. Less than a decade after near destruction, the Japanese fleet again flew the nation's flag in world trade routes. No longer symbols of imperial Japan, these ships renewed the nation's position as an integral component of global transportation.

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[21] Kaji, Okaniwa, and Furukawa, eds., *Gendai Nihon kaiunshi*, 343. For the "return to civilian management" (*min'ei kangen*), see ibid., 120–27.

[22] Kaji, Okaniwa, and Furukawa, eds., *Gendai Nihon kaiunshi*, 344–52. For O.S.K. services, see *OSK 80-nenshi*, 173, 179–80.

APPENDIX I. SHIPPING COMPANIES

Companies are listed in alphabetical order, based on the Japanese name. The emboldened name is used throughout this dissertation. Entries present the following information:

1. Romanized company name
2. Japanese characters
3. English translation (author's translation)
4. Company name as it appeared in contemporary Western-language materials
5. Abbreviation (if commonly used)

Awanokuni kyōdō kisen kabushiki gaisha
阿波国共同汽船株式会社
Awanokuni Union Steamship Company

Azuma kisen kabushiki gaisha
吾妻汽船株式会社
Azuma Steamship Company

Chōsen yūsen kabushiki gaisha
朝鮮郵船株式会社
Korea Mail Steamship Company
Chosen Yusen Kaisha
C.Y.K.

Daidō kaiun kabushiki gaisha
大同海運株式会社
Daidō Shipping Company
United Ocean Transport Company

Dairen kisen kabushiki gaisha
大連汽船株式会社
Dalian Steamship Company
Dairen Kisen Kaisha
D.K.K.

Hokuriku kisen kabushiki gaisha
北陸汽船株式会社
Hokuriku Steamship Company

Ishihara sangyō kabushiki gaisha
石原産業株式会社
Ishihara Industries

Katsuta kisen kabushiki gaisha
勝田汽船株式会社
Katsuta Steamship Company

Kawasaki kisen kabushiki gaisha
川崎汽船株式会社
Kawasaki Steamship Company
Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha

Kinkai yūsen kabushiki gaisha
近海郵船株式会社
Near Seas Mail Steamship Company

Kishimoto kisen kabushiki gaisha
岸本汽船株式会社
Kishimoto Steamship Company

Kita Nihon kisen kabushiki gaisha
北日本汽船株式会社
North Japan Steamship Company
Kitanihon Line

Kokusai kisen kabushiki gaisha
国際汽船株式会社
International Steamship Company
Kokusai Kisen Kaisha

Mitsui senpakubu
三井船舶部
Mitsui Shipping Department
Mitsui Lines

Mitsui senpaku kabushiki gaisha
三井船舶株式会社
Mitsui Shipping Company
Mitsui Lines

Nan'yō kaiun kabushiki gaisha
南洋海運株式会社
South Seas Mail Steamship Company

Nan'yō kisen kabushiki gaisha
南洋汽船株式会社
South Seas Mail Steamship Company

Nihonkai kisen kabushiki gaisha
日本海汽船株式会社
Japan Sea Steamship Company

Nippon yūsen kabushiki gaisha
日本郵船株式会社
Japan Mail Steamship Company
Nippon Yusen Kaisha
N.Y.K.

Nisshin kisen kabushiki gaisha
日清汽船株式会社
Japan-China Steamship Company
Nisshin Kisen Kaisha

Ōsaka shōsen kabushiki gaisha
大阪商船株式会社
Ōsaka Mercantile Shipping Company
Osaka Shosen Kaisha
O.S.K.

Shimatani kisen kabushiki gaisha
島谷汽船株式会社
Shimatani Steamship Company

Taiyō kaiun kabushiki gaisha
太洋海運株式会社
Taiyō Shipping Company

Tatsuuma kisen kabushiki gaisha
辰馬汽船株式会社
Tatsuuma Steamship Company

Teikoku senpaku kabushiki gaisha
帝国船舶株式会社
Empire Ship Company

Tōa kaiun kabushiki gaisha
東亜海運株式会社
East Asia Shipping Company
Toa Kaiun Kaisha

Tōyō kisen kabushiki gaisha
東洋汽船株式会社
Oriental Steamship Company
Toyo Kisen Kaisha / Oriental S.S. Co. T.K.K.

Uchida kisen kabushiki gaisha
内田汽船株式会社
Uchida Steamship Company

Yamashita kisen kabushiki gaisha
山下汽船株式会社
Yamashita Steamship Company
Yamashita Kisen Kaisha

Appendix II. Ship Names

This Study	Japanese	Japanese Romanized	Chinese	Korean
America Maru	亜米利加丸	Amerika		
Anping Maru	安平丸	Anpei	Anping	
Asama Maru	浅間丸	Asama		
Atago Maru	愛宕丸	Atago		
Baikal Maru	ばいかる丸	Baikaru		
Baling Maru	巴陵	Haryō	Baling	
Busan Maru	釜山丸	Pusan		Busan
Daihoku Maru	大北丸	Daihoku		
Delhi Maru	でりい丸	Derī		
Eijun Maru	英順丸	Eijun		
Eishō Maru	永昭丸	Eishō		
Fukusei Maru	福星丸	Fukusei		
Fusō Maru	扶桑丸	Fusō		
Hakushin Maru	博進丸	Hakushin		
Harbin Maru	ハルピン丸	Harupin	Haerbin	
Hebei Maru	河北丸	Kahoku	Hebei	
Heilong Maru	黒龍丸	Kokuryū	Heilong	
Henan Maru	河南丸	Kanan	Henan	
Hong Kong Maru	香港丸	Hon Kon		
Huashan Maru	華山丸	Kazan	Huashan	
Hubei Maru	湖北丸	Kohoku	Hubei	
Isshin Maru	一進丸	Isshin		
Izumi Maru	和泉丸	Izumi		
Jilin Maru	吉林丸	Kichirin	Jilin	
Jilong Maru	基隆	Kīrun	Jilong	
Jinryū Maru	神隆丸	Jinryū		
Jinzhou Maru	金州丸	Kinshū	Jinzhou	
Kasuga Maru	春日丸	Kasuga		
No. 12 Kenkon Maru	大十二乾坤丸	Dai-jūni kenkon		
Kinai Maru	畿内丸	Kinai		
Kobe Maru	神戸丸	Kōbe		
Korea Maru	これあまる	Korea		
Lüshun Maru	旅順丸	Ryojun	Lüshun	
Maiko Maru	舞子丸	Maiko		

Maizuru Maru	舞鶴丸	Maizuru	
Nagara Maru	長良丸	Nagara	
Nako Maru	那古丸	Nako	
Naruto Maru	鳴門丸	Naruto	
Nippon Maru	日本丸	Nippon	
Nittō Maru	日東丸	Nittō	
Nojima Maru	野島丸	Nojima	
Noshiro Maru	能代丸	Noshiro	
Noto Maru	能登丸	Noto	
Rehe Maru	熱河丸	Nekka	Rehe
Ryūhei Maru	龍平丸	Ryūhei	
Sakaki Maru	榊丸	Sakaki	
Saikyō Maru	西京丸	Saikyō	
Saitsū Maru	済通丸	Saitsū	
Sendai Maru	仙台丸	Sendai	
Seattle Maru	しあとる丸	Shiatoru	
Shandong Maru	山東丸	Santō	Shandong
Shanxi Maru	山西丸	Sansei	Shanxi
Shinshū Maru	神州丸	Shinshū	
Shōka Maru	彰化丸	Shōka	
Siberia Maru	さいべりや丸	Saiberia	
Sumire Maru	すみれ丸	Sumire	
Tacoma Maru	たこま丸	Takoma	
Taishan Maru	泰山丸	Taisan	Taishan
Taiyō Maru	泰陽丸	Taiyō	
No. 8 Tamon Maru	第八多聞丸	Daihachi tamon	
Tangshan Maru	唐山丸	Tōzan	Tangshan
Tenchō Maru	天潮丸	Tenchō	
Tianjin Maru	天津丸	Tenshin	Tianjin
Ten'yō Maru	天洋丸	Ten'yō	
Tosa Maru	土佐丸	Tosa	
No. 6 Union Maru	第六共同丸	Dai-roku kyōdō	
No. 10 Union Maru	第十共同丸	Dai-jū kyōdō	
No. 22 Union Maru	第二十二共同丸	Dai-nijūni kyōdō	
Ural Maru	うらる丸	Uraru	
Ussuri Maru	うすりい丸	Usurī	
Wakaura Maru	和歌浦丸	Wakaura	
Weihai Maru	威海丸	Ikai	Weihai
Yalu Maru	鴨緑丸	Ōryoku	Yalu
Yasaka Maru	八坂丸	Yasaka	

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